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CATHOLICISM AND CHRISTIANITY

A Vindication of Progressive Protestantism

By

CECIL JOHN CADOUX

M.A., D.D. (LOND.), M.A. (OXON.),

Professor of New Testament Criticism, Exegesis and Theology, and of Christian Sociology, in the Yorkshire United Independent College, Bradford.

With a Foreword by

J. VERNON BARTLET, M.A., D.D.,

Professor-Emeritus of Church History, Mansfield College, Oxford.

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TO

MY FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES

IN THE SERVICE OF CHRISTIAN TRUTH,

THE GOVERNORS, STAFF, AND STUDENTS OF

THE YORKSHIRE UNITED INDEPENDENT

COLLEGE, BRADFORD

57438

"But whenever the heart turns towards the Lord, the veil (of 'the letter') is taken away. Now the Lord is 'the Spirit.' But where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."

(Paul in 2 *Cor.* iii. 16–17.)

"Nihil itaque indignandum vel dolendum, si quicumque de Divinis quærat, sentiat, proferat, cum non disputantis auctoritas, sed disputationis ipsius VERITAS requiratur." ("There is therefore no need to get angry or feel grieved, when anyone makes investigations and forms and expresses opinions concerning the things of God; since it is not a question of the arguer's authority, but of the TRUTH of his argument.")

(Minucius Felix, *Octavius*, xvi. 6.)

"The time is ripe for a discriminating consideration of the meaning and conditions of religious truth."

(*Times Literary Supplement*, 29 April 1926, p. 319.)

FOREWORD

THE function of this Foreword or Introduction is literally to introduce: to put the reader more easily and surely into positive relations with the book's thought and aim, so as to see it in true perspective. I count it a privilege to be thus associated with it: for it is in my judgment a really important as well as a timely contribution to the true understanding of Christianity to-day, an epoch of much perplexity and many cross-currents in religious thought. That it is a work of wide learning, even a superficial inspection will reveal: that it is marked by rare candour and the will to be just to all facts and views, will soon be felt, especially if its notes be studied: that it shows a fine sanity and balance of mind, will probably be a growing impression the further one accompanies the writer through his full pages. But there is just a danger lest some readers should fail "to see the wood for the trees"; while others might think it a work of mere erudition and so not even begin to read it. Yet in fact it is full of living and urgent issues for educated men and women, whether Catholic or Protestant, treated in a spirit of great actuality and relevance to the everyday thought amid which we all live and have our mental being.

Of recent books in English it most resembles Dr. W. P. Paterson's *The Rule of Faith* (1912), originally delivered as lectures under the title of "The Substance and Standard of Christian Doctrine," one of the most powerful pieces of critical and constructive religious thinking of this century, though strangely little heeded south of the Tweed. But Dr. Cadoux's treatment of the common ground is far fuller of concrete historical evidence; so that, for a complete parallel, one has to go back to Karl von Hase's similarly massive work entitled *Handbook to the Controversy with Rome*, published originally in 1862 (partly elicited by Möhler's *Symbolik, or Exposition of the Dogmatic Differences of Catholics and Protestants*, 1832 and later), and brought up to date in 1878. This is a book which has never been seriously answered; yet the general mental perspective has so changed and enlarged since its day, owing to progress in historical, scientific, and philosophic thought, that a work like Dr. Cadoux's was long overdue, and especially one adjusted to English-speaking conditions.

The issue on which it centres attention and discussion is the claim of Roman or Papal Catholicism, as the most powerful and distinctive form of its type, to be the one and only authentic Christianity. But implicitly it examines Catholicism generally and in principle, as that

kind of religion which makes Christianity dependent on a hierarchic and sacerdotal Church rather than on a purely witnessing one. In both senses it tests the challenge of Catholicism by the standard of original historic Christianity and the principles of religious authority, alike generally and in their specifically Christian form. Thus it is no mere book of polemics as between Catholicism and Protestantism, but contains implicitly a positive philosophy of Christianity—particularly as embodied in the personality and message of Christ Himself—as intrinsically self-authenticating to the human soul. Into the argument there further enters a survey of the evidence of history, set forth in what I believe competent readers will recognize to be a truly objective spirit. Inasmuch, however, as the history appears under a variety of heads or topics, the exposition of the nature and significance of the historical development as a whole cannot but suffer somewhat in unity and clarity of effect. Hence I had thought originally of attempting here to supply a brief bird's-eye view of the historical process as a whole. But leisure failed me for the task, which would have called for severe compression combined with great accuracy of balanced statement. And so, instead, I can only refer those who feel the need of any such a supplemental survey to the sketch in *Christianity in History*, by Dr. Carlyle and myself, where the 'Evangelical' and 'Catholic' strains in the story of Christianity are traced side by side in the Church, in connexion with the supersession of Hebraic by Græco-Roman forms of religious thinking, and with the ideas of conscience and moral personality in religion.

In the main, then, I must here content myself with simply bearing my sincere and considered testimony both to the high quality of this book and to its cumulative success, as it seems to me, as an answer to Rome's overweening claim to be, exclusively, the Church of Christ. Yet there are a few remarks by way of comment and illustration which it may be in place for me to add.

The crucial issue between Catholicism and Protestantism, one really underlying almost every chapter of this book, concerns the true nature of authority in Christianity, and in the Church as its institutional form, according to the mind of Christ Himself. This will be found to involve the question whether an *historical* or a *dogmatic* form of presenting Christ and His authoritative revelation brings Divine truth the nearer to human apprehension, and makes it the more fitted to inspire the soul with Divine life. Antecedently it would seem that the form likest to the mode under which Jesus Himself presented Himself and His message to men and women in person, when on earth, must be the best; and that, surely, is the historical, with its concrete appeal to the whole moral personality.

But in a more general way, too, History is the tribunal before which, sooner or later, the great case 'Catholicism *versus* Protestantism' must be argued out and settled. This was indeed the claim which the former itself eagerly made in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, after it had assumed that more rigid and narrowed form which it took on at and after the Council of Trent, by forcing out of the Church, as one visible organization, the more New Testament type of piety—so becoming Romanism. It was to the objective facts of the Church's past, verifiable by any competent historical scholar as such, that the great Jesuit Bellarmine, and still more the great Benedictine patristic scholars of the next age, confidently appealed; and Protestant scholars with equal alacrity took up that challenge. But after the Jesuit Petavius had shown how the Fathers differed among themselves even in fundamental doctrine, the official attitude of Romanism gradually altered, and Bossuet was the last great representative [1] of the older one in the matter. On the other hand, the Lutheran Hase cheerfully, and with much candour, in 1862 pressed anew the appeal to history, which was now becoming more truly exact, as the principles of objective 'historical method,' to-day common to real historians of all kinds, were coming more generally into recognition and practice. About the same time the later attitude of Romanism as such to history, by which history was put completely and confessedly into leading strings to dogma in the form of 'the living Voice of the Church,' was made clear by the declaration of Cardinal Manning on the point (as quoted, with characteristic care, on p. 504 below), following on the great practical illustration afforded by the Bull of Pius IX in 1854. This defined as new dogma that the Mother of Christ had herself been conceived without stain of 'original sin,' in defiance of the plain historical fact that it had not only not been held by all Church 'doctors' but had even been explicitly denied by not a few. A yet more striking case, both by its representative nature and owing to the protest called forth within Roman Catholicism itself, was the new dogma of Papal Infallibility adopted at the Vatican Council in 1870. There the historically expert minority was out-voted by the relatively ill-informed majority; and the great Döllinger and other *élite* members of the Papal Church were driven out and made 'heretics' and 'schismatics,' while others, like Lord Acton, had to become bad Catholics, as also later did Duchesne, Ehrhard, and Baron F. von Hügel on points like Biblical Criticism, etc. But the full significance of the whole issue, History *versus* Infallibility in the official Church—about which, as distinct from the failure of all attacks on the Church as a community trusting Jesus as the Christ, Scripture says nothing (while it

[1] See Archdeacon Lilley's Jowett Lecture for 1928, on Bossuet.

affords a case of her fallibility, that touching the time of Christ's Return)—comes out most clearly in Manning's contention that all appeals '*from* the living voice of the Church' to Scripture and antiquity are 'treason' to the Church, 'because that living voice is supreme.' *It* 'is the maximum of evidence, both natural and supernatural, as to the *fact* and the *contents* of the original revelation.' 'How can we know what antiquity was except through the Church'—not as represented by written records, but by her living mind at any given time? There we have it. The Infallible Church says to History, as a means of knowing the truth about the past of the Christian faith, 'If you agree with me, well and good; if not, you don't count.' What is this but another form of 'Heads I win, tails you lose'? No serious study that seeks truth as such can permanently accept such a position of pupilage: nor, surely, in the long run can serious historians who are also Catholics, even though in the realm of religion proper, as faith and morals (so far as matters of faith), they may continue to accept the position of permanent pupilage of reason and conscience to the Church from which they first learned religion.

For Romanism, then, to profess to argue really historically, is mere camouflage. Infallibility is the *differentia* and of the essence of Roman Catholicism; and in a measure it is so also of any thorough-going Catholicism in the traditional sense, though with a smaller field of application to the conceptual forms of faith (as distinct from faith itself, i.e. trust in the religiously self-evidencing personality of Jesus Christ). But such infallibility is a pure assumption, based on the supposed needs of the case if there is to be religious certitude sufficient for resting life upon—what we call moral certainty. It is contradicted too by an immense body of experience outside Catholicism, which reaches 'full assurance of faith' by the New-Testament way of an inward moral process, met and fulfilled by the direct self-witness of the Christ of the Gospels as a whole, a witness absolute in its religious quality and authority. ('Infallibility' in the Catholic sense, viz. as inclusive of intellectual or scientific inerrancy, even in the time and space forms of Nature and History, the Bible never represents Jesus or any other as claiming for religious revelation.) To reverse this order, as Catholicism, and Romanism in particular, does by interposing an institutional Church between Christ and the seeking soul as needful to guarantee Him and define His truth for saving faith, is 'to put the cart before the horse.' The Church has claims only as Christ's Church, that is, as a religious community corresponding to His intention and continuing His spirit. But trust in the Church *as such*—in spite of its mixed character and record—*presupposes* knowledge of Him, in order to recognize in it His spirit and some real fulfilment of His intention.

Ultimately, then, all depends, both logically and psychologically, on the self-authenticating light of Christ's own personality for the individual consciousness, i.e. on 'private judgment' (in the religious or Protestant sense), both as to Christ and the Church as truly His. Moreover, the recognition of 'the Church' in the Catholic sense, as distinct from other forms of organized Christianity, really implies much historic knowledge of all kinds (quite beyond the reach of most), and even then cannot yield more than a degree of intellectual probability. Hence Catholicism, and especially Romanism—with its long series of doubtful historical assumptions on which the Petrine and Papal claims, as Dr. Cadoux shows, utterly depend—has in the end to assume a supernatural 'gift of grace' to enable the individual to select and believe in the true Church as the object of religious faith.

Romanism, then, is in fact a dogmatism helped out by supernaturalistic assumptions. This is the case not only with the cult of the Virgin Mary, of Patron Saints, and of wonder-working relics, but also with the Catholic theories of 'real presence' in the Mass and of baptismal regeneration. These last move on the plane of the subpersonal, though they assume certain effects in personal experience, sooner or later. This wrong kind of realism concerning the presence of Christ's *body*, and its effects on the believer's body (quite manifest in the classic Catholic Fathers Irenæus and Cyprian[1]), gave Catholic language its peculiar emphasis on the 'body' and 'blood.' But subpersonal modes of thought are (as the Epistle to Hebrews teaches) sub-Christian in form, however true it is that the sacramental use of things material in a symbolic or suggestive sense is genuinely Christian.

The historical judgments in which Dr. Cadoux does not carry me with him are few and secondary as compared with those where we are at one. Generally speaking, however, I incline more to trace to the reaction of early Christian opinion upon the tradition of Christ's sayings, those beliefs of a religious kind (as distinct from mere traditional views on historical or scientific matters) which seem (e.g. unending punishment) out of harmony with the general spirit of His teaching, as determined by His master-ideas touching God and man. Most heartily, however, do I concur in the religious and theological principles which constitute his conception of Progressive Protestantism, of which, according to its sub-title, his book offers a vindication. To us both, too, a Protestantism progressive in its intellectual forms is the only Protestantism consistent with its root-principles. These were present, indeed, implicitly in its first creative period, as distinct from the Scholastic era which quickly supervened; but have disentangled themselves rather painfully from the element of

[1] See *Christianity in History*, pp. 163 f, and Cyprian *De Lapsis*, c. 25.

'Catholic' dogmas and assumptions (e.g. verbal inspiration, original guilt, Augustinian Predestination) which passed largely unchallenged at the Reformation. Among them the Inner Light of intuition and the 'inward witness of the Holy Spirit' are integral to the Gospel, as to the Protestant idea of Grace; and render the Catholic claim to a right to coerce conscience and to persecute a negation of Christ. A broad Evangelicalism, which rests all directly on Christ as *self-authenticating in His historic personality*, is the most genuine form of Christianity, and the only one ultimately tenable by Christians who really think in terms of modern knowledge and methods—scientific, historical, and philosophic. This, I believe, was the verdict of my own masters in historic method, Hort, Hatch, and Sanday. In their persons I see a pledge of future reunion, at any rate in spirit and practical co-operation, between the Evangelical Free Churches and the great Anglican communion which among evangelically Reformed Churches retained, particularly in its Church order, more traditional Catholic elements than did any of its sister Protestant communions. In any case, the historical spirit, which dissolves dogmatisms that divide, by explaining the inner and good motives of past divisions, is an eirenic influence, and can bring us closer on a basis of large comprehension. May such be the final effect of this book.

To sum up. Dr. Cadoux's aim and spirit are essentially positive. His concern is to show that in Christianity there lives an absolutely true or 'eternal' revelation of God and man, in their mutual relations, which has been largely obscured, and is so for men to-day more than ever, by the inevitably relative and temporary conceptions or thought-forms under which it has been apprehended by the fallible but progressive mind of man. Catholicism, however, and especially Roman Catholicism, claims for its chief doctrines and practices a unique and exclusive exemption from such obscuring relativity and error. In virtue of this, Romanism claims also to be co-extensive with the one Church of Christ, denying to those outside itself, and particularly to Protestantism, any distinctive element of positive truth or value. It is in relation to such exclusive claims that Dr. Cadoux has to develop his negative criticism—philosophical, historical, and moral—in the interests of the progressive apprehension of a Christianity truer and larger than any existing form of it, but to which all its main historic embodiments, both Catholic and Protestant, have elements of positive value to contribute.

VERNON BARTLET.

OXFORD.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

My chief duty under this heading is the pleasant one of acknowledging gratefully the very considerable help I have received from various friends in writing this book. The necessity of making as sure as possible about all details has involved special inquiry in numerous directions; and to those many who have assisted me with answers to my questions I take this opportunity of expressing most hearty thanks. It is not feasible to enumerate them all, but I feel I ought to mention by name Mr. G. G. Coulton, M.A., of St. John's College, Cambridge, and Mr. H. Sellers, M.A., B.Litt., of the British Museum. I am also much indebted to Rev. R. C. Ford, M.A., B.D., of Shipley, for timely help in connexion with the biblical index. Most of all, I owe thanks to my old friend and teacher, Dr. Vernon Bartlet, who gave the whole project his blessing when I first broached it to him, has answered various inquiries which I have addressed to him from time to time, has read through the whole in its manuscript form and made numerous valuable suggestions, and finally has honoured me by contributing a Foreword. I appreciate this large measure of help the more, realizing, as I do, that it has not been given without considerable expenditure of time and strength and in the midst of other pressing duties. On a great many points of all degrees of importance I have been glad to profit by his wise suggestions. There were, however, naturally some details on which our opinions diverged; and while I am glad to know that Dr. Bartlet agrees in the main with what the book tries to demonstrate, it goes without saying that the responsibility for its contents in detail rests solely with myself.

The exigences of proof-correcting unfortunately make this the best place for mentioning two matters that have come to my notice since the book was put into type. I should like to have been able to add to n. 4 on p. 224 a reference to Dr. H. M. Relton's valuable *Study in Christology* (S.P.C.K., 1917, 1922), in which the doctrine that our Lord's human nature was impersonal is very fully discussed, both in its historical and in its philosophical aspects; albeit his argument does not seem to me to meet the objections to which this doctrine lies open. Pages 437–439 ought to have contained an allusion to the statement issued in June 1913 by the papal Biblical Commission, to the effect that the Pastoral Epistles were genuine works of the Apostle Paul, written during the period between his release from his first imprisonment and his death (*Cath. Encyc.* xv [1914] 78b). The reader will oblige by kindly noting these particulars in the appropriate places.

A word of explanation may be added on one or two matters of detail. In passages translated from other languages, words demanded by English idiom but absent from the originals are put in brackets. In the footnotes, the abbreviations "p." "pp." are for the sake of clearness usually confined to references to the pages of *this* book, a bare figure being used for references to other works. A cross-reference to a footnote in this book should be regarded as alluding also to the corresponding part of the text. All biblical references have been adapted to the chapter- and verse-numeration of the English Revised Version.

Lastly an apology is owing to all readers for the somewhat forbidding size of the book. I can only trust that this defect will not be traced to an undue diffuseness of style. The largeness and importance of the subject made it imperative to quote authorities fully, and desirable to show the connexion between each successive section of the argument and the treatment of the same theme in modern theological literature. Thus the book would have been incomplete and deficient without this full documentation. Readers, however, who feel repelled by the formidable appearance and bulk of the footnotes, and are not desirous of seeing chapter and verse for everything, are encouraged to believe that the text by itself is purposely adapted for continuous reading and contains the whole substance of the argument, and that they will, therefore, miss nothing essential to their purpose if they skip the footnotes altogether.

C. J. CADOUX.

SHIPLEY,
August 1928.

ERRATA

Page 19, line 17: *for* "in 1223", *read* "about 1230".
Page 19, line 18: *for* "in connexion with", *read* "as a basis for".
Page 45, line 21: *for* "1264", *read* "1274".
Page 46, line 24: *for* "Pius IV", *read* Pius V".
Page 90, line 32: *for* "in 1223", *read* "about 1230".

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PART I

THE CHALLENGE OF CATHOLICISM

CHAPTER I

THE APPEAL OF CATHOLICISM TO-DAY

In the often overheated atmosphere generated by religious controversy, the disputant is not infrequently reproached by those whom he criticizes with being actuated by the feeling that they are winning all along the line while he himself knows he is on the losing side. No doubt the wish that is so often father to the thought has much to do with the exaggerated form in which such reproaches are cast: but it is strange that the modicum of obvious truth which they contain should be thought to furnish a basis for blame or contempt. For who would waste words in attacking a position which next to nobody holds, or in defending a position which has won, or nearly won, its way to universal acceptance? In any case, in the great struggle with which this book is to deal, whatever confession of weakness controversial concern may betray is made not less by one party than by the other. Rome issues her challenge and pushes forward her propaganda, because for four centuries she has experienced the stubbornness of Protestant resistance, and dreads its further inroads:[1] Protestants concern themselves to reply with vindications of their resistance, because they know that Rome is still a great power, and they fear she may be a growing power.[2]

The issue at stake between Romanist and non-Romanist Christians is one that does not turn on statistics: at any rate, the statistics are too vague and doubtful to cast any very clear light on the main points in dispute or to help to settle them in any decisive way. At the same time it is not without interest to survey—so far as we have it—the evidence for the growth or otherwise of the Roman communion. Actual figures do not tell us very much. Estimates of the total number of Catholics in the world vary so greatly that it is impossible to trace a reliable curve showing their fluctuations over a number of years. There is often operative a natural tendency to exaggerate, and to put the total as high as possible: and this not only obstructs subsequent investigation, but has its nemesis in the unfavourable contrast set up between the swollen figures of an earlier date and accurate figures arrived at later. Leaving aside obvious exaggerations and, for the

[1] Cf. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 499b: "Present-day Protestantism . . . is no mean enemy at the gate of the Catholic Church."

[2] Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 48 f. There is a good account of the apologetic literature of Protestantism in *Journ. of Relig.* Sept. 1926, 504–525, by J. T. McNeill.

moment, calculations prior to 1890, we find that, for the ten years prior to 1900, the estimates of the total number of Catholics in the world vary from 200,000,000 to 250,000,000; those for the next decade lie between 220,000,000 and 270,000,000, and those for the next fifteen years between 250,000,000 and 324,000,000. An estimate for about 1905–1910 gives 292,787,085; another for 1924 272,860,000. The round figure usually accepted to-day is 300,000,000.[1] These figures probably suffice to prove that there has been a considerable increase in the number of Catholics during the past thirty-five years: but what the rate of increase has been, how regular it has been, and whether it has equalled the rate of increase of the population, it is impossible to say.

Sixty years ago it was stated that, since persecution and coercion had given place to free discussion, the relative positions of Protestants and Catholics had not been perceptibly changed;[2] and the same might almost be said to-day, at least so far as the general demarcation of frontiers is concerned. But whatever may be the truth in regard to numbers, the Roman Church has certainly gained a good deal in prestige and influence during the past century. The loss of the Popes' temporal sovereignty has been compensated for by a greatly increased influence in international diplomacy. The Popes of the last fifty years have acquired within Catholicism a more absolute and undivided homage, and in the world at large a more respectful recognition, than any of their predecessors since the Reformation.[3] In this country, the Anglo-Catholic movement, which began in 1833 and has survived in vigour until the present day, has necessarily involved the transfer of a large number of Anglicans to the Roman fold.[4] In 1850 the Catholic hierarchy of archbishops and bishops was restored in England; and this has led, not indeed (as some feared it might) to conflict or tension between Catholicism and the civil power, but to a large increase in the number of Catholic religious houses and colleges in this country and to a much more vigorous Catholic propaganda.[5] In 1898 some

[1] Cf. Horton, *England's Danger*, 55; Bain, *New Reformation*, 31; Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 519; *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 503a, xiv (1912) 277, 281; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 387; Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 131 n. 2; R. E. G. George in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1924, 552. I have also used a number of figures quoted from various sources, Catholic and other, in the pamphlets issued by 'The Protestant Press Bureau.'

[2] Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 5.

[3] Heiler, *Kathol.* 305, 646; cf. 422 ("Die Grösse, der Reichtum und die Schönheit der katholischen Liturgie ist der heutigen Generation von neuem aufgegangen"); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 87 f, 94–96.

[4] Cf. e.g. W. G. Ward, quoted by Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 201 (Tractarians "by hundreds straggling towards Rome" in 1843); also Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 401 (". . . 1854, when the conversions to Catholicism arising from Puseyism in England filled Rome with high hopes").

[5] J. W. Poynter (then a Catholic) in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1924, 543–546. On the propagandist zeal of the Catholic laity, Heiler, *Kathol.* 571.

were entertaining fears of the ultimate recapture of England by the Roman Church, so numerous and significant were the conversions that were taking place.[1] The number of conversions to Catholicism in England and Wales between 1916 and 1924 (inclusive) was over 99,000 —an annual average of about 11,000. The annual figure rose, though not quite uniformly, during that period from 8,501 in 1916 to 12,355 in 1924.[2] The actual number of Catholics in England and Wales appears to have risen from 1,362,000 about 1895[3] to 1,500,000 or 1,600,000 about 1900,[4] and to 1,997,280 in 1924.[5] In Scotland the numbers of Catholics have grown considerably, and both there and in England their legal disabilities have been lightened by recent legislation. Both in France and in Germany, since the War of 1914–1918, a vigorous Catholic revival has been taking place.[6] In Germany, in particular, Lutheran Protestantism has fallen on evil days. The complete collapse of the military and monarchistic system in consequence of the Great War involved the serious weakening of the State-Church which had for so long given that system its blessing.[7] The result has been an immense increase of Catholic numbers and power in Germany, such as even to occasion the boast that in ten years the country will be entirely Catholic.[8] In various other countries, e.g. Russia, America,

[1] Horton, *England's Danger*, 3–5.

[2] Figures supplied by 'The Protestant Press Bureau.' Cf. Poynter in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1924, 545 (". . . Published returns, averaged, give a maximum of perhaps 12,000 conversions in England each year; . . ."), and Woodlock, *Modernism*, 10 n. Controversy over the revision of the Anglican Prayer-Book is expected to increase the number of conversions.

[3] Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 131 n. 2. But Cardinal Manning's estimate for 1890 was 1,500,000 (Purcell, *Manning*, ii. 772, 791).

[4] Horton, *England's Danger*, 63 (1,600,000 in 1898); *Daily Mail Year-Book* for 1904, 322 (1,500,000); *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 498a (1,500,000 in 1910).

[5] *Cath. Directory* for 1924, 601. *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 278 gives the Catholic population of Great Britain, *Ireland*, Malta, Gibraltar, and the Channel Islands, in 1909 as 5,786,000. Still later figures are given by Mr. J. W. Poynter in *Ch. of Eng. Newspaper*, 26 Aug. 1927, 7; but their general significance is the same.

[6] Cf. Denis Gwynn, *Cath. Reaction in France* (1924); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 44, 73 (note to 12), 80 (note to 44), 91; P. M. Jones in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1926, 161–163. The revival in France is taking place mainly among the intellectuals, and is of a religious character. Its one *political* success was the restoration of the French Embassy at the Vatican.

[7] A French Catholic, Beaudrillart, contended in 1915 that Germany had planned the war in order to secure the triumph of Protestantism over Catholicism (*Journ. of Relig.* Sept. 1926, 512 n.).

[8] Heiler, *Kathol.* 647 f: cf. id. XIII (triumphant anticipations of the Catholic theologian Guardini in 1920–21), 8 (". . . Voll Siegesgewissheit verkünden bereits heute katholische Stimmen den nahen Untergang des Protestantismus"). On the decline and weakness of German Protestantism, id. 9, 647, 704; also Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 499b. Very full details regarding the Catholic advance in Germany are given by Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 2–17, 33–41, 51, 69–73, 78 f, 86, 91–103, 110–118, 137–143: the matter is dealt with also in a volume of Protestant lectures entitled *Moderner Katholizismus*, known to me only through the notice in *Expos. Times*, Feb. 1927, 234 f.

Australia, China, etc., Catholic advances of one sort or another are from time to time referred to.[1]

Over against these impressive facts, however, we have now to place certain other pieces of evidence that point in a contrary direction. Large allowance has to be made for the Catholic custom of speaking about Rome's successes in confident and optimistic terms. It is almost a commonplace of Catholic apologetic to represent Catholicism as triumphantly advancing and Protestantism as dying out.[2] Cardinal Manning observed, on the eve of the Vatican Council of 1870, that "the Council of Trent fixed the date after which Protestantism ceased to spread; the impending general Council will determine the date of its death." [3] It is probable that the cheerful and hopeful feeling thus produced actually has a favourable effect on propaganda: how far it is deliberately cultivated with this end in view is not certain. What is certain is that the habit is prejudicial to an exact knowledge of the true state of things. It ignores, for instance, the patent fact that a very large proportion of those included in Catholic statistics are only nominal, not practising, Catholics.[4] When the Christian denominations undertook a quasi-statistical inquiry into the state of religion in the British Army during the Great War, and allowance had to be made by all other bodies for a certain percentage of 'lapsed' members and adherents, the Catholic chaplains insisted on regarding all registered Catholics as still "vitally connected" with the Church.[5] Such methods, of course, impair the value of figures for purposes of comparison.

[1] Cf. e.g. Cardinal Gibbons in *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 499 f; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* saepe.

[2] Cf. Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 265: "Though badly scarred by the assaults of modern naturalism, she is still living and fighting, while the non-Catholic bodies are lying prostrate and mortally wounded all around her."

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 282; cf. xxxvii ("the favourite reference to the break up of Protestantism as already begun"—in 1864), xlviii n. ("the assurance" [of Perrone] ". . . that Protestantism, decayed and powerless, is hastening to its complete overthrow"—same year). Cf. Rev. S. F. Smith, S.J. *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness* (about 1899) 2 ("it is quite likely that the next half-century will see the end of" Lutheranism); Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 131 n. 2 ("At any given moment a Roman Catholic will assert that his denomination is increasing in numbers").

[4] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 71 f; Bain, *New Reformation*, 31 (Wahrmund's admission of 1902); Coulton, *l.c.*; Poynter in *Hibb. Journ*, Apl. 1924, 546 ("The great weakness' [of Catholicism in England] "—not unknown to all religious bodies!—is perhaps1 lack of enthusiasm among a large proportion of Church members . . ."); Gwynn, *Cath. Reaction in France*, 3 f (in France, outside Paris and Alsace and Lorraine, there are—out of 34,000,000 persons—10,000,000 "practising Catholics," and 16,000,000 or 17,000,000 others who "keep themselves more or less in conformity with the rules laid down by the Church, but only by complying with some of the statutory obligations. . ."). The 10,000,000 is probably an outside figure; in 1908 there were said to be not more than 4,000,000 practising Catholics in France (W. Soltau, *The Religious Crisis in France*, 4).

[5] *The Army and Religion* (1919) 190.

Furthermore, no precise figures are apparently available for Rome's losses, whether by lapse, apostasy, excommunication, or transfer to other religious bodies. Those losses must have been continually going on, ever since the Counter-Reformation, and must at times have been enormous.[1] One Catholic scholar describes the nineteenth century as the age of secularization—a secularization which was most marked in Catholic countries.[2] A widespread estrangement on the part of thinking men from the Roman Church in such lands is recognized, not only by Protestant writers,[3] but occasionally by Catholics also.[4]

The figures already quoted [5] as representing the number of Catholics in England are not sufficiently well-attested and mutually consistent, nor do they cover a sufficiently long period, to make it quite certain that there has been a net gain on the part of Rome, not to speak of a gain proportionate to the increase of population. In any case, the conversions have been very seriously counterbalanced by a steady leakage. In 1887 a Catholic periodical seems to have admitted that Rome was losing in England more than she gained.[6] In 1890 Manning wrote: "We have lost the people of England."[7] In 1897 'Romanus' spoke, with reference to the times since Elizabeth, of "the gradually dying out Catholic part of the nation."[8] About 1899, Rev. S. F. Smith, S.J., conceded that Dr. Horton's estimate of the spread of Catholicism in England was "unfortunately exaggerated."[9] Twenty years later, a Catholic priest in America wrote: "Catholicity in England never was at a lower ebb."[10] In 1922 another Catholic writer assumed "that one and a half million Catholics, if not more, have been lost to the Faith in England in a century!"[11] In 1924

[1] Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 131 ("Boasts of conversion may cheer the Roman Church for a moment here and there, but in the long perspective of history her tide has steadily ebbed; there is probably no district in which this Church increases in proportion to the increase of population; in its main regions, France, Italy, and Spain, it has lost immensely during the last century"). Coulton quotes a Catholic estimate of the number of Catholics in the world in 1846 as 256,000,000: this figure contrasts remarkably with the estimate of 200,000,000 usually accepted in the early nineties, and even with the 220,000,000 claimed by a later edition of the same Catholic treatise in 1896 (*ibid.* n. 2).

[2] Ehrhard, quoted by Bain, *New Reformation*, 25.

[3] E.g. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 142, 167; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 14; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 195.

[4] 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 856; Ehrhard, quoted by Bain, *op. cit.* 22.

[5] See above, p. 5 nn. 3–5.

[6] Brinckman, *The Controversial Statistics of Romanism* (1895) 14 (cf. Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 131 n. 2). Brinckman quotes "*The Tablet*, May 21, 1887." That periodical contains an article on 'Our losses' (831 f), but I did not succeed in finding anywhere in it the words on which Brinckman's statement was based. It is possible that his reference was wrong.

[7] Purcell, *Manning*, ii. 790.

[8] *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 863.

[9] *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness*, 1.

[10] *Universe*, 7 Nov. 1919, 3 col. 3.

[11] *Cath. Herald*, 14 Oct. 1922, 6 col. 2.

Mr. J. W. Poynter, a well-informed layman then belonging to the Catholic communion, was writing of the grave anxiety felt in Catholic circles over the continual leakage from the Church's ranks,[1] and expressing his opinion that, the religious mentality of Britain being what it is, the re-conversion of the country to Catholicism "would seem to be impossible except by a miracle," which apparently was not to be expected.[2] In 1926 the growing leakage from the Church all over the country was frankly admitted and discussed at a Catholic gathering at Westminster.[3]

Similar deductions have to be made from what has already been said of the recent successes of Romanism in other countries. In France the eighteenth century, as much as the nineteenth, was a century of secularization. The Gallican Church suffered heavily in the French Revolution; nor had she by a very long way regained her former status when, towards the close of last century, she was overtaken by a serious anti-Catholic movement, which led to the loss of great numbers of her priests and adherents, and also of the support and patronage of the State.[4] In 1919 Dean Inge observed: "Unless the Republican Government blows the dying embers into a blaze by unjust persecution, it is to be feared that Catholicism in that country may soon become 'une quantité négligeable.'" [5] Doubtless the recent Catholic reaction in France has to a considerable extent reversed these conditions; but even so there can be no talk of a full recovery, nor, apart from the restoration of the embassy to the Vatican, has the reaction scored any important political success. Rome seems to be having her best chance in Germany at the present moment; but there, too, she has enormous lee-way to make up. Young Germany may have largely revolted from the yoke of the Lutheran State-Church: but the influence of Luther is so deeply rooted in the German heart that it will not be easily eradicated. The

[1] *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1924, 545 f ("Of course, there are an ebb and flow of members —a gain by converts and a loss by leakage. As to whether there is any great predominance on either side of this account, there are probably no ways of obtaining adequate statistics to prove. . . . The 'leakage' undoubtedly causes grave anxiety. . . . As to *conversions*, their high-water mark was probably during the late European War, and the number seems somewhat to have decreased since"). Cf. also the admission of the Church's losses since 1300 in *God and the Supernatural*, 273 f.

[2] *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1924, 547 f. Similarly Woodlock, *Modernism*, 84. Cf. Bishop of Salisbury in *Congress-Report 1920*, 19, on the "ingrained Protestantism" of the English nation.

[3] *Universe*, 30 Apl. 1926, 24. Cf. also the Catholic admissions quoted by Ballard *Protestantism Justified* (1928) 80, and McCabe's devastating criticism of Catholic numerical statistics generally (*Popes*, 178–190).

[4] Bain, *New Reformation*, 118–161, 242, 275; W. L. George, *France in the Twentieth Century*, 63 f, 67 f, 123–151.

[5] *Outspoken Essays*, i. 168. Beside this we may place the admission of the Catholic Father J. T. Smith that there was "no Catholic strength in France" (*Universe*, 7 Nov. 1919, 3 col. 3).

'Los-von-Rom' movement in Germany and Austria round about 1900 very largely increased the obstacles Catholicism will have to overcome before these countries are recaptured.[1] While the Treaty of Versailles has on the whole had an unfavourable effect on Continental Protestantism, yet in one region things have been otherwise. The erection of Czecho-slovakia into an independent state has imparted immense strength to the anti-Roman Christian movements in the emancipated territories.[2] Italy and Spain both felt the force of the 'Los-von-Rom' movement;[3] and, according to Dean Inge, the prospects of the Roman Church in those countries are not very much better than they were in France before the recent revival.[4] As regards America, it does not appear that the number of Catholics is increasing in any marked way in the United States, though the absence of exact numerical statistics makes a precise judgment impossible.[5] In Mexico, a contest has broken out between the Church and the State, which cannot fail to affect the latter disastrously. In Australia, the census-figures for 1901 and 1921 show that, whereas the total population had increased by 43 per cent, the Catholics had increased by only 33 per cent.[6]

But it is not from thorough-going Romanism only that the Catholic challenge sounds forth in the ears of the modern world. From the point of view of the vast bulk of English-speaking Christians, the pull of Anglo-Catholicism and the pull of Romanism both lie in the same general direction. Of the verbal ambiguity of the word 'Catholic' something will be said presently: for the moment we have to note, firstly, the close though not complete similarity between Roman and Anglican Catholicism, and secondly, the immense and continuous growth of the latter since its inception, and its portentously attractive power at the present day.[7] Its kinship with Rome is seen in its vehement

[1] Bain, *New Reformation*, 43–103; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 36–47, 79, 131–133.

[2] Bain, *op. cit.* 85–91; *Encyc. Brit.* xxx (1922) 791a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 647; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 44 f, 80: also Dr. Adolf Keller's letter in *Christian World*, 5 Aug. 1926, 11.

[3] Bain, *op. cit.* 181–221, 244. See also the separate 'Hefte' of the *Berichte über den Fortgang der 'Los von Rom-Bewegung'* (Lehmann, Munich).

[4] Inge, *loc. cit.* Cardinal Bourne is stated in *Cath. Times* for 21 June 1924, 13 col. 4, to have said: "We know how many millions of people from both these countries" [Italy and Ireland] "have lost the Faith when they have gone to other countries . . ." Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 44, 46.

[5] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 279; Bain, *New Reformation*, 239 f, 246 f, 250 f, 255–259; Poynter, *Ch. of Rome from Within*, 36 f.

[6] *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1926, 462 f.

[7] Convenient and recent statements of the Anglo-Catholic position are to be found in *Report of the First Anglo-Catholic Congress, London, 1920*, *Report of the Anglo-Catholic Congress: London, 1923*, the fifty-two little *Congress Books* published in connexion with the latter, Dr. Darwell Stone's *Faith of an English Catholic* (1926), and Canon T. A. Lacey's *Anglo-Catholic Faith* (1926). Cf. also Rawlinson, *Authority*, 168–182, and N. P. Williams in *Expos. Times*, Nov. 1927, 53–60.

modern [1] repudiation of the name 'Protestant' and of the work of the Reformation, its persistent claim to the name 'Catholic,' [2] the avowed and often impatient longing of some at least of its representative members for corporate reunion with the Roman Church, the steady stream of converts it has supplied to that community, and the obvious, though of course qualified, welcome and approval which Roman Catholics extend to it. No doubt, for many of its professed adherents, its Rome-ward leanings are a very secondary matter, if not an entire irrelevance: the main distinction that endears it to them is the helpfulness of the liturgical and sacramental worship which it provides.[3] But the Rome-ward leanings are at the same time an unmistakable reality; and they cause the Free-Churchman's apologetic against Rome on the one hand and against Anglo-Catholicism on the other necessarily to follow in part at least the same lines. As for the present power of Anglo-Catholicism, that is a matter of general notoriety, which finds sufficient expression in the fact that about one-third of the clergy in the Church of England are said by those who know to belong to the Anglo-Catholic party.

A by-product of the Catholic appeal in our time is the 'Free Catholic' movement, the general ideals of which have their most powerful exponent in Dr. W. E. Orchard, the distinguished and beloved minister of a large Congregational church in London. The movement aims at a resumption of Catholic usage in worship and doctrine, so far as this is possible without the surrender of individual or corporate freedom to the domination of Rome. Dr. Orchard has recently alarmed his Protestant friends by the declaration that "Rome is the true Church."[4] Certainly the alarm is found to be largely needless, when we observe that modern Protestants generally believe Rome to be at least a part of the true Church, and that Dr. Orchard claims that all orthodox believers really belong to Rome (though Rome does not recognize them) and himself remains loyal in practice to the ideals of freedom and tolerance for which Congregationalism has always pleaded. At the same time, we cannot ignore the fact that Dr. Orchard's writings and influence, and the 'Free Catholic' movement generally, contribute not a little to the urgency of that Catholic appeal which

[1] Archbishop Laud and even the early Tractarians did not object to calling themselves Protestants (Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 28, 40).

[2] On "the Catholic idea" as the great driving motive behind Anglo-Catholicism, see Rawlinson, *Authority*, 175.

[3] D.M.J. in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1926, 127, is in all probability largely right in saying that "what the Anglo-Catholic now stands for is simply freedom to use such developments of worship as have proved in other parts of Christendom powerful to convert or to edify souls."

[4] Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 47.

proceeds with such power from the Anglican and Roman Churches and which imposes on every convinced Protestant the duty of giving a reason for the conviction that is in him.

The foregoing collection of facts and observations has of necessity been somewhat amorphous; but it will have sufficed to show that Roman Catholicism, however exaggerated some of its claims to success may be, is still an immense power, possibly a growing power, and that the religious ideals for which it peculiarly stands are exercising a very great attractive force within the Church of England and are not without influence even in the Free Churches. Such statistics as have been quoted help to bring out the critical importance of the situation with which we are faced; but the challenge thus presented to non-Catholics is one that cannot be adequately understood, much less answered, by a study of statistics. Nor is the question simply this: whether or no we *like* Catholicism, and if not, why not? or, how best we can oppose it—

> What reinforcement we may gain from hope,
> If not, what resolution from despair.

Nor even is it, solely or primarily, a matter of the *inadequacy* of Catholicism to the modern mind, as Dr. Fairbairn was wont to represent it.[1] The basic question is, whether the affirmations on which the distinctively Catholic appeal is based are true affirmations, and whether the things which Catholics set forth as the realities on which their characteristic tenets rest are true realities. That is the question which will be discussed in this book; and the discussion is offered to readers interested in these matters, as an answer to the Catholic challenge particularly from the view-point of the Free-Church mind of to-day.

The book is primarily an answer to the claims of the Roman Church; and certain sections of it (chiefly Chapters XXIV and XXV) will apply exclusively to that community. But it is also addressed to our non-Romanist Catholic brethren, as an apologia on behalf of those who feel that they cannot throw in their lot with them. In approximate proportion as the reply to Rome is felt to be cogent, will the vindication of Free-Church principles over against Anglo-Catholicism carry weight: and the patience of Anglican readers is asked for, in order that such complications as are involved in our treatment of so many-sided a problem may not occasion perplexity or misunderstanding.

The use of the words 'Protestant' and 'Catholic' is attended with much ambiguity: but there is no real necessity why divergent preferences in the matter of words should be allowed to confuse discussion.

[1] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 50, 93, 203

While sections of people, like individuals, are entitled in the abstract to use words in special senses, provided they make their meaning clear to others, the reading public at large also has a right to ask that the established associations of certain words should not be disturbed by sectional movements of thought, since such disturbance clogs the wheels of argument with the recurrent need of circumlocution. Thus the word 'Protestant,' which originated in the 'protest' of certain German princes at the Diet of Speyer in 1529, has long come to mean all Christians (other than those of the Eastern Churches) who are not in communion with Rome. Clearly some word is still required to designate this class of Christians, and nothing is to be gained by choosing a different one. The use of it does not imply agreement in all things with all other Protestants, still less with the protesting princes of 1529. It does not seem reasonable that the quite legitimate desire of certain Anglicans to dissociate themselves from some of their fellow-non-Romanists and to draw nearer to Rome without actually going over, should impose on the community at large the trouble of altering its well-understood vocabulary.[1]

To deal with the ambiguity of the word 'Catholic' is not so simple a matter. Probably expressing at first the universality and identity of the one Christian community, in spite of the number and the scattered condition of its component groups,[2] the word was eventually claimed by adherents of the papacy as the exclusive prerogative of the Church of Rome, proclaiming her at a stroke to be, not only uniform in her teaching, but co-extensive with the true Church. When the fierce tension of the days of persecution had passed away, other Christians, particularly Anglicans, came to desire and to demand a greater emphasis on their own 'catholicity,' and to bring to the front their right to the name 'Catholic,' which they had never officially surrendered to Rome.[3] Even Free-Churchmen protest against Rome's monopoly of the word, and use it occasionally of themselves.[4] Romanists object to this use of it by Protestants: they do not even like being called themselves '*Roman* Catholics,' as that implies (what they deny) that there are other

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 9 f. See also above, p. 10 n. 1.

[2] Ignat. *Ep. Smyrn.* viii. 2 ("Wherever Christ Jesus is, there is the Catholic Church"). This (± A.D. 110) is the earliest known use of the word in its Christian sense. Cf. J. H. Maude in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 259.

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxvi; A. W. Streane, in the Preface to his translation of Hase (viii); Salmon, *Infall.* xv f; Maude in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 260. Cf. Söderblom in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 468 f. Some modern Anglo-Catholics would prefer to be known by the unhyphenated term 'Catholic' (*Priests' Convention*, 195; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 1; Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 10–12, 89 f).

[4] Oman, *Vision*, 157, 162; Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 114 ("Why do we allow Rome to run away with the Catholic idea?"); Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 8 f; Peel in *Congreg. Quart.* Jan. 1927, 6.

Catholics who are not Roman.[1] They admit, however, that the Anglican use of the word 'Catholic' has succeeded in importing a certain de facto ambiguity into the term,[2] and that therefore the name 'Roman Catholic' is a necessity.[3] Their objection to the word 'Catholic' being used by others is, however, more intelligible than their objection to 'Roman' being used of themselves. The term 'Roman' describes them accurately; and, in the phrase 'Roman Catholic,' it is at worst a redundancy.[4] To raise any other objection to it is simply to complain because others do not think of Rome as they do. In the interests, therefore, of clarity and brevity, and with no wish to offend, we shall be compelled sometimes to speak of 'Romanists' or 'Roman Catholics,' and even to include Anglicans and Anglo-Catholics under the general designation of 'Protestants.' It may not be possible to avoid all ambiguity in the use of the simple word 'Catholic.' Without abandoning their claim to true catholicity, Free-Churchmen at least (whatever may be the case with Anglicans) do right not to call themselves 'Catholics' (except with special explanations), but to leave the name—for the sake of clearness—to Romanists and to such Anglicans as desire it. Nothing is lost by accepting these conventions of language: we should not expect a Romanist to mislead us by saying that he belonged to the 'Reformed Church,' albeit the Roman Church *could* plead that since the Council of Trent it might be rightly so described; nor do we regard him as giving his case away when, like the rest of the world, he calls the Reformation 'the Reformation.'[5]

Differences between men in the matter of religious convictions have usually been accompanied, as is well known, by violent rancour and ill-will. It was said of Maimonides, the mediaeval Jewish savant, that he taught that a Jew ought not to save an idolater from death by drowning.[6] The lepers' quarter at Jerusalem used to be the only place in the city where Jews and Mohammedans were willing to live together. Unhappily,

[1] Salmon, *Infall.* xi–xiii, xv f. Dr. Faà di Bruno, however, is mistaken in imagining Protestants to say to Roman Catholics: "we are careful to call you by this name, because the word 'Roman' makes it appear that you are only national like ourselves" (*Cath. Belief*, 157). It is one thing to recognize the international character of Roman Catholicism: it is quite another thing to admit its *sole* claim to the name 'Catholic.'

[2] S. F. Smith, S.J. *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness*, 19.

[3] Salmon, *Infall.* xi.

[4] The phrase 'Roman Church' or 'Holy Roman Church,' with or without further supplementary epithets, occurs again and again in official Roman Catholic documents—frequently, for instance, in the Tridentine Decrees, in papal bulls of various dates, in the so-called *Creed of Pius IV* ("sanctam *catholicam* et apostolicam *Romanam* ecclesiam"), in the decrees of the Vatican Council, etc. In a papal 'allocution' of 1805 occurs the phrase "sanctae ecclesiae *catholicae* apostolicae *Romanae*" (italics, of course, mine).

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxvi, 5.

[6] Gibbon, *Decline* (ed. Bury) ii. 3 n. 3.

Christian controversy has not been exempt from reproach on the score of animosity and bitterness. Christian literature, even from the earliest times, bears traces of this spirit. "First-born of Satan" is the favourite phrase of the saintly Polycarpus for addressing or referring to an errorist teacher.[1] Marcion's pathetic term for his adherents, 'partners in bearing misery and hatred,' bears witness to the harsh antipathy with which he and they were treated.[2] The vehemence of the antagonism subsisting between Christian sects, later in the second century, scandalized even the pagan philosopher Celsus;[3] and the like impression was made on the historian Ammianus Marcellinus in the fourth.[4] The evil precedent descended through the Middle Ages. Melanchthon reckoned it among the blessings of the future life that one would be freed from the outrageous fury of theologians. In defending their cause against the criticism and dissent of Protestants, Catholics have often gone to extremes of bitter censure—to say nothing of punishment. It was natural enough for them, especially in former days, to regard all opposition not only with regret and disagreement, but with the most intense moral repugnance, as a wilful attack upon truth itself. Hence the charges of bigotry, spitefulness, misapprehension, and misrepresentation, so freely levelled by Romanists at those who criticize them.[5] It is probably due largely to this, namely, the treatment of all dissent from the Roman Church as morally reprehensible, as well as to the habit of concentrating on the minor exaggerations and inaccuracies incidental to such dissent, that Catholic apologetic often wears an air of evasiveness in the eyes of Protestants.[6] Doubtless Protestant criticism must often seem just as evasive to Catholics: certainly there has been no lack on the Protestant side of the use of hard words. We do not pause here to discuss which side has the best excuse for its censoriousness: we merely observe the fact that the vicious circle, being once set up, tended to revolve at an accelerated pace. The immoderate

[1] Polyc. *Ep. Philipp.* vii. 1; *Mart. Polyc.* epil. Mosc. 3.

[2] Tertull. *Adv. Marc.* iv. 9 (*συνταλαίπωρον, συμμισούμενον*).

[3] Origenes, *Contra Celsum*, v. 63–65.

[4] He remarks of the Emperor Julianus: "nullas infestas hominibus bestias, ut sunt sibi ferales plerique Christianorum expertus" (Ammianus Marc. *Rerum Gest.* XXII. v. 4).

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxxv f, xl f, xliv f, lv, lx f, 129. Dr. Horton prints in *England's Danger* (33–36) a violently vituperative letter that appeared against him in *The Universe* for 12 Mar. 1898, 4. Cf. Rev. S. F. Smith, S.J. *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness*, 3 (Liguori misrepresented in *Encyc. Brit.*), 28 ("fanatics"), 29 ("garbled and misconstrued quotations"), 31 ("unreasoning bigots like Dr. Horton"); Gilavert, *Influence of Cath.* 48 f, 72 f. Newman confesses frankly in his *Apologia* his rude and unfriendly conduct to some, of whose opinions he disapproved during his Anglo-Catholic days (*Apol.* 66 f [iv], 128 [v]: cf. Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 19).

[6] Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxxv f, xxxviii f, 129; Salmon, *Infall.* 243; Martineau, *Seat*, 157 ("dogmatic in assertion, unjust in criticism, evasive in reply").

vehemence of Luther's expressions about the papacy is notorious.[1] Queen Elizabeth's suggested marriage with a Catholic was deprecated on the ground that it was unlawful for a child of God to wed a son of the devil. Foxe, the martyrologist, maintained the controversial style of the great German reformer.[2] The struggles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries stamped into the British mind a feeling of the bitterest hatred for Rome and all her works. That Rome was the Scarlet Woman of the Book of Revelation, and the Pope Antichrist, almost became commonplaces of the British Christian's 'Weltanschauung.' [3]

But, although this deeply-rooted prejudice against Rome cannot be said to have altogether passed away,[4] it is pleasing to be able to refer to the spread of a new spirit in the polemical literature of our time. This must not be confused with a conscious willingness to concede points at issue on either side, though it will probably be found eventually to involve, logically at least, some fairly far-reaching modifications in the doctrine of truth. Be that as it may, the new tolerance does not mean that we can "cease from mental fight." [5] As long as the exclusive claims of Rome are advanced, for so long must they be tested and challenged. Nor, since we have the courage of our convictions, ought we to shrink from wishing and trying to bring Catholics into a larger and truer, because more charitable, faith.[6] But in doing this, we shall not forget that the forward movement of the human spirit has put the old-time slandering and prejudice out of date. "Nam et pessimi exempli nec nostri saeculi est." [7] A story is told of Platon, the Metropolitan of

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 244; Heiler, *Kathol.* 566.

[2] Salmon, *Infall.* 2 f.

[3] Readers of Charlotte Brontë may remember the outburst of Lucy Snow in *Villette* (1850), at the end of ch. xxxvi. Kingsley probably overstepped the mark in the attack to which Newman replied in his *Apologia* (q.v. 2, 13 [i]). An American writer recalls a Presbyterian vestryman known to him in his boyhood "who still had a barrel or two of pamphlets on 'The Whore of Babylon' in his attic" (*Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1921, 242). Cf. Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, passim, esp. 213, 249, 258 f.

[4] Witness the *tone* of the pamphlets of 'The Protestant Press Bureau.'

[5] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 10 ("Die Offenheit für die tiefen und schönen Seiten des Katholizismus ist mit der prinzipiellen Ablehnung des Katholizismus durchaus vereinbar. . . . Eine objektive Darstellung des Katholizismus erfordert aber nicht bloss diese Ehrfurcht vor dem Heiligen, sondern ebenso die schonungslose Blosslegung jeder Entstellung und Trübung, Verzerrung und Profanierung der religiösen Idee"), 13 ("Aber solange das Vollkommene nicht gekommen ist, muss Kampf sein, harter, unerbittlicher Kampf: πόλεμος πατὴρ πάντων"); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 119, 127.

[6] Salmon, *Infall.* 6 f: cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 203; Rogers, *Rome*, iv.

[7] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 3 f; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 190, 193, 279 ("the Catholic Revival . . . has made the English people kindlier to Catholics, but not to Roman Catholicism"); C. F. Rogers in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1927, 64–74. Peter Rosegger, the adventurous Catholic reformer of Styria (about 1900) was strongly drawn towards Protestantism by the comparative mildness and charity of its preachers (Bain, *New*

Kieff, that one day, when he was met by the Jews carrying the Pentateuch in their hands, he kissed the holy book, and said: "I believe that the walls built by men against each other are far from reaching up to God's heaven." The anecdote well represents the new spirit that is more and more commending itself in Christian controversy. One of the reasons why so much arguing in the past has been futile is because people did not fully *understand* the beliefs they were opposing:[1] and one of the reasons why they misunderstood the beliefs was because they did not love the believers.[2] Perhaps they acted on the false counsel: "Be just before you are generous," forgetful of the fact that it is impossible to be just, unless one is loving and generous enough to sympathize and understand.[3] It is our sincere desire that there may be nothing in this book that violates either of those two greatest commandments, on which hang the whole Law and the Prophets.

But good intentions—here as elsewhere—are not enough. The ethics of controversy demand that one shall be not only morally willing, but also intellectually capable, of *stating* the other man's position as the latter himself would like it to be stated. The very atmosphere of controversy makes it difficult for us all to do this: it is not easy to keep a sense of proportion when one is treating a matter in a polemical way and with a view to propaganda. Unwitting distortion is further facilitated by the existence of pertinent realities which neither side has yet seen. "Look, gentlemen!" cries Thackeray. "Does a week pass without the announcement of the discovery of a new comet in the sky, a new star in the heaven, twinkling dimly out of a yet farther distance, and only now becoming visible to human ken though existent for ever and ever? So let us hope divine truths may be shining, and regions of light

Reformation, 83). "It has become possible, surely, to look at the scarlet shimmer of the robes of cardinals without being scorched by flames from the nether pit. The Pope is no longer Antichrist" (R. E. G. George, in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1924, 559). *The Times Lit. Suppt.* has more than once protested against what it considers the excessive censoriousness of Prof. G. G. Coulton (22 Feb. 1923, 117; 31 July 1924, 479; 21 Jan. 1926, 37). Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 49–54, 81.

[1] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. xix f.

[2] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 6 f ("Der Zauberstab, mit dem die Psychologie fremdes Seelenleben enträtselt, ist die Liebe. . . . Die Liebe ist das Geheimnis der Religionsforschung . . . Ohne Liebe, ohne Weitherzigkeit, ohne Aufgeschlossenheit gibt es kein Eindringen in die religiöse Welt des Katholizismus"). Hence Heiler's determination *ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ* (XXVI; cf. 13: "Dieser Kampf muss aber ein edler, ritterlicher Kampf mit blanken Waffen sein, . . ."). Cf. Woodlock, *Modernism*, 88 bott.

[3] Cf. Glover, *Conflict of Religions*, 259 ("contempt is no pathway to understanding or to truth"); also the professions of Hase (*Handbook*, i. xxiii), Salmon (*Infall.* 15 f: "In every controversy the Christian teacher should put away all bitterness, . . . pray that God will inspire you with a sincere love . . . of the whole truth . . . and ask Him also to inspire you with a sincere love of your brethren: . . ."), and Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 54, 57 f, 65–67.

and love extant, which Geneva glasses cannot yet perceive, and are beyond the focus of Roman telescopes."[1] Nor is it at all impossible that some such things may be sighted by Rome before Geneva, and others by Geneva before Rome. This plea has of course been used before now in favour of Rome. The Catholic Church has been compared to a cathedral, whose window-panes look dark and dull when seen from without, and reveal the richness of their blazonry only to those who enter within.[2] The warning of this analogy may be humbly and sincerely accepted: but it tells both ways, and we may fairly ask our Catholic brethren to admit that, as an analogy, we are just as much entitled to appeal to it as they are. If one may push it a trifle further —not all who have been within the cathedral have been content to stay there; for they have realized, what is well known to many outside, that there are other and greater glories in God's universe than the most gorgeous stained-glass windows of a single edifice.

We shall however do our best to understand the position we are criticizing, the challenge to which we are replying. Dr. Faà di Bruno reasonably says: "*Fairness*, no less than common sense, teaches that a man should study and examine the teaching of the Catholic Church at *Catholic sources* before condemning her. . . . Nor is it fair to form a judgment from misrepresentations made by ill-informed, interested, or prejudiced persons. A man should rather, by the study of authorized Catholic works, judge of the truth with that calm and unprejudiced mind which the all-important subject of Religion deserves."[3] The present writer has earnestly tried, so far as it lay within his power, to fulfil this demand. He has read and consulted a large number of Catholic books and articles, and wherever practicable has gone to the original authorities. He has not, however, felt it incumbent upon him to refrain from using all facts for which only a Protestant authority was within reach. Care, of course, has been necessary to eliminate the effect of prejudice: but this holds good, not only for Protestant, but also for Catholic, writings. It would be unreasonable to demand that one's facts should be derived *solely* from one's opponents: "Facts . . . do not cease to be facts because they are stated by Protestants."[4] Efforts have been made to ensure accuracy in statements of fact: and if at any point

[1] *The Newcomes*, ch. lxv.

[2] In a similar way, Heiler (*Kathol.* 5) regards it as characteristic of Protestant polemic to see only the rough exterior and to ignore "die wundersamen Kunstwerke im Inneren." Cf. G. K. Chesterton's protest in *Superstitions of the Sceptic*, 36 f.

[3] *Cath. Belief*, 219.

[4] G. F. Edwards in *Papacy and Bible*, 27 f. Cf. Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 24 ("Why should I not trust the word of a Protestant, against whose character—so far as I can ascertain—nothing can be said . . .? If we reject the evidence of reliable persons, how can history be properly written?"); also Sanday's testimony to Walsh's fairness in the use of documents (*Conception of Priesthood*, 117).

these efforts have not been attended with success, notification of the error will be gratefully accepted. At the same time, the author would beg his critics not to regard casual inaccuracies on subordinate points, and what they may consider to be weak or inconclusive arguments on secondary questions, as invalidating the main contentions of the book. That the book will leave some readers unconvinced is certain: but it is hoped that, if these should have occasion to state the grounds for their dissent, they will keep them distinct from criticisms on relatively minor issues, desirable and welcome as all such criticisms will be.

Christian hearts on both sides of the great dividing line vibrate in response to the prayer in Philip Pusey's hymn: "Peace in Thy Church where brothers are engaging." But love for peace and love for truth are twin loyalties to one majestic and sovereign Reality; and it cannot be that there is any inevitable incongruity between them. May it be granted to us all to be so faithful to them both, that our controversy shall vindicate the truth of the Proverb

ὃς δ' ἐλέγχει μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρηνοποιεῖ.

CHAPTER II

THE CATHOLIC POSITION

THE purpose of this chapter is not to summarize the content of Catholic belief as authorized and normally held to-day, but rather to give an account of the basis on which it rests, the sources from which it is derived, and the nature of the authorities by which it is thought to be guaranteed.

The special Catholic doctrine in regard to the relation of reason to faith will have to be described and discussed in detail later. For the moment it must suffice to observe that, so far from intending to reject reason, Catholicism assigns it a very definite and important place in its system. Reason is indeed unable to teach us the Divine mysteries which are needful for our salvation; these can be known to us only by subordinating reason to a humble faith in Divine revelation. But reason can furnish as it were a foundation for faith, or, to vary the metaphor, can prepare a road for it. A few basic things can be brought home to man by cogent intellectual proof alone, without the need of faith or revelation. The chief of these is the existence and spiritual nature of God. Though Gregorius IX in 1223 strongly deprecated the use of philosophy in connexion with theological study, yet, in the course of the same century, Thomas Aquinas worked out a whole system of Catholic doctrine on the basis of Aristotelianism; and it became an accepted piece of Catholic teaching that reason by itself is capable of proving that God exists and can be known.[1] The 'Roman Catechism' of 1566 made a declaration to this effect;[2] the Vatican Council of 1870 erected it into a binding article of faith;[3] and in 1910 a papal decree required every Catholic priest to swear explicitly that he accepted it.[4]

The next step, logically speaking, in the explication of the Roman system is the argument that, if such a God exists, He will supplement the limited powers of human reason by giving a supernatural revelation

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 428; Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 516; Heiler, *Kathol.* 114 f, 318 f, 136 (Dante), 348 f; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 52–78. Dr. Orchard's statement on this point (*Foundations*, iv. 10, cf. 38) seems to me to be erroneous.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* praef. 1 (see below, p. 95 n. 1), 2 ("Invisibilia quidem Dei, ut docet Apostolus, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et divinitas: verum mysterium illud," etc. etc.).

[3] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 2 init. (Mirbt 457 [4]), can. ii. 1 (Mirbt 460 [24]: "Si quis dixerit, Deum unum et verum, creatorem et dominum nostrum, per ea, quae facta sunt, naturali rationis humanae lumine certo cognosci non posse; anathema sit").

[4] Mirbt 516 (12).

of Himself, and, in order to guide men in their obedience to this revelation, He will provide—somehow and somewhere—an infallible authority to present and interpret it to them. The functions of this authority will be to direct men in such matters of belief and conduct as are necessary to their salvation, partly by safeguarding the body of revealed truth, and answering without error the questions that arise from time to time in connection with it,[1] and partly also by exercising practical and administrative control.[2] This a priori argument is for Catholic minds strongly confirmed by certain New-Testament passages, which are understood to record, as pure matters of historical fact, that our Lord claimed as God Incarnate to have brought a supernatural revelation to men, that He founded the Christian Church, and promised that it should be infallible,[3] and that the Church from the beginning regarded herself as such.[4] As the Roman Catholic Church is the only Christian body existing to-day, which both claims to enjoy this infallibility, and at the same time can boast unbroken continuity of life from the earliest period, the conclusion seems irresistible that she is in very truth the infallible guardian and interpreter of God's Revelation to the world, and as such entitled to the submission and obedience of all men.[5] Not only does this conclusion *seem* irresistible: to the Catholic it actually is so. Newman, indeed, at one time professed himself able to believe in an infallibility that was

[1] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 27, 35 ("Such Revelation having been given, it follows that there must be some way in which these truths can be communicated to us in their purity, and in such a manner as to render us certain of possessing them"), 391 f; Newman, *Developm.* 117–119, 128, *Apol.* 220 (vii), *Gramm.* 407 n. (quotation from the Catholic apologist Amort), 417–421, 434 (strong a priori probability of a Divine revelation); Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 19–23; Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 511b top (necessity of a qualified infallibility in every society). Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 69; Stanton, *Authority*, 87, 152 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 351 f.

[2] Merry del Val, *op. cit.* 21 f ("Suppose . . . that no Divine promise had been made to S. Peter . . ., the Pope would nevertheless be *practically* infallible, or, what is the same thing, he would have to be considered so, as being the ultimate tribunal which admits of no appeal. . . . Hence it is that practical infallibility is always asserted as a necessity for the government of every organised society"). Cf. Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 256 f. *Strictly speaking*, however, infallibility pertains not to the Church's administration, but only to the exercise of her doctrinal authority (so Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 790a, and Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 512a).

[3] Merry del Val, *op. cit.* 19 f; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 790–793.

[4] Toner in *op. cit.* 790 f.

[5] Newman, *Apol.* 220 f (vii), *Gramm.* 424, 434; Salmon, *Infall.* 19 ("they" [the Tractarians] "accepted the Church of Rome as that guide . . . merely because, if she were not that guide, they knew not where else to find it"), 56, 57, 101, 170 (". . . the proof has been simplified into: 'There is an infallible Church somewhere, and no Church but that of Rome can claim the attribute' "); Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 102 (summarizing Lammenais: "the true religion is that which rests on the greatest visible authority, which from sheer lack of actual or possible claimants can be no other than Rome"); Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xiii (1912) 3 f.

probable only:[1] but in this he was certainly not representative; and it is not easy to see what value such an infallibility could possess for one who so regarded it.[2]

Nominally and as a matter of theory, infallibility is claimed in the first place for 'the Church,' though the actual word 'infallibility' is not often used until late times.[3] The Tridentine Decrees and Canons contain no definition on the subject. They speak frequently of "the Roman Church, which is the mother and schoolmistress (magistra) of all churches," [4] refer to her authority in various terms,[5] and describe her as daily instructed in all truth by the Holy Spirit.[6] The 'Creed of Pius IV' (1564) makes no explicit claim to infallibility on behalf of the Church,[7] but pledges the convert to acknowledge her supremacy and to reject the heresies she has condemned. The 'Roman Catechism,' however, besides re-echoing the language of the Council,[8] lays it down definitely that the Church cannot err in handing on the discipline of faith and morals.[9] More or less casual allusions—official and otherwise—to the infallibility of the Church are found later;[10] and it is to-day regarded (apart from the question as to who constitute the Church) as one of the doctrines common to Catholicism and High-Anglicanism.[11]

[1] Newman, *Developm.* 119 f. Cf. *Gramm.* 406 f (". . . from probabilities we may construct legitimate proof, sufficient for certitude": in religious inquiry we cannot wait for the kind of logical demonstration which we rightly require in mathematics and science).

[2] Salmon, *Infall.* 57.

[3] Gregorius VII (1073–1085) laid it down "Quod Romana ecclesia numquam erravit nec in perpetuum scriptura testante errabit" (Mirbt 146 [42]).

[4] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, bapt. can. 3 (Mirbt 304 [22]): similar phrases in sess. xiv, extrem. unc. cap. 3; sess. xxii, sacrif. miss. cap. 8; sess. xxv, 4 Dec. de delectu ciborum: also in the *Creed of Pius IV.*

[5] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, bapt. can. 8 (Mirbt 304 [31]: "omnibus sanctae ecclesiae praeceptis"), sess. xxi, commun. cap. 1 ("ipsius ecclesiae iudicium et consuetudinem"), cap. 2 ("hanc suam in administratione sacramentorum auctoritatem . . . ipsius ecclesiae auctoritate"). Similarly *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 3 (Mirbt 458 [16]: ". . . quae . . . ab ecclesia sive solemni iudicio sive ordinario et universali magisterio tamquam divinitus revelata credenda proponuntur").

[6] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiii, praef. (Mirbt 305 [44]: "catholica ecclesia, ab ipso Jesu Christo Domino nostro et eius Apostolis erudita, atque a Spiritu sancto illi omnem veritatem in dies suggerente edocta . . .").

[7] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 173–175.

[8] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 2 ("Ecclesiae auctoritate neglecta"), III. ii. 15 ("qui non credunt ea quae sancta mater Ecclesia credenda proponit").

[9] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 19 ("haec una Ecclesia errare non potest in fidei ac morum disciplina tradenda, cum a Spiritu sancto gubernetur"). Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 38. This point is overlooked in Salmon, *Infall.* 173.

[10] One is of special interest—Newman, *Apol.* 121 (v) (the sudden conviction produced in him by the words, "Securus judicat orbis terrarum"). Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 271. See also above, n. 5 fin.

[11] Pusey, *Eiren.* 91, 93 ("It is matter of faith that the whole Church shall never be led into any formal acceptance of error by virtue of our Lord's promise"); Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 37, 49, 60 n. 3, 73, 173; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 791a; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 18 f, 22

It is important, however, to observe that the infallibility of the Church has been frankly abandoned by some recent and representative High Anglican writers.[1]

But to say that the Church is infallible is but to provoke the further question as to precisely what part or phase of the Church is the actual organ of her infallibility. Prior to 1870 very diverse views were entertained by Catholics on this point.[2] Strange as it may seem, the unanimous or virtually unanimous conviction of Christians at any particular time has not been in the past, and is not to-day, regarded as being necessarily infallible. Phrases recalling the Arian controversy, like "Athanasius contra mundum" and "The whole world groaned and wondered to find itself Arian," and the declaration of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Catholic authorities that it was possible that the true faith of Christ might remain in a single person,[3] are sufficient evidence in regard to earlier times; while a modern Catholic exponent says: "nor is the general or even unanimous consent of the faithful in believing a distinct and independent organ of infallibility." [4] The Gallican view that the consent of the Church is a necessary condition of an infallible pronouncement has been definitely rejected by Rome.[5]

There remain only two conceivable organs of infallibility—the General or Œcumenical Councils, and the Popes; and each of these two authorities, under certain specified conditions, is to-day regarded in the Catholic Church as an independent organ of infallibility. Such doctrine is however in both cases the outcome of a long process of development.

When the first General Council was held at Nicæa in 325 A.D., it was natural to presume that its conclusions were the result of the guidance of the Holy Spirit. The Emperor Constantinus gave voice to this general conviction; and on the strength of it the historian Socrates in the fifth century declared that the members of the Council "were utterly unable to err from the truth." [6] During the next thousand

[1] See below, p. 230 n. 3.

[2] Salmon, *Infall.* 175 f; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 271. Cf. Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 257 f; W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 112.

[3] Quoted by Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 78, and by Hase, *Handbook*, i. 37.

[4] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 790b. Cf. Collins in *op. cit.* 87 f ("Roman writers . . . tend to make the Church not an authoritative body, but a body within which there are authoritative agencies . . .").

[5] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 4 fin. (Mirbt 465 [30]: "ideoque eiusmodi Romani pontificis definitiones ex sese, non autem ex consensu ecclesiae irreformabiles esse"). Cf. Van Hove in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 324a; Salmon, *Infall.* 262–266. In 1713 the Pope condemned as erroneous the Jansenist proposition: "Ecclesia auctoritatem excommunicandi habet, ut eam exerceat per primos pastores de consensu saltem praesumpto totius corporis" (Mirbt 398 [no. 90]).

[6] Socrates, *Hist. Eccles.* i. 9. It is *Socrates* who makes this latter judgment, not Constantinus, as stated by Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 168 n. 1. Cf. Wilhelm n *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 433b.

years, many Councils were held which professed, or were thought, to represent the whole Church: but the decisions of some of them did not establish themselves, and no theory was generally framed or accepted as to which of them were really authoritative, and how far their authority reached. The opinion, however, that a General Council is superior in authority to the Pope, even in the settlement of points of faith, was strongly held and emphatically professed by many representative Catholics in the fourteenth and following centuries. Such was, broadly speaking, the position taken up by the Councils of Pisa (1409),[1] of Constance (1414–1418)[2] and of Basle (1431 ff)—the last-named with the approval of Pope Eugenius IV.[3] It was held by William of Occam, the English scholastic (about 1280–1349),[4] by John Gerson, the famous French divine and Chancellor of the University of Paris (1363–1429),[5] by the eminent Spanish theologian Tostatus of Avila (1400?–1455),[6] by Diether von Isenburg, Archbishop of Mainz (1412–1463),[7] and (as regards individual popes in distinction from the papacy apprehended ideally) by the Dominican Cardinal John de Turrecremata (1388–1468).[8] The infallibility of Œcumenical Councils in general and of the Council of Constance in particular was taken for granted by Dr. Eck, the opponent of Luther at Leipzig in 1519.[9] The Cardinal of Tortosa, afterwards Pope Adrianus VI (1459–1523), believed that Popes could err.[10] Melchior Cano, the great Dominican theologian of Spain

[1] Hase, *Kirchengeschichte* (XIth ed.) 287; Stanton, *Authority*, 222 f.

[2] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 34, 36, 269, 277 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 264 f, 321; Stanton, *op. cit.* 223; Mirbt 228; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 435a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 301 f.

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 269 f, 277 f, *Kirchengeschichte* (XIth ed.) 290: cf. Stanton, *op. cit.* 223; Wilhelm, *l.c.*; Van Hove in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 324a; Mirbt 233.

[4] Cf. R. M. Pope in H.*E.R.E.* xii (1921) 730b.

[5] Quoted by Stanton, *op. cit.* 223 f.

[6] Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 192. Cf. *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 788.

[7] *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 706b note.

[8] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 270; Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 191 f.

[9] McGiffert, *Martin Luther* (1911) 142.

[10] The case of Adrianus VI is especially interesting: it has been very fully treated by E. H. J. Reusens in his *Syntagma Doctrinae Theologicae Adriani Sexti* (published at Louvain, 1862) xxvii–xxxi, 122–152. It appears that Adrianus, when professor of theology at Louvain, wrote a work entitled *Quaestiones in quartum Sententiarum librum*, which was published in 1516 and several times subsequently. In this work he emphatically maintained that it was possible for the Pope to err in matters relating to faith by affirming heretical statements. He became Pope in Jan. 1522, and died in Sept. 1523. After his elevation to the papacy, the book (still including the statement in question) was republished both at Rome and at Venice, but apparently without Adrianus' knowledge or consent. Catholic authorities plead (1) that Adrianus' statement, being made before his election, was not a papal utterance at all; (2) that, even if it were a papal utterance, it was not an ex-cathedra utterance, but simply the statement of a private doctor, and might therefore be erroneous; (3) that, even if ex cathedra and not erroneous, it may well refer, not to ex-cathedra errors of Popes, but only to their errors as private doctors: from all which it follows that Adrianus' utterance does not conflict with the official Roman doctrine of the infallibility of the

(1509–1560), contended that in a General Council the bishops were true judges, not merely assessors to the Pope.[1] No declaration as to the infallibility of Councils was made at Trent; and in the main this Council was obsequious to the papal supremacy: yet it took occasion to warn the Pope solemnly as to the kind of men he appointed as cardinals and pastors.[2] The Pope, in the bulls issued on the termination of the Council, observed that it had followed in the footsteps of the ancient Councils, and that the Almighty Lord had deigned Divinely to inspire its conclusions; and he demanded general acceptance of "all other things delivered, defined, and declared by the sacred Canons and General Councils, and particularly by the holy Council of Trent." [3] Henceforth until 1870 the official Catholic view was that the normal seat of infallibility was the Pope in Œcumenical Council.[4] In reaction, however, against the growing power of the papacy, Bossuet, the great champion of Catholicism in France, and the Gallican Church generally, declared emphatically, towards the close of the seventeenth century, that the doctrinal decisions of the Pope were not final and irreversible, unless they were confirmed by a General Council of the Church. The declaration led to a contest with the Pope, and was officially withdrawn in 1693 (eleven years after its formal promulgation), but its doctrines continued to be widely held.[5] Seventy years later they were revived in a modified form by von Hontheim ('Febronius'), coadjutor-bishop of Trier in Germany, whose book (1763), maintaining

Pope. On the other hand, there does not seem to have been any outcry against Adrianus' statement during or soon after his lifetime—on the contrary, his book was highly praised by zealous Catholics. Moreover his statement quite clearly did *not* refer only to what Popes said as private doctors, but to their official (i.e. their ex-cathedra) utterances ("certum est, quod possit errare etiam in his, quae tangunt fidem, haeresim per suam determinationem aut decretalem asserendo"); the inference is obvious: the Church of the sixteenth century certainly did not believe that even the ex-cathedra utterances of the Pope were necessarily infallible. Cf. Forget in Vacant and Mangenot's *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*, i (1903) 461; W. W. Rockwell in *Encyc. Brit.* i. 216b. The articles on Adrian VI in Wetzer and Welte's *Kirchenlexikon* v (1888) 1426–1437 and *Cath. Encyc.* i (1907) 159 f ignore this whole matter.

[1] Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 196.

[2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiv, reform, cap. 1 fin. ("Postremo eadem sancta synodus . . . non potest non commemorare, nihil magis ecclesiae Dei esse necessarium, quam ut beatissimus Romanus pontifex" etc. etc. ". . . idque eo magis, quod ovium Christi sanguinem, quae ex malo negligentium et sui officii immemorum pastorum regimine peribunt, Dominus noster Jesus Christus de manibus eius sit requisiturus"). Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 198.

[3] See the bulls *Benedictus Deus*, Jan. 1564, and *Injunctum nobis* (containing the *Creed of Pius IV*) Nov. 1564 (Mirbt 337–340).

[4] St. Cyres in *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 489b; Newman, *Apol.* 229 (vii).

[5] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 34–37; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 273 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 87, 264 f; St. Cyres in *Encyc. Brit.* xi. 418b. Edmond Richer, the Gallican theologian (1559–1631), made this view a matter *of faith*, but Bossuet would not go so far (Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 192).

among other things that the Pope is subject to General Councils, had enormous influence among Catholics throughout Europe, in spite of its immediate condemnation at Rome and of the very qualified submission eventually extorted from the author.[1] It has, however, been held with fair uniformity in the Roman Catholic Church ever since 1870 that no Council has been truly General or Œcumenical, unless it was summoned by, or with the consent of, the Pope, carried on its deliberations under his presidency or that of his deputies, and received his approval to its conclusions.[2] Covered by such a definition, Catholic authorities do not now hesitate to declare that the decisions of a General Council are infallible, indeed that such a Council is an independent organ of infallibility.[3] The decrees of the Councils of Trent (1545–1563) and the Vatican (1870) in fact together form a tolerably complete corpus of definitive Catholic teaching.

It is fairly obvious, however, that this way of defining a General Council is simply a method of maintaining papal infallibility without repudiating in so many words the authority of conciliar decrees. Apart from the fact that the initiative, presidency, etc. of the Pope cannot be historically proved in the case of some of the Councils accepted even by Rome,[4] there has been ever since the fourth century considerable difference of opinion (some even among Catholics) as to precisely which Councils were truly General;[5] and all parties agree that even

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 70, 234–236; W. A. Phillips in *Encyc. Brit.* x. 230 f; anon. in *op. cit.* xiii. 663 (art. 'Hontheim'); St. Cyres in *op. cit.* xxiii. 492b; Lauchert in *Cath. Encyc.* vi (1909) 23–25.

[2] Hefele, *Councils*, i. 52–54; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 111 f; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 424a, 426–428, 430 f, 433–435; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 793b, 795b, 796a, 799a. See below, pp. 26 f n. 5. On the repudiation of Gallicanism, Salmon, *Infall.* 88; Van Hove in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 324a.

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 64, 68; Catholic authorities as in last note; also Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 109 ("there is not an instance of any point of faith once defined as true by the Church in a General Council, or by the Pope speaking *ex cathedrâ*, having been contradicted by another General Council, or by any Pope speaking *ex cathedrâ*; nor will there be such an instance to the end of time").

[4] Note the guarded language of Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 795b ("the right to summon an œcumenical council belongs properly to the pope alone, though by his express or presumed consent given *ante* or *post factum*, the summons may be issued, as in the case of most of the early councils, in the name of the civil authority"), and the similar admissions and minimizations of Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 428ab (". . . It is, however, evident that the Christian emperors cannot have acted thus without the consent, actual or presumed, of the pope. Otherwise their conduct had been neither lawful nor wise . . ." Imperial convocation does not mean authorization; 'jubeo' may mean only 'exhort,' and so on), 430 f (cases in which papal confirmation is 'presumed').

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 30, 41; Hefele, *Councils*, i. 55–64; Rackham in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 137; Collins, *ibid.* 176–183; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 46 f; Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 268ab; *Cath. Dict.* 665a. According to Wilhelm (*Cath. Encyc.* iv [1908] 424 ff), some Councils were Œcumenical only *in part*: he gives a definitive list of twenty in all (*op. cit.* 425 f).

some for which œcumenicity has been claimed have erred. Thus the decisions of the Council of Ariminum (359 A.D.), Ephesus (449 A.D.), and Constantinople (754 A.D.), which, so far as representation went, had as good a claim to œcumenicity as the Council of Nicæa, were later generally rejected. The possibility of a General Council deciding wrongly was certainly assumed in the fourth and following centuries, was explicitly stated by Augustinus, was reaffirmed by a succession of representative mediaeval Catholics (Thomas Waldensis, Cardinal d'Ailly, St. Antoninus Archbishop of Florence, and Bellarmine), and has been asserted by some modern Catholics (Döllinger and Manning before the decisions of 1870, and Ehrhard after), and by the Anglican authorities generally.[1] Hence, corresponding to the Catholic theory that only those Councils were truly General whose conclusions were approved by the Pope, there has arisen the Anglican theory that only those Councils were truly General, or, alternatively, only those General Councils possessed final authority, whose conclusions were accepted by the Church at large.[2] When we consider the extraordinary difficulty of applying definitely and in detail a test at once so searching and so vague, we can hardly be surprised that Catholics regard the principle as unworkable and therefore erroneous.[3]

In Catholicism, while lip-service has been paid to General Councils and at times recourse has been had to them, the recent tendency has certainly been towards a growing disuse of them as inconvenient, logically anomalous, and virtually unnecessary.[4] In any case, the superiority of the Pope to a General Council, first asserted in the 'Decretum Gratiani' (1140–1150 A.D.), then declared by the Fifth Lateran Council (1512–1517) and the papal bull issued in the course of it, and exhibited in the humble submission of the Tridentine Decrees to Pius IV for confirmation, has since 1870 been the fixed doctrine of the Roman Church.[5]

[1] Pusey, *Eiren.* 32; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 32–37, 40, 62, 64 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 284 f, 294 f, 302; Stanton, *Authority*, 221 f; Rackham in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 135 f; Collins, *ibid.* 167–171, 177 f, 184 f, 188, 193 f; Bain, *New Reformation*, 24 ; D. Stone in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 626b; Heiler, *Kathol.* 658 n.

[2] This theory was also held by Bossuet and some Catholics of later times, like Döllinger and Hotzl. See Pusey, *Eiren.* 32; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 62 f; Stanton, *Authority*, 177–181, 220 f, 224; Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 179, 183, 186 f, 194; W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 112 f.

[3] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 791a, 796a (". . . No workable rule can be given for deciding when such subsequent ratification as this theory requires becomes effective; . . .").

[4] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 23, 110–113; St. Cyres in *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 489b; Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 268 f.

[5] See the bulls *Pastor Aeternus* of 1516 (Mirbt 252 f) and *Benedictus Deus* of 1564 (Mirbt 337 f) and the connected documents: also Hase, *Handbook*, i. 34, 40, 235, 269; *Conc Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 3 (Mirbt 463 f) ("Quare a recto veritatis tramite aberrant,

We pass on, then, to the other, and vastly more important, organ of infallibility in the Roman Church—I mean, the ex-cathedra utterances of the Pope. The following is a close translation of the terms in which Pius IX, at the Vatican Council of 1870, after a long preamble, issued the momentous decree making the acceptance of papal infallibility a binding article of faith for every Catholic: "And so we, by faithfully adhering to the tradition accepted since the beginning of the Christian faith, for the glory of God our Saviour, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the salvation of Christian peoples, the sacred Council approving, teach and define it to be a dogma divinely revealed, that the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, in the performance of his function as pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, is, through the Divine assistance promised to him in the Blessed Peter, potent with that infallibility wherewith the Divine Redeemer wished His Church to be endowed in the definition of doctrine concerning faith or morals, and that therefore such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are unalterable—inherently, and not through the consent of the Church. But if anyone presumes—which God avert!—to contradict this our definition, let him be anathema." [1]

It is important to observe both the extent, and also the limitations, of what is here claimed. In the first place, it is maintained by Catholics that there is no case on record of an ex-cathedra papal utterance having been either erroneous or contradicted by any other ex-cathedra papal utterance.[2] In the next place, it has been laid down with unmistakable

qui affirmant, licere ab iudiciis Romanorum pontificum ad œcumenicum concilium tamquam ad auctoritatem Romano pontifice superiorem appellare"); Hefele, *Councils*, i. 49–52; Salmon, *Infall.* 20 f, 281, 485; Van Hove in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 324a; Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 195; Heiler, *Kathol.* 305 f n. (quotations from the new *Codex Juris Canonici*, can. 222, 227 ["Concilii decreta vim obligativam non habent, nisi a Romano Pontifice fuerint confirmata et eius iussu promulgata"], 228 [Mirbt 536]).

[1] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 4 fin. (Mirbt 465 f; also in Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 45 f, and Salmon, *Infall.* 487 f): "Itaque nos traditioni a fidei christianae exordio perceptae fideliter inhaerendo, ad Dei salvatoris nostri gloriam, religionis catholicae exaltationem et christianorum populorum salutem, sacro approbante concilio, docemus et divinitus revelatum dogma esse definimus: Romanum pontificem, cum ex cathedra loquitur, id est, cum omnium christianorum pastoris et doctoris munere fungens pro suprema sua apostolica auctoritate doctrinam de fide vel moribus ab universa ecclesia tenendam definit, per assistentiam divinam, ipsi in beato Petro promissam, ea infallibilitate pollere, qua divinus redemptor ecclesiam suam in definienda doctrina de fide vel moribus instructam esse voluit; ideoque eiusmodi Romani pontificis definitiones ex sese, non autem ex consensu ecclesiae irreformabiles esse. Si quis autem huic nostrae definitioni contradicere, quod Deus avertat, praesumpserit: anathema sit."

[2] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 109 (see above p. 25 n. 3); Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 798.

clearness that this belief in papal infallibility is primitive, that is, that it has prevailed in the Church from the beginning. On the eve of the Vatican decision, Pius IX declared to a deputation of protesting bishops that it was notorious that the whole Church had at all times taught the unconditional infallibility of the Pope.[1] In the discussions, the majority "explained that the few historical difficulties did not involve any dogmatic defect in the teaching of the popes." [2] In the actual decree, the Pope claims that he was "faithfully adhering to the tradition accepted since the beginning of the Christian faith." In the first chapter of it, he quotes Matt. xvi. 16–19 and John xxi. 15–17 as the obvious scriptural proof of Peter's supreme jurisdiction, and says that these passages have always been so understood by the Catholic Church.[3] The fourth chapter begins: "This holy See has always held, the perpetual usage of the Church proves, and the Œcumenical Councils themselves . . . have declared, that in the Apostolical primacy, which the Roman pontiff as successor of Peter the chief of the Apostles holds over the universal Church, there is contained also the supreme power of instruction (magisterii)." Later on, before the great concluding words, the Pope says: "The Holy Spirit was promised to Peter's successors, not in order that, by His revelation, they should lay open new doctrine, but that, by His assistance, they should sacredly guard and faithfully expound the revelation handed down through the Apostles, otherwise, the deposit of faith. And their Apostolic doctrine, indeed, all the venerable Fathers embraced and the holy orthodox Doctors revered and followed, knowing full well that this Seat of Saint Peter ever remains unimpaired by any error," etc.[4] Pope Leo XIII, the successor of Pius IX, laid it down in an encyclical that, "in the decree of the Vatican Council dealing with the force and meaning of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff, no new opinion is introduced, but the ancient and constant faith of all the ages is asserted." [5]

It is well known that there is much in the history of the Church which it is extremely hard to reconcile with this alleged infallibility of

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 300 f.

[2] Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 512b.

[3] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 1 (Mirbt 462; also in Salmon, *Infall.* 483, and Heiler, *Kathol.* 289 n.): "Huic tam manifestae sacrarum scripturarum doctrinae, *ut ab ecclesia catholica semper intellecta est*, aperte opponuntur pravae eorum sententiae, qui . . . negant, solum Petrum prae caeteris apostolis . . . vero proprioque iurisdictionis primatu fuisse a Christo instructum: aut qui affirmant, eundem primatum non immediate directeque ipsi beato Petro, sed ecclesiae, et per hanc illi ut ipsius ecclesiae ministro delatum fuisse" (italics mine). An anathema is added for those who maintain these errors

[4] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 4 (Mirbt 464 f; also Salmon, *Infall.* 486 f).

[5] Encyc. *Satis Cognitum*, 29 June 1896 (official edition, 53): "quibus de caussis, Concilii Vaticani decreto, quod est de vi et ratione primatus Romani Pontificis, non opinio est invecta nova, sed vetus et constans omnium saeculorum asserta fides."

the Pope, and in particular with the assertion that the Church has always believed in it. The Vatican Decree was in fact carried through in the teeth of a protesting minority, which had the support of the most eminent Catholic scholars and Church-historians. We shall deal with the various objections to it later: but we may note at this point the eager efforts of modern Catholic writers to limit the scope of the Decree to the very minimum which its terms demand. Thus it is usual to urge that the primitive and prior belief of the Church in the Pope's infallibility was simply *implicit*.[1] Here is a typical explanation on these lines: "this definition does not constitute, *strictly speaking*, a dogmatic innovation, as if the pope had not hitherto enjoyed this privilege, or as if the Church, *as a whole*, *had admitted the contrary*; it is the newly formulated definition of a dogma which, like all those defined by the Councils, continued to grow into an ever more definite form, ripening, as it were, in the always living community of the Church. . . . If the Divine constitution of the Church has not changed *in its essential points* since our Lord, *the mode of exercise of the various powers of its head has varied*. . . . This explains the late date at which the dogma was defined, and the assertion that the dogma *was already contained* in that of the papal primacy established by our Lord himself in the person of St. Peter. *A certain dogmatic development is not denied*, nor an evolution in the direction of a centralization in the hands of the pope of the exercise of his powers as primate; it is merely required that this evolution should be well understood and considered as legitimate."[2] The reader will be able to judge for himself how far these careful qualifications really harmonize with the spirit and the letter of the Vatican Decree.

Again, the Decree lays it down that the Pope is infallible only "when he speaks ex cathedra, that is, when, in the performance of his function as pastor and teacher of all Christians, he defines by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority a doctrine concerning faith or morals to be held by the whole Church." But no final authority has declared precisely when these conditions are or have been fulfilled. Pius IX was himself begged in 1871 to explain the Decree further, but refused on the ground that it was clear enough.[3] A member of the minority at the Vatican Council expressed his willingness to accept the decision, only he was not convinced that since our Lord's time any Pope ever had spoken ex cathedra.[4] The dominant theory, however, is that the Pope speaks ex cathedra only when he explicitly declares himself to be

[1] See Thurston in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 627b; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 798a.

[2] Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 511b (italics mine). Cf. id. in *op. cit.* xxii. 81a: also Newman, *Developm.* 145.

[3] Mirbt 465 n. 2.

[4] Salmon, *Infall.* 435 n.

imposing on all the faithful the obligation to believe some definite proposition relating to faith or morals, and that official allocutions and bulls, even when dealing with matters of doctrine, and addressed to the whole Church, are not necessarily infallible unless they comply with this specific condition.[1] But even so, the uncertainty as to which papal utterances are ex cathedra, and which are not, to some extent remains; and, although it renders precarious the authority of many particular pieces of Catholic teaching,[2] yet it is obviously a very great convenience to Catholic apologists in meeting Protestant complaints as to certain admittedly erroneous papal decisions.[3]

It is pleaded in support of this minimizing view of the scope of infallibility that it is the correct view because it has never been blamed by ecclesiastical authority.[4] One would, however, be making a very grave mistake, were one to suppose, on the strength of such a judgment, that a Catholic is bound only to those doctrines which have been infallibly declared, by the anathema pronounced against those who deny them, to be 'de fide.' [5] To begin with, it is unreasonable in simple logic to separate off some public and official utterances of the Pope as ex cathedra, from other public and official utterances which are couched in equally authoritative language and equally assume the right to settle points of faith and morals. The only logical distinction is between the Pope's private and personal expressions on the one hand, and his public and official declarations and decrees on the other: [6] and it is interesting

[1] For these Catholic limitations, compare Newman, *Apol.* 230 (vii); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 46; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 253, 307 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 250, 435–439; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 17–19; Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 896a (papal encyclicals not necessarily infallible); Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 512a; Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 109, 167, 201; and especially Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 796ab (instructions issued by Roman Congregations, even when approved by Pope, not infallible, because infallibility cannot be delegated, etc. etc), 799b. Salmon has pointed out (*Infall.* 438 f) that the demand that an ex-cathedra utterance should be addressed to *the whole Church*, would exclude every papal utterance prior to 1302 A.D., when Bonifatius VIII issued his bull *Unam Sanctam*.

Further qualifications urged by Catholics are that the Pope's infallibility does not involve Divine inspiration or freedom from sin, and does not depend on adequate personal investigation or knowledge of the matter concerned, that it represents the infallibility of the whole Church, that it does not cover the *reasons* adduced in support of an infallible utterance, and so on (Hase, *Handbook*, i. 253 f, 309 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 185 n., 436; Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 511b (a) and xxii. 81b top; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 790b, 796a, 797a).

[2] Cf. Gladstone, *Vaticanism*, 108.

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 308; Salmon, *Infall.* 435, 438, 443 f; Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 275b. In Mr. G. Bernard Shaw's paradoxical defence of the papal claim (*Saint Joan*, pref. xxxvi f), the scope of infallibility is with twofold inaccuracy limited to "certain historical matters on which he has clearly more sources of information open to him than anyone else."

[4] Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 512a.

[5] Cf. Lattey, *First Notions*, 95 (on the duty of shunning 'rash' views).

[6] So Salmon, *Infall.* 250, 434 f (". . . To my mind, the only common-sense view

to learn that some Catholic authorities "extend the privilege of infallibility to all official exercise of the supreme *magisterium*, and declare infallible, *e.g.* the papal encyclicals." [1] But the best test of what is ex cathedra, or alternatively of what, though not technically ex cathedra, is binding, is papal history. In 1439 Pope Eugenius, in the Council of Florence, pronounced that the Pope was "the head of the whole Church and the father and teacher of all Christians, and that to him in the blessed Peter there had been handed over by our Lord Jesus Christ full power of feeding, ruling, and guiding the universal Church." [2] In 1520 Leo X solemnly condemned a number of Luther's errors, among them the following: "If the Pope with a great part of the Church should think so and so, and not be wrong, yet it is not sin or heresy to think differently, especially in a matter not necessary to salvation, until one (view) shall have been rejected, (and) the other approved, by a General Council." [3] He further stated in the same bull that his predecessors in the Roman See "in their canons and constitutions . . . had never erred." [4] Erasmus well revealed the conditions of the time, as well as his own pusillanimity, when he said that he would submit to Emperors and Popes even when they were wrong, for the sake of safety.[5] The profession of faith drawn up by Pius IV in 1564, and frequently used even to-day in the reception of converts and appointment of Church-officials, requires the professor to say: "I likewise undoubtingly receive and profess all other things delivered, defined, and declared by the sacred Canons and General Councils, and particularly by the holy Council of Trent." [6] It has recently been urged by a

is, that the pope speaks *ex cathedra* whenever he clearly speaks in his official capacity:" etc.), 439, 442 top. Cf. Gladstone, *Vaticanism*, 32–34, for Catholic arguments in favour of the Syllabus of 1864 being regarded as ex cathedra.

[1] Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 512a. Cf. Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 109, 182.

[2] Bull *Laetentur Coeli*, § 8, in Mirbt 234.

[3] Bull *Exsurge Domine* in Mirbt 258 (no. 28).

[4] Mirbt 259 (9); Hase, *Handbook*, i. 271.

[5] *Ep. to R. Pace*, 5 July 1521 (ed. Allen, iv. 541, no. 1218): "Non omnes ad martyrium satis habent roboris. Vereor enim ne, si quid incideret tumultus, Petrum sim imitaturus. Pontifices ac Cesares bene decernentes sequor, quod pium est; male statuentes fero, quod tutum est. Id opinor etiam bonis viris licere, si nulla sit spes profectus."

[6] The original Latin of this *Creed* is in Mirbt 339 f; also in the Tauchnitz edit. (1842) of *Conc. Trid.* 226–228, and among the prefatory items in *Catech. Rom.* My quotations of it are taken from the official English version, printed in *Ordo Administrandi Sacramenta* (Derby, 1856) 77–80, which very nearly coincides with that given by Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 238–242 (cf. 231). Editions and translations published since 1877 contain clauses to cover the acceptance of papal infallibility. Particulars as to the precise classes of persons who are required to pronounce this *Creed* can be seen in Hauck, *Realenc.* xvi (1905) 73, and in *Codex Juris Canonici* (1917) can. 1406–1408. The 'Profession of Faith' included in Bishop Hedley's *Form for the Recep-*

Catholic apologist that if "declarata" be mistranslated "decreed," and the clause be thought to bind the convert to obey disciplinary canons ordering persecution (such as were issued by the Fourth General Council of the Lateran in 1215), its true sense is perverted, since it—like the 'Creed' generally—refers only to doctrinal definitions and declarations.[1] But what avails this subtle and lawyer-like ingenuity when the same document makes the believer promise: "I most steadfastly admit and embrace the Apostolical and Ecclesiastical Traditions, and all other observances and constitutions of the same Church . . . and I promise true obedience to the Bishop of Rome, Successor of St. Peter, Prince of the Apostles, and Vicar of Jesus Christ"?[2] What room do these clauses leave for the suggested liberty in regard to the Church's disciplinary canons?

In 1794 Pope Pius VI had occasion to issue a bull condemning certain propositions promulgated by a diocesan conference at Pistoia. It is addressed to all the faithful, assumes throughout a tone of absolute and decisive authority, denies that the Roman Pontiff receives his "potestatem ministerii" from the Church, defends the extension of the Church's authority and power—beyond the limits of faith and morals—to include coercive discipline, specifies repeatedly as the ground on which various propositions are condemned the fact that they are "subversive of the hierarchical rule," "injurious to the supreme Pontiffs," derogatory to their authority, contrary to specified decretals of earlier Popes, and so on, and concludes with an emphatic prohibition containing these words: "We therefore command all the faithful of Christ of either sex that, concerning the said propositions and doctrines, they presume not to think, teach, (or) assert otherwise than is declared in this our constitution, so that whoever teaches, defends, (or) publishes them or any one of them, conjointly or separately, or even treats of them in public or private discussion, unless perchance adversely, shall by that very fact and without further notice (being given) be liable to the ecclesiastical censures and other penalties legally laid down for those who do such things. . . . Furthermore we enjoin our venerable brothers, the patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops and other ordinaries of places, also

tion of a Convert ('Cath. Truth Soc.' 1908), which is sometimes referred to as the official version of the *Creed* (see Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 79, 150, 195, 229–231; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 48 n. 3, 87) is not in any sense a translation of the *Creed of Pius IV*, but a brief and loose paraphrase of its main provisions—with an introduction adapted to the situation of a convert. See Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxix; Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 113; and below, p. 39.

[1] See Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 1, 15, 40, 79–83, 146–150; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 85–88.

[2] See above, p. 31 n. 6: also Mirbt 339 (33: "all" is not in the Latin), 340 (15: "obedientiam spondeo *ac iuro*"); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 239, 241; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 46–49.

the inquisitors of heretical pravity, that they by all means coerce and compel (all) gainsayers and rebels whatsoever, by means of the aforesaid censures and penalties and other remedies of law and action, calling in for this purpose, if need be, even the aid of the secular arm." [1] Is this an ex-cathedra utterance, or not? If it is not, in what respect could its author have made it more official, doctrinal, solemn, and emphatic, in order to give it ex-cathedra status? If it is, why may not the same be said of other papal encyclicals like those dealing with Modernism?

Dr. Newman quotes Bellarmine as saying: "all Catholics agree . . . that the Pope when determining anything in a doubtful matter, whether by himself or with his own particular Council, *whether it is possible for him to err or not, is to be obeyed* by all the faithful." [2] In 1857 Pius IX insisted that the decree of the Congregation of the Index condemning Günther's views should be accepted and obeyed by all Catholics, inasmuch as he himself had sanctioned it and ordered its publication.[3] In 1863 he laid it down that it was not enough for Catholic scholars to submit in their investigations to the dogmatic decisions of the infallible authority of the Church: they must submit also "to the decisions pertaining to doctrine that are put forth by the Pontifical congregations, as also to those heads of doctrine which are retained by the common consent of Catholics as theological truths and conclusions so certain, that opinions adverse to the same, though they cannot be called heretical, yet deserve some other theological censure." [4] In 1864 he issued an encyclical (the famous 'Quanta Cura'), accompanied by a 'Syllabus' of eighty prevalent erroneous beliefs which the Church condemned. One of these "errors" was that "the obligation by which Catholic teachers and writers are strictly bound is confined to those things only which are put forward by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all." [5] The encyclical itself condemned, as "contrary to the Catholic dogma of the full power Divinely conferred on the Roman Pontiff by the Lord Christ Himself, of feeding, ruling, and guiding the Universal Church," "the audacity of those who, not enduring sound doctrine, contend that, without sin, and without

[1] See the long bull *Auctorem Fidei* (partially printed in Mirbt 412 f and fully in Tauchnitz edit. [1842] of *Conc. Trid.* 292–327), prop. 3–5, 7–12, 14, 38, 42–45, 50, 54, 62, 74, 80, 82 f, and the closing paragraphs.

[2] Newman, *Developm.* 125 (similarly 348, and *Apol.* 224 [vii]; also in letters of 1867 quoted by Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii [1914] 270a). Newman goes on to say that obedience to our ecclesiastical superior, even if he be mistaken, may be good for us, like obedience to an honest but misguided conscience. But this ignores the vital fact that, in the latter case, we are at least following the highest ethical guidance it is in our power to obtain.

[3] Salmon, *Infall.* 249 n.

[4] *Ibid.*: cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 473–476.

[5] Mirbt 452 (no. 22).

any loss of Catholic profession, assent and obedience may be withheld (detrectari) from those judgments and decrees of the Apostolic See whose object is declared to concern the general good of the Church and its rights and discipline, provided only that it does not touch dogmas of faith and morals."[1] Again, the tone of absolute authority was assumed; and loyal Catholics generally inferred that the encyclical claimed infallibility for all public judgments of the Pope, whatever the subjects with which they dealt. Efforts were made by Dr. Newman —as they might be by Catholic apologists to-day—to show by argument that the encyclical and its accompanying 'Syllabus' are not absolutely binding on all Catholics: but the document itself makes the argument look very unconvincing.[2] As if to remove all doubt on the matter, Pius IX in the Vatican Council reaffirmed the above-quoted decree of the Council of Florence,[3] and drew attention again to "the Roman Pontiff's power of jurisdiction," "in relation to which pastors and the faithful of whatever rite and dignity (they be), both individually and collectively, are bound by the duty of hierarchical subordination and true obedience, not only in matters which pertain to faith and morals, but even in those which pertain to the discipline and rule of the Church diffused through the whole world, in such a way that, unity both of communion and of profession of the same faith being preserved with the Roman Pontiff, the Church of Christ may be one flock under one supreme shepherd. This is a doctrine of Catholic truth, from which no one can depart without prejudice to his faith and salvation." The chapter concludes with the pronunciation of an anathema against those who say the contrary.[4] In 1885 Leo XIII reaffirmed the duty of all Catholics to believe whatever the Roman Pontiffs have taught or may teach, especially as regards modern liberties.[5] In 1890, in another encyclical, he explained at some length that obedience was to be rendered, not only to dogmatic decisions, but to all the instructions of the hierarchy, and especially of the Apostolic See.[6] In 1910 an oath was demanded from all Catholic priests to the effect that they submitted unreservedly to the decree of the Inquisition 'Lamentabili' and the papal encyclical 'Pascendi' of 1907 against Modernism.[7] The demand

[1] Encyc. *Quanta Cura*, 8 Dec. 1864 (three-fifths through).

[2] Pusey, *Eiren.* 287–305, 318 f, 331; Salmon, *Infall.* 444 f; Lacey in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 473.

[3] See above, p. 31.

[4] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 3 (Mirbt 463 [4–21: ". . . Haec est catholicae veritatis doctrina, a qua deviare salva fide atque salute nemo potest"], 464 [4–11]). Cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 132; Salmon, *Infall.* 484–486; Heiler, *Kathol.* 303 f n. 25; Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 628a; Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 274a.

[5] Encyclical *Immortale Dei*, 1 Nov. 1885, in *Pope and People*, 95.

[6] Encyclical *Sapientiae Christianae*, 10 Jan. 1890, in *Pope and People*, 161–163.

[7] Heiler, *Kathol.* 241, 651 f.

did not of course imply freedom to dissent from other decrees and encyclicals, but was a special measure adopted to deal with a special danger. The new 'Code of Canon Law,' published in 1917, reaffirms the Pope's "supreme and full power of jurisdiction over the universal Church, both in matters which pertain to faith and morals, and in those which pertain to the discipline and government of the Church diffused throughout the whole world," and lays it down that "it is not enough to avoid heretical pravity, but it is necessary also diligently to flee from those errors which more or less approach it; wherefore all ought to keep also the constitutions and decrees with which evil opinions of this kind have been proscribed and prohibited by the Holy See." [1]

There is no need to pile up further evidence. It is abundantly clear that the supposed uncertainty about ex-cathedra and infallible utterances, whatever be the theoretical truth in regard to it, furnishes the Catholic with no liberty at all, either logical, legal, or practical, to express any dissent from any authoritative statement officially issued by the Holy See. Private and unexpressed dissent on the part of lay-Catholics is not interfered with, not because it is permissible, but because it is inaccessible.[2] But all Catholics must obey the Pope, whether he be infallible or not.[3]

[1] Mirbt 536 (no. 218 § 1), 555 (no. 1324). Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 305 n. 1, 240 n. 5.

[2] Cf. Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 681b; Maycock, *Inquis.* 135 f. On the amount of actual but unpunished scepticism among Catholics in regard to various portions of the Church's teaching, see Hase, *Handbook*, i. 71 f; 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 854–866; Bain, *New Reformation*, 237–245 ('Americanism'—eventually condemned by Leo XIII); H. C. Corrance in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1925, 157–159 (free views among Catholic *priests*, especially prior to the condemnation of 'Modernism').

[3] Cf. Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 19, 22; Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 512a (some Catholics "have been able to assert that since the Vatican Council no infallible definition had yet been formulated by the popes, while recognizing *the supreme authority* of the encyclicals of Leo XIII." Italics mine); St. Cyres in *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 495a ("Theologians might draw their fine-spun distinctions between realms where the pope was actually infallible and realms where he was not; but Pius knew well that loyal Catholic common sense would brush their technicalities aside and hold that on any conceivable question the pope was fifty times more likely to be right than anyone else"); Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 792b (". . . internal assent is sometimes demanded, under pain of grievous sin, to doctrinal decisions that do not profess to be infallible . . . the assent to be given in such cases is recognized as being not irrevocable or irreversible, like the assent required in the case of definitive and infallible teaching, but merely provisional; . . . internal assent is obligatory only on those who can give it consistently with the claims of objective truth on their consciences—this conscience, it is assumed, being directed by a spirit of generous loyalty to genuine Catholic principles"; Galileo, for instance, might rightly have refused internal assent to the tribunal, "provided that in doing so he observed with thorough loyalty all the conditions involved in the duty of external obedience"); Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 626b (". . . There can be no doubt that, whatever Cisalpine theologians may object to the view, Rome regards such pronouncements" [as those of 1907] "as infallible; and that, given the premisses, Rome is right"); Lacey in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 475; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 193 f.

Catholic authorities are accustomed to distinguish grades of certainty within the general body of Catholic teaching, and they have their technical descriptions for the various grades.[1] All agree that doctrines belonging to the first grade, i.e. 'de fide,' are absolutely binding on all. These are virtually the Canons of the Councils of Trent and the Vatican, to which are attached anathemas against those who deny them. To this class also belongs the papal bull of 1854, in which Pius IX, without having summoned any General Council, declared that belief in the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin was compulsory for all Catholics. It is a well-understood part of the Catholic system that all such 'de fide' doctrines are regarded as having been held in the Church from the beginning, and that, if no explicit formulation of some of them is to be found until late on in the Christian era, the reason is, not that these beliefs were not held earlier, but that their formulation was not necessitated by the denials of heretics or the controversies of Christians until a comparatively late date.[2] One classic expression of this view is that given by Athanasius with reference to the great credal definition of the Council of Nicæa: "Concerning the Passover (the formula is), 'It seemed good as follows,' for it *then* seemed good that all should comply: but concerning the Faith they wrote, not 'It seemed good,' but 'Thus the Catholic Church believes': and immediately (thereafter) they confessed how they believed, in order to show that their thought was not new (*νεώτερον*), but apostolic, and that what they had written had not been discovered of themselves, but was the same as what the Apostles had taught." [3] But the most oft-quoted statement of the doctrine is that of Vincentius of Lérins (434 A.D.): "In the Catholic Church itself the greatest care ought to be taken that we should hold that which everywhere, which always, which by all has been believed; for this is truly and characteristically Catholic. (This is) what the word's very meaning and sense, which embraces practically all things universally, declares. But this can be done only so—if we follow universality, antiquity, (and) agreement. Now we shall follow . . . antiquity . . ., if we nowise depart from these meanings (sensibus) which it is manifest that our holy ancestors and fathers published abroad (celebrasse) . . ." [4] The Council of Trent assumed that Christian truth and discipline were "contained in the written Books

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxx; Salmon, *Infall.* 91, 213 f; Coghlan in *Cath. Encyc.* v 1909) 89–91; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 799 f; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 46–49.

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 605 f; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 211.

[3] Athanasius, *De Synodis*, 5 (Migne, *P.G.* xxvi. 688). Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 132 f, 136 (remarks that the references might easily be multiplied); Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 60–62; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 43, *Holy Spirit*, 172 f.

[4] Vincentius, *Commonitorium*, ii. 3 (in Mirbt 73 [27]: freely translated by Collins in *op. cit.* 62 f).

(of Scripture) and in unwritten traditions which have come down to us, having been received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or passed on, as if by hand, by the Apostles themselves—the Holy Spirit dictating (to them)." [1] The antiquity and unchangeability of dogma was maintained by the mediaeval Schoolmen, by Catholic champions like Bellarmine and Bossuet, and by nineteenth-century apologists like Milner, Perrone, Wiseman, and Manning.[2] Among the Pistoian errors condemned in 1794 was one that implied that the "primitive notion of ecclesiastical ministry and pastoral care" could be obliterated or forgotten as a result of changes in the government of the Church.[3] We have already quoted the words in which the Vatican Council of 1870 laid it down that belief in papal infallibility was not a new doctrine: [4] it also declared that "the doctrine of faith, which God has revealed, has not been put forward, like a philosophical discovery, (as) needing to be completed (perficienda) by human skill, but has been handed down to the Bride of Christ, like a Divine deposit, (as) needing to be faithfully guarded and infallibly declared. Hence also that meaning (sensus) of the sacred dogmas must be perpetually retained, which Holy Mother Church has once (for all) declared, nor must any departure ever be made from that meaning, under the pretence or plea of a deeper understanding. . . . If anyone says that it can happen that sometimes, in conformity with the advance of knowledge, a different meaning (sensus . . . alius) ought to be given to the dogmas put forward by the Church, from that which the Church has understood and does understand, let him be anathema." [5] Modern Catholics repeat the same belief with equal emphasis, but usually in somewhat modified language. Thus Dr. Faà di Bruno says that a new doctrinal definition is "a clearer statement of what was believed, *at least implicitly* (*that is, in an implied way, or inferentially*), in the time of the Apostles." [6]

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv, can. script. init. (Mirbt 291 [37]). The Council also declared that "sancti patres nostri, concilia et universalis ecclesiae traditio *semper docuerunt*" that Christian marriage was to be included among the Sacraments (sess. xxiv, init. [Mirbt 330 (11)]). Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 33 n.; *Pope and People*, 46.

[2] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 460 (he quotes Perrone: "The belief which prevails at present is the surest criterion by which to recognize what has been the belief of the Church in each century"); Salmon, *Infall.* 33–37; Manning, *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost* (1865) 226.

[3] Bull *Auct. Fid.* prop. 77.

[4] See above, p. 28 nn. 3 and 4.

[5] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 4, and can. 3 (Mirbt 460 [1], 461 [10]: also Salmon, *Infall.* 480, 482). Compare the contemporary statement of Newman, *Gramm.* 425 ("Christianity . . . is the depositary of truths . . . maintained one and the same in substance in every age from its first . . ."); also Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 38 f. Nevertheless, Rome does in practice sometimes alter her dicta (cf. Lacey in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 474 f).

[6] *Cath. Belief*, 217 (italics mine). Cf. Father Clarke, quoted in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 32, 66; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 18; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 790b; W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 108 f.

A great deal, of course, depends on how much this last qualification is meant to cover; for, in its unqualified form, this doctrine is perhaps, for Protestants with a knowledge of history, the hardest of all Catholic claims to reconcile with truth.[1] It has indeed been pleaded that "at bottom, to be sure, this historical fiction is only the figurative outward form in which past generations (of men that were) historically blind were able to visualize the unity and organic development of Catholicism." [2] But this plea, while it may help to explain, certainly does not justify, the doctrine in question. Refuge is therefore normally sought by modern Catholic controversalists in some theory of 'development.' The 'Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine,' written by Newman on the eve of his conversion to Catholicism in 1845, is the version of the theory best known in English circles. But the Catholic attitude both to this book, and to the theory in general, has been very varied. When broached by a Calvinist in the seventeenth century, the suggestion of a development of the doctrine of the Church was vehemently condemned as heretical by the Catholic champion Bossuet. The Vatican Council, while welcoming in Vincentius' terms the growth of human understanding in regard to the doctrines of the Church,[3] used terms, as we have seen, that leave little room for any theory of development. The Roman authorities declined Newman's offer to submit his work to them for revision before publication: [4] and, although allusions to 'development' are common enough in Catholic propagandist literature, papal approval has never been given, so far as the present writer is aware, to this dangerous and double-edged theory, while there have not been wanting Catholic spokesmen who (more consistently) have rejected it altogether, and entirely and defiantly subordinated the plainest historical evidence to the exigences of dogma understood in its simplest and most obvious sense.[5]

[1] Martineau, *Seat*, 138; Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 87 f; Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 143, 145; Heiler, *Kathol.* 606. The protest of the Catholic Wahrmund is quoted by Bain, *New Reformation*, 33.

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 608 (my translation).

[3] The passage quoted before the dots on p. 37 continued: "Crescat igitur et multum vehementerque proficiat tam singulorum, quam omnium, tam unius hominis, quam totius Ecclesiae, aetatum ac saeculorum gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia: sed in suo dumtaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu eademque sententia" (Mirbt 460 [5]; Salmon, *Infall.* 480).

[4] Newman, *Developm.* advertisement, postcript, x f.

[5] Newman, *Developm.* passim; Salmon, *Infall.* ix, xiv, 31–44, 275 f, 370; 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 857, 862; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 203–211; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 157 f n.; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 795a; Joyce in *op. cit.* xiii (1912) 4 f; Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 511b ("A certain dogmatic development is not denied," in the infallibility decree of 1870); Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 37–39; Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 273; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 209–211; D'Arcy, *Cathol.* 26 f; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 168–172.

The Anglo-Catholic school adheres firmly to the view that no *new* doctrine or dogma has ever been, or can ever be, introduced by the Church; and, like a certain section of the Roman communion, it supports this view by a fairly liberal use of the theory of doctrinal development.[1] The fact that it is committed to no belief in papal infallibility or other *recently* promulgated dogmas enables Anglicanism to present a less difficult version of history than Catholicism can: but whether there corresponds to this advantage any gain in ultimate logical consistency may well be doubted.

Inferior to the dogmas of the Church, but amply covered by the de facto infallibility of the Pope, are certain further official documents, which, though not technically 'de fide,' are so authoritative as to be quite reliable criteria of what Catholicism stands for.[2] Papal bulls and encyclicals generally fall under this category; and among them we may specify the bull 'Injunctum Nobis' (1564), in which the so-called 'Creed of Pius IV' is contained. This Creed was originally intended as a kind of brief summary of Tridentine doctrine, to which agreement was to be sworn by all persons in positions of ecclesiastical authority. It commenced with a repetition of the Constantinopolitan (or so-called 'Nicene') Creed, and thereafter binds the professor to an acceptance of the decrees of Œcumenical Councils in general and of that of Trent in particular, and to true obedience to the Roman Church and Pontiff. In 1877 it was enlarged to include explicit acceptance of the Vatican Decrees of 1870 and in particular the primacy and infallibility of the Pope. It is frequently used to-day as the pledge exacted of converts entering the Roman Church, as well as of various classes of persons invested with ecclesiastical authority.[3]

Further, mention must be made of the 'Catechism' planned by the Council of Trent [4] and ultimately issued in 1566 by Pius V. It is not cast in the form of question and answer, but is a full systematic treatise, addressed to the clergy and explaining the whole body of Catholic doctrine, except in so far as this has been added to by dogmatic definitions promulgated since its publication. Having more than once received official papal sanction, it "comes as near to a binding authority as any

[1] E.g. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 38–45; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 29; Collins in *op. cit.* 56–67, 76, 83–86; W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 108 f.

[2] When the Pope prior to 1854 asked for prayers to be made for him to be rightly guided in deciding whether or not to make belief in the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin 'de fide,' the ignorance of the poorer classes as to any distinction between what is 'de fide' and what is simply enjoined by authority occasioned great difficulty to the episcopal intercessions (Pusey, *Eiren.* 115 f).

[3] See above, p. 31 n. 6.

[4] It is alluded to casually in the Decrees—sess. xxiv, reform. cap. 7, sess. xxv contin. 4 Dec. (Mirbt 337 [10]). See also the 'apparatus' prefixed to the *Catechism.*

writing which has not absolute authority," [1] and is recommended by Catholics as being (apart from the important limitation just mentioned) in some ways the handiest and completest statement of their position.[2]

Thirdly, we may note the great 'Codex Juris Canonici,' begun by order of Pius X and published under papal authority by his successor in 1917—a codification and revision of the vast body of Church-Law that had accumulated during the centuries. Its provisions have the force of law throughout the Roman Church, and, while it does not exhaust the whole of the established and authoritative customs of Romanism, it puts the coping-stone on the work of the Vatican Council by the way it secures and applies the monarchical supremacy of the Pope.[3]

There are, finally, two further sources of information as to the nature of Catholicism, neither of which ranks as an official authority in the same sense as those sources we have hitherto discussed, but both of which are of real significance and interest in this connexion.

One of these consists of the approved publications of Catholic writers. The complaint is not infrequently made that Protestants condemn Catholicism unheard, and are content to do so in ignorance of its real teaching and character: and a good deal of Catholic literature is produced with the object of disseminating reliable information in regard to the Catholic system. Whenever a Catholic publishes a book dealing with some religious subject, he has to submit it to the right and proper ecclesiastical authority, whose duty it is to see whether the book contains anything inconsistent with the Catholic faith, and if not, to give formal permission for it to be printed. Hence the 'Nihil obstat' and 'Imprimatur,' which we usually see on opening a Catholic book.[4] Dr. Faà di Bruno pleads that men should judge of the truth "by the study of authorized Catholic works"; [5] and his own little book with its numerous editions and wide circulation, and the fifteen stately volumes of 'The Catholic Encyclopedia,' are typical samples of authorized works of this kind. Yet despite these invitations and guarantees, it is always carefully explained that no individual Catholic teacher or writer (other than the Pope) is infallible: [6] and Newman in his 'Apologia' takes pride

[1] Pusey, *Eiren*, 195: cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 12–14; Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxix, 4; Scannell in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 79b; Wilhelm in *op. cit.* xiii (1912) 120b–121b.

[2] On Catholic catechisms in general and the *Roman* in particular, cf. Grieve in *Encyc. Brit.* v. 506; Maude in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 252 f; Scannell in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 79–82; Wilhelm as in last n.

[3] Cf. Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* v. 193–200; Adrian Fortescue in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 832–838; Heiler, *Kathol.* 305 f, 308–311, 652, 700; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 26–31, 77. Copious extracts are printed in Mirbt 534–563.

[4] Cf. Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 5–8, 38, 67 f, 134.

[5] *Cath. Belief*, 219; cf. xiii–xv, 245 ("Theologians teach . . .").

[6] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 790ab: cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 50.

in the wide play of fallible private judgment alongside of authority in the Catholic Church.[1] The Church, we are told, must not be identified with any of her individual champions;[2] and she always enjoys the right of repudiating the unwise or untimely things said on her behalf [3]—not even excepting those that have received their 'imprimatur' from the proper authority.[4] Moreover, individual Catholics are not prevented from criticizing with severity the highly approved publications of other Catholics.[5] Even the fully authorized writings of the canonized 'Doctor of the Church,' St. Alphonso dei Liguori, neither commit the infallible authority of the Church, nor bind the conscience of the individual believer.[6]

Last of all we have to learn about Catholicism from the observed practices of Catholic priests and laymen. In the abstract, Apostolic infallibility should reside in the episcopate: but in practice, episcopal infallibility is entirely vested in the Pope, and the bishops retain only an ordinary measure of church-authority.[7] Still less are the priests, strictly speaking, infallible. Further, it must often remain uncertain how far the Church, quâ Church, is responsible for what goes on (for example, in the matter of Mariolatry) in various circles in her name and under her shadow.[8] Yet in practice, the Roman Church is far more than her minimum 'de fide' requirements indicate: her censures fall on many who have not denied the faith.[9] Stories of little children caned at Catholic schools because they had not been to Church, or of a priest seizing a poor woman's rent-money from her mantel-piece in liquidation of her Church-dues, cannot tell us anything about the official commitments of the Church in matters of faith and morals; but they are not without their bearing on the genius of Catholicism as a practical system of Church-discipline.

[1] Newman, *Apol.* 226 (vii).

[2] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 226–228: cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 7–10.

[3] Salmon, *Infall.* 187 f, 191.

[4] Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 166.

[5] Salmon (*Infall.* 188–190) instances O'Connell's repudiation of the notes in praise of persecution published in the Catholic Bible in Ireland in 1813.

[6] Salmon, *Infall.* 194 f.

[7] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 20; Van Hove in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 324a; Toner in *op. cit.* 795ab, 798b, 800a.

[8] Salmon, *Infall.* 192 f, 201 f.

[9] The *Roman Catechism* (III. v. 25) quotes Deut. xvii. 12 as sanctioning the punishment of those who disobey the priests. Cf. the case of Father Duggan referred to by H. C. Corrance in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1925, 156.

CHAPTER III

THE CATHOLIC ESTIMATE OF HERESY AND SCHISM

In order rightly to understand the nature of the challenge to which we are replying, it is necessary to take account of the judgment passed by the Catholic Church on those Christians who are beyond her borders. For the moment the inquiry need not involve a study either of the doctrine of eternal punishment (which Catholics, as well as others, are regarded as liable to incur) or of the practice of persecution (which is not a common feature of present-day Catholicism). Both of these topics will come up for discussion later in a different connexion. What we are concerned with here is rather the view taken by Catholics, quâ Catholics, of Christians who are not in communion with them.

That view is of course based on the Romanist's certainty of possessing a body of absolutely infallible truth: but it is shaped in particular by two implicates or accompaniments of this certainty, both of them highly characteristic of the Catholic temper.

Firstly, Catholics insist, with the most intense conviction, on man's moral obligation to believe the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in regard to God and religious subjects generally. In the customary tolerance of Protestantism, they discern a culpable indifference to credal truth, an idea that it matters not what one believes so long as one's life is virtuous.[1] Against such laxity they cease not to utter their most passionate protests and denunciations. Here, for instance, is the emphatic manifesto of Newman: "That opinions in religion are not matters of indifference, but have a definite bearing on the position of their holders in the Divine Sight, is a principle on which the Evangelical Faith has from the first developed.[2] . . . That there is a truth then; that there is one truth; that religious error is in itself of an immoral nature; that its maintainers, unless involuntarily such, are guilty in maintaining it; that it is to be dreaded; that the search for truth is not the gratification of curiosity; . . . that the mind is below truth, not above it, and is bound, not to descant upon it, but to venerate it; that truth and falsehood are set before us for the trial of our hearts; that our choice is an awful giving forth of lots on which salvation or rejection is inscribed; that 'before all things it is necessary to hold the Catholic faith'; that 'he that would be saved must thus think,' and not otherwise; . . .—this is the dogmatical principle, which has strength.

[1] Cf. Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 763–766.

[2] *Developm.* 339. Cf. Rawlinson, *Authority*, 28.

That truth and falsehood in religion are but matter of opinion; that one doctrine is as good as another; that the Governor of the world does not intend that we should gain the truth; that there is no truth; that we are not more acceptable to God by believing this than by believing that; that no one is answerable for his opinions; that they are a matter of necessity or accident; that it is enough if we sincerely hold what we profess; that our merit lies in seeking, not in possessing; that it is a duty to follow what seems to us true, without a fear lest it should not be true; that it may be a gain to succeed, and can be no harm to fail; that we may take up and lay down opinions at pleasure; . . . that we may safely trust ourselves in matters of Faith, and need no other guide,—this is the principle of philosophies and heresies, which is very weakness." [1]

In the second place, the Catholic judgment is moulded by the belief that the acceptance of Catholicism in its totality is the only alternative to agnosticism or even atheism. Not that Catholics would concede that atheism or agnosticism is a real logical alternative to Catholicism, for they hold that the existence and spirituality of God are capable of logical demonstration. What they contend is that, in logic, there is no place outside their own system for a real belief in God, and that, in practice, non-Catholic attempts to maintain such belief inevitably degenerate sooner or later into scepticism.[2] This view—which is also

[1] Newman, *Developm.* 344 f; cf. 347 ("that truth was one; . . . that its absence was a grievous want, and its loss an unutterable calamity;" etc). It would not be difficult to quote many other Catholic formulations of the same contention. Cf. e.g. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 224 ("as the law of God in morals excludes vice, so in intellectual matters it excludes *error in faith* ('dissensions,' 'sects'), and forbids it under pain of exclusion from heaven. (See Galatians v. 20, 21.) To suppose that God, who is essential truth, is indifferent as to whether we have the truth or the contradiction of it, which is error, . . . would be . . . to contradict the declaration of Christ, and, if done wilfully, to offer an insult to the God of holiness, charity, and truth"). See also below, pp. 61, 63. An interesting but somewhat acrimonious discussion of the point will be found in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 31–36, 52–61, 97, 100, 116–128, 157, 170–178, 181, 199 f, 215 (= p. 49, no. 8). Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 172; Forsyth, *Authority*, 38 f, 112; Moxon, *Modernism*, 198; Woodlock, *Modernism*, 22.

[2] Newman, *Developm.* 72, *Apol.* 186 (vi) ("I came to the conclusion that there was no medium, in true philosophy, between Atheism and Catholicity, . . ."), 190 ("there are but two alternatives, the way to Rome, and the way to Atheism: Anglicanism is the halfway house on the one side and Liberalism the halfway house on the other"), *Gramm.* 92, 239, 382 ("we are not left at liberty to pick and choose out of its contents according to our judgment, but must receive it all, as we find it, if we accept it at all"); Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 102 top (of Lamennais), 120–128 (of Newman, e.g. " 'Unlearn Catholicism,' and the 'infallible succession' is, 'Protestant, Unitarian, Deist, Pantheist, Sceptic' "); Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 792a ("Practically speaking the only alternative to infallibility is private judgment, and this after some centuries of trial has been found to lead inevitably to utter rationalism"), 795a ("the growth of Rationalism, the logical successor of old-time Protestantism"); Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 513, 516, 528, 530; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 299 f; Corrance in *Hibb. Journ.*

shared mutatis mutandis by Anglo-Catholics [1]—is the basis of the claim that the Catholic Church is the one conceivable effective barrier against unbelief.[2]

It means but an easy step from the two positions just defined, to declare that only those who are within the Catholic Church can be saved, or—to quote the great traditional formula—'Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus.' Few items of Catholic belief have been asserted more repeatedly and emphatically than this. Born in the Jews' high notions of the privileges of Israel and their often impotent disapprobation of the sins of the Gentiles,[3] belief in exclusive salvation passed into the Christian Church through certain views taken in regard to the Kingdom of God; and, under pressure from the revolutionizing experiences of conversion and still more the terrific impact of persecution, it went through a process of development and fixation until it became an integral part of the Church's world-view.[4] It could thus have been in no wise an innovation when explicitly formulated, apparently for the first time, by Origenes about the middle of the third century. After urging that an error in doctrine is more serious even than one in morals, he asks: "For if good moral conduct sufficed for the salvation of men, how (is it that) philosophers among pagans and many who live temperately among heretics are by no means saved, inasmuch as the falsity of their doctrine darkens and soils their conduct?" [5] "Let no one therefore persuade himself," he says elsewhere, "let no one deceive himself: outside this house, that is, outside the Church, no one is saved. For if anyone goes out of (its) doors, he will become responsible for his own death." [6] A few years later, Cyprianus was reiterating the

Oct. 1913, 232 (Tyrrell's and Loisy's consequent rejection of Protestantism). Cf. R. Knox in *God and the Supernatural*, 11 (". . . it is only Catholicism that has no drift in the rationalist direction. Only Catholicism has the instinct that it stands trustee for the Supernatural, . . ."); Rawlinson, *Authority*, 28, 46; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 186. J. H. Shorthouse represents the General of the Jesuits as saying to Inglesant: "Between unquestioning obedience to authority and absolute unbelief there is not a single permanent resting-place, though many temporary halts may be made" (*John Inglesant*, 431: ch. 38).

[1] Pusey, *Eiren.* 54 (all or none), 283 f ("rejection of Catholicism ends in the long run in Rationalism, and . . . it is an inclined plane on which generations cannot stand. We have seen the truth of this in Lutheranism and Calvinism," etc); N. P. Williams in *Congress-Report 1920*, 68 (". . . evaporation—a fate which the sixteenth-century versions of Christianity are undergoing before our eyes"); G. A. Michell in *Congress-Report 1923*, 97 ("sooner or later they will have to make up their minds between Catholicism and some form of Socinianism or Ritschlianism").

[2] S. F. Smith, *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness*, 1; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 794b; Wilhelm in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 502a.

[3] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 32.

[4] On this belief during the Apostolic and early Patristic periods, see my *Early Church and the World*, 80 f, 87, 148–150, 156 f, 214–217, 225–227, 298 f, 307 f.

[5] Orig. *In Matt. comm. ser.* 33 (Lommatzsch iv. 252).

[6] Orig. *Hom. in Jos.* iii. 5 (Lommatzsch xi. 34). Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 47 f, 89.

doctrine with the greatest urgency, declaring further that no one could have God for his Father unless he had the Church for his Mother.[1] Augustinus repeated it in still sharper terms, and maintained that no amount of personal virtue could enable a heretic to possess the Kingdom of God, and that even martyrdom for Christ's sake would not save a schismatic from eternal punishment.[2] An ancient regulation of uncertain origin, but probably at least as old as the fifth century, laid it down that a bishop, before being ordained, should openly acknowledge—among other cardinal points of faith—his belief that no one is saved outside the Catholic Church.[3] The so-called 'Athanasian Creed,' composed at first as a local form of confession, probably in the fifth or early sixth century, but later adopted as generally authoritative, commenced: "Whoever wishes to be saved (salvus), it is needful before all things that he should hold the Catholic Faith: for unless each man keep it whole and inviolate, without doubt he will perish eternally (in aeternum peribit)"; and it ends: "This is the Catholic Faith, and unless each man believes it faithfully and firmly, he will not be able to be saved." [4] The doctrine was well maintained throughout the Middle Ages. In 1215 the Œcumenical Fourth Lateran Council declared: "There is one universal Church of the faithful, outside which no person whatever (nullus omnino) is saved." [5] Thomas Aquinas (1226–1264) regarded it as one of the established items of Catholic belief that to be subject to the Roman Pontiff was necessary for salvation; [5] and Pope Bonifatius VIII, in an ex-cathedra utterance (1302), gave binding papal sanction to the same view: "We are compelled," he wrote, "under the pressure of faith, to believe in and hold one holy Church, Catholic and also Apostolic. And we firmly believe in, and simply confess, this (Church), outside of which there is neither salvation nor remission of sins. . . . Furthermore we declare, say, define, and pronounce that, for every human creature, to be subject to the Roman pontiff is absolutely

[1] Principally in his treatise *De Catholicae Ecclesiae Unitate*, but also in several *Letters*. Full references to the writings both of Cyprianus and also of other Christian authors from 250 to 313 A.D. are given in my *Early Church and the World*, 469 f, 478. Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 266; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 753a; Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 535; Heiler, *Kathol.* 613.

[2] The passages are collected and quoted by Heiler, *Kathol.* 99, 613 f, 698 (note to S. 99). Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 269 and (for Fulgentius) 267.

[3] No. 1 of the Canons of the imaginary Council of Carthage, 398 A.D.—in reality a miscellaneous collection of ancient canons: see Hefele, *Councils*, ii. 409–411; Mirbt 60 (30); and Hase, *Handbook*, i. 76.

[4] On the nature of the damnatory clauses in the Athanasian Creed, cf. Turner, *Creeds*, 82–87.

[5] Mirbt 179 (19).

[6] Mirbt 200 (7): "Ostenditur etiam, quod subesse Romano pontifici sit de necessitate salutis."

necessary for salvation." [1] In 1418 Martinus V condemned the Wyclifite statement that "it is not necessary for salvation to believe that the Roman Church is supreme among other churches." [2] In 1441 Eugenius IV issued from the Œcumenical Council of Florence a bull stating that the Holy Roman Church "firmly believes, professes, and preaches, that none who are not within the Catholic Church, not only (not) pagans, but neither Jews, nor heretics, nor schismatics, can become partakers of eternal life, but that they will go into the eternal fire, 'which has been prepared for the devil and his angels,' unless they are gathered into the same (Church) before the end of life: . . . and that no one, however much almsgiving he may have done, even if he has poured out his blood for the name of Christ, can be saved, unless he remains in the bosom and unity of the Catholic Church." [3] In 1516 Leo X, in the Œcumenical Fifth Lateran Council, solemnly "renewed and approved" Bonifatius VIII's bull just quoted.[4] The Council of Trent in 1547 anathematized those who said that the Sacraments were not necessary for salvation, and that without them or the wish for them men could obtain from God by faith alone the grace of justification.[5] The 'Creed of Pius IV' refers to its own summary of Tridentine doctrine as "this true Catholic faith, outside of which no one can be saved." [6] The 'Roman Catechism' reasserts that there can be no Divine grace or hope of salvation for those who are outside the Church and do not participate in her Sacraments.[7] In 1570, in the bull in which he deposed Queen Elizabeth, Pius IV once more repeated the ancient and exclusive formula.[8] In 1826 Leo XII stated in a brief: "Every one separated from the Roman Catholic Church, however unblamable in other respects his life may be, because of this sole offence, that he is sundered from the unity of Christ, has no part in eternal life; God's

[1] Bull *Unam Sanctum* in Mirbt 210 f (". . . Porro subesse Romano pontifici omni humanae creaturae declaramus, dicimus, diffinimus et pronunciamus, omnino esse de necessitate salutis"). Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 462; Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 628ab; Heiler, *Kathol.* 300 f, 316, 614.

[2] Mirbt 230 (no. 41).

[3] Bull *Cantate Domino* in Mirbt 237 (34): cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 316, 614.

[4] Bull *Pastor Aeternus* in Mirbt 252 f.

[5] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, sacram. can. 4 and 8 (Mirbt 303).

[6] Mirbt 340 (22): ". . . extra quam nemo salvus esse potest."

[7] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 20 (God so established the Church that "qui . . . extra illam essent, quemadmodum iis evenit qui in arcam recepti non sunt, suis sceleribus obruerentur"), II. i. 13 (3) ("aliter vero" [i.e. without the Sacraments] "nemini ulla salutis spes reliqua esse poterit"), II. iv. 52 ("neque extra Ecclesiam consequi gratiam ullus potest"), IV. x. 11 (". . . Ecclesiam . . . ad quam solam et ad eos quos suo sinu et gremio complexa est, pertinet divini illius imploratio nominis, quod unum sub coelo datum est hominibus, in quo oporteat nos salvos fieri").

[8] Bull *Regnans in Excelsis* in Mirbt 348 (18): "unam sanctam catholicam et Apostolicam ecclesiam, extra quam nulla est salus."

wrath hangs over him." [1] In 1830 Pius VIII referred to it as "that most firm dogma of our religion, that outside the true Catholic faith no one can be saved." [2] Pius IX in 1854 said that "it must be held as 'of faith' that outside the Apostolical Roman Church no one can be saved"; [3] and from the Vatican Council in 1870 he issued the statement that the Roman pontiff's primacy was "a doctrine of Catholic truth from which no one can depart without prejudice to his faith and salvation." [4] Nor are modern Catholic works lacking in reaffirmations of this well-attested and venerable doctrine.[5]

No piece of teaching could very well be more unmistakably plain than this. Those who from age to age made themselves the mouthpieces of this particular phase of the Church's mind were utterly unaware, as the whole Roman Church was also unaware, of any ambiguity whatever in the meaning of the word 'Church.' What they were denying was that salvation was possible for any who were not in visible, intentional communion with the See of Rome—'subesse Romano pontifici.' The language they use is such as to exclude all ambiguity, all mental reservation, all exceptions or qualifications. 'The Church' is the visible Roman communion, and nothing else; and the doctrine 'extra ecclesiam nulla salus,' though it applies to Jews and pagans, is especially directed against heretics and schismatics whose essential position was that they refused 'subesse Romano pontifici.' The 'Roman Catechism' lays it down that "only three classes of men are excluded from" the Church: "firstly, unbelievers, next heretics and schismatics, lastly the excommunicated: the heathen—because they never were in the Church, nor have ever known it, nor have they been made partakers of any Sacrament in the society of the Christian people; but heretics and schismatics —because they have withdrawn from the Church, for they do not have regard to the Church any more than deserters belong to an army from

[1] Quoted by A. H. Newman, *Manual of Ch. Hist.* ii (1908) 448 f.

[2] Brief *Literis altero abhinc* in Mirbt 436 (22).

[3] Allocution *Singulari quadam* in Mirbt 447 (23) (but see below, p. 59). Cf. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 753a (quoting Pius IX, 10 Aug. 1863: "Notissimum est catholicum dogma neminem scilicet extra catholicam ecclesiam posse salvari"), and Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 223 (repetition of the doctrine by the Inquisition in 1864).

[4] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 3 (in Mirbt 463 [21]: ". . . a qua deviare salva fide atque salute nemo potest"). See above, p 34.

[5] E.g. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 228 ("One must be within the ark to be safe from the deluge; one must be within the walls of the city to be safe from the enemy. The Church is that Ark, that City"); Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 752b (". . . Incorporation with the Church can alone unite us to the family of the second Adam. . . . It alone makes known the light of revealed truth. . . . Union with the Church is not merely one out of various means by which salvation may be obtained; it is the only means. . . . The doctrine is summed up in the phrase, *Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*"), 756a; Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 766a, 766 f; Brownson and Müller quoted by Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 536 (Protestants, even if blameless, cannot be saved); Lépicier quoted by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 70.

which they have absconded. . . . Lastly also the excommunicated—because, having by the Church's judgment been excluded from her, they do not belong to her communion until they come to their right mind again." [1] The denotation of the word 'Church' has thus exceedingly well-defined boundaries; and it is in conformity with this denotation that, "if Roman theologians permit themselves . . . to speak of the Greek Church or the Anglican Church, the term is not used univocally but analogically" only.[2]

There is, of course, a clear technical difference between a heretic and a schismatic. The former is one who denies some doctrine of the Church, but has not necessarily any wish to withdraw from her communion:[3] the latter, on the other hand, does so withdraw, though he does not necessarily repudiate any Church-doctrine. But inasmuch as heretics are frequently driven by excommunication to the necessity of setting up their own organizations, and inasmuch also as the Church's right to obedience has long been a matter of Catholic doctrine, the actual distinction between schism and heresy tends to become more and more faint, and in some cases to disappear altogether.[4] For our present purpose, the attitude of the Church in regard to both offences can be studied as a single theme. This attitude has been well described by a modern ex-Catholic as follows: "Ecclesiastical orthodoxy has at all times sought for the cause of heresy in wickedness—in the pride, self-exaltation, lust for novelty, and contentiousness of the heretics. It has treated the heretics, or at least the heresiarchs, as men misled by the devil, for whose baseness there is only one punishment—the eternal pain of hell." [5] We do not need to recall again in detail those early Christian denunciations of theological error to which allusion has already been made.[6] A few examples from mediaeval and later times will serve to illustrate the normal Catholic view. As early as 1232 we meet

[1] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 12: cf. Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 681b.

[2] Father Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 627b.

[3] Heretics must also be distinguished from apostates, who abandon the whole of Christianity after accepting it, and from infidels, who refuse to accept any of it: see the definitions, etc., given by Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 256.

[4] On the distinction and identity of heresy and schism, cf. Garvie in *Encyc. Brit.* xiii. 359a, 360a; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 256b; Forget in *op. cit.* xiii (1912) 529a; Fulford in H.*E.R.E.* xi (1920) 232 f; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 22 with n.

[5] Heiler, *Kathol.* 638 (my trans.). For the charge of pride, see below, p. 124.

[6] See above, p. 14, and cf. Garvie in *Encyc. Brit.* xiii. 358b (". . . no possibility of morally innocent doubt, difficulty or difference in thought is admitted . . ."). Traces of polemical bitterness appear in the New Testament, chiefly in the later books. Catholics naturally often appeal to these as justifying their own attitude (e.g. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 259 f: cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 63). Forget (*Cath. Encyc.* xiii [1912] 529–531) gives a full collection of N.T. and early patristic quotations on Church-unity and the evil of schism. Heiler (*Kathol.* 638 n.) quotes the words in which Augustinus compares all the heresies to "sarmenta inutilia de vite praecisa."

the phrase 'haeretical pravity' ('haereticae pravitatis'), which later on appears with great frequency in official documents referring to infringements of orthodoxy.[1] Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274) argued that the sin of unbelief was the greatest sin in the whole range of perversity.[2] John XXII in 1327 described Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun, who took a low view of papal prerogatives, as "isti viri reprobi," "isti filii Belial," "homines isti pestiferi," and so on.[3] At the Council of Constance in 1418, Wyclif's books were said to contain "mad teaching" (another reading is "poisonous teaching"), "hostile to faith and morals."[4] In 1483 Sixtus IV forbade believers in the Virgin's Immaculate Conception to be accused of being "defiled with the blot of any heresy."[5] About 1520 the French theologian Raulin declared that, if anyone asserted that the Catholic Church can err in matters of faith and morals, unless perchance he said it in his simplicity, he must straightway be judged a pertinacious heretic; also, that the adult and intelligent Christian, who denied any assertion published as Catholic among all Catholics, was a heretic, more clearly pertinacious the more he knew of Catholics and of Scripture.[6] The Tridentine Decrees attribute the prevalence of heresy to the wiles of Satan and the work of certain contentious and vicious men; heresy is compared to tares and bramble-bushes, and is associated with falsehood, deceitful tongues, the abuses due to depraved morals, and so forth.[7] The 'Roman Cate-

[1] See Maycock, *Inquis.* 94.

[2] See quotations by Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 257a.

[3] Mirbt 219.

[4] See the decree of condemnation printed in the Tauchnitz edn. (1842) of *Conc. Trid.* 266 ("doctrinam in ecclesia Dei vesanam [*alii*: venenosam], et fidei ac moribus inimicam").

[5] Constitutio *Grave nimis* in Mirbt 243 (32): "alicuius haeresis labe pollutos."

[6] See Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 50.

[7] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiii init. ("zizania exsecrabilium errorum et schismatum, quae inimicus homo" etc. etc.), cap. 1 ("quibusdam contentiosis et pravis hominibus"—who disbelieve transubstantiation), cap. 5 ("mendacio et haeresi"), concluding decree (". . . synodus errores omnes" [concerning Eucharist] ". . . tanquam vepres ex agro dominico evellere . . . cupiens"); bull *Ad ecclesiae regimen*, 29 Nov. 1560 ("cernentes . . . non sine magno horrore, quam longe lateque pestis haeresum et schismatis pervasisset"); *Conc. Trid.* sess. xvii ("ad horum temporum levandas calamitates, sedandas de religione controversias, coercendas linguas dolosas, depravatorum morum abusus corrigendos"), sess. xviii (". . . librorum, quibus doctrina impura continetur . . . huic tam magno ac pernicioso morbo . . . varias et peregrinas doctrinas tanquam zizania a Christianae veritatis tritico separare"), sess. xxi intro. ("quum" [concerning Eucharist] ". . . varia diversis in locis errorum monstra nequissimi daemonis artibus circumferantur"), sess. xxiv intro. ("impii homines huius saeculi insanientes"), sess. xxv contin. 4 Dec. ("Tanta fuit horum temporum calamitas et haereticorum inveterata malitia, ut nihil tam clarum in fide nostra asserenda unquam fuerit, aut tam certo statutum, quod non humani generis hoste suadente illi errore aliquo contaminaverint"), concluding oration ("doctrina, qua non solum haereticorum fraudibus et calumniis obsistetur, sed . . ."). Such of the foregoing as are included in

chism' defines a heretic as one "who, despising the authority of the Church, defends impious opinions with a pertinacious mind";[1] and its pages abound in bitter and abusive epithets similar to those used by the Council.[2] Bellarmine quoted with approval the opinion of Chrysostomus and Augustinus that a heretic is far worse than heathens and publicans; and he added that heresy is as much more serious than all other crimes and sins ("sceleribus atque flagitiis") as the plague is more to be dreaded than other diseases.[3] The bull of Clemens XI, in which in 1713 he condemned the errors of the Jansenist Quesnel, contained allusions to false prophets, lying teachers begotten by the master of falsehood and following his example, wolves in sheep's clothing, virulent poison, arrows ready on the bow to injure secretly the upright in heart, and so on.[4] In one of the condemned propositions Quesnel had complained that for pious men it was a death more terrible than that of the body "to be regarded and treated by the ministers of religion as impious and unworthy of all intercourse with God, as a rotten member capable of corrupting all things in the society of the saints."[5] In an annotated Bible published in Ireland about 1800 by the Roman Catholic Dr. J. T. Troy, titular Archbishop of Dublin, it was stated that "When Rome puts heretics to death, their blood is no more than that of thieves and mankillers," and the Protestant clergy were described as "thieves, murderers, and ministers of the devil."[6]

Mirbt appear there on 305 (38), 306 (20), 307 (40), 310 (7), 320 (10), 330 (13). Cf. bull *Dominici Gregis*, 24 Mar. 1564 intro. ("sanam catholicamque doctrinam a falsa adulterinaque internoscere").

[1] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 2: ". . . qui, Ecclesiae auctoritate neglecta, impias opiniones pertinaci animo tuetur."

[2] *Catech. Rom.* praef. 8 (". . . venenatas voces . . . impietatis errores . . ."), I. x. 12 ("transfugae": see above, pp. 47 f), I. x. 19 (". . . ita caeteras omnes, quae sibi Ecclesiae nomen arrogant, ut quae diaboli spiritu ducantur, in doctrinae et morum perniciosissimis erroribus versari necesse est"), II. iv. 29 ("iis qui, erroribus obcaecati, nihil magis quam veritatis lucem oderunt"), III. ii. 15 (". . . Sunt enim in hoc numero" [i.e. sinners against first commandment in Decalogue], "qui in haeresim labuntur; qui non credunt ea quae sancta mater Ecclesia credenda proponit"), IV. v. 2 ("preces et vota faciendi . . . ut haeretici redeuntes ad sanitatem . . . ut schismatici . . ."), IV. xi. 23 ("Petimus . . . a Deo . . . ut . . . schismatici ac haeretici redeant ad sanitatem . . ."), IV. xiii. 36 ("In hoc furore animi et mentis caecitate versantur illi qui, neglectis iis qui legitime eis praesunt . . . et a sancta romana Ecclesia desciscentes, corruptoribus Dei verbi haereticis se in disciplinam tradiderunt), IV. xv. 19 ("nonnunquam habet" [diabolus] "emissarios et excursores perditos homines, imprimisque haereticos, qui sedentes in cathedra pestilentiae, malarum doctrinarum mortifera semina dispergunt, ut . . . homines per se proclives ad malum nutantes ac praecipitantes impellant").

[3] Bellarmine, *Opera* (ed. 1872) i. 18a (Pref. to *Disput. de Controv.*).

[4] Bull *Unigenitus*, 8 Sept. 1713, intro. Pohle defends the Catholic use of the word 'poison' in connection with heresy against the charge of offensiveness (*Cath. Encyc.* xiv [1912] 766b).

[5] Bull *Unigenitus*, prop. 100 (in Mirbt 399 [23]).

[6] *Papacy and Bible*, 48 f

In 1851 a Catholic writer in 'The Rambler' asked concerning the Protestant: "Shall I lead him to think that religion is a matter for private opinion, and tempt him to forget that he has no more right to his religious views than he has to my purse, or my house, or my life-blood? No! Catholicism is the most intolerant of creeds. It is intolerance itself, for it is truth itself." [1] Eminent Catholics have reviled the moral character of founders of the Reformation, like Luther and Calvin, and denounced Protestant theological literature in sweeping and unsparing terms.[2] In a work written in 1877 by a leading Spanish Catholic, Protestants in general are referred to as "our obstinate adversaries," "these modern Rationalists and godless accusers," and "godless sophists," whose criticisms are simply "rude murmurs." [3] In 1887 a Catholic paper, in an article dealing with the priest's difficulties, spoke of the Anglican clergy as "his foes," and with reference to Protestant philanthropy observed that "the devil and the district visitor are strong." [4] In 1888 the Jesuit scholar Granderath, in an article in Herder's 'Kirchenlexikon,' affirmed emphatically that heresy was "a very grievous and fatal sin," and "a crime" ("Verbrechen"), because it means the rejection of Divinely proclaimed truth, which it is the duty of all men to believe, and the injury and disintegration of the Church.[5] In the public and official utterances of Pius X against the Modernists in 1907 and 1910, the latter were rebuked in the harshest and most censorious terms.[6] Perhaps the best expression of the Catholic condemnation of heresy is to be found in the article on 'heresy' in 'The Catholic Encyclopedia.' The author clearly aims at being as moderate and conciliatory as possible, and makes all allowance for inculpable error, and so on. But here is his resultant judgment: "Heresy is a sin because of its nature it is destructive of the virtue of the Christian

[1] *The Rambler*, Sept. 1851, 178.

[2] See the quotations from, and references to, Perrone, etc. in Hase, *Handbook*, i. xlvii–xlix, ii. 450 f, 541: also the denunciation of the great Reformers by Pius X in 1910, quoted by Heiler, *Kathol.* 325. Cf. also Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 529. It is, however, interesting to note that it was largely the quality of Luther's personal religion which drew Heiler himself away from Romanism (Söderblom in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 464–466).

[3] Gilavert, *Influence of Cath.* xv, xx, xxi, 12, 38.

[4] *Tablet*, 21 May 1887, 831b.

[5] Lengthy extracts from the article are printed in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 320–341 (esp. 323, 326, 334), and the contention is discussed in §§ 97, 157, 181, 199. Father Walker, S.J., stands by Granderath's doctrine. For an instance of the extreme vituperation with which Catholics sometimes reply to Protestant criticism, see the article printed in *The Universe* for 12 Mar. 1898, 4, à propos of Dr. Horton, and reprinted by him in *England's Danger*, 33–36 ("this ignorant sophist," "this vulgar person," "the mass of disgraceful rubbish of which this man's lecture was made up," etc.).

[6] Mirbt 508, 515; Heiler, *Kathol.* 325 f.

faith. Its malice is to be measured therefore by the excellence of the good gift of which it deprives the soul. Now faith is the most precious possession of man, the root of his supernatural life, the pledge of his eternal salvation. Privation of faith is therefore the greatest evil, and deliberate rejection of faith is the greatest sin. . . . It cannot be pleaded in attenuation of the guilt of heresy that heretics do not deny the faith which to them appears necessary to salvation, but only such articles as they consider not to belong to the original deposit. . . . In the constitution of the Church there is no room for private judgment sorting essentials from non-essentials: any such selection disturbs the unity, and challenges the Divine authority, of the Church; . . .The guilt of heresy is measured not so much by its subject-matter as by its formal principle, which is the same in all heresies: revolt against a Divinely constituted authority." One of its causes is "the opposition between the obligations imposed on us by faith and the evil inclinations of our corrupt nature." [1] "Heresy," he goes on, "being a deadly poison generated within the organism of the Church, must be ejected if she is to live. . . . The rôle of heresy in history is that of evil generally. Its roots are in corrupted human nature . . . misery and ruin have followed in its track." [2] Father E. Lester, S.J., wrote in 1913: "Protestantism isn't a Religion, it is a disease. The Church has to deal with those affected with the disease as a physician deals with a case of smallpox or a dentist with a decayed tooth." [3] The following sentence is reported as having appeared in the Belgian 'Le Pays Wallon' during the winter of 1926–1927: "Protestants lead a depraved, epicurean, and bestial life. Their great god is their stomach. They are the fat pigs of our Lord God." [4]

There are various grades and kinds of heresy, and various disciplinary measures have been enacted to correspond to them: but for simple heresy or heresy of the first degree, i.e. "pertinacious adhesion to a doctrine contradictory to a point of faith clearly defined by the Church," the Church's invariable punishment is what the Council of Trent expressively called "the piercing-point of the anathema" and

[1] J. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 257a. Cf. Joyce's contention that schism implicitly breaks the law of brotherly love, and his quotation of Augustinus' saying that heretics do not belong to the Church because she loves God, and schismatics do not belong to her because she loves her neighbour (*Cath. Encyc.* iii [1908] 757b); also Forget's remarks on the sinfulness of schism in *Cath. Encyc.* xiii (1912) 529a, 532a.

[2] J. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 259 f, 261b. Wilhelm remarks further that heresy is permitted as a test of the Church's faith and as a punishment for the Church; also that it has been the occasion of important doctrinal developments in the Church. On the possible unworthy and worldly motives for heresy in some cases, cf. Wilhelm, *op. cit.* 256b, 259a, and Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 218 f.

[3] *Universe*, 9 Mar. 1923, 2. Cf. Unamuno quoted by Rawlinson, *Authority*, 46.

[4] *Christian World*, 24 Feb. 1927, 11.

"the sword of excommunication." [1] By these means the Church established during the Middle Ages an almost despotic authority over the individual conscience. How serious a view was officially taken in regard to the effects of excommunication is clear from certain papal utterances. In 1520 Leo X condemned the doctrine of Luther that "excommunications are only outward penalties, and do not deprive the man of the common spiritual prayers of the Church." [2] In 1713 Clemens XI solemnly and emphatically condemned, among other statements by the Jansenist Quesnel, the following: "91. The fear of unfair excommunication ought never to hinder us from fulfilling our duty: we never go out of the Church, even when through men's wickedness we seem to be expelled from it, when by love we are attached to God, to Jesus Christ, and to the Church itself. 92. To suffer peacefully unfair excommunication and anathema rather than to betray the truth, is to imitate St. Paul; so far is it from being an erection of oneself against authority or a splitting of unity. 93. Jesus sometimes heals the wounds which the headlong haste of the chief shepherds inflicts without His commandment; Jesus restores what they with inconsiderate zeal cut back." [3] In 1794 Pius VI condemned certain decisions of the diocesan synod of Pistoia, in the following terms: "46. The proposition asserting that 'the effect of excommunication is simply external, because by its own nature it excludes only from external communication with the Church,' *as if excommunication were not a spiritual penalty, binding in heaven, binding souls*, . . . (is) false, pernicious, condemned as Luther's twenty-third article, (and) at least erroneous. 47. Again, the one that lays it down that it is necessary . . . that personal examination ought to take place first, whether for excommunication or suspension, and that therefore sentences pronounced have ipso facto no other force than that of serious threatening without any actual effect, (is) false, temerarious, pernicious, injurious to the Church's power, (and) erroneous." [4] The modern exponent of Catholicism explains that

[1] Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 680a ("Anathema is a sort of aggravated excommunication, from which, however, it does not differ essentially, but simply in the matter of special solemnities and outward display"); Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1901) 256 f, 260ab, 261a; *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxv, reform. cap. 3 ("Quamvis excommunicationis gladius nervus sit ecclesiasticae disciplinae, . . . sobrie tamen magnaque circumspectione exercendus est . . . Quod si . . ., tunc eos etiam anathematis mucrone . . . ferire poterit"). Calvin distinguished between anathema which devoted to eternal perdition, and excommunication, which was rather censure and punishment (*Inst.* IV. xii. 9 f). On the first use of the anathema, Turner, *Creeds*, 28 f, 31, 39 f, 42, 47, 62, 65, 82 f, 88. Cf. Forget in *Cath. Encyc.* xiii (1912) 529b, on punishment of schism.

[2] Bull *Exsurge Domine* in Mirbt 258 (no. 23). Cf. Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 679a (" . . . the sentence pronounced on earth is ratified in heaven . . .").

[3] Bull *Unigenitus* in Mirbt 398 f.

[4] Bull *Auctorem Eidei* in the Tauchnitz edn. (1842) of *Conc. Trid.* 312.

excommunication "is no mere external severance from the rights of common worship. It is a severance from the body of Christ, undoing to this extent the work of baptism, and placing the excommunicated man in the condition of the 'heathen and the publican.' It casts him out of God's kingdom; and the Apostle speaks of it as 'delivering him over to Satan' . . ."[1] While it is true that excommunication was intended to be 'medicinal,' it was generally understood that this hope would be realized only if the excommunicated person submitted and was restored.

During the ages when the influence of the Church in the social life of Europe was supreme, ecclesiastical excommunication usually involved most serious personal and civil consequences, often extending—as we shall see later—to torture and death by burning. Even where such gruesome extremes were not reached, the effects of excommunication might still be sufficiently grievous. The heretic could not hold social intercourse with a Catholic, or marry the son or daughter of a Catholic, without involving the latter in suspicion and guilt.[2] Amid many modifications and relaxations in detail, the Catholic Church has aimed on the whole at securing the minimum of intercourse between her members and outsiders. Marriages between Catholics and Protestants are not indeed absolutely forbidden: it would have been quite impossible to enforce such a prohibition. But they are strongly discouraged. The Church has usually aimed at securing, as a condition of her sanction, an undertaking that in such cases the children shall be educated as Catholics, and in recent years the restrictions in force on the Continent have been tightened up.[3] The disapproval of mixed marriages is part of a wider policy, viz. that which forbids to Catholics 'communicatio in sacris' with non-Catholics. Here again, relaxation is permitted to enable Catholics to attend the wedding- or funeral-services or baptisms of their friends and relatives.[4] Further, non-Catholics are allowed to be present at Catholic worship other than the Sacraments: but any kind of real participation by Catholics in non-Catholic prayer or

[1] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 755b: similarly Boudinhon in *op. cit.* v (1909) 679a ("The rites of the Church . . . are always the providential and regular channel through which Divine grace is conveyed to Christians; exclusion from such rites, especially from the sacraments, entails therefore regularly the privation of this grace, to whose source the excommunicated person has no longer access").

[2] Cf. Garvie in *Encyc. Brit.* xiii. 360 f.

[3] The history of the regulations on this matter is long and complicated. Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 322–340; Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 695–698; Fanning in *op. cit.* ix (1910) 698a–699b; *Pope and People*, 65 f; Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 103 n.; Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 1, 3 n., 37, 66, 131–133, 214 (mid. p. 46), 215 (init. and p. 49); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 27 f, 116, 118 f; and the various documents printed by Mirbt.

[4] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 261a.

worship is strictly forbidden, and does not in fact take place except quite sporadically and 'sub rosa.' Again, there are regulations (doubtless not carried out with rigour) forbidding the education of Catholic children at other than Catholic schools, the reading of books that have been placed on the Index, and so on. All such exclusiveness is the natural and logical consequence of the Catholic belief in the Church's monopoly of saving truth and in the heinousness and peril of being separated from her.[1] Protestants must be furnished with the amplest opportunities of learning about Catholicism. But the converse does not hold good. Little or no effort is made to see that Catholics are fully or accurately informed about Protestantism. This onesidedness is a real obstacle to the mutual understanding and sympathy which is an essential condition of happy relationships and just judgments.[2]

The natural concomitant of excommunication in this life is hell-fire (or, to word it more vaguely and moderately, perdition) in the next. To the clear evidence already given in connection with the doctrine 'Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus,' [3] we add here a few casual illustrations of Catholic sentiment. In the fourth century, St. Optatus seems to agree with his Donatist friend Parmenianus "that schismatics are cut off as branches from the vine, destined for punishments, and reserved, like dry wood, for hell-fire." [4] After the death of Frederic, the Protestant King of Denmark, in 1533, a Danish prelate expressed the wish that he might be transformed into a devil so as to be able to assist in hell in punishing the late king for his heresy.[5] The Council of Trent anathematized not only the heresies but the heretics. At the close of the sittings, in the course of a series of responses, the presiding Cardinal gave the word: "Anathema cunctis haereticis," and the assembled fathers replied: "Anathema, anathema."[6] The 'Roman Catechism' claimed that heretics and schismatics, though they had abandoned the Church, yet might be "punished and condemned with an anathema" by her.[7] For some centuries prior to the time of Clemens XIV (1769–1774), there was annually read in public at Rome a papal bull, 'In

[1] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 244 f, 312 n. 29, 317 n. 33 (". . . Diese dogmatische Exklusivität ist die tiefste Ursache für alle 'intoleranten' Gesetze der Kirche (Mischehenverbot, Verbot der Teilnahme an akatholischem Gottesdienst, Verbot der Simultanschule usw.)").

[2] Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 54–57, 127–131.

[3] See above, pp. 44–47, and cf. the suggestiveness of Augustinus' words quoted on p. 48 n. 6.

[4] Optatus, *De Schism. Donist.* i. 10 (Migne, *P.L.* xi. 903): "Dixisti" [i.e. rightly] "enim inter caetera, schismaticos a vite, velut sarmenta esse concisos: destinatos poenis, tanquam ligna arida, gehennae ignibus reservari."

[5] Milner, *Hist. of the Church,* vi. 144 n.

[6] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxv, contin. 4 Dec. and the "acclamationes Patrum in fine Concilii."

[7] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 12 ("anathemate damnentur").

Coena Domini,' in which all heretics and schismatics, along with pirates and several other classes of evil-doers, were solemnly excommunicated and anathematized.[1] Needless to say, the canons enacted at the Council of the Vatican in 1870 are all furnished with anathemas upon those who deny them. A Catholic work, published in 1854, laid it down as absolutely certain that Catholics who become Protestants are damned, unless before death they repent and return to the Church.[2] Another, published in 1879 "with the kind permission of . . . Cardinal Manning," states that "the Anglican Church was established by man and Satan together; it is therefore impossible to be saved in the so-called Anglican Church. Nor is it otherwise with the dissenters."[3] Another, which appeared in 1888, says that, because Protestants refuse to confess their sins to a Catholic bishop or priest, "therefore their sins will not be forgiven them throughout all eternity," and "that they die in their sins and are damned."[4] Another, published in 1902, stated that the obstinate heretic "has, according to Scripture, earned (verdient) eternal punishment in hell."[5] Such utterances, although not official (and therefore easily repudiated, should controversy require it), are yet significant as to the generally understood implications of the Catholic position. They are supported by a responsible contributor to 'The Catholic Encyclopedia,' who writes: "The guiding principles in the Church's treatment of heretics are the following: Distinguishing between formal and material heretics, she applies to the former the canon, 'Most firmly hold and in no way doubt that every heretic or schismatic is to have part with the Devil and his angels in the flames of eternal fire, unless before the end of his life he be incorporated with, and restored to the Catholic Church.' "[6]

The evidence so far collected in this chapter would seem to be clear and abundant enough to leave little or no room for either misunderstanding or qualification. Yet its terrible and pitiless rigour has not been able to resist altogether the influence of those gentler and more charitable feelings which humanity in general instinctively associates with the religion of Jesus. The Catholic Church has all along been

[1] Mirbt 369–371; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 100 f.

[2] Perrone, ap. Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 73.

[3] Father A. op Broek, *Search the Scriptures*, 339.

[4] Father Michael Müller, C.SS.R., *Catholic Dogma* (published "permissu superiorum"), 67. The book appears to be unobtainable: I am therefore dependent on quotations in Tract No. 36 issued by 'The Protestant Press Bureau.'

[5] Father Brors quoted in translation by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 72.

[6] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 261a. Cf. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 534 f; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 219 ("So likewise there is no salvation for anyone who, having by God's grace come to a knowledge of the truth, obstinately refuses to join the true Church of God").

willing to dispute and reason with heretics, however inexcusable she was obliged officially to regard them. More than once in the course of the Council of Trent, efforts were made to induce the Protestant leaders to take part, and safe-conducts for the purpose were solemnly guaranteed—unhappily without result.[1] In the end they were entreated to read the Council's decisions "humbly, as becomes a Christian man; and if any light shines upon them, let them not turn their face away; and if they hear the Lord's voice, let them not harden their hearts, and if they wish to return to the common embrace of Mother-Church, whence they have withdrawn themselves, let them not doubt that full clemency and mercy will be accorded to them." [2] Prayer for the conversion of Protestants is a not uncommon Catholic practice.[3] Heterodox persons of every rank who visit Rome are normally treated with courtesy and tolerance on the part of the Church-authorities.[4] A good deal of real kindliness and generosity has from time to time entered into the judgments expressed by Catholics in regard to non-Catholics. The Benedictines, for instance, normally refer to Protestants as their "separated Christian brethren." [5] J. A. Moehler, in the prefaces to various editions of his 'Symbolik,' pledged himself to be conciliatory and eirenic in his arguments.[6] At the Vatican Council in 1870, Strossmayer, the Catholic Bishop of Sirmium, protested strongly against the un-Christian habit of condemning Protestantism wholesale, and pleaded for a recognition of what was good in its life and literature—though it is true his speech led to an uproar.[7] In 1892 Leo XIII declared in a letter to the Bishop of Grenoble that it was the part of Christian wisdom to promote the co-operation of all men of good will, whether believers or those who, while not believers, were yet 'naturaliter Christiani,' in the pursuit of individual and social good.[8] In 1894 he issued an encyclical on Reunion, which included conciliatory appeals both to the Eastern Church and to the Protestant nations.[9] In 1902 Dr. Ehrhard,

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiii (concluding decree and 'salvus conductus'), sess. xv, sess. xviii end, sess. xxv contin. 4 Dec., and especially the concluding speech of Jerome Ragazzone.

[2] Ragazzone's speech (see last note). Similar sentiment in Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 534.

[3] *Catech. Rom.* IV. v. 2 (". . . ut haeretici redeuntes ad sanitatem, catholicae doctrinae praeceptis erudiantur; ut schismatici, a qua desciverunt . . . Ecclesiae communione, cum ea iterum verae charitatis nodo juncti copulentur"), IV. xi. 23 (see above, p 50 n. 2); Horton, *England's Danger*, 3; Heiler, *Kathol.* 273.

[4] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 98–100.

[5] Heiler, *Kathol.* 462. Cf. Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 764ab, 765 f, 767ab.

[6] Moehler, *Symbolism.* xiii, xvii, xxi.

[7] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 59 f, 83; Löffler in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 316a. Cf. Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 92.

[8] Quoted by Lilley in H.*E.R.E.* viii (1915) 764a.

[9] Encycl. *Praeclara Gratulationis*, 20 June 1894, in *Pope and People*, 225–229.

a Catholic theological professor at Vienna, conceded that Protestantism had enough of the essence of Christianity in it to make it the instrument of a genuinely Christian life for millions.[1] The authors of a recent 'Catholic Statement,' where they have to join issue with certain current religious theories, "do so with a deep appreciation of the earnestness and sincerity which commonly lie behind even the 'heresies' as they regard them." [2]

Nor has this more charitable way of judgment been without its influence on the normal, and even the official, estimate of heresy as such. Catholic writers now regularly draw a distinction between 'formal heresy' and 'material heresy.' Formal heresy is pertinacious, wilful, and culpable; and in regard to it the traditional severity of the Church's judgment still holds good.[3] Material heresy, on the other hand, is the involuntary and unblameable heresy of a Christian who has never had an opportunity of learning what the true Catholic faith is, or who, for any reason for which he is not blameworthy, is ignorant of it, or who, even if not ignorant of it, is earnestly desirous of discovering and believing the truth and pleasing God, but is honestly unconvinced of the truth of Catholic teaching. The condition is described as one of 'invincible ignorance,' but of 'good faith,' and is not regarded as involving the heretic in the loss of salvation. The origin and early history of this lenient judgment are not easy to trace. As a Church-doctrine, it probably began with Augustinus, who wrote: "Those are by no means to be counted among the heretics who do not defend their opinion, howbeit false and perverse, with any pertinacious zeal, especially when they have not given birth (to it) by the boldness of their own presumption, but have accepted (it) from parents who have been seduced and have lapsed into error, and when they nonetheless are seeking the truth with cautious solicitude, ready to be corrected when they shall have found it." [4] We have seen already and we shall see still more clearly how much there was in the Middle Ages to contra-

[1] See Bain, *New Reformation*, 23.

[2] *God and the Supernatural*, pref. vi. Compare the sympathetic words quoted from Wilhelm (*Cath. Enc.* xii [1911] 500b) below, p. 63: also Woodlock, *Modernism*, 85; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 67 (hope that Catholic exclusiveness has reached its zenith, "so dass ein neuer universalistisch weitherziger Katholisierungstrieb einsetzen kann, . . ."), 75 top.

[3] Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 686ab, and Wilhelm in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 256b. (See also above, pp. 56 f). The distinction however it not *quite* clear, for Wilhelm says: "Considering that the human intellect can assent only to truth, real or apparent, studied pertinacity, as distinct from wanton opposition, supposes a firm subjective conviction which may be sufficient to inform the conscience and create 'good faith.'" Elsewhere he speaks as if pertinacity was always sufficient to earn damnation.

[4] Aug. *Ep.* xliii. 1 (Migne, *P.L.* xxxiii. 160): cf. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 534, 536 f; Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 246, 248; Maycock, *Inquis.* 254.

dict such a view;[1] but apparently Thomas Aquinas recognized ignorance as an occasional excuse for heresy.[2] The Jesuit Cardinal De Lugo, who died in 1660, boldly maintained that non-Catholic Christians, and even Jews and heathen, could be saved by the grace of God if they were loyal to the light granted to them.[3] In 1690 Pope Alexander VIII condemned Arnauld's statement that pagans, Jews, and heretics receive no influx of grace from Jesus Christ;[4] and similarly in 1713 Clemens XI condemned the statement of Quesnel that "outside the Church no grace is granted."[5] Pius IX in 1854, after reiterating the doctrine that outside the Church no one could be saved, added: "but nevertheless it is equally to be held for certain that those who labour under ignorance of the true religion, if it be invincible (ignorance), are not in the Lord's eyes guilty of any fault for this thing."[6] Nine years later, in a letter to the bishops of Italy, he wrote: "It is known to Us and to You that they who are in invincible ignorance concerning our religion, but observe the natural law . . . and are ready to obey God and lead an honest and righteous life, can, with the help of Divine light and grace, attain to eternal life . . . for God . . . will not allow anyone to be eternally punished who is not wilfully guilty."[7]

Such a doctrine quite clearly called for some modification in the Catholic view of excommunication and of the Church, as normally stated and understood.[8] This modification once again finds a basis in Augustinus. For him the true Church and the visible Church were not exactly co-extensive. God knew of many who were outside the latter, but within the former. Unjust excommunication was possible, but God would crown in secret those who bore it patiently without denying

[1] It is not in keeping with historical facts to say: "*In every age* the Church has drawn a fundamental distinction . . . between formal and merely material heretics, and her penal legislation was directed solely against the former category" (Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv [1912] 767b: italics mine). Whatever may have been the theory of the matter, in practice the distinction was to all intents and purposes ignored for centuries. See below, pp. 614f n. 5.

[2] Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 200.

[3] Cf. von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses*, 63, 236, 252 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 612 f.

[4] Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 767a.

[5] Bull *Unigenitus* in Mirbt 396 (no. 29).

[6] Mirbt 447 (24: ". . . nulla ipsos obstringi huiusce rei culpa . . ."); Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 536; Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 767a.

[7] Quoted by Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 261b. For later statements of the doctrine, cf. Newman, *Apol.* 308 f (appx. 8); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 217 f, 242 note †; Thurston in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 629a; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 256b, 257a, 258 f, 261a (see above, p. 56); Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 766b, 767a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 316, 611–613; Maycock, *Inquis.* 136. On the status of modern Protestants, see below pp. 613 f.

[8] Without such modification, the contradiction between 'Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus' and the salvation of the invincibly ignorant non-Catholic, is of course glaring. This is very clearly exemplified in Pohle's paragraph referred to in the last note.

the faith or starting rival assemblies.[1] In the eleventh century, Cardinal Deusdedit, in the twelfth the canonist Gratianus, and in the thirteenth Innocentius III—all taught in various terms that an excommunication, though it must be formally respected, may be unjust, and if so, is invalid in the sight of God. Innocentius III, in fact, propounded the precise doctrine which was later condemned in its Quesnellian form by Clemens XI in 1713.[2] He laid it down that a Christain must submit to excommunication rather than commit what he knows (but cannot prove to the Church) to be a mortal sin.[3] Augustinus' doctrine on the matter was reproduced by Aquinas.[4] The comforting distinction between 'excommunicati tolerati' and 'excommunicati vitandi' goes back to the fifteenth century.[5] But it was apparently not earlier than about the end of the eighteenth century that authoritative Catholic teachers began to explain that 'material heretics,' if sincere in belief and upright in life, were really after all members of the Catholic Church, through their *implicit* desire to be so, and belonged to its 'soul,' though cut off from its visible body. Most statements of the doctrine stipulate that it applies only to those who have been baptized, though here again a way out of the difficulty can be found. The consignment of all the unbaptized to hell is avoided by deeming the good ones among them to have received 'the baptism of desire,'[6] despite the anathema pronounced at Trent against those who say that water is not necessary for baptism and who interpret the demand for it (Jn. iii. 5) metaphorically.[7]

[1] Aug. *De Vera Relig.* vi (11) (Migne, *P.L.* xxxiv. 128), *De Bapt. contra Donat.* i. 17 (Migne, *P.L.* xliii. 123 f), v. 27 (*ib.* 196), *Unit. Eccles.* 74 (*ib.* 444).

[2] See above, p. 53.

[3] Carlyle, *Mediaeval Polit. Theory in the West*, ii. 244–249; Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, 401 f: cf. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, ii. 115, and Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 684a.

[4] *Summa Theol.* supplem. tert. part. Qu. xxi, art. iv.

[5] Cf. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 756a; Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 680 f, 682b–683b; Schaff in H.*E.R.E.* iv (1911) 717b.

[6] Newman, *Apol.* 308 f (appx. 8); Hase, *Handbook*, i. 90–94 (my authority for the *date*); Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 154 f; Fanning in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 266ab (baptism); Lylburn, *Our Faith*, ii (1908) 77–88 (full exposition—baptism, 85); Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 752 f, 755b, 756a; Wilhelm in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 261b; Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 532–537 (full statement); Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 629a (". . . It is now universally held . . ."); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 217–219, 228 ("a Christian estranged from the Church of God is not, as a rule, reckoned as belonging to the Church . . ."); Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 262–267; Martindale in *op. cit.* 285 (baptism); Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 121; Heiler, *Kathol.* 278, 611 f (baptism); Woodlock, *Modernism*, 85 f; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 38, 43 f, 48, 95, 109 (baptism), 184 f; D'Arcy, *Cathol.* 32–34; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 232–240. A couple of unofficial mediaeval anticipations (fourteenth century) of this doctrine of baptism are quoted by Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 451, and a few more by Fanning in *loc. cit.*

[7] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, bapt. can. 2 (Mirbt 304 [19]). See above, p. 37, on the impermissibility of interpreting Church-dogmas in a new sense.

But which heretics actually thus belong to the soul of the Church, and which are guilty of that degree of pertinacity which constitutes them 'formal' heretics and involves them in eternal damnation—only God can judge.[1] In this way the de fide doctrine 'Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus' is effectively relieved of its most appalling implications, without being verbally contradicted and abandoned.[2]

In order to complete our account of the Catholic estimate of heresy and schism, it is necessary only to summarize the criticisms passed by Catholics on Protestantism from the practical and empirical (as distinct from the more theoretical) point of view.

The first criticism has already been referred to at the beginning of this chapter.[3] It is that non-Catholicism inevitably involves scepticism as a matter of logic, and produces it as a matter of experience. Non-Catholics, even if they belong to 'the Soul of the Church,' are cut off from God's appointed means of grace.[4] Of the Old Catholics and various other groups of ex-Catholic dissidents it is said: "As a matter of fact, they are all on the road to free-thinking and Rationalism." [5] Among Protestants, "the very ideas of God, religion, Church, sacraments, have lost their old values: they stand for nothing real outside the subject in whose religious life they form a kind of fool's paradise. . . . Present-day Protestantism, therefore, may be compared with Gnosticism, Manichæism, the Renaissance, eighteenth-century Philosophism, in so far as these were virulent attacks on Christianity, aiming at nothing less than its destruction [6] . . . among Protestants the principle of Subjectivism is destroying what remains of their former faith and driving multitudes into religious indifference and estrangement from the supernatural." [7] In a word, the prevalence of irreligion in the modern

[1] Pius IX ap. Mirbt 447 (26) (see above, p. 59) ". . . Nunc vero quis tantum sibi arroget, ut huiusmodi ignorantiae" [i.e. 'invincible' ignorance] "designare limites queat iuxta populorum, regionum, ingeniorum aliarumque rerum tam multarum rationem et varietatem?"); Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 679a ("Undoubtedly the Church cannot (nor does it wish to) oppose any obstacle to the internal relations of the soul with God; . . ."); Wilhelm in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 256b ("It is not for man, but for Him who searcheth the reins and heart, to sit in judgment on the guilt which attaches to a heretical conscience"), 257b ("A study of the personal narratives in 'Roads to Rome' and 'Roads from Rome' leaves one with the impression that the heart of man is a sanctuary impenetrable to all but God and, in a certain measure, to its owner. It is, therefore, advisable to leave individuals to themselves and to study the spread of heresy," etc.); Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 766 f.

[2] According to 'Romanus' (*Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 865), it "has been practically abrogated by the doctrine" of the Soul of the Church. Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 91 f.

[3] See above, pp. 43 f.

[4] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 753a, 757a: cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 223.

[5] Forget in *Cath. Encyc.* xiii (1912) 535a.

[6] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 499b.

[7] *Id.* 500b.

world is to be laid at the door of those who have revolted from the authority of the Church.[1]

An equally glaring and damning defect of Protestantism—one which Catholic apologists press incessantly and confidently—is the changefulness and inconstancy of Protestant teaching and the consequent disunion and sectarianism of Protestant bodies. This plea is probably the most popular weapon in the Catholic armoury. For the alleged inevitable scepticism of heresy, however firmly a Catholic may believe it, is after all a theory incapable of being cogently demonstrated: but no one can deny the fluctuations and varieties of Protestant thought, and the endless divisions of Protestant church-life. If reproach really attaches to these, it is not difficult to drive such reproach home: and at first blush at least, unity and constancy command more respect than denominational rivalries and shifting theologies. Hence the frequency and confidence with which Catholics press their attack along this line. "What a contrast," cries one, "between this blessed vision of peace within the Church and the scene of disorder and tumult outside! There, nearly every pulpit is made the centre of a different teaching, which, delivered without authority, is heard without submission; there, sometimes the very foundations of Christianity are uptorn that it may be shaped anew, according to individual bias or the caprice of an excited assembly." [2] "The 'unhappy divisions,' " observes another, "not only between sect and sect but within the same sect, have become a by-wordl They are due to the pride of private intellect, . . . Protestantism claim. roundly one hundred millions of Christians, products of the Gospes and the fancies of a hundred reformers, people constantly bewailing their 'unhappy divisions' and vainly crying for a union which is only possible under that very central authority, protestation against which is their only common denominator." [3] "Divided into various sections and parties," writes a third, "they are the scene of never-ending disputes; and by the nature of the case they are cut off from all hope of attaining to certainty." [4] The theological disagreements in question are not only those between various groups of Protestants to-day, but also those that make a present-day school of thought like modernism such a contrast in many ways to the Reformation-movement of the sixteenth century. The consequence of all this confusion is that "no man knows what the creed of a faithful Protestant is or should be." [5] Such solidarity

[1] Cf. *id.* 502a: also the clever attempt of D'Arcy (*Cathol.* 60) to brand all the liberal movements of European thought in the nineteenth century as naturalistic and anti-religious.

[2] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 254.

[3] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 496b, 503a; cf. 498a.

[4] Joyce in *op. cit.* iii (1908) 755a Cf. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 510–513, 528.

[5] Wilhelm in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 495b, 499b.

as Protestantism does undoubtedly possess is due to the various ways in which it has limited the principle of private judgment, and to the proximity and influence of Catholicism. This last factor accounts for irreligion being less rampant in England, where the grip of Protestantism on the masses was much lighter, than in Germany.[1]

A third ground for the Catholic depreciation of Protestantism is the supposed diminution and evanescence of the latter in point of numbers and influence, as contrasted with the growing strength and solidity of the Catholic Church. A number of facts and opinions in connection with this claim have already been given,[2] and do not need to be repeated here. The point we have now to observe is the plainly one-sided nature of the argument. Catholic gains and Protestant losses must be held to point to the validity of Roman claims; but apparently the converse does not hold true. Protestant gains and Catholic losses are easily patient of other explanations than as arguments for the truth or merit of Protestantism. Thus on behalf of Catholicism it is pleaded: "A better standard of comparison than the glamour of worldly progress, . . . is the power of self-preservation and propagation, i.e. vital energy. What are the facts?" Then follows an appreciation of the triumph of the Counter-Reformation.[3] The advances and gains of Romanism since the sixteenth century are indicated, and the question is asked: "Can our separated brethren tell a similar tale of their many Churches, even in lands where they are ruled and backed by the secular power? We do not rejoice at their disintegration, at their falling into religious indifference, or returning into political parties. No, for any shred of Christianity is better than blank worldliness. But we do draw this conclusion: that after four centuries the Catholic principle of authority is still working out the salvation of the Church, whereas among Protestants the principle of Subjectivism is destroying what remains of their former faith and driving multitudes into religious indifference and estrangement from the supernatural." [4] One would have thought that the immense losses that Rome has incurred as a result of the triumphs of the Reformation would in the same way have proved something in the way of Divine favour for Protestantism. But that is not the inference drawn. "A moment's consideration supplies the solution of this difficulty. Success is not invariably due to intrinsic goodness, nor is failure a certain proof of intrinsic badness." Protestantism spread chiefly because it pandered to man's worst instincts, though it is admitted that the Church's need of reform had prepared the way for it. Various other

[1] Wilhelm in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 497 f, 499 f (where apparently "tighter" is a misprint for "lighter").

[2] See above, pp. 1–9.

[3] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 502ab.

[4] *Id.* 500ab.

causes contributing to the success of Protestantism are recognized, but none that consists in any *distinctive* virtue of its own. "Evidently we need not look for Divine intervention to account for the rapid spread of Protestantism. It would be more plausible to see the finger of God in the stopping of its progress." [1] Foreign missions were always the concern of the Catholic Church: with Protestants they were comparatively a very late development. In point of success Protestant missions compare unfavourably with Catholic,[2] and have achieved such inadequate results "as to justify the conclusion that the blessing of God did not rest upon the enterprise." [3]

As with soundness of faith, as with strength and efficiency, so with moral worth. The moral progress of the world, and particularly of Protestant peoples, since the Reformation, proves nothing in favour of Protestantism. Protestantism was the child of the Renaissance, which was a classical—that is, a pagan—revival; and much so-called progress is simply worldly and material betterment, which is easily compatible with growing irreligion. Such real gains as have been made are due to quite other causes than the particular brand of Christianity prevalent in particular countries. The idea that they are due to Protestantism is based on the erroneous self-esteem of the Teutonic races.[4] But while it is impossible to credit Protestantism with the good, it is obvious that it must be debited with the evil. For Protestantism appealed to the lowest things in human nature. "A bait was tendered to the seven-headed concupiscence which dwells in every human heart; pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy, sloth, and all their offspring were covered and healed by easy trust in God. No good works were required: the immense fortune of the Church was the price of apostasy: political and religious independence allured the kings and princes: the abolition of tithes, confession, fasting, and other irksome obligations attracted the masses."[5] More than that, it was Protestantism that was responsible for Cæsaro-papism, the supremacy of the State in

[1] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 499ab. See also above, p. 63 top.

[2] *Id.* 502 f: but he recognizes their "great activity in all heathen countries" and their "fair success."

[3] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 759b: similarly, but more fully, Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 517–519 (yet he admits that Protestants spend far more on foreign missions than Catholics do—what does that point to?—and that the conversions they effect can at least in part be attributed to "gratiae divinae quae conceditur iis qui, extra veram Ecclesiam, bonâ fide regnum Dei propagare conantur." Their measure of success, such as it is, is due to their imitation of Catholic virtues). A comparison more favourable to Protestantism is conceded by Dr. Orchard (*Foundations*, iii. 166).

[4] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 500a–502a. Cf. C. Dawson in *God and the Supernatural*, 114–116. A full and cautious consideration of the contribution of Protestantism to the modern world is to be found in Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress* (Eng. trans.) passim, esp. 40 f.

[5] Wilhelm in *Cath Encyc.* xii. (1911) 498 f. Cf. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 529 f.

religion, with all its attendant horrors. Protestantism alone therefore must bear the blame for the hundred and thirty years of strife that passed before the Catholic Church gave up trying to regain her losses by force of arms. "No one nowadays," continues the Catholic apologist, "can read without a sense of shame and sadness the history of those years of religious and political strife; of religion everywhere made the handmaid of politics; of wanton destruction of churches and shrines and treasures of sacred art; of wars between citizens of the same land, conducted with incredible ferocity; of territories laid waste, towns pillaged and levelled to the ground, . . . ; . . . of barbarous cruelty on the part of princes, nobles, and judges . . ., in short of the almost sudden drop of whole countries into worse than primitive savagery." No one, indeed. But who was responsible? " 'Greed, robbery, oppression, rebellion, repression, wars, devastation, degradation' would be a fitting inscription on the tombstone of early Protestantism." [1]

If the Catholic estimate of Protestantism is sound, it ought to follow that true saintliness of life is found only within the Roman Church. The 'Roman Catechism' says explicitly that those who are truly holy cannot be outside the Church.[2] By limiting saintliness to a certain type or narrow range of types, it is possible to argue that this judgment is justified in point of fact.[3] But the existence of much apparent goodness of life in heretical circles is so well known that the Catholic thesis in general is very far from being obviously true. The favourite method of getting over the difficulty in early times was to assume that the apparent goodness was only apparent: it was due to hypocrisy and love of ostentation.[4] That theory is now largely, if not wholly, abandoned by Catholic writers, who are usually ready to recognize frankly that the apparent goodness of Protestants is on the whole real goodness. Even in theological disputings, tribute is often paid, where it is due, to the scholarliness and fairmindedness of Protestant writings. But such recognition always stops short of praising anything characteristic of Protestantism. "No one of course," it is conceded, "would wish to

[1] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 501b. Some modern German Catholics put down the recent collapse of their country to its Protestantism (Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 85).

[2] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 17 (3) "(ita ut, quicunque vere sancti sunt, extra hanc Ecclesiam esse non possint"). This cannot be an allusion to 'the Soul of the Church,' which is not mentioned anywhere else in the *Catechism*; moreover the immediate context (on visible worship and Sacraments) excludes any such allusion.

[3] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 759b (". . . Outside the Church men do not look for such holiness"). Cf. Martineau, *Seat*, 152 f, 159–161.

[4] Garvie in *Encyc. Brit.* xiii. 359a. Cf. *Catech. Rom.* praef. 8 (heretical "libellos . . ., qui, cum pietatis speciem prae se ferrent," etc). Similarly in the condemnation of the opinions of Quesnel in 1713 in the bull *Unigenitus* ("splendida pietatis specie prava dogmata latenter insinuantes, introducunt sectas perditionis sub imagine sanctitatis . . . specie quadam pietatis . . . sub falsa piae institutionis imagine . . .").

deny that within the Protestant bodies there have been many men of great virtues. Yet it is not too much to assert that in every case their virtue has been nourished on what yet remained to them of Catholic belief and practice, and not on anything which they have received from Protestantism as such." [1]

[1] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 757a. Similarly, in regard to Protestant *missionaries*, Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 518 f, and, more generally, *ibid.* 527–530 (admits however that sincere Protestants enjoy Divine grace). See further, on the question of Catholic saintliness, below, pp. 634 f.

CHAPTER IV

THE ADVANTAGES AND MERITS OF CATHOLICISM

In our first chapter we have already recognized—and that gladly—our duty as controversialists to conform to that new spirit which requires of us a sincere endeavour to understand sympathetically the position we are challenging and to pay tribute to whatever goodness is to be seen in it. To the discharge of that duty we now address ourselves. We have to set forth our appreciation of those things in Catholicism that give it value. It can hardly be expected that anyone who is not himself a Catholic should be able to do full justice to these things: but there is no reason why a sincere outsider should not be able to feel at least sufficient appreciation of them to enable him to come to a fair decision in regard to the claims of Catholicism—indeed it is surely to a large extent on the possibility of such appreciation that Rome herself relies in her efforts to attract converts from outside. Our enumeration of the merits of Rome shall therefore be ample and sincere; and we shall not shrink from hoping that Protestant Christians may be willing to take a leaf out of Rome's book, wherever their religious life stands to gain by their doing so.[1]

At the same time, preliminary warning must be given lest our tribute to merit be misunderstood. For one thing, the boundary between meritorious and non-meritorious advantages is very hard to draw. There are many things in the Roman system that are sources of strength to it: but we should not be prepared to reckon them all as real merits,[2] or to advocate an undiscriminating attempt on the part of Protestants to secure them. Owing to the close interpenetration of the component elements in a religious system, exact analysis in this field is extremely difficult. Here and there it will be possible to express unqualified admiration, here and there to indicate an advantage that seems meretricious. Otherwise judgment must be regarded as provisional, the final estimate being dependent upon one's decision in regard to the Catholic case as a whole.

Further, recognition of the merits of Catholicism clearly does not imply—and ought not to be taken as implying—a belief that such merits are necessarily inseparable from Catholicism as it is, or an incipient repentance of the revolt against the domination of

[1] Cf. Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 52 f, 236–263; Forsyth, *Authority*, 311 f, 364; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 32–37.

[2] Cf. Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 10 f, 45 f.

Rome.[1] No surprise can be felt at the fact that Catholics will be gratified by our willingness to admire parts at least of their religious system: and it would be absurd to feel fear, or to raise objection, because they express such gratification. But Catholic writers frequently seem inclined to construe the tribute now frequently paid to Catholicism by Protestants as a tacit admission on the part of the latter that the position they hold is on the whole the weaker position—as an indication, in fact, that Protestantism is gradually 'coming their way.'[2] It is, of course, nothing of the sort. Catholics themselves speak much more tolerantly and appreciatively of Protestants to-day than they did formerly: indeed, it seems as though one very considerable doctrine (that concerning 'the Soul of the Church') has been actually brought in for the sake of removing from good Protestants as a class the traditional and wholesale consignment of them to perdition in the next life. But Catholics would quickly complain of being misinterpretated if this new generosity of theirs were regarded as an incipient abandonment of the Roman stronghold. On the one side, as on the other, a chivalrous commendation of the opponent's virtues must not be treated as a surrender to him. It may, however, be observed that the danger in question besets our Catholic fellow-Christians more than it besets us. For, as was remarked above,[3] a tolerant attitude in actual controversy may be found to involve some very far-reaching implications. How can it be justified unless it rests on tolerance in heart and belief—that is, on tolerance as a principle? That question has no terrors for the real Protestant, for whom toleration in religious belief is a settled and avowed tenet. But it is not easy to see how the Romanist can answer it without either condemning his courtesy as a controversialist, or contradicting Rome's repeated rejection of toleration on principle.

Be that as it may, the great and good things in Catholicism deserve to be recognized: and our list of them may well begin with those qualities that strike most immediately upon the eye and imagination of the beholder. The Roman Catholic Church is unique: but to say that by itself is not to say very much, for every religious body is unique in some way or another, and some of them are unique in ways that do not call forth our esteem. But Rome is unique in the sense of having no other body even roughly similar to her: in most things that concern us here she is not one of a class, she is distinctly 'sui generis.'[4] It is

[1] See above, p. 15 n. 5. Cf. Horton, *England's Danger*, 16; and (for Luther's concessions) Hase, *Handbook*, i. 8 f, 222 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 697 (note to S. 10).

[2] Cf. Hermelink's complaint of misrepresentation (*Kath. und Prot.* 132), and, more generally, Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 23–38 ('The Shop Window').

[3] P. 15.

[4] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 152; Heiler, *Kathol.* X ("die ganze Religionsgeschichte kennt keine Parallele der *una sancta catholica*"), 317 (". . . die Einzigartigkeit dieses kirchlichen Rechtsorganismus"), 595 f.

the things in which she is unique that make her uniqueness significant. She has, for instance, appropriated the appealing word 'Catholic' so successfully that the utmost other claimants have been able to effect is to introduce a little ambiguity into its meaning in certain contexts; and their very fondness for the name puts two or three powerful arguments against them into the hands of Rome, as the body that has so many obvious claims to it.[1] Impressive support to these claims is afforded by her numerical superiority. She is—so far at least as nominal membership goes—by far the largest of all Christian bodies. She has approximately twice as many adherents as the Eastern Churches have, and very considerably outnumbers all the Protestant Churches put together (though Protestants and Orientals together would exceed her total). Along with this pre-eminence in numbers stands her international character: she transcends all barriers of race, country, and language. Of the various 'internationals' of our time, the Catholic Church is the oldest and strongest. "In it, and in it alone," the claim runs, "is the brotherhood of man realized." [2] What renders this world-wide extension the more imposing is the general uniformity of creed and usage that prevails throughout the whole of the Catholic Diaspora.[3] But the uniformity of the Church transcends not only the distances of space, but also the distances of time. Her persistent vitality and resourcefulness enable her to defy the corrosion of the centuries.

> "Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale
> Her infinite variety."

But variety need not be taken to mean change. The Church claims, if not with entire accuracy,[4] yet at least with sufficient accuracy to make

[1] See above pp. 11–13, and cf. Augustinus, *Contra epist. Manich.* i. 5 (Migne, *P.L.* xlii. 175: "Multa sunt alia, quae in eius" [Catholicae Ecclesiae] "gremio me iustissime teneant . . . tenet postremo ipsum Catholicae nomen, quod non sine causa inter tam multas haereses sic ista Ecclesia sola obtinuit, ut cum omnes haeretici se catholicos dici velint, quaerenti tamen peregrino alicui, ubi ad Catholicam conveniatur, nullus haereticorum vel basilicam suam vel domum audeat ostendere").

[2] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 757b. Cf. Aug. (as above) ("tenet consensio populorum atque gentium . . .").

[3] Martineau, *Seat*, 161 f; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 253 f; Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 506–521; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 503a ("Catholicism numbers some 270 millions of adherents, all professing the same Faith, using the same sacraments, living under the same discipline"); Heiler, *Kathol.* 597 ("Der hervorstechendste Wesenszug des Katholizismus ist seine Universalität . . . Die katholische Kirche ist die Weltkirche . . . Die Universalkirche umfasst alle Klassen und Stände, alle Rassen und Sprachen, alle Völker und Nationen. Mit heiligem Eifer hat sie immer wieder jede Tendenz zum Landeskirchentum bekämpft," etc.), 604. The uniformity of the Catholic Church, however, has not prevented a certain amount of vigorous party-strife within her borders (Hase, *Handbook*, i. 24–26; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 113 f).

[4] Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 228: "It has its own history of variations, as vast and quite as conflicting as those of Protestantism."

a very imposing case, that her teaching is permanent, fixed, and unchangeable.[1] In a world where there is so much that is shifting and uncertain, this apparent fixity and constancy naturally exert an immense attractive power.[2] It has, however, to be pointed out that, inasmuch as this vast uniformity in place and time has been brought about by the rigid suppression of differences and by the repeated amputation of dissenting minorities, it represents an unalterability far more apparent than real; and the appeal to it is in essence simply the argument—in another form—from numerical superiority and effective discipline.[3]

If, for this and other reasons, merit cannot be claimed for uniformity throughout the world and unchangeability throughout the ages, much real prestige will still remain to the Church of Rome on the score of her antiquity and the unbroken continuity of her life. No other city in the world can produce a similar Christian record reaching without a gap from the Apostolic age to the present day. Whether the alleged stability be there or not, at all events antiquity is there, and the unbroken chronicle running right back into the lifetime of the Apostles. Further, there is a great setting-forth of the unity of the Church, not as an ideal only, but as something largely realized in practice. The prayer ascribed to our Saviour in the Fourth Gospel, that those who believe in Him "may all be one," [4] is understood by Catholics to refer to the unification of all Christians in a single organization under the headship of the Bishop of Rome; and, as such, it is a prayer that Catholic hearts love to offer.[5] The necessary unity of the Church as a visible organization is to the Catholic the most obvious of all truths; the dis-

[1] See above, p. 25 n. 3, p. 30 n. 3, pp. 36–38. Cf. R. A. Knox in *God and the Supernatural*, 13.

[2] Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 220 ("I do not . . . desire to ignore the fascination which the Roman Church naturally possesses . . . as continuing, and presenting to this day before our eyes, with the main features unaltered, the religious life which has been that of many past ages"); Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 506–517, 520; Heiler, *Kathol.* 374, 597, 647; F. W. Norwood in *Christian World*, 4 Feb. 1926, 4 ("I see men putting back in their little boats towards Rome, and what attracts them is the lamp that burns upon the Vatican inscribed with the legend 'Semper Eadem'—always the same—which gives it the appearance of a lighthouse in a storm").

[3] Martineau, *Seat*, 152, 161–165 (a trenchant criticism, concluding: "The illusory nature of a 'universality' that breaks in pieces, and then allows a fragment to label itself as the whole, in virtue, not of identical essence, but of greater size, is in our time laid bare before the eyes of all the living"). Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 24; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 16 f.

[4] John xvii. 20 f: cf. x. 16 ("and they shall become one flock [with] one shepherd").

[5] Cf. for instance, Heiler, *Kathol.* 273, and the closing words of Ragazzone's sermon at the conclusion of the Council of Trent ("Sed fac, tu Domine Deus noster, ut . . . fiat temporibus nostris, ut unum sit omnium ovile, et unus pastor, atque is potissimum Pius IV., in tui nominis gloriam sempiternam. Amen").

ruption of that unity the most indefensible of all errors;[1] the maintenance and expression of that unity the most incontestable of all arguments for the papacy.[2] The appeal of an all-embracing unity is one to which few religious minds will fail to make some response; and even such partial embodiment of it as the Church of Rome affords is not without its majesty even for Protestant eyes. When Gladstone first visited Rome at the age of twenty-two, "in entering St. Peter's . . . he experienced his 'first conception of unity in the Church,' and first longed for its visible attainment. Here he felt 'the pain and shame of the schism which separates us from Rome—whose guilt surely rests not upon the venerable fathers of the English Reformed Church but upon Rome itself, yet whose melancholy effects the mind is doomed to feel when you enter this magnificent temple and behold in its walls the images of Christian saints and the words of everlasting truth; . . .' This was no fleeting impression of a traveller." [3]

Without staying to estimate here the value of such a conception and such an embodiment of the ideal of Christian unity, we may yet observe with genuine admiration the magnificent corporate loyalty which the Catholic Church has succeeded in maintaining among her members. Granting that this wonderful esprit de corps has been facilitated by the peculiar history and character of Catholicism, is impoverished through its proud exclusion of so many 'separated brethren,' and may even be by no means remotely connected with some great evils, and granting too that Protestant shortcomings in this respect are largely explained by hindrances arising from the inevitable struggle for supreme issues, it yet remains true that corporate loyalty to one's fellow-Christians as a body is a real and much-needed Christian virtue, that Catholicism is comparatively rich in it, and that Protestantism, and especially Free-Church life, is comparatively poor in it. There is no need to assume that the poverty is an inevitable and eternal accompaniment of Protestantism; but it is not easy to see any royal road to amendment, and Protestants should not shrink from recognizing their need in this respect and from emulating the rich community-sense of their Catholic fellow-Christians.[4] And what is true of the Catholic community-sense

[1] Cf. F. D. Maurice, *Theological Essays*, 174: " 'Yes,' replies the Romanist, 'and your Protestant mode of reforming the universal Church was to split it into a thousand sects; . . .' The mockery is severe, and it is deserved. . . ."

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 332 f (". . . Das Papsttum . . . ist ihnen die Garantie für die Einheit der Kirche . . ."), 604 (". . . der päpstliche Primat ist seiner Idee nach der 'persongewordene Reflex der Einheit der ganzen Kirche' " [quoting Moehler]).

[3] Morley, *Gladstone*, i. 64 f.

[4] W. S. Bruce, *Social Aspects of Christian Morality* (1905) 8 f ("If Catholicism tends to suppress the individual and to become therefore stationary, Protestantism has helped to undermine the idea of the Church and to that extent has been anti-social. What we need is a synthesis that shall embrace the truth that resides in both

is very largely true also of that remarkably warm affection and devotion which the Roman Church has known how to awaken in the bosoms of her many children.[1]

The intense missionary-zeal of the Church and her marvellous organization are too well known to need much comment.[2] They are of course invaluable assets for a propagandist body to possess; but they are not the peculiar possession of Catholicism. Protestantism, too, has a strong missionary-spirit—so also has Mohammedanism; while efficient organization is not unknown as a characteristic of aggressive military states. Such qualities make a movement formidable: but praise for them has to wait on our judgment as to the doctrines promulgated and defended.

More unquestionably creditable, and at the same time more characteristic of Catholicism, is the Church's extraordinary elasticity and adaptability. She caters for all types—the simple and the profound, the mystical and the practical, the statesman and the theologian, the æsthetic and the philosophical, the man-of-the-world and the aspirant after perfection. Hence the appearance she often wears, in the eyes of outsiders, of being a 'complexio oppositorum,' a synthesis of antithetical yet complementary elements—or, as others see it, an aggregate of inconsistencies and contradictions. But even supposing contradiction and inconsistency are there, they are not of the essence of this quality, which at its best resembles the 'infinite variety' of Mother-Nature or the inexhaustible applicability of the Divine bounty to the needs of men of every sort.[3]

Another quite remarkable feature of Romanism is the assumption

of them. . ."); Heiler, *Kathol.* 578 ("Jene Begeisterung für den Kirchengedanken, welcher der katholischen Frömmigkeit eigen ist"), 615 f, and (in regard to the strong Church-idea in Calvin and *real* Calvinism) 583 f; Father F. H. Jeayes, C.R., in *Reconciliation*, Sept. 1924, 146b ("The main distinctive idea of Catholicism is the corporate idea," etc.); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 58. The need of a stronger sense of corporate responsibility is often alluded to in discussions of modern religion. See also below, pp. 675 f.

[1] The persecuting Cardinal Santaseverina says that, after prayer in his garden-chapel, "I felt within me such joy and gladness that I desired to be slain for the Catholic faith" (Ranke, *Popes*, iii. 262 f, document No. 64 [I]). Cf. the Protestant Kattenbusch in *Theol. Litzg.* 1922. 12. 267 (quoted by Heiler, *Kathol.* XXI f) (converts from Protestantism to Catholicism speak of the former with contempt and dislike, whereas converts from Catholicism to Protestantism speak tenderly of the Roman Church. "Die Mutter bleibt dem s i t t l i c h r e c h t gearteten Sohn die Mutter, auch wenn er sich von ihr hat wegwenden m ü s s e n"); Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 293.

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 312, 571; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 502b; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 53 f, 81 f.

[3] See Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 152, and especially Heiler, *Kathol.* XIII, 77, 83, 435, 585 f, 595–600, 703 (note to S. 598, quoting Söderblom). Similarly the unfathomable complexity of the Church's riches (Heiler, *Kathol.* XXIII, 599) might be taken as a reminder of the *βάθος πλούτου* and the *ἀνεξιχνίαστοι ὁδοὶ* of God.

of absolute certainty on the part of her champions, and the ability to induce others to regard the assumption as a proof of its own justification. We have in this quality more than simple trust or confidence in the truths of religion. We have an insistence on the obvious and absolute certainty of the rightness of Catholicism, which can be compared only to the ontological argument for the existence of God when accepted as cogent and final. It was this kind of certainty that appealed to Newman, as it has appealed to many others. "The very idea of Christianity," he writes, ". . . is a 'Revelatio revelata'; it is a definite message from God to man distinctly conveyed by His chosen instruments, and to be received as such a message; and therefore to be positively acknowledged, embraced, and maintained as true, on the ground of its being divine, not as true on intrinsic grounds, not as probably true, or partially true, but as absolutely certain knowledge, certain in a sense in which nothing else can be certain, because it comes from Him who neither can deceive nor be deceived." [1] The similar belief that, in accepting Catholicism, one gets beyond the possibility of making a mistake, is reflected in the reminiscences of another Catholic, Father G. Bampfield: " 'If I can be mistaken when I interpret Scripture, how am I to tell when I am mistaken, and when not?' To this question I have to this day been unable to obtain an answer, except in the Catholic Church . . . if our interpretations of Scripture are little more than guesses in which we might be mistaken, we could *never* tell if we were right or not; and . . . as a result, the possession of truth was to us impossible: if we once admit doubt we cease to *know* it as a truth. Most of all should this be the case with religious truth: . . . I fear, then, we must . . . own that there is no certain religious truth on earth: unless, indeed, the Catholic Church be right, and God has provided, in His mercy, a guide whom He has made infallible." [2] So strong is this sense of absolute certainty that it imparts to Catholic literature, particularly to the official utterances of the Church's rulers, a tone of sustained self-confidence and of invincible and unchallenged despotism, the imposing effectiveness of which it is very hard for the normal mind to resist indefinitely. To those who feel either no reason, or no capacity, for resistance, the Church's absolute certainty of being right often brings relief and peace and a welcome escape from the storms of doubt, the ennui of endless controversy, and the ceaseless

[1] Newman, *Gramm.* 381 f; cf. 179 (of religious faith: "its intrinsic superiority is not a matter of experience, but is above experience"), 213 ("Certitude then is essential to the Christian; . . ."), 406 f (quotations from Amort's book, significantly described by its author as "a new, modest, and easy way of demonstrating the Catholic Religion"). Cf. N. P. Williams in *Congress-Report 1923*, 175.

[2] Quoted by Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 391 f. Cf. Woodlock, *Modernism*, 21 f; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 128 bott.

gnawings of subjectivism.[1] We shall have later on to subject this feeling of certainty to a thorough philosophical analysis: for the moment, we would merely remark that of course it proves nothing except for the person who happens himself to possess it, and that both it and the restfulness it induces are susceptible of very different explanations from that which Romanists offer (namely, the supernatural origin of the Roman Church).[2] Psychologically considered, the phenomenon does not seem to differ in its essential nature from that self-assumed unquestionableness and certainty which is so marked a feature of religious zeal, even among comparatively small bodies like the Plymouth Brethren and the International Bible Students. The main differences would appear to be the special context supplied in the case of Catholicism by vast numbers, by hoary antiquity, and by great names belonging to a time when as yet the system had not lost the support of a large part of the modern educated world—as well as by what is confidently believed to be absolute logical cogency and consistency.[3]

This telling assumption of unquestionable certainty is in any case a good example of the extraordinary capacity of the Roman Church to commend herself to the average and sub-average human mentality. Another instance of the same capacity is the power to present in comparatively small compass and in extremely definite terms all that is absolutely necessary for converts and adherents to believe. Furthermore, the sacramental system enables the Church to offer to her members immense aid and support in the apprehension of Divine things. The use of realistic and visible means of expression, beautified by all the resources of art,[4] hallowed by antiquity, if not consecrated (as is in some cases claimed) by the Saviour's own commandment, facilitates to an enormous degree the task of bringing into ordinary human minds a vivid sense of the presence and graciousness of God,

[1] "There is a time when every man is weary of raising difficulties only to task himself with the solution, and desires to enjoy truth without the labour or hazard of contest" (Sam. Johnson, *Life of Sir Thos. Browne*). Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 4 f; Inge, *Authority*, 20; Heiler, *Kathol.* 421 (". . . Je mehr die Geisteskultur eines Zeitalters hineingerissen in den Strudel des Subjektivismus, desto imponierender wirkt jene vollkommene Objektivität, wie sie der Katholizismus in seinem Dogma, seiner Verfassung und seiner Liturgie verkörpert. Eine solche Objektivität öffnet einer subjektivistisch zerrissenen Geisteswelt den Zugang zum Göttlichen"; etc), 422, 696 bott.

[2] Cf. *Catech. Rom.* I. ii. 3 (". . . etenim divinum lumen, quo ea percipimus, tametsi rebus perspicuitatem non afferat, nos tamen de his dubitare non sinit . . ."); Salmon, *Infall.* 82.

[3] On the last point, Newman, *Developm.* 432 f, *Gramm.* 372; Heiler, *Kathol.* 347 ff.

[4] On the beauty of Catholicism, and especially of its liturgy, see Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 35, 283, and Heiler, *Kathol.* XI (a Catholic is convinced that Heiler "wie keiner dereinst berufen ist, die innere Schönheit des Katholizismus der wissenschaftlichen Welt zu enthüllen . . ."), 374, 645 f.

notwithstanding the peculiar dangers (excessive dependence on externals, image-worship, and so forth) incidental to such methods.[1]

Closely allied, at least psychologically, to the features of Catholicism just studied, is its peculiar ability to apprehend the objects of worship with vivid concreteness, and mentally at least to clothe them with reality and objectivity.[2] It must not be assumed too hastily that this faculty is an unmixed blessing; for there can be no doubt that it has often been exercised on purely imaginary objects—such as unhistorical and non-existent saints seen in visions, special manifestations of the Madonna, and so forth.[3] But it applies also to the whole Catholic sense of the Divine in human life, and in particular to the sense of the reality of Christ. The Jesus Christ of the Catholic combines the features of the personal and quasi-human Friend, Master, and Lord,[4] with those of the Eternal Christ of Pauline theology, whose body is the Catholic Church.[5] Protestantism, especially in its evangelical form, has certainly not been lacking in a sense of the nearness and reality of the presence of Christ, particularly in the former of the two types of experience just mentioned, namely, that of personal and mystical apprehension. But it must be admitted that the Protestant, whose mind is beset with concerns for historical and philosophical clarity and exactness (which are quite legitimate in themselves, but which do not—in at all the same way—trouble the Catholic), does not find it so easy as his Catholic brethren do to throw his apprehension of the Divine, overpoweringly real though it is, into a vivid and almost pictorial visualization of the personal Saviour. It is this difference in the way of approach that has, for the most part unjustly, been made the ground of the charge that Protestants do not really believe in the Divinity of Jesus Christ and that Catholicism is the one true champion of that central doctrine.[6]

[1] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 205–207; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 393–396, 410; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 129–141; and especially the full study and generous appreciation of Heiler (*Kathol.* 165–212, 619–621).

[2] Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 58 f.

[3] See below, pp. 486–498.

[4] See, e.g., the prayers to Jesus suggested by Faà di Bruno in *Cath. Belief*, 263–270.

[5] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 623 f.

[6] Newman, *Developm.* 436, 438 ("And next it must be asked, whether the character of Protestant devotion towards our Lord has been that of worship at all; and not rather such as we pay to an excellent human being," etc.), *Gramm.* 55 (English Protestantism "induces its followers to be content with this meagre view of revealed truth; or, rather, it is suspicious and protests, or is frightened, as if it saw a figure in a picture move out of its frame, when our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, or the Holy Apostles, are spoken of as real beings, and really such as Scripture implies them to be"); Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 513 n. 2; Heiler, *Kathol.* 576 f ("Auch der Katholizismus enthüllt sich bei näherem Zusehen als Hüter des paulinischen Panchristismus"), 578 ("Wie für jenen" [Paulus], "so ist auch für sie" [die katholische Kirche] "Christus keine blosse heilsgeschichtliche Grösse der Vergangenheit, sondern lebend-

Another distinction that emerges on a comparison of the Catholic and Protestant tempers, is that, while the latter excels in practical service to human need,[1] the former is, generally speaking, unquestionably superior in general sensitiveness to the call of the supernatural, and consequently in the exercises and enjoyments of the life of devotion. Protestantism, as a movement, cannot compete with Catholicism in the appetite and capacity for fervent prayer, and in reverence for the sanctities of spiritual experience and for the visible symbols that set them forth.[2] As with most really good things, so here—there lies close alongside the good thing the easy risk of misuse. The aptitude for sensing the supernatural has undoubtedly betrayed Catholics again and again, despite exhortations and intentions to avoid superstition, into the grossest and most foolish credulity in regard to supposedly miraculous occurrences and other unrealities.[3] But a thing is not to be judged by its abuses: and it is probable that, of all the distinctive merits of Catholicism, this openness of heart for the eternal, the unseen, and the holy, most needs to be sought and cultivated by Protestants.[4] Mysticism, with all its beauty and its value, is by no means a monopoly of the Catholic Church; and it is remarkable that the greater mystics who have appeared since the seventeenth century have been Protestants and not Catholics.[5] But the vogue of mysticism in the Catholic Church

ige Gegenwart"); Rawlinson, *Authority*, 96 ("it is . . . probable . . . that in regard to the theory and practice of 'objective' worship Protestantism will have to sit frankly at the feet of the Catholic tradition").

[1] Protestant Christianity is grouped by Heiler (*Kathol.* 445 f) with Judaism, Mazdaism, and Islam, as "die stark diesseitig orientierten Hochreligionen"! Cf. Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress* (Eng. trans.) 22 f; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 74, 91 f.

[2] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 198–200, 210, 219, 547–551, 704 (note to S. 656); Rawlinson, *Authority*, 96 ("I do not personally believe that it will prove possible for Protestants to recover fully the idea of adoration in their religion, except on the basis of a revival of sacramentalism on Catholic lines"). At the same time it has to be recognized that popular Catholic usage in worship, etc., often strikes the outsider as irreverent.

[3] See below, pp. 486–498.

[4] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 409 f, 617 ("Das ganze katholische Denken und Leben ist bestimmt von der entschlossenen Bejahung der Übernatur und der unbedingten Hingabe an dieselbe . . ."), 618 (". . . Das Göttliche ist im Katholizismus die 'Wirklichkeit der Wirklichkeiten' . . ."), 618 f ("Wie kaum in einer christlichen Gemeinschaft . . ., lebt im Katholizismus der konsequente religiöse Supranaturalismus, das Bewusstsein von Gott als der eigentlichen Heimat der Seele und die vollkommene Hingabe an die göttliche Transzendenz . . ."), 703 (note to S.618: ". . . Darin liegt ein wichtiges Unterscheidungsmerkmal des Katholizismus von anderen christlichen Konfessionen, in denen die reale Verkehrsgemeinschaft mit der Überwelt, der Gottes u m g a n g zurücktritt hinter dem Glauben an die Überwelt, dem blossen Gottes g e d a n k e n"): also Rev. Norman H. Smith in *Congreg. Quart*, Jan. 1927, 68 ("I have always considered myself a good Protestant, but I venture to believe that I am a better Protestant because" [the Convent of] "St. Odile has long since enabled me to see something of the profound devotion and simple piety of which Catholic souls are capable").

[5] Heiler, *Kathol.* 498.

has on the whole been sufficiently superior in extent, in strength, and in variety, to its vogue elsewhere, to warrant the plea that men should be willing to learn in this matter what the Church of Rome has to teach them.[1]

Corresponding to this peculiar devotional intensity, there is a special ethical intensity which, without injustice to the morals of Protestantism, may yet truthfully be predicated of the Catholic character. One manifestation of this quality is the constant willingness of the Church to welcome and encourage to the utmost of her power that self-abandonment to ethical perfection which characterizes the normal programme of the monastic and the mystical life. Our appreciation of it may be qualified, but should certainly not be cancelled, either by our disappointment at the comparatively low view thus implied as to the ethical possibilities of the lay-life, or by our disagreement with the Catholic Church as to specific items in the content of the ethical ideal. We may feel that there is a good deal to criticize in Catholic notions as to what constitutes a morally perfect life: but that ought not to reduce to silence our admiration for the peculiar way in which Catholicism finds room for, and fosters, that passionate and devouring ethical intensity on the part of the professed 'religious' which alone seems worthy of the supreme values of which religion speaks to us.[2] Not only in the special 'consilia evangelica' held out to these aspirants after perfection,[3] but also in certain of the more normal exhortations addressed to all and sundry, the same peculiar moral earnestness and urgency find expression. The 'Roman Catechism' insists with the utmost emphasis that a firm determination to sin no more is to be expected and demanded of the adult candidate for baptism, on pain of rejection if it is not forthcoming.[4] "But this also is to be noticed,' it says, "that just as, on the testimony of St. Bernard, no end or measure is prescribed for love—for the measure, says he, of loving God is to love Him without measure—so let no measure be laid down for our detestation of sin." [5] Observe too the reckless language of Newman: "The Catholic Church holds it better for the sun and moon to drop from heaven, for the earth to fail, and for all the many millions on it to die of starvation in extremest agony, as far as temporal affliction goes, than that one soul, I will not say, should be lost, but should commit one single venial sin, should tell one wilful untruth, or should steal one

[1] On Catholic mysticism, see the enthusiastic appreciation of Heiler (*Kathol.* 407, 475–555).

[2] On Catholic saintliness, see below, pp. 634 f.

[3] Cf. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 522, 528.

[4] *Catech. Rom.* II. ii. 40, 41 (Christians to be required "ut quotidie tam sancte et religiose traducere vitam studeant, perinde ac si ea ipsa die Baptismi sacramentum et gratiam consecuti essent . . .").

[5] *Catech. Rom.* II. v. 35 (3).

poor farthing without excuse." [1] What is wrong with this language is its apparent unconcern over the immorality of causing pain and over the complexity of ethical dilemmas, not its emphasis on the seriousness of moral issues.[2] The Roman Confessional also, notwithstanding the grave abuses and dangers to which it is exposed, is not only intended, but is to a large extent in practice adapted, to assist individuals in their struggle against temptation, their quest for Divine forgiveness, and their aspiration after true holiness of life.[3]

It is the more necessary to insist upon this aspect of the Catholic spirit because vehement discontent with certain definite ethical teachings of Catholicism and with certain of its practical and admitted failures has tended to blind Protestants to the grand moral zeal and intensity which Catholicism deliberately aims to foster. Errors in the Church's ethical teaching there undoubtedly are: but let us not overlook or minimize the large amount of unquestionable and genuine Christian goodness which finds a prominent place in that teaching. The perfection and love and mercy of God,[4] and the duties of brotherly love,[5] forgiveness of wrongs, justice to one's neighbour, charity to those in need,[6] and strenuous purity of life—are all inculcated with constant repetition and unflagging emphasis.[7] Nor are there lacking duties to which Catholicism has been even more loyal than Protestantism. It must, for instance, be conceded that the Catholic accusation against modern Protestants of being woefully unconcerned over the soundness and adequacy of their religious beliefs is not without a good deal of justification.[8] We must admit that the Catholic is right in laying

[1] Newman, *Apol.* 222 (vii). The words have often been quoted by others. The idea was anticipated by Anselm (*Cur Deus Homo?* i. 21, ii. 14).

[2] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* XXIV, on "der lebenswarmen Frömmigkeit" of Catholicism.

[3] Cf. *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiii, cap. 7 and can. 11, sess. xiv, cap. 3, cap. 4 fin. (in Mirbt 312 (41): "Quamobrem falso quidam calumniantur catholicos scriptores, quasi tradiderint, sacramentum poenitentiae absque bono motu suscipientium gratiam conferre; quod nunquam ecclesia Dei docuit neque sensit"), sess. xxii, cap. 2; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 195; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 298 (on the method of Confession: "Thirdly, Make a Firm Resolution never to Sin again"); Heiler, *Kathol.* 253–261, 572 ("Für so manchen katholischen Christen ist die sakramentale Beichte eine Heimkehr des verlorenen Sohnes zum Vater geworden").

[4] E.g. bull of Pius IV *Ad ecclesiae regimen*, 29 Nov. 1560: ". . . pius et misericors Dominus, qui nunquam ita irascitur, ut misericordiae obliviscatur, . . ."

[5] " 'We should love our neighbour . . . because our neighbour is Jesus Christ'; 'The maximum intensity of life' is the only limit to the charity of the true Christian" (*Times Lit. Suppt.* 16 July 1925, 483, reviewing *Christ in His Brethren* by Rev. Raoul Plus, S.J.).

[6] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 574: "Die Geschichte der christlichen Liebestätigkeit zeigt, dass auch in der katholischen Kirche das höchste Kriterium der Jesusjüngerschaft nie vergessen war").

[7] On the social service of Catholicism, see below, pp. 630 f.

[8] See above, pp. 42 f. J. Baillie discusses in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1926, 242–247, the question whether belief is a duty and disbelief a sin. His conclusion is that they are

great stress on the duty of believing the truth, and the truth alone, about God and ourselves, and that many of us deserve admonition only too well for the unconcern in credal matters into which we have allowed our freedom to betray us. Nor does it in any way excuse us to say—as may truly be said—that to admit this duty by no means involves accepting the Roman way of fulfilling it.

Another matter—connected, like the last-mentioned, with the characteristic theology of the Church, and presenting a certain advantage over some forms of traditional Protestantism—is the Church's strenuous loyalty (however marred by misinterpretations) to the ethical teaching of Jesus as an integral element in that Divine law to which Christians are bound. Intolerance and unkindness apart, the Council of Trent did a good piece of work when it anathematized any who should say "that Christ Jesus has been given by God to men as a redeemer whom they should trust, but not as a legislator whom they should obey," or "that those who had been baptized were by baptism made debtors to faith alone, but not to the observance of the whole law of Christ." [1] It is quite true that the element of literalism associated with this loyalty to the historical Jesus is apt to lead to extravagances in special cases, as for instance in the Roman Church's maintenance to this day of the office of exorcism.[2] But the general attitude has the merit of safeguarding certain values in practical Christian ethics which have often been in danger of submersion owing to the extreme anti-legalism of the Lutheran position.[3]

One of the most curious examples of this safeguarding process is seen in the Church's attitude to divorce. The facts in regard to this matter are briefly these. In the Gospels two rulings are given. In Mark and Luke Jesus absolutely forbids divorce (i.e. a separation that

so, in the sense that there are certain things (for example, the spiritual nature of the universe) which a man has no right to disbelieve. He does not, however, seem to remember that it is also man's moral duty to believe whatever is true, on the sole ground that it is true. This important connection between intellect and morality (viz. the sense of *duty* to believe the truth quâ truth) seems also to be overlooked by Grubb, *Authority*, 20 f. Cf. A. T. Cadoux, *Essays*, 12 f, 20 f.

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vi, can. 21, sess. vii, bapt. can. 7 (Mirbt 302 [10], 304 [29]).

[2] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 709–712; *Cath. Dict.* 340 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 571 f. The Roman baptismal rite is framed on the assumption that the unbaptized child is really in the possession of a devil, who has to be solemnly adjured to depart (*Catech. Rom.* II. ii. 60; McCabe, *Popes*, 116 f; A. Le Marchant in *Congreg. Quart.* July 1927, 303 f).

[3] Cf. H. L. Stewart in *Construct. Quart.* June 1920, 189 (the Catholic scholar Wilfred Ward "would say, wherever the plan of life called Christian is treated as merely one among competing plans from which we may pick and choose, accepting this and rejecting that, wherever it is conceded that worldly wisdom, practical citizenship, patriotic zeal, or anything else may be allowed to force upon us a tampering with the New Testament 'Way,' there we have a sect that has excommunicated itself from the Church Catholic").

can be followed by marriage with another), and admits no qualification of this prohibition. In 'Matthew,' in each of the two passages concerned, a saving clause is added which virtually permits divorce to the innocent party when the other has been guilty of adultery.[1] Modern criticism, which the Roman Church rejects as 'rationalistic,' is virtually unanimous in regarding the saving clauses in 'Matthew' either as interpolations inserted by the evangelist—or as glosses added in the source he used—in order to soften the rigour of the absolute prohibition uttered and intended by Jesus. It has the best grounds for doing so—firstly, in the silence of the other two Gospels (inexplicable if Jesus really uttered the saving clauses), secondly, in the obvious existence of a strong and natural motive for the interpolations, and thirdly, in the repetition of the more rigorous of the two rules by the Apostle Paul (1 Cor. vi. 16, vii. 10 f, 27, 39; cf. Rom. vii. 2 f). According to the professed principles of Catholic exegegis, by which no words ascribed to our Saviour in the Gospels ought to be treated as not having been spoken by Him, the Roman Church ought to permit divorce in the case of adultery and to sanction a fresh marriage for the innocent party, since the *Matthæan* Jesus almost explicitly lends His authority to this course. The Church, however, moved—not, we may be sure, by any deference to modern criticism—but probably by a dread of violating the character of marriage as a Sacrament,[2] absolutely forbids divorce under any circumstances,[3] therein adopting a course which can be said to have the sanction of Jesus only if the operations of modern higher criticism are justified. Nothing could very well be more feeble and hopeless than the efforts of Catholic scholars to square

[1] Mk. x. 2–12; Lk. xvi. 18; Mt. v. 31 f (*παρεκτὸς λόγου πορνείας*), xix. 3–9 (*μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ*).

[2] Cf. Mrs. Scharlieb in *Congress-Report 1923*, 130; Binns, *Reformers and Bible*, 8.

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiv, can. 5 ("Si quis dixerit, propter haeresim, aut molestam cohabitationem aut affectatam absentiam a coniuge dissolvi posse matrimonii vinculum: anathema sit"), 7 ("Si quis dixerit, ecclesiam errare, quum docuit et docet iuxta evangelicam et apostolicam doctrinam, propter adulterium alterius coniugum matrimonii vinculum non posse dissolvi; et utrumque, vel etiam innocentem, qui causam adulterio non dedit, non posse altero coniuge vivente aliud matrimonium contrahere; moecharique eum, qui dimissa adultera aliam duxerit, et eam, quae dimisso adultero alii nupserit: anathema sit"), 8 ("Si quis dixerit, ecclesiam errare, quum ob multas causas separationem inter coniuges quoad thorum seu quoad cohabitationem ad certum incertumve tempus fieri posse decernit: anathema sit"); *Catech. Rom.* III. x. 30; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 301–318 (Hase is mistaken in supposing—as I understand him to do [311]—that Paul in 1 Cor. vii. 12–15 regarded the desertion of a Christian partner by an un-Christian as permitting a fresh marriage on the part of the former: Paul is thinking only of *separation, not divorce*); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 104–106; *Pope and People*, 57–61, 64 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 245; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 136–138, 141 f. Anglo-Catholics generally take the same view (Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 78 f). Scandal is, however, sometimes caused by the Roman Church *annulling* a marriage on supposedly inadequate grounds and thus permitting what is *virtually* divorce and remarriage to certain of her influential members.

the Matthæan passages as they stand with the teaching of their Church.[1] But our surprise and regret at their inconsistency in this matter is counterbalanced by a sense of genuine satisfaction that somehow or other the Church has been faithfully maintaining intact the real teaching of Jesus of Nazareth. Despite its rigours, that teaching is more likely, not only to represent the true Will of God, but to conduce to the ultimate good and happiness of men and women, than any of the looser and more plausible expedients, of which people give themselves the benefit to-day. (It does not however follow from the acceptance of this teaching by the Christian minority that the State, representing as it does the non-Christian majority also, ought to attempt to enforce it upon all).[2]

Finally, we may be thankful to the Roman Church that she withstood, in the interests of a simple and healthy sense of human free-will and moral responsibility, those doctrines of determinism, predestination, and virtual antinomianism, which made their appearance at different times, within and without the Church, from the fourteenth to the eighteenth century. They were no doubt felt at the time, by pious men shocked at the mercenary appearance or character of certain Church-teachings of their day, to be a great relief, and to do better justice than Catholicism was doing to the central doctrine of Christianity—that, namely, of the grace of God. In particular, the Lutheran doctrine of salvation by faith alone apart from works has deeply endeared itself to generation after generation of godly hearts. In so far as it brought into prominence the New-Testament doctrine that God forgives the penitent on the strength of his trustful penitence (i.e. his faith), and not on the strength of his meritorious deeds, it did

[1] Cf., for example, Lehmkuhl in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 56a ("The words in St. Matthew's Gospel (xix, 9), 'except it be for fornication,' have, however, given rise to the question whether the putting-away of the wife and the dissolution of the marriage bond were not allowed on account of adultery. The Catholic Church and Catholic theology have always maintained that by such an explanation St. Matthew would be made to contradict Sts. Mark, Luke, and Paul, and the converts instructed by these latter would have been brought into error in regard to the real doctrine of Christ. As this is inconsistent both with the infallibility of the Apostolic teaching and the inerrancy of Sacred Scripture, the clause in Matthew *must* be explained as the mere dismissal of the unfaithful wife without the dissolution of the marriage bond. Such a dismissal is not excluded by the parallel texts in Mark and Luke, while Paul (1 Cor., vii, 11) clearly indicates the possibility of such a dismissal: 'And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband.' Grammatically, the clause in St. Matthew may modify one member of the sentence (that which refers to the putting-away of the wife) without applying to the following member (the remarriage of the other), though we must admit that the construction is a little harsh . . ."), 56b (". . . Catholic exegesis is unanimous in excluding the permissibility of absolute divorce from Matthew, xix, but the exact explanation of the expressions, 'except it be for fornication' and 'excepting for the cause of fornication,' has given rise to various opinions").

[2] Cf. Forsyth, *Authority*, 331, and for Anglo-Catholicism, *Congress-Report 1920*, 193.

a much-needed and inestimable service. But it is not at all clear that the Roman Church ever intended to teach the contrary of this; and unhappily this was not by any means the whole of what salvation by faith was sometimes construed to signify. The doctrine was in Lutheranism pushed so far as virtually to deny the important truth that God does reward meritorious deeds and punishes sin. No doubt some of the words of the Apostle Paul (e.g. Rom. iii. 5–8, iv. 3–5, ix. 11–24), as well as the complexities of the subject itself, largely account for the misunderstandings and controversies that arose. But if it was a good thing to have re-emphasized the doctrine of the free grace of God and the centrality of faith as personal trust—and that is what Protestantism did —it was also a good thing to have taken a firm stand against certain formulations and supposed implicates of these central things, which, if unopposed, would have reduced Christianity to an unethical determinism. When to-day we read the terms in which Rome condemned the fatalism of Wyclif,[1] the predestinationism of Hus,[2] Calvin's denial of free-will,[3] Luther's repudiation of 'good works,'[4] and the revival of Augustinianism by Michael Baius,[5] Cornelius Jansen,[6] Paschasius Quesnel,[7] and the diocesan Synod of Pistoia [8]—we cannot escape the impression that the Catholic protest was very well worth making. It is well known that, during Luther's own lifetime, the promulgation of his peculiar doctrine of salvation by faith alone, apart from works, resulted in a good deal of actual moral deterioration among his followers in Germany.[9] And one would be justified in hazarding the statement

[1] Bull *Inter Cunctas*, 22 Feb. 1418, in Mirbt 230 (no. 27): "Omnia de necessitate absoluta eveniunt."

[2] *Ibid.* in Mirbt 230 f (nos. 1, 3, 5, 21).

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vi, can. 5, 6, 17, 25, in Mirbt 301 f.

[4] Bull *Exsurge Domine*, 15 June 1520, in Mirbt 258 (nos. 31 f, 36); *Conc. Trid.* sess. vi, justific. passim, and can. 4, 7, 9, 19 f, 24 (Mirbt 294–303). It was on the non-Lutheran conception of the place of 'good works' that the Catholic Church based her doctrine of penance and 'satisfaction' (*Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, cap. 8 and can. 2, 5, 12–15, in Mirbt 315 f, 318 f). For other Catholic animadversions on the Lutheran doctrine, cf. Wilfred Ward, *William George Ward and the Oxford Movement*, 283–287; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 347–367. On Luther's determinism and antinomianism, Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 387; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 27 f: on the legalism of Trent, Heiler, *Kathol.* 148. Moehler (*Symbolism*, 31–201, 370–372) discusses very fully and fairly all these doctrinal differences between the Roman Church (to which he belonged) and the great Reformers.

[5] Bull *Ex omnibus*, 1 Oct. 1567 (partly in Mirbt 347 f), nos. 8, 25, 35, 44, 49–52, 65, 67, 74–76.

[6] Bull *Quum Occasione*, 31 May 1653 (Mirbt 383 f): cf. St. Cyres in *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 491a.

[7] Bull *Unigenitus*, 8 Sept. 1713 (Mirbt 395–399): cf. St. Cyres, *loc. cit.* 492a.

[8] Bull *Auctorem Fidei*, 28 Aug. 1794, props. 23 f.

[9] Moehler, *Symbolism*, 342 f, 424, 441 f, 447; *Quarterly Review*, July 1897, 41 f; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 498ab; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 289 f; H. Rashdall, *Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, 417.

that the views condemned by Rome on the several occasions to which reference has been made are not held to-day by more than a tiny fraction of the Protestant community.[1]

Here then is no slight array of powers and virtues. The list, of course, is not exhaustive—for we have said nothing of the services of Catholicism to art, scholarship, and social amelioration. But a sincere attempt has been made to do full justice to the most significant and characteristic good things in a system to which as a whole we cannot but refuse acceptance and submission. We hear a challenge to which we must answer: but, before answering it, we have had to understand it. No apology therefore need be offered for the length at which its details have been expounded or the candour with which its attractions have been recognized. Even at the risk of being erroneously supposed to mean more than we have said, we have gone out of our way to pay tribute to excellences that deserve it. But just as we hope that our concessions will not be misinterpreted as signs of weakness, so we ask that our criticisms hereafter be not misconstrued as manifestations of injustice or irreligion.

[1] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 22 ("It may be openly avowed that the semi-Pelagian tendency of Catholic dogma approaches more nearly to the Protestant consciousness as it at present prevails than does that of the Reformers in its gloomy majesty"), 30.

PART II

THE ANSWER OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER V

THE USE OF ARGUMENT

THE present writer still remembers with some distress the remark made to him by an Anglo-Catholic with whom he fell into friendly discussion several years ago at Swanwick. "I never mind being beaten in an argument," said he, "so long as I know I am on the right side." [1] The words could not but raise the question, To what purpose should we ever take the trouble of arguing anything, if success in the argument is not going to produce belief in the conclusion which it establishes? Debate is robbed of all its zest and interest, unless the debaters can be supposed to have, not only a real desire for truth, but also a trust in honest debate itself as a method of arriving at truth. To be willing to argue, but unwilling to accept the results of arguing, is a position which it is impossible to prevent a man from taking, but one which at least may be expected to discredit his views in the eyes of the fair-minded and the truth-loving.

It has, of course, to be reckoned with as a fact that this blunt defiance of conclusive disproofs of one's own position is an easy and frequent —one had almost said, a natural—position to find men taking up. "It is so much easier to assume than to prove; it is so much less painful to believe than to doubt: there is such a charm in the repose of prejudice, when no discordant voice jars upon the harmony of belief; there is such a thrilling pang when cherished dreams are scattered, and old creeds abandoned, that it is not surprising that men should close their eyes to the unwelcome light. Hence the tenacity exhibited by systems that have long since been disproved." [2] Not that a man who has made up his mind will always refuse to listen to adverse arguments. He may listen, but with a determination to let nothing that he hears make any difference—like Croaker, in Goldsmith's play 'The Good-Natured Man,' who—when begged to listen to reason—replies: "Come, then, produce your reasons. I tell you I'm fixed, determined, so now produce your reasons. When I'm determined, I always listen to reason, because it can then do no harm." It is the melancholy prevalence of this attitude of mind—whether consciously or subconsciously taken—that forbids

[1] I hope I do Dr. Gore no injustice in choosing this place for a reference to his warning (*Rom. Cath. Claims*, 1–5) against the one-sidedness that has often beset the effort to be logical.

[2] Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 96. Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 169 ("Men are not influenced by mere logic: they will easily believe what they wish to believe, whether there be logical proof of it or not").

us to regard proving a thing conclusively as at all equivalent to getting it believed.[1]

People who refuse to argue on religion, or who, though willing to listen to argument and engage in it, refuse to abide by its results, often try to cover themselves by the plausible, but utterly inadequate plea, that the province of reason is not co-extensive with the whole of life, or even with the whole of the religious life. In religion, it will be said, as in morals, poor logic is quite compatible with goodness. If we might borrow another line of Goldsmith's, we could say of many what he said of William Burke: "His conduct still right, with his argument wrong": and the verdict might apply, not only to conduct, but also to faith. There are things in man's religious experience, as there are things also in his moral and in his æsthetic experience, which do not lend themselves to logical handling. You cannot deal with the fragrance of lilac or the coloured shadows of foliage or the hues of sunset by means of syllogisms and inferences: you cannot do justice to an act of self-denial by accounting for it with arguments: nor can you by any series of proofs put into a man the fundamental postulates of religion or open to him a real vision of the Fatherhood of God. You can—and indeed ought—to reason and argue about these things; but you can neither produce them, nor establish them, nor wholly analyse them, by any purely rational operations. Religious experience is of such a quality that, unlike mathematics, it transcends the domain of pure reason. Hence it is possible for a man to be rich in faith, but poor in intellect. And not only so, but the religious temper is found ever and anon insisting on its independence of reason—sometimes by implication, sometimes overtly, and sometimes with an aggressive exclusiveness.[2] Tacitus tells us how attempts to explore beyond the Pillars of Hercules were abandoned, because "it seemed more holy and reverent to believe concerning the acts of the Gods, than to know (about them)." [3] The mystery-religions which were so prevalent in the Empire both before and after his time aimed, not (like Greek philosophy) at discovering and imparting truth, but at creating the conviction that the soul had been saved.[4] The Christian Fathers not infrequently admitted that

[1] "In one of his last letters Herbert Spencer says: 'In my earlier days I continually made the foolish supposition that conclusive proof would change belief, but experience has long since dissipated my faith in man's rationality' " (*Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1921, 48). Cf. Inge, *Authority*, 13 ("Liberal theologians often miscalculate and grossly underestimate the vitality of a belief which has been merely disproved, because they do not realise that belief in authority interposes an impenetrable armour between customary thought or practice and the reasoning which would destroy it").

[2] See Paterson's careful vindication of the *extra-rational* elements in religion (*Rule of Faith*, 105–119).

[3] Tacitus, *Germania*, 34.

[4] Cf. C. P. G. Rose, *Antecedents of Christianity*, 227.

the credal formulæ upon which they felt they must insist were forced upon the Church almost against her will by the erroneous doctrines of the heretics, and were by no means equal to the sublime themes with which they dealt.[1] At the Reformation, in violent reaction against Scholasticism, several of the leading reformers relegated reason and logic to an altogether inferior place in their systems.[2] In the eighteenth century in England an unintentional return to barren intellectualism took place. In the discussions of the time, "Christianity appeared made for nothing else but to be 'proved'; what use to make of it when it was proved was not much thought about. Reason was at first offered as the basis of faith, but gradually became its substitute. . . . The only quality in Scripture which was dwelt upon was its 'credibility.'" [3] The great reaction against such rationalism in the times that ensued is primarily represented by the Anglo-Catholic revival; but it made itself felt—and still does so—in other than Anglo-Catholic circles. The philosophy of Kant effectively disposed, for many people, of the notion that one could, in the ordinary sense of the words, *prove* the existence of God or of the future life.[4] Carlyle was impressed with the futility of logical warfare, and its utter lack of finality as compared with the appeal to arms.[5] He felt this not only in politics, but in religion. "Suspicious of all logic, he desired only 'to *see* somewhat, to *believe* somewhat.'" [6] How far he was right or wrong in his judgments is for the moment irrelevant: the point to observe is that the purely intellectualist view

[1] The classical expression of this feeling is Augustinus' famous saying (*De Trin.* v. 10, in Migne, *P.L.* xlii. 918): "Dictum est tamen, Tres Personae, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur." Cf. *ibid.* vii. 7, 9, in Migne, *P.L.* xlii. 939, 941; and Hilarius, *De Trin.* ii. 2, in *P.L.* x. 51 ("Sed compellimur haereticorum et blasphemantium vitiis, illicita agere, ardua scandere, ineffabilia eloqui, inconcessa praesumere. Et cum sola fide explorari, quae praecepta sunt, oporteret, adorare videlicet Patrem, et venerari cum eo Filium, sancto Spiritu abundare, cogimur sermonis nostri humilitatem ad ea quae inenarrabilia sunt extendere, et in vitium vitio coarctamur alieno ut, quae contineri religione mentium oportuissent, nunc in periculum humani eloquii proferantur"). Cf. also K. Lake, *Stewardship of Faith*, 150 ("practically what happened was that the Church occupied itself for several centuries in saying 'No' in various accents of emphasis to inadequate propositions which were presented for the speedy solution of insoluble problems"); Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 120, 242.

[2] Moehler, *Symbolism*, 32 (Melanchthon); Heiler, *Kathol.* 369 and McGiffert, *Luther*, 331 (Luther); Milner, *Hist. of the Church*, v. 188 f (Carolstadt); Calvin, *Inst.* I. v. 12. Cf. Robert Burns's jibe at the Scotch Calvinism of his day, in *The Kirk's Alarm*:

> "To join faith and sense upon ony pretence,
> Is heretic, damnable error."

[3] Mark Pattison, in *Essays and Reviews*, 259 f.

[4] Cf. J. Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 717, 725.

[5] *French Revolution*, ii. 13 (= vol. ii, bk. i, ch. 2): ". . . In the manual kind, where you front your foe with drawn weapon, one right stroke is final; . . . But how different when it is with arguments you fight! Here no victory yet definable can be considered as final. . . . The thing that *will* logically extinguish him is perhaps still a desideratum in Constitutional civilisation."

[6] *Times Lit. Suppt.* 10 July 1924, 426.

of religion appealed neither to him nor to the other strong minds of last century. The progressive thinkers are found objecting to it, as well as the mediaevalists. Macaulay argued that neither natural theology nor revealed religion was of the nature of a progressive science.[1] Here is Scott Holland's statement in 'Lux Mundi': "the self is not only rational but something more: it combines, with its unbroken, central individuality, other elements besides reason: and therefore, of sheer necessity, whenever that central self puts forth an elemental act in which the integral spring of personal energy takes part,—such as an act of will, or love, or faith,—then, reason can be but one factor, but one element, however important, in that issuing act: and if so, then it can give but a partial account of it; its own contribution cannot wholly explain, or justify the result. In Bishop Butler's language, the utmost that reason can do is to make it 'very probable.'"[2] It is notorious that one of the most characteristic features in Roman Catholic Modernism was a new emphasis on the practical, the volitional, and the non-rational nature of religious experience, and a consequent treatment of Christian doctrines simply as statements of ideals, value-judgments, and calls for religious self-commitment, coupled with a neglect—almost to the point of denial—of their historical or theoretical truth.[3] And it is significant how repeatedly Friedrich Heiler, the ex-Catholic, with his deep sympathy for the Modernist leaders and his appreciation also of Catholicism, insists upon the irrationality of the deepest things in religion, and the consequent incongruity of attempting —as the Church does—to throw them into a series of logically interconnected propositions.[4]

The anti-rationalism of Rome has never resembled that which we see in Catholic Modernism: Rome has always insisted in the clearest way that her dogmas were to be believed to be true as matters of fact.[5] But she has done her best to hold reason at arm's length, and to confine its operations within very carefully defined and rigidly observed limits. Gregorius IX, in fact, made an attempt in 1223 to divert theologians altogether from contaminating the word of God and the doctrines of the faith with human reason and the figments of philosophy. The Zeitgeist was indeed too strong for him; and Thomas Aquinas and the Schoolmen effected a permanent union between human reason and Catholic theology.[6] The relations between the two, however, came to be

[1] *Essay on Ranke* (near beginning).

[2] *Lux Mundi*, 22; cf. 39: also Rawlinson, *Authority*, 11 f; A. E. Taylor in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 32–38.

[3] Cf. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 153–161; Grubb, *Authority*, 47 f.

[4] Heiler, *Kathol.* 6, 115, 235, 350, 357, 360 f, 368, 371.

[5] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 242. See, however, the quotations from Unamuno in Rawlinson, *Authority*, 46 f.

[6] See above, p. 19.

authoritatively defined in such a way that reason found herself at a permanent disadvantage. The obvious and admitted transcendence of the supreme things in religion was, of course, made the basis of the doctrine.[1] The 'Roman Catechism' begins by granting the ability of reason to discover many Divine truths (for example, the existence of the One Invisible God); but it proceeds immediately to lay it down that most of such truths, including those the knowledge of which is necessary for salvation, are beyond the reach of reason, but have been revealed by God and can be appropriated only by faith.[2] Stated thus in the abstract, this is not an objectionable position: but it was understood and applied by the Church in such a way as inevitably to evoke discontent. Her assumption of the sole right of saying what are these higher truths, given by God through revelation and accepted by man through faith, was found to involve not only the treatment of reason as incapable of doing everything by herself, but the constant refusal to let reason have a free hand in spheres (like natural science, history, and the philosophy of religion) with which it is her peculiar function to deal.[3] Dissent from the beliefs of the Church usually takes the form of a conflict between an authoritative decision of the Church and a confident verdict of human reason in the same field; and the Church's method of discrediting the dissent has been to attempt to show (usually with the help of a train of reasoning) that in the disputed question reason was acting beyond her province. Thus the Catholic and Anglo-Catholic revival of last century took the form, in part, of a great assault on reason. Lamennais argued that the inevitable outcome of the sovereignty of human reason was universal disbelief. A distrust of man's intellectual powers was an important element in the ideal of the Oxford Movement.[4] Certainly so far as Newman was concerned, the depreciation of 'reason' was a very integral factor in the Catholic philosophy. His 'Grammar of Assent' is one long effort to demonstrate (by processes of reasoning) that reason, in the sense of inference, is a thoroughly inadequate basis for belief, that its chain hangs loose at both ends, that it gives sure results only when it draws deductions from infallible premises which it cannot itself supply, that it is therefore always conditional (whereas belief, or 'assent,' is necessarily unconditional), and that assent (from which action springs) does not in practice, and ought not in theory, to wait upon it.[5] The Vatican Council of

[1] On the views of Aquinas on this matter, cf. J. Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 676 f.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* praef. 1 f, I. i. 2.

[3] Cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 14 f, 105.

[4] Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 37, 102, 113, 128 n.

[5] Newman, *Gramm.* passim, esp. 92 f, 155–166, 270, 277, 280, 419–421. See also above, p. 73, and cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 125–128, 137, 210 f, 215.

1870 undertook to explain fully the relation between faith and reason. It began by reproducing the doctrine of the 'Roman Catechism,' viz. that the supreme things in religion, the "Divine mysteries," are too high to be perceived or cognized by natural human reason, and can be appropriated only by Divine faith humbly accepting what God has by revelation given to it.[1] It proceeded to say that there could be no real contradiction between faith and reason, "but the empty appearance of this contradiction arises chiefly from the fact that either the dogmas of the faith have not been understood and expounded according to the mind of the Church, or the fabrications of (men's) opinions are regarded as the utterances of reason. Therefore we define every assertion contrary to the truth of enlightened faith to be absolutely false. Furthermore the Church, which, together with the Apostolic function of teaching, received the command to guard the deposit of faith, possesses, by Divine conferment, the right and duty of proscribing falsely-so-called science, 'lest anyone be deceived by philosophy and empty fallacy.' Wherefore all Christian believers are not only forbidden to defend as legitimate conclusions of science opinions of this kind, which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, especially if they have been rejected by the Church, but are absolutely obliged to hold them rather as errors which bear upon their face a fallacious appearance of truth." The Church does not deny the freedom of scientific disciplines to pursue their own method, "but, recognizing this just liberty, she takes diligent care lest, by disagreeing with Divine doctrine, they should take up errors into themselves, or, passing beyond their proper limits, they should seize upon and upset those things which belong to faith."[2] The doctrine of the faith needs no completion or improvement, but only faithful protection and infallible declaration: hence no other meaning than that which the Church has once declared, has always understood, and still understands, can ever be applied to her dogmas on the plea of riper knowledge or deeper understanding. The Church wishes everyone's understanding, knowledge, and wisdom in regard to her doctrines to grow, "but only in their own (proper) province (genere)

[1] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 4 (Mirbt 458 f: also Salmon, *Infall.* 479). It is to this doctrine of the opening paragraphs that the corresponding canon 1 de fid. et rat. (Mirbt 461 [5]) refers: "Si quis dixerit, in revelatione divina nulla vera et proprie dicta mysteria contineri, sed universa fidei dogmata posse per rationem rite excultam e naturalibus principiis intelligi et demonstrari; anathema sit" (Cf. can. 1 de fide [Mirbt 460 (34)]: "Si quis dixerit, rationem humanam ita independentem esse, ut fides ei a Deo imperari non possit; anathema sit"). On the admission of modern Catholic theologians that theological formulæ are inadequate for expressing the content of the Divine revelation, cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 360 (see above p. 89 n. 1).

[2] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 4 (Mirbt 459 [19–44]: Salmon, *Infall.* 480). Cf. can. 2 (Mirbt 461 [7]): "Si quis dixerit, disciplinas humanas ea cum libertate tractandas esse, ut earum assertiones, etsi doctrinae revelatae adversentur, tamquam verae retineri, neque ab ecclesia proscribi possint; anathema sit."

—to wit in the same dogma, the same meaning, and the same opinion (sententia)." [1]

Here we have, in the first place, the contention that, in order that spiritual realities may be appropriated, something more is required than the exercise of man's reasoning powers. To the truth of that plea all thorough reflection on religious experience bears witness. So far from denying it or objecting to it, we should be disposed to apply it even further in some respects than Rome herself does. Thus, it is not easy to maintain, after what Kant has written, that the existence of one spiritual Divine Being can be demonstrated by reason alone, as the Roman Church asserts 'de fide' that it can.[2] But, supposing such a demonstration to be possible, it is not easy to see, either why atheism must necessarily result from a failure to embrace the Catholic faith,[3] or why reason, if capable of demonstrating the existence of a spiritual Deity, should be incapable of rising also to those Divine mysteries of revelation, which are hardly more remote from the mind of the 'natural man' than is the existence of God itself. The truth would seem to be that neither belief in God's existence, nor the discernment of Divine mysteries, can be produced by any purely logical process. Experience, indeed, strongly suggests that they cannot; for it is probable that our belief in God is usually given, not by rational arguments alone, but by the intuitive perception of truth, with its corresponding emotional or instinctive pressure.[4] Hence the familiar necessity of something far deeper than cogent logic for the creation of religious conviction.[5]

But it is clear that the Catholic doctrine goes beyond the mere assertion that reason is incapable by herself of discovering all the deep things of God. Over and above this, her operations are on every hand to be rigidly limited by the Church's dogmas. True, it is asserted that reason and dogma cannot disagree, and that, where they seem to dis-

[1] See above, p 37 n. 5 and p. 38 n. 3. Can. 3 runs: "Si quis dixerit, fieri posse, ut dogmatibus ab ecclesia propositis, aliquando secundum progressum scientiae sensus tribuendus sit alius ab eo, quem intellexit et intelligit ecclesia; anathema sit." Cf. further, on the Catholic doctrine of reason as the submissive handmaid of faith, Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 402 f; W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 686–688; Heiler, *Kathol.* 115, 347 f; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 43.

[2] See above, p. 19.

[3] See above, pp. 43 f, and cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 122 f ("It seems, at first, curious that the Theism, which does not need Catholicism for its creation, should need it for its continuance. . . . .").

[4] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 351 ("Durch die sogenannten 'Gottesbeweise' ist noch nie ein Mensch zum Glauben an 'Gott,' den Heiligen und Gnädigen, bekehrt worden . . ."). There would seem therefore to be some exaggeration in Benjamin Warfield's statement that Christianity "has been placed in the world to *reason* its way to the dominion of the world. And it is by reasoning its way that it has come to its kingship. By reasoning it will gather to itself its all. And by reasoning, it will put all its enemies under its feet" (quoted in *Expos.* July 1922, 28). Cf. however Grubb, *Authority*, 14–16.

[5] Forsyth, *Authority*, 102, 111; A. T. Cadoux, *Essays*, 1–43, esp. 9 f, 14 f, 16 f, 23–27, 35 ff.

agree, it is either because the dogmas have been misunderstood, or because the fabrications of human opinion have been mistaken for the pronouncements of reason. But it is clearly in contemplation that such conflicts will inevitably arise unless reason purposely refrains from entering upon the field already occupied by dogma, i.e. unless she refrains from going as far as she might go and wants to go. This is something quite different from a humble halt before ineffable mysteries, when reason has had unfettered scope and has done her utmost. It administers a check to her before she has got to the end of her tether. For the dogmas of the Church, which are said to have the right to put limits to the operations of reason, are not confined to a recognition of basic and supra-rational verities, but include a host of concrete propositions relating to questions of ecclesiastical and literary history, of physical science, and of philosophical theology: and these are the very fields which reason knows and claims as her own.[1] It is all very well for Catholic apologists to say that "submission to infallible authority implies no abdication of reason, nor does it impose *any undue check* on the believer's freedom to pursue enquiry and speculation."[2] The fact remains that a check is imposed, and that the check does not in reality consist simply in the plea that reason must of necessity find some things to be beyond her reach; but it consists in forbidding her, at certain points in her own peculiar province, to go further, when she might go further and is eager to do so. The plea that conflicts between reason and dogma are only apparent, and are due either to the latter being misunderstood, or to faulty opinion being mistaken for the former, is clearly only a verbal device for evading the charge of unreasonableness. The Church's record in connexion with astronomical discovery and biblical and historical criticism shows clearly enough that she claims the right, not simply to supplement reason as a limited religious faculty, but to forbid her to go further in many directions in which she desires to go further, and in which she could go further without abandoning any of the methods she uses in those inquiries which the Church willingly permits her to undertake.[3]

In Catholic theory then the domain of reason is cut down against her will by the cold unpassable stream of dogma.

> **See how this river comes me cranking in,**
> **And cuts me from the best of all my land**
> **A huge half-moon, a monstrous cantle out.**

But within the limited territory left to her, reason is acclaimed as

[1] Hence that "revolt of the intellect" of which Fairbairn speaks (*Cathol.* 107) as "the gravest possible reflection on the capacity of the church."

[2] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 794ab (italics mine). Cf. Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 164, 172 (plausibility of Church's tenets deducible from her veracity, not necessarily provable by reason).

[3] Cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 188–191.

supreme; and every effort is made to lay stress upon her supremacy and indeed to do the amplest possible honour to her rank and dignity. We have seen how the Schoolmen generally, and Thomas Aquinas in particular, gave to reason a large and recognized place in the Catholic system. The 'Roman Catechism' opened with the recognition that the human mind was capable by itself of investigating and discovering much pertaining to the knowledge of Divine things.[1] The Vatican Council elaborated and emphasized this recognition. "Reason indeed," it said, "enlightened by faith, when it seeks diligently, piously, and soberly, attains—through God's gift—some understanding of the mysteries and that the most fruitful (understanding), both from the analogy of those things which it knows naturally, and from the connexion of the mysteries themselves with one another and with the final end of man. . . . But although faith be above reason, yet there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason, since the same God, who reveals mysteries and infuses faith, has conferred on the human mind the light of reason; and yet God cannot deny Himself, nor can the true ever contradict the true.[2] . . . Not only are faith and reason unable ever to disagree with one another, but they even afford each other mutual help, since right reason points out (demonstret) the foundations of faith and, illumined by its light, works out the knowledge (scientiam excolat) of Divine things, while faith frees and guards reason from errors and furnishes it with manifold knowledge (multiplici cognitione). Wherefore it is so far from being the case that the Church opposes the cultivation of human arts and disciplines, that in many ways she (actually) helps and advances it. For she is not unaware of, nor does she despise, the advantages that flow from them for human life: nay rather, she confesses that, in so far as they proceed from God the Lord of all knowledge (Deo scientiarum domino), so—if they are rightly handled—they lead towards God, through the help of His grace. Nor assuredly does she forbid it that disciplines of this kind should use, each one in its own orbit, its own peculiar principles and peculiar method. . . . May therefore the understanding, knowledge, (and) wisdom (in regard to Church-doctrine), both of individual men and of all, both of the man by himself and of the whole Church, grow and advance greatly and mightily, with the (advancing) steps of the ages and the centuries. . . ." [3]

[1] See above, pp. 19 and 90 f. Cf. *Catech. Rom.* praef. 1: "Ea est humanae mentis et intelligentiae ratio, ut, cum alia multa, quae ad divinarum rerum cognitionem pertinent, ipsa per se, magno adhibito labore et diligentia, investigaverit ac cognoverit, maximam tamen," etc. etc.

[2] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 4 (Mirbt 459 [11]; Salmon, *Infall.* 479); cf. cap. 3 (Mirbt 458 [1]; Salmon, *Infall.* 477: "Ut nihilominus fidei nostrae obsequium rationi consentaneum esset," etc.).

[3] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 4 (Mirbt 459 [33]–460 [9]; Salmon, *Infall.* 480). The

Such is the official tribute of the Church to the limited monarchy of reason. Individual Catholic authors also have from time to time manifested great eagerness to express their loyalty to her sway. Even Newman, whose system might almost be said to have been founded on a distrust of reason, yet makes such concessions as cannot but cast doubt on his consistency. In his 'Grammar of Assent,' he admits "that, when an argument is in itself and by itself conclusive of a truth, it has by a law of our nature the same command over our assent, or rather the truth which it has reached has the same command, as our senses have," that there is a legitimate and actual connexion between inference and assent, that assent always implies grounds in reason, that it is doubtful "whether assent is ever given without some preliminary, which stands for a reason," and that it is as certainties and not as probabilities "that we receive the informations of sense and memory, of our intellectual instincts, of the moral sense, *and of the logical faculty*. It is on no probability that we receive the generalizations of science, and the great outlines of history. These are certain truths." [1] In the 'Apologia'—apparently in a moment of inadvertence—he makes the truly surprising statement: "Controversies should be decided by the reason." [2] It is well known how his later life was troubled by conflicts between the conclusions of his reason and the dictates of his Church; and he has even been recognized and proclaimed as the true father of Catholic Modernism.[3] But Catholic writers in general, despite their habit of accusing others of 'Rationalism,' are by no means willing to concede to Modernism and Protestantism the claim of superior reasonableness. Perrone thought it useless to ask for reasons, in support of the Protestant objections to the Mass, from those who make for themselves articles of faith at their own will.[4] Otto Kunze sees in the Modernism of Heiler, and in Protestantism generally, with its Kantian recognition of the limits of reason, a fatal dualism, which marks it off sharply from the rationality of Catholicism.[5] "Many of our Roman Catholic apologists," wrote Mr. J. W. Poynter (when still a Catholic), "really believe that a clear and correct presentment

dots represent intervening and qualifying clauses, which have been quoted separately above, pp. 92 f. See p. 38 n. 3. for the Latin of the last sentence.

[1] Newman, *Gramm.* 163 f, 232 (italics mine); cf. 278 ("the logical faculty . . . teaches us the direction in which truth lies").

[2] Newman, *Apol.* 13 (i).

[3] Cf. Leckie, *Authority*, 44; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xiii (1912) 4 f; Quick, *Liberalism*, 27, 38; W. H. Carnegie, *Anglicanism*, 81–88; *Times Lit. Suppt.* 11 Mar. 1926, 172; Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 30. See also below, pp. 506 f.

[4] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 280.

[5] Quoted in Heiler, *Kathol.* XV: "Die Modernisten sind Kantianer . . . fast durchgängig sind es aber die heutigen Protestanten, Positive wie Liberale. Ihre Religion ist irrational . . . Im Katholizismus aber . . . Die Religion ist r a t i o n a l, ein vernünftiger Gehorsam."

of the arguments in favour of their position must convince any person of good will." [1] Father Lattey, in the preface to a recent Catholic symposium on Thomas Aquinas, deplores the modern unwillingness to apply reason to revelation, and calls for a new and fearless intellectual effort in this direction, in imitation of the great Schoolman's meritorious example.[2] As a last witness we may quote Mr. G. K. Chesterton, who maintains that the Church of Rome "defends common sense and consistent thinking and the perception that two and two make four. And to-day she is alone in defending them." In contrast to the fads and stunts of modern thought, "the little priest is still sitting in his confessional-box believing that two and two make four, and living up to that." [3]

The very emphasis of these professions of loyalty to reason rouses the suspicion that they are due to an uneasy consciousness on the part of the Church that her manifold opposition to reason has created a widespread antipathy on the part of reasonable people against her. "The lady doth protest too much, methinks." In any case, the reader has to be reminded that these repeated boasts of reasonableness will be gravely misunderstood if they are read out of their context. Read out of their context, they seem to evince quite as strong a trust in reason as we find even in the most thorough-going Rationalist. Their context, however, is the declaration that any apparent contradiction between reason and faith arises from the fact that either dogma has been misunderstood, or an erroneous opinion has been mistaken as a pronouncement of reason, that therefore every assertion contrary to the truth of enlightened faith, i.e. to the dogmas of the Church, is absolutely false, and that these dogmas must never, on pretence of a fuller knowledge or a deeper understanding, be understood in a different sense from that in which the Church has understood and does understand them.[4] It is very evident, therefore, that all assertions of the reasonableness of Catholicism, however numerous and emphatic, do not in the slightest degree alter the fact that reason is not allowed by the Church to go her full length, to use her powers *freely*, and to

[1] *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1924, 547.

[2] Fr. Lattey in pref. to *St. Thomas Aquinas* (1925) v–vii. Cf. the rhetorical statements of Gilavert (*Influence of Cath.* 17–31) on the true but subordinate place of reason and philosophy in religion, and the much more reasonable plea of Tanquerey (*Synops. Theol.* 537) that fixed dogma in regard to the exclusive rights of the Church does not necessarily generate credulity or exclude the exercise of man's critical faculty.

[3] G. K. Chesterton in Intro. to F. J. Sheen's *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy* (1925) vii–ix. Cf. M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., in *God and the Supernatural*, 47–50; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 90–93; Maycock, *Inquis.* 250–255 (immense trust of mediaeval Catholics in reason); Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 39–47. On the loyalty of Anglo-Catholicism to reason, see *Congress-Report 1920*, 93, *Congress-Report 1923*, xiv, 12; *Priests' Convention*, 12–24.

[4] See above, pp. 37, 92 f.

advance as far as she feels able to advance. Limits are set to her on every hand by the Church's dogmas.

If these limits are to be allowed to stand, it is obviously to no purpose that one should be able, by virtue of a logical argument, to establish against the Roman system as a whole a charge of logical inconsistency. For no sooner would the charge be proved, than the reply would instantly be made: Since your argument, if true, would prove the existence of a contradiction between reason and the dogmas of the Church, your argument must necessarily be unsound, for the Church has declared that no such contradiction can exist. To advance the argument, therefore, would be a waste of time—so far, that is, as the mind of a Romanist who chose to adhere to that position was concerned; for nothing can prevent a man taking up an illogical position if he chooses to do so. Nevertheless, inasmuch as argument means an appeal, not only to the other party, but to the objective truth of things, and to the judgment of hearers and readers, it is perhaps worth while to bring the inconsistency out into the light of day. If you are going to reason at all, you are inconsistent unless you let reason go her full length. This is not by any means to expect reason to construct the whole of one's religion. Scott Holland, whose great words on the limitations of reason we have already quoted,[1] leads up to them by saying: "We are not . . . dreaming of limiting reason by any limitations *except those which it makes for itself*. We are not violently attempting to make reason stop short at any point, *where it could go on*. We are only asking, is there any point at which it stops of itself, and *cannot* go further? We propose to use reason right out, to press it to its utmost limit, to spur it to put forth all its powers; and we assert that, so doing, reason will, at last, reveal its inability to get right to the end, to carry clear home." [2] In no other province of human inquiry do the reasoning processes have to be stopped short, before their work is done, by the a priori determinations of metaphysics. Psychologically considered, religious belief, though it differs in content and intensity, does not differ widely in method and quality, from other forms of belief (including in the latter term our ultimate philosophical and æsthetic judgments).[3] There can therefore be no justification for limiting reason in an exceptional way in the case of theology.[4]

[1] See above, p. 90.

[2] *Lux Mundi*, 21 f (italics mine).

[3] Cf. W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 687 f; A. Mair in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 463ab.

[4] "Theology has often been treated, even by master-minds, as a protected province, in which more than elsewhere things may be taken for granted, assertions accepted without scrutiny, fallacies left unexposed, claims acknowledged without inquiry into their foundation. Thus all sorts of statements have been considered as of overwhelming importance because their authors calmly declared them to be the Word of God" (T. R. R. Stebbing in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1921, 152).

To set other limits to reason than those which she makes for herself is not only 'unreasonable' in the most literal sense, but also objectionable as involving an implicit denial of that Divine origin of reason, in which the Vatican decrees explicitly assert belief.[1] If reason is, as Rome declares, the gift of God, there will be no occasion to warn her constantly lest she transgress this limit or that: she will be able to judge for herself how far she can go; and any arbitrary assertions that hamper her movements or block her path will thereby stand self-condemned. "Protestantism . . . may be construed to signify the supremacy of reason, and so it does; but this only means the supremacy of the truth, or, in religious speech, the sovereignty of God. The reason . . . is . . . the thought which cannot think without following the laws of its own being, and cannot follow them without finding the truth. The whole truth may not be found, but what is found is reality, divine and sovereign to the man who finds it." [2] On analysis, therefore, there is no such deep difference between reason and revelation as the Catholic scheme presupposes: rather should we say that all truth attained by reason is revealed, though it may not exhaust all that is revealed.[3] So too argument, in proportion to its own inherent cogency, is a reliable guide to the truth of God, dogmas notwithstanding. It is the manful wrestling and grappling of the spirit with the problems of life, the Divinely-ordained method of clarifying and systematizing experience.[4] The proper province of faith, as distinct from reason, lies not in the construction of a system of propositions which foreclose the operations of reason at innumerable points,[5] but in humble and loyal response to the call of God's Spirit within us (Rom. viii. 15) and in the eager self-surrender of the will to those ultimate and Divine ideals of truth and goodness, towards which the Divine endowments of reason and conscience are ever leading the truth-loving and the sincere.[6]

[1] See above, p. 95.

[2] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 136 f; cf. 229 ("We prefer to find God where he" [Newman] "has not found Him, and build faith on the sanity of a human reason which is full of God and akin to the divine"). Cf. also Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 260b.

[3] "When a truth, we say, comes home to the mind, there is always a revelation; equally so with Newton's apple and Simon Peter's confession of the Christ. When the mind lays hold of any fragment of reality, you may call it discovery or reason, but the same thing occurs, though it is viewed from the other standpoint. All revelation must be to a mind that is capable of receiving it, and all discovery implies that truth reveals and manifests itself to a discoverer" (R. B. Tollinton in *Modern Churchman*, Sept. 1921, 238). Cf. also Rawlinson, *Authority*, 111–115; Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 14.

[4] Cf. Horton, *England's Danger*, 117 f.

[5] "Faith can come by its rights only as it fulfils its duties to reason" (Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 204).

[6] Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 388 ("only the thought which trusts the reason can truly vindicate faith in the God who gave it"); A. Mair in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 463b; J. Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 682, 717, 721, 727.

The Roman Church, in spite of all professions of deference to reason, certainly does not take this view. Those who are deaf to the voice or blind to the presence of reason when she is operating within the ring-fence of dogma, cannot really compensate for this disrespect by lavish professions of trust in her when she is outside it, seeing that her credentials and her methods are the same in the one case as in the other. The wisest and least humiliating position, therefore, for Catholics to take up, would be not to argue at all, but simply to demand absolute and unquestioning obedience.[1] That, as a matter of fact, is the only thing for the Catholic to do when his system lands him in a stark contradiction, and he is cornered for an explanation in regard to it. "Let us suppose, for argument's sake," says Newman, "that ethnologists, philologists, anatomists, and antiquarians agreed together in separate demonstrations that there were half a dozen races of men, and that they were all descended from gorillas, or chimpanzees, or ourang-outangs, or baboons; moreover, that Adam was an historical personage, with a well-ascertained dwelling-place, surroundings and date, in a comparatively modern world. On the other hand, let me believe that the Word of God distinctly declares that there were no men before Adam, that he was immediately made out of the slime of the earth, and that he is the first father of all men that are or ever have been. Here is a contradiction of statements more direct than in the former instance; the two cannot stand together; one or other of them is untrue. But whatever means I might be led to take, for making, if possible, the antagonism tolerable, I conceive I should never give up my certitude in that truth which I firmly believed to come from heaven. If I so believed, *I should not pretend to argue, or to defend myself to others;* I should be patient; I should look for better days; *but I should still believe.*"[2] But it is possible to cover a good deal of ground in campaigning before needing to admit that one is cornered; and the Roman Church, despite her dogmatic basis and her claim to absolute infallibility, not only argues her case, like every other school of Christian thought,[3] but does so with a persistency and an ingenuity which resemble, in their intensity, other qualities of the Catholic character.

[1] So Horton (*England's Danger*, xii), who continues: "an Infallible authority contending for its infallibility in the face of facts is in a humiliating position." Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 46 ("If a Roman Catholic will discuss any point of doctrine with you, he is really putting the Infallibility of his Church on its trial").

[2] Newman, *Gramm.* 249 f (italics mine). Salmon (*Infall.* 75 f) quotes this passage, and adds: "I recollect hearing, when I was young, that there were then still surviving Roman Catholic ecclesiastics who, in reference to the Copernican theory of astronomy, took the course here described. They looked upon it as a scientific craze, which had become so epidemic, that direct struggle with it was time wasted. They must only wait until it would blow over."

[3] Cf. Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 260b.

Unhappily, however, these admirable features of Catholic apologetic are accompanied by a certain evasiveness[1]—inevitably so, since, in view of the dogmatic system, Catholics are not free to draw patent and logical inferences from the arguments they handle, or to admit such inferences when others draw them. However, Rome does argue: Rome therefore ought to abide by the verdict of the argument. We intend to argue our case against her: we shall show that her claim to infallibility is philosophically untenable, that the acceptance of it involves a shutting of one's eyes to the truths of history, and that her claim to be a unique and Divinely-maintained moral guide for mankind is—despite the many virtues of many Catholics—stultified over and over again by facts in her record. We believe we shall win the argument.[2] That possibly will not alter the beliefs of many Romanists: but the truth will have been told, and humanity—in the persons of our readers—may be left to judge it.

[1] See above, p. 14 n. 6.

[2] It is somewhat arbitrary on the part of Rev. N. P. Williams to assume that "a patient, candid, and unprejudiced survey" and "the 'wireless' of prayer" would convince an enquirer of the rightness of 'The Catholic Faith' as held by Anglo-Catholics (*Congress-Report 1920*, 63). He must know that candid investigation and earnest prayer often lead to a very different result.

CHAPTER VI

THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY STATED

We propose therefore to go forward, with our reply to the Catholic contention, by the way of philosophical reasoning—quite aware that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy, but at the same time confident that reason is a reliable guide to truth, that she can be quite well trusted to determine her own limits, and that what is philosophically untenable cannot be theologically and religiously true. As for the soundness and cogency of our argument, that must be left to the judgment of the discerning reader: our part will be to endeavour, by stating it lucidly, to enable him to criticize and correct it where it is at fault.

In the case of a problem so large and many-sided as that now before us, it is clearly not a matter of indifference which phase of it we take up first, which next, and so on. For, on many a special point, arguments on one side or the other will necessarily be felt to have force, not simply according to their intrinsic character, but according to the disputant's views on certain prior questions or antecedent probabilities.[1] Unless, therefore, the most fundamental matters be first dealt with, a large proportion of the argument devoted to relatively less fundamental questions will be spent in vain. Now it would probably be agreed by all parties in this controversy that the most basic problem involved in it is the problem of authority in religion. It would not be difficult to show that most of the specific points of disagreement between Romanists and ourselves are defensible—and are defended—on their side only by means of the doctrine of the Church's infallibility. If that doctrine be unassailable, it is to little purpose that we spend our blows on matters of detail, however important: while if it can be shown to be untenable, controversy on other matters is immeasurably simplified.[2] "As soon as the problem of authority really lifts its head, all others fall to the rear."[3] It is desirable, therefore, that we should turn our first attention to this subject.

It ought to be observed at the outset that, although our inquiry is a

[1] Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 133–135, 180 f.

[2] This is well brought out by Salmon (*Infall.* 17–19, 24, 42–47), who, however, rightly observes (46) that the clear discovery of a specific error in Rome's doctrines is often the occasion for an abandonment of belief in her infallibility.

[3] Forsyth, *Authority*, 1.

philosophical one, a successful handling of it does not necessarily involve the maintenance of some definite view or other on all the great ultimate problems of philosophy. Doubtless there are certain philosophical positions which are more or less clearly incompatible with the position we shall be taking up. Atheism, materialism, naturalism, and solipsism, for instance, obviously cannot be harmonized with a theistic or Christian view of the universe. Other systems, such as pragmatism, agnosticism, pantheism, pluralism, and realism, could probably be shown to be neither wholly incongruous, nor (taken strictly) wholly reconcilable, with such a view. We do not, however, need in this place to substantiate the grounds on which we judge the former group to be excluded, or to elaborate and vindicate our attitude towards each in the latter. Nor is there any occasion for us to enter into the abstruse ramifications of the problems of epistemology, or of the question as to the precise relation of subject and object in experience or of soul and body in humanity. The final solutions of these problems, supposing we could discover what they were, would in all probability make no difference to our argument. It will be sufficient if we assume, as ground common to both Catholics and Protestants, the simple philosophical position of Christian theism—the spiritual nature of man, the spiritual purpose of the universe, and the sovereignty of a spiritual Deity over them both.

We begin then with the reverent acknowledgment of one eternal and infinite, perfect and personal Being—the wise and holy God, Whose judgments are often unsearchable and His ways past tracking out, but Who has yet made us in His own image and for Himself, and intends that we should desire and attain to fellowship with Him. He therefore is our final authority.[1] His nature and His handiwork constitute the universe of truth which is the final authority for belief: His Will the universe of absolute values which has the sole and supreme right to determine our duty. In the great words of the Vatican Council, "Since man is totally dependent upon God as his Creator and Lord, and created reason is completely subject to uncreated Truth, we are

[1] The objective reality, transcendence, holiness, initiative, and ultimate authority of the personal God are repeatedly insisted on by Forsyth (*Authority*, 55, 59 f, 64, 70, 86, 136, 164, 454, etc.). I do not regard it as pertinent to the present enquiry to discuss the ultimate grounds of this belief in God. It is sufficient for our purpose to note that the Roman Church has laid it down as a dogma that belief in the existence of one supreme spiritual Being can be proved by human reason. From this it follows that our belief in God is at any rate not based on the authority of the Church (cf. Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 40–47). The general tendency outside Catholicism is to regard the traditional 'proofs' of the existence of God as inconclusive. The ultimate ground for our belief in God is something deeper than any ratiocination. Paul hints at it in Rom. viii. 15b–16 (cf. Westcott and Hort, marg., and Moffatt's trans. for the true punctuation). See above, pp. 19, 91, 93.

by faith under obligation to yield full obedience of intellect and will to the revealing God." [1]

Philosophical objection has, indeed, been raised to the statement that the ultimate moral authority is God's Will, and that things are right or wrong, as the case may be, because He wishes it to be so.[2] The ground of the objection is that such a statement denies the proper ultimacy of moral distinctions. Thus, Martineau finds fault on this score with the system of Whewell. Whewell had written: "The supreme rule of human action derives its real authority, and its actual force, from its being the law of God. . . . The reason for doing what is absolutely right, is, that it is the will of God. . . ." On this Martineau comments: "The supreme rule then is not the supreme rule; and a reason is discovered for that which can have no reason. . . . We protest against the notion that a Being, by acting as our Creator, and putting us under a certain constitution of things, becomes morally entitled to our obedience. Were it so, any superhuman force, capable of systematic agency, might equally command our conscience; and the only reason why men should not love and serve the devil is that he is not *strong enough* to substantiate his claim. If there are no moral distinctions *in rerum naturâ*,—if they date their origin from the creation of man,— . . . they are entitled indeed to respect as the municipal by-laws of the club in which I live, but I see beyond them on every side. . . . Say that he caused them, and you deny that he followed them. Deduce justice from his will, and his will ceases to be just. . . . If wisdom and holiness are historical births from his volition, they are not inherent attributes of his being. . . . It is therefore an utterly suicidal act of ambition on the part of religion to demand precedence of morals; and instead of proclaiming that the laws of the world are

[1] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 3 init. (Mirbt 457 [36]; Salmon, *Infall.* 477): "Cum homo a Deo tamquam creatore et domino suo totus dependeat, et ratio creata increatae veritati penitus subiecta sit, plenum revelanti Deo intellectus et voluntatis obsequium fide praestare tenemur." Cf. Iverach in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 253b ("All authority is thus ultimately Divine authority . . . So, too, the binding power of morality flows from God"), 254a ("God alone is Lord of the conscience, and He alone can command the conscience. . . . Laws of nature, laws of reason, laws of civil authority, laws of morals, are binding on men so far as they are laws of God, and no further. This seems to be what authority is from the religious point of view"); Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 764a (quotes Leo XIII's encyclical *Immortale Dei* of 1 Nov. 1885: "Officium est maximum amplecti et animo et moribus religionem, nec quam quisque maluerit, sed quam Deus jusserit quamque certis minimeque dubitandis indiciis unam ex omnibus veram esse constiterit": it remains however to be seen which religion that is); Leckie, *Authority*, 70–72; Freeman, *Authority*, 22–24, 196; Grubb, *Authority*, 6 mid.

[2] Heiler observes (*Kathol.* 244) how completely this view characterizes Catholic ethics: "Ein ethisches Gebot muss peinlich befolgt werden, nicht weil es als sittliche Norm oder als sittlicher Wert erkannt ist, sondern weil es von Gott geboten und von der Kirche als Gottes Gebot verkündet ist."

good because they are established, it must teach that they are established because they are good. God must be presented to our faith, as having *recognized*, not as having *originated*, the moral distinctions, through which we love and worship, as well as fear and obey him." [1]

There is a real philosophical difficulty here, though withal of an abstruse and abstract kind, and so probably beyond the range and interest of the 'ordinary man.' It is doubtful how far, if at all, the settlement of it would affect our subsequent investigation. There is therefore little need to linger over it. It must suffice to observe that Martineau's objection would be unanswerable if God had to be regarded as a finite Being—on however grand a scale. Since, however, we must needs think of Him as the ground of all being and the source of the nature of things, we can regard His Will as possessed of an ultimacy inconceivable in the case of the will of any finite creature. Because God is God, the distinction between His nature and His Will is a concession to human modes of thought rather than the discernment of an ultimate reality. "That which for us is duty is for the Holy One not duty but a nature, which makes our duty and is our sovereign." "Absolute Being must be identical with the absolute moral norm. God wills good because He is good, He is good because He wills good. That is the holiness of God, the identification of the moral norm and the ultimate reality of the world." [2]

We may therefore continue to think of the Will of God as the ultimate ground of moral values, in the same way that we think of His

[1] Martineau, *Essays*, iii. 365–367. Similarly A. T. Cadoux, *The Gospel that Jesus preached*, 166: "If goodness is to be really supreme in man's heart, he must commit himself to it because it is good, not because it is revealed as a quality of a Being on whom for other reasons he believes himself to depend. We can never make goodness supreme within us so long as it comes to us first as the quality of an Almighty Being. It could never in this way be supreme in its own right. Goodness, if it is to be really supreme in us, must not be imposed upon us by an external reality. Only when we enthrone it in its own right does it . . . become the mouthpiece of infinity . . . we find that to enthrone goodness in ourselves is to commit ourselves to the faith that goodness is dominant in the universe." The question is touched on by Mozley in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 244, and by A. E. Taylor, *Plato*, 151.

[2] Forsyth, *Authority*, 413, 6. Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 52 (". . . the Divine nature is a law to the Divine will, and . . . that nature is perfect reason, righteousness and love"); Iverach in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 253b ("Religion would not distinguish minutely between a Divine nature and a Divine will, nor would it seek to derive the Divine authority from a Divine will as distinguished from a Divine nature, for to religion the Divine will is only the expression of the Divine character"). We may recall also Wordsworth's lines (*Excursion*, bk. iv):

> "For adoration Thou endurest; endure
> For consciousness the motions of Thy will;
> For apprehension those transcendent truths
> Of the pure intellect, that stand as laws
> (Submission constituting strength and power)
> Even to Thy Being's infinite majesty."

Nature as the ground of all cognizable reality. The problem of authority therefore is the question, What is the truth in regard to the Nature and Will of God? And the very fact that we enter into arguments with one another on the subject presupposes a common belief that that Nature and that Will have constituted for us a great objective world of realities [1] and values—a world which, despite its manifoldness, is yet one, a world which is our natural home, into which we fit, and which we are therefore not only disposed by a love of truth to investigate, but which we are capable of progressively discovering and interpreting. God, however, does not offer His ultimate truth to our minds with that quasi-immediacy and unmistakableness with which material objects are presented to our senses: [2] still less can we simply equate human experience and Divine truth. It is necessary therefore to inquire as to the means at our disposal for discovering His Nature and His Will.[3] If and when any authority other than God is accepted by a Christian man, it is accepted only on the ground that it expresses His meaning and can produce and substantiate credentials from Him.[4] If and when any such authority is rejected, it is rejected because it is not believed to have His authorization.[5] Hence it may be truly said that "the principle of authority (namely, that of divine revelation) is the natural principle of Christian theology."[6] Men know instinctively that they stand in need of authoritative guidance and of Divine control, however inarticulate that knowledge may often be, and however confused its expression. The recent and rapid loss of faith in a number of previously venerated seats of authority has created something like a panic in the minds of many; and some are consequently disposed to give their support to any authoritative form of religion, so long as it *is*, in men's estimate, authoritative, irrespective of the question whether it is well- or ill-founded in the matter of truth.[7]

To many it seems theoretically unquestionable, and in practice a sine-quâ-non, that God should provide us with an absolutely infallible, unmistakable, and objective embodiment of such of His truth and guidance as we need to possess. It is urged by Romanists, for instance,

[1] "The question of Authority and certainty . . . is the question of reality. On reality, religion at least must stand, however it might be with other interests of mankind . . ." (Forsyth, *Authority*, 200 f).

[2] Cf. Grubb, *Authority*, 6 f.

[3] "Inasmuch as the ultimate truth of things is the truth as God sees it, the 'authority' of God would be absolute, *could it be adequately ascertained*" (Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 369: italics mine). Cf. Leckie, *Authority*, 72–76; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 4 f, 26.

[4] Cf. Iverach in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 254a.

[5] Cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 223 bott.

[6] Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 680.

[7] Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 4 f, 49; F. W. Norwood in *Christian World*, 4 Feb. 1926, 4.

as a piece of cogent reasoning that, if God be believed to have given any revelation at all, He must be supposed to have made it not only obvious but incapable of error. It is urged as an unquestionable practical necessity for the Church that it should have an infallible head, a supreme court beyond which there is no appeal.[1] It may readily be conceded that the desire for such a complete and serviceable, because plain and unerring, authority is a very natural desire for men to feel.[2] That argument, however, is very far from proving that any such authority actually exists. Nor, of course, does the alleged necessity for it in practice (for the settlement of controversies) constitute any proof of its real presence.[3] The question as to whether history gives us any ground for believing that such an authority has in fact been provided, will have to be considered in detail later. It remains here only to consider the argument in so far as it is advanced on grounds of a priori probability, namely that, if God has given us any revelation at all, then it must be through the instrumentality of some infallible authority of the kind just described. It is, however, obvious that the argument is purely presumptive, and that it ought not to be made the basis of further inferences unless and until it has been verified a posteriori in experience. We may not argue that, because we think it ought to be so, because we should like it to be so, because it would be very convenient in many ways if it were so, therefore it is so. That is clearly a 'non sequitur.' "Our *a priori* assumptions of the modes in which God *must* have provided for our need of guidance and enablement are very liable to be overturned in the school of daily experience." [4] There is nothing in the Gospels to suggest that God guarantees to protect the Church against error more completely than He protects the individual.[5] And how much support can be found for the theory in the analogy of God's provision for our other needs? We have health and safety, and it is His will that we should have them: but has He provided any means by which we can make perfectly certain of them? Still more urgently do we—and does the Church—need sinlessness of life: still more unquestionably does God will that we and she should have it; and bounteous is the help that He has given for the quest of it. But does He undertake to keep the Church or the individual unfailingly sinless? Obviously

[1] See above, pp. 19 f.

[2] "The rapid growth of Catholicism is easy to understand. The conditions are always there, for, as Sohm says, the natural man is always a Catholic, and that does not cease to be true though he call himself a Protestant. He still likes material guarantees, and would rather not trust anything to God that can be managed by man" (Oman in H.*E.R.E.* iii [1910] 622a: cf. Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii [1914] 267a; Grubb, *Authority*, 5 f).

[3] See the forcible passage quoted from Henry More's *Modest Inquiry* by Coleridge, *Church and State* (4th ed. 1852) 153 f.

[4] Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 277a.

[5] Curtis in *op. cit.* 269b.

not. Why therefore ought we to believe, prior to inquiry into the facts, that God must have acted in quite a different manner as regards our need for sound doctrine? Not only is the theory that there *must* be somewhere an infallible guide at best a plausible assumption void of logical cogency; but every analogy drawn from God's *known methods* of providing for us in other ways tends to show that, plausible or not, it is inherently unlikely to be true.[1]

Our judgment as to whether it is, in point of fact, true or false, must in any case rest not upon an a priori assumption, but upon an examination of the facts; and to that examination we must now proceed. It will perhaps be best if we go to work analytically, and set down in a list all those things, institutions, or persons, which Christian men actually have regarded, or conceivably might regard, as the depositaries, embodiments, channels, mouthpieces, spokesmen, witnesses, revealers, or mediators, of Divine truth and guidance. One comment only needs to be made before we begin our enumeration. Most Christians would consciously regard every one of the following authorities as being in some real way normative for their own lives: but, in the event of these authorities suggesting different counsels, some are necessarily treated as more authoritative than others, and usually one is regarded as supreme, if not absolutely infallible. It is rather in their several capacity, not as sole arbiters, but as final arbiters, taking precedence of others, that we have to consider them; for it is the fact that they so often differ or seem to differ that constitutes our whole problem.

Here then is our list:

1. *The Natural World.* We might hesitate to include Nature among the final authorities for Christian life and thought; for it is far easier to give instances of its enthronement in the field of pagan philosophy than in that of Christian theology. It had an honoured place in the early Greek systems and especially in Stoicism and Cynicism ('vivere convenienter naturae').[2] Since the establishment of Christianity in Europe, the recognition of Nature's authority has either taken the form of a concentration of philosophical inquiry on the problems of physical science, or has characterized systems—like those of Spinoza, the Deists, and Herbert Spencer—that could hardly be considered compatible with Christian theism at all.[3] In some respects

[1] Salmon, *Infall.* 99–104, 106, 109, 169; Stanton, *Authority*, 87 f, 138 f, 153, 158; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 42 f; Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 368 ("we have no more reason, *a priori*, to look for infallibility in the sphere of intellect, as the result of that operation of the Divine Spirit which we call inspiration, than we have to look for impeccability in the sphere of conduct as the result of that parallel operation of the same Spirit which we call grace"); Grubb, *Authority*, 65.

[2] Cf. Windelband, *Hist. of Philos.* (English trans.) 73 f, 84 f, 116, 171 f, 186

[3] *Op. cit.* 302, 350 f, 366, 409, 493 f, 668, 672: per contra 669 (Huxley)

the Cambridge Platonists in the seventeenth century gave Nature a central place in their system, and its claims in a general way dominated the philosophical thought of the nineteenth.[1] In the apologetics of theism, great value has been attached to Nature's testimony to God, especially in what have come to be known as the cosmological and teleological arguments. But there is no considerable set of Christian people who avowedly and consistently treat the world of Nature as the supreme revelation of the Divine. Where that world is appealed to as authoritative, its limits are frequently very vague, and it is made to include, over and above the physical universe, portions of such subjective fields as psychology, logic, æsthetics, and morality; and the appeal for guidance is usually made, not on the greatest issues of thought and life, but on a few special and controversial problems of practical conduct (like hunting and flesh-eating). Yet most Christians regard Nature as furnishing a very valuable supplement to what is believed about God on other grounds.[2]

2. *The Christian Church.* The palmary instance of the acceptance of the Church as the final authority is of course the great Roman Catholic communion. As we have already described and discussed in some detail the Romanist position in this matter,[3] there is no need to enlarge on it again here. In some ways it may be said that the infallibility of the Church is as much a tenet of Anglo-Catholicism as it is of Romanism. It is true that Anglo-Catholics accept it only with certain important qualifications—so important as to discredit in Roman eyes the very claim of Anglicans to belong to the true Church at all. But apart from the divergence on the subject of the papacy and from the comparatively greater vagueness of definition on the Anglican side, the Roman and Anglican views in regard to the determinative authority of the established traditions of the Church are very similar.[4]

3. *The Bible.* The Roman Church professes to believe in the infallibility of the Bible;[5] but, in proclaiming herself the sole authorized

[1] *Op. cit.* 435 f, 624 f.

[2] Cf. Leckie, *Authority*, 104–109.

[3] See above, pp. 19–41. It is true that Catholics now base their belief in the Church on reason (Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 40–47); yet their admission of her claim to infallibility makes her, under God, *virtually* their final authority.

[4] Cf. Freeman, *Authority*, 15, 135 (Apostolic doctrine "always to be quoted as the ultimate authority in every item of Christian principle and conduct"); N. P. Williams in *Congress-Report 1920*, 62–72, and in *Priests' Convention*, 18; Briscoe in *op. cit.* 179 f; Moxon, *Modernism*, 25 f, 86–90, 99 f, 108 f, 169; Grubb, *Authority*, 48–50; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 15–22; Selwyn in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* vi ("the claims of the Catholic Church to provide for it" [faith] "a rational basis of authority; . . ."); W. L. Knox in *op. cit.* 98 (". . . the Church has a divine authority, in virtue of which it can claim the absolute assent of the reason and conscience of all mankind"); E. Milner-White in *op. cit.* 337–339. See below, pp. 121 f.

[5] See below, pp. 273 f.

interpreter of it, she strictly subordinates its authority to her own, and thus forestalls all appeal to it against herself. Traditional Protestantism on the other hand (as represented—with some qualifications—by the Reformation-leaders, by virtually all the older Protestant bodies including the Church of England, and by modern Fundamentalists) with one voice proclaims the Scriptures to be the *ultimate* authority for creed and life. This theory, like that of the authority of the Church, goes back to the early centuries of Christian history; and impressive passages can be quoted from the Fathers emphasizing the fontal sanctity of what had come to be regarded as the written word of God.[1] By an instinctive process, rather than on cogent rational grounds, a sacred book, through which the Spirit of God was known to breathe, came imperceptibly—in Christendom, as previously in Judaism—to be regarded not only as authoritative, but as flawless and final.[2] Luther indeed laid the chief stress on saving faith, and took liberties accordingly with the New Testament canon; but his collision with the Anabaptists threw him back on biblical infallibility. Calvin had a doctrine of the 'testimonium Spiritus sancti internum': but that did not mean that the Bible contained errors. Broadly speaking, therefore, it is true to say that the Protestant Reformation did put an infallible Bible in the place of the infallible Church or Pope;[3] and Catholics are entirely within their rights in emphasizing the fact.[4] The ultimacy of the objective authority of Scripture is still the avowed doctrine of most of the large Protestant communions.[5] Moreover, it was declared by

[1] Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 17 f, 46.

[2] Sanday in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 571a, 579a ("A book that came from God must needs be in all respects authoritative and infallible. It was an instinctive rather than a reasoned idea; but so instinctive and so natural that it held sway more or less completely for about twenty centuries"); Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 370; Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 261 f (". . . For the Greek and Latin Fathers, for the Schoolmen great and small, for all branches of the divided modern Church, the unmistakable teaching of the Bible is infallible . . .").

[3] Cf. M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 197–200; Bernard in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 176 f; Leckie, *Authority*, 38–42; von Dobschütz in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 590b; Troeltsch, *Prot. and Progress* (Eng. trans.) 47 f; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 57–65, 405–407; Binns, *Reformers and Bible*, 19, 21, 30, 32; Grubb, *Authority*, 54 f; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 54–57, 59, 65; H. R. Mackintosh in Gore, *Infall. Book*, 56–59.

[4] Bellarmine spoke of the "paper Pope of the Protestants" (von Dobschütz, *l.c.*: cf. Newman, *Gramm.* 236; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii [1911] 496a, 497b).

[5] Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 718; H. E. Jacobs in H.*E.R.E.* viii (1915) 203b (". . . Lutheranism lays greater stress upon . . . —'Justification by Faith alone'—than upon . . . —'The Sole Authority of the Holy Scriptures.' While, in fact, the two are never separated, the Scriptures are regarded as the absolute norm of revealed truth . . ."); H. L. Clarke in *Anglic. Ess.* 295 ("On the question of doctrine the Swedish Bishops insist upon two things—(1) the recognition of Scripture as *norma normans* both with regard to life and doctrine, . . ."); *Message of the Baptist World Alliance, Stockholm*, July 1923 ("There are various ways of stating the fundamental Baptist principle. If we indicate the source of our knowledge, we

the Lambeth Conference of 1920 to be a needful element in the reunited Church, and it has again and again been professed by representative Anglicans as an accepted doctrine of the Church of England.[1] It is quite true that Anglicans and many others do not—at least normally —understand the acceptance of Scripture as *ultimate* to imply that it is infallible.[2] The validity of this distinction will come up for discussion later: for the present it will suffice to observe that those who emphatically declare that Scripture is the ultimate standard can be grouped only here along with those who declare that it is infallible.

In a very vigorous and aggressive form, the doctrine of the final authority of the Bible has in recent years received a new lease of life in the movement known as Fundamentalism, which boldly proclaims the inerrancy of the Scriptures in opposition to the now very widely accepted conclusions of higher criticism. In America the controversy has become a matter not only of public but of political interest, through the determination of certain parties in certain States to allow only Fundamentalist teaching in the public schools. In this country, though less a matter of public controversy, Fundamentalism is still a power in more than one denomination.

4. *The Historical Jesus.* While virtually all Christians recognize in some sense the supreme authority of the personal example and teaching of Jesus recorded in the Gospels,[3] comparatively few have seen in this historical figure God's actual, supreme, and final injunctions for us

say the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are divinely inspired, and are our sufficient, certain, and authoritative guide in all matters of faith and practice"). For the Scotch Presbyterians, see *Rev. of the Churches*, July 1927, 419a. According to *Daily News*, 5 Mar. 1926, 7, the General Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church recently called upon one of its pastors to declare his acceptance of the literal interpretation of the text of Genesis ii and iii.

[1] *Lambeth Appeal*, vi (Church-unity will involve "the wholehearted acceptance of:—The Holy Scriptures, . . . as being the rule and ultimate standard of faith; . . ."). The Anglican *Article* on the subject (vi) simply declares that Scripture *contains* all things necessary to salvation. Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 197 ("those express words of God" —quotation of 1 Tim. ii. 1–4), 337 (". . . whether Holy Scripture is the ultimate source of faith (in which we were always agreed)"); Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 62; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 17 ("the important thesis constantly maintained by the Church for fifteen centuries, viz. that Scripture is the ultimate criterion of the Church's teaching on matters of faith"), 19 ("this primary degree of authority"); Bernard in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 179; H. L. Clarke in *Anglic. Ess.* 277 top, 295; *Times Lit. Suppt.* 22 Feb. 1923, 117 (on *Anglic. Ess.*) and 127 (on Carey's *Conversion, Catholicism, and the English Church*); Bishop Welldon, quoted in *Public Opinion*, 10 July, 1925, 35 ("I hold . . . that every clergyman should formally assent to Holy Scripture as the basis, and the sole basis, of doctrine").

[2] Cf. Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 719 f; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 244 f, 256 f, 263 f.

[3] Rev. N. P. Williams speaks loosely of the eschatological teaching of Jesus as "the ultimate authority" on the subject (*Congress-Report 1923*, 169, 174). Cf. W. H. Rigg in *Expos. Times*, Apl. 1927, 311a (Evangelical Anglicans submit every doctrine "to the acid test of its accordance, or otherwise, with the teaching of Christ").

to-day. Even the Catholic Church, which insists most emphatically on an absolutely transcendental Christology, does not teach that every Christian, or even every 'religious' Christian, should actually copy Him as the supreme practical guide. Many Catholics, indeed, have from time to time made great efforts to obey the 'consilia evangelica'—the 'hard sayings' of the Gospels—and closely to reproduce in themselves the pattern of the Master's life. The 'imitatio Christi' is an ideal that has always appealed to the most intense type of Catholic. The name of Francis of Assisi will occur to us as that of the most interesting and attractive figure in this class; but he is in this respect only a shining sample out of a great company. The Catholic copying of Jesus is however limited in two ways: it is not advocated as the right way for all Christians, but only for the few who are specially called, and it is throughout overshadowed by the supreme authority of the Church. In the case of Tolstoy, on the other hand, the authority of the human Jesus was accepted without any such limitations, and taken for granted as the obviously right and best standard for belief and conduct. The immense influence of Tolstoy, particularly over the younger and more progressive sections in all countries during the last sixty years, has helped to bring about a wide acceptance of the teaching of Jesus as constituting the social ideal and determining the proper course for social amelioration. A great many Christian, semi-Christian, and non-Christian idealists, who have no considered theory of authority, appeal again and again to the Gospels, as if it could be taken for granted that no policy or guidance ought to take precedence of the example and teaching there recorded.[1]

5. *The Christ Within.* More or less clearly distinguishable, though often not distinguished, from the human Jesus portrayed in the Gospels, is the Divine Christ, apprehended as an inward presence or power, associating in a mystical or quasi-mystical way with the individual believer. For many the idea or experience of the indwelling Saviour coalesces with the desire to obey and imitate the historical teacher; both are associated with the single dominating concept 'Christ.' So it was doubtless with a leading Congregationalist who told the author that, when challenged by the Catholic ideal during his college-days, he decided to put 'Christ' where the Catholics put the Church. This type of Christian piety must be very widely prevalent in Protestant circles. For many others, however, the indwelling of Christ supersedes —almost excludes—interest in the historical Jesus and the sense of obligation to obey His teaching. Such persons are fond of appealing to the words of Paul: "Even if we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now we know (Him so) no more" (2 Cor. v. 16). The appeal is indeed

[1] Cf. Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 157–164.

often made in order to justify some neglect of, or departure from, the ethical teaching of Jesus: but it must at least be granted that the sense of mystical or vital union with Christ is an experience distinct from the recognition of His authority as a historical teacher. Paul is himself the prototype of those whose religious life is centred on such a personal attachment:[1] and it is familiar to us all in the hymns and traditions of the Evangelical Revival. To the Catholic mind, Jesus Christ is present as a very real and distinct figure; but the ideas with which the name is charged are—as in the case of the historical Jesus—largely if not wholly determined by the hereditary thoughts and usages of the Church. It needs to be observed that Paul himself, as well as many devout Christians in later times, seems not to have distinguished clearly between 'Christ' (as personally apprehended by himself through faith), the 'Spirit of Christ,' and the Holy Spirit.[2]

6. *Conscience*. While it is universally admitted that conscience needs educating, there is among Christian people to-day a very widely felt, if unanalysed, conviction that a definite dictate of conscience—even of an imperfectly educated conscience—is, in the moral sense, absolutely binding on the man who feels it, and remains so until he feels otherwise: that is, that—relatively to the individual concerned—conscience (as his particular hearing of the voice of God) takes precedence of every other authority whatever. "Here stand I; I can no other!" The sovereignty of conscience is sufficiently familiar to need no further elucidation in this place. "Had it strength," says Butler, "as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world."[3]

> The heart, they say, is wiser than the schools;
> And well they may. All that is great in thought,
> That strikes at once as with electric fire,
> And lifts us, as it were, from earth to heaven,
> Comes from the heart; and who confesses not
> Its voice as sacred, nay almost divine,
> When inly it declares on what we do,
> Blaming, approving? Let an erring world
> Judge as it will, we care not while we stand
> Acquitted there.[4]

7. *Reason*. While it is probable that only in certain forms of Deism, Pantheism, and Agnosticism has reason (in its strict sense of ratiocina-

[1] Cf. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 213, 224 f.

[2] Cf. Gal. iv. 6; 1 Cor. xv. 45; 2 Cor. iii. 17 f; Rom. i. 4, viii. 2, 9–11; Morgan, *Relig. and Theol. of Paul*, 24–26. The same coalescence is perceptible in the Johannine theology (cf. Scott, *Fourth Gospel*, 329 f, 346 ff) and in *The Shepherd* of Hermas. Cf. Grubb, *Authority*, 108–111.

[3] Butler, *Sermons*, ii. 3c. Cf. J. H. Hyslop in H.*E.R.E.* iv (1911) 30–33.

[4] Samuel Rogers, *Poems* (ed. 1853) 303 f. Cf. R. M. Jones, *Conscience*, passim; Grubb, *Authority*, 18–29; G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light*, 44 f.

tion) been treated as the sole avenue to reality,[1] its absolute supremacy within its own proper sphere is recognized by virtually all Christians to-day. Even the Roman Church admits it, protecting herself by setting dogmatic limits to reason's sphere.[2] In Protestant circles, wherever the principles of scientific criticism in the study of literary, religious, and political history are frankly admitted, the absolute validity of sound reasoning as a means of arriving at truth is taken for granted without more ado. It is treated as the light of God Himself within the intellect of man, and is trusted accordingly. The word 'Reason,' however, is capable of being used and has been used in philosophy and theology in a wider sense, as very nearly equivalent to the 'Inner Light,' which Quakers regard as ultimate, that is, as standing for that whole group of inward powers or endowments whereby man appreciates all reality—including beauty and goodness, as well as factual truth.[3] We do not, however, give a separate place in our list either to Reason in this wide sense, or to the 'Inner Light' of the Quaker, because both concepts are capable of being analysed into simpler elements, which have been separately provided for. Thus the Inner Light includes (besides reason in the narrow sense) both conscience and the indwelling Christ, and is in fact simply a modern name for the work of the Holy Spirit within mind and heart. The Quakers have always insisted that this inward authority of the Spirit was the first and supreme source of faith;[4] but there has also been operative in some Quaker circles, ever since the time of Barclay, a veneration for the outward authority of the Scriptures, which—somewhat in the manner of Calvin—have been pronounced infallible and yet subordinate to the internal witness of the Spirit.[5] For the same reason that we have

[1] Cf. Rawlinson, *Authority*, 122.

[2] See above, pp. 90–98.

[3] Freeman, *Authority*, 44–46; Inge, *Authority*, 31 f; R. M. Jones, *Conscience*, 28 n.; G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light*, passim, esp. 26, 39–48; Grubb, *Authority*, 10 f, 13 f.

[4] See the interesting account of the Quaker position from the Catholic point of view, in Moehler, *Symbolism*, 390–396.

[5] ". . . we have shewn what Service and Use the Holy Scriptures, as managed in and by the Spirit, are of, to the Church of God; wherefore we do account them a Secondary Rule. Moreover, because they are commonly acknowledged by all, to have been written by the Dictates of the Holy Spirit, and that the Errors, which may be supposed by the Injury of Times to have slipt in, are not such, but that there is a sufficient clear Testimony left to all the Essentials of the Christian Faith; we do look upon them, as the only fit outward Judge of Controversies among Christians; and that whatsoever Doctrine is contrary unto their Testimony, may therefore justly be rejected as False. . . . We shall also be very willing to admit it, as a positive certain Maxim, *That whatsoever any do, pretending to the Spirit, which is contrary to the Scriptures, be accounted and reckoned a Delusion of the Devil.* For . . . we know, that as every Evil contradicts the Scriptures, so it doth also the Spirit in the first place, from which the Scriptures came, and whose Motions can never contradict one another, though they may appear sometimes, to be contradictory. . . ." (Barclay *Apology*, prop. III, § vi [ed. 1736, 85 f]).

not devoted a special heading to the Inner Light, have we dispensed with one for 'Private Judgment,' the bête-noire of all Catholic apologists, the 'head and front' of all Protestant offending. Here too we have a compound whose ingredients are already included under other headings. The connotation given to the term fluctuates; and its fluctuation sometimes leaves room for ambiguities, and consequent fallacies in argument. But while for these reasons we omit the term from this list, we shall not omit to deal with the arguments that gather about the things for which the term stands.

When we now look back at our list of seven conceivable authorities, and begin to compare and contrast them with one another, the first thing we notice is that they fall into two main groups. Nos. 1–4 are objective, in a sense that Nos. 5–7 are not. They are entities external to the believer himself—entities in which many believe that God has located and expressed His absolute authority for the believer. In this important quality, therefore, of objectivity and externality, they are all alike. In particular, the sameness in essential principle of No. 2 (the infallible Church) and No. 3 (the infallible Bible), as alike final for the individual, has often been noticed, sometimes to the annoyance of those who accept the latter.[1] The similarity in this respect of No. 1 and No. 4 to Nos. 2 and 3 is less usually observed, partly because no considerable body of Christians venerates Nature as the supreme rule; and partly because the authority of the historical Jesus is as a rule not sharply distinguished from the prompting of His spirit in the heart.

Nos. 5–7 lack *that kind* of objectivity which characterizes Nos. 1–4. They locate the ultimate authority within. But if, on that ground and in order to distinguish them from the first four, we must call them 'subjective,' we must be careful to remember that this word does not mean 'self-produced,' but simply marks the fact that in the use of these authorities man knows God by His immediate operation on his

[1] M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 201–204, 207 f; Stanton, *Authority*, 87 f; Oman, *Vision*, 86–88; Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 371 f ("There is a sense, indeed, in which the so-called orthodox Protestantism . . . was not Protestantism at all, but only mutilated Catholicism. Its intellectual basis . . . was equally authoritarian with that of Rome, from which it differed merely in the substitution of the infallible Book for the infallible Church: a substitution which in itself was by no means an improvement. . . ."); Grubb, *Authority*, 43, 52 f (the Protestant the less logical of the two, for "the only guarantee he has for making this sharp distinction" [between books of the Bible and other books] "is that these books have been pronounced to be authoritative by Councils of the very Church whose final authority he denies . . ."); Macnaughton in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1927, 355. See also above, p. 110 n. 4. Principal Oman roused considerable protest recently by making the assertion that Fundamentalism was a purely Roman Catholic position (*Daily News*, 24 Mar. 1926, 7, and *Christian World*, 1 Apl. 1926, 7); he was drawing attention to the obvious fact that both locate the final authority in an *external* thing believed to be *infallible*.

own individual heart and mind, without the mediation of any *external* mundane or bodily instrument. To call them subjective, or to draw attention to their subjective character in contrast to other forms of authority, is not to deny or ignore or belittle the objective reality of the Divine, or to identify the Divine with the human, or to confine it within the human.[1] A great deal of irrelevant polemic would have been spared, had it been remembered that reliance on these inward standards, subjective only by contrast with certain external entities, was perfectly compatible with the fullest recognition of the reality, the transcendence, and the initiative of the Divine.[2]

We may then state the problem of Authority thus: how are these several 'authorities' related? Are they co-ordinate and equal, or do they depend on one another? On what grounds do their claims on our obedience rest? Can we test them? And in particular, how is the subjective group related to the objective, and what bearing does that relation have on the validity of each group and of each authority?

[1] Cf. Martineau, *Seat*, xi (pref. to 3rd edn.) ("Is then religious authority a mere 'subjective' rule, 'which conscience enforces on the nature of man'? A power which can 'enforce something on the nature of man' must be above that nature and not a piece of it: and if conscience be taken in this sense, as an authority *over* humanity, felt within but with appeal descending from beyond, it passes into a Divine reality, communing with us as person with person, seeking the assimilation of spirit with spirit. And this is precisely the relation which opens upon our view when the moral intuitions spread forth their contents in articulate consciousness. If therefore by 'subjective' be meant an affection limited to the human subject, the epithet marks precisely what this experience rejects: the authority felt to be *over us* is *eo ipso* objective; alighting upon consciousness, but from an illuminating source known only as Divine. This is not exclusively 'subjective,' unless all inspiration is so; if this word is to be applied, by way of reproach, to all that is given us in consciousness, how can you exempt the greatest prophet from it?" etc.); Leckie, *Authority*, 87–90; Selbie, *Freedom*, 11.

[2] I think particularly here of Forsyth's *Authority* (e.g. 441): cf. the Catholic criticism levelled at Heiler (*Kathol.* XV top)—the supernatural "passt dem modernen Denken nicht, das sein Verhältnis zu Gott von sich aus regelt und nicht von Gott aus als gegeben ansehen will." See below, pp. 117, 128, 143 n. 5, 147, 149, 166 n. 1.

CHAPTER VII

THE ULTIMACY OF THE INNER LIGHT

As was indicated in the last chapter, I understand the term 'Inner Light' to designate the whole of those internal powers and endowments which enable the individual to appropriate Divine reality. By occasionally calling the Inner Light 'Private Judgment,' we do not mean to imply that it has to do simply with intellect and reason. It does indeed include reason, both in its narrower sense of ratiocination, and in its wider sense of the appreciation of all absolute values. But it includes also conscience and the moral sense: it includes apprehension of the Indwelling Christ or (in a more general way) man's responsive sense of the Divine.[1] All Christians believe in the existence of this Inner Light and in its Divine origin as the medium whereby God's Holy Spirit of Truth and Goodness operates in mankind.[2] They differ, however, as to its conditions and limitations, and in particular as to its relation to other authorities. We shall refer to the other authorities as objective, and to the Inner Light as subjective, stipulating however that the latter term must not be understood to deny the reality, the transcendence, or the initiative of God.

Our first contention is that, in all experience of authority in religion, the Inner Light is logically and therefore really prior to—and ultimate by comparison with—all objective authorities whatever. We shall

[1] Cf. J. Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 682, 721, 727 (appeal of Divine truth primarily to the *will* of man); Iverach in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 254b; D'Arcy in *Anglic. Ess.* 13 ("It would be enough to say of such an authority that it must rule by its appeal to the reason, if the word reason be used in the widest sense. This is largely a question of words"). Newman (*Private Judgment*, 344–350) argues as if private judgment, strictly speaking, means only the independent, conscious, and deliberate decision of an individual reasoning on his own initiative and by himself, uninfluenced by others. It is merely a matter of terminology: and consequently Newman's strictures on what *he* calls private judgment do not touch *our* doctrine of the Inner Light. In somewhat the same rather unnecessary way, Forsyth keeps insisting that the central act of religion is not a mere rational judgment, but a moral act of the will, a self-surrender to God (*Authority*, 183, 189, 195, etc.). Of course it is; but that does not make it any less subjective in the sense in which we are here using the term.

[2] Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 234 ("Without the presence and action of God in nature, through reason and on man, I could not conceive religion as existing at all. That it exists anywhere is to me evidence that God has been active there, seeking man, as man has been seeking Him"); Inge, *Authority*, 30–32; Forsyth, *Authority*, as above, p. 103 n. 1; Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 126 (refusal to worship with fellow-Christians who differ from oneself argues disbelief in the *Holy Spirit*); G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light*, 16 f, 54–56.

hardly expect the reader who does not believe this already to accept it on the strength of our affirmation; and accordingly we must proceed to a demonstration of it.

Consider, first, the position of a conscientious and intelligent fundamentalist, or, if you will, any broadminded Protestant who declares that the Scriptures are the *ultimate* basis of authority in religion and morals. On what ground does such a man so revere the Bible, as containing a revelation of God, above and apart from other books? He might reply that he accepts the Scriptures on the authority of the Church, saying with Augustinus: "I should not believe in the Gospel, unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me thereto," [1] or with Hooker: "The Scripture doth not teach us the things that are of God, unless we did credit men who have taught us that the words of Scripture do signify those things." [2] In this case, we should have to pass him on to our next section,[3] where he will in due course be asked to say on what ground he trusts the Church. Or he might reply in slightly different terms that he hallows the Bible because he has been taught to do so from his youth up; and so he might need to be reminded that having been taught a thing is no guarantee of its truth, that the Moslem and 'the benighted Hindu' and 'the heathen Chinee' are all taught from their youth up to believe many things which clearly ex hypothesi are not true. Or he might say that he bases his belief on the fact that the Bible itself *claims* to be the Word of God.[4] Granting that it does so, we cannot help asking, Does the mere advancement of a claim prove that it is justified? Obviously it does not. The Koran, for instance, advances for itself more emphatic and insistent claims to Divine inspiration than any other book: but no Christian, least of all a fundamentalist, would admit for a single moment that these claims are well-grounded in point of fact. We are bound therefore to inquire as to the basis of the claims.[5] Nor could we accept the answer that the inspiration of the Bible is guaranteed by the miracles of which it tells. That is obviously a purely circular argument, for the only ground for believing the miracles to have occurred at all is the inspiration of the book that narrates them, and that is precisely the point in question.[6] It is clearly much nearer the truth to say that the Bible is uniquely authoritative because through it so many lives have been helped, so many sufferers comforted, so many strugglers blessed with peace and light, so many sinners cleansed.

[1] Aug. *Contra ep. Manich.* v. 6 (Migne, *P.L.* xlii. 176).

[2] Hooker, *Eccles. Polit.* ii. 7, approvingly quoted by R. L. Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 14.

[3] See below, pp. 121–139 ff.

[4] So, virtually, even Forsyth (*Authority*, 375).

[5] Cf. Grubb, *Authority*, 35, 43.

[6] M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 201–204; Grubb, *Authority*, 35.

Even this however does not give us complete finality: for it is still possible to ask why such changes should be regarded as real blessings and as the real work of God? In the last analysis, the only possible answer to our question is, that the ground for believing the Bible to be inspired beyond any other book is that, more than any other book, it comes home to the individual, it speaks to his condition, it answers the deepest needs of his own life, it saves him, as he sees that it has saved and still saves others.[1] This, and in the last resort only this, is our proof that the Scriptures are of God. In the quest for grounds and reasons, we inevitably get down at the finish to that grand major premise, the instinctive and elemental 'faith,' which we cannot but believe with Paul to be the witnessing of God's Spirit in conjunction with our own to the effect that we are His children (Rom. viii. 15 f). Beyond that we cannot go. The ultimate justification for our belief in the Bible is the 'testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum,' of which Calvin dimly taught. We believe—and even the fundamentalist believes—not 'Because it is so written,' but because so much of what is written evokes the glad approving recognition of our own inward sense of the Divine.

We reach precisely the same conclusion if we examine the way in which the Bible is not only marked off from other books, but treated in actual use. Many Anglicans and others, while declaring that the Bible is the *ultimate* authority, yet have no scruple in accepting the best-attested results of modern criticism, which involves the rejection of at least *some* biblical statements as erroneous. And even fundamentalists, who regard such criticism as wrong and who venerate and perhaps read the whole Bible from cover to cover as their theory

[1] Cf. von Dobschütz in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 591a; H. W. Robinson in *Zeitschr. für das alttest. Wissenschaft*, 1923, 11 f ("Coleridge has given classic expression to this truth in modern times; speaking of the Bible as a whole, he says, 'I have found words for my inmost thoughts, songs for my joy, utterances for my hidden griefs, and pleadings for my shame and feebleness. In short, whatever *finds* me bears witness for itself that it has proceeded from the Holy Spirit.' It is worthy of notice that that is really the continuous argument which underlies more superficial reasons for belief in divine inspiration, through all the generations. Professor Moffatt, in his 'Approach to the New Testament,' quotes Origen as saying in the third century almost exactly what we have just found Coleridge saying in the nineteenth: 'The words of the Bible find me at greater depths of my being; and whatever finds me brings with it an irresistible evidence of its having proceeded from the Divine Spirit' "); A. T. Cadoux, *Essays*, 82 f ("When we ask how we are to know what writings are inspired, we are driven to find the criterion in the response they evoke from something within us: . . ."); Moffatt in *Expos.* Jan. 1924, 3 f (quotes from W. Adams Brown a story of a lecturer suggesting to his class that Christians' esteem for Scripture sprang simply from custom, and that birth in India or Japan would similarly produce reverence for Hindu and Japanese writings. "A young Japanese student made this reply. He said, 'The case described was my own. I was converted to Christianity by reading a copy of the Bible. I knew nothing of Christ but what I found in this book, but when I read the Gospels they spoke directly to my soul, and I said to myself, "This is God's word to me" ' ").

demands, do not scruple in practice to prefer one part of it to another: they find God much more clearly revealing Himself in the New Testament than in the Old, in Psalms than in Leviticus, in Isaiah xl than in the lists of proper names in Chronicles, in the Fourth Gospel than in the Second and Third Epistles of John, and so forth. The necessity and the existence of such preferences are obvious enough, though orthodox folk fight shy of admitting them, and are eager to disavow the objectionable habit (with which they often reproach the critics) of 'picking and choosing.'[1] We must needs ask, however, by what authority these distinctions are drawn? The proceeding is clearly inconsistent with belief in the Bible as the *ultimate* authority: for if an authority is really ultimate, it is all equally true and equally Divine throughout, and you are acting entirely ultra vires if you draw distinctions between the value or truth of one part and that of another. In order to draw these distinctions, you are plainly obliged to use some test of truth and value ulterior to Scripture itself. What test can it be, other than that same inner enlightenment, conferred by the Spirit of God, on which rests also our acceptance of the Bible as a whole?[2] If a tradesman uses in his business a yard-measure or a pound-weight which he has verified by comparison with the standards at Greenwich, it is clear that it is those standards, and not his own articles, however usable, that are his ultimate authority. If B is guaranteed to me by A, then, however much I trust B, I clearly trust A still more: A is by comparison my more fundamental standard.

It is therefore utterly inconsistent and short-sighted and inaccurate when those who criticize the Bible (however slightly), or those who, without meaning to criticize it, prefer one part of it to another, profess to regard it as the *ultimate* standard of faith and the *ultimate* guide for life. It is futile to protest against this conclusion that "we believe the Bible for other reasons than the mere subjective reason that it meets our 'felt need,' " and to try to find those other reasons in the fact that "the Bible claims to be" so and so, and that "the Bible claims to have in it" this or that.[3] So it does: but how far does that take us unless the

[1] In *Christianity and Secularism* (1853, 211), for instance, G. J. Holyoake's complaint that Christians "make a selection of the Bible, discarding some parts and retaining others," just as secularists do, meets with no adequate or candid admission from his orthodox opponent. Again, in *The Eclipse of Faith* (6th edn. 1855, 343–346), Henry Rogers denies anyone's right to accept a part of the teaching of the Bible, and reject other parts. Per contra, M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 205–213.

[2] Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 88 (". . . the same spiritually-illumined reason, which must, in any case, in the first instance, decide upon its" [i.e. authority's] "claims, must afterwards continue watchful lest it should be used in improper ways, and extended beyond its true sphere"); A. T. Cadoux, *Essays*, 83 ("we know that we get good only from those parts of Scripture that call out this inward response"); Pryke, *Modernism*, 74.

[3] So Forsyth, *Authority*, 375.

claims be true, and who else is to tell whether they are true, except the reader himself who can test them in that final court of appeal that God has set up within him—the light of reason, the love of truth, the voice of conscience, and the sense of the Divine? To call this test 'subjective' is in a certain sense true: to call it 'merely subjective,' as if by being in any sense subjective it lost all title to validity and adequacy, is but to betray confusion of thought. There is thus no escape from the conclusion that the *ultimate* authority on which the fundamentalist depends, though he himself may be unaware of it, is not the Bible itself, but the Inner Light.

Catholic writers, though themselves accepting the infallibility of Scripture, have not been slow to observe the logical weakness of the traditional Protestant view. They see clearly enough that the necessity Protestants are under of interpreting the Bible for themselves, and the manifold and inevitable divergences of their several interpretations, effectually dispose of the profession that it is for them the one supreme and final authority.[1] Curiously enough, even High Anglicans also, who seem for the most part to hold that Scripture is the ultimate standard,[2] yet urge that it can be rightly interpreted only with the help of the "hermeneutical tradition" of the Church and under the direction of "the one rule of the ecclesiastical sense." [3] That is indeed the truly Catholic view: but it is utterly inconsistent to maintain at the same time that "Scripture is the ultimate criterion"; [4] for if Scripture must always be interpreted according to the traditional doctrines of the Church, it is clearly the Church and not Scripture that is being treated as the ultimate criterion.

We pass on therefore to examine the typically Catholic view that the really supreme and ultimate authority, the infallible mouthpiece of the living God, is the Christian Church, or, more precisely, the Church of Rome. We have already discussed above in our second chapter the Catholic doctrine in regard to the authority of the Church: but we may further observe here that, in the individual Catholic's attitude to his Church, an avowed and indeed essential element is the humble submission of both will and intellect to its despotic control. Starting from the admitted principle that man owes the submission

[1] Cf. Kenelm Vaughan in *Papacy and Bible*, 55; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 496b.

[2] See above, p. 111 n. 1.

[3] Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 36–40; W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 99 f. Cf. N. P. Williams in *Congress-Report 1920*, 65 (". . . we can, when asked 'By what authority do ye, or believe ye, these things?' safely reply . . .'By the authority of Holy Scripture,' provided that we add . . . 'the tradition of the whole Church' as *the final interpreter* of what 'the sense of the Scripture' intends" [italics mine]), 70.

[4] Ottley in *op. cit.* 17.

of his will and intellect to God as Creator and Lord,[1] Catholics deduce as if by an absolutely flawless syllogism—or rather affirm as an alternative statement of the same thing—the principle that man owes precisely this humble submission to the Roman Church. A Spanish ecclesiastic prays to God "that His Divine Will may be pleased to allow our Faith to honour His adorable and sovereign Truths, and as in love we sacrifice our hearts, so, also, we would sacrifice, in like manner, our intelligences, by means of that same faith, and that He may bestow on us heaven as a recompense!" Speaking of belief in the Church's Articles of Faith, he calls it "a belief so firm and so absolute, that through it we reject our senses, imposing silence upon our reason, and subjecting her completely to its sweet yoke." [2] Acceptance of the Church's doctrine results, not from insight into its truth, but from intentional subjection to its authority. Doubt and dissent are forced down in obedience to the 'lex fidei.' In the last resort, it is a question of obedience, not of truth. "The Church is not a belief; the Church is a discipline," was the reply of a theologian of the Vatican to a German scholar who complained to him of the incongruity between certain Catholic beliefs and modern knowledge. It is because 'faith' demands this difficult 'sacrifice of the intellect' that the exercise of it is regarded as a Christian virtue which God may be expected to reward.[3] This imperious demand for submission has reference to the will and conscience, as well as to the intellect, and it characterizes all Catholicism, not the Jesuit and monastic orders alone, but Catholic Modernism as represented by Tyrrell and von Hügel [4] and the adaptations of Catholic monasticism seen in certain of the Anglican religious orders.[5] It is a mistake to infer from the place given to reason and Scripture in the Roman system [6] and from random utterances in general terms on the sovereignty of conscience, that Rome does not make the authority of the Church final and absolute, or that she avowedly approves of individuals trusting their own conscience and reason when these run counter to her own teaching.[7]

[1] See above, p. 104 n. 1.

[2] Gilavert, *Influence of Cath.* 49 f; cf. 29 f, 37, 60.

[3] Summarized from Heiler, *Kathol.* 241 f. Cf. *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxv, reform. 1 (". . . quae nos tantopere commendat Deo, sanctae humilitatis . . .").

[4] Heiler, *Kathol.* 150 f (he quotes from a work by Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order, the words: "In order to be entirely of one mind with the Catholic Church, we must—if it declares that something which to our eyes appears white is black—confess that it is black; we must undoubtingly believe . . . that the God who once gave the ten commandments is no other than the one who now teaches and leads the hierarchical Church"), 450 (monastic orders), 616 f (Modernists).

[5] Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 116–118.

[6] See above, pp. 19, 94–97, and below, pp. 256 ff.

[7] In face of the evidence adduced above, Father Knox's surprised assurances concerning the priority of reason's authority to that of the Church (*Belief of Caths.* 40–47) are quite unsatisfying. Dr. Orchard's account also (*Foundations*, iii. 89–95) of Roman broad-mindedness in these respects is far more favourable than the facts

Discerning that biblical Fundamentalism is untenable, Catholics usually see the one real rival of their system in 'private judgment,' and they are fond of drawing out the contrast between this and Catholic 'faith.' "For faith consists in submitting; private interpretation consists in judging. In faith by hearing the last word rests with the teacher; in private judgment it rests with the reader, who submits the dead text of Scripture to a kind of post-mortem examination and delivers a verdict without appeal: he believes in himself rather than in any higher authority. But trust in one's own light is not faith. Private judgment is fatal to the theological virtue of faith. . . . Yet upon that simple, unquestioning faith the Church was built up and is held together to this day. Where absolute reliance on God's word, proclaimed by his accredited ambassadors, is wanting, i.e. where there is not the virtue of faith, there can be no unity of Church." [1] "If this docile loyalty to Divine authority which true faith implies means anything," writes another Catholic scholar, "it means that one must listen to the voice of those whom God has expressly appointed to teach in His name, rather than to one's own private judgment deciding what God's teaching ought to be. For to this, in final analysis, the issue is reduced; and he who chooses to make himself, instead of the authority which God has instituted, the final arbiter in matters of faith is far from possessing the true spirit of faith, which is the foundation of charity and of the whole supernatural life." [2] For such decisive exercise of private judgment on matters of religious belief, not only in distinguishing truth from error, but even in distinguishing essentials from non-essentials, the Roman Church has absolutely no place whatever. "The Catholic Church," we are told, "interdicts the use of private judgment in matters of faith; she has ever interdicted it, and she will continue to interdict it to the end of time. Free inquiry, individual preference, liberty of mind, freedom of thought, private judgment in the domain of faith are words which she has no ears to hear. She will not, she cannot listen to them; they would rend the rock on which she rests." [3] Private judgment was

warrant (cf. *op. cit.* 165: "The historic Catholic Church, all down history, has . . . been fighting the supreme battle for the liberty of the individual . . ."). This flattering view is sufficiently refuted by the following sentence, written by a modern Romanist: "St. Francis founded his Order on the triple vow of poverty, chastity *and obedience*; Waldo *omitted the latter*, declaring, like many who were to come after him, that his conscience was his guide and that he preferred to follow God rather than man. Implicit in such doctrine was, of course, *a repudiation of the whole Catholic tradition*, the whole idea of the Church as the Divinely appointed Guardian of the Faith, the whole teaching of the Apostolic succession" (Maycock, *Inquis.* 36: italics mine).

[1] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 496b.

[2] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 794b.

[3] Maclauchlin, quoted by Horton, *England's Danger*, 96 f. Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 66, 72, 394 ("the sin of going by individual judgments in matters of faith"); Wilhelm

frowned upon also by the Tractarians,[1] and is so to-day by the Anglo-Catholics.[2]

As Catholic 'faith' necessitates a submissive humility befitting the low estate of man before God, so the private judgment of the Protestant cannot fail to incur the heavy and oft-repeated charge of pride—a vice which the 'Roman Catechism' declares to be the source of all crimes.[3] No reproach is more frequently or more confidently uttered against heresy by Catholic lips than is this reproach of pride [4]: and it is an inevitable, if less direct and aggressive, part of the Anglo-Catholic apologetic.[5]

This perpetual accusation of pride, however, rests on a misapprehension. Our answer to it is (1) that, inasmuch as the mental and spiritual process by which a man adopts or defends Catholicism is, so far as its form goes, precisely and absolutely the same as that by which he adopts or defends Protestantism, the latter position is no more open to the charge of pride—and no more necessarily accompanied by pride—than is the former; and (2) that this process—in Catholic and Protestant alike—is not necessarily accompanied by pride at all, since recognition of the ultimacy of the Inner Light does not deserve to be so stigmatized.

in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 257a, xii (1911) 496b (in the time of the Apostles "there was no room whatever for what is now called private judgment"); W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 684.

[1] Newman, *Apol.* 118 (v), 178 f, 191 f (vi); Pusey, *Eiren.* 41 f.

[2] Cf. A. E. Taylor in *Congress-Report 1920*, 36 mid; C. S. Gillett in *op. cit.* 115 ("But when 'obedience' has dropped out of the vocabulary of religion, who does not know the poisonous fruits which that very gift" [i.e. liberty] "can bear? Liberty becomes licence, spiritual independence a muddle of cliques and heresies, intellectual freedom a mere madness of 'private interpretation' "), 117 ("if once certain definite, fundamental truths of faith and morals were finally removed from the sphere of private judgment, . . .").

[3] *Catech. Rom.* II. v. 22: "superbiae radices . . . a qua omnia scelera quae deflet, ortum habuerint et enata sint."

[4] Cf. Gilavert, *Influence of Cath.* 29 f, 36 f, 38 ("Let not Rationalists and godless Sophists forget that the . . . voice of Truth will not resound in their ears until after they have compelled their boastful, haughty reason to suffer a veritable and legitimate humiliation"), 39, 46 f, 49 f, 51 ("presumptuous and reckless intelligences . . . proud, enervated intelligences"), 75 ("The chair of Protestantism, resting as it does on the ruinous foundations of pride, can only be occupied and filled by the proud man"); Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 256b (among motives of heresy "intellectual pride or exaggerated reliance on one's own insight"), 257b (pride the cause of Catholic Modernism), and xii (1911) 496b (Protestant divisions "due to the pride of private intellect"); M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., in *God and the Supernatural*, 64; Heiler, *Kathol.* 242; Woodlock, *Modernism*, 3, 6 f.

[5] Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 15 (quoting Leo's *Tome*); Collins in *op. cit.* 68 ("when the heresy does become notorious, its teachers are generally so honestly anxious on behalf of their element of truth, and so desperately in love with the work of their own minds, that they are little ready to submit it to the true touchstone"); Moxon, *Modernism*, 20 ("heresy . . . is usually merely a sign of human pride").

The justice of the first [1] clause in our defence will be seen when we scrutinize the basis of the individual Catholic's position. The individual Catholic knows that his Church is criticized, but he decides nevertheless—with or without examining the criticisms—to adhere to it; nay, he attempts to make converts of those who do not belong to it. He puts pleas and arguments before them—pleas and arguments which he regards as trustworthy, and which he desires the potential convert also to regard as trustworthy. Who decides whether those arguments are to be treated as trustworthy or not? The individual Catholic himself: the potential convert himself. Of what nature will their decisions necessarily be? Decisions of private judgment. If the decision be in favour of Catholicism, wherein does it differ from a decision against Catholicism? It differs, of course, in content and results; but in form and basis the two are precisely similar, inasmuch as both are personal and individual pronouncements of private judgment in regard to the truth of God. "We have too great a horror of the principle of private judgment," wrote Newman in 1841, "to trust it in so immense a matter as that of changing from one communion to another. We may be cast out of our communion, or it may decree heresy to be truth— . . .; but I do not see other conceivable causes of our leaving the Church in which we were baptized." [2] But when, four years later, Newman joined the Roman Church, on what authority rested that decision in regard to the rightness of the Roman claims and the heresy of Anglicanism, on the strength of which he changed from the one communion to the other? Only one answer is possible: it rested on Newman's own private judgment. "That submission to the Church of Rome rests ultimately on an act of private judgment is unmistakeably evident, when a Romanist tries (as he has no scruple in doing) to make a convert of you. . . . What does he then ask you to do but to decide that the religion of your fathers is wrong. . . .? Well, if you come to the conclusion to reject all the authority which you have reverenced from your childhood, is not that a most audacious exercise of private judgment? But suppose you come to the opposite conclusion, and decide on staying where you are, would not a Romanist have a right to laugh at you, if you said that you were not using your private judgment *then*; that to *change* one's religion indeed is an act of private judgment, but that one who continues in his father's religion is subject to none of the risks to which every exercise of private judgment is liable? Well, it is absurd to imagine that logic has one rule for Roman Catholics and another for us; that it would be an exercise of private judgment in them to change their religion, but none if they

[1] For the second point, see below, pp. 138 f.
[2] Newman, *Apol.* 178 f (vi).

continue in what their religious teachers have told them. An act of our judgment must be the ultimate foundation of all our beliefs."[1]

Since in order to become or to remain a Roman Catholic, it is necessary to accept the infallibility of the Pope, and since a great initial act of private judgment is necessary as the prius and basis of such acceptance, it follows that one cannot bow to the infallible authority of Church or Pope, without having first bowed to one's own. The fact is sufficiently clear; but, inasmuch as it is so frequently evaded, it may be useful and interesting to transcribe a few of the statements of it that have from time to time been made. Thus—

It is as in the old dispute of private judgment against authority. Even the Catholic exercises the right of private judgment at the moment when he decides that as for him and his house he will serve the Church. It is he and not another who wills the act by which he gives up his will to another. The only person who would have no private judgment would be the man who never sufficiently awoke out of the sleep of custom to have any judgment at all, but lived on as his fathers did before him.[2]

And . . . it is easy to show that it is in the nature of things impossible to give men absolute security against error in any other way than by their being themselves made infallible; and I shall hereafter show you that when men profess faith in the Church's infallibility, they are, in real truth, professing faith in their own.[3]

Though I do not wish to argue with those who prefer slavery to freedom, yet I may remind them that, even in choosing slavery, they follow their own private judgment quite as much as others do in choosing freedom. In claiming infallibility for popes and councils, they claim in reality far greater infallibility for themselves.[4]

The true philosophy may be that God has not given us the power to solve our own difficulties, but has appointed us a supreme, divinely taught teacher,

[1] Salmon, *Infall.* 48 f. Similarly, though less pithily, Hase, *Handbook*, i. 70. Cf. Carlyle, *Hero as Priest* ("The sorriest sophistical Bellarmine, preaching sightless faith and passive obedience, must first, by some kind of *conviction*, have abdicated his right to be convinced. His 'private judgment' indicated that, as the advisablest step *he* could take"); Edward Longman in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1924, 797 ("The Reformation . . . established the principle of private judgment in matters of religion. Even converts to Roman Catholicism from Protestantism exercise that Protestant right, by resolving to change from one religious profession to another. Roman Catholic propaganda is, then, simply one of the natural effects of the freedom which resulted from the Reformation").

[2] Jas. Bonar in *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (1883) 239.

[3] Salmon, *Infall.* 47. The point is demonstrated with great cogency in the next few pages: cf. 23 n., 47–50, 53–55, 71 bott., 77 ("Dr. Newman . . . is certain the Pope is infallible, and I am certain he is not. Dr. Newman would get over this by calling his strong conviction certainty, and giving to mine some weaker name. But what is this but assuming that he is infallible, and I am not? And when he refuses to revise his former judgment that the Church of Rome is infallible, notwithstanding that since he came to it the Pope has made two decisions which, if Newman were free to exercise his own judgment, he would pronounce to be wrong, what is this but assuming that he was infallible at the time of his former judgment?"), 81, 279.

[4] Max Müller in *The Forum*, March 1891, 39.

and holy infallible guide in life. But that would in no way rid us of dependence on the intellect. . . . The duty of inquiring into the merit of any who might claim to be such a teacher and guide, would be entirely a task for the intellect. Only inquiry could satisfy us that we need not inquire further.[1]

Even Rome cannot evade the awkward circumstance that, after all, our acceptance of the pope as . . . infallible depends in the last resort upon an exercise of individual conscience and private judgment. 'How otherwise,' wrote Mivart to Cardinal Vaughan in 1900, 'could we know that authority had spoken at all, or what it had said?' Before the soul has any right to fling itself into arms extended to receive it in its quest of truth and peace, it must first convince itself that the arms are everlasting and that the proffered bosom is divine.[2]

The man who calls upon others to follow his lead unquestioningly in the highest matters that humanity can deal with, is in effect claiming infallibility. He does not mend matters by saying it is the church which is infallible, so long as he persists in defining the church as the body of those who think with himself; and this, in the last analysis, is what the strict catholic theory comes to.[3]

A crucial illustration of the moral and intellectual situation which thus comes into being is the position of one who in our time deliberately submits himself to the authority of the Papal See. Here the claim to infallibility is urged with all the parade of great pretensions. If a mind is merely overwhelmed by these pretensions, or yields through moral weakness, the decision has no spiritual value whatever. Only when there is conviction and deliberate choice can the action be morally justified. But this conviction and deliberate choice mean that the Papal claims have been submitted to the judgement of the individual and have been accepted. Their value for the individual is the value of his own judgement. He may fortify his opinion by appealing to the multitudes who accept the authority of the Papal See, or by consideration of its august history and splendid monuments; but, in every instance, he passes judgement on the evidential value of these various considerations. In the last resort, the infallibility of the Pope resolves itself into the infallibility of his own private judgement.[4]

Thus our analysis has led us to a conclusion in regard to Catholicism very similar to that arrived at in regard to Fundamentalism. In both cases, a firmly-held belief that the ultimate authority upon which reliance is placed is a wholly objective entity (in the one case the Church, in the other the Bible) proves on examination to be faulty, inasmuch as reliance upon this objective entity presupposes a still more fundamental reliance on inward or subjective tests of truth, usually designated by the terms 'Inner Light' or 'Private Judgment.' These, however unconsciously exercised, are in (relation to the objective standards) ulterior or prior—logically, chronologically, and really: and

[1] Oman, *Vision*, 67.
[2] Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 276a; similarly 258a.
[3] Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 124.
[4] C. F. D'Arcy in *Anglic. Ess.* 11. Similarly Rawlinson in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 93 f, and W. L. Knox in *op. cit.* 114; also Poynter, *Rome from Within*, 4, 11–13.

their ultimacy—clearly shown in the analysis—finally disposes of the claim of either Bible or Church to be the truly ultimate and absolute authority in religion. Such authority inheres only in the Inner Light—not in the sense that this Light is self-produced, nor in any sense that denies the objectivity, reality, transcendence, and initiative of God, nor (as we shall see) in any sense that makes objective and external guidance unnecessary, but in the sense that through it God comes more directly and *immediately into contact* with us than through any entity external to ourselves.

Patent as the ultimacy of the Inner Light thus is, it is virtually overlooked or ignored by Catholics[1] for the same reason that it is by Fundamentalists, viz. because their appeal to it is made almost or altogether unconsciously, and also because the appeal has to be made only once and that as the very first step in the building of their religion. The Bible, once chosen, thenceforth serves as *the* authority: the process by which it was chosen has either never been brought to light or has been completely forgotten; and the free choice of one Scripture in preference to another somehow never reveals it. The conversion to Rome once effected, the Pope's infallibility once agreed to, the private judgment by virtue of which these great decisions were reached is ignored or forgotten; and thereafter private judgment, being superseded by the dictates of the Church, never needs to be called into conscious action, and can thus be repudiated in principle without the inconsistency therein committed being felt.[2] It is partly at least this limitation of the scope of private judgment to one initial decision that causes its priority and ultimacy to be overlooked: it is extremely difficult—notwithstanding the plainness of the case—to get either Fundamentalists or Catholics to apprehend it. Yet their reliance on private judgment differs from that of Liberal Protestants, not in being less ultimate and fundamental, but simply in being less self-conscious and consistent.

It is indeed sometimes said that the Roman Church "admits that in the last resort the *seat* of authority is in the soul"; [3] and there is a certain amount of evidence that can be quoted in support of this statement. Innocentius III laid it down that a Christian should incur

[1] Even by some Anglo-Catholics. Rev. N. P. Williams, for example, discusses (*Congress-Report 1920*, 62–72) 'Authority in Matters of Belief,' "laying," as he says, "the foundations of our theory of authority, as I hope, strong and deep," but without so much as noticing the subjective side of the problem. He gets no further than the contention that our ultimate authority in religion is the Church prior to 1054 A.D.!

[2] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 53 ("If they use their private judgment *on no other question*, they must use it on the question, Are we bound to submit implicitly to the authority of the Church of Rome?"); Oman, *Vision*, 67 (an infallible authority "would in no way rid us of dependence on the intellect, though it might save us the necessity of *exercising any further our own spiritual insight*"). Italics mine.

[3] Forsyth, *Authority*, 12: similarly J. A. Robertson in *Expos.* Sept. 1922, 216 f.

excommunication rather than commit what he knows (but cannot prove to the Church) to be a mortal sin.[1] His younger contemporary, Francis of Assisi, taught the same doctrine, declaring that, if the Pope commanded anything which was contrary to faith and love and its fruits, one must obey God rather than man.[2] Reginald Pecock (circ. 1395–1460), Bishop of St. Asaph and later of Chichester, anticipated in a surprising way the modern doctrine of the sovereignty of reason in the interpretation of Scripture; but he was found guilty of heresy.[3] The 'Roman Catechism' recognizes in various ways man's Divinely-given capacity for discerning Divine truth.[4] The Vatican Council stated that, although the assent of faith was not a blind motion of the mind, yet no one could exercise it without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who facilitates for all men belief in the truth.[5] Newman, in his 'Grammar of Assent,' makes some surprising assertions in regard to the finality of one's own personal decisions: thus, in bringing out the defects of logic, he asks: "What is left to us but . . . to confess that there is no ultimate test of truth besides the testimony borne to truth by the mind itself. . .?" Again, "The authoritative oracle, which is to decide our path, is . . . seated in the mind of the individual, who is thus his own law, his own teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of duty which are personal to him." "In no class of concrete reasonings, whether in experimental science, historical research, or theology, is there any ultimate test of truth and error in our inferences besides the trustworthiness of the Illative Sense that gives them its sanction." "In religious inquiry each of us can speak only for himself, and for himself he has a right to speak. His own experiences are enough for himself, but he cannot speak for others. . . . He knows what has satisfied and satisfies himself; . . . he brings together his reasons, and relies on them, because they are his own, and this is his primary evidence; and he has a second ground of evidence, in the testimony of those who agree with him. But his best evidence is the former, which is derived from his own thoughts." "How possibly can it" (Christianity) "prove its claims except by an appeal to what men have already?" [6] The incom-

[1] See above, p. 60 n. 3.

[2] Sabatier, *Life of St. Francis*, 334 f.

[3] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 360 f.

[4] *Catech. Rom.* III. x. 36 (4) (". . verbum Dei, quod in animis nostris a magno illo agricola Deo insitum est"), IV. xii. 3 ("Nam a principio Deus proprii boni appetitionem creatis rebus ingeneravit, ut naturali quadam propensione suum quaererent et expeterent finem," etc.), 31 (". . . ab eo coelesti lumine dignati sumus").

[5] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 3 (Mirbt 458 [10]: also in Salmon, *Infall.* 478 top). Cf. Kenelm Vaughan in *Papacy and Bible*, 56 ("The Holy Ghost has written His Divine Law on the souls of the baptised, and engraven it on their hearts").

[6] Newman, *Gramm.* 343, 347 f, 352, 379 f, 383. Fairbairn has laid emphasis on the fact that Newman based his Catholicism on his Theism, and his Theism on *his conscience* (*Cathol.* 120–125).

patibility between these assertions and the Catholic doctrine that the voice of the Church must take precedence of private judgment (which deals of course, through conscience, with conduct, just as through intellect it deals with beliefs) is sufficiently glaring not to need any further exposure. We shall as a matter of fact find few Catholic apologists who will surrender the Catholic doctrine of authority as completely as Newman here surrenders it, just as we shall find few who will repeat to-day the bold utterances of Innocentius III and of Francis about obedience to conscience. Modern writers tend rather to confine themselves to general affirmations of the authority of conscience, without drawing out the logical implications of any admission of its real ultimacy.[1]

In Anglican and Anglo-Catholic writers also we sometimes come upon a doctrine of the subjective nature of authority. R. D. Hampden created a disturbance in Oxford in 1834 by advocating the abolition of the rule requiring subscription to the Thirty-Nine Articles from undergraduates at matriculation, on the ground that Church-formularies (in distinction from "Divine facts" of revelation) were only human interpretations and inferences binding on none but those who had reason to think them true.[2] William George Ward, a few years before his conversion to Rome, considered (his biographer tells us) "that the objections to the subjective nature of his theory" (of religious conviction) "have their real origin, in part, in a deficient appreciation on the part of his critics of the subjective character of nearly all deep beliefs, so far as their ultimate basis is concerned. Their true grounds are latent, and in great part subjective. Either must there be latent and subjective grounds for religious belief, or there are no sufficient grounds." [3] Pusey, in discussing the Roman Supremacy in 1866, is said to have observed: "It matters not under whom we live, so that by living under that authority *it does not touch our conscience*." [4] The late Dr. V. H. Stanton of Cambridge, in his book, 'The Place of Authority in Matters of Religious Belief' (1891), alludes several times, though with many qualifications, to the need and duty of the individual to judge in the last resort for himself.[5] In 1909 Dr. A. C. Headlam wrote that it

[1] Cf. W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 682 f ("By all its greatest champions the testimony of conscience is regarded as the turning-point, determining belief in a personal God," etc.). Dean Inge, however, truly observes (*Authority*, 9): "It was admitted, indeed, theoretically, that an immoral order ought not to be obeyed, but it was not for a layman to pronounce immoral any order received from a priest; . . . disobedience to constituted authority was a deadly sin." See above, pp. 122 f. n. 7.

[2] R. W. Church, *Oxf. Movement*, 156 f.

[3] W. Ward, *W. G. Ward and the Oxf. Movement*, 231 (the words quoted are the former's summary, not the latter's ipsissima verba).

[4] Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 234 (italics mine).

[5] Stanton, *Authority*, 65 (". . . whatever most commends itself to my conscience and commands my sympathy and affections, I see in" the saints), 88 ("the . . . spiritually-illumined reason, which must, in any case, in the first instance, decide

must "be clearly understood that there can be no authority which does not commend itself to our reason and work in us through our reason." [1] More recently, Dean Inge and Dr. D'Arcy, the Evangelical Archbishop of Armagh, have propounded the doctrine of the ultimacy of private judgment with great clarity and emphasis;[2] while Canon Rawlinson, who has strong sympathies with Anglo-Catholicism, frankly abandons the infallibility of the Church, and teaches that Christianity "makes its appeal to the spiritual discernment of men, to the heart and conscience." [3]

Despite their inability to do justice to the subjective character of the grounds of their faith, Catholics often unconsciously reveal this subjective character when they are not deliberately considering the problem of authority, but are simply stating their position on other matters. They are of course totally unaware that they are tacitly abandoning their theory of authority; but the abandonment, although implicit, can often be made sufficiently clear to the reader by the simple device of italicizing a few words in their statements. Thus Newman concludes the 'Advertisement' to his 'Essay on Development' by saying "that *he now submits* every part of the book to the judgment of the Church, with whose doctrine . . . *he wishes* all his thoughts to be coincident." In the book itself, we find: "The only general persuasive in matters of conduct is authority; that is, when truth is in question, a judgment which *we consider* superior to our own." [4] In his 'Apologia' he wrote: "*For myself, I found I could not hold*" certain arguments against Rome. "*I left* them. From the time *I began to suspect* their unsoundness, I ceased to put them forward. When *I was fairly sure* of their unsoundness, I gave up my Living. When *I was fully confident that* the Church of

upon its" [authority's] "claims"), 188–194 (individual must decide on doctrinal questions by private judgment, but must do so as a member of a vast organism—the Church, and with deference to its teaching-authority).

[1] *History, Authority and Theology*, 66 n.

[2] Inge, *Authority*, passim, esp. 6 ("a moment's reflection will convince us that no authority can be more purely authoritative, more absolute, than the inner light regarded as a direct illapse of the Spirit of God into the human soul"); C. F. D'Arcy in *Anglic. Ess.* 9–14: see above, pp. 127, and cf. *Times Lit. Suppt.* 22 Feb. 1923, 117.

[3] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 20; cf. vii f, 19 f, 25, 176, 188 f. Very similarly Father J. H. Jeayes, an Anglo-Catholic, in *Reconciliation*, Sept. 1924, 146. In *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* (93–97), Canon Rawlinson, after admitting the ultimacy of private judgment (cf. also 114), seems inclined to forget it and to put in its place the ultimacy of the consensus of Christian minds—philosophically, of course, quite a different position. In the same book (102–107) Rev. W. L. Knox lays stress on the basic importance of "Christian experience." As the reviewer in *Expos. Times* (Oct. 1926, 11a) points out, the book nowhere lays down a clear basis of authority for the Anglo-Catholic apologia. Canon N. P. Williams, in his account of Anglo-Catholicism in *Expos. Times*, Nov. 1927, 58b, declares that "the individual reason is the only judge" of the conformity of any doctrine with the N.T.

[4] Newman, *Developm.* 128.

Rome was the only true Church, I joined her."[1] "As I never, I do trust, aimed at anything else than *obedience to my own sense of right*," etc.[2] "*I profess my own* absolute submission to its" (Rome's) "claim. *I believe* the whole revealed dogma . . . *I receive* it, as it is infallibly interpreted. . . . *I submit*, moreover, to the universally received traditions. . . . And *I submit myself* to those other decisions of the holy see. . . ."[3] The Anglican Church "may be a great creation, though it be not divine, and *this is how I judge* of it." His former regard for it "simply *disappeared from my mind* on my conversion. . . . Anyhow, *this is my mind*; . . ."[4] Dr. Faà di Bruno introduces his 'Catholic Belief' with the words: "All men readily admit that, *to be in a position to judge fairly* of any case, one should hear both sides": he pleads that a man should study Catholic works, and "thus, having heard both sides, *he will be in a state to pass a judgment*, and not in danger of being guided by prejudice."[5] He quotes Newman's words: "Faith is the consequence of *willing to believe*."[6] The 'Creed of Pius IV,' which he reproduces, consists simply of a series of private judgments: "I . . ., with a firm faith, believe and profess. . . . I most steadfastly admit . . . I also admit . . . I also profess . . . I embrace and receive . . . I profess likewise . . . I steadfastly hold . . . I most firmly assert . . . I also affirm . . . I acknowledge . . . I likewise undoubtingly receive. . . . And I condemn, reject, and anathematize . . . I . . . do at this present freely profess and sincerely hold. . . ."[7] Dr. Manning and others, in the interests of the doctrine that the Popes have always been infallible, pronounce orthodox certain letters of Pope Honorius which were repeatedly condemned as heretical by succeeding Popes and by General Councils: their approval, of course, was nothing else than "an audacious exercise of private judgment."[8] Another Catholic authority dismisses as "altogether nugatory" Calvin's 'notes' of the true Church, viz: the preaching of God's Word and the administration of Christ's Sacraments. "The very reason," he says, "why notes

[1] Newman, *Apol.* 154 (vi).

[2] *Op. cit.* 213 (vi)—written a few weeks after his conversion to Rome.

[3] *Op. cit.* 225 (vii).

[4] *Op. cit.* 267 f (appx. 3). In basing his certainty of the being of God on the testimony of his conscience, Newman was not necessarily departing from the Church's teaching: yet, as Fairbairn says, "Cardinal Newman's doctrine is the purest individualism. The deliverance of his conscience avails for himself—can avail for no other; . . ." (*Cathol.* 130; cf. 123 f).

[5] *Cath. Belief*, xiii, 219. See also below, p. 229 n. 7.

[6] *Op. cit.* 281.

[7] *Op. cit.* 238–242. Connected with this unconscious reliance on one's own judgment is the frequent use in Catholic writings of arbitrary, inconclusive, question-begging, and circular statements such as "the Church claims," "it is the Catholic belief," "the Catholic Church teaches," "theologians teach," and so on.

[8] Salmon, *Infall.* 439: and see below, pp. 480–482.

are required at all is that men may be able to discern the word of God from the words of false prophets, and may know which religious body has a right to term its ceremonies the sacraments of Christ. To say that the Church is to be sought where these two qualities are found cannot help us." [1] But he does not seem to perceive that, if the individual is incapable of telling whether what is preached is God's word and whether what are administered are Christ's Sacraments, he must be equally incapable of recognizing in Rome the true Church. To switch us off from testing Word and Sacraments to *the harder task of finding and recognizing an infallible Church* cannot help us. Another Romanist scholar, in the course of a criticism of Protestantism and private judgment, advocates "absolute reliance on God's word, proclaimed by his accredited ambassadors." [2] Now to describe ambassadors as "accredited" implies that they are accredited *to someone*. But what use or sense can there be in this accrediting, unless those to whom the ambassadors come possess the means and the right to test their credentials, and to accept their message only in so far as their credentials answer the test? And how else is this testing to be done except by the exercise of private judgment?

We find precisely the same unconscious proof of the ultimacy of the Inner Light in many an Anglo-Catholic statement. As an Anglican, Newman defended his criticisms of Rome by saying to himself: "I am not speaking my own words, *I am but following* almost a *consensus* of the divines of my Church. . . . *I wish to throw myself* into their system. While I say what they say, I am safe." [3] Pusey wrote: "For myself I have always felt that had (which God in His mercy avert hereafter also) the English Church, by accepting heresy, driven me out of it, I could have gone in no other way than that of closing my eyes, and accepting whatever was put before me." [4] But for all the closing of the eyes, it would have been Pusey and not the Church that would have had to judge whether heresy had been accepted or not. He says of a certain opinion published by a French Catholic, "*To me this seemed* unintentional heresy, sanctioned by the two Gallican Bishops who recommended the book." [5] After enumerating several historical objections to papal infallibility, he says: " I have set down no difficulty *which I do not myself think* insurmountable. *I see absolutely no way* in which . . . Alexander VI. can be reconciled with Gregory I.," etc.[6] In spite of his condemnation of the principle of private judgment, it was on his part private judgment pure and simple to limit the Church to

[1] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 759a.
[2] See above, p. 123.
[3] Newman, *Developm.* ix: italics (except "*consensus*") mine.
[4] Pusey, *Eiren.* 98.
[5] *Op. cit.* 104: italics mine.
[6] *Op. cit.* 317: italics mine.

the Roman, Greek, and Anglican communities, to declare the Church's infallibility to have been active before the great schism of east and west in the ninth century, dormant ever since, and resumable if and when the three communities named should reunite.[1] Attention has been drawn to the arbitrary and individualistic character of the eclectic Catholicism professed by the later Tractarians.[2] 'The Order of Corporate Reunion' drew up in 1877 a 'Pastoral' in which they said: "In thus associating ourselves together, *we solemnly take as the basis of this Our Order* the Catholic Faith as defined by the Seven General Councils," etc. etc.[3] R. W. Church says of Hurrell Froude: "his reason and his character craved for authority, but authority which morally and reasonably *he could respect*." [4] Rev. W. E. Collins quotes approvingly the words of Gregorius the Great: "*I confess that I receive and venerate*, as the four books of the Gospel, so also the four councils . . . and the fifth council also *I equally venerate*": [5] likewise the words of a later writer: "the sheep of Christ, being reasonable, have and must have a kind of discerning whether they be directed into wholesome and pleasant pastures or not." [6] Dr. Gore speaks repeatedly of the necessity of testing in various ways the presentation of the Church's authority (of which he takes a high view); but he seems not to allow sufficiently in his general system for the fact that the private judgment that tests and the things by which it tests must be more fundamental and ultimate than the thing tested.[7] Dr. Darwell Stone, in his recent sketch of the Anglo-Catholic position, says that the Tractarians "*made their appeal to* the Church of the Fathers and . . . of the New Testament; *they regarded* the historic Catholic Church as the teacher of truth and the home of grace"; they appealed also "to that preservation of the earliest tradition which, *it was believed*, might be found in the authorized formularies and the great divines of the English Church. . . ." "The Catholic may not reject anything to which *he believes* that the Church as a whole is really committed. . . . It may often be a difficult task to determine exactly how far the authority of the Church has gone, . . . But, whenever it *can be determined*" (by whom?) "that there has been a decision to which the Church as a whole is permanently committed, the acceptance of that decision is obligatory." The Tractarians "accepted and kept all that was of positive value in what they received from earlier

[1] Salmon, *Infall.* 277 f.
[2] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 333 f.
[3] Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 105: italics mine.
[4] Church, *Oxf. Movement*, 41: italics mine.
[5] In *Auth. in Matt. of Faith.* 175 f: italics mine.
[6] *Op. cit.* 185.
[7] Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 151–183, 208–228, 317 ff, 328, 334, 337–340, 343 f, 353. He does however recognize that the dictates of personal conviction are finally binding (vi f, 151, 328, etc.).

times." [1] Of value in whose eyes? In the eyes, i.e. in the private judgment, of the Tractarians. Similarly, Canon Rawlinson argues that there is nothing "irrational in the acceptance of beliefs on authority, *provided always that there is reasonable ground for believing the authority* on the strength of whose assurance the beliefs in question are accepted to be trustworthy," etc.[2] Precisely: but who is to say whether or no this reasonable ground exists? Obviously, none other than the learner himself.

The ultimacy of private judgment, when once pointed out and illustrated, is so patent and so damaging to the Catholic doctrine of infallibility,[3] that attempts have sometimes been made to meet it, though I have met but few of these in the course of my reading.

Newman, in his 'Essay on Development,' answers the argument that belief in the infallibility of the Church presupposes one's own infallibility, by urging firstly that the argument tells as much against the infallibility of the Apostles and the Scriptures as against that of the Church, and secondly, that belief in the Church's infallibility is not prevented or discredited, even though it may rest (as Newman seems to admit it does) only on probable grounds, since a probable infallibility is no worse than a doubtful truth or a contingent necessity.[4] On the first point, we agree that the infallibility of the Apostles and of the Scriptures cannot be maintained: the suggestion therefore that our argument proves too much does not touch us. On the second point, a merely probable belief in the Church's absolute infallibility may be just conceivable *in the abstract*, but it is not representative of the Catholic position, and is hardly robust enough psychologically to sustain itself in practice. Newman likens it to a quite ordinary probable belief that something or other is true: but there is a big difference between them which he ignores. If I say a thing is probably true, I say no more than that it is probable. In strict logic we ought not, and in practice we usually do not, say that a thing is probably certain or a person probably infallible. When we say that a thing is "probably true" or a person "probably right," we presuppose our own power (if opportunity be given) to check, verify, and (if need be) correct the thing or person so described. That is not the attitude of the Catholic towards the infallibility of his Church; nor was it Newman's attitude when, after his conversion, the Church did things with which his private judgment disagreed. He then found that, if he was to remain a Romanist, he must act as if his belief in the Church's infallibility were not merely probable, but absolutely certain. So he clung to the infalli-

[1] Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 2 f, 22, 35: italics mine.
[2] In *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 91: italics mine.
[3] See below, pp. 162 f.
[4] Newman, *Developm.* 119 f.

bility of his private judgment of 1845 in trusting the Church to the point of total submission.[1]

In his 'Grammar of Assent' he again urges the charge that the objection proves too much, as if it implied that "I cannot be certain that the Supreme Being is infallible, until I am infallible myself."[2] The Being and Attributes of God, however, do not come home to us in the same way as facts about objective entities totally external to ourselves, such as the Church, the Bible, other minds, etc. His great and wondrous reality is not related to the subjective side of our experience in the same way that the objective side is related to it. God is the ground of our intellect and of our moral judgment in a sense in which the Church and the Bible are not, and can never be. Our certitude in regard to Him is something other than our certitude in regard to facts of history or of science.[3] It is at bottom the result, not of a process of arguing, but of an instinctive act of faith.[4] It therefore does not follow that because, without infallibility, I cannot believe the Church to be infallible, therefore, without infallibility, I cannot believe God to be so. But Newman goes on to offer further answers.[5] The objection, he says, means that nothing would be certain except what is self-evident, whereas many conclusions of science are certain without being self-evident. But he forgets, as before, that these conclusions of science are not invested by us with infallibility, but are liable always to verification and correction by the private judgment of the student, whereas nothing whatever of that kind is admitted in the case of the infallibility of the Church. He speaks as if infallibility could mean only infallibility in everything; he co-ordinates it for instance with impeccability. He does not seem to see that, whereas impeccability means that one *never* sins, infallibility does not mean—even as applied to the Pope—that he never errs; it means that he does not err in a certain limited class of judgments. When we say that the Catholic presupposes his own infallibility, we do not mean an infallibility in everything, but only an infallibility in regard to this particular quality of the Roman Church. Newman rightly says: "Certitude is at most nothing more than infallibility *pro hac vice*, and promises nothing as to the truth of any proposition beside its own." Quite so: but it is at least *infallibility* pro hac vice, which is precisely what our argument has claimed, namely, that to believe the

[1] Newman's subsequent trust, despite intellectual sacrifices, in the rightness of the step he took in going over to Rome, forms a contrast to the misgivings as to his constancy with which he approached it (*Apol.* 208 [vi, near end]).

[2] Newman, *Gramm.* 218.

[3] Cf. G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light*, 37, 54–56. On the a priori nature of belief in God, cf. Kalweit in H.*E.R.E.* i (1908) 652 f. This is probably what Forsyth has in mind in his rather obscure insistence that we are chiefly concerned not with knowing God, but with being known by Him (*Authority*, 170, 175 f, 187 f, etc. etc.).

[4] See above, pp. 88, 99.

[5] Newman, *Gramm.* 218–220.

Roman Church or Pope to be infallible, one must *presuppose* one's own infallibility at least in regard to that belief.

A more recent answer is given in the article on 'Infallibility' in 'The Catholic Encyclopedia.' I transcribe it in full in order to avoid all risk of misrepresentation.

> In reply it is to be observed that this argument, if valid, would prove very much more than it is here introduced to prove; that it would indeed undermine the very foundations of Christian faith. For example, on purely rational grounds I have only moral certainty that God Himself is infallible or that Christ was the infallible mediator of a Divine Revelation; yet if I am to give a rational defence of my faith, even in mysteries which I do not comprehend, I must do so by appealing to the infallibility of God and of Christ. But according to the logic of the objection this appeal would be futile and the assent of faith considered as a rational act would be no firmer or more secure than natural human knowledge. The truth is that the inferential process here and in the case of ecclesiastical infallibility transcends the rule of formal logic that is alleged. Assent is given not to the logical force of the syllogism, but directly to the authority which the inference serves to introduce; and this holds good in a measure even when there is question of mere fallible authority. Once we come to believe in and rely upon authority we can afford to overlook the means by which we were brought to accept it, just as a man who has reached a solid standing place where he wishes to remain no longer relies on the frail ladder by which he mounted. It cannot be said that there is any essential difference in this respect between Divine and ecclesiastical infallibility. The latter of course is only a means by which we are put under subjection to the former in regard to a body of truth once revealed and to be believed by all men to the end of time, and no one can fairly deny that it is useful, not to say necessary, for that purpose. Its alternative is private judgment, and history has shown to what results this alternative inevitably leads.[1]

We have already on the previous page dealt with the plea that our argument, if valid, would make it impossible for us to believe in the infallibility of God without presupposing our own. With the similar plea advanced in connexion with the infallibility of Jesus Christ, we shall deal fully in a subsequent chapter.[2] We must however challenge directly here and now the tacit assumption that Divine and ecclesiastical infallibility stand on precisely the same footing. So far from there being "no essential difference" between them, the complete objectivity of the Church in relation to ourselves puts her authority in a very distinct category from that of the authority of God, Whose indwelling Spirit joins His testimony with our spirit in certifying us of our filial relation to Him, and Whose nature and will, expressed by the absolute values of truth, goodness, and beauty, are revealed in the very structure and experience of our human nature. Knowledge of Him does

[1] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 794a. Cf. the less precise statement by Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xiii (1912) 3 f.

[2] See below, pp. 215 f.

not rest on "purely rational grounds." To say that the inferential process here transcends the rule of formal logic is true, if we are speaking of the infallibility of God, because God—unlike the Church—is the ground of our being, the very creator and basis of our logic and of our æsthetics and ethics and religion also.[1] But for that very reason, to say the same of the infallibility of the Church is not true. As for the complaint that the assent of faith would be no more secure than natural human knowledge, this cannot, for the reasons just stated, apply to our faith in God. It does apply to our faith in the Church: but why should that constitute an objection? The analogy of the ladder—like other analogies—cannot be made to run on all fours, and constitutes no proof of what it illustrates. It is true that, in the case of fallible authority, assent is actually given to an authority which the inference introduces rather than to the inference itself: yet philosophically it remains clear that for the learner the reliability of an objective authority does hang on the reliability of the subjective process (inferential or otherwise) which leads to the acceptance of it; and while that process may be forgotten or "overlooked," it does not cease to be prior, ultimate, and fundamental, as compared with the objective authority. If it be urged that the latter gives us truth which no Inner Light would of itself be sufficient to supply, that we readily concede; but, as our next chapter will show, the fact is not by any means inconsistent with what has been advanced in this. As for the closing allusion to the lamentable results of private judgment, as the only alternative to the infallibility of the Church, this argument—even if true as regards the facts—is simply an argumentum ad terrorem, a piece of pure pragmatism, which is consequently devoid of weight against a philosophical demonstration. But in any case, if an appeal is to be made to the results which history shows, Protestants can accept the challenge with a light heart.[2]

We are now in a position to substantiate the second half of our answer to the charge of pride.[3] We have shown that Catholicism, just as much as Protestantism or any other religious position which is deliberately taken, must rest upon an initial trust in a Divine enlightenment subjectively received and interpreted—i.e. upon 'Inner Light' and private judgment. Such trust is a binding necessity of our nature: no religious belief is possible without it. And what is for us a binding necessity of our nature cannot be blamed for being, as the charge of pride in this case suggests, vicious or sinful. It is, of course, perfectly possible for a man, whatever his religious beliefs, to be guilty of pride in the way he holds them: but there is no *necessity* for him to be so; a conscious and consistent trust in private judgment does not neces-

[1] See above, p. 213.
[2] See below, Part IV, pp. 548–639.
[3] See above, p. 124.

sarily make him so; and in point of fact Protestants, in comparison with Catholics, are not specially found to be so.[1] Catholic apologists often speak of private judgment as if it were a claim to admit ideas and beliefs to the mind with absolutely uncontrolled freedom, as mere whim or fancy or casual inclination may dictate.[2] No one but a lunatic or an irresponsible trifler would advance such a claim. Private judgment does not mean that.[3] It does indeed mean a judgment that is not under obligation to accept *unconditionally* the statements of other human minds, even though those statements may purport to be messages from God. But it presupposes always a humble submission to the authority of God Himself, and a humble desire to learn the truth about Him, about His actual Will and Nature, and about His objective universe of facts and values. The mind that refuses to surrender at discretion to the Bishop of Rome, is not for that reason a proud mind: for it has a surrender to make, and it makes it—a surrender to reality and to God. Questions of accuracy and of personal temperament apart, there is no more pride in the private judgment that accepts the higher-critical arguments for the documentary theory of the Pentateuch than the private judgment that accepts the Catholic arguments for papal infallibility.[4]

In order to complete the scheme on which we are working, we ought now to examine the view of those who find ultimate authority either in physical Nature or in the Gospel-story of Jesus. For it will be remembered that here too, as well as in Scripture and in the Church, many have assumed and contended that such authority was discernible.[5] Detailed discussion is, however, not necessary in this place; for it will be apparent that our analysis of the Fundamentalist and Catholic views is equally applicable to any view which professes to take some externally objective entity as the final arbiter. The application of this analysis to the authority of our Lord is complicated by questions which will necessitate discussion in a special chapter. It must suffice here to say that some ground other than His bare historical existence or the

[1] Cf. Coulton in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 117.

[2] See above, p. 123, and below, pp. 145 ff.

[3] Cf. Grote, *Plato*, ii. 513 f; Dale, *Ultimate Principle*, 21–27.

[4] Cf. J. Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 724 ("The usual Catholic accusation that it is the pride of the natural man which refuses obedience to the church is totally irrelevant. That is not at all the question. We seek by all available means to investigate reality and to recognize what is given to us in experience. Then we can always make the proviso that our results are not infallible, and that it is always possible that they may be corrected. But this correction is conceivable only on the ground of investigation. . . . And the adoption of this and no other position is not to be ascribed to pride, which is always morally reprehensible, but simply to moral duty. It would be contrary to the spirit of truthfulness if we assumed any other attitude"); Macnaughton in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1927, 356 top.

[5] See above, pp. 108 f, 111 f.

record of it is necessary to justify our submission to Him in preference to Confucius, or Gautama, or Mohammed, or Karl Marx; and that that something can be only the illumination of God's Spirit within heart, soul, mind and conscience—the power in fact which alone guarantees the Divine dignity of the Scriptures and the Church. The same may be said, mutatis mutandis, of Nature, though here the problem is simpler, because Christian people are not in the custom of appealing to external Nature, in distinction and detachment from human logic and sentiment, as the supreme source of knowledge about God, except on a few controversial problems in ethics.

The doctrine of the ultimacy of the Inner Light seems never yet to have been worked out with sufficient clearness and thoroughness to secure for it general appreciation and acceptance on the part of Christian people. It is, however, very far from being new teaching. It has behind it a fairly solid body of precedents, expressions of it—of varying degrees of fulness and clarity—being found as far back as even pre-Christian times. The philosophical germ of it appears in the doctrine of Protagoras that "Man is the measure of all things";[1] and the unfavourable treatment which this theory received at the hands of Plato and Aristoteles exemplifies man's natural reluctance to reconcile himself to his own limitations.[2] Old-Testament thought is seen feeling its way in the same direction in Jeremiah's notion of Yahweh putting His law in men's inward parts and writing it on their heart (Jerem. xxxi. 33; cf. Isa. li. 7), in the Proverb "The spirit of man is the lamp of Yahweh,"[3] and in the doctrine of the Spirit of God generally. In the teaching of Jesus the truth in question is reflected in the assumption that what is truest and best in man is a clue to the nature and will of God (e.g. Mt. vii. 11=Lk. xi. 13; Lk. xv), and also in the Master's repeated insistence on the need of thought, reflection, and wisdom. In Paul, it comes to still clearer formulation in his great doctrine of the indwelling Spirit of God as the basis of our belief in His Fatherhood and our sonship (Gal. iv. 6 f; Rom. viii. 14–18, 26 f). In the Johannine writings, the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is still further developed, and His supreme authority recognized.[4] This doctrine was duly maintained throughout the Middle Ages as a

[1] Plato, *Theaetet.* 152 ff, *Kratylos*, 386: cf. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, viii. 171 f, *Plato*, ii. 323 ff, 507 ff; Martineau, *Essays*, ii. 295 f.

[2] "The ancient mind, it is often said, was defective in its failure adequately to recognize the principle of individuality; and this, no doubt, is true" (Rawlinson and Parsons in *Foundations*, 177). This in part accounts for the comparative lateness and slowness of the recognition in philosophy of the subjective side of experience.

[3] Prov. xx. 27: Toy's paraphrase is: "Conscience is God's searchlight."

[4] Jn. xvi. 13: cf. 1 Jn. ii. 20 f, v. 10; Grubb, *Authority*, 98.

part of orthodoxy, but its meaning and import were very imperfectly seen. We have already taken note of the occasional recognition of it within the Catholic Church.[1] Even the leaders of the Reformation were often far from grasping it. Yet it may truly be described as one of the achievements of the Reformation that it paved the way for a fuller and juster appreciation of the sovereignty of the individual conscience and the freedom of personal judgment.[2] Calvin went further than others with his doctrine of the 'testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum'; but he was very far from inferring thence that individuals were free to pronounce any part of Scripture to be erroneous, or even to interpret it as they thought best.[3] The Arminians extended this principle in opposition to the bibliolatry of their time.[4] William Chillingworth, who made himself notorious by declaring in 1637 that "the Bible only is the religion of Protestants," yet asserted the freedom of the individual conscience in its interpretation.[5] The Westminster Divines in 1647 reaffirmed Calvin's doctrine of "the inward work of the Holy Spirit" as the ground of our confidence in Scripture, yet without abandoning belief in the latter's "infallible truth" and "entire perfection."[6] A further step towards elucidation was taken by the Quakers, who emphatically subordinated the authority of Scripture to that of the Inner Light or the Spirit, though still apparently without realizing that the infallibility of Scripture was thereby at all imperilled.[7] Ralph Cudworth, the Cambridge Platonist (1617–1688), and John Locke (1632–1704) both adopted similar views in regard to the ultimate basis of faith.[8] On the Continent, Pierre Bayle (1647–1706), of 'Dictionary'-fame, advocated toleration on the ground that moral intuition takes precedence of all external revelation.[9] It was perhaps partly owing to its being taken

[1] See above, pp. 128–130.

[2] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 364 f; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 136 f, 193, 234 f; Horton, *England's Danger*, 94; von Dobschütz in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 591a; Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 511a. See also above, p. 126 n. 1.

[3] Calvin, *Inst.* I. iii. 3, v. 2, 3, vii. 2, 4 f, viii. 13, ix. 3: cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 347–349; Fisher, *Christian Doctr.* 299; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 67–71; J. A. Robertson in *Expos.* Sept. 1922, 219 f; Binns, *Reformers and Bible*, 24 f; H. R. Mackintosh ap. Gore, *Infall. Book*, 58 f.

[4] Platt in H.*E.R.E.* i (1908) 814 f.

[5] Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 60 f; Green, *Short History*, 600; *Encyc. Brit.* vi. 162b.

[6] *Westminster Confession*, i. 4–10: cf. Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 263a. Channing (*Works*, i. 29 n.) observes that Milton's *Treatise on Christian Doctrine* contains several passages to the same effect.

[7] Fox, *Journal*, ch. ii (ed. Penney, 24) (1649); R. Barclay, *Apology* (1676), as above, p. 114 n. 5. Cf. the appreciation and criticisms of Dean Inge (*Authority*, 16–19, 27–29) and Dr. W. P. Paterson (*Rule of Faith*, 78–91, 167).

[8] Mark Pattison in *Essays and Reviews*, 290 f; A. C. Fraser in *Locke*, 257 (Locke's arguments tended "to transfer the foundation of Christianity from unreasoned or dogmatic assumption . . ., to the response which it finds in the conscience and spiritual constitution of man"); G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light*, 23.

[9] Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 60–63.

up by the Deists[1] that in the eighteenth century the doctrine of the Inner Light fell into disrepute as a perquisite of 'the sectaries.'[2] As such, indeed, the Calvinistic doctrine appears among the tenets of John Barclay (1734–1798), founder and apostle of the 'Bereans.'[3] The philosophical idealism developed by Berkeley (1685–1753) and Kant (1724–1804) was bound to produce a movement towards subjectivism in theology: and this is primarily represented by the names of Schleiermacher (1768–1834) and Ritschl (1822–1889).[4] More or less casual recognition of the finality of the inward test appears in Coleridge (1772–1834),[5] Byron (1788–1824),[6] Carlyle (1795–1881),[7] William George Ward (1812–1882),[8] Alfred Tennyson (1809–1892),[9] and Mrs. Craik (1826–1887).[10] Since the middle of the nineteenth century, its place in theological and philosophical controversy has been becoming more and more central. Secularism challenged orthodoxy to take account of it.[11] One of the writers in 'Essays and Reviews' (1859) spoke of the "verifying faculty" or "the witness in ourselves" as the justification for biblical criticism; another urged that the supreme guarantee of the truth of Christianity lay in its "moral and internal proof" and not in its miracles.[12] The presupposition of one's own infallibility in the acceptance of papal infallibility was seen and urged by Hase (1862 ff),[13] by James Bonar (1883),[14] and, with especial force, by Salmon (1888 ff).[15] Dr. R. W. Dale, in his lecture on 'Protestantism: its Ultimate Principle' (1874) elucidated and vindicated the right of private judgment in relation to religion and the Scriptures.[16] Rev. W. L. M'Farlan, of Lenzie, a minister of the Church of Scotland, maintained

[1] "Do not these instances . . . plainly show . . . that we sin against that Reason, which was given us to distinguish between Good and Evil; Religion and Superstition; if we do not by it examine all Doctrines whatsoever, and by whomsoever delivered?" (Matthew Tindal, *Christianity as old as the Creation* [1730] 245).

[2] Mark Pattison in *Essays and Reviews*, 290 f.

[3] A. Miller in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 521b.

[4] Cf. Selbie in H.*E.R.E.* xi (1920) 908 f.

[5] See above, p. 119 n. 1.

[6] *The Island*, I. vi:

> "Whatever creed be taught, or land be trod,
> Man's conscience is the oracle of God."

[7] See above, p. 126 n. 1.

[8] See above, p. 130.

[9] "God is unknowable as He is in Himself, but He touches us at one point. That point is the conscience. If the conscience could be further developed, we might in some sense see God . . ." (quoted in *Rev. of Revs.*, July 1896, 50b).

[10] She makes Olive say: "I follow no ritual, and trust no creed, except so far as it is conformable to the instinct of faith—the inward revelation of Himself which He has implanted in my soul—. . ." (*Olive*, 274).

[11] See above, p. 120 n. 1.

[12] Rowland Williams and Baden Powell in *Essays and Reviews*, 83, 122–124.

[13] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 70.

[14] See above, p. 126 n. 2.

[15] See above, pp. 125 f: also by Max Müller (p. 126 n. 4).

[16] Dale, *Ultimate Principle*, 9–58.

the ultimacy of private judgment in a sermon contributed to a volume published in 1880.[1] According to Dr. Fairbairn (1885), true authority "corroborates and develops the native godliness of the mind." [2] Robertson Smith (1846–1894), the eminent biblical critic, is reported to have said: "If I am asked why I receive Scripture as the word of God, and as the only perfect rule of faith and life, I answer with all the fathers of the Protestant Church, 'Because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God drawing near to man in Christ Jesus. . . . And this record I know to be true by the witness of His Spirit in my heart, whereby I am assured that none other than God Himself is able to speak such words to my soul.' " [3] It was, however, James Martineau, the Unitarian, who did more perhaps than any other theologian to bring the facts fully before Christian thinkers. In several essays stretching over a long lapse of years, and then finally in a massive volume, published in 1890 and several times re-edited, Martineau worked out the thesis that the foundations of religious knowledge are laid by God in the reason, the conscience, and the heart of man.[4] Since that time, the ultimacy of the Inner Light has been again and again alluded to, and occasionally discussed at some length, in the works of Protestant theologians.[5] The most significant

[1] *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 195–218. [2] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 230.

[3] In Denney, *Studies in Theol.* 204 f.

[4] Martineau, *Seat*, passim, esp. 297, 308, *Essays*, i. 183–188 (1846), ii. 243–254 (1850), iii. 33, 50 f (1850), iv. 323–326 (1881); J. E. Carpenter, *James Martineau*, 585–596.

[5] E.g. Stanton, *Authority* (1891: see above, p. 130 f n. 5); A. B. Bruce, *Apologetics* (1892) 310 (". . . the divine in us bearing witness to the divine in" the books of Scripture), 320 (on Calvin's theory); W. S. Bruce, *Social Aspects of Christian Morality* (1905) 359 f; Oman, *Vision* (1906) 67 (see above, p. 126 f), 104; Leckie, *Authority* (1909) 76–78, 82, 220 f; von Dobschütz in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 591a; Garvie in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 647b (Calvin's doctrine "wide enough to leave room for our growing modern knowledge of the Bible"), 648a; Inge, *Authority* (1912) passim; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 7 f (Christianity shines by its own light); Forsyth, *Authority* (1913) 55, 82–84 (recognizes that the *seat* of authority is subjective to us, but lays stress on the obvious and admitted fact that this authority is derived, not from ourselves, but from God); W. A. Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 258a (belief in infallibility implies one's own), 276a (see above, p. 127 n. 2), 277a; H. C. Ackerman in *Construct. Quart.* Sept. 1918, 553 (". . . Subjective truth, therefore, is the substance of faith; the individual mind's own decision is the only criterion, and faith is not real unless it is personally individualistic . . ."); Theodor Krüger, *Das Verhältnis des historischen und des mystischen Elements in der christlichen Religion* (1918: reviewer in *Theol. Litzg.* 1922. 24. 533 says: "Kern der Religion ist freilich das 'mystische' Erlebnis," etc.); E. Griffith-Jones in Peake's *Commentary* (1919) 8a; Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. (1919: see above, p. 127 n. 3); George Milligan in *Expos.* Dec. 1921, 423 f; A. T. Cadoux, *Essays* (1922) 81–83 (see above, pp. 119 n. 1, 120 n. 2), 89 ("Nothing is inspired for us unless we are in some true sense inspired, and all authorities must defer to that which is within, . . ."); L. P. Jacks in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1923, 385 (power to believe divinity of Christ presupposes knowledge of God); Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 81, 91, 95; Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 20 ("The ultimate authority, therefore, is the Holy Spirit speaking in and through the divine word"), 23–25.

of these discussions are, perhaps, those recently put forth by the Anglican writers already referred to [1] and by three Quaker scholars, whose denominational connexion gives them a special interest in the problem.[2]

It may, however, safely be said—without any disrespect to these or other scholars—that no treatment of the problem rivals that of Martineau in scope and penetration, and that none—not even his—fully brings out the bearing of the true solution of it on the Church-problems of modern times. In any case, even if this last statement does less than justice to the convictions, broad hints, and positive statements of many individuals, the failure to secure general recognition of the truth in question may fairly be pleaded as a warrant for further attempts.[3] This failure is perhaps in some measure due to a conscious or unconscious unwillingness to make concessions or accept arguments that will imperil one's own denominational position. Like the controversialist who refused to grant that the whole was greater than the part, until he should see what use his antagonist proposed to make of the admission, we are probably all of us, at least instinctively, if not knowingly, somewhat exposed to the fallacious influence of the argumentum ad terrorem. But apart altogether from this disturbing factor, the very complexities of the question itself go a long way to account for the disagreements that arise in regard to it. Appealing therefore to the reader for a verdict of 'Proven' on the basic thesis of this chapter, we proceed in the immediate sequel to draw out those needful qualifications, conditions, and implications, apart from which the doctrine of the ultimacy of the Inner Light is almost bound to be misunderstood.

[1] See above, pp. 127 n. 4, 130 f. In *Priests' Convention* (104), Rev. J. J. G. Stockley, an Anglo-Catholic, deprecates frequent appeals to authority, and pleads rather for efforts, on the part of the Church's teachers, to satisfy the conscience and convince the reason of men.

[2] R. M. Jones, *Conscience* (1920); E. Grubb, *Authority* (1924: passim, esp. 36–39, 98); and G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light* (1924).

[3] The writer may perhaps be allowed to refer here to some of his own earlier endeavours in this direction, viz: his papers on 'The Subjective Element in Churchmanship' in *Construct. Quart.* Sept. 1919, 517–530, 'The Crux of the Problem of Christian Re-union' in *Venturer*, Aug. 1920, 407–412, 'The Proposed Creedal Basis for Christian Re-union' in *Journ. of Relig.* Nov. 1921, 592–607; 'Anglicanism and Re-union' in *Construct. Quart.* Mar. 1922, 1–19; 'The Christian Concern with History' in *Journ. of Relig.* May 1923, 225–237; 'The Spiritual Meaning of Biblical Criticism' in *Congreg. Quart.* Apl. 1924, 184–195; 'A Good Word for Individualism' in *The Gryphon*, June 1925, 211–213; and 'God, History, and Ourselves' in *Congreg. Quart.* Apl. 1926, 152–166.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PLACE OF OBJECTIVE AUTHORITIES

ANY stick is good enough to beat a dog with: and a philosophical argument that cannot be refuted directly can always be brought without difficulty into some discredit by being described as 'too individualistic and subjective.' For towards anything that lends itself to such a charge, many minds feel an instinctive dislike, often amounting almost to horror. "The individual," we are told, "regarded as an isolated unit, is a thoroughly unreal abstraction, and . . . individualism as a philosophy of life is profoundly and radically false." [1] Modern philosophy is well known to be on its guard against "the taint of subjectivity." [2] The vague form in which objections of this kind, when directed against any particular theory, are usually couched makes it difficult to appraise their real value. They often register merely a half-conscious unrest of the mind in the presence of a factor which has long made itself felt and attracted attention, but which has never yet been accorded its proper place in our religious philosophy. When attention is drawn to the relative and subjective element in experience, the impression is created that the reality of objective truth is being somehow denied. The educationalist sees on this ground a danger in the historical method—since, by engendering a sense of the relativity of all statements of spiritual truth, it "may produce a mist upon the mirror of the mind and blur its perception" of that truth.[3] The theologian looks askance at the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge as the main prop of agnosticism.[4] The plain man—followed too often by the Catholic apologist—treats it as a clever but clearly absurd attempt to entitle the individual to think and do exactly as he chooses, irrespective of any warrant beyond his own whim, somewhat like Trotty Veck in Dickens' 'Chimes,' who tells his daughter what the bells say

[1] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 76. Cf. Freeman, *Authority*, 50 ("Individualism, pure and self-sustained, is not only to be dreaded, but abhorred as a monster . . ."!); Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 151.

[2] J. S. Mackenzie, *Elements of Constructive Philos.* (1917) 161–164. Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 18 ("Doch es bleibt tatsächlich die 'Rückkehr der Philosophie zum Objekt' als Gegenwartserscheinung"), 19.

[3] M. Sadler in *Christ and Human Need* (S.V.M.U.) 125.

[4] Fisher, *Hist. of Christian Doctr.* 5. Cf. J. K. Mozley in *Construct. Quart.* Sept. 1920, 425 ("But it is certainly true that people and movements which have thrown the whole religious weight upon the inner light in isolation from other things have come near to destroying Christianity").

to him, and meets her surprise by asking: "If I hear 'em, what does it matter whether they speak it or not?"

The natural prejudice against subjectivism and individualism enters, of course, pretty largely into the criticisms directed by modern Catholics of all types against Protestantism in general. Dissenters, said Newman in his Anglo-Catholic days, "are in grievous error, in their mode of exercising their private judgment, . . . because they do not use it in looking out for a teacher at all . . . those who despise the notion of a teacher altogether, are already wrong before they begin" their inquiries. "Scripture speaks of a certain pillar or ground of truth, as set up to the world . . .; dissenting teachers and bodies . . . assert there is no such authority to be found anywhere." [1] Wilfred Ward defines heresy as "private judgment which makes its choice without regard to authority." [2] "It is the root-and-branch individualism of Protestantism," writes Canon Rawlinson, "which is part of the trouble." [3] Of Schleiermacher, who exercised a profound influence on subsequent Protestant thought, he remarks: "The subjectivist trend of his thinking is clearly manifest, and has proved fruitful of unfortunate results. . . . Much of the new piety" (i.e. in post-Napoleonic times) ". . . was in its essence the subjectivist piety of Schleiermacher." [4] The general view of religion and religious authority expounded in the Lutheran Ritschlianism of Herrmann appears to Canon Rawlinson "to be lacking in objectivity." [5]

The traditional trust of Protestants in the authority of Scripture does not avail to exonerate them from the reproach of subjectivism. Catholic critics often write as if not a small part only, but virtually the whole, of Scripture were so obscure and ambiguous that an individual reader could not of himself properly understand it, and—further than that—as if the Protestant, when he encountered an obscure passage, scrupulously avoided consulting anyone else (any expert, for example—linguist, exegete, Church-teacher, or early Father) and insisted on interpreting the passage solely by virtue of his own unaided insight, even if that must mean nothing better than an ignorant guess.[6]

[1] Newman, *Private Judgment* (1841) 356: cf. Chesterton, *Superstitions of the Sceptic*, 2–6, 12 f.

[2] In *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 689.

[3] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 75.

[4] *Op. cit.* 64 f.

[5] In *Foundations*, 372 f.

[6] Thus Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 25 (the Protestant, appealing to the Bible, does not "mean that he stands by the Bible as interpreted by somebody else, as that would be, according to his notion, to give up his right of private interpretation"), 26 ("if a Catholic were to add: 'Is it not reasonable to suppose that the interpretation of the Bible by the whole body of Bishops of the Catholic Church, though disagreeing with your private interpretation, is the right one, and therefore more likely the Word of God?' the Protestant must answer: 'I do not agree, because that interpretation would not be *mine*' "), 28 ("Catholics do think to have life in the Holy Scriptures,

More particularly, it is the Protestantism *of modern times* that is declared to have fallen under the prevailing curse. "The Church," says Dr. Forsyth, "needs to recover not now from an Orthodoxy but from a Subjectivism in its spiritual cast and ideal, which, having lost the objective power that Orthodoxy did have, runs out into spiritual softness; and being subjective and therefore problematical, is not authoritative, and has no firm hand to lay on the age's passion, and no firm footing to stay its wavering doom." [1] "The habit," writes Canon Rawlinson, ". . . of seeking the reality of God primarily in the spiritual experience of individuals tends inevitably in the direction of subjectivism. The impression is sometimes conveyed that the modern Protestant believer regards God almost as though He were a personal possession." [2]

These repeated attacks on Protestant and particularly Liberal Protestant subjectivism have reference of course to the doctrine of the ultimacy of the Inner Light, for which we pleaded in the last chapter.[3] Insistence on the ultimacy of the internal standards in the acquisition of truth (as arising from a more immediate contact between man and God than can be attained through the so-called objective authorities) is thought to involve the repudiation, or at least the neglect and disuse, of all those objective authorities as unnecessary.[4] The Christian who avowedly takes his stand on the Inner Light, or—as he may term it—Private Judgment, or Reason (in the wider sense), is tacitly understood by his critics to be claiming complete self-sufficiency,

but do not thereby exclude authoritative interpretation, but . . . take it for their guide"), 30 ("Hence it appears how rash and dangerous is the principle of private interpretation, which emboldens every individual to prefer his own private view of any passage of Scripture to the solemn interpretation and decision of the whole body of Catholic Bishops of past and present time united to the See of Peter. Persons actuated by such pride cannot expect to be led by God unto truth"), 391 f (see above, p. 73); K. Vaughan in *Papacy and Bible*, 55 (similar); J. H. Bernard in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 176 f (see below, p. 148 n. 5); Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 496b (see above, p. 123). Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 188 f ("There is a great difference between the attitude of mind of one who looks for guidance only to his own inner light, or to his own powers employed upon the interpretation of Scripture, and of one who in addition has recourse to the teaching and usages of the Church as aids in the formation of his own judgment").

[1] Forsyth, *Authority*, 441.

[2] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 75: cf. Rawlinson's quotation (156) from Heiler (*Kathol.* 421 f) about modern subjectivism (see above, p. 74 n. 1).

[3] Thus, even the late Dr. H. T. Andrews could write: "Others find the basis of authority in the individual Christian conscience. Each man is endowed, it is maintained, with power to appraise the value of the different forms of religious teaching. . . . This theory breaks down because it is altogether too subjective and individualistic . . ." (*Chambers's Encyc.* iii [1923] 219b).

[4] Cf. Moulsdale in *Priest's Convention*, 68: ". . . protestants of the worst type, those in whom private judgment has been exercised to the abolition of all sense of authority."

such as has no need of any teacher, informant, or external guide. A Catholic critic once pencilled on the margin of a paper of mine: "the Catholic uses private judgment to accept authority, the Protestant to dispense with it." Wilfrid Ward says that a "critical difference between the philosophy which looks to Authority and that which looks only to reason lies in the former supplementing its own imperfect perceptions and interpreting them by the higher perceptions of others whom it regards as the pioneers of further conceivable evolution." [1] I doubt very much whether there ever existed believers in reason, private judgment, and inner light, who seriously refused to make any use of knowledge which was derivable only from other minds: if there did, their tribe must have been long extinct.[2] Wilfrid Ward speaks of "the theory of private judgment, long upheld by so many earnest believers, but now less and less defended in an unqualified form." [3] We would speak of it rather as more and more defensible when the right qualifications are made.

Before we proceed to state these right qualifications, there is one preliminary concession that has to be made. While it may be doubted whether any considerable person or sect ever really repudiated all external authority, yet there have been from time to time, on the part of some enthusiasts, exaggerations (for the most part in the rejection of the authority of *the Church*) which have given ground for the suspicion that they were willing to learn from no one. Luther, in the beginning, somewhat laid himself open to this charge.[4] Among the Continental Protestants, we are told, there were some who may have wished to become pure individualists, and who went so far as to belittle the Creeds. "They were the precursors of modern individualism in their dream that each man was intended by God to work out his creed from the Bible by himself, without human aid, paying no deference to the opinions of the past, yielding no respect to the experience of fifty generations of Christian life." [5] It is probable enough that extremists of this type were to be found here and there during the next two or three centuries.[6] In the eighteenth century in England, the inner light had "fallen into discredit through the extravagances to which it had

[1] In *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 688. Cf. Woodlock, *Modernism*, 3.

[2] Cf. Ward in *op. cit.* 679 f: "I suppose that no one now holds the crude private judgment theory, never consistently acted on, but which had its theoretical advocates from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth—the one-man-one-vote theory of the philosophy of belief;—the theory that the intellect of one man has as good a right to its opinion as that of another on every subject."

[3] *Op. cit.* 679.

[4] Moehler, *Symbolism*, 318–340; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 10.

[5] J. H. Bernard in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 176 f.

[6] See n. 2 above; and cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 360 f, 375–378, 413 f.

given birth."[1] Even a great thinker like Martineau was not always careful to refrain from over-statement or successful in avoiding illegitimate inferences.[2]

But to recognize and correct exaggerations is but to skim the surface of the problem. It may be a sufficient answer to some of the more loosely-worded criticisms, but it does not really touch the main issue. On that main issue, we have firstly to remind our readers of the stipulation we have already repeatedly made—that the ultimacy of the Inner Light does not for a moment mean (what it is often criticized as meaning) that our religious beliefs are purely human productions, evolved solely out of our own minds. The Inner Light is always thought of as the light of God, the presence of His Holy Spirit; and private judgment is carried back to God's own gift of reason—a gift, to our use of which He gives continual assistance in response to our love for truth and our prayer for His guidance. We agreed to call the Inner Light and Private Judgment subjective, only on the distinct understanding that this stipulation was admitted and remembered.[3] It is only in contrast with the external world and with other human minds than our own that these inward standards are subjective; and we lay stress on them here as the subjective factor in the appropriation of truth, not because they are everything, but simply because, though real and fundamental, they are frequently ignored or else given comparatively scurvy treatment. You can, if you like, dispense with a consideration of them, but only at the cost of dispensing with all philosophical treatment of the subject whatever. In contrast, however, to arbitrary imagination and atheistical solipsism, they may claim to have as much objectivity in them as our experience of sensible objects. Since atheism and solipsism are here beyond our purview, we have ventured to use the terms proper to the other comparison, trusting that our repeated explanations will prevent any misconception arising from this instance of the "sad incompetence of human speech." We have no objection therefore to our position being called 'subjectivism,' provided our explanation of the word be borne in mind. Nor do we repudiate the term 'individualism,' regarding it however as simply indicating the widely known fact that the individual, however much he live in society and be shaped by it, cannot

[1] Mark Pattison in *Essays and Reviews*, 291. Cf. E. Griffith-Jones in Peake's *Commentary*, 7b (on the vagueness and disagreements of the mystics).

[2] See the passages quoted from him by Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 677 f. Cf. Bruce's—largely unjustified—criticism of Martineau's position in his *Apologetics*, 342 f: "When a man happens to believe that he can do without an objective light of the world, he can afford to be very sceptical as to the existence of such a light,—nay, if he be in a small minority in maintaining the sufficiency of the inner light, he may be tempted to raise a mist of doubt about the sun that no alternative may be left but to trust in the guidance of the candle."

[3] See above, pp. 115 f, 117, 138 f, etc.

help—poor fellow—being in some sense the centre of his own universe, just as he cannot get away from his own shadow.[1]

But even this is nothing more than what has been already urged. It remains for us to meet the complaint that the ultimacy of the Inner Light—even admitting our objective interpretation of it—implies the neglect and disuse of all authorities that are objective in the more ordinary sense of the term. That complaint we meet by urging that the supposed implication of which it speaks is totally illusory. Not only is it obviously non-existent and impossible as a matter of practice; but it is also a complete non-sequitur as a matter of theory. It is quite erroneous to argue, as Catholics frequently do, that *they* wisely and humbly submit to Divinely appointed teachers, while the Protestant, in his foolish pride, refuses all teachers and trusts *exclusively* in his own fallible and individual private judgment. However true it may be that the Reformation abolished the exclusive authority of Rome and, despite its biblicism, eventually enthroned private judgment as the ultimate standard, yet the repudiation of all authoritative teaching has never been and is not now one of its principles:[2] while the picture drawn for us of the Protestant refusing to accept light from anyone else on an obscure passage of Scripture, on the mere ground that, if he accepted it, it would not be his own, is a piece of the purest caricature.[3]

The objective is real: it is the universe of God in which we find ourselves placed; it is a constant element in our experience. The natural craving of man for an external and objective, and also (if possible) infallible, guide[4] is indeed frequently a stubborn barrier to clear thinking: but it is so simply because it is the perversion of an instinct in essence right and healthy—the instinct namely which bids us seek the needful confirmation of our own conclusions, and test the rightness of our thoughts and feelings, by reference to that universally valid standard—the objective reality of things. Unless we were prepared to submit to such tests, we should have nothing to say in reply to those who regard truth and goodness as the mere chance preferences of each individual. Baron von Hügel tells us that a sceptical acquaintance for whom he had great regard "was wont, in his deeper moods, always to end by admitting with me the substantial unanswerableness of the argument that, if man did not somehow have a real experience of objective reality and truth, he—a creature apparently so contingent and subjective

[1] "Every being is his own centre to the universe, and in himself must one foot of the compasses be fixed to attain to any measurement: nay, every being is his own mirror to the universe" (E. B. Browning, 'Book of the Poets,' in *Works*, 635a)

[2] "It is no principle of the Reformation to despise authority" (Bernard in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 175). Cf. Dale, *Ultimate Principle*, 22 f (private judgment not thinking as you please); Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 137–140.

[3] See above, pp. 146 f n. 6.

[4] Inge, *Authority*, 3 f.

through and through—could never, as man actually does in precise proportion to the nobility of his mind, suffer so much from the very suspicion of a complete imprisonment within purely human apprehensions and values." [1] Our task therefore now is, having established the ultimacy and fundamentality of the Inner Light, not to treat the objective world as negligible (as we be slanderously reported, and as some affirm that we do), but to discover the true relationships between these two great existing things. It is a task we may not evade, however seasonable be the warnings as to its difficulty and danger.[2]

In endeavouring to perform it, we may avail ourselves of the analogy to religious inquiry afforded by the familiar process of learning in other fields. No objection to this analogy can be based on the fact that in religion there is always an element of the supernatural, of Divine revelation. For in the first place, we have in the supra-rational ultimates of philosophy, science, and the arts (all of which are well-recognized subjects of human investigation) something that is very analogous to the revealed in religion. Moreover, before any advantage can be taken of an alleged revelation, its credentials need to be examined: and this involves the employment of the normal and accredited methods of educational inquiry.[3] But in any case, the best justification we can have for using this analogy is that those who (like the Catholics) insist most on the supernatural, do not themselves hesitate to use it. They engage in *teaching* their religion: they *argue* in defence of it: they produce *evidences* for it. The content of religion is doubtless very different from the subject-matter of astronomy or medicine or art or education in good-manners: but all alike are instances of man learning the truth about the objective world of facts and values in which he lives.[4]

[1] *Construct. Quart.* Dec. 1920, 661.

[2] Cf. Forsyth, *Authority*, 85: ". . . our task is to preserve the reality of a religious authority while we change its locale, or its speech, or its procedure. We are crossing a heavy stream and we must not change our horse—though we may not land at the same spot where the old ford did . . ."

[3] Cf. E. Holmes in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1927, 490.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 112 f (". . . There need be no difficulty now in coming to an agreement, that the divinely-appointed methods for man's acquirement of secular and of religious knowledge are not so very dissimilar"); Wilfrid Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 687 f (". . . in the ultimate analysis not only of religious knowledge but of nearly all knowledge of what is objectively true, knowledge not merely of what is *consistent* but of what is *real*, it" [our *organon investigandi*] "is practically admitted to be the latter" [i.e. authority, rather than reason.] "The trust in conscience is, *mutatis mutandis*, paralleled to the assumptions made in applied mathematics or in physics. . . . The difference between such cases and the case of religion is that" we have not in religion the same universal consent that we have for the postulates of science); Rawlinson, *Authority*, 3 f ("It needs to be emphasised . . . that Christianity is a definite, historical, and positive religion, which *therefore requires to be taught*, both in theory and practice . . ." [Italics mine]), 10, and in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 85 (similar).

Now when we examine any typical example of learning, we cannot help seeing that the mind of the learner—with its apparatus of intuition, logic, moral sense, and any other powers it may possess of apprehending reality—is ultimate and fundamental to the learning-process, in a sense in which the statements of other persons are not. The latter may lend themselves to subdivision into a number of more or less co-ordinate sources of information, groups of authorities, embodiments of truth, and so on: but the learner's multiform faculty of apprehension does not form an item in this set of co-ordinates; it is rather related to them all in ways in which they are not related to one another. They, as well as it, are normally necessary for the acquirement of truth: [1] but it and they play different parts. It is the foundation; they are the superstructure. It is the camera with its lens; they are the light-rays from the field of vision. A foundation is necessary for a building, and there is only one place where a foundation can go, and that is at the bottom; but if we stop short with the foundation, we get no building. A camera is necessary for a photograph, and, for a given picture, there is only one place where the camera can stand; but if the light-rays from the visible objects before it are not allowed to pass through the lens into the camera, there will be no photograph. The similes, of course, are not perfect; but they are at least sound enough to show the entire consistency between the ultimacy of the Inner Light and the use of objective authorities, and the utter fallacy of arguing (as is sometimes done) as if the Inner Light could be reckoned as one in a list of co-ordinate sources of instruction, with which it could be compared and regarded as being in competition.[2]

It is, indeed, possible for the mental faculties of man to arrive at some measure of truth without the aid of any objective teacher, almost without the aid of anything objective beyond bare visible space. The best examples of this type of learning are the truths of geometry. The earliest geometricians had no text-books or teachers: yet by sheer cogitation they made some extraordinary discoveries in regard to the nature of space. Blaise Pascal was found as a boy—at the age of twelve—contemplating his quite independent discovery that the three interior angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles; and at the age of sixteen he wrote an original 'Traité de Coniques.' [3] Nor is it only

[1] Gladly we concede the plea of Henry Rogers (*Eclipse of Faith* [6th edn. 1855] 248) that the capacity to receive a revelation from God is not the same thing as receiving that revelation.

[2] E.g. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 5; Freeman, *Authority*, 33 f, 38, 49, 175–179, 184 f, 188–191, 194; Frere in *Congress-Report 1923*, 116 f; Sir H. Lunn in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1928, 10 f. Cf. Leckie, *Authority*, 23 f, 29.

[3] The stories are told in the opening pages of *Vie de Blaise Pascal* by his sister Gilberte.

the professional geometricians who have done this. We may recall Socrates' conversation with the slave in Plato's 'Meno,' wherein the slave—an entirely uneducated boy—is enabled, not by being told anything, but simply by being shown some diagrams and asked a series of questions, to evince quite a considerable amount of knowledge in regard to the areas of squares.[1] In the same category we may place every child's early discovery of the simple facts of space and distance, and the simple properties of his own body and other familiar objects. Similarly, in matters of religion and morals, we can—by prayer and meditation alone—learn some of the things God has to teach us. The Old Testament is full of records of God speaking directly to individual men: the call of Abram to leave the heathen surroundings of his homeland is a typical instance. Modern writers would probably describe these experiences in different language; but, unless unduly sceptical, they would have to represent many of them as direct communications from God to the human mind and conscience.[2] According to Paul, God had revealed to the Gentiles a certain amount of clear knowledge of Himself, and some of them—though they had been taught by no law-giver—yet had the work of the law written on their hearts and expressing itself in the approval or disapproval of conscience (Rom. i. 18–21, ii. 14 f). Evidence of such stray enlightenment is found in the history of foreign missions. "There are various revelations," says Newman, "all over the earth. . . . Such are the inward suggestions and secret illuminations granted to so many individuals; such are the traditionary doctrines which are found among the heathen, that 'vague and unconnected family of religious truths, originally from God, but sojourning . . . as pilgrims up and down the world, and discernible and separable from the corrupt legends with which they are mixed by the spiritual mind alone.' " [3]

But although such unaided discovery of truth is a real and distinguishable element in learning, and in some cases is of considerable extent, it is of itself far from sufficient. Lonely meditation might conceivably teach me that triangles on the same base and between the same parallels are equal in area: but it could never tell me the depth of the Pacific or the date of King Alfred or the time of my train to London. So too in spiritual things, man can of himself hear the voice of God within, he may learn to fear and love God and even to pray to

[1] Plato, *Meno*, 82–86.

[2] Cf. H. W. Robinson on 'The Psychology and Metaphysic of "Thus saith Yahweh" ' in *Zeitschrift für die alttest. Wissenschaft*, 1923, 1–15, esp. 10–15.

[3] Newman, *Developm.* 118. See the extraordinary case of the God-fearing and temperate Red Indian discovered by Brainard and the similar case of a woman in Central Africa—referred to by Horace Bushnell, *Nature and the Supernatural*, 343 f (ch. xiii).

Him: but what he learns in this way is altogether too little for his needs.[1]

Hence arises the constant necessity for those external and objective teachers, whose instruction is, as a matter of fact, always inextricably interwoven with our self-evolved knowledge from the very beginning of our conscious life. Throughout the long and varied process by which we grow in knowledge of the world and of all its many departments—botany, astronomy, geography, history, politics, philosophy, theology, and what not—we are constantly dependent on information which we have humbly to receive from the spoken or written word of others who are better informed than ourselves.[2] In all common matters of investigation we defer, and we ought to defer, to the judgment of the expert.[3] The same, of course, is true in our moral and religious education: here again we are very indebted to the minds of others generally,[4] in large part to those who have charge of us during our childhood and youth, but in a very special way to the religious geniuses of our own and of earlier days, whose exceptional insight gives them a peculiar title to our trust.[5]

Strictly speaking, the field within which our objective authorities are to be found is conterminous with the universe itself—in its twofold aspect of nature (as known through science) and humanity (as known

[1] "Individual experience by itself may well prove too narrow a basis to work on" (Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 377).

[2] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 50, 110 f, 112.

[3] Cf. W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 680 ("We all now believe in the authority of experts. We all believe . . . that the uneducated should accept the authority of the educated; children that of adults; laymen that of specialists in their own science; . . . I give these as obvious instances of an obvious principle on which it is needless to enlarge"), 685 (similar), 681 f (authority of the specially endowed pioneer), 691 (1); Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 366 f.

[4] Newman, *Developm.* 128 ("The only general persuasive in matters of conduct is authority; that is, when truth is in question, a judgment which we consider superior to our own"); Salmon, *Infall.* 53, 68; Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 374 (average man, if religious at all, bound to accept his religion on authority, being unfitted to work out a reconstruction for himself), 375 (Protestantism [or intellectualism] tends unduly to despise those who, like the proverbial charcoal-burner, accept everything on trust from a revered authority;—but does it?), *Authority*, 1 f (same as in *Foundations*, 374), 105 (". . . neither is there any solution of our problems to be found in a mere insistence upon Freedom without Authority").

[5] W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 683, 688 f (great differences in the religious endowment of different men), 691 (5); J. H. Bernard in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 178 f (traditional respect of Protestantism for knowledge and learning as against popular clamour and ignorant prejudice); Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 367 (". . . we must go to school with the saints, . . . in the religious as in other spheres there are experts, who as such are entitled to speak with authority"); Grubb, *Authority*, 7. The Roman Church anathematizes those who say "that the Divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and that therefore men ought to be moved to the faith solely by the inward experience or private inspiration of each man by himself" (*Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, can. 3 de fide [Mirbt 460 (38); Salmon, *Infall.* 482]).

through history, literature, and personal intercourse). Herein, at sundry times and in divers manners, is the Divine embodied and enshrined for our enlightenment and guidance: and terribly do we stand to lose if we neglect that world of creation and of life, in which God has not left Himself without a witness. We shall say no more here of the world of nature, not because God's self-revelation through it is small or insignificant, but because the recognition and interpretation of this are not strictly pertinent to a discussion of the issue between Catholicism and Protestantism. The broad realm of history, on the other hand, with which chiefly we shall be concerned, comprises at least three distinct and important subdivisions (Scripture, Church, life and teaching of Jesus Christ) to each of which separate consideration must be given later. We content ourselves for the moment with observing that from the experience of the race, the gathered stores of human wisdom, the writings and institutions whose value has been tested out in human experience, the seeker will expect to draw knowledge concerning the ways of God and help in the doing of His will such as he could never draw from lonely meditation and reflection.[1]

It will in all probability be generally agreed that none of these sources of light avail for us without the insight that comes from personal Christian experience,[2] and that it is the peculiar office of the Holy Spirit, as dweller in the innermost, to guide us into all the truth, by putting at our disposal the twin touchstones of reason and conscience, and thus controlling and directing our search. If in genuine and humble docility we suffer ourselves to be so guided, our own powers of discovery and apprehension will increase;[3] we shall be enabled to grow

> not alone in power
> And knowledge, but by year and hour
> In reverence and in charity.

Our burning desire to get at the truth will be for us one of the sure proofs of the Divine origin of our humanity—a gift, in fact, in the possession of which we are made true sons of the Lord of all. But, more than that, we shall with growing clearness discern in history the strivings of the Divine Spirit in human lives. We shall see God

[1] Cf. Martineau, *Essays*, iv. 117 (see below p. 156 n. 2); W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 680 (". . . individual should accept as in some degree authoritative the results of the reasoning of the race, and provisionally the authority of general consent; . . . The long experience of the race is to a great extent the basis of the authority of the educated (to whom its acquirements are known) over the uneducated . . ."), 682 (1); Leckie, *Authority*, 90–94, 222 f; Inge, *Authority*, 29 f; Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 277ab (see below p. 156 n. 2); Grubb, *Authority*, 7 f

[2] Cf. Grubb, *Authority*, v f.

[3] So W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 689 (". . . the lead of Authority makes reason itself fruitful . . .").

—winning, educating, befriending, inspiring, and using men, with infinite patience, self-sacrifice, and love, undeterred by repeated setbacks, by centuries of delay, by folly and sin running to appalling lengths, eternally pursuing His "immemorial plan" of entering into personal fellowship with His children and evoking their freely surrendered love and obedience.

It is, however, commonly assumed that any really candid admission of our dependence upon external and objective authorities is somehow inconsistent with the ultimacy of private judgment and the Inner Light. Authority, indeed, has been defined, by contrast with reason, as the sum-total of non-rational causes of belief.[1] This notion of inconsistency between reason and authority we can meet only with a direct negative: over against it we maintain that there is no incompatibility whatever between the fullest recognition of the ultimacy and fundamentality of the Inner Light, on the one hand, and the constant appeal to the judgment of authorities better informed than ourselves, on the other. "God has sanctioned and hallowed many forms and instruments of authority in the Church as in the world. The teaching of history, which is the sphere of His providence, seems to admonish us to learn from all, to give all their just place in our confidence, to be loyal to their dictates *according to our conscience*." [2]

We proceed to vindicate our consistency on this point by examining the typical and formal process of learning-from-authorities, and showing how, in four several ways, the ultimacy of the Inner Light is always exhibited throughout that process.

(1) It is clearly exhibited, in the first place, in the patent fact that every individual, in proportion as he has emerged into responsible

[1] So virtually Balfour, quoted in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 249b.

[2] Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 277ab (italics mine). Cf. Martineau, *Essays*, iv. 117 (1865) ("No doubt it must always rest with the individual reason and conscience to pronounce the personal verdict of true or false; but the pleadings on which they decide are fetched from the gathered stores of Christian and heathen wisdom, and epitomize the thought expended on the oldest and deepest problems; and, when seeming to flow immediately from a single mind, are rendered possible there only by a traceless myriad of influences infiltrating into it from earlier time"); Grote, *Plato*, ii. 508–510 (". . . A man is just as much a measure to himself when he acts upon the advice of others, or believes a fact upon the affirmation of others, as when he judges upon his own unassisted sense or reasoning . . ."); Inge, *Authority*, 4 f (". . . In accepting such information there is . . . no surrender of the individual judgment. . . . As for Mr. Balfour's use of the word" ['authority': see above, n. 1] ". . . I can see nothing in it but an inexcusable misuse of language . . ."; Theodor Siegfried in *Theol. Litzg.* 1922. 24. 533 ("Kern der Religion ist freilich das 'mystische' Erlebnis, das sich allenthalben entzünden kann, an der Gott erfüllten Persönlichkeit, an der profanen Geschichte und an der gerade von der protestantischen Theologie ungebührlich verachteten Natur. Der Wahrheitsanspruch der Religion findet seine Begründung nicht in einer rationalen Metaphysik, sondern in dem Wesen der Intuition als der einzigen Mittels, zu letzten Wahrheiten und Einsichten vorzudringen").

personal life, himself chooses, by an act or acts of private judgment, the authorities whom he will trust as the spokesmen of God. Setting aside the case of the little child, with which we shall deal in a moment, we urge that this autonomy of choice is integral to all learning of religious or other truth whatsoever: it is no perquisite of the Quaker or the Protestant or the Higher Critic; it is shared by these with the Fundamentalist and the Catholic. However firm or absolute your trust in this or that religious authority may be, it does not in the least degree alter the fact that the one who constitutes such an authority *your* authority is your very own self and not another. As a Protestant, then, I use my private judgment, not to dispense with authority, but to select it—which is exactly and precisely what the Catholic does when he prefers the authority of the Church to that of Galileo or Darwin or Wellhausen. However great my ignorance may be in regard to the subject I am investigating, I cannot learn about it from an informant unless I am first satisfied somehow that he is honest and competent. Even if I know nothing about the authorities for this particular subject and have to ask so-and-so who they are, it still remains myself and no one else that decides whether this so-and-so can be trusted to tell me of them aright. Illustrations are needless [1] where the fact is so obvious. Whether my guide has to be a chart of the heavens, a map, a work of science, a history-book, or a living voice, its authority for me cannot but rest on my own conviction of its trustworthiness. It is in fact a simple psychological impossibility to make anyone but one's self responsible for the choice of one's teachers and the acceptance of their teaching. As, however, the exercise of this autonomy is often unconscious, and therefore capable of being ignored or denied,[2] it becomes necessary to draw attention to its reality, and to claim the conscious exercise of it as a sovereign right.[3]

It is of course quite true that throughout life we are exposed to the pressure of a good many teachings and persuadings that we have not chosen. These fall into two classes, which in actual life shade off into one another, but which none the less lend themselves to distinct treatment in discussion, according as we think of ourselves as responsible or not responsible for the permanent effect we find that they tend to have upon us. In the former case, the admission of responsibility is an admission of the point now being urged, which is that the individual can choose—not who shall speak to him and who shall not—but who, when they speak, shall be trusted, and who distrusted. The latter case

[1] Salmon (*Infall.* 49) has a good one of an inexperienced woman having to choose an agent to manage a landed estate.

[2] See above, pp. 127 ff.

[3] Cf. Leckie, *Authority*, 17–21: also above, pp. 117 ff, 125 ff, where fuller evidence of the position here maintained is given.

is the normal position of the young child who in his earliest years inevitably trusts those whom he has not chosen. This fact is not infrequently urged in the interests of a Catholic or quasi-Catholic doctrine of authority.[1] But it has to be remembered that this complete quiescence of the selective faculty belongs only to that stage of infancy in which the child's personality may be said to be completely latent, having as yet hardly begun to emerge from the mental and spiritual matrix of the parental life.[2] In proportion, however, as this emergence takes place and independent personality develops, the child's acceptance of what his parents and elders teach him, less and less rests upon those accidents of family and social life which placed him under their care, and more and more rests on his personal belief that such people are worth trusting.[3] At an early age, a child begins to realize that his elders do not always agree in what they tell him, and to recognize differences even between the authority of one parent and that of another. He notices, for instance, and puts it on record, that, whereas his mother surpasses his father in knowledge of the right course to take in times of illness, yet for the exposition of ethical principles the equipment of his father is superior! As he grows up, he frequently meets—even during school-days—with those who, on one subject or another (probably enough, wireless and aeroplanes) know far more than his parents; and under such circumstances he does not hesitate, and ought not to hesitate, to let his beliefs on such subjects be guided by the former rather than by the latter. That is to say, he exercises increasingly a personal choice among the informants accessible to him, in proportion as he increasingly attains to a responsible personality of his own.[4]

Although the fact we are here urging is unfavourable to the Catholic and strict Anglican theories of authority, its truth is so familiar that we find virtual admissions of it in the writings of those who defend these theories. Newman, for instance, speaking of Augustinus, says: "he did not know what to hold, and was tempted to general scepticism. At length he found he must be guided by Authority; then came the question, Which authority among so many teachers? He cried earnestly to God for help, and at last was led to the Catholic Church." [5] But what else is this but to say that Augustinus, by virtue of the Inner Light,

[1] E.g. Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 373 f, *Authority*, 3: cf. W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 687 f.

[2] Cf. Horace Bushnell, *Christian Nurture*, 14–16, 57–63.

[3] Canon Rawlinson—perhaps only half-consciously—gives evidence of this important truth in the very attempt to describe the child's complete dependence. As children, he says, we believe our elders as "'authorities' who would not willingly deceive us, and of whose competence to speak *we have no doubt*" (*Foundations*, 373: italics mine).

[4] On the child as critic, cf. Pryke, *Modernism*, 26–33.

[5] Newman, *Developm.* 332.

chose to trust the Catholic Church? In his essay on 'Private Judgment,' written four years before his conversion to Rome, Newman, though he repudiates as unscriptural the exercise of private judgment on the constituent parts and details of religious instruction, yet openly admits as both scriptural and right the use of private judgment in discovering the true and duly-authorized teaching body.[1] He does not, however, seem to see that the same private judgment that has to discover for itself the true Church has already had to discover for itself the true Scriptures also, on which it is dependent for information as to the true Church's character. When Dr. Stanton observes, in regard to individual members of the Church, that "the discipline of a common life corrects their partialities, and teaches them to subordinate their private views, however valuable in their place, to the great articles of faith,"[2] his observation really amounts to this, that such Church-members learn to subordinate some private views to other private views, seeing that their very willingness to belong to the Church and to accept her Creeds comes fairly under that category.[3]

(2) The ultimacy of the learner's Inner Light is seen also in the fact that he always has to keep some kind of a check upon his teachers. As before, the total absence of this checking process is found only in young children and childishly ignorant persons, who—because of their ignorance—are not in a position to test the statements of others at all. For practical reasons it is best for the progress of very elementary pupils that their teachers should be invested with a kind of de facto infallibility. Yet as a child or youth progresses in his studies, he soon realizes that, in acquiring from his 'authorities' facts of history or astronomy or botany or whatever it may be, he must be able at least to detect misprints and correct obvious slips,[4] then to distinguish between their more and their less reliable statements, later on to choose between them when he finds one differing from another, and finally to be able definitely to pronounce some authority mistaken and to form an independent judgment of his own. I may know nothing at first hand about Central Africa; but that does not necessitate my swallowing every tall yarn even of substantially truthful explorers. I may have no technical knowledge of medicine; but that does not prejudice my right to disregard immoral or intemperate counsel, sup-

[1] Newman, *Private Judgment*, 350–355. The position of Wilfrid Ward is substantially similar: see *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 686 ("it may be said,—after all it is for the individual reason to find these authorities and to test their credentials. Yes; but . . ."), 690 (for many educated, practical men "their good sense and rudimentary knowledge may lead them up to the recognition of the expert guides, but no further"), 692 (similar of "the average unspeculative mind").

[2] Stanton, *Authority*, 200. See above, pp. 125 ff.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 110 f.

posing (what is happily unlikely) a physician should give it.[1] Nor is it otherwise with other studies. If a learner has no power within himself entitling him to dissent from his teacher when occasion requires, then eo ipso he has no right to choose one teacher rather than another: and if he has not that, he becomes the chance-victim of anyone, competent or incompetent, beneath whose influence he may happen to fall, and thus all true study on his part comes to a standstill. "Every historic authority, as Sabatier justly says, demands at once respect and criticism." [2] Authority has to vindicate itself by bringing out the agreement or correspondence between itself and thought, not by suppressing or contradicting thought.[3] But for this power to check and set aside, this right on occasion even to defy authority, how would any kind of mental or moral progress from age to age be possible? [4]

It is very widely agreed, in the abstract, that the Christian tradition is no exception to this general rule of the liability of all authorities to repeated examination, sifting, and correction. Dr. Stanton, for instance, following Butler, concedes that the "spiritually-illumined reason, which must, in any case, in the first instance, decide upon its" (authority's) "claims, must afterwards continue watchful lest it should be used in improper ways, and extended beyond its true sphere." [5] Canon Rawlinson again and again admits the need of sifting, testing, and criticizing the Christian tradition: in every generation, he says, some men are called to the vocation of teaching a new truth or rejecting an old; [6]

[1] Cf. M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 196 f.

[2] Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 277b: cf. Grubb, *Authority*, 10. As Rev. Josiah Crawley wrote to Bishop Proudie: "in this, as in all questions of obedience, he who is required to obey must examine the extent of the authority exercised by him who demands obedience" (Trollope, *Last Chronicle of Barset*, ch. xiii).

[3] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 233.

[4] Salmon, *Infall.* 53 ("the instructor must be a bad one, or his pupils of mean capacity, if they do not arrive at a point . . . when they feel that they may, without breach of modesty, criticise what he has told them, and perhaps improve on it"), 112 (". . . the whole progress of the human race depends on two things—human teaching, and teaching which will submit to correction"); Inge, *Authority*, 10 f (". . . The liberation of humanity from these chains" [horrible savage practices, mutilation, etc.] "has been the indispensable condition of progress and civilisation. And this liberation has been entirely brought about by asserting the right to question, criticise, and reject time-honoured customs which have been placed under sacrosanct authority . . ."); Grubb, *Authority*, 2 f (". . . It is defiance of such traditional authority that has won for us most of the liberties we now enjoy": Copernicus, Roger Bacon, and Galileo instanced); Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 17 f.

[5] Stanton, *Authority*, 88. J. H. Leckie (*Authority*, 114–122) rightly recognizes that there are in a prophet's utterances elements of differing value, and believes supreme authority to reside only in what the prophet utters by direct Divine revelation. But he omits to observe that it must rest with *the listener* to distinguish this element from the rest of the prophet's utterances.

[6] *Foundations*, 380; cf. 375 (". . . A stage is reached in the inner life of the spirit at which the individual claims, and is bound in the name of intellectual honesty to claim, the right to question, and, if need be, to deny, the validity of inherited and

he repudiates the view that there is a nucleus of stereotyped "doctrinal propositions which must be simply taken or simply left, and which are exempt from rational criticism, in a sense in which ordinary Christian teaching is not so exempt." [1]

It is not, of course, to be assumed that these Anglican writers here admit that such free investigation, if accurately pursued, would lead to the actual disproof of some article in the great historic creeds. The point is, however, that they recognize *in principle* the competency of the devout and duly qualified theologian of to-day to bring his criticism to bear, not only upon the subordinate details of Christian teaching, but upon the most central affirmations of the faith.[2] On the other hand, this is precisely what Catholics (and in a different way, Fundamentalists) refuse to allow. Whatever you may discover to be true, and however strong the grounds on which you regard it as such, you may believe it only on condition that the Church-rulers do not pronounce it inconsistent with the 'depositum fidei.' [3] "Although," wrote Descartes, "I consider all my conclusions based on very certain and clear demonstrations, I would not for all the world sustain them against the authority of the Church." [4] Newman, as an Anglican, had admitted the function of private judgment in finding the true Church, but even then he repudiated "the notion of gaining religious truth for ourselves by our private examination, whether by reading or thinking, whether by studying Scripture or other books": [5] as a Catholic he professed his willingness simply to endure patiently without arguing a stark contradiction between an agreed scientific demonstration and a statement of Scripture, should such contradiction arise.[6] He pressed strongly the necessity of accepting or rejecting the whole of the Catholic system; "reduction does but enfeeble, and amputation mutilate. It is trifling to receive all but something which is as integral as any other portion." [7] Just as it is good for a man to obey his conscience, even though it may be mistaken, so it is good for us to obey our ecclesiastical superior, even if he be mistaken.[8] Wilfrid Ward, indeed, speaks of the need that the individual reason should help to correct the details and particularly the application of agreed conclusions in science, history, and even

traditional dogma . . ."), 378 top. In *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* (92) he brings out the strength which such verification in experience gives to doctrines at first accepted on authority only.

[1] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 189; cf. 14 f, 17. Cf. also Dr. Gore's view of the need of *testing* the authoritative utterances of the Church (see above, p. 134 n. 7).

[2] We shall deal later with the consequent indefensibility of excluding a man from Church-fellowship on the ground of serious disbelief of something in the Creeds.

[3] See above, pp. 91 ff, and cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 464.

[4] Mahaffy, *Descartes*, 59.

[5] *Private Judgment*, 355: see above, p. 159 top.

[6] See above, p. 100.

[7] *Developm.* 154 f.

[8] *Op. cit.* 124 f (see above, p. 33 n. 2); cf. 348.

theology; yet he urges that in the case of most men it is unable to do this, and at any rate the theology in question is one "whose fundamental assumptions it accepts as authoritative." [1] "In the constitution of the Church," writes another Romanist, "there is no room for private judgment sorting essentials from non-essentials." [2] He who once puts himself under the guidance of Rome abandons all means of criticizing her doctrines or detecting error in them, should any exist.[3]

Observe now the gross and palpable inconsistency of taking, on the strength of an inward enlightenment, a great initial step, like accepting the Bible as the Word of God or Rome as the true Church (a step on the effects of which one's whole religious future depends), and thereafter refusing to use that same inward enlightenment to check, sift, and criticize detailed biblical or Roman doctrines, because—forsooth!—it is an unreliable guide. So to the Fundamentalist I say: if, as you declare, I have no gift of judgment that entitles me to pronounce the Creation-story in Genesis unscientific and untrue in point of fact, or to deny that God enjoined the massacre of the Canaanites, then a fortiori I cannot trust myself to follow or accept any of your eloquent arguments for the infallibility or even the authority of Scripture. And to the Catholic I say: if, as you argue, my private judgment is such a poverty-stricken instrument that it does not warrant me in believing, as against the Church, that our Lord did not institute seven Sacraments, or that religious persecution is un-Christian and immoral, then a fortiori I certainly have not sufficient intelligence to yield to your persuasive pleas for submission to Rome. The throat that is expected to be able to swallow the camel ought not to be pronounced incapable of negotiating the passage of the gnat.[4]

To establish or to admit the right of the learner to test every objective authority is not of course to say that any particular objective authority must be mistaken in some point or other; but it does at least establish the abstract *possibility* of mistake, i.e. it rules out absolutely the *necessary infallibility* of that authority. In no single study is any teacher, however great and wise and indispensable, regarded by progressive pupils as being infallible, i.e. exempt from criticism and from the *possibility* of

[1] W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 689–692 (see quotation from 690 above, p. 159 n. 1).

[2] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 257a.

[3] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 59 f.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 53 f; Stanton, *Authority*, 15 ("It is impossible that he" [man] "should evade a measure of responsibility for first choosing the authority to which he will submit. And it is difficult to see by what right responsibility can be made to cease there, if he has the means of testing the truth of the pronouncements which the authority makes"), 157 ("Our probation . . . will not consist only in the process by which we choose or refuse an infallible guide, and then, after the guide has been chosen, cease for ever. It will continue so long as there is possibility of progress in faith and spiritual knowledge"); Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 185 f.

correction on their part. A pupil does not consent to learn—nor ought he to consent to learn—on any other conditions.[1] The presupposition that the ultimate authority attaches to the Divine light within (in our choosing and subsequent testing of informants) is not indeed inconsistent with the actual inerrancy (in experience) of this or that informant—nay, a great deal of what informants tell us (including a great deal of traditional lore) receives confirmation and consequent increase of weight as a result of the testing process.[2] But the supposition in question *is* inconsistent with any informant's a priori infallibility. This is a vital point in our argument; but there is no need to labour it, as it is sufficiently patent. Let the reader judge for himself whether it is possible to escape this conclusion, without shutting one's eyes to the psychological and philosophical facts which we have passed in review. Authority—trustworthy authority—is not the same thing as infallibility: [3] the former we need, and may have in abundance—the latter, however much we may think we need it, does not exist and therefore is not to be had.[4]

The total logical collapse of the Roman theory of papal infallibility is well exemplified in Catholic discussions of the question as to how a heretical Pope would be dealt with. Such an 'extra-constitutional crisis' "might arise were a pope to become a *public* heretic, i.e., were he *publicly and officially* to teach some doctrine *clearly* opposed to what has been defined as *de fide catholicâ*. But in this case many theologians hold that no formal sentence of deposition would be required, as, by becoming a *public* heretic, the pope would *ipso facto* cease to be pope." [5]

[1] Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 182 f ("The pursuit of truth is a high endeavour in which no fellow mortal can be more to us than a brother. Older and wiser a brother may be, one of whom to ask aid, one able and willing to give it, not one, however experienced and wise, to claim mere submission . . .").

[2] Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 16; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 15, and in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 91 f. For this reason we should not wish to quarrel with Newman's language (in *Gramm.* 232) about the great generalizations of science and outlines of history being not mere probabilities, but certain truths (see above, p. 96 n. 1).

[3] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 109 ("But in what subject in the world is it dreamed that we have got to choose between having infallible teachers, or else having no teacher at all?"); J. H. Bernard in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 172–176; Leckie, *Authority*, 56–62, 64, 68.

[4] Cf. W. N. Clarke, *Outline of Christ. Theol.* 384 ("We often fancy . . . that nothing but what is perfect can come from God, and that therefore the Holy Spirit can have no share in imparting partial and imperfect views of truth. But this is a sad misjudgment. God is so great that he can make much of imperfect agencies. His Spirit can have a helpful share in imperfect works"); Salmon, *Infall.* 280; Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 170 ("The demand for infallibility is one which, in human life, it is impossible to gratify. All truth here must have an element of relativity and imperfection"); Inge, *Authority*, 7 f (". . . Infallibility is a category which men cannot use. What guarantee can we have that any authority is infallible? It may speak in very dictatorial tones, but that is no proof of divine inspiration . . ."), 18; Grubb, *Authority*, 8; and see below, p. 230 n. 3.

[5] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 799a (italics of English words mine).

"The pope himself, if *notoriously* guilty of heresy, would cease to be pope because he would cease to be a member of the Church." [1] Now in order that this procedure might be carried into effect, it would be necessary to decide whether—and if so, when and how—a suspected Pope *had* actually become a public and notorious heretic. These questions would certainly be matters of dispute. On *whose* judgment would the decision of them depend? To *whom* must his heresy be "clear," in *whose* opinion "notorious"? Obviously not that of the Pope himself—for if guilty, he could not be expected to pass sentence of condemnation and deposition on himself. If we say, on the judgment of the cardinals, or on that of a General Council, what is this but to exalt their authority above that of the Pope, and so abandon the orthodox theory that the Pope's authority is above theirs? To get out of the difficulty by saying that in such a case the Pope would automatically have already ceased to be Pope, barely saves the letter of the Vatican decree, by a legal refinement which reduces its plain meaning to an absurdity. In fact, the very admission that 'extra-constitutional crises' of this kind are conceivable possibilities in the history of the papacy is a virtual surrender of the transcendental claims advanced on its behalf.

(3) So far we have been considering the general right to criticize and check those on whose superior knowledge we are dependent, and the special exercise of this right in the rejection of any authoritative dictum which, whether we can demonstrate the root of its error or not, we can yet see conflicts plainly with something we know to be true. There is, however, another special form of this general right to check; and that is, the assumption—whenever we trustingly receive a statement on authority—that we could, if time and opportunity allowed, travel over our teacher's ground, weigh up his reasons, and arrive by ourselves at his conclusions. That is to say, his statements, though authoritative and actually (so far as we are concerned) unverified, are yet *potentially verifiable*. Suppose, for instance, that I take it on trust from Simon Newcomb that the moon is 238,800 miles distant from the earth, or from J. B. Bury that Constantius died at York on 25 July, 306 A.D., I do so only on the tacit understanding that, had I time and opportunity to go over their calculations, I should be able to reach, and should reach, the same results. Medical students "arrive at a point when their beliefs rest on a better foundation than their teacher's word; when they are able to verify for themselves the things which they at first accepted from him with meekness and docility." [2] Doubtless it may be urged that the supposition of a personal

[1] Wilhelm in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 261a (italics mine): cf. *id.* in *op. cit.* iv (1908) 426b, 435a (similar): also Hase, *Handbook*, i. 272, 277 f; Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 191 n. 2. [2] Salmon, *Infall.* 53. Cf. M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 196 f.

verification is on many occasions of learning sufficiently remote: doubtless too, it may often be possible for us to verify things that we could never have discovered by ourselves.[1] This however does not affect either the fact of potential verification or the duty of actual verification, in the interests of progress, up to the limit of our powers.[2] This fact and this duty being unquestioned in the case of the sciences, the presumption is that they are also present in the learning of religious truth; and this means that the Christian Church must not only make assertions, but must offer proofs.[3]

It is important to observe that, whenever such verification is carried out or thought of, the ultimate standard by which the truth of any statement is to be tested is never the pronouncement of some infallible teacher, but always some phase of the universe of objective reality. Wilfrid Ward happily illustrates this from the inception and growth of vision in the evolution of the animal kingdom, as giving creatures a sense of a new and vast world. "Dim and inaccurate though that sense was—for example, in the earthworm, with its eyespots—from the first it had the claim of Authority." [4] For ourselves, the broad generalizations of geography or of any other science, of which we daily make use as true without personally verifying them, can be so relied on only on the supposition that multitudes of men are constantly testing them by comparison with the world itself, that consequently any gross error would inevitably be brought to our knowledge, and that minor adjustments and corrections are being continually made and thereafter embodied in normally accessible sources of information.[5] In astronomy, we do need an infallible astronomer: human and fallible astronomers will not suffice, since the stars are still there. We do not need—at least we certainly have not got—infallible historians: fallible historians can suffice us

[1] W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 688 (instances logarithms and theory of gravitation).

[2] Salmon, *Infall.* 112. Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 367 ("we must begin by doing good actions suggested to us by 'the legislator,' even though our actions be not, properly speaking, virtuous, until rationalized by that insight into the principle underlying them which only subsequent reflection can give"), 376, 377, 378 (". . . It should be the individual's aim . . . to appropriate and make his own, in so far as he may, the whole complex fact of the Christian life as historically manifested" etc); Grubb, *Authority*, 8 ("Outward Authority is but a means through which an Inward Authority may become the guide of his life"). Iverach (H.*E.R.E.* ii [1909] 249b) points out (against Balfour) that even customs, traditions, etc. "have been the products . . . of beings . . . who have been implicitly rational from the beginning."

[3] Salmon, *Infall.* 116.

[4] W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 681 f.

[5] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 67; Iverach in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 250a (nature as the objective authority for science. ". . . The value of the generalizations of science lies in the fact that they represent nature, and that they may be verified in the processes and in the facts of nature"); Forsyth, *Authority*, 448; D'Arcy in *Anglic. Ess.* 38 f (a good statement).

because the original documents, such as they are, are still accessible. Precisely the same general scheme holds good in religion and morals. God is still in His Heaven; His love still attends us; His laws still control us; His world is still our home.[1] There are real objective standards of truth, of beauty, and of goodness, ever available to regulate our belief and our conduct.[2] If, through our frailty and sin, we stumble in our quest and go wrong in our calculations, what better corrective do we need than simply God Himself and the objective truth of things—His great universe of reality with which we are ever in touch and by which we can ever test our findings? Not a timid clinging with half-shut eyes to some provisional statements of truth, supposed to be final and infallible and buttressed by the excommunication of all who do not similarly cling to them, but rather a confident and repeated self-commitment to the universe and its Divine Ruler, to the light of His leading in the Inner Witness of mind and heart—this, I say, is the only final standard of verification, the only final corrective of our errors, the only real guarantee of our ultimate arrival at Truth.

(4) Finally, the ultimacy of the Inner Light in the process of learning from authorities is evinced by the fact that, in the last resort, it is the individual alone who can satisfy himself as to when and where he has found the truth. At the end of the transaction, he and he alone must decide whether what his teachers have given him rings true, bears the royal stamp, looks like the other coins of the currency, and is likely to pass in the market of life and experience. Granting our need of a Divine revelation, the revelation is no revelation to us unless it be recognizable as such. It may be embodied in a life, an utterance, a book, a tradition. But we have got to investigate and interpret the embodiment, and to see that what it embodies *is* a revelation from God. We may need the help of others in doing this: but at bottom it must be ourselves that do it.[3] And we do it on the strength of the Inner Light which enables us to know when we have found the truth. Against the view that the ultimate authority is the inner light of the

[1] Dale, *Ultimate Principle*, 23–30, 36 f. Forsyth is certainly right in urging (*Authority*, 90–93, 112 f, 120–123, 171 f, 448) that theology does not create its own certainty, but derives it from the great objective datum with which it deals, viz. God and Truth: hence alone the justification for missionary enterprise. I find it hard, however, to follow him in the distinction he draws between 'appropriating' and 'verifying' central things (*op. cit.* 378, 381). Here, as elsewhere in the treatise quoted, the antithesis seems mainly verbal.

[2] On the objectivity of moral values, see W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 683 (the theist "holds conscience to be a new and dim perception of reality, as *prima facie* itself an authority which should be acted on, . . ."); H. G. Wood in *Expos.* Apl. 1920, 299 f; Rashdall in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1921, 452; E. S. Brightman in *Journ. of Relig.* July 1921, 370 f; Grubb, *Authority*, 21.

[3] Cf. Mrs. Gaskell, *North and South*, ch. 28: "But suppose it was truth double strong, it were no truth to me if I couldna take it in."

mystic (in the broad sense of this term), it has been urged that the mystics, besides being often indefinite and sometimes morbid, are also often in disagreement with one another; and so the question is asked: Who shall judge between them? The answer is, not the Church, nor any "atmosphere of objective religion": [1] it can be only—the mystically minded questioner himself.[2] Newman remarks that, as soon as it was suggested—in regard to a number of passages in Psalms, Job, and Lamentations—that they referred to the Roman doctrine of Purgatory, "all other meanings would seem tame and inadequate." [3] We differ from him on the point of exegesis; but his words well describe the way in which the conclusion of a search is appreciated. We do not rest content with our treatment of a problem until we have found a solution which makes all other solutions seem tame and inadequate. But it is only the Inner Light that can tell us when that point is reached.[4]

The doctrine of the ultimacy of the Inner Light has thus been shown to be perfectly consistent with our need of and our trust in many external and objective authorities. It claims, however, that in all our learning from these authorities, in all our search for the witness God has left of Himself, in sifting the data of science, in interpreting the message of history, and in appraising the religious and moral teaching of others—the ultimacy of the inward test is visible in our necessary choice of whom to follow, our right to check and criticize and on occasion to dissent, our potential ability to verify what we take on trust, and finally our monopoly of the right to say when and where we have found the truth.

[1] E. Griffith-Jones in Peake's *Commentary*, 7b.
[2] Cf. Newman, *Gramm.* 352 (quoted above, p. 129).
[3] Newman, *Developm.* 420.
[4] Cf. Freeman, *Authority*, 27, 30; Macnaughton in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1927, 347, 356.

CHAPTER IX

THE MARGIN OF UNCERTAINTY

It might seem at first sight as if the ultimacy and Divine origin of the Inner Light, supposing them to be true in point of fact, ought to render the individual, so endowed and enlightened, infallible. Believers in the Inner Light have indeed been known to claim infallibility on this very ground.[1] It is not easy to demonstrate, directly and absolutely, that such a claim on the part of any particular individual is false. The fact that he disagrees with a great community like the Roman Church, which claims infallibility for herself, would not necessarily prove him to be mistaken: for she does not profess to believe in the individual's Inner Light in at all the same sense as he does, and besides that, *her* infallibility can be disproved on independent grounds. But his disagreement with many others who believe that they possess the same Inner Light as himself, has a very important bearing on his claim. For it would indeed seem that at least all those who feel sure that they are guided in this way ought to be infallible, and therefore in complete agreement with one another.[2] Nay more, those who, like ourselves, believe that Catholics and Fundamentalists are just as really guided by the Inner Light as Quakers are, might well expect that not only Quakers, but all sincere Christians (not to mention sincere adherents of other religions), ought to be infallible and consequently unanimous in matters of religion. Nothing however could very well be more patent than the innumerable differences of belief among religious people, whatever theory of authority they may hold. Conscientious men differ widely from one another on questions of practical ethics:[3] higher critics differ on the literary and historical problems of Scripture: theologians differ on points of doctrine. The existence of these differences amounts to a de facto disproof of infallibility. Probably even Catholics would admit this of themselves, except in regard to the Church's dogmas: Protestants admit it frankly.[4]

[1] See Braithwaite, *Beginnings of Quakerism*, 109, 271, 277, 505; Inge, *Authority*, 18 (Isaac Penington).

[2] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 31 f: "Objectors also say that everyone has the assistance of the Holy Spirit that he may interpret the Bible rightly. But if this were so, people would agree and not contradict each other in their interpretation of Scripture"; etc.

[3] Cf. R. M. Jones, *Conscience*, 39, 72 f; Grubb, *Authority*, 18 f.

[4] The reproach sometimes levelled by Catholics at Protestants, to the effect that the latter, while denying infallibility in the Pope, attribute it to each one of themselves, is thus a pure travesty.

This admission of fallibility, and the crowd of disagreements which makes it a necessity, have been constantly acclaimed by Catholics as the plain and simple demonstration of the utter hollowness of the Protestant case. "The Protestant Churches . . . are only a multitude of warring sects whose confused voices but protest their own insufficiency, whose impotence almost atones for their sin of schism by the way it sets off the might, the majesty, and the unity of Rome." [1] In particular, it is the Protestant doctrine of private judgment—what we have called the ultimacy of the Inner Light—that is singled out for special reproach as inconsistent with the glaring facts of disagreement and fallibility. Not only has that argument been urged by Catholics against Protestantism in general; [2] but it has also been urged by the stricter Protestant orthodoxy (now represented by Fundamentalism) against the Liberal and critical approach to the New-Testament Scriptures.[3]

Now, however grievous such discrepancies and such fallibility may be,[4] it is not the slightest use trying to mend our case by simply affirming that we possess an infallibility which we do not and cannot possess. The endeavour will be made in a moment to show why it is that the possession of the Inner Light does not make the possessor infallible: but before doing that, we must observe that the mere fact that we have eventually to confess ourselves fallible does not make it a reasonable proceeding to select (on grounds that are really all the time subjective) some particular book or creed or institution or piece of history, and then declare that to be an infallible and complete objective deposit of truth. All experience has its subjective as well as its objective qualification: and if you insist on striking out the subjective qualification, you simply strike out the experience as well. If you wish to keep the experience and understand it truly, you have no choice but to allow for the subjective conditions, and endeavour to see exactly what they imply. We have in the preceding chapters taken account of the subjective element in religious experience: we have seen that it does not contradict or threaten our belief in the reality of the objective world or of Divine guidance, but that it does prove the impossibility of finding and trusting an infallible objective authority, except by tacitly assuming our own infallibility, which ex hypothesi we may not do.[5]

[1] So Fairbairn (*Cathol.* 153) puts the Roman view.

[2] So Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 48: "those Protestants who hold that they are assisted by the Holy Spirit . . . by a strange inconsistency do not consider themselves to be infallible; for they admit that they are liable to err, liable to contradict themselves, and liable to contradict each other."

[3] See, e.g., Henry Rogers, *Eclipse of Faith* (6th edn. 1855) 342 f, 346 f, 349, 354, 357.

[4] Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 174–176.

[5] See above, pp. 126 f, 162 f. Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 55, 69, 74 (lack of infallibility "seems to Roman Catholics an unsatisfactory state of things, and they look

As a matter of fact, it is quite easy to account rationally for the margin of uncertainty, out of which our errors and disagreements spring, without surrendering either the Divine origin or the ultimacy or the practical effectiveness of the Inner Light. Its cause is to be sought in what we may call the 'personal factor,' present in each of us and special to each of us. This personal factor consists simply of each individual's whole nature, as it is at any particular moment of inquiry —the multifarious sum-total of his characteristics. As such it is the product of a large number of prevenient conditions—nationality, ancestry, parentage, period and place of birth, surroundings of early life, personal influences operative then and later, physical health, education, reading, companionships, and experiences of every kind—not omitting, of course, the formative influence of the Christian Church [1] —and (interacting with all these) the free choices constantly being made and affecting physical, psychological, intellectual,[2] moral, and religious life, and lastly the more or less set character so developed. Just as no two human faces are exactly the same, so no two characters are exactly the same. Every man's personal factor makes him a peculiar being, different in greater or in less degree from all his fellows. It is impossible for a man to escape from the modifying influence of his personal factor: the only way of escaping from it would be to escape from experience altogether. Not only can it not be eliminated; but it cannot either be fully controlled or exactly measured and allowed for (not even in oneself, still less in one's neighbour). It eludes all attempts at precise compensation or adjustment. And—what is the important point here—it affects, shapes, qualifies, modifies, determines, and limits our experiences at every stage. Every human experience, in the very widest sense of that term, is in part at least made what it is by conditions peculiar to the mind of the experient.

Consider first the limiting and qualifying effect of the personal factor in the case of vision. Each individual has his own peculiar series of pictures of the visible world around him. That series is made what it is by his bodily movements and successive positions, the successive opening and shutting of his eyes, the distance from which he looks at objects, his angle of vision and special perspective, the keenness or dimness of his eyesight, his sensitiveness or blindness (partial or total) to colour, and

about for some tribunal which shall give to any question that may be proposed answers absolutely free from risk of error. But how can we eliminate risk of error from the process of finding this tribunal, or, indeed, of determining whether it exists at all?").

[1] Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 194; Oman, *Vision*, 175.

[2] Forsyth (*Authority*, 319) is, of course, perfectly right in urging that the private judgment of a man in regard to a subject he has not studied is worth very little in comparison with that of a man who has (cf. *ibid.* 335: "Criticize your competency as well as your ancestors and your superiors").

even his mental habits of attention and observation and his technical knowledge concerning this or that class of objects.[1] All these conditions make up his personal factor so far as vision is concerned. The resultant factor is quite peculiar to himself; no one else has exactly the same factor: and its effect is to make his visual experience different from that of any of his neighbours. The difference will manifest itself, not only in his ability to supplement the visual experience of others and his readiness to have his own supplemented by theirs, but also in his occasional disagreement with others as to some detail which has been visible to both. Two persons, for instance, looking at a vase of flowers from different corners of a room, will probably agree in a large number of general facts concerning it: but, beyond a certain degree of detail (as to the number, size, position, colour, etc. of the blooms and their component parts), they will begin to differ, because they are looking from different distances and angles and with slightly different kinds of eyes: and it will not be difficult for one to feel sure about something, while the other disagrees with him with equal confidence. Yet the invariable presence of this (as we consider it, comparatively small) margin of uncertainty, which makes our vision in its finer details inexact and misleading, does not prevent it revealing to us a real external world and revealing it reliably enough for the manifold practical needs of our daily life.

Nor is it essentially otherwise with hearing. Our hearing is limited and sometimes defective and even deceptive, because our ears are necessarily ears of a particular kind, functioning at any particular moment under special conditions of distance, direction, and other acoustic advantages or disadvantages. How often have we found ourselves differing from our friend in regard to precisely what was said by some third person! And yet we do not hesitate to rely constantly on our powers of hearing as a true and serviceable index to real sounds.

But the modifying and limiting effect of the personal factor is by no means confined to the physical senses. It is equally observable in mental and higher processes. The fact that a peculiar stamp is given to a man's mental operations—his opinions, beliefs, and convictions, his style of argument, his principles of conduct, and so on—by his own personal character, temperament, and education, must be perfectly familiar to us all. What is true of visible objects and audible sounds is also true of the external world generally. No one of us regards his own knowledge of it as either exhaustive or infallible, or as never needing to be supplemented or corrected by the knowledge of others. In scientific observation and theory, the possibility of frequent test and verifica-

[1] A connoisseur of bird-life, for example, will be able to *see* features in birds at a distance which another man with equally good physical eyesight will be unable to see.

tion enables a high level of certainty to be attained: yet even so, there is a margin of doubtfulness due to the special limitations of each investigator; and this margin inevitably gets overgrown with the disagreements of experts. In history it is much the same. "But inasmuch as 'history never repeats itself,' historical conclusions, unlike those of the physical sciences, are unverifiable. They can never be subjected to the test of experiment, and consequently they can never be 'proved.' They represent the individual historian's guess at truth—a guess made, of course, only after weighing and estimating the evidence by the best methods available; but still at best the intuition of an individual, and as such impatient of objective tests; a probable judgment, not a 'scientific' certainty. What we have ventured to call the margin of ambiguity can never, therefore, be entirely eliminated; and this margin is necessarily at its maximum where . . . the available evidence is fragmentary and disputable." [1] Despite all uncertainty, however, we do, as a matter of fact, know a good deal about the history of past times. Of our knowledge of truth generally we may say that, while our personal characteristics enter very considerably into our views and opinions and have much to do in making them what they are,[2] yet this does not prevent our acquirement of a very considerable amount of real objective truth.[3]

Now on what grounds should we be justified in doubting that the same general limitations are present in our moral and religious growth? Divine guidance is always conditioned by the human subject on which it acts. Our vision of the infinite God and our detailed judgments about His nature and His will cannot help being subject to the limits of our finite intelligence. The cupfuls we take from the great ocean of truth cannot help being but cupfuls,[4] and cannot help assuming the shape of each man's cup. The personal factor enters into every man's creed, whether he believes with the majority or with a minority: it affects his reading, not only of every external witness to Divine Truth, but also of the most basic authority we have, the witness of God's Spirit within us. That witness indeed cannot contradict itself, but—as received and interpreted by us—must necessarily bear the marks of our own personal

[1] Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 384 f. Cf., on the probable and non-demonstrative character of history, Salmon, *Infall.* 63 f.

[2] Cf. Newman, *Gramm.* 366–369.

[3] Cf. Newman, *Gramm.* 304 ("Shall we say that there is no such thing as truth and error, but that anything is truth to a man which he troweth? and not rather, as the solution of a great mystery, that truth there is, and attainable it is, but that its rays stream in upon us through the medium of our moral as well as our intellectual being; . . .?"), 356 (". . . Not as if there were not an objective standard of truth; but that individuals, whether by their own fault or not, variously apprehend it"), 369.

[4] Cf. Phillips Brooks, *Lectures on Preaching*, 49: "Our new Christian experience only slowly realizes that it is but one part of the universal Christian life."

appropriation of it.[1] When it is said that theology is largely dependent on the spirit of the time,[2] what is meant is that it is largely dependent on the personal factors of the most representative individuals, who lay hold of truth each in his own peculiar way.[3] In laying hold of it, men sometimes obscure and distort it, and thus land themselves in error, and that not only through limitation of knowledge, but also through imperfection of motive and the wrongful dominance of human passions.[4] As Athanasius well urged in his treatise 'Concerning the Humanization of the Word,' a good life, and a pure soul and mind, and virtue after the manner of Christ, and an imitation of the saints, are necessary pre-requisites for learning about the Word of God and understanding the teaching of the saints about Him.[5] But errors exist to be overcome, and the overcoming of them is the way to truth. "To learn through error is our lot, both Churches and men. Therefore it is essential to a reverent faith, on the part of both, while believing that God's Spirit will not fail us, to avoid the presumption of believing that we shall never fail God's Spirit." [6]

Here then we have, created by the personal factor, a margin of uncertainty—broad or narrow as the case may be—an element of fallibility, which accounts rationally for men's errors and disagreements, without in any way upsetting our prior analysis and theory as to the nature and seat of authority. No doubt its existence ought to make all

[1] Cf. O. W. Holmes, *Professor at the Breakfast Table* (ed. 1887) 184 f ("Do you know that every man has a religious belief peculiar to himself? Smith is always a Smithite. He takes in exactly Smith's-worth of knowledge, Smith's-worth of truth, of beauty, of divinity. And Brown has from time immemorial been trying to burn him, to excommunicate him, to anonymous-article him, because he did not take in Brown's-worth of knowledge, truth, beauty, divinity. He cannot do it, any more than a pint-pot can hold a quart, or a quart-pot be filled by a pint. Iron is essentially the same everywhere and always; but the sulphate of iron is never the same as the carbonate of iron. Truth is invariable; but the *Smithate* of truth must always differ from the *Brownate* of truth"); also J. M. Thompson in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1919, 240 (". . . at no point in the development of Christianity has Christian faith been the simple acceptance of the person of Jesus, any more than of his miracles, but . . . the believer has always brought something with him, and that something not the same. . . . Christian faith is never merely receptive, but also creative: it makes what it finds. The idea is a familiar one, but it has been used chiefly to depreciate faith as subjective and self-centred; it ought to be welcomed and given its proper place in Christian apologetic").

[2] Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma* (Eng. trans.) i. 9.

[3] This is well brought out by Lecky (*Rationalism*, ii. 98 f). Similarly Paterson (*Rule of Faith*, 11–13) urges that the intellectual disagreements between Romanists and Protestants are subordinate to their prior convictions regarding the essence of Christianity.

[4] So Salmon (*Infall.* 285), who continues: "for it is not wonderful that the Holy Spirit should not completely clear from error the minds of those whose hearts He does not completely clear from sin." Cf. G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light*, 47 f.

[5] Athan. *Incarn.* lvii.

[6] Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 277a: cf. Inge, *Authority*, 19.

of us who see it cautious and humble in attacking the conclusions and arguments of those who differ from us, seeing that the cause of the disagreement may sometimes lie in our own limitations rather than in the obliquity of our neighbour's vision. And it ought to make us more than ever eager and anxious to be taught about the objective truth of things—the world of facts and the world of moral and other values.[1] Yet when all such qualifications have been admitted, it still has to be maintained, not only that these objective worlds of truth and reality do exist, but that we can and do attain to a real and reliable knowledge of them.[2] We may have the treasure in very earthen vessels; but that does not alter the fact that what we have is the real treasure. Why should religious knowledge be the one field in which the limitation and fallibility of our minds are supposed to vitiate the process of our learning and allowed to sap our trust in the accessibility of truth? To deny infallibility is not to deny knowledge, or even certainty. The point is that, despite the margin of uncertainty, we have through our inward spiritual powers—as through our powers of seeing and hearing —such measure of knowledge, light, and certainty as is sufficient for our daily need; [3] and we have no right or reason to demand more.[4] We have got to do our best with that measure of truth that is within our compass: and, granted that we are doing our honest best, we need not be afraid of sometimes coming to conclusions which afterwards we may learn to have been partly or even wholly mistaken, nor need we be ashamed of having done so.[5] The risk of error naturally concerns for

[1] Cf. Grubb, *Authority*, 21 f.

[2] Newman argues (*Private Judgment*, 341–343) that our personal limitations so incapacitate us for private inquiry into Divine truth, that we ought not to undertake it, "unless a Divine command enjoin the work upon us, and a Divine promise sustain us through it": if these are given, all will be well. Precisely; and they are.

[3] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 89 ("we should not want the help of the Church of Rome if we might be content in matters of religion with that homely kind of certainty which is all that God gives us for the conduct of the most important affairs of life"), 280. The parallel between religious and spiritual vision is well put by Oman, *Vision*, 42–47.

[4] Salmon, *Infall.* 279; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 6 f; Moxon, *Modernism*, 115.

[5] Cf. Browning, *The Ring and the Book*, X (*The Pope*), 243–267,

> ". . . . . .
> So and not otherwise, in after-time,
> If some acuter wit, fresh probing, sound
> This multifarious mass of words and deeds
> Deeper, and reach through guilt to innocence,
> I shall face Guido's ghost nor blench a jot.
> 'God who set me to judge thee, meted out
> 'So much of judging faculty, no more:
> 'Ask Him if I was slack in use thereof!' "

1239–1252:

> "So do I see, pronounce on all and some
> Grouped for my judgment now,—profess no doubt

the most part matters which—though not unimportant—are remote and obscure and detailed, and is more than counterbalanced by a great and sufficient fund of unquestioned truth. Further, unlike our physical vision, which wanes as we advance into old age, our power of appropriating the truth of God increases steadily from year to year,[1] and continues—we cannot doubt—to grow in the life beyond. Not only does the individual's insight grow thus during his life-course, but there is a certain racial progress in religion, as a result of which the child born to-day has within his reach a fuller and truer knowledge of the ways of God than was accessible to one born two or three millenniums ago. Nor, seeing that these conditions of limitation and fallibility are necessarily inherent in our finite nature as human beings, ought we —however troublesome at times we may feel them to be—to count them a real disadvantage.[2] It has rightly been pointed out that, only through "the discipline of uncertainty and of deferred hope even in the search after truth," could the filial character be developed and enriched, the desire and capacity to co-operate with God evoked, and reverence, trust, and love stimulated.[3] And despite all uncertainty and temporary confusion, we shall be led by our very limitations to draw closer to the ultimate Divine authority within, and to discover in that a surer guide than any external witness concerning whom we may dispute.[4]

The ever-present margin of uncertainty, therefore, constitutes no ground for assuming that there must be somewhere an infallible objective interpreter of God, who is entitled to our unconditional submission and capable of giving absolutely final answers to our

> While I pronounce: dark, difficult enough
> The human sphere, yet eyes grow sharp by use,
> I find the truth, dispart the shine from shade,
> As a mere man may, with no special touch
> O' the lynx-gift in each ordinary orb:
> Nay, if the popular notion class me right,
> One of well-nigh decayed intelligence,—
> What of that? Through hard labour and good will,
> And habitude that gives a blind man sight
> At the practised finger-ends of him, I do
> Discern, and dare decree in consequence,
> Whatever prove the peril of mistake."

[1] Cf. Wilfrid Ward, in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 687.

[2] Cf. Newman, *Gramm.* 344: "We may gladly welcome such difficulties as there are in our mental constitution, . . ., if we are able to feel that He gave them to us, and He can overrule them for us. . . . It is He who teaches us all knowledge; and the way by which we acquire it is His way."

[3] So Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 7–10. Cf. *Times Lit. Suppt.* 8 May, 1924, 276: "it is only through such unsettlement and free inquiry that a tradition can be formed which has any value."

[4] Oman, *Vision*, 339.

questions. We have already urged the presupposed right of every learner to test and check his teacher, as a proof in advance, not that every teacher must be actually mistaken in something or other, but that no teacher can be regarded a priori as infallible, i.e. as certain not to make a mistake.[1] We are now in a position to show from a different angle that the supposed infallibility of the Roman Church does not exist. In the first place, the Roman system is built up on the assumption that the biblical authors, the Œcumenical Councils, and the Popes (when speaking ex cathedra), were totally exempt from that margin of uncertainty, which we have seen to be a necessary and inherent part of all human interpretation of the Divine. The ground upon which these particular interpreters are believed to have been exempt from the common lot of humanity is simply that the Church, which is supposed to be similarly exempt herself, declares them to have been so. The individual Catholic's belief that the Church is Divinely preserved from error in declaring them to have been so, is again assumed to be totally free from any margin of uncertainty.[2] From the philosophical and psychological point of view, the position is about as arbitrary as it could be. Is it possible for a system which steadily ignores one great and inseparable phase of the religious history on which it builds to be other than philosophically untenable? This criticism, furthermore, holds good not only against Rome, but also against the strict Anglican position, in which certain creeds, even though their infallibility is sometimes no longer maintained,[3] are yet *treated* as if infallible in that they are used to exclude from fellowship Christians who disbelieve any part of them: but this point will come up for discussion later.[4] It is sometimes taken for granted in Roman and Anglo-Catholic arguments, that any unanimous and considered conviction of the Christian Church must necessarily be right and true, and therefore binding on all Christians of later times [5]—"quod ubique, quod ab omnibus," and so forth. Keeping for the present to the philosophical side of things, it is absolutely necessary to urge that unanimity is no guarantee of truth. When Athanasius was 'contra mundum,' the Church was to all appearances virtually unanimous in her Arianism; but no Catholic would admit that Arianism was therefore true. When Christopher Columbus had sailed for several days along the south coast of Cuba,

[1] See above, pp. 162 f.

[2] Newman (see above, p. 20 f) is in some ways a solitary exception here. Cf. also Hase, *Handbook*, i. 66.

[3] See above, pp. 22 top, 163 n. 4.

[4] The importance of the personal factor in connexion with Reunion is touched on by the Anglican Bishop of Willochra, South Australia, the Rev. Gilbert White, in his article on 'The Hope of Reunion' in *Construct. Quart.* June 1918, 373–376: but he does not follow out the clue to its logical conclusion.

[5] E.g. Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 22.

he became convinced that it was not an island, but the mainland of Asia. "He sent round . . . a public notary . . . to each of the vessels, accompanied by four witnesses, who demanded formally of every person on board, from the captain to the ship-boy, whether he had any doubt that the land before him was a continent, the beginning and end of the Indies. . . . If anyone entertained a doubt, he was called upon to express it, that it might be removed. On board of the vessels . . . were several experienced navigators and men well versed in the geographical knowledge of the times. They examined their maps and charts, and the reckonings and journals of the voyage, and after deliberating maturely, declared, under oath, that they had no doubt upon the subject. . . . A formal statement was afterwards drawn up by the notary, including the depositions and names of every individual. . . ." [1] They were unanimous; but they were wrong. As we read the story, it never occurs to us to despair of the reliability of our maps: why therefore, when we plead that it is just as possible for a unanimous decision to be erroneous in theology as it is in geography, should men's hearts tremble for the ark of God?

As the Roman theory of infallibility finds no support in logic or philosophy, so it is belied by its own history. Its baselessness is patent when the religious experience is carefully analysed. It would not be established by the unanimity of the Church, even if that unanimity existed. But what are we to say in face of the fact that over a half of the total number of Christians [2] in the world deny the infallibility of Rome. If that infallibility were a fact, as Romanists claim, we should naturally expect that the reasons for regarding it as such would be so strong and unmistakable, that all sincere and truth-loving Christians would be easily convinced of it. This, however—Rome herself being witness—is very far from being the case.[3] Finally, if that infallibility really existed, it surely ought to have been exercised over and over again to reassure minds perplexed by controversy and to divulge the

[1] Washington Irving, *Christopher Columbus*, 298.

[2] It is to be observed that Romanists concede this name to all duly baptized persons, even though they be heretics and schismatics. On the numbers, see above, p. 69.

[3] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 86 f, 100 (". . . The" [a priori Romanist] "proof" [that an infallible guide exists] "equally shows that such a guide ought to be able to produce unmistakeable credentials; and the claims of one who has been rejected by half the Christian world are by that rejection disproved"), 108. Newman (*Gramm.* 234 f) parries this argument by observing that civilized scientists are right in believing that the earth moves round the sun, although the majority of the human race believe otherwise. The answer to this is (1) that an uncivilized ignoramus is not entitled to an opinion on astronomy in the same sense that a Protestant is entitled to an opinion on religion; and (2) that what is in question in the case of Rome is her necessary infallibility, not (as in the case of the scientists) superior information and judgment on some particular issue.

truth to multitudes eagerly yearning for it,[1] instead of being (as has often happened) kept in reserve until warring parties had convulsed and exhausted themselves in disputing over it and an infallible decision could hardly do more than register an already universally accepted belief.[2] The rarity of the exercise of the Pope's infallibility, and the failure to use it on many occasions when the use of it (if it really existed) would have averted much error, strife, and distress, are real arguments against its existence, and ought not to be brushed aside as being devoid of force, on the plea that they are advanced by people who disbelieve in it altogether, and who therefore object to assertions of its exercise, however rare.[3] If, for the sake of argument, the infallibility be supposed to exist, one is surely justified in inferring that certain results will be almost sure to follow: when we find not only that these results do not follow, but that other consequences occur very difficult to harmonize with our initial supposition, it is not fair to tell us that we must not complain since *we* object to that supposition altogether. It cannot but lie under suspicion of inaccuracy when, besides being philosophically ill-founded, it proves to have such incongruous results in practice.

[1] See the candid admission of this in the bull *Auctorem Fidei*, 28 Aug. 1794: "Absit, ut vox Petri in illa unquam sede sua conticescat, in qua perpetuo vivens ille ac praesidens praestat quaerentibus fidei veritatem."

[2] See Salmon, *Infall.* 172 f, 181 f, 184, 261, 442. The passages are weighty, but too long to quote. Salmon shows incontrovertibly that the politic and opportune hesitation of the Pope to decide living disputes ex cathedra reveals virtual distrust, on the part of himself and of Catholics generally, in his infallibility.

[3] Cf. Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 794b–795a (". . . we would observe that it seems highly inconsistent for the same objector to blame Catholics in one breath for having too much defined doctrine in their Creed and, in the next breath, to find fault with them for having too little. . . . Catholics . . . can afford to decline the services of an opponent who is determined at all costs to invent a grievance for them . . .").

CHAPTER X

THE AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE

THE main conclusions of biblical Higher Critics have for some time now been very widely accepted among educated Protestants, in much the same way as the assured results of expert investigation in secular history and in the sciences. The protest raised against these conclusions by traditionalists and Fundamentalists consists, of course, in very large part, of panic-stricken obscurantism: but it can plead at least this in justification of itself, that the modern critical attitude to the Scriptures involves a very distinct modification in the traditional Protestant doctrine of authority, at least in so far as that doctrine has usually been held and understood and formulated; indeed, it virtually implies a new theory of the sources of religious knowledge. Critics, however, and Christians who welcome their achievements, seem never to have properly realized how revolutionary a change in our religious universe is involved by their proceedings: and, while critical investigation of specific biblical problems has been vigorously pursued, little seems to have been done to work out and to popularize a fresh theory of authority such as alone could justify the use of the critical method.[1] It is, indeed, only by means of an arbitrary definition of words that one can argue that the abandonment of biblical infallibility means the abandonment of essential Protestantism:[2] but it must be admitted that Higher Criticism does involve a very far-reaching change in traditional Protestant thought—sufficiently far-reaching to account quite easily for the profound unrest which it has actually occasioned, that the acceptance of Criticism does impose on us the duty of exploring this change and of formulating such new categories as are involved in it,[3] and that up till now comparatively little has been done to discharge that duty.

It is, indeed, a duty that cannot be adequately discharged by merely setting forth a number of apparently incredible or highly improbable statements in the Bible itself. For the matter is one that concerns—in the last resort—not simply the exhibition of evidence, but the presuppositions that control the treatment of the evidence

[1] Cf. Bezzant in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1926, 619, 624.

[2] As is done, e.g., by a writer in *Times Lit. Suppt.* 8 May 1924, 276 (". . . The whole basis of the original Protestantism is gone . . . the moment this modern type of religion offers any positive interpretation of the Universe, any doctrine as to the relations between God and man, it has to find a new basis upon which to build . . .").

[3] The need of this is admirably urged by Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 182–191.

exhibited: and no appeal to historical or literary probabilities will avail, until these presuppositions have been examined and agreed upon.[1] In the last four chapters, an attempt has been made to go into these prior questions, which concern the sources of our religious knowledge, and to offer a definite theory in regard to them. Whether our theory be accepted or rejected, it at least represents the issue around which the battle between Criticism and Fundamentalism must be fought out. In adding a chapter here on the authority of Scripture, we do not propose to recapitulate, still less to repeat, the arguments in regard to the nature of authority which we have already set forth: we propose simple to take note of the bearing which these arguments have on the question as to the true place of the Scriptures in our religious life.

In the course of our argument, we recognized in the amplest way man's need of external embodiments or media of Divine truth, upon which to exercise profitably his native endowment of spiritual apprehension. We divided the great realm of such objective embodiments of the Divine into the two main divisions of nature and human history, specifying Scripture as an important section within the latter of these two.[2] In proceeding now to a somewhat closer inspection of the use of Scripture as authoritative, we must first observe that, as a collection of religious literature, it must necessarily take its place—whatever elements of uniqueness it may contain—in a group along with many other compositions that resemble it at least in the general characteristic of being truly useful in helping man to a knowledge of God. Such a classification has more than once been hinted at by Christian thinkers. Justinus believed that the Divine Logos, 'incarnate' in Christ, was 'spermatic,' i.e. existent as a seed of reason, in every man, and that, by virtue of it, not Abraham only but even Socrates and Heracleitus were in a sense Christians. Clemens of Alexandria held that Greek philosophy was a gift of God bestowed upon the Greeks (like the Old-Testament revelation imparted to the Hebrews) as a propædeutic to Christianity. The Greeks who philosophized accurately, saw God: by philosophy, truth was comprehended and God glorified among them.[3] Tertullianus's great phrase, 'anima naturaliter christiana,'[4] if justified, warrants us in treating the best religious literature of all times and races as in some measure Divinely inspired. Luther refused to confine the Word of God to the Bible, and held that God still speaks to holy men as He did of old.[5] It is entirely in line with this view that we find an eminent modern High-Anglican describing Zoroaster as "a mighty prophet of

[1] Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 99.
[2] See above, pp. 150–155.
[3] See my *Early Church and the World*, 211, 326 f, where full references are given.
[4] Tert. *Apol.* 17.
[5] See Binns, *Reformers and Bible*, 23.

God." [1] Other scriptures than the Bible have helped men, if not to the same extent, at least in the same way, as the Bible helps them. An Indian Sadhu once told a missionary: "When my heart is lonely, I read in the Bhagavad-Gita, and get consolation; and I like that better than any other book, because it makes my heart glad." [2] Gandhi, speaking to a conference of Christian missionaries, acknowledged his indebtedness to Christianity, but added: "for me Hinduism, as I find it, entirely satisfies my soul, fills my whole being, and I find in the Bhagavad-Gita, in the Upanishads, what I miss even in the Sermon on the Mount . . . when doubt haunts me, when disappointment stares me in the face, and all alone I see not one ray of light, I go back to the Bhagavad-Gita. I find a verse here and a verse there and I immediately begin to smile in the midst of overwhelming sorrow, in the midst of overwhelming tragedies—and my life has been full of external tragedies—and if they have left no visible or no indelible scar upon me, I owe it all to the teachings of the Bhagavad-Gita. . . ." [3] In the early days of the Brahma Samaj movement, the Vedas were given a supreme position, very similar to that accorded by many Christians to the Bible, alike in the infallibility which it presupposed and in the untenability which it eventually revealed.[4] To say that the Bible is immeasurably superior, as a revelation of God, to all other religious literature is true enough: human experience, fairly tested, gives abundant warrant for such a judgment.[5] What this human experience does not warrant is the ascription to the Bible of a unique *kind and method* of inspiration, such as would give to its words—and to *all* its words—a religious authority superior to any non-biblical statement, however true, helpful, or enlightening. John Bunyan tells us that, in a period of spiritual gloom, he was cheered by recalling the words: "Look at the generations of old and see: did ever any trust in God, and were confounded?" He searched Scripture for them, but without success; and at length discovered after a year that they were in the non-canonical book 'Ecclesiasticus.' "This at the first," he says, "did somewhat daunt me; but because, by this time, I had got more experience of the love and kindness of God, it troubled me the less; especially when I considered that, though it was not in those Texts that we call Holy and Canonical, yet forasmuch as this sentence was the sum and substance of many of the Promises, it was my duty to take the comfort of it. And I bless God for that word, for *it was of God to me*." [6] Here we see the collision between the real, but half-conscious, test of inspiration on the one hand, and

[1] Gore, *Infall. Book*, 16 n.
[2] H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 90b n.
[3] Quoted in *Christian World*, 27 Aug. 1925, 10, and *Reconciliation*, Dec. 1925, 222.
[4] Farquhar in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 816a.
[5] See, for instance, above p. 119 n. 1.
[6] Bunyan, *Grace Abounding*, §§ 62–65 (italics mine).

the unreal but orthodox test on the other. Happily the former is allowed its rights. Nor is it either untrue or derogatory to say that, while no book as a book can compare with the Bible in value and inspiration, yet we know many portions of non-biblical literature ('The Imitation of Christ,' 'Rabbi ben Ezra,' and 'Lines written above Tintern Abbey' will do as examples), which present precisely those qualities of truth and edifying power that in the case of the Bible are taken to prove Divine inspiration, and which are, by the same token, far more inspired than we can feel many portions of the Bible to be.[1]

But however the case may stand with non-biblical literature, let it be said at once that Higher Criticism, and the theory of authority we have advanced in its support, constitute no denial whatever of the objective authority of the Holy Spirit of God in the Scriptures. On the contrary, we would express our emphatic agreement with one who has said: ". . . we find spiritual truths there which in themselves are permanently valid. Indeed, one who for long years has preached those truths with joy cannot content himself with so cold a phrase as 'permanently valid.' He would rather say that in the course of that religious history whose record is the Bible, truths were wrought out without which no man can really live; truths essential to man's health in character, to man's hope in service, to man's triumph in death; truths that for the sake of the life here and the life hereafter, must be preached and repreached and preached again as long as the world stands. . . . He who long can ponder the fact and not perceive that God was speaking there does not earnestly believe in God at all." [2] Needless to say, it follows that the Bible is a real and indispensable objective Divine authority for religion and for life.[3]

We have laboured to show that humble trust in, and indebtedness to, an objective authority is not incompatible with the ultimacy of the Inner Light.[4] We claim therefore not to be criticized as inconsistent

[1] This *qualitative similarity* between the inspiration of the Bible and that of other good literature is emphatically denied by most Catholics (see Newman in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 191 [the Fathers *not* inspired]; Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures* [1921] 1), and finds little sympathy with some Protestants (e.g. J. Phillips in *Congreg. Quart.* July 1927, 323). Other Catholics admit, however, that it is permissible to hold, *as a pious private opinion*, that sundry non-scriptural writings are inspired, so long as one accepts the inspiration of the *whole* of canonical Scripture (Lattey, *First Notions*, 19 f, and in *The Bible*, etc. 24–26). There is a good discussion on 'The Interpretation of Scriptures' in general, by Mr. F. Eakin, in *Journ. of Relig.* Oct. 1927, 596–611.

[2] Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 94 f. Cf. the striking testimony of the novelist, Basil King, quoted from *Harper's Magazine* in *Public Opinion*, 11 July, 1924, 40 f.

[3] Cf. M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 215; Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 718; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 66 f, 111 f, 115–117; Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 18–20.

[4] See above, pp. 156–167.

when, after positing the real authority of the Bible, we proceed to observe how the Inner Light displays its own ultimacy in our learning from that authority. To begin with, the acceptance of the Bible by any individual believer as the Word of God, in preference to other books, is made ultimately on the strength of that individual's personal conviction.[1] And not only so: but the very determination of which writings should be included in the Canon of Scripture rested, not on any unmistakable Divine revelation imparted at a definite time or times to the Jewish and Christian Churches, nor even on the decrees of Œcumenical Councils meeting ad hoc (Councils only recognized already established canons, and settled some disputed details), but primarily on the spontaneous and general consensus of Christian men and women, who appropriated the Divine teaching in certain writings in precisely the same way as the modern liberal Christian appropriates it.[2] In a word, the Canon of Scripture was settled by the Inner Light of the average Christian. We may thankfully recognize that the books chosen for inclusion, firstly, in the Jewish Canon (afterwards our 'Old Testament'), and secondly in the New Testament Canon, were *on the whole* those of by far the greatest religious value, and that the insight and judgment determining the choice were imparted and guided by God. But where in the facts can we find any ground for believing that *all* of the books so selected in *all* their parts are endowed with a unique kind of sanctity (involving infallibility, 'revelation,' etc.), which would give a special and relevant religious value to *every* passage of Scripture, but which no extra-canonical book possesses in any measure whatever?[3] For that is the assumption behind both the Catholic and the Fundamentalist positions: and not only is it devoid of any inherent justification as an a priori theory, but the retention of it involves the necessity of constantly and violently twisting the actual facts into agreement with it.

The fact then that our Bible consists of books selected in the first

[1] See above, pp. 117–121. Dr. Forsyth strangely ignores this important point in his protests against (I suppose) liberal Christians. E.g., "They do not believe it" (the Word of God, i.e. apparently, the Bible) "because it is God's; for them it is only God's in so far as they understand and agree" (*Authority*, 307; cf. 373 ff). But what warrants us in believing the Bible to be God's Word, except the response it wakes in man's heart? And even if the individual accept it as God's Word on the testimony of the Church in preference to his own (*op. cit.* 374), what but his Inner Light warrants him in regarding the Church as a truthworthy witness?

[2] Cf. Milligan in *Expos.* Dec. 1921, 415 f: "Nor in doing this" (i.e. exercising biblical criticism) "are we really embarking on any such novel and venturesome method of dealing with the Bible as some people would like to make out. For . . . we can never forget that the very formation of the Canon was the result of a somewhat prolonged critical process, several of the books being accepted only after considerable hesitation and an anxious period of sifting and trial." Also, Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 106.

Cf. Grubb, *Authority*, 55–57; Sanday in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 576–579.

place from among other books for their helpfulness, according to the consentient private judgment and inner light of Jews and Christians, and the further fact that the acceptance of it as God's Word by the individual Christian to-day is also based on his personal conviction, sufficiently exhibit the fundamental nature of the inward, as compared with the outward, authority. But if the inward authority is competent for this great initial choice, it is a fortiori competent to exercise a check on the outward authority it chooses.[1] We have already proved that this check is, as a matter of fact, unconsciously exercised whenever a Fundamentalist sets aside or neglects one part of Scripture in preference to another.[2] No one can help having such preferences: and, that being so, intellectual honesty requires us to recognize consciously the grounds on which they are entertained. Those grounds we have seen to be, in the last resort, the self-revelation of God in the individual's mind, heart, and conscience: and here accordingly we have the one ultimately valid basis from which the teaching of Scripture may be checked.[3] The general abandonment of the more revolting elements in the doctrine of future punishment, for instance, was due—not to any enhanced sense of the authority of Scripture—but to the growing "habit of educing moral and intellectual truths from our own sense of right." [4] An eloquent and popular appeal has recently been made for a distinction between the "abiding experiences" and the "changing categories" of the Bible.[5] It has, however, been pointed out in reply that the latter were as real and dear to the biblical authors as the former, that both alike possess biblical authority, and that, if a distinction is to be drawn between them, it cannot be drawn on the authority of the Bible itself as such, but must depend on men's own discovery of what is inherently credible and good.[6]

The learner's indefeasible right to check and possibly dissent from his teachers has already been shown to exclude the infallibility, i.e. the a priori and necessary inerrancy, of any objective teacher other than God Himself.[7] The admitted sanctity of Scripture does not constitute it an exception to this general truth. While there has been much haziness

[1] See above, p. 162. [2] See above, pp. 119 f.

[3] I do not therefore understand why Kaftan, who frankly abandons the infallibility of Scripture (*Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 718–720), should—in urging that the individual conscience must consult Scripture—appeal to "evangelical Christians who, from the Reformation downward, have accepted the conscience *subjected to* God's Word as the final and decisive arbiter" (*ib.* 694 f: italics mine. Cf. 706: "inner experience is no reliable source of knowledge," etc). Forsyth's protests are dealt with above, p. 183 n.

[4] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 336.

[5] Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 103, 170, 173 f, 182.

[6] G. Birney Smith in *Journ. of Relig.* Mar. 1925, 182 f.

[7] See above, pp. 135–138, 162 f.

and disagreement in regard to the theory of authority, it has become increasingly clear to thoughtful Protestants of nearly all schools that the old idea of the infallibility of the Bible must be definitely and finally abandoned.[1]

This is not the place in which to marshal the numerous biblical phenomena that have led men irresistibly to this conclusion. They can be found in abundance in any of our standard modern commentaries. But two or three of the most undeniable cases may be cited. And it is significant that, for the purposes of selection, we do not need to go to the strictly *miraculous* narratives, in defence of which special theories are advanced. Thus, the present writer's early confidence in the chronology of Genesis was first seriously shaken when, on working out the figures, he discovered that Jacob must have been over seventy years old when he fell in love with Rachel. "For the transport of the Tabernacle and the court, consisting of 48 'boards' or 'frames,' each 15 ft. high, $2\frac{3}{4}$ ft. broad (their thickness is not stated), with 13 'bars' . . . and 100 bases of solid silver—according to [Exodus] xxxviii. 27 weighing 96 lbs. each, and altogether therefore more than 4 tons,—the 9 pillars of acacia-wood, each 15 ft. high . . ., the 300 pillars for the court, each $7\frac{1}{2}$ ft. high . . ., with their 300 bronze bases, and the cords and bronze pegs. . ., the Merarites have only *four* wagons assigned to them (Nu. vii. 8, cf. iii. 36 f.),—evidently an altogether insufficient number." [2] If the census-figures given in the early chapters of Numbers are carefully examined and compared, they are found to imply that there must have been about fifty children born to every married couple,

[1] Among eminent Anglicans who have abandoned it are Mr. Gladstone (see quotation in *Rev. of Revs.* June 1896, 561), Dr. J. H. Bernard (*Expos.* Sept. 1905, 178 f), Rev. G. Freeman (*Authority*, 101), Dr. A. C. Headlam (*Doctr. of the Church*, 169 f), Dr. C. Gore (*Infall. Book*, 42–52, *Holy Spirit*, 205, 256, 264, 267, 277), Rev. W. L. Knox (in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 99, 101), Rev. E. J. Bicknell (*ibid.* 217), and Rev. N. P. Williams (*ibid.* 379). Dr. Gore was reported in *Daily News*, 4 Mar. 1926, 8, to have said in St. Paul's Cathedral: "Let us proclaim as constantly, as emphatically and as publicly as possible the abandonment by the Church of an untenable position—the position that the early chapters of Genesis record literal history." Cf. also M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 207–213; Oman, *Vision*, 87 f; Leckie, *Authority*, 50; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 65; and Grubb, *Authority*, 59–61, 65. Dr. P. C. Simpson (*Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1926, 532) speaks of "the religious meaning of" infallibility "in the evangelical protestant church (apart from obscurantist sections of it), which is that Scripture is authoritative and 'infallible,' not verbally, or even, in the technical sense, dogmatically, but on the character of God and the way of Salvation, and that in it we find God speaking to us convincingly and certainly as nowhere else." A similar view has been expressed by others, e.g. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 95; Garvie, quoted in *Expos. Times*, Nov. 1926, 52b. I agree that this is the true view to take of the *authority* of Scripture; but I plead that 'infallibility' is altogether the wrong word to use for it. The idea of an infallible book has, of course, figured in other religions—Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Islam, etc.

[2] Driver, *Exodus* ('Camb. Bible') 426.

and that, of the women over twenty years old, only one in about fourteen or fifteen was a mother. The total population is also impossibly large; "for let anyone read the story in 20 1–13, and ask himself whether this suggests a water supply sufficient for a multitude equal to the combined populations of Glasgow, Liverpool, and Birmingham." [1] In 2 Chron. xxii. 2 we are told that Ahaziah was forty-two years old when he came to the throne: as his father Jehoram had reigned only eight years, and had become king at the age of thirty-two (xxi. 20), it follows that Ahaziah must have been two years older than his father.[2] In Luke xxiii. 45 the original text (set aside in the Authorized Version, and mistranslated by the Revisers) tells us that there was an eclipse of the sun at the time of our Lord's crucifixion—a total impossibility, since this event took place at the Passover season, which came at full moon. There is also a clear inconsistency between the Fourth Gospel and the Synoptics as to the precise *date* (not the day) of the Crucifixion, and between the several Synoptics as to the wording of a great many of our Lord's sayings.[3] If these errors, or even only some of them, be recognized, it is futile to say they are the only ones, or that they are unimportant. The infallibility of the Bible is no more.[4]

This conclusion established, the way is clear for the investigation of the content and teaching of Scripture by means of scientific criticism. Scientific biblical criticism means simply "the application of truly scientific methods to Biblical study": [5] and scientific methods are simply those ordinary laws of evidence, those canons of historical and literary probability, which we regularly trust as a means of arriving at the truth in regard to the past generally. Their application begins with the task of textual, or so-called 'lower,' criticism, the effort, namely, to restore as far as possible, from the multifarious and often perplexing evidence of extant and varying copies and translations, the actual wording of the original documents. Then comes the work of accurate translation, with the linguistic problems pertinent thereto. Thence we pass on to so-called 'higher' criticism, viz. the determination of the date and authorship of each of the several books of Scripture and also (when its structure is composite) of each of its component

[1] Gray, *Numbers* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.' [1903]) 12 f. The discrepancy as regards the size of the families, etc., was discussed by 'The Author of "'The Policy of the Pope" ' in *Contemp. Rev.* April, 1894, 590, and Sept. 1894, 361–364.

[2] To say that textual criticism easily emends this obvious blunder, does not alter the fact that the Hebrew text and both our English versions are here in error.

[3] E.g. compare Mt. vii. 11 with Lk. xi. 13, and Mt. xix. 17 with Mk. x. 18 = Lk. xviii. 19.

[4] See also Gore, *Infall. Book*, 29; Grubb, *Authority*, 58—for a selection of other equally undeniable, if less striking, instances of error. An impressive array is set forth by a *Catholic* scholar in *Contemp. Rev.* Apl. 1894, 584–591, 598.

[5] Milligan in *Expos.* Dec. 1921, 412. Cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 266–268, 275.

parts.[1] From the results thus ascertained, criticism proceeds to reconstruct the history (literary, political, and religious) which the books reveal. Of the laws governing all this investigation, one is the Law of Parsimony: "Non sunt multiplicanda entia praeter necessitatem"—which, being interpreted, is: We have no right to accept as true, or to require others to accept as true, historical statements for which the evidence is inadequate. Christian people, who dislike being asked to change their views, sometimes complain of critics 'minimizing' or 'whittling down' Christian beliefs. But they forget that a certain inquisitive scepticism is essential to historical investigation, and that simple honesty forbids a historian to give credence to statements for which a reasonable amount of evidence cannot be produced. Another law is that due allowance must be made for the psychological condition of our informants—their credulity, ignorance, and fallibility, their prejudices and special interests, as well as their trustworthiness. We have no right to assume, as is often done, that they must be either wholly accurate, or wholly untrustworthy.[2] We never make such an assumption with regard to other witnesses, whether in historical study or in legal investigation: it would be most foolish and unfair to do so.[3] It is perfectly possible for an honest and capable informant to make mistakes. Recent investigations into the value of human testimony in the law-courts lead to the conclusion that it "has much less value than is normally assigned to it." [4] Nor must the known methods of historical writers, particularly those of ancient times, be ignored—the habit, for instance, of supplementing assured fact by a certain amount of conjecture and imagination,[5] the much freer use of direct speech in old-time than in modern narrative, and especially the custom (sanctioned by the best classical historians) of putting into the mouths of important characters, not only words they were known to have actually uttered, but speeches composed for them (in character, of course) by the historian himself.

[1] On the inseparability of textual and higher criticism, see the words of the anonymous Catholic in *Contemp. Rev.* Apl. 1894, 601–606.

[2] E.g. Rev. W. H. Denbow writes in *Christian World*, 7 Jan. 1926, 11: "the Fundamentalist, rightly or wrongly, will have all or none. Either he must have a Book sufficiently 'inspired' as to make it irrefragably reliable or no Book at all." But the whole question lies in that "rightly or wrongly." Unless the Fundamentalist can say "rightly" and prove his case, how can he expect others to listen to him?

[3] See the sound remarks of M. H. Carré in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1924, 831 f, in criticism of G. K. Chesterton's *St. Francis of Assisi*; and cf. Conybeare, *Historical Christ*, 168.

[4] Cf. *Times Lit. Suppt.* 18 Aug. 1921, 521 f, and 13 Oct. 1921, 655.

[5] "The writer of the book . . . dresses up the narrative in his own way. . . . And, as is the case with the most orthodox histories, the writer's own guesses or conjectures are printed in exactly the same type as the most ascertained patent facts. . . . You tell your tales as you can, and state the facts as you think they must have been" (Thackeray, *The Newcomes*, ch. 24).

The ultimate problems concerning the ethical and religious import of the historical facts thus established belong to the domain of theology proper, rather than to that of higher criticism. The two fields shade off into one another, and in both of them it is that inward tests of truth are ultimate: but it is a canon of scientific procedure that literary and historical criticism must be allowed to pursue its examination of the data without let or hindrance from doctrinal presuppositions, and to complete its task before the theologian begins to build his doctrines.[1] There must be no appeal to religious terror, no use of the fallacious 'argumentum ad verecundiam,' no attempt to subordinate desire for truth to the natural dislike of changing one's religious beliefs.[2] And just as the historian has perforce to pick and choose among the documentary data (not arbitrarily, but on a scientific method), in order to reconstruct the story of the past, so the theologian has also to pick and choose (not arbitrarily, but by the leading of the Divine Spirit within), in order to give a true ethical and religious interpretation of the history. As a spiritual-minded man, he reserves to himself the right to refuse credence to beliefs about God and duty which do violence to his most clear and sacred personal convictions—"the likest God within the soul." He accepts and learns from those portions that bear the stamp of Divine truth, and he leaves the rest on one side. His conclusions differ widely from those of the Fundamentalist; but his method, as a method, differs from the Fundamentalist's only in this, that whereas the Fundamentalist picks and chooses half-consciously and in defiance of his own principles,[3] the modern theologian picks and chooses with his eyes open and in conformity with an avowed and defensible theory.

In essence and principle, the critical attitude to Scripture may certainly claim to have the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ. It would indeed have been totally foreign to the mental habits of his race and time—as well as useless for His immediate purpose—had he called in question the traditional Jewish ideas as to the integrity, authorship, historicity, and general Divine sanctity, of the books of the Hebrew Canon: and it is indeed clear that He did not do so. Nor did He construct any abstract theory to synthetize this general acceptance of traditional beliefs about Scripture and His free criticism of its specific contents. But we may remember that in the Sermon on the Mount He

[1] Cf. Principal E. Griffith-Jones in Peake's *Commentary*, 3a ("No theorising till we have the facts to theorise about; and as fresh facts pour into view, a rigorous re-examination and rebuilding of existing theories in the light of these facts—such is the modern way of thinking . . ."); H. J. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.* i. 409 n. ("Die Theologie" [in the *wide* sense, including criticism] "aber ist, weil Wissenschaft, autoritätsfrei"); Pryke, *Modernism*, 83–86.

[2] Cf. on criticism generally, Grubb, *Authority*, 62–66.

[3] See above, pp. 119–121.

superseded the dictates of the Mosaic Law several times over; on another occasion He repudiated the Mosaic law of divorce; on yet another He set aside the law distinguishing clean and unclean foods (Mk. vii. 19). He depreciated the value of sacrifices on the strength of a passage in Hosea (Mt. ix. 13, xii. 7). He distinguished between the weightier and lesser matters of the Law (Mt. xxiii. 23; cf. Lk. xi. 42): He reminded His critics how, under pressure of human need, David had infringed the Law without blame. He refused to sanction the infliction of the legal penalty on the adulteress. It will not do for us to say that our Lord was in all this making use of a peculiar privilege conferred on Him by the uniqueness of His Person and His office. He did indeed speak at times (e.g. in the Sermon on the Mount) in a tone of unique personal authority: but usually, when handling Scripture with freedom, He takes it for granted that His hearers will easily feel, not the weight of His authority, but the force of His argument. No theory of exegesis is worked out; but the ultimate validity of the human reason and conscience—even as against the letter of Scripture—is everywhere presupposed.[1]

Still more unmistakably may the method of modern criticism claim the sanction of the Protestant Reformation and its leaders. Doubtless they had no completely thought-out theory as to the precise relation between the inward enlightenment of God's Holy Spirit and the inspired Word of God in the Scriptures: doubtless also they shrank from any explicit and categorical statement to the effect that the Bible was not infallible. At the same time it is clear enough that Luther's emphasis on the centrality of our inner experience of Christ, and Calvin's on the basic character of the 'testimonium Spiritus Sancti internum,' and the later Arminian appeal to reason in exegesis, all contained in germ the principle of modern liberal criticism. Some of the more daring utterances both of Luther and of Calvin are frankly irreconcilable with the traditional principle of biblical infallibility; "and the shattering to pieces by the criticism of the last century of this particular mode of conceiving the ground of Christian faith is but the working out after three hundred years of that principle of religious individualism which was a large part of the inner significance of Protestantism from the first."[2]

[1] Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 97; Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 262b; Weinel, *Bibl. Theol. des N.T.* 91 (". . . ihm ist gewiss, dass Gott hier" [about honouring father and mother] "deutlicher spricht als da, wo Moses vom Gelübde redet . . ."); Gore, *Infall. Book*, 19–27, *Holy Spirit*, 257; Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 91 f.

[2] Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 372. Cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 294 f, 310–317; Dale, *Ultimate Principle*, 48–51; M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 204–206, 212–214; Platt in H.*E.R.E.* i (1908) 814 f; von Dobschütz in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 590b; Leckie, *Authority*, 37 f; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 68–71, 405–407; Binns, *Reformers and Bible*, 14, 20–26, 29 f, 35; H. R. Mackintosh ap. Gore, *Infall. Book*, 56–60;

Our allusion to the Reformers should remind us how easy it is to accept the doctrine of the internal witness of the Spirit, and yet to fail to harmonize the rest of our beliefs with it. It ought, for instance, to be obvious that if, in conscious or unconscious deference to this doctrine, the infallibility of Scripture be abandoned and the principle even of the most moderate biblical criticism accepted, it is totally illogical to continue to call the Bible the ultimate standard. Yet, in spite of the fact that very few Anglican scholars to-day profess to believe in the infallibility of the Bible, and very many of them—probably a large majority—accept in considerable measure the results of criticism, representative Anglicans still speak of the Bible as if it were the final court of appeal.[1] Doubtless also other Protestant bodies—as well as individuals—have fallen unknowingly into the same inconsistency.[2] The position of Anglo-Catholics has a special interest. Intelligibly enough, their avowed distrust of private judgment caused them to offer strong opposition to the earliest efforts of biblical critics. The most moderate scholars to-day take the documentary theory of the Pentateuch for granted; but when John William Colenso, the Bishop of Natal, began—during the sixties and seventies—to work out and popularize the initial investigations which led to the establishment of that theory, his work raised a storm of protest and opposition in the Church of England,[3] and Dr. Pusey wrote: "Anything more superficial than Dr. Colenso's first volume I never saw," and referred to "Dr. Colenso's heathenism." [4] Yet many Anglo-Catholics to-day have no scruple in accepting in the main the generally established critical conclusions in regard to the Old Testament and, with certain important reservations on points of historical and doctrinal (as distinct from literary) interest, in regard to the New Testament and to early Church-history also.[5]

Rawlinson, *Authority*, 54; Grubb, *Authority*, 52–54, 61 f; Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 15–17, 19. See also above, pp. 110, 141, 179.

[1] See above, pp. 110 f, 120.

[2] Cf. Forsyth, *Authority*, 307, 373 (see above, p. 183 n. 1), 376 (admitting the need of "corrections which the modern Church . . . is able and bound to make on the traditional *statement* of" our authority); and Kaftan in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.* Oct. 1900, 718–720.

[3] Cf. Dean Farrar quoted in *Rev. of Revs.* Aug. 1897, 167 ("I was grieved to see him universally treated as if he were a pariah. . . . He told me how, once, seeing an English Bishop at Euston Station, the bishop . . . advanced most cordially to meet him, and gave him a warm shake of the hand, which Colenso as warmly returned. But, alas! the next moment the English prelate said, 'The Bishop of Calcutta, I believe?' (or some other see). 'No,' replied Colenso, 'the Bishop of Natal.' The effect, he said, was electrical. The English bishop almost rebounded with an 'Oh!' and left him with a much-alarmed and distant bow, as though after shaking hands with him he needed a purifying bath").

[4] Pusey, *Eiren.* 13, 16, 284 f.

[5] Cf. Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 17 f; C. H. Turner in *Congress-Report 1920*, 20–33; others in *Congress-Report 1923*, 12 f, 30; Pryke, *Modernism*, 77 ("Judged by the standard

Their position in regard to the Creeds, however, is—as we shall show—hard to reconcile with that doctrine of the ultimacy of the Inner Light without which biblical criticism has no standing-ground whatever.

In accepting the critical method in the abstract, but making reservations in the concrete use of it, Anglo-Catholics have the sympathy and support of a large number of their Protestant fellow-Christians. For there are plenty of people who are not prepared to defend a glaring inaccuracy in Scripture, when it is pointed out, and are to that extent 'higher critics,' but who are yet thoroughly uneasy as to where criticism is going to lead them. The result is that, while they profess no quarrel with the declared basis of criticism, they do quarrel with nearly everything erected on that basis—everything, that is, that involves any change in traditional terms and propositions. There is thus a certain justice in the rhetorical observation that faith is the enemy of history.[1]

It is from one point of view a good thing that opposition should be offered, particularly when it takes the form of a rational counter-argument. It ensures us against the hasty acceptance of untested and dubious hypotheses, a goodly number of which must inevitably be advanced in the discussion of matters that lie in that wide penumbra between clear historical knowledge and total obscurity. At the same time a good deal even of the more intelligent opposition to criticism in the concrete rests upon one or other of a certain number of definite objections, which are capable of being considered and answered separately.

Firstly, then, it is made a reproach to critics that they endlessly disagree with one another on points of biblical inquiry.[2] But such disagreements are inevitable in all historical study, especially where the available data are scanty and the possible conclusions proportionately numerous. As in secular history, the divergences for the most part concern the details rather than the main outlines. The reason why they seem more plentiful and troublesome in biblical study is simply that the subject attracts more scholars than other subjects, and that there is a wider interest taken in what the scholars say.

Secondly, criticism is sometimes thought to be discredited by the

of forty years ago even the leaders of the Anglo-Catholic party may themselves be described as advanced Liberals"); Selwyn in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* v f; Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 49 (". . . Not all of us are even now courageous").

[1] Bousset, *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* 54 ("Denn mit einem gewissen Recht kann man sagen, dass der Glaube der Feind der Geschichte sei"); Schweitzer, *Quest of the Historical Jesus* (Eng. trans.) 116 ("There is no position so desperate that theology cannot find a way out of it"), 233 ("the apologists, as we learn from the history of the Lives of Jesus, can get the better of any historical result whatever").

[2] Bezzant in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1926, 619: "Traditionalist opponents of 'the critics' are never weary of pointing out this lack of agreement, and seem curiously to suppose that it in some way establishes the truth of their own position."

obvious foolishness and error of some of its suggested conclusions. The risk of error has of course to be admitted—as has also the existence of a certain number of extremists, such as are to be found in every branch of professional study. Some critics, for instance, have stultified documentary analysis "by the application of a logic which would destroy the unity of a monolith." [1] But we should like to ask, If the absurd conclusions of some scholars discredit criticism, how will traditionalism fare if subjected to the same test? Traditionalists, whether Fundamentalist or Catholic, would do well not to say too much about the extravagances of higher critics, or else we shall remind them that Pope Innocentius III tried to demonstrate the primacy of the Bishop of Rome from the fact that Peter once leapt into the sea and on another occasion walked on it, the sea in Scripture standing symbolically for the whole world and all the people in it [2]—that Augustinus identified the Good Samaritan with Christ Himself, the inn with the Church, and the two pence with the Sacraments, and so on [3]—that Luther discovered the Trinity in Psalm lxvii. 6 and 7 ("God, even our own God, shall bless us. God shall bless us . . .")[4] and Calvin in the phrase, "Let us make man in our own image" [5]—and that Spurgeon saw a distinct phase of the Christian's spiritual life represented by each of the first ten or twelve books of the Old Testament.[6] It would not be difficult in fact to weave a tissue of grotesque absurdities out of the exegesis of traditionalists. Biblical critics, though (like scientists) they have their body of generally accepted conclusions based on research, candidly admit the possibility of erroneous theories being advanced. But the advancement of these no more discredits criticism than the need of abandoning exploded scientific hypotheses discredits science. Historical study profits by fertility of speculation, and this is bound to produce a certain proportion of erroneous and extravagant suggestions: but these are being continually detected and eliminated by constant reference to positive data and by the general progress of inquiry over the whole field.[7]

Thirdly, the bankruptcy of criticism has been recently proclaimed in certain quarters on the strength of one or two reversions on the part of scholars towards traditional views as opposed to those previously

[1] Jackson and Lake in *The Beginnings of Christianity*, i. 339.

[2] Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 9 f. See also, for extraordinary examples of Catholic exegesis, below, pp. 306–326, 341 f, 374, 401 f, etc.

[3] Aug. *De Nat. et Grat.* 50 (43): cf. Trench, *Parables* (edn. 1853) 317–319.

[4] Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 9. [5] Skinner, *Genesis* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') 30.

[6] C. H. Spurgeon, *Lectures to my Students*, First Series, 109 f.

[7] Cf. Milligan in *Expos.* Dec. 1921, 413–415; W. H. Rigg in *Expos. Times*, Apl. 1927, 311b (if sometimes critics "reach what appear to be fantastic and extravagant results, the only way to refute them is to show that they have not wielded aright the instruments of their craft").

held fairly widely in critical circles. Harnack, for instance, about 1906, argued strongly for the Lucan authorship of the Third Gospel and Acts.[1] More recently, a much earlier date has been advocated for Deuteronomy than critics generally had thought possible. In so far as these newer critical conclusions establish themselves (and it is an error to assume too soon that all will do so), they simply reveal instances of earlier critical fallibility: but they represent no defeat of the critical method; on the contrary they are themselves arrived at by the use of that very method. The corrective of the critics' errors lies neither in Fundamentalism nor in Catholicism, but in more criticism of a yet more thorough and scientific kind.[2]

A great deal of the uneasy dislike felt towards higher criticism narrows itself down to the point just referred to—its tendency, namely, to go to negative and rationalistic extremes. It has become customary—especially with a certain type of Anglican scholar—to try to draw a sharp line of demarcation between reasonable, moderate, and objective criticism, which must be admitted, and excessive, sceptical, and subjective criticism, which leads to heresy and must be withstood.[3] Now no doubt there have been and are critics with a kind of mania for distrusting everything, like those Members of Parliament of whom Cromwell said: "Nothing was in the hearts of these men, except 'Overturn, overturn!' " Such wilful and unreasonable scepticism has certainly to be resisted. But two points need to be remembered: (1) the strong subconscious pressure inevitably exerted upon the most fair-minded orthodox scholar by his traditional and ecclesiastical beliefs, and (2) the impossibility of sharply distinguishing criticism into objective and subjective.[4] Critical conclusions of course (as all reasonable critics

[1] Cf. McGiffert in *Beginnings of Christianity*, ii. 393 f; Jas. Stalker in *Expos.* Nov. 1920, 348–363 (Art. 'A Revolution in New Testament Criticism').

[2] Cf. J. M. Creed in *Journ. of Theol. Stud.* Apl. 1923, 352 f ("But if Dr. Harris believes that the present healthy reaction against the extreme scepticism of an earlier period is leading us back to the outlook of pre-critical days, he is unlikely to be supported by responsible scholars"); Milligan in *Expos.* Dec. 1921, 421. See also above, n. 7 on previous page.

[3] Cf. e.g. Headlam, *Life and Teaching of Jes.* intro., 75 f n. (". . . The determination to prove, in the face of obvious evidence, that the New Testament is wrong is considered by many persons a sign of unbiassed research"), 158 n. ("It is a characteristic of certain modern criticism that it never accepts any statement in original documents if it can avoid doing so, and prefers to reconstruct the history in a purely conjectural manner"), 160 f, 166 n., 167; Chas. Harris, *Creeds or No Creeds?* pref., 199–230; Gore, *Infall. Book*, 7 f, 24, 39 ("there is a strange delusion abroad that no criticism is worthy of the name which is not destructive in result"), 42. Prof. C. H. Turner refers to modernist views of the Resurrection as "the assault on this bastion of the Christian tradition" (*Congress-Report 1920*, 31).

[4] As, e.g., Dr. C. Harris does (*loc. cit*). Examples of the former would be the documentary theory of the Pentateuch and the denial that Paul was the author of Hebrews—of the latter, the denial that Paul was the author of the Pastorals and John the Apostle of the Fourth Gospel.

freely recognize) vary in the degrees of their approach to certainty: but they cannot be so dichotomized. Both kinds are subjective, in that they presuppose the reliability of the critical faculty in man; and both are objective, in that they concern themselves with features in the record itself. The subjective has no more to do with the mischievous philosophy of Kant (as is supposed) than has the objective: and the objective was quite as much anathema to the orthodox of fifty years ago—and is to-day as much anathema to the Romanist and Fundamentalist—as was and is the subjective.

While however no hard and fast line can be drawn between moderate and 'rationalist' criticism, it must be admitted that the religious and philosophical presuppositions of the critic are bound to affect in some measure his estimate and interpretation of the historical evidence. The claim that liberal criticism rests on an unbiassed examination of the facts is, it is said, a false claim, because liberal theologians, like everyone else, come to the evidence with their own peculiar 'Weltanschauung,' and are therefore no less guilty of fitting facts to their own metaphysical theories than are the theologians whom they criticize. "Tell me a man's philosophy," a certain conservative friend of mine used to say, "and I will tell you what he will make of the biblical evidence." Now, granted that the critic stands philosophically somewhere fairly within the wide limits of ordinary Christian theism, his Christian opponents ought to be able and willing to meet him on the open field of historical research, and not be driven simply to defy him from within the walls of a credal fortress. The question between them is this: Is our power of observing, reasoning, and understanding, when impelled by a sincere love of truth and supported by a genuine faith in God, a reliable and adequate instrument for the elucidation of the facts of history, or is it not? If it is, then the results of historical criticism, always allowing for the varying degrees of its success, must be accepted as true, however novel and distasteful they may be. But if it is not, if it must abjure all claim to be so, because it presupposes some initial 'Weltanschauung' or other, which may be wrong, then not only must we declare the results of *all* historical research (and incidentally all scientific research also) to be untrustworthy, but we must for ever forego the acceptance of any argument, revelation, or teaching (Fundamentalism and Catholicism alike included), which makes any appeal whatever to our powers of discerning truth. As in science, so in history—as in secular history, so in sacred history—collection and verification of actual facts not only may, but must, precede all philosophical synthesis that goes beyond the simple presuppositions of a self that can learn, a universe that can be learnt, and a God who rules over both.[1]

[1] See below, pp. 503 f.

When objection is raised to the philosophical presuppositions of the critic, what is generally meant is that he refuses credence to some or all of the biblical miracles. A good deal, though not everything, here depends on how one defines the term. For a miracle is not simply a wonderful and unusual event that surprises us, but is in essence a clear departure from the regular ways of Nature, in so far as these are conceived of as governed by known laws. Could we agree that miracles are brought about by some natural law not yet detected or understood, a considerable step towards agreement would have been taken. But this is precisely what orthodox scholars will not admit. It seems to them necessary to the real initiative of God that such incidents should *not* be instances of unexplored natural laws, but that they (or at least some of them) should be special and unique irruptions of God into Nature *as it really is*.[1] There can be no doubt that it was this sense of the word 'miracles' that the Vatican Council had in mind in anathematizing those who deny their occurrence.[2] We are all well aware of the fact that there has prevailed in the past a very widespread prejudice against belief in any 'miracle' (in either sense of the word), that the same prejudice exists to-day in certain quarters, but that (owing to revolutionary enlargements of our scientific knowledge of the universe) the disinclination to admit the possibility of miracles has recently weakened very considerably indeed. The assumption is often made that biblical higher critics as a class decide in advance that miracles are impossible, and come to the evidence with their minds unreasonably made up to deny them.[3] But this has certainly not been the attitude of the majority of such critics; nor is it at all a necessary element even in the advanced position known as liberal modernism. Critics and modernists do not need to say—and for the most part do not say—'No such thing as a real miracle has ever actually happened.'[4] Quite well-attested narratives turn up from time to time describing events for which no scientific explanation is known. The beating of a man's heart is restored after ceasing for three minutes when he is under an anaesthetic. An Egyptian fakir, in a state of catalepsy, is kept for an hour in a coffin under water, and is seen to be alive and well after the experiment. A Bedouin, under the close inspection of witnesses

[1] Cf. e.g. Headlam, *Life . . . of Jesus*, 194.

[2] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, can. 4 de fide (Mirbt [460] 40) ("Si quis dixerit, miracula nulla fieri posse, proindeque omnes de iis narrationes, etiam in sacra scriptura contentas, inter fabulas vel mythos ablegandas esse; aut miracula certo cognosci nunquam posse, nec iis divinam religionis christianae originem rite probari; anathema sit"). Three verified miracles are required as proof of a man's 'sainthood' and as a condition of his canonization.

[3] Cf. Lattey, *First Notions*, 100–103, and in *The Bible*, etc. 161–163.

[4] Cf. G. W. Wade, *New Test. Hist.* 112; McCabe, *The Lourdes Miracles*, 26; Friedrich Loofs in *Theol. Litzg.* 1926. 12. 325 ("Ich bin nicht 'wunderscheu' ").

(including an English traveller), thrice licks a red-hot spoon without suffering any sort of harmful effect on his tongue. Such incidents undoubtedly occur, and could certainly be multiplied if one took the trouble to collect and test the evidence. The records of psychical research are particularly rich in them, though not possessing any monopoly. Modern scientific method takes cognizance of the great power of spirit over matter and of our very limited knowledge of the real Laws of Nature, and forbids us to say in advance that anything that is not self-contradictory is impossible.[1] But to admit the possibility of miracles is very far from settling the problem of the historicity of those miracles with which the biblical critic is concerned.[2] The question the critic has to decide is rather this: Given the existence of this or that miraculous narrative, which is the more likely to be true, that the miracle really happened, and was accurately reported, or that the miracle did not happen, but somehow came to be mistakenly believed and reported to have happened? [3] In endeavouring to answer this question rightly, he cannot help feeling that, in view of *all* that we know about Nature and about the minds and habits of men, a miraculous narrative must necessarily labour under a great initial and inherent improbability. With all due concessions as to what is possible on a theistic view of the universe, the presumption is that God's modes of working in the physical world are constant and will remain so. It is only playing with the problem to urge the obvious truths that many familiar things, such as the conception and birth of a child, and the conversion of a soul, are miracles, that at bottom everything in Nature is beyond our powers to explain it, and is in that sense miraculous, and that—in philosophy and theology especially—'omnia abeunt in mysterium.' The question turns not on ultimate inexplicability, but upon rarity and strangeness, and consists in weighing the trustworthiness of the narrative against its inherent improbability. No student would think twice about admitting this improbability in the case of non-biblical and (especially if he were a Catholic) non-ecclesiastical narratives. The question is entirely one of adequate evidence. "The evidence for miracles," my conservative friend used

[1] This last is the idea with which Kingsley toys in *Water-Babies*, chs. ii and iv.

[2] "There is a story that when the sculptures were first excavated in the Assyrian Palaces, the Arabs believed that Allah had put them there, and that when doubt was cast on this explanation, the answer was 'Well, could he not have done so?' (on which . . . the Victorian relator of the story commented . . . with the words 'Which was unanswerable')" (*Times Lit. Suppt.* 19 Apl. 1923, 258).

[3] "It is harder to believe that God should alter or put out of its ordinary course some phenomenon of the great world for once, and make things act contrary to their ordinary rule purposely, that the mind of men might do so always after, than that this is some fallacy or natural effect of which he knows not the cause, let it look ever so strange" (John Locke, quoted in Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 157 n.).

to tell me, "is there all right; only you will not accept it." But before I accept it, I must know whether it is sufficient to justify belief: for does not honesty require me to withhold belief from any statement unless there is at least sufficient evidence to make its truth more probable than its untruth? In weighing the evidence, we have to remember the admittedly uniform habit of all other religions, besides Judaism and Christianity to produce untrue miraculous narratives (a tendency shared, as many educated Catholics would be ready to admit, by mediaeval Catholicism); we have to take into consideration how oriental and especially Semitic minds would be likely to work in an unscientific age and under the impulse of strong religious feeling; and we have to make due allowance for the fact that, in Scripture as in other religious narratives, the element of miracle is comparatively rare in documents contemporary with the events, and increases in almost exact proportion with the years that elapse after their occurrence. Is it unreasonable, in the face of facts like these, to hold that the evidence for the biblical miracles—broadly speaking—does not nearly reach that severe standard of strength which we must demand as a condition of credence? Is it not at least a sound principle of study that natural explanations of the data must be exhausted before recourse is had to theories of miraculous or even exceptional providences? [1]

At the bottom of the stubborn defence of the Bible-miracles against liberal criticism is the notion—consciously or unconsciously held—that without them we have no guarantee of the real activity and initiative of God in human affairs. Miracles have stood for the real participation of God in man's life, the means by which He intended to create, or at least to encourage, faith in Himself, and frequently in experience the real cause or occasion of that faith[2]. To this it may be replied on behalf

[1] See the discussions of the whole question in Sanday, *Divine Over-ruling* 53–81; Wade, *New Test. Hist.* 112–114; Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 142–168; Woodlock, *Modernism*, 48–73; Pryke, *Modernism*, 12–14; Mozley in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 199–201; H. T. Knight in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1926, 649–655; Slesser in *Journ. of Phil. Stud.* Oct. 1926, 445–447; A. E. Taylor, *David Hume and the Miraculous* (1927); and Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 74–77, 122–125. Cf. also P. W. Schmiedel, *Johannine Writings* (Eng. tr.) 70 ("Everyone who has had much to do with history knows that, to understand events and characters, it is of the first importance to look for such explanations as suggest themselves to us from experience of other human happenings. There will always be points which we cannot clear up in this way. But every student of history knows that he would be defeating his own purpose if he were to set aside those obvious explanations which hold good again and again in all human experience and were to try to put in place of them indefinite and unusual explanations such as a miracle, a direct intervention on the part of God. In other branches of history, even those people whom we have described above carefully avoid this; it is only in the field of 'sacred' history that they prefer the dark to the clear, the inconceivable to the conceivable, the miraculous to the natural"); Hatch, *Organization of the Early Christian Churches*, 17–20.

[2] Cf. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 516; Quick, *Liberalism*, 72 f; Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 155–162, esp. 157; Woodlock, *Modernism*, 19 f. Lattey (in *Religion of the Scriptures*,

of criticism, firstly, that an increasing number of modern religious minds derive no religious help whatever from miracle-narratives as such, have no wish to see their historicity proved, and are only repelled by being required to believe them;[1] secondly, that there is after all no good reason for regarding a miracle as the only really cogent evidence or guarantee of the Divine activity. It is perfectly possible in the abstract, and not rare in experience, to disbelieve all miracles (in the sense of real breaches purposely effected ad hoc by God in the order of Nature), to treat all abnormal incidents that are well-attested as due to the operation of as yet unknown natural laws, to think of the natural as including the supernatural within itself, and at the same time to believe in the fullest sense in the Heavenly Father of Jesus Christ.[2]

Nevertheless, the general impression somehow still remains that the liberal or modernist attitude to Scripture and to Christianity generally tends towards or is associated with irreligion. Newman, for instance, after insisting on the Divine origin and character of Christianity, counts among the reasons why he cannot force his proof on others the fact that the providence and intention of God enters into his own reason, while others ignore it![3] In the opinion of modern Catholic scholars, biblical criticism takes the spirit out of the Bible and leaves only the letter, and treats its inspiration simply as the impassioned expression of human religious experiences.[4] Evangelical or orthodox Protestants have been known to share the same general view—one insisting that God's truth is necessarily unpalatable and incomprehensible to man in his natural state;[5] another urging that "the bane of liberal thought is that it does not grasp the idea of the holy as the changeless thing in God," and that its treatment of sin "is an index of a blind spot in its vision, and its languor to the holy amid its zeal of love";[6] and yet another tacitly assuming that orthodoxy, as distinct from modernism, alone "teaches that Divine love gives human nature an opportunity to be more perfect than it was, in being created according to the Divine designs."[7]

45–47) regards disbelief in miracles as tantamount to disbelief in revelation, Divine intervention, and even "immediate communication between God and man": Protestant critical commentaries on the Prophets seem to him to assume "that such immediate communication is entirely out of the question." This is certainly not true of such critical commentaries on the Prophets as I have seen.

[1] Cf. Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 150–153.

[2] Cf. Canon J. Gamble on 'The Supernatural' in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1925, 491–498.

[3] Newman, *Gramm.* 407 f; cf. 301.

[4] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 498a, 499b.

[5] Milner, *Hist. of the Church of Christ*, ii. 347, iii. 5: the argument is advanced in the interests of the Augustinian doctrine of predestination.

[6] Forsyth, *Authority*, 215.

[7] Leading art. on 'Orthodoxy and Modernism' in *Times Lit. Suppt.* 1 Apl. 1926, 241 (last comma mine). Cf. Quick, *Liberalism*, 69 f.

It is possible that a certain proportion of the responsibility for this impression rests upon the shoulders of the critics and modernists themselves. Doubtless there is room for the exhortation that zealous interest in problems of literature and history should not be allowed to smother either reverent appreciation and helpful exposition of the spiritual truth and value of Scripture,[1] or loyal response to its insistent ethical claims.[2] The fact has also to be reckoned with that real sceptics who take an interest in biblical problems hold a good many opinions (mostly negative ones) in common with Christian modernists and against the orthodox, and this of course is taken to reflect on the modernists. But for the rest the impression seems but a senseless and indeed a cruel fallacy, arising partly from fear,[3] partly from prejudice.

What then shall we say to these things? If God be for us, how can the critic be against us? If God has sent forth His Spirit into our hearts, whereby we cry, "Abba! Father!", how can the honest and untrammelled search for His truth put us further away from Him? Is it not He that has placed us in this wondrous universe of truths and values, and has He not given us a nature like His own, with minds to discover and understand the true and the good, with hearts to love it, and wills to be loyal to it? Modernism certainly does not give God a smaller place in the life of the world than does traditionalism, though of course it views His presence differently. The analogy of scientific advance should reassure us. It is no harder to believe in God as Creator and Friend when we discover that our earth is not the motionless centre of the universe, but a tiny planet—that the rainbow is not something set by special providence in the cloud, but is produced under regular natural laws by the refraction of sunlight through the drops of rain. Why then should history become in some way less full of Divine significance because we conclude that Moses did not write the Pentateuch, that the world was not created in six days, or that very few of the Psalms were written by David?[4] Does the chief guarantee of God's interest in Israel and the world consist in stark improbabilities of literature and in physical marvels? Is God less present with us when, though abandoning many miraculous stories and traditional interpreta-

[1] Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 174–182, 191.

[2] *Ibid.* 191–206: though, according to Dr. Forsyth (*Authority*, 143, 215, 363, 419, 473, etc.), an unbalanced over-emphasis on love and social service is one of the sad things about modernism.

[3] ". . . men hastily or fearfully conclude that the change which is glorifying science will abolish religion" (Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 53).

[4] Anglo-Catholics who accept critical conclusions are careful to explain that they do not regard them as incompatible with the orthodox faith; but their precise attitude to the miracles (beyond strong adhesion to those of the Gospels) is not easy to make out. Cf. Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 24 f; Turner in *Congress-Report 1920*, 20–33; Gore, *Infall. Book*, 7–9, 13, 62 f; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 18.

tions, we daily learn more of His wisdom in Nature, daily hear His voice more distinctly in words of kindness and truth "from the dim past and present clear," daily witness His goodness in the brave and loving deeds of men, daily deepen our insight into His purpose, and so school ourselves into closer obedience to His will? Nay, in one way, modernism sees more of God in life than traditionalism does: for, remembering His transcendence, it emphasizes His immanence which traditionalism so often ignores; and it pleads that the subjectivism which is so often made a reproach against it is simply the belated recognition of a truly Divine gift in the intellect and conscience of man.[1]

It is not, of course, to be denied that such a thing as naturalistic scepticism does exist, and that (as has been said) on many specific biblical questions its conclusions resemble those of Christian criticism more than they do those of Catholicism or Fundamentalism. No doubt, also, the apparent and partial simplicity of these latter give them a certain strategic advantage over a criticism which frankly recognizes a multitude of uncertainties.[2] But it is well to bear in mind that the traditionalist attitude to Scripture carries with it, not only strategic advantages, but fatal dangers. It is, for instance, a matter of common historical knowledge that the terrible and shameful stories of witch-burning, slavery, persecution, and religious war, were made possible because of the general belief that these things were sanctioned and even enjoined upon Christian men by their unblamed appearance in the pages of the Old Testament:[3] nor is it possible to subvert the arguments used in their favour except by rejecting certain parts of

[1] Cf. Martineau, *Essays*, i. 151: "To those who are haunted with fears lest 'neological' speculation should undermine the foundations of religion, it must be consolatory to remember, that though mankind, according to the testimony of divines, have always been on the point of renouncing their belief in God, they have never actually done so. On the appearance of every great class of discoveries in physical science, every large extension of ancient chronology, every new school of metaphysics, the danger has been announced as imminent: yet the Atheism of the world, like the Millenium of the Church, is a catastrophe which continues to be postponed." It was Martineau who said: "Our Christian communion has no other end than . . . to interpenetrate the matter of our natural existence with the sense of supernatural relations" (*op. cit.* iv. 537).

[2] Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 183 f.

[3] For witch-burning, cf. Exod. xxii. 18, Lev. xx. 27, Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 1–138: for slavery, Gen. ix. 25–27, Exod. xxi. 2 ff, Lev. xxv. 44–46, etc., Channing, *Slavery*, ch. 5 (in *Works* [ed. 1843] i. 248–257): for persecution and religious war, O.T. saepissime, e.g. Jerem. xlviii. 10 ("cursed be he that keepeth back his sword from blood"—said to have been Pope Hildebrand's favourite quotation [Peake in *Jerem.* ('Century Bible'), ad loc.]), Macaulay, *Hist. of Eng.* ch. 1 (i. 39—of the Puritans), Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 10 f, 19, 22 f, 44, 56, Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 750 f, Pryke, *Modernism*, 70–73. In general, Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 75, 205 f; Binns, *Reformers and Bible*, 23.

Scripture, or at least by treating one part as higher and more inspired than another—a procedure which, as we have already shown, involves subjective criticism of precisely the same type as that which traditionalists so confidently censure in others.[1]

Then again, it is well known that multitudes of young, thoughtful, and religious folk have been lost to the Christian Church and the Christian ministry because they were either deliberately taught, or else somehow allowed to believe that they ought not to be in the Church or even to consider themselves Christians, unless they accepted the complete inerrancy of the Bible, including the six days of Creation, the Divine instructions for the massacre of the Canaanites and the Amalekites, Jonah's whale, and eternal punishment. Doubtless the blame in some such cases has been partly theirs, and not their teachers'; doubtless youthful minds are often shortsighted and impatient; doubtless the partial obscurantism to be found in the Church can be used by the lukewarm, just like any other short-coming, as a convenient excuse for non-attendance. But the main responsibility must lie with those who insist on a fundamentalist Christianity. The rebels, to their honour be it said, decline to stifle their God-given reason and conscience at the bidding of tradition.[2] To such as these—and they are a great host —modernism is a gospel, whereas traditionalism brings them no light and no help. Of a representative fundamentalist it has been said that he "sits in judgment on the modernists and is painfully oblivious of the reasons why his system fails to satisfy numbers of Christian men as devoted and earnest as he is."[3] Some think to demolish modernism by calling it 'unevangelical,' as if the Gospel of God were inseparable from the older and customary terms in which it was stated. At bottom the only Gospel is the assurance through Jesus Christ of the love and holiness of God; and modernism brings that Gospel home to multitudes in emancipating them from the yoke of trying to believe a mass of violent improbabilities as a condition of being assured in regard to God's saving purpose. It is often remarked that the present age is an age of religious doubt; and so it is. But for the most part the doubt is

[1] See above, pp. 119 f.

[2] Cf. Max Müller in *Forum*, Mar. 1891, 47 f (quoting Rev. Jas. M. Wilson, Headmaster of Clifton College); F. C. Conybeare, *Myth, Magic, and Morals*, 139 f; N. P. Williams in *Priests' Convention*, 22, 24; Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 61; and the correspondence in *Christian World* for June and July 1926 on 'What young Jones is believing'; also Moxon, *Modernism*, 126; Pryke, *Modernism*, 31–33.

[3] G. B. Smith in *Journ. of Relig.* Jan. 1922, 103 (on Dr. Horsch). Cf. C. H. Dodd, quoted in *Christian World*, 21 May 1925, 10 ("The discovery that Israel was a nation undergoing a course of spiritual education leading up to the full revelation of God in and through Jesus Christ has redeemed not only the Old Testament, but the character of the God it reveals, from blemishes that offended alike the modern intellect and the modern conscience").

not that of moral slackness or religious indifference; it is the doubt of honest and truth-loving intellect, concerned to be scrupulous in creed as in scientific judgment. It is not likely that minds in such an attitude will humbly submit to arbitrary and dogmatic assertions, on the part of their fallible fellow-men, to the effect that in this institution or in that volume is to be found the final and indubitable authority for life and belief. The dogmatism of the Catholic and the Fundamentalist, for all its simplicity and antiquity, is responsible for a vast amount of scepticism. Honest folk, assured that they must choose between scepticism on the one hand and either papal or biblical infallibility on the other, in their bewilderment choose scepticism from a sense of duty.[1]

Nor is it among the least of the drawbacks to traditionalism that it holds men back from a knowledge of the actual truth of things. It is no doubt simple and comforting to believe that one possesses an infallible external guide; but if this traditionally sacrosanct guide is in point of fact partially inaccurate, it is surely better that we should know it. Doubtless it is comforting to many to believe that Moses wrote Genesis, David the Psalms, Paul Hebrews and the Pastorals; but if actually this was not so, surely it is better not to believe it. Truth may be painful; but it cannot be harmful. Critics insist on criticism for the very good reason that it brings us nearer the actual truth of things. They take their stand on the self-consistency of Truth in a Divinely-governed universe, on the supreme duty of loyalty to truth,[2] and the supreme ultimate advantage in attaining it.[3] We may reasonably dread the discomfort of changing settled beliefs; but we ought to dread still more the penalty of drifting away from the God of Truth by a timid unwillingness to face facts.[4] Man comes nearest to God—as Pythagoras

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 44 f; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 49, 58 f, 62 (". . . no church has begotten so much doubt and disbelief as the church of Rome . . ."); Pryke, *Modernism*, 59–75.

[2] "The duty of guileless workmanship is never superseded by any other . . ." (Hort in *N.T. in Greek*, ii. 324).

[3] "The one and only business before us is to discover by all means the truth, whatever it may be, whether or not it happens to coincide with our preconceived ideas, and whether or not it seems likely to prove convenient to the champions of any tradition, however august, or of any institution, however necessary in our eyes to human welfare. . . . Once the truth is established, it may be safely trusted to produce its own results; and these will probably be largely unforeseen, possibly embarrassing to some people, involving some readjustment, not to say reconstruction, but always in the long run for the sure, true, and lasting benefit of mankind" (P. N. Harrison, *Problem of the Pastoral Epistles*, 3). Cf. Channing, *Works* (ed. 1843) i. 120 (on usefulness of all truth).

[4] Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 60, 91 (". . . love of truth is love of God, and the more we find of it, the more we know of Him"); W. H. Rigg in *Expos. Times*, Apl. 1927, 312a (on behalf of Anglican Evangelicals). The reductio ad absurdum of Fundamentalism is seen in an American project to print a Bible, substituting "a cake of

is reputed to have said—when he is truthful. Facts are stubborn things; and it is better to agree with them quickly, whiles we are in the way with them, lest haply we be found even to fight against God. "Fortis est veritas, et praevalebit."

On the whole, however, it is by no means an unmitigated evil that biblical criticism has met with stubborn opposition. Such opposition is helpful in putting us on our mettle, in driving us back to our foundations, in sounding to us a wholesome challenge to find and declare a reason for the faith that is in us. Such reason we have found; such reason can we give—gladly yet not defiantly, with confidence yet not with scorn, not only to justify ourselves but to assist as well as to reconcile others. The stress of controversy, the pain of mutual offence, the humbling disquietude of having sometimes to confess uncertainty and ignorance—these are but the price we have to pay for a blessing that is beyond all price. For what price is not worth paying in order to procure a deeper insight into the ways of God with us? What disappointment is not worth while, if it be but a means whereby our contact with God is made more real and close, our confidence in Him transferred from a shaky, to an unshakable, foundation?[1] His ways with us here are truly reflected in Nature's ways. The grim intractability of Nature has to be wrestled with and overcome, and often it is a sore struggle: the farmer "goeth on his way weeping, bearing forth the seed." But Nature's opposition is also her invitation; and having taken up her challenge in faith, "he shall come again with joy, bringing his sheaves with him." So with God, as men have to learn of Him through the Bible. In 'the good old days,' our whole theological system seemed to be well and truly built. Then criticism came: and at its ungentle touch the foundations of man's faith began to crumble, and he seemed to timid eyes likely to be left naked and adrift in a Godless world. But behold! the old foundations were loosened, only that the firmer basis on which they had rested might be brought to light. Our faith is not weaker, but stronger—not less accessible to the minds of others, but more accessible—now that we have been taught that its sheet-anchor is the self-authenticating witness of God within us, assuring us that we are His children, and interpreting Himself to us, not only in His fair creation, but in all the truthful words spoken, and all the loving and noble deeds done, in the present and in the past alike. God is His own interpreter; and if we are in direct

raisins" (or similar words) for the word "wine" wherever it occurs (*Daily News*, 16 Mar. 1925); by this means teetotalism would be given biblical sanction, without prejudice to biblical infallibility!

[1] Cf. M'Farlan in *Scotch Sermons 1880*, 216–218.

touch with Him, no fresh accession of historical or religious truth can fright our faith. The Bible becomes not less, but more, of a blessing to us, when in and by our study of it we are brought, not only to a fuller and truer vision of God's witness to Himself in history, but to a more conscious and intimate dependence upon Him for our ability to perceive it.

CHAPTER XI

THE AUTHORITY OF JESUS CHRIST[1]

It has been said of a recent book on the life of Jesus that despite its merits it "does not enter upon the field in which the vital issues regarding the problem of Jesus have to be decided—the field of the presuppositions."[2] It is precisely these presuppositions that have been occupying us throughout the latter half of what has been already written here: and in the light of our findings we have now to explore the content and meaning of that eternal Christian confession that "Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father."

We may take our start from the general loyalty to 'Jesus Christ' (in the most comprehensive sense of that sacred name), which for millions of Christians serves as the unanalysed but sufficient summary of their whole religious attitude.[3] Such fusing of the Christian's total response to his Master into a single concept is a natural and perhaps helpful approximation for many Christians to make; but by those who are called to go deeply into the matters of faith, the apparent unity of this concept is immediately observed to cover a distinction, which calls imperatively for recognition and study. However close be the connexion between the historical figure of Jesus and the risen, living Christ inwardly present to the believer, it is obvious that the two are not exactly and entirely identical, in such a way that all that can be predicated of the one can with equal fitness be predicated of the other. For the purposes of exact investigation a distinction must be drawn between them.[4]

The attempt to ignore or dispense with this distinction does indeed seem to be made in that form of Ritschlianism which has been widely popularized by the late Wilhelm Herrmann.[5] Herrmann's position is elaborated in distinction from and opposition to mysticism, which he

[1] Cf. the general discussions of Curtis (in H.*E.R.E.* vii [1914] 276 f) and Grubb (*Authority*, v, 69–81, 108–111).

[2] *Times Lit. Suppt.* 22 Apl. 1926, 292, on Goguel's *Jesus the Nazarene.*

[3] See above, pp. 111–113; and cf. Forsyth, *Authority*, 72 ("Our authority . . . is not simply Jesus, nor simply Christ, but Jesus Christ, our Redeemer, our Conqueror, who in one act breaks us and makes us for ever").

[4] I cannot follow Sir E. C. Hoskyns (*Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 176 f) in thinking that criticism has been wrong in formulating the contrast in this way, instead of drawing it between the Christ humiliated and the Christ returning in glory. Indeed the only meaning I can give to the latter contrast makes it identical with the former.

[5] *Das Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*, 1886: later translated into English: several editions. In what follows I omit detailed references.

feared as tending to foster indifference to the historical element in Christianity: the mystic, he complains, leaves Christ behind him at the door when he steps across the threshold into supreme blessedness. So he puts mysticism aside as unchristian, in favour of the objective fact of the historical life of Jesus, and pleads that there preeminently, if not exclusively, God turns towards us, gives us the certainty we need, and permits real communion with Himself. Herrmann explains that he means here the Jesus of history, not the risen and glorified Christ, mystical or personal union with whom was the supremely precious experience of Paul and thousands after him. Such personal communion with the living Christ he regards as sharing the illusiveness of mysticism. Yet at the same time he refuses to base our acceptance of the story of Jesus ultimately upon historical records, which must needs be fallible. He bases it instead on what he calls "finding," or "laying hold of, the inner life of Jesus," a process absolutely reliable, because its unreliability would imply that we could have produced the record ourselves. So superior is this faith in Jesus to the record itself as a source of information, that if the record of His teaching suggested the existence of saving forces other than Jesus Himself, "we should quietly declare such a doctrine to be an error of the narrator." Moreover Herrmann denies that Jesus is to be loved by Christians in the human sense or followed as a human example.

But apart from the injustice here done to mysticism, what are we to make of this treatment of history? Mysticism is set aside as delusive and subjective: only objective history can furnish a basis for faith. Yet when we do come to history, it turns out that the objective records cannot after all bear the weight to be put upon them; all depends on a certain religious experience, which is of a decidedly mystical nature, is induced by the record, and yet has to take the place of adequate historical evidence as a guarantee of the truth of the story. We are told we must "lay hold of the inner life" of the personality in the story, not the exalted Being of whose eternal existence the story is but an episode. If we ask how we can enter into a personal relationship with one who lived centuries ago, Herrmann replies that this is the plea of unbelief, and that, "when our understanding of the historical Christ makes us see the Living God, we certainly do not think of the centuries that intervene. . . ." We are not to concentrate on the Living Christ of the present, but to cleave to the Christ of history: if, however, we try to follow the latter as an example, we shall be grievously misguided; while if we feel for Him human sympathy, love, and sorrow, Herrmann tells us in the words of Luther that such ways are childish and womanly hysterics. It seems impossible to acquit the system of some measure of inconsistency and confusion.

We must therefore recognize that there is a clear distinction (which is not the same as a disjunction) between the historical figure of Jesus on the one hand, with the appeal that He makes to us and the influence He exerts on us both by His teaching and by His example, and on the other hand the risen and living Christ apprehended by the disciple of later days in inward mystical union. Many Christians have been through a deep first-hand experience that moves them to say, "Jesus, Lover of *my* soul." Many more, trusting to the testimony of such as these, and convinced that the experience is a true one and truly interpreted, assume the same to hold good of themselves and so grow into a sort of indirect verification of it. There are others who owe to Jesus a realization of fellowship with God through the aid of His Holy Spirit—a fellowship which lacks that special *personal* stamp characteristic of the experience just referred to, and is therefore not in its own right usually described as union with the living Christ. We are unable to account for these great differences between the experience of one Christian and that of another: but it has been widely admitted that the operation of 'the Living Christ' on hearts surrendered to Him is not essentially different from those operations of God which have been designated as the presence of the Divine Logos in man, the bestowal of the Holy Spirit, the Divine enlightenment of mind and conscience, and, in short, communion with God.[1] This identification does not of course call in question the objective reality of that clear personal colour which designates a certain experience as union with Christ: but it does serve to show that this experience, inasmuch as it takes place without the *direct* mediation of any external factor, physical or human, has to be grouped (like conscience and the Inner Light) with what we have called the subjective authorities, rather than with those that we call objective in the full and ordinary sense of the word.[2]

The historical life of Jesus, on the other hand, and the records we have of it, clearly belong to this latter objective group, and are therefore subject to the same conditions and qualifications which we have seen to govern the submission of the learning mind to objective authorities generally. That is to say, mighty as is the debt we owe to them for true enlightenment and inspiration and true mediation of the supremely Divine, we cannot rightly describe them as constituting our ultimate

[1] For the identification of Christ with the Spirit in the New Testament, see above p. 113 n. 2, and cf. G. Jackson in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1926, 499–512. For the Logos-doctrine in this connexion, Inge, *Authority*, 30 f. On Christ and conscience, Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 231–233 (". . . He is an authority in the sense that conscience is . . ."—unlike the authority of the Church); Curtis, in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 277a. On Christ and the Inner Light, G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light*, 7, 13, 49–59.

[2] See above, pp. 115 f, where the sense in which the word 'subjective' is here used is made clear.

authority, as unconditionally infallible, or as exempt by right from the checking, sifting, and verifying processes of the Christian disciple's mind. These words may have an offensive sound to the ears of some; for so supreme has been the service of Jesus to men, that His recorded life and teaching have not unnaturally been assumed to be the absolutely final seat of Divine authority for them.[1] But we have here stated nothing more than the plain observable facts of the case, as they are recognized and (perhaps less positively) stated by many leading Christians of unimpeachable orthodoxy.

Remembering always that we are here speaking, not of the eternal and present Christ, but of the Jesus of history, is it not true that *we choose Him* from among all the other characters of Scripture and history, as the supreme revelation of God?[2] On what ground, ultimately? Not because high claims have been advanced for Him, for the same could be said of Bar-kokba and Buddha: but only because the Divine in us (little though it may be) re-echoes, tallies with, testifies to, and enables us to recognize, the Divine in Him.[3] It follows from this, that great as is our dependence on the historical Jesus, yet our ultimate ground for trusting Him as the revealer of the Father is the Father's direct enlightenment of our hearts by His Spirit. No episode in history, however well-authenticated and however uniquely helpful, can—from

[1] H. R. Mackintosh (*Person of Christ*, 232) says in summarizing Luther: "The foundations of faith are to be laid in the recorded facts of our Lord's career as man, and anything else would be to start building from the roof." Cf. Garvie, *Beloved Disciple*, 258 (". . . Christian faith has its unshaken foundation, not in religious ideas and moral ideals, but in historical facts, in the historical personality, . . . the Son . . ."). The heroine of Mrs. Craik's *Olive* (274) naïvely co-ordinates as the two final tests of truth "the instinct of faith—the inward revelation of Himself which he" (God) "has implanted in my soul—and . . . that outward revelation, the nearest and clearest that He has ever given of Himself to men, the Divine revelation of love which I find here, in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ, my Lord."

[2] Cf. Forsyth, *Authority*, 350: "We choose this Master and His choice of us. We do not simply recognise, we choose. . . ."

[3] "To show me the Divine in human form would mean nothing new to me if I were unequipped with the capacity to recognise the Divine when I saw it. . . . Does not my power to identify the Object before me with God presuppose in me that very knowledge of God which is said to be drawn inferentially from the proposition that 'Christ is God'? Are we not in danger of circular reasoning at this point?" (L.P. Jacks in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1923, 385). See also above, pp. 117–121, and cf. Forsyth, *Authority*, 163 : ". . . we ask at once, . . . 'But how can I attach any value to Christ except as He appeals to something in me whose answer countersigns His claim? Is there not an *a priori* in me with which He must set up a harmony, even if it is a harmony pre-ordained by Himself in my creation?' This is a very telling point, and to examine it may be of much value." Dr. Forsyth discusses it accordingly, and seems to find the main answer to it in the view that the ultimate thing in religion is not knowing God, but being known by Him, which I understand to be his way of asserting the objective reality and initiative of God. But he never gets so far as to establish a negative answer to the questions he has put—at least so far as the Jesus of the human records is concerned.

the philosophical point of view—serve as the really ultimate foundation of faith: for such a foundation needs to have an absoluteness, a certainty, and a finality, which no history, in the nature of the case, can possess, and which can belong only to God's immediate witness of Himself given to us through His indwelling Spirit.[1]

Furthermore, the Inner Light, besides prompting and guaranteeing our profound veneration for Jesus as One sent from God, has to shoulder the responsibility of investigating the facts of His life, and, having investigated them, of interpreting them.[2] As it is abundantly clear that the Gospels, like the other books of the Bible, are not infallible in detail,[3] it is idle to frown upon or evade the task of determining by critical methods the probable limits of error in them—of distinguishing what He probably did do and say, from what He probably did not do and say. Critical methods are necessarily in part subjective; but none the less they have got to be used.[4]

It is no part of our present task to state in detail the conclusions to which the critical study of the Gospels points. But it may be worth while, for one or two reasons, to summarize in this place the main grounds which have led critics to regard as specially dubious and in some cases certainly inaccurate a number of statements about Jesus that rest on the unsupported testimony of the Gospel of 'Matthew.'

It is, to begin with, as well proved as any fact in the history of ancient literature is ever likely to be, that this Gospel was written later than, and was in the main based upon, the Gospel of Mark. This fact of itself should make it more than doubtful whether the Apostle Matthew wrote the Gospel that bears his name, for he would hardly need to base his work on that of one who had not been, as he had, a personal disciple of Jesus. Again, it is almost equally certain on various internal grounds that our Gospel of 'Matthew' was originally written in the language in which it has come down to us, namely Greek, whereas one of our earliest informants (Papias of Hierapolis, about 125 A.D.) tells us—what we should in any case have expected—that

[1] Cf. J. S. Haldane in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1923, 434.

[2] "In one sense obviously He is a particular historical character among other historical characters, a possible object of historical research and of purely historical contemplation; and it is a mistake so to read the story in terms of a purely abstract theology as to miss or ignore the individual traits which give reality and definition to the facts" (Rawlinson, *Authority*, 131).

[3] See above, pp. 185 fin. Cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, viii, 264.

[4] Cf. Jackson and Lake in *Beginnings of Christianity*, i. 396 f (". . . Subjective methods in such cases may give wrong results; mechanical ones will certainly do so. The compilers of the Gospels were assuredly subjective, and criticism, which is, after all, merely the attempt to reverse the process of compilation, must follow the same method"). On the reluctance to apply to the New Testament the same principles of criticism as are willingly applied to the Old, see Pryke, *Modernism*, 78–82.

the book that the Apostle Matthew compiled was in the 'Hebrew' (by which he probably means the Aramaic) language. This strong presumption against the Apostolic authorship of the book is strongly confirmed by an accumulation of historical improbabilities in it. Let the reader now judge for himself whether this language is justified. In Mk. x. 18=Lk. xviii. 19, Jesus says to the Ruler: "Why callest thou me good? No one is good except one, (namely) God"—a clearly genuine saying, for no one would have dared to invent it. In Mt. xix. 17 it becomes: "Why askest thou me about goodness? There is One who is good." In Mk. xi. 7 ff = Lk. xix. 35 ff = Jn. xii. 14 ff, Jesus rides into Jerusalem on a young ass. In Mt. xxi. 2, 7, the disciples, in obedience to His instructions, bring Him a she-ass and her colt, and lay their garments upon *them*, and he sits upon *them*. Why does the author depart from his source here in this most extraordinary way? The only conceivable reason is, not that there really were two animals there (if so, why is only one mentioned in Mark, Luke, and 'John'?), still less that Jesus rode on both of them, but that the author wanted to make the incident match as closely as he could the prophecy he had just quoted from Zech. ix. 9, in which the ass is mentioned twice over, not however in order to indicate two animals, but simply in obedience to the Hebrew usage of poetic parallelism.[1] Again, in Mk. v. 1 ff = Lk. viii. 26 ff, Jesus cures a madman on the east side of the Sea of Galilee: in Mt. viii. 28 ff, the same cure is narrated, but there are *two* madmen. Similarly, in Mk. x. 46 ff = Lk. xviii. 35 ff, Jesus cures a blind man at Jericho: in Mt. xx. 29 ff, at precisely the same point in the story, He cures *two* blind men. In Mk. xi. 12 ff, 20, Jesus curses a figtree, and *the next morning* it is found withered: in Mt. xxi. 19 f, He curses it, and it withers *immediately*. In Mk. vi. 5, we are told that at Nazareth, because of the people's unbelief, Jesus "*could not* do there *any* deed of power": in Mt. xiii. 58 it is said that " he *did not* do there *many* deeds of power." In Lk. xi. 30, Jesus says: "For as Jonah became a sign to the Ninevites, so also will the Son of Man be to this generation": in Mt. xii. 40, in precisely the same context, we read instead: "For as Jonah was in the belly of the whale three days and three nights, so will the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights." For a number of reasons which we shall have occasion to specify in detail later,[2] we may regard it as virtually certain that the Matthæan version here is a fictitious substitute for the saying accurately reported by Luke. In Mk. i. 32–34, *all* the sick are brought to Jesus, and He cures

[1] A very similar and equally gratuitous improvement on the Gospel-story is seen in Justinus Martyr's *Apology* (153 A.D.) i. 32 (cf. 54, Dial 52 f), where, on the basis of Genesis xlix. 11, it is stated that the ass on which Jesus rode was found tied to a vine!

[2] See below, pp. 322 f.

many of them: in the parallel in Mt. (viii. 16) *many* are brought, and He heals them *all*—the suggestion that there were some present whom He did not heal being thus avoided. This Gospel also frequently avoids repeating after Mark statements implying that Jesus' wishes were frustrated, or that His knowledge was limited (as the reason of His needing to ask questions), or that He was emotionally moved, or that the disciples failed to understand Him.[1] In Mt. xiv. 3 the author harks back in a parenthetical way to an earlier episode: but he speedily forgets the parenthesis, and continues (xiv. 13) as if the original sequence of his stories had not been broken. In xxvii. 51–53 the author says that *at the crucifixion* the tombs were opened by an earthquake, and that deceased saints rose out of them and appeared to many in Jerusalem *after His resurrection*. The way in which our Lord's teaching about divorce has been modified by this writer in the interests of leniency has already been referred to.[2]

The cumulative force of these details is very great, and would have been greater still, could we take the time and space to make the collection exhaustive. They are not subjective critical fancies; they are concrete, observable, objective facts: and it is idle to run away either from them or from the conclusions to which they only too obviously point, namely, that the Apostle Matthew was not the author of this Gospel, and that in its structure and contents there has been a very considerable infusion of the legendary and imaginative element. A scholar who should refuse to draw such inferences from such data in the case of a non-biblical biography would be generally adjudged deficient in the historical sense, if not criticized in still harsher terms. Yet Anglican scholars who know perfectly well that the author of this book in its present form was not the Apostle Matthew, still continue to speak of him as "St. Matthew," not only in references (where convention may be thought by some to compel), but in continuous prose (where convention does not compel and misunderstanding inevitably ensues).[3] Still more amazing is the continual quotation by such scholars of unsupported statements drawn from this Gospel as if they were assured historical facts,[4] and the denial that any dogmatic purpose is

[1] See for references Wade, *New Test. Hist.* 176 f.

[2] See above, pp. 79 f. Dr. Gore (*Infall. Book*, 41 n) mentions some of these—and half-a-dozen more—"disputable features in the First Gospel." Cf. his *Holy Spirit*, 47, 260.

[3] So, e.g., the Bishop of Salisbury in *Congress-Report* 1920, 17 (cf. 28). Dr. Headlam does the same in his *Life . . . of Jesus*, 25–29, but makes the procedure *slightly* less objectionable by observing earlier (6 n. 3): "I use the names St. Matthew, St. Mark, St. Luke, and St. John without committing myself to any opinion as to the correctness of the traditional attribution."

[4] E.g. Bishop of Zululand in *Congress-Report 1920*, 43; H. P. Bull, *ibid.* 184; Bishop of St. Albans, *ibid.* 200; Bishop of Salisbury in *Congress-Report 1923*, 159, 164 f.

discernible in the alterations which its author makes in his sources.[1] It is of no use to say that, if we go on like this, we shall dissolve the whole story of Jesus' life into a purely human story[2] or a 'Christ-myth': our alternatives are not total credulity and total scepticism here—any more than they are with any other historical document. The Gospel of 'Matthew' contains priceless material in the extracts it preserves from an ancient collection of Sayings of Jesus, probably actually compiled by the Apostle Matthew, and certainly used also in the Gospel of Luke; but this valuable feature does not guarantee the truth of the setting in which these extracts are placed in the Gospel. The tendency (probably in part unconscious) to embroider the tradition in the interests of edification is observable in the other Gospels as well, even more in the Fourth Gospel than in 'Matthew,' less in Luke, and least of all in Mark; and it is simply abandoning the quest for truth to shun the task of unearthing the facts by as careful a removal as possible of the overlying crust of legend.[3]

An essential part of the investigation of the life of Jesus is the critical search for His words and thoughts; and this task is inextricably interlocked with the deeper question of the truth and authority of His teaching. For, as we all know, there are certain elements in His recorded words which as they stand seem at first sight to conflict sharply with what on other grounds we firmly believe to be true. Different readers will naturally discover somewhat different groups of such elements; but all—even the most devout Catholic—will find some. For our own part we should, in common with many of our contemporaries, mention the following as belonging to this category:

the ascription of the Pentateuchal Law as a whole to Moses:

the ascription of Psalm cx to David (Mk. xii. 36 f and parallels):

the statement that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit will never be forgiven:

"these enemies of mine who did not wish me to reign over them, bring them here, and slaughter them before me" (Lk. xix. 27; contrast xv. 4–7 = Mt. xviii. 12–14):

[1] Headlam, *Life . . . of Jesus*, 27–30 (". . . It is, I think, possible to maintain that there was some tendency, probably unconscious, in St. Matthew to omit expressions which might seem to be over-familiar from a sense of reverence, but that is the utmost that can be maintained . . . there is no evidence for any dogmatic purpose, deliberate or even unconscious, in the alterations that he makes. We can in all essentials trust St. Matthew's use of St. Mark, and we may assume that his use of his other sources was similar." Etc.). Somewhat similarly, Sir E. C. Hoskyns in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 164–171. Per contra, N. P. Williams, *ibid.* 379 f.

[2] So K. E. Kirk in *Congress-Report 1923*, 55.

[3] Even Dr. Forsyth, despite the severe things he sometimes said about human judgment in matters of religion, and his contempt for the 'lust for lucidity,' admitted the necessity for "our critical reductions in the record" (*Authority*, 330; cf. 376).

the belief in demon-possession and exorcism, and, in a lesser degree, the belief in a personal Satan: also details in regard to angels (e.g. Mt. xviii. 10, xxvi. 53):

much of the eschatology: Gehenna-fire, and the retention of the earthly body with its limbs in the next life (Mt. v. 29 f = xviii. 8 f = Mk. ix. 43–48): "eternal punishment" (Mt. xxv. 46): the prophecy that Jesus Himself will return on the clouds *within the space of one generation* (Mk. ix. 1, xiii. 24–32, xiv. 62, and the parallels):

the traces of determinism (Mt. vi. 13a = Lk. xi. 4b; Mt. xv. 13; Mt. xxvi. 54; Jn. xvii. 12 end).

Good Christians have often got very indignant with one another on account of their suggestions in regard to these things, and charges of irreverence, heterodoxy, and even blasphemy, have been bandied about, though the difficulty is so serious that even the orthodox possess no uniform solution. Broadly speaking, there are five conceivable solutions, not all mutually exclusive.

1. It is supposed that *Jesus said these things, and meant them to be taken literally; and we must take them at their face-value and believe them; otherwise we are wrong.* This view commends itself to the Christian instinct for reverence and humility, and is accordingly taken by Roman Catholics and others in regard to many of the passages referred to (e.g. demon-possession, authorship of Old-Testament books, etc.). It is the easiest to harmonize with the theory of the Saviour's omniscience and infallibility, to which many cling.[1] We shall suggest later that there are aspects of Jesus' teaching in regard to which such an attitude is the only right one: but those are deep questions concerning ethical and religious values, not (as here) matters of history, science, and current Jewish beliefs. But it is doubtful whether anyone—Catholic or Protestant—feels bound to accept *all* recorded sayings of Jesus in their literal sense. It has long been customary among all Christians to accept some parts of Scripture in a non-literal sense; and this suggests our second possible solution, which is

2. that *Jesus said these things, and therefore we must believe them: but that He meant them, not in the literal sense, but in some metaphorical or other sense conformable to our own ideas of truth.* Here again, the Saviour's infallibility is safeguarded; and so elastic is the method of interpretation allowed, that one cannot be surprised that this is the solution favoured by most ordinary Christians who wish to preserve

[1] Dr. Forsyth admits the necessity of criticizing the Gospels, but says (*Authority*, 332): "it is no part of the Church's own true freedom to work critically upon Him (as distinct from the record) and to judge our judge. A true freedom works critically *from* Him. It accepts His Word against our own judgment in obedience of intellect" etc. But see below, p. 216 n. 5.

the ancient faith without subscribing to anything clearly incredible.[1] Nor is it to be hastily rejected. Figurative and metaphorical language *was* used by the Jews generally and by our Lord; and it is difficult to say exactly how far He carried the use of it. But one cannot escape the impression that to apply this theory all round could rightly be described as special pleading. We should not dream of exonerating the Jewish apocalyptists and Jesus' contemporaries generally of all error by interpreting all their apparently inaccurate statements metaphorically. Yet these were the people with whom Jesus spoke; and it seems unlikely that the use of metaphor can have been disproportionately more habitual with Him than with them.[2] To have recourse to figurative interpretation whenever Jesus' words clash with modern knowledge or belief, in order to maintain the complete conformity of our beliefs with His words, is an unnatural and forced proceeding, which does violence to the instinct of truth.

3. A by-form of this theory is the view that *Jesus said these things, but did not mean them: in saying them, He was simply bringing Himself down to the intellectual level of His hearers* (as an adult does when talking to children about fairies, etc.) and not troubling to enlighten them in matters unessential to His Gospel. There are some of our difficult passages to which this form of the theory would apply better than does the preceding.[3] But it cannot be said to be very helpful. It ascribes to Jesus the use of a method which, in the case of another man, would be held to be ethically questionable, and which—judged historically and psychologically—certainly does not seem inherently likely. Many therefore take refuge in another view, namely,

4. that *Jesus never said these things at all, and that the ascription of them to Him is due to misunderstanding or legendary enlargement.* This theory is probably true as regards some at least of the passages, e.g. the special *emphasizing* of the eschatology in 'Matthew,'[4] some of the apparently deterministic sayings, and the specific mention of 'eternal punishment,' which occurs in a picture of the Last Judgment apparently not given, at least in its present form, by Jesus Himself.[5] But

[1] E.g. Rev. A. D. Martin in *Congreg. Quart.* Apl. 1927, 254–256, à propos of Jesus' eschatological predictions, which, he contends, are to be taken in a poetical and imaginative sense.

[2] Cf. Bezzant in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1926, 621.

[3] Cf. Plummer, *St. Luke* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') 473 top.

[4] Cf. Streeter in *Studies in the Synoptic Problem*, 424 ff.

[5] The picture seems to deal with the question, How will pagans (ἔθνη, Mt. xxv. 32), who never got to know Christ in this life, fare at the Last Judgment? The answer is: According to whether they were kind or negligent to needy Christians. Such a question is far more likely to have been raised in the times of the early Church than during the Lord's earthly life.

it certainly will not serve for all. Where, as in the cases just mentioned, we have *documentary* (*or historical*) grounds for doubting the accuracy of the report, it is allowable to do so. Where, however, as is the case with many of these hard passages, the documentary evidence is satisfactory, it is very dubious whether we ought to argue that Jesus could not have said so-and-so, because it seems to us either untrue or unideal or inconsistent with something else which He is reported to have said and which pleases us better. This argument, for instance, has recently been used in order to prove that most of the eschatological teaching in the Gospels is erroneously ascribed to Jesus, inasmuch as it is apparently inconsistent with His clearly true and original gospel of the love of God.[1] But our criteria for judging what is psychologically possible, whether in the case of men generally, or in that of our Lord in particular, are far too inexact to allow of more than the very roughest and most tentative suggestions (supposing the documentary and historical evidence to be satisfactory) in regard to what He could or could not have said.[2]

5. We are thus left with the last alternative, viz: that *Jesus said some at least of these things and was mistaken in saying them.* Apart from wide differences in application, this principle is now very generally accepted by orthodox Protestant scholars. It is based on Jesus' own clear declaration that His knowledge was limited, at least in one important matter (Mk. xiii. 32 and parallels). That His knowledge was limited in other respects also is the only natural inference we can draw from the fact that He repeatedly asked people questions—on one occasion when delicacy would presumably have withheld Him from asking, had He known the answer (the case of the woman with the issue, Mk. v. 30 ff and parallels).[3] That in all ordinary matters of human knowledge He was subject to the normal limits of humanity generally, is not only consonant with the best attested facts of His life, but is strongly suggested by the statement that in youth "He progressed in wisdom and in stature" (Lk. ii. 52). Belief in Jesus' infallibility and omniscience is, for these strong reasons, frankly given up by a large number of leading Protestant scholars, though most of them carefully guard themselves by limiting

[1] Dougall and Emmet, *The Lord of Thought* (1922), passim.

[2] Cf. Baden Powell in *Essays and Reviews*, 132: "The most seemingly improbable events in *human* history may be perfectly credible, on sufficient testimony, however contradicting ordinary experience of human motives and conduct—simply because we cannot assign any limits to the varieties of human dispositions, passions, or tendencies, or to the extent to which they may be influenced by circumstances of which, perhaps, we have little or no knowledge to guide us."

[3] It is true that Eastern taste differs from Western—also that Jesus in asking aimed simply at identifying the person who had touched Him: nevertheless, the woman's subsequent 'fear and trembling' seem to confirm our natural supposition that, in this case, the process of being identified was a painful ordeal.

His limitations in some strict way.[1] Perhaps the most widely recognized instance of a real limitation of Jesus' knowledge is His ascription of Psalm cx to David, whose authorship in this case modern criticism with fair unanimity denies.[2] It is, however, particularly explained by some who take this view that our Lord's ignorance as to the true authorship of the Psalm did not affect the infallibility of His actual 'teaching.'[3] Another very generally accepted instance is Jesus' eschatological forecast, which, if understood in the natural sense of the words, was certainly not historically fulfilled in the form in which He announced it.[4]

Christian theologians are ready with a theory which finds room in the Christology of the Creeds for a certain limitation of Jesus' knowledge during His earthly life. It is the theory of 'kenosis' or 'emptying'—based upon Paul's statement that Jesus "emptied Himself" (Phil. ii. 7), and suggesting that in the Incarnation the Son of God temporarily laid aside certain of the metaphysical, as distinct from the ethical, attributes of Deity, viz. omnipresence, omnipotence, and omniscience, and confined Himself in these respects within the limits of the human.[5]

[1] Martineau, *Essays*, i. 186 f (". . . Will anyone plainly say, with these things before him, that Jesus was infallible, and that in his spoken language we have a standard of doctrinal truth? . . ."); Fairbairn, *Christ in Modern Theology*, 353, *Cathol.* 232; J. Drummond in *Jesus or Christ?* (*Hibb. Journ. Suppt.*), 197; Temple in *Foundations*, 213 ("Where is the evidence that Jesus of Nazareth was omniscient?. . . "), 250; Rawlinson, *ibid.* 368 ("He . . . was in nowise exempted from such intellectual limitations, or even (within the spheres of science and history) from such erroneous conceptions of fact, as were inseparable from the use of the mental categories of the age and generation among whom He came"); Talbot (Bishop of Pretoria) in *Church Times* 27 Feb. 1925 (quoted by Woodlock, *Modernism*, 40 f note); Grubb, *Authority*, 79–81; W. H. Rigg (Evangelical Anglican) in *Expos. Times*, Apl. 1927, 311b.

[2] Stanton, *Authority*, 84–87; Kirkpatrick, *Psalms* ('Camb. Bib.') 661–663; Briggs, *Psalms* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') ii. 375 f; Driver, *Intro. to Lit. of O.T.* XII f; Gore, *Infall. Book*, 25–27. His belief in the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is a very similar case. On his acceptance of the historicity of the Book of Jonah, see below, pp. 332 f.

[3] Driver, *loc. cit.*; Gore, *loc. cit.* (". . . He cannot be said to *teach* anything but what is of eternal validity about God and nature and man"), *Holy Spirit*, 157 f, 180, 258.

[4] Cf. Rawlinson, *Authority*, 141: "The mind of the Jesus of history was primarily that of a Prophet, and His outlook in large measure the eschatological outlook of later Judaism. The deeper values discoverable in Him, and the doctrine of the Incarnation itself, do not alter this fact. And the mind of a prophet is neither omniscient nor primarily predictive. . . . His vision of the future takes normally the form of a symbolic eschatology not destined to be literally fulfilled. Not otherwise does it appear to have been in the case of our Lord . . ."

[5] See Loofs' valuable art. in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 680–687, and cf. Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in Hist.* 602 f. Curiously enough, Dr. Forsyth, who so belittled the higher-critical attempts to restore the actual figure of the historical Jesus (*Authority*, 137–140, 143–145, 150, 158, 356, 416 f) and protested against "judging our judge" (see above, p. 213 n. 1), yet says: "We allow duly for our critical reductions in the record, and *for His own kenotic self-limitations* in the fact" (330 bott.: italics mine).

We have no concern with this theory here except to acknowledge its value in freeing the quest for the historical Jesus from the necessity (which orthodoxy has long been understood to impose) of finding Him to be infallible, whatever the evidence might be. If kenotists mean what they say, we need not be deterred from facing the facts by partisan exaggerations or panic-stricken outcries.[1] We are not bound to infer from the grandeur of our Lord's figure or from the Church's doctrine of His Person that, during His earthly ministry, He could not have shared in any degree the native determinism of the Semitic mind, that, if He did share it, His words would always have been consistent with it, that He allowed His training as a child in the venerable Scriptures and other sacred traditions and beliefs of His people to introduce into His mind nothing but undiluted and permanent truth fully consistent with the heart of His Gospel, that He could never have uttered—under the influence of apocalyptic literature—prophecies not destined to be fulfilled. To surrender the infallibility of Jesus in matters of history and science, and yet try to retain it in regard to the intellectual forms in which His characteristic religious teaching was couched, is not really possible, for the simple reason that the two fields, though broadly distinguishable, shade off imperceptibly into one another on their borders. Such a position would involve either denying or ignoring or else twisting a good many of His reported sayings, and is moreover untenable on a priori grounds. For when we doubt, say, the existence of 'eternal punishment' or of an unpardonable sin (assuming for the moment that the Gospel-sayings on these topics are correctly attributed to Jesus [2]), our doubt springs from precisely that self-revelation of God within by virtue of which ultimately we see in Jesus the incarnation of God, and from regard for that element in God's nature which is manifested to us supremely in and through Jesus, namely, God's Fatherly love. If that inward guidance can substantiate the one judgment, why should it be unable to substantiate the other? [3]

[1] Protestants are stated by Father Michael Müller (*Catholic Dogma* [1888] 67—see above p. 56 n. 4) to believe in a kind of Christ "whom they can make a liar with impunity, whose doctrines they can interpret as they please . . ." Cf. N. P. Williams in *Congress-Report 1920*, 64: "we would recall men's minds to the incommunicable and ineffable magnificence of our Divine Saviour's prerogatives as Supreme Teacher, Legislator, Priest and King, in opposition to the 'reduced Christianity' which views Him merely as a human Prophet, conditioned and limited by the ignorance of His time, a teller of picturesque stories or a purveyor of delusive apocalyptic alarms."

[2] See below, pp. 524–526.

[3] See above, chap. VIII, esp. pp. 162 f. Dr. Forsyth uses emphatic language in maintaining the infallibility of Jesus. "Whatever He taught or did is true and final in the sense in which He taught or did it" (*Authority*, 330): " . . . (to sharpen the issue by an impossibility) if Christ clearly said one thing and every conscience in the world clearly said another, it is with Christ we should have to go" (*op. cit.* 423; cf. 307, 331). It is true that acceptance of Jesus as the Word of the Father involves the recognition

It cannot however be too strongly insisted on, that to disbelieve the intellectual infallibility of Jesus does not involve denial of His Divinity or His authority, or the refusal of true and loyal reverence to Him as Lord and Saviour. To assume that it does is to advance a kind of argument which, if used in any other connexion than this, would be regarded as plainly unfair. Why is it that in religion—a sphere in which, if anywhere, the utmost fairness and truthfulness are called for—men should judge on the one hand so perversely, and on the other hand so timidly? Let us therefore go on to complete our case by a thankful and humble acknowledgment of the greatness of God's gift to us sinful men in the life of His Son, our Redeemer. Naturally enough, the Christian's love and loyalty to Him gather around the entire figure of Christ, the Christ of human history, the One who is revealed both in the books of the New Testament generally and in mystical and evangelical experience throughout the Christian era.[1] But as has been more than once pointed out, all this experience of Christ is associated with and dependent upon some knowledge of the historical facts of His life on earth, which (despite the Pauline abandonment of knowing Him "according to the flesh") was after all the beginning and foundation in history of Christian experience and the Christian Church.[2] Here we have the justification of the persistent efforts of historical critics to reconstruct our Lord's earthly life and teaching, as in all probability they actually were. Here too lies the importance of His ethical teaching and example for the guidance of modern Christian life and for the settlement of modern ethical problems. There has been a great tendency among Christians, especially in recent decades, to think rather lightly of our Lord's ethical teaching. Sometimes this tendency rests upon a horror of legalism—a horror that delights to cry: "Love God and do as you please!" Sometimes it springs from the idea that the presence of the Christ-spirit within supersedes all external legislation, sometimes from a mistaken belief that Jesus taught that the externals do not matter, but that all depends on the state of the heart, sometimes from the

of an inward sphere or element of infallibility in Him. We can discern this in His central and characteristic teaching (especially where its content cannot be accounted for by the influence of Jewish upbringing, etc.) and in the constant *direction* of His mind and conduct: but we cannot delimit it with precision, still less can we extend it without qualification to include "whatever He taught or did . . . in the sense in which He taught or did it."

[1] Cf. Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 276 f.

[2] Cf. F. R. Tennant in *Construct. Quart.* Mar. 1920, 37 (". . . The spiritual experiences of our exalted moments doubtless find with us their natural explanation in the doctrine of a living, indwelling Christ. But the doctrine cannot be extracted from the experiences; it must be brought to them from elsewhere—from the historical, the objective, the real, as distinguished from the illusory . . . "), and J. S. Bezzant in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1926, 617 f.

other mistaken belief that Jesus' eschatological expectations, or else the different conditions of the world of his day as compared with our own, unfit His ethics for application to modern social life. We are in the presence of a big problem here, the discussion of which would take us too far afield: but we would submit that, basic for ethical conduct as are the inner motive, the love for God, the presence of the indwelling Christ, yet men need the guidance of an external teacher in comparative moral values (for the solution of dilemmas as well as for the mere knowledge of what is good in the abstract), just as, despite their logical endowments, they need teachers in mathematics and science. To give a man no more legislation for his moral life than: "Love God and do as you please," is like telling a man to learn chemistry by using his powers of observation and neglecting all text-books. As a matter of fact, we all do receive authoritative teaching in morals—in our early years, from teachers whom we have not chosen, and later on, from teachers whom we choose. The historical Jesus is, through His teaching and example, the modern Christian's legislator and pattern; and the admitted need of interpreting and adapting His example and teaching to our own case, does not alter the fact that we have in Him—and must have in Him—a supreme objective authority to interpret and apply. Jesus is a unique objective moral authority because, by evoking a unique response from our deepest selves, He reveals Himself as the human image of the Invisible God.[1]

In illustration of the dependence of the Christian conscience on the ethical teaching of Jesus, I would mention, in the first place, the principle of returning good for evil, and in the second place, the Christian sex-ethic. The first of these is highly controversial, and has become especially so since 1914. In fact, the desire to prove that service in the trenches had the sanction of Christ lent potent support to the view that His ethical teaching had no binding authority as if it were a code of laws. Yet the opinions of many on this point have undergone a profound change since 1918. In any case we have here a principle of conduct, the wisdom of which is not at all obvious at first sight, but to which Jesus committed Himself and His followers, despite the national character of his rôle and His con-

[1] Cf. Martineau's confession in *Essays*, iii. 50 f ("And if it hath pleased God the Creator to fit up one system with one Sun, to make the daylight of several worlds; so may it fitly have pleased God the Revealer to kindle amid the ecliptic of history One Divine Soul, to glorify whatever lies within the great year of his moral Providence, and represent the Father of Lights. The exhibition of Christ as his Moral Image has maintained in the souls of men a common spiritual type to correct the aberrations of their individuality, to unite the humblest and the highest, to merge all minds into one family,—and *that*, the family of God"); A. T. Cadoux, *Essays*, 89; W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 683 f.

cern over the political tension between Judaea and Rome. A principle so integral to His whole vision of God and of His mission, and so contrary to normal human feeling and to Messianic prophecy, can be adjudged only an essential part of the new way of life which He came to reveal and to which those who believe on Him are therefore bound.[1] On the question of sex-ethic I have already briefly touched.[2] In sex-experiences we have a department of life entirely sui generis: there is nothing else in our make-up like it, nothing to compare with it, nothing to throw full light on it. Its ultimate meaning is beyond our vision, and yet it is insistent in its pressure upon human interest and attention: it is fraught at once with the sublimest as well as with the most degrading possibilities. In such a situation we need authoritative guidance as to the Will and purpose of God; and we are not likely to find the truth without it. Whom better can we trust than Him whose insight so far surpasses our own? His judgment in this matter clearly sprang directly from His insight: it was not simply a derivative from the views of His race and age, a mere repetition of current teaching; nor was it materially affected by the special conditions of His personal calling. It has therefore a distinctly better claim on the obedience of Christians than the guesses (or preferences) of other teachers or of themselves.

While on these—and upon ethical questions generally—a clear judgment pronounced by Jesus (when we can get it) thus takes precedence of all other judgment (so that a conscience that should declare it right to return evil for evil or to practise fornication would have to be pronounced mistaken),[3] yet the acceptance of the authority of Jesus involves at least the potential right to test and verify the wisdom of His rulings in actual experience. Even in the two somewhat controversial examples I have referred to, it may reasonably be claimed that this verification is little by little being carried out.[4] On the question of sex in particular, it is remarkable how the sanity of His lofty dictates has been vindicated by nineteen centuries of Christian loyalty—a loyalty maintained, not only out of reverence for Him, but also with a sense of the practical value and helpfulness of His guidance, and maintained

[1] See below, pp. 548 f.

[2] See above, pp. 79–81.

[3] This does not contradict what was said above (p. 217 with n. 3), because
(1) Jesus' *characteristic* ethics cannot be explained as the fruit of His environment:
(2) belief in their *general* inerrancy is involved in the Christian acceptance of His person and teaching as a whole:
(3) they do not contradict the considered judgment of the human conscience:
(4) their wisdom is verified by our experience.
See above, pp. 164–166.

too, not (like some customs) as a concession to human weakness, but in the teeth of the strongest incentives that arise from man's animal nature. Our verification, partial though it be, is not to be despised. But for a full share of Jesus' Divine insight into the deep vistas of truth and goodness we must be content to wait until God removes the veil from before our eyes.

The authority of Jesus, however, does not consist only in His right as a moral legislator. That authority exists—as has already been suggested—because in a unique sense Jesus is the representative of God: and God's ministry to us through Him does not consist only in giving us moral laws, but includes the bestowal of power to keep them—a power that springs from knowledge of God, vision of God, and fellowship with God. An unreal antithesis between law and grace has indeed been allowed to vitiate much of our thinking. Even to recognize an imperative as a moral law means that God's grace has already in some way enlightened the heart. But in any case it is Jesus Himself who makes us feel as none other can the majesty of duty, makes us feel too the wisdom and truth of the content He gave to duty, and the holiness and love and forgiveness and bounty of the God whose Will our duty is. Hence a New Testament author calls Him "the pioneer and completer of our faith" (Heb. xii. 2). Hence comes the Christian confession, "Jesus is Lord," which, says Paul, no one can make except by the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. xii. 3). Jesus is the image of the Invisible God, the embodiment and expression of the Divine in human life: God was in Him, reconciling the world unto Himself. God has purposed that we should share the likeness of His Son, in order that He might be the first-born among many brothers.

But what, it will inevitably be asked, is your attitude to the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation, and to the Christology of the Christian Creeds? What have you to say to the persistent charge that modernism, with its emphasis on the human Jesus, inevitably leads to a negative and unevangelical Unitarianism? To this I would answer—

1. If these traditional doctrines enshrined in the Creeds be true, they must necessarily be in harmony with all other truth, including the historical facts of our Lord's life and teaching, and also the experience of Him that men have had since the days of His life on earth. These are matters more or less within our power to discern, and in tracing out our discernment of them before inferring our doctrine, we have followed the only right order of procedure: and any mistake we have made will be demonstrable on historical grounds. Our order is not: First ask what the Creeds say, and then read the evidence so as to

fit it, but: Read the evidence simply and fairly, and on it build the Creed.[1]

2. Many of the statements about Jesus of which the Creeds are composed, and on which the credal Christology is built, were accepted simply on the authority of the New Testament, by men who, with all their glowing devotion to our Lord, had neither the will nor the ability to put them to the test of historical credibility. When we now put them to the test, some of them fail to pass it. Detailed discussion now is impossible, and brevity must not be interpreted as cavalier dogmatism: but we may note the following points. Much of the credal Christology rests upon statements made by the author of the Fourth Gospel and upon words ascribed by him to Jesus. The former are admittedly an interpretation, which, however valuable, is not couched in infallible or eternally valid terms: the latter (as is indeed widely admitted) cannot be regarded as ipsissima verba of Jesus, though of course they are important for the indirect light they throw on the greatness of Him to whom it was thought fitting to ascribe them. On the strength of the Fourth Gospel, it used to be assumed that Jesus was conscious of, and taught, His own personal pre-existence from all eternity. There is no evidence for this in the Synoptics [2]—i.e. there is no evidence for it at all, for Paul's belief in it is clearly an inference from the Messiahship and not based on anything Jesus said. The Virgin-Birth is unequivocally asserted by 'Matthew' alone among New Testament authors; for Luke's language, though in two places (Lk. i. 34 f, iii. 23) clearly meant to convey it, in others is ambiguous, and in others again definitely incompatible with it. In 'Matthew,' the event is said to fulfil a prophecy—which is rather the inaccurate Greek rendering of a prophecy—in the Old Testament; and we have already seen that there are abundant grounds for declining to trust this Gospel where its evidence for a miraculous narrative has no strong independent support.[3] The omniscience of Jesus is, as we have seen, clearly inconsistent with the records we have of Him.[4]

[1] So R. C. Moberly in *Lux Mundi*, 177 (vi): "Councils, we admit, and Creeds, cannot go behind, but must wholly rest upon the history of our Lord Jesus Christ." Similarly, Moxon, *Modernism*, 140.

[2] We know far too little about the precise meaning of the phrase 'the Son of Man' to assume that the use of it by Jesus implied a claim to pre-existence (Harris, *Creeds or No Creeds?* 367 f), while to see pre-existence in the aorist εὐδόκησα in the words Jesus heard at baptism, is quite erroneous. The Greek aorist simply stands for an Aramaic perfect, which, in the case of a stative verb like this, would normally have the sense of an English present. And in any case, there are the previous thirty years of Jesus' life to which the past tense might apply. Nor is the exegesis of Mt. xxiii. 34 = Lk. xi. 49 clear enough to prove that in this saying Jesus was alluding to His pre-existence.

[3] See above, pp. 209–212. On the Virgin-birth, see the detailed discussion below, pp. 348–356.

[4] See above, pp. 215–217.

The 'Nature-miracles' (feeding the crowd, walking on the water, stilling the storm, blasting the fig-tree, turning water to wine) must be put in a different category from the miracles of healing, despite the plea that the science that once doubted the latter doubts them no more, and may therefore some day cease to doubt the former.[1] Admitting in the abstract that anything is possible and anything may become credible, we are yet bound to frame our beliefs according to the light we have; and, as things are and will in all probability remain, both the scientific and the historical grounds adduced in support of the Nature-miracles are insufficient to compel belief. For the healing-miracles we have the earliest documentary evidence ('Q' contains no Nature-miracle) and close analogies in scientific experience: it is far harder historically to believe that they did not occur, than to believe that they did. The Nature-miracles, on the other hand, are precisely of the type that quickly gather around the memory of great leaders in most religions. They all have fairly obvious symbolic significance; and in the case of one of them (the fig-tree) Luke actually has in place of the Marco-Matthæan miracle a parable (xiii. 6–9), which bears on its face the stamp of genuineness.[2] Among the Nature-miracles, the resurrection ranks as the most essential. The Creeds do not explicitly rule out a spiritualizing interpretation of the resurrection-incidents, probably because it occurred to no one in the early days to suggest it. There can be no doubt that their authors had a physical resurrection in mind. But a physical resurrection (implying an emptied tomb) involves a physical ascension, for which the New Testament evidence is very weak (Luke alone clearly asserts it—in Acts) and which in the light of modern cosmology is meaningless, not to say incredible. The objective-vision-theory does far less violence to our knowledge of the universe, and—when due allowance is made for the psychology and mental habits of the first Christians and the evangelists—can fairly be said to satisfy the documentary and historical data. At the same time it preserves the cardinal truth of the continuance of Jesus' life in triumph.[3] On the whole, then, it cannot be denied that what we know to-day about the Gospels puts a very different complexion on many of the alleged facts out of which the Creeds were built: and "doctrines originally asserted dogmatically on a historical basis which no longer exists or which is historically very doubtful cannot be dogmatically asserted on some other basis, unless they are matters of moral and religious experience." [4]

[1] So Headlam, *Life . . . of Jesus*, 194.

[2] See above, pp. 195–198, and cf. Sanday, *Divine Overruling*, 64 f, 72 f, 75.

[3] Cf. the present writer's pamphlet, *The Resurrection and Second Advent of Jesus* (Independent Press, 1927).

[4] Bezzant in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1926, 624 f.

3. The Creeds, as philosophical syntheses of certain data of history and religious experience, do not for many to-day fulfil the primary function of a philosophical synthesis, viz: to clarify and simplify the data without injustice to any part of them.[1] The Chalcedonian doctrine, for instance, of the two distinct natures—Divine and human—united in the single person of our Lord is an unfairly heavy yoke to impose on the mind of a modern Christian, unless indeed he be allowed to understand 'natures' simply as 'qualities.' However little we may to-day be able to plumb "the abysmal deeps of Personality," the theologians of the fifth and preceding centuries were still less able. They have given us a 'Person of Christ' which we cannot recognize as a real human being at all. Well has Dr. Temple said: "The formula of Chalcedon is, in fact, a confession of the bankruptcy of Greek Patristic Theology."[2] It might almost be said that all modern constructive christological thought starts from the abandonment of it. Even Dr. Gore admits that modernism "is a reaction for which the Catholic Church is largely responsible. Over long ages it obscured the full Gospel reality of our Lord's humanity."[3] And it obscured it chiefly by means of the Chalcedonian definition. The Catholic view is openly said to imply that Christ "has . . . no human personality."[4] Moreover, when it comes to meeting objections brought against the Creeds, reasoned defence

[1] In *God and the Supernatural* (169), Father Cuthbert says that the Catholic belief in Christ is not put forth as a philosophical conclusion, but as a Divine revelation. Similarly, as regards the Trinity, etc., Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 164. From another angle, Moxon also (*Modernism*, 207, 209 f) maintains that the Creeds are not metaphysical or philosophical: their interest, he says, is ethical and practical. But it is clear historically that the Christology of the Creeds *was* the result of a series of attempts at a philosophical synthesis.

[2] *Foundations*, 230. Cf. H. R. Mackintosh, *Person of Jesus Christ*, 209–215, 292–299; K. E. Kirk in *Congress-Report 1923*, 52; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 228–243; Mackintosh in *Expos.* July 1924, 66 f; J. K. Mozley in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 190, 192.

[3] *Church Times* quoted in *Public Opinion*, 30 Sept. 1921, 327: cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 290, and Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 233 f (widespread reluctance to assert Christ's humanity).

[4] Woodlock, *Modernism*, 36. Cf. Kirk in *loc. cit.*; J. K. Mozley in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 192 f (defence of doctrine "that Christ's human nature is impersonal"); Srawley in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 215a; Rev. Sir E. Hoskyns in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1928, 21 (" . . . the Creeds quite pointedly exclude human personality from their picture of the Christ"). Cf. also the way in which Anselm evades belief in the plain statements of the N.T. regarding the human nature of Jesus (*Cur Deus Homo?* i. 9 ["Potest hoc et eo modo intelligi, quo idem Dominus legitur profecisse sapientia et gratia apud Deum; non quia ita erat, sed quia ille sic se habebat, ac si ita esset"], 10 ["et didicit ex his, quae passus est, obedientiam, id est, quam magna res facienda sit per obedientiam"]). In the endeavour to prove the thesis that Jesus claimed to be God, Father Knox (*Belief of Caths.* 104–113) is reduced to arguing that Jesus took special steps to prevent people forgetting that He was also man: hence He narrated His temptation, and "his Agony in . . . Gethsemani shows once more *the intention to parade* (you might almost say) his human weakness. He insisted upon having witnesses at hand. . . . I have never been able to make any sense of these two stories, except on the assumption that our Lord meant to say, 'See, I am Man, although I am God' . . ." (italics mine).

seldom rallies about the specific assertions of their clauses, but concentrates on the one supreme issue, viz: the certain, unmistakable and unique presence of God in Jesus' life.[1] This is the modern counterpart of the Athanasian contention that salvation must proceed from a source at least as high and Divine as that from which creation proceeded.[2] It is a truth to which the position taken in these pages is entirely loyal, but for the statement of which the phrases embodied in the Creeds are not necessarily indispensable.[3]

4. We plead for a more adequate recognition of the fact that the Divine Nature is beyond the reach of exact human analysis, and does not lend itself to that method of sharp definition which the Creeds attempt.[4] We are not called on to criticize the men who felt led—indeed compelled—to frame them: they themselves often admitted the insufficiency of the human instrument for the task.[5] Still, the fact remains that they did attempt the task; and the Creeds are the result. To feel dissatisfaction with these Creeds, and even to refuse to be bound by them, must not be treated as if it were either a slight on their authors or a blindness to the unspeakable and wondrous realities they were attempting to affirm. It is perfectly possible to render as worthy honour to God the Father as the most devout Catholic can render, to love and obey Jesus Christ His Son our Lord, and to submit oneself to the gracious control of His Holy Spirit, without at the same time yielding to that rigorous logical process which pushes the mind on to the acceptance of the Creeds by dint of a repeated 'either . . . or . . .,' to that dichotomous insistence on one antithesis after another, and this in a region of thought far too mysterious and sublime to yield to any such humble instrument as human logic.[6]

[1] E.g. Rawlinson, *Mark* ('Westminster Commentary'), xxii ("No form of Christianity which denies the affirmation made in A.D. 325 at Nicaea, viz.: that the historical person, Jesus of Nazareth, is in His essential being eternally one with the Eternal Father, has any future before it"). Cf. Cuthbert in *God and the Supernatural*, 168 bott. ("If Christ were not in very truth both God and Man, if He were not the Divine Life Itself manifested in a real human life, . . .").

[2] Cf. Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 213.

[3] An admirable modern attempt to re-state the Chalcedonian doctrine in modern terms is made by Quick, *Liberalism*, 108–148. Cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 228–243, and (for Nicene Creed) J. S. Lidgett in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1927, 54–58.

[4] This is recognized in the abstract by Anglo-Catholics; cf. e.g. Moxon, *Modernism*, 24 f.

[5] See above, pp. 88 f.

[6] Cf. S. Cave in *Expos. Times*, Mar. 1926, 253a: "To others of us it seems better to abandon altogether the attempt to interpret Christ to our age in the categories of a philosophy which is not only obsolete, but incongruous with Christian values. The ancient formulae, as Schleiermacher pointed out long ago, are self-contradictory. In the doctrine of the Trinity as we have it in St. Augustine, the 'Athanasian' creed and St. Thomas Aquinas, the unity of the Godhead is so strongly emphasized as to make meaningless the dominant Christology in which Christ is regarded as the

The divinity of our Lord and the authority that rests upon it must be looked for, not—where many have looked for it—in the evidence of physical marvels and the final pronouncements of ancient Creeds, but in the moral and religious grandeur of His life, the truth of His words, and His proved power to save men from sin and to bring them to the Father.

incarnate Son of God. If Christianity be, as we believe, a religion not of 'deification' but of communion, then no philosophy of 'substance' can be adequate for its expression."

CHAPTER XII

THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

MAN is dependent for enlightenment in regard to the truth upon the testimony and teaching of those who know better than he does. This fact—already repeatedly stated in these pages—is well exemplified in the personal experience of each one of us, particularly in the earlier years of our life. Without choosing or being consulted, we come under the influence of a variety of teachers, and, before we are aware of what has happened, we have received from them a multitude of beliefs, many of which will remain with us through life. As we grow up, and become accustomed to investigating questions on our own initiative and forming independent judgments in regard to them, we find it necessary now and then to abandon a belief instilled into us by the guardians of our youth. Yet—unless our experience has been exceptionally unhappy—we recognize that it was good for us to have been at first so much taught by others, and that for the most part our best wisdom consisted during those early years in allowing our immature opinions and notions to be corrected by the dogmatic assertions of our trusted elders. We understand, furthermore, what it was that gave them the right to form our opinions for us: it was their relatively longer and richer experience of life—an experience itself founded on the gathered wisdom of the race at large.[1]

Not otherwise is it with the things of God. We need our teachers. The teacher in religion is constituted by the depth and reality of his spiritual experience. He has seen and known—and also learnt: therefore he has a right to speak, and to be listened to with docility.[2] We have already studied especially the authority of those men of ancient times, whose experience is enshrined for us in the Bible: we have studied too the unique authority of Him whose oneness with God gives Him so central a place among those from whom we must learn. And now we have to study the authority of the Church—the claim of the common Christian tradition and witness upon our humble attention and regard. As a man cannot learn geometry or history or medicine without allowing his personal opinions to be authoritatively guided by those who before him have been exercised in these several things, so the individual Christian cannot learn of the things that God is telling

[1] Cf. W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 680 bott.; A. E. Taylor in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 72 f.

[2] Taylor in *op. cit.* 73, 80.

us in and through Jesus Christ unless he hearkens with deference to the witness of the Christian Church. The point is plain and certain, and need not be further laboured here, especially since, besides being insisted on by the Catholic and Anglican Churches, it is in principle frankly admitted by virtually all Christian bodies.[1]

No doubt, therefore, there is ample justification for insisting that the individual Christian should not presume to settle his beliefs on the strength of his own unaided Inner Light, without having recourse in addition "to the teaching and usages of the Church as aids in the formation of his own judgment":[2] and our Catholic friends would do well to note that, whatever else the principle of private judgment may mean for us, it certainly does not mean indifference to the authority of the Church. Doubtless, too, it is right to plead that the individual Christian, if he criticizes the Church at all, should do so 'from within,' i.e. with an eye to his indebtedness and responsibility as a member of the Church, seeing that it is only when one is in sympathetic fellowship with the Church that one's personal judgment is best able to

[1] A small selection of testimonia and references must suffice. For Catholics, cf. *Catech. Rom.* praef. 3 ("Cum autem fides ex auditu concipiatur, perspicuum est quam necessaria semper fuerit, ad aeternam salutem consequendam, doctoris legitimi fidelis opera ac ministerium"; etc.); Moehler, *Symbolism*, 264–269, 281; W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 684, 689, 691 f; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 112; and see above, pp. 19–22. For Anglicans, cf. Gore in *Lux Mundi* (ed. 1891) 237 f (viii) (". . . Let a man put himself to school in the Church with reverence and godly fear, and his own judgment will become enlightened . . ."), *Holy Spirit*, 153 f, 162, 182, 205 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 68 (". . . we own that the teaching of the Church is God's appointed means for the religious instruction of mankind"), 109, 113–115; Stanton, *Authority*, 158–160, 189; W. E. Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 49–92; J. H. Bernard in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 175 f ("To put it on the lowest ground, the Church's authority in matters of doctrine is the authority which attaches itself to the formulated verdicts of the Christian consciousness reflecting devoutly on the revelation which God has given us in Christ." Etc.), 177; Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 373 f, 377, 379 f, and *Authority*, 12–15, 105, and *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 85–91, 95, 97; D'Arcy in *Anglic. Ess.* 38; A. Chandler in *Congress-Report 1923*, 110; W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 98. For Presbyterians, cf. Leckie, *Authority*, 93 f, 134–177, 221–229; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 167; Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 266 f. For Congregationalists, cf. Forsyth, *Authority*, 11, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 74; A. T. Cadoux, *Essays*, 84 ("the inward authority lacks content except through fellowship, and the authority of the Church is its experienced power to evoke and bring into exercise this inward authority of its members"); Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 96. For Quakers, cf. G. K. Hibbert, *Inner Light*, 41–43; Grubb, *Authority*, 40–51, 105–107 ("The authority of the Church . . . is in essence the unity of the Christian consciousness—the collective experience and testimony of all saintly souls who have learned through Jesus Christ that God is their Father. . . . Any new thought that comes to an individual Christian he will always desire to test and temper, by comparing it with what has been revealed to others richer, stronger and more devoted than himself, whether in the past or the present . . ."). For Unitarians, cf. Martineau, *Essays*, iii. 50, iv. 117 (see above, p. 156 n. 2).

[2] So Stanton, *Authority*, 188 f.

operate with full knowledge and without unfairness.[1] There is, moreover, the further point that, when an individual opposes his own judgment to that of the Church, it is—other things being equal—prima facie more likely that the Church, as the more numerous and experienced party to the controversy, is in the right.[2]

And yet the authority of the Church, inasmuch as her mind is built up out of the consentient beliefs of her individual members, does not supersede the authority of individual judgment.[3] Nothing we have said alters the fact that, for the individual, the *ultimate* court of appeal is the voice of God within his own mind and conscience, and not the voice of the Church.[4] His own judgment is almost certainly affected by personal peculiarities, and the voice of the Church *must* be reverently considered by him among his data: but in the last resort—for him—the decision must rest with what he can hear of the voice of God within himself. It is the more important to emphasize this in view of the suggestion put forward—perhaps as a kind of reconciliation between the authoritarian and the Quaker views—that the ultimate authority is not the inner light of the individual, but the inner light of the Church.[5] Nor is the relation between the authority of private judgment and the authority of the Church that of two co-ordinates, as is so often taken for granted.[6] The unit of human religious life is after all the individual: it is as individuals—not of course isolated from others, but yet each responsible for himself—that the Church makes her appeal to us,[7] and that God (according to the Church's own teaching) deals with us: and nothing that has been said, or can be said, about the extent to which the voice of the Church should weigh with us, can reverse the argument

[1] Stanton, *Authority*, 189–191; Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 376; A. T. Cadoux, *Essays*, 84 (see n. 1 on previous p.).

[2] Temple in *Foundations*, 352 f; Rawlinson, *ibid.* 377–380; H. R. Mackintosh in *Expos.* Nov. 1920, 375.

[3] Stanton, *op. cit.* 189–192: cf. Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 379; Grubb, *Authority*, 106.

[4] So Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 151: and see above, p. 134 n. 7.

[5] So J. A. Robertson in *Expos.* Sept. 1922, 217 ("the heart and conscience of the living Church of believers must still hold themselves free to make their own Spirit-guided judgments as to nature and degree of the authority of Scripture within the Canon"), 222 ("Not man in his solitude, be it said, lest we be thought to minimise the place of the Church in this experience, but the believer within the Fellowship of Faith, a Member of the Mystical Body, the Church Catholic"). I read the latter of these passages in the light of the former: if not to be so read, it says no more than the point made above, pp. 228 f.

[6] See above, p. 152.

[7] Cf. R. Knox in *God and the Supernatural*, 14 f (the book "shall neither thunder at him nor woo him, but attempt no more than to state a case and let him withdraw for his verdict. It rests with him to decide when he will pronounce the *Et reliqua* that will silence it"); C. C. Martindale in *op. cit.* 28. See also above, p. 132 n. 5.

already advanced for the ultimacy of the authority of the Inner Light.[1]

A clear corollary of the ultimacy of the Inner Light is that the Church, though possessing authority, is not infallible. This has been already proved in general terms,[2] and our recurrence to it here is simply in the nature of a reminder. Romanists, of course, refuse to admit it, and must be referred to our earlier argument. Free-Churchmen, however, should observe that Anglican thinkers—even many who cherish sympathies for Catholic ideals—are coming more and more to abandon the theory of the infallibility of the Church.[3] And the grounds upon which this judgment rests are equally decisive against the infallibility

[1] See above, pp. 117–167, and cf. the unconscious concurrence of Stanton, *Authority*, 65 (". . . whatever most commends itself to my conscience and commands my sympathy and affection, I see in them," viz. in Christian believers generally): also more clearly, Hibbert, *Inner Light*, 42; Grubb, *Authority*, 106.

[2] See above, pp. 162 f.

[3] We may mention Dr. Salmon (*Infall.* 269 f, 272, 277 [". . . it is maintained that when once the majority of Christians have agreed in a conclusion . . ., that conclusion must never afterwards be called in question. But why not, if the Church has in the meantime become wiser? . . ."]), Rev. W. E. Collins (in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 77 f ["It is even conceivable that the whole Church at any particular time should *seem* to concur in a false decision as to the faith"—but the Church's infallibility is verbally retained on the plea that it applies to the *whole* Church from Pentecost to the Day of Judgment (80 f): cf. also 67–70, 179]), Dr. J. H. Bernard, late Archbishop of Dublin (in *Expos.* Sept. 1905, 174–177), Dean Inge (*Authority*, 7 f), Dr. W. Temple, now Bishop of Manchester (in *Foundations*, 352 [". . . it is always possible that the Church is wrong, but the weight of probability is always on its side," as against an individual]), Canon Rawlinson (in *Foundations*, 365, 367 f, 370, 378 f, and in *Authority*, vii f, 19 f, 25, 175 f, 188 f [unequivocally]), Dr. A. C. Headlam, now Bishop of Gloucester (in *Doctr. of the Church*, 169 f ["There have always been those . . . who have demanded an absolute, infallible authority. Either, they say, the teaching is true or it is not true. They cannot recognize any grades of truth or" (? read "and they") "refuse to allow that truth can in any way be relative to our own mental development. Some have tried to find this infallible authority in Scripture. . . . Others have tried to find it in the authority of the Church, but no one has yet been able to find an authoritative statement of where the authority of the Church really lies. Others have tried to find it in the infallibility of popes, but they are . . . confronted with the fact that many utterances of popes have been erroneous, and that there is no exact means of distinguishing which papal utterances are infallible and which are not. The demand for infallibility is one which, in human life, it is impossible to gratify. All truth here must have an element of relativity and imperfection. We must be content to recognize that we have in the spiritual weight and authority of the whole Christian Church a quite sufficient guide, if we will only use it, to arrive at such a measure of truth as we need for our guidance in this life." I regard this as a very important passage indeed]), Rev. F. H. Jeayes (in *Reconciliation*, Sept. 1924, 146), Dr. C. Gore, formerly Bishop of Oxford, (*Infall. Book*, 46 f ["we must all admit, whether we like it or not, that opinions may become almost universally current in the Church without being true, . . ."]; per contra, *Holy Spirit*, 199, 205 f, 357 f [Divine message which Church has authority to declare is infallible; but Church herself often far from infallible: cf. *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 140]), Rev. C. F. Rogers (*Rome*, 54), and Dr. W. E. Barnes (in *Modern Churchman*, July 1925, 196). To the same effect, Oman, *Vision*, 88–91, 121, 174 f; Leckie, *Authority*, 166, 217 f; Grubb, *Authority*, 8, 43 ff.

of the majority of the members of the Church [1]—as also against the infallibility of her General Councils.

With these positions in mind, we pass on to consider the general Catholic view that subscription to a formulated Creed is a necessary condition of membership in the Church.[2] The convert to Rome has to declare his acceptance of the so-called 'Nicene Creed'—an important but very small part of the beliefs which by his conversion become absolutely binding upon him. In the Church of England, the same Creed is said or sung by the congregation at every Communion-Service, and the so-called 'Apostles' Creed' at every meeting for Morning or Evening Prayer (except that the so-called 'Athanasian Creed' takes its place in the morning on certain days). The Apostles' Creed is also accepted by the god-parents of children undergoing baptism, the acceptance is ratified by the child himself at Confirmation, and none are lawfully admitted to the Communion-Service except those who have been confirmed or desire and are ready to be so.[3] In recent discussions between Anglicans and Free-Churchmen on the subject of reunion, Anglicans have always contended that the acceptance of one Creed—usually the Nicene—would be indispensably necessary as the basis of membership in the reunited Church.[4] The view that the acceptance of a fundamental Creed or group of Creeds is an obviously necessary condition of being admitted to the fellowship of the Christian Church is one that can claim the sanction of many centuries and of preponderant numbers. There have, of course, been wide differences in regard to the length and content of the Creed imposed at different times and in various circles; but the principle of the credal test is virtually the same in all cases, is perfectly well understood, and is very widely accepted as clearly right.

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 272–275. [2] Cf. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 259b.

[3] Cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 286 f.

[4] Cf. *Lambeth Appeal*, vi ("We believe that the visible unity of the Church will be found to involve the whole-hearted acceptance of:—The Holy Scriptures . . .; and the Creed commonly called Nicene, as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith, and either it or the Apostles' Creed as the Baptismal confession of belief"; etc); Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 231–240 (proposes Nicene Creed as basis for reunion: ". . . I would put to you that the only Christian reunion that is possible is the reunion of that Christianity which is commonly designated as orthodox—a reunion on the basis of belief in the Incarnation and the Trinity. However much we may respect the personal character or the intellectual attainments of the Unitarian, it would be difficult to find a place for him in the reconstructed Church. To the Modernist I would say that he must settle with his own conscience whether he can accept the Creed of the Church. We cannot write a new creed for him, nor reconstruct Christianity to suit his taste. It is in the traditional beliefs now as always that the whole Church—Protestant and Catholic alike—finds its inspiration, and these beliefs are put forward in the Creed in the manner which may most generally obtain acceptance . . .")

It sounds an obvious thing to say, but it has to be said nevertheless, that to demand a credal test is nugatory unless one intends definitely to deny, to the Christian who cannot pass it, all recognition of status as a member of the Church of Jesus Christ, and to refuse accordingly to have Christian fellowship with him. It is this fact that makes the question of the creeds a burning one. Were it a matter of adopting a formula to stand as the declaratory confession of the Church at large and as the summary of her habitual teaching, the difficulty would not be so great. But in the devising of machinery which is to exclude possible candidates from the fellowship of the Church, the issues at stake are so serious, that a flaw in the modus operandi may be said to be a fatal objection. It therefore becomes necessary to scrutinize closely the grounds upon which a credal test of this kind is demanded.

It is frequently taken for granted that, since the Church is a society of human beings, and since we know roughly how societies of human beings have to proceed, therefore the Church must proceed in the same way, i.e. she must have rules and regulations, constituted government, conditions of membership—with discretionary power of admission and expulsion.[1] This is precisely the kind of fallacious analogy that is the undoing of Catholic apologetic. If the Christian Church were a debating-society, or a tennis-club, or an association of scientists, doubtless the inference would be quite in order. It may be admitted also to be in order in the case of groups formed *within* the Church for the furtherance of specific objects. But as applied to the Christian Church per se it is not in order, for the simple reason that the Church is not a society *in the same sense* that these other associations are societies: she resembles them simply in the fact that her members are human beings pursuing a common purpose; but she differs from them in such fundamental things that their customary methods are no guide as to what hers ought to be. The Church is sui generis; the tennis-club is not. There can be many tennis-clubs; there can in the nature of things be only one Church of Christ. The tennis-club is local and purely human; the Church is universal and Divine. The Church has its centre and head in Jesus Christ; the tennis-club has no such centre and no such head. It is the duty of every Christian to be a member of the Church; it is not the duty of every tennis-player to belong to any particular club. Every Christian has, further, a claim to the recognition and fellowship of his fellow-disciples in the Church; the tennis-player has no such claim on his local club. The conditions of club-membership (payment of subscription, etc.) are external and such as are easily tested; the conditions of Church-membership are inward and spiritual,

[1] Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 53 f, 116 f; Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 238 f; C. Harris, *Creeds or No Creeds?* 231–246.

such as only the eye of God can see.[1] The analogy, therefore, between the Church and an ordinary human association is a remote one; and the inference based upon it—viz: that the Church cannot exist unless the test of an explicit creed be applied to all her members—is unjustified as an inference, whatever other arguments may be producible in its favour.

Nor does it settle the matter to urge that a credal condition was exacted in New-Testament times. That no convert from paganism was admitted to Church-membership unless he confessed that "Jesus is Lord," is probable enough: but then without that, no question of his joining the Church at all could have arisen. As to how much more than that was demanded in the first century, the evidence does not enable us to say; probably the usage differed in different times and places.[2] But in any case the practice of the first century is no final test for modern orthodox procedure—as Catholics of all schools are eager to urge whenever the antiquity of some usage or other of their own is called in question.[3]

Again, the Creeds are regarded as enshrining the 'essentials' of the Christian faith; and the acceptance of them is held to be necessary on that ground.[4] But inasmuch as the precise delimitation of essentials from non-essentials is impossible without the admixture to some extent of the limiting influence of the personal factor, is it unreasonable to expect that every true Christian will be able to use precisely the same scale of values as every other in measuring the comparative truth and importance of the various parts in the manifold complex of Christian belief and experience?

Another argument sometimes advanced on the Anglican side is the fact that—even if we exclude Rome—there remain large sections of the Church (Eastern, Lutheran, Reformed, Anglican, etc.) that will certainly never agree to any scheme of reunion except on the basis of exacting a credal test as a condition of membership.[5] But what is the difference in principle between admitting the necessity of a credal test on this ground, and admitting the infallibility of the Pope on the ground that reunion with Rome will never be possible unless we do? The Church —as has been well pointed out—is not an end in itself, but a means for

[1] Cf. Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 28 f, 45; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 82.

[2] Neander (*Church Hist.* [Eng. tr., Bohn] i. 501) says of Justinus: "He invariably abides by the principle of the apostolic church, that faith in Jesus as the Messiah is the sole ground of salvation; and this faith he recognises even in the midst of the most defective Christian knowledge." Cf. Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, 196–244.

[3] See below, pp. 660-662.

[4] Cf. D. Stone in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 625a.

[5] So Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 239: cf. Woodlock, *Modernism*, 17, 22; Sir H. Lunn in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1926, 479; J. Scott Lidgett in *op. cit.* Jan. 1927, 54.

the manifestation of God's Kingdom.[1] Our business, therefore, is to get at the truth regarding that Kingdom, and then, if possible, to lead our fellow-Christians into it, not to hamper ourselves in advance in our search for truth by imposing on ourselves the limits set by the fixed ideas of other branches of the Church.

A more formidable plea is put forward when appeal is made to the decision of 'the whole Church.'[2] What Christian is there that would not bow submissively before such a judgment, could it be produced?[3] But how produce it? Or, to ask a prior question, how define the Church, so as to know when we have the whole of it? The Romanist, regarding the Church as a closed corporation under the monarchy of the Pope, excludes from his definition of the Church all who do not submit to the See of Rome. The Anglo-Catholic, unwilling either to submit to Rome or to be excluded from the Church, selects the first thousand years of Christian history—the period prior to the final separation of Eastern and Western Christendom.[4] That, he says, is the undivided Church: to that he, like the Eastern Christian, makes his appeal;[5] of that Church, Anglicans, Romanists, and Eastern Christians are all equally legitimate 'branches';[6] and it is because the Nicene Creed takes us back to that age of unbroken unity that all Christians should unite on it now.[7] It follows, of course, that Christian denominations which do not accept this Creed as binding are not within the true Church. Romanists, of course, say so quite bluntly. Some Anglicans say so bluntly, some guardedly,[8] and many others think so: they must indeed

[1] Cf. L. S. Thornton in *Congress-Report 1920*, 55, 58; and G. C. Binyon in *Construct. Quart.* June 1922, 300 ("Institutional Christianity, like the institutional form of all other spiritual or idealist movements, is always liable to mistake the means for the end," etc.).

[2] Note the phrases in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 75 ("the consensus of the Universal Church"), 82 ("the universal Church . . . that Catholic Church of Christ which hath been dispersed throughout the whole world"), 83 ("The *whole* mind of the Church: we cannot be content with anything less"), 179 ("the Church in her 'length and breadth and depth and height' "), 183, 185 n.

[3] On the deference due on this ground to the Church's Creeds, cf. W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 115 f.

[4] Rev. N. P. Williams with delightful naïveté remarks: "Where and what is the Church in this sense? At the present moment our answer must necessarily be somewhat different from that which would be given by our Roman brethren, because their answer would be one which excludes us from the Church" (*Congress-Report 1920*, 66). Why, then, may not we Free-Churchmen with equal right repudiate the Anglo-Catholic definition of the Church, which excludes *us*? For why go back only nine hundred years? We will go back nineteen hundred, and who then will challenge our claim to be 'Catholick and Apostolick'?

[5] N. P. Williams in *Congress-Report 1920*, 65–69: cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 171.

[6] Cf. D. Stone in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 625a, 627a: these are the Churches which preserve "those features of life which are essential to the Church's being": presumably they are the only bodies that do so.

[7] Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 231 f.

[8] Cf. Bishop of Zululand in *Congress-Report 1920*, 45 f.

do so, if they wish to be consistent with their principles: but since the days of the 'Lambeth Appeal' of 1920 many, feeling the injustice of unchurching so many of their fellow-believers, have declared that all baptized believers are within the Church.[1] Such generosity is certainly an advance towards a settlement: but it is—in theory largely, in practice almost totally—repudiated by the Church of England, and has had the effect of bringing out still more clearly the exclusiveness of her official position. But observe the circular character of the general Catholic argument for the authority of the Creeds. Why is the acceptance of the Creeds essential? Because it is declared to be so by the practice of the whole of the true Church. By what is the true Church to be distinguished? Among other things—by her loyal retention of the Creeds. That is to say, the argument for the necessity of the credal test rests upon a purely arbitrary definition of the Church. Catholics coolly define the Church as composed of Christians who share their essential views,[2] and then have of course no difficulty in showing that those who differ from them are schismatics. The Anglican and Eastern appeal to the undivided Church—the Church before 1054 A.D.—is illusory: for long before that date the unity of the Church had been rent and lost by the wholesale excommunication of those whose views were adjudged heterodox by the majority. Even the extension of the Church to include all baptized believers is not adequate; for it excludes such obviously good Christians as members of the Society of Friends, who consequently are either frankly adjudged to stand outside the Church, or are else admitted on the basis of some theory about 'Baptism by the Spirit' or 'the Baptism of Desire.'[3] There is, after all, only one definition of the Church which can be presented as a true unfolding of the connotation of the term itself and cannot be charged with sectarian onesidedness. The Church consists of all Christians who desire to be its members. Now Catholics define 'Christians' in a way that excludes Quakers as being unbaptized. But they admit that baptized persons, who may be heretics and schismatics but who yet do not wish to renounce the faith, remain Christians.[4] If they are Christians, and claim Church-

[1] *Lambeth Appeal*, intro.: "We acknowledge all those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, and have been baptized into the name of the Holy Trinity, as sharing with us membership in the universal Church of Christ which is His Body." Cf. Headlam, *op. cit.* 219 f. The logical corollary of Canon T. A. Lacey's very sensible contention (*Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 74–77) that the Church is not easily definable, would be to discontinue excluding his nonconformist fellow-disciples on grounds that presuppose that the Church *is* easily definable.

[2] Cf. Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 124–126. It is this arbitrariness of definition that makes the well-worn Vincentian maxim 'Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus' practically useless for the fair settlement of controversies (Salmon, *Infall.* 270, with note).

[3] See above, pp. 59–61.

[4] Pusey, *Eiren.* 268; Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 678b ("The excommunicated person, it is true, does not cease to be a Christian, since his baptism can never

membership, then surely they are of the Church, as the more progressive Anglicans have at least in theory conceded.[1] But if this larger definition of the Church be adopted, what becomes of the plea that the acceptance of the Nicene Creed is demanded by the whole Church?

But even if it could be proved that some one formula voiced the beliefs of the whole Church at any particular time, would that of itself make the formula in question infallible or binding on every Christian? Clearly Athanasius, when standing 'contra mundum,' did not think so. Our argument here must not be misunderstood. We are impeaching a theory and method of Church-polity, not criticizing the contents of any particular creed, when we urge that "it is only [by] an *assumption* . . . that universality and ubiquity are thus made the tests of religious doctrine. . . . It is a mere prejudice of veneration for antiquity, and the imposing aspect of an unanimous acquiescence, (if unanimous it really be,) which makes us regard that as truth, which comes so recommended to us. Truth is rather the attribute of the few than of the many. The real Church of God may be the small remnant, scarcely visible amidst the mass of surrounding professors. Who then shall pronounce any thing to be divine truth, *simply because* it has the marks of having been generally or universally received among men?" [2]

The plea that all Catholic Christians should rally round the so-called Nicene Creed has been reinforced by an exposition of its peculiar merits. These lie partly in its early history; for, we are told, "it enshrines the labours of all the great Christian teachers of the second, third, and fourth centuries," and so on.[3] But they lie also in its inherent qualities—its dignity and power, the completeness with which it "responds to the beliefs and ideals of every orthodox Christian," its retention of what is necessary, its omission of what is unessential. "The central faith of the Church has been from the beginning the belief in Christ. Here we have that belief expressed in its completeness and its fulness without mutilation but without addition." [4] But while it is easy to see that these merits, if rightly predicated of the Creed, would give it a claim on the reverence of every Christian, it is not at all easy to see that they justify the refusal of Church-fellowship to every Christian who cannot accept it in toto. Furthermore, over against the merits, there are certain qualifications to be noted:

be effaced"); Wilhelm in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 256b (heretic, as distinct from apostate, "always retains faith in Christ"); Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv. (1912) 767a. On the validity of the simple definition of a Christian as a person who tries, however imperfectly, to follow Christ, see Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 17–19, 58, 162–164.

[1] Dr. Arnold of Rugby held a view of this kind about the constitution of the Church: see R. W. Church, *Oxf. Movement*, 6 f, 101.

[2] R. D. Hampden, *The Scholastic Philosophy* (Bampton Lectures of 1832), 356.

[3] Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 231 f, 237.

[4] *Op. cit.* 233. Cf. J. Scott Lidgett in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1927, 50.

1. The establishment of the Creed as binding—and in fact, the formulation of the christological Creeds generally—took place in an era when the Church was, in comparison with her condition in pre-Constantinian days, morally degenerate. This is not a question of blaming the Chalcedonian Council in particular, or of passing a censorious or uncharitable judgment on the Church at large,[1] nor does it involve any under-estimate of the amount of real goodness still enshrined in Christian lives at that time: it is simply an allusion to an easily verifiable historical fact.[2] The fifth century, which saw the final establishment of the Nicene Creed, saw also the banishment of Chrysostomus, the brutal murder of Hypatia, the persecution of the Donatists, the villainies of the 'Robber Synod' of Ephesus, and the baptism of the bloody but orthodox ruffian Clovis. Can the acceptance of any doctrine by a Church that had so far forgotten its task, lost its purity, and missed its way, as had the Church of the fifth century, be acclaimed as worthy of binding the minds of Christians for ever afterwards?

2. The Church's acceptance of the Creed was not simply the free, untrammelled concurrence of Christians deliberating under no pressure but the transparent persuasiveness of the truth and the winning cogency of orthodox arguments: it was also the outcome of a long period of furious party-strife, in which the Emperors and their court and the coercive machinery of the State were implicated from first to last. The long disputes that began in 318 A.D. were subject at every turn to imperial influence; and, under the successive edicts of Theodosius, Marcianus, Zeno, and Justinianus, heterodoxy was visited with State-punishment.[3] Those who dissented from the decision which the Emperor chose to support were either bullied into acquiescence or silenced. Making all due allowance for the extent to which pure persuasion may have operated,[4] we may fairly ask whether final authority can attach to a decision arrived at and accepted under such conditions as these?

3. In regard to its content as a statement of the central things in

[1] Cf. Headlam, *op. cit.* 236 f.

[2] As I have been on a previous occasion censured by Anglican critics for alluding to this fact, I am glad to be able to quote in my support the words of Dr. Gore, spoken at the Anglo-Catholic Congress in 1920: "when it required more courage to refuse Christianity than to accept it, it is a fact that the moral level came down at a run. A hundred years or less after the peace of the Church, as the Sermons of Chrysostom and Augustine and the terrific argument of Salvian assure us, the moral level of average Christianity was perhaps no better than it is among us to-day" (*Congress-Report 1920*, 191 f; the same view is expressed in Gore's *Holy Spirit*, 158 f, 227, 297, 348, and in his paper in *Congress-Report 1923*, 32). Cf. Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 233; Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, 106–108; Duchesne, *Early History of the Christian Church* (Eng. trans.) iii. v f, 3 f, 226, etc

[3] See Smith, *D.C.B.* iv. 961b, iii. 815b, 545b.

[4] Foakes-Jackson in *H.E.R.E.* i (1908) 782b.

Christianity, the Nicene Creed and the Creeds generally are open to criticism on the score that their explicit clauses are all of them statements of intellectual belief rather than declarations of moral experience or self-surrender, and statements too about the metaphysical rather than the moral aspects of the Being of God and the Person of Christ.[1] The position taken in these pages is indeed that *no* elaborated Creed is suitable as a test for prospective Church-members. It may be well therefore to explain that the point is not here pressed beyond the observation that the Creed's comparative omission of the moral and experiential elements—in favour of the metaphysical and intellectual—does detract somewhat from its value as a summary of the faith. It is impossible not to see, in the pride of place here given to orthodox belief, but another piece of evidence of the Church's aberration. The story of the Creed-making centuries is the story of increasing concern for doctrine and decreasing concern for righteous conduct: and this distorted sense of proportion is clearly visible in the terms—as in the history—of the Creed.

4. Viewed from another and more pertinent angle, the Nicene Creed says too much. It is hardly true to urge that it expresses the Christian belief in Christ "in its completeness and its fulness . . . but without addition." If it simply did that, there would be no occasion to discuss its claims. But inasmuch as it has made many weighty additions to the simple profession of faith in Christ, some judgment in regard to the value of those additions is inevitable. It is impossible that they should be equally acceptable to all Christians. Some have no difficulty with them. But many others, who claim the Christian name, who demand Christian fellowship, and who evince the Christian spirit, find certain clauses in the Creed a difficulty, and cannot therefore without questionable mental reservations declare their acceptance of the Creed as a whole. The Creed adds considerably to the simple profession of faith in Christ. By what authority is one party's estimate of these additions to be made the standard for the other party, on pain of the exclusion of the latter from the Church? I ask with Galba: "Commilito, quis iussit?"

Consider, for instance, the statements in the Creed that Jesus was "made flesh of the Holy Spirit and of Mary the Virgin," and that He "went up into the heavens." These are clearly categorical affirmations of the Virgin Birth and the bodily Ascension of our Lord as traditionally conceived. It might perhaps be pleaded that the Creed permits a symbolical or spiritual interpretation of the Ascension on modernist lines, though one's right to such an interpretation would have to be

[1] Cf. Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 428; Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 274; C. Harris, *Creeds or No Creeds?* 252–254. The last-named dissents.

judged at best precarious.[1] But it is impossible to interpret the Virgin Birth symbolically. One must either believe it to be a historical fact, or disbelieve it, or remain doubtful.[2] It is well-known that many Christian scholars, including some in the Church of England, have ceased to believe that our Lord was miraculously born—on the ground that the historical evidence is insufficient to warrant belief. We do not here discuss whether this view is right or wrong, but simply observe that it is honestly and intelligently held by sincere and capable Christian men. How are they to stand with regard to the Creed? It is hardly possible, in the present stage of critical study, to contemplate their exclusion from the Church. But suppose they stay in. In that case apparently they must be prepared to declare their belief in a historical statement which they do not believe, in order to prove their fitness for membership or office in the Church, and they are to be left to settle with their own conscience whether they can do this or not.[3] If their consciences are sufficiently pliable to permit them to make a solemn assertion which is for them simply not true, and to allow them to take shelter under the tacit official permission to interpret symbolically, well and good: otherwise, they must remain outside, because forsooth they cannot reasonably expect a new Creed to be written for them, or Christianity to be reconstructed to suit their taste! But has not the mark been overshot when, out of deference to a venerable creed, genuine and thoughtful Christian men have to be shut up to a dire choice between remaining outside the Church and playing fast and loose with truth?

As a matter of fact, this whole idea of 'symbolically' or 'figuratively' interpreting a personal credal pledge—even when applied to less intransigeant clauses than that concerning the manner of our Lord's birth—is in the last degree unsatisfactory. For one thing, as we have already hinted, it opens the door to an extremely dangerous tampering with truthfulness and sincerity of speech.[4] But besides that, it involves

[1] C. Harris (*Creeds or No Creeds?* 276 f) quotes a passage from Hieronymus in which the materialistic and spatial notion of heaven entertained by some Christians is denounced as nonsense. But was Hieronymus, or is Dr. Harris, prepared to draw the inference that Jesus' physical body did not physically ascend? Cf. Pryke, *Modernism*, 163 f; and on the symbolical element generally in the Creeds, Sanday, *Divine Overruling*, 77.

[2] Cf. Pryke, *Modernism*, 24.

[3] Cf. Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 238 (see above, p. 231 n. 4).

[4] Rev. H. Handley argues (in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1014, 340 f: cf. P. Gardner in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1917, 122–128, and *Expos. Times*, Mar. 1927, 249 f) for the idea that in worship the Creeds are repeated *representatively*, and not as declarations of individual belief—an idea which is trenchantly and deservedly criticized by P. E. Vizard (in the following no., *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1914, 675–677), and, from the Roman standpoint, by Woodlock, *Modernism*, 22–25, 48, 70. Mr. Handley discusses the question of 'Modernist Veracity' further in *Modern Churchman*, Dec. 1925,

an open-eyed self-deception that is almost puerile. For it is a departure from the purpose of the Creed-makers, coupled with a sort of solemn pretence that there is no such departure. The early Church established the Creed in order to exclude heresy: the deference due to the early Church requires of us that we retain the Creed for the same purpose, but does not prevent us from interpreting the clauses of the Creed in a way that would have seemed to the early Church utterly heretical.[1] We are thus to blow hot and cold with the same breath. We are to take away with one hand what we have given with the other. But either the Church's utterances in the Creed are absolutely binding, or they are not. If they are, then it is right to insist on their being accepted as a sine-quâ-non by all members, but we have no right to interpret them otherwise than their authors meant them to be interpreted: if they are not, then indeed we are free to interpret them as we are led by the Spirit of Truth; only, in that case, the ground for making the acceptance of them a condition of admittance to the Church disappears.[2] But our argument here involves the question as to the fallibility or infallibility of the Creeds in general—a point that must be taken up presently. Enough has been said to show that, great as the merits of the Nicene Creed may be, they are not such as to justify the excommunication of all who cannot fully accept it.

It is generally thought that the application of a credal test to candidates for Church-membership effectually safeguards the Church against contamination by heresy. It does not seem to have occurred to Catholic minds that there is any other way of protecting God's truth

491–498: he urges by way of apologia that modernists' "dissents" from the Creeds are inevitable and avowed, and are "*literal*, not moral, dishonesties" (like "Dear Sir," etc.). R. F. Horton points out the grave moral danger of all such mental reservations on the part of 'Modern Churchmen' (*Congreg. Quart.* Apl. 1926, 167 f). Cf. the remarks of Fairbairn in regard to the requirement of 'subscription' to the Articles at Oxford (*Cathol.* 471–473 [". . . There was thus begotten in the minds of the more thoughtful the worst of all attitudes to religious belief—that of giving a formal assent to what was understood not to represent internal conviction. . . . The subleties of 'Tract XC.' show how fast and loose the ultra-orthodox, when their own views were at stake, could play with the very formula which they could not allow their opponents any latitude in interpreting . . ."], 477). See also Glover, *Reunion*, 22; Pryke, *Modernism*, 21, 25.

[1] Cf. B. W. Noel, *Union of Church and State* (1848), 443 ("it seems to me puerile to exult in orthodox creeds which are disregarded by the living teachers"); C. Harris, *Creeds or No Creeds?* 271–273 (on the illegitimacy of symbolical interpretation); Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 356 f.

[2] Prof. P. Gardner writes (*Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1917, 125): "A Church which is alive and not fossilised is obliged to take one of two courses as regards its formulae: either it must from time to time revise them, or it must allow licence in their interpretation." A third alternative (not necessarily inconsistent with the second) would be not to exact subscription to them at all as a condition of membership. Cf. Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 26 f ("The most creed-bound Churches are compelled to allow a certain liberty of interpretation, and in doing so practically give away their case . . .").

save by excommunicating those who cannot submit to the Creeds.[1] They overlook the fact that, if orthodoxy is (as they assuredly believe) the truth of God, then the *teaching* activities of the Church, coupled with the operation of the Divine Spirit in the minds of men, ought to suffice for the proper protection of the truth against error.[2] But in any case it is clear that the alternative method of limiting membership to those who can subscribe to this or that statement of essentials has totally failed to include all the fit within the Church and to exclude all the unfit. With a few exceptions, each Christian group has its list of what it regards as essential Christian doctrines. Refusal to accept any one of these doctrines is regarded not simply as calling for instruction and apologetic, but as disqualifying the doubter for recognition as a fellow-Church-member. The inevitable outcome of this rigour is simply to perpetuate the disunion of Christendom. So far from guaranteeing the Catholic status of such groups, it constitutes them sects in the plain sense of the word. Each group, of course, throws the blame of disunion on those outside its own ranks; but in recognizing the outsiders as Christians it does but stultify its own definition of the Church. This criticism affects different bodies in different ways. A few of the very narrowest Protestant bodies regard themselves as co-extensive with the true Church: but most nonconformists have no very clear theory on the matter, and acknowledge readily, when challenged, that others beside themselves are within the true Church. For certain Free-Church denominations the recognition of the Church-status of other bodies is an avowed and explicit principle. The Anglican Church is divided: strict Anglican theory—best represented to-day by the Anglo-Catholics—implies that all non-episcopal bodies, even if consisting of real Christians, are outside the true Church, but recognizes Rome and the Eastern Church as parts of it.[3] Recently, however, there has been a willingness on the part of leading Anglicans to admit the sectarian position of their own communion,[4] and to adopt a definition of the

[1] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 259 f. Cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 56 ("The imposition of a dogma as a condition of communion is a necessary evil which should be kept within the smallest limits possible in view of the Church's safety"); J. S. Lidgett in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1927, 53 f.

[2] This indeed seems to be virtually admitted by Rev. W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 116: but would he be willing to draw the logical inference and abandon the credal *test*? See also the strangely uncatholic remarks of Newman (*Developm.* 76 f) to the effect that "Forms, subscriptions, or Articles of religion are indispensable when the principle of life is weakly . . ."

[3] See above, p. 234.

[4] Cf. Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 225 (". . . The only correct language would be the Anglo-Catholic schism, the Roman schism, the Presbyterian schism, the Wesleyan schism, the Congregational schism . . ."). Forsyth (*Ch. and Sacraments*, 38 f) insists forcibly on the schismatic character of the Anglican Church.

Church which in theory includes most nonconformist Christians:[1] they are, however, almost to a man unwilling to carry this concession to its logical conclusion, by allowing intercommunication and interchange of pulpits between themselves and nonconformists.[2] Rome, of course, knows of only one Church—her own,[3] and throws the whole blame of disunion upon those who refuse to submit to her,[4] who in turn of course cast it back upon her.[5] The deadlock is thus complete: but Rome exposes her own inconsistency by her willingness to regard even excommunicated persons and heretics, if baptized, as Christians,[6] and by her strange and new-fangled doctrine of 'the soul of the Church' to which many such may belong.[7] But whatever variations there may be in the precise positions occupied by the different groups, it is clear that the use of the credal test has been utterly unsuccessful in securing doctrinal uniformity for Christendom and in safeguarding it against the entry of unsuitable members. Not only has it failed egregiously in this: but it has involved, and was bound to involve, the appalling débâcle of Christian disunion.

We have now discussed all the familiar reasons advanced in support of the view that the due authority of the Church justifies the refusal of Christian fellowship to those who cannot accept in toto some more or less elaborated summary of essential Christian doctrines. These reasons we have found to be, though not in every case devoid of weight, yet insufficient to justify the conclusion deduced from them. But there is one further consideration to be advanced, which definitely proves the procedure of the credal test to be ultra vires. It is this: that while a creed does not need to be absolutely infallible in order to serve as a declaration or as a basis for teaching, it must be absolutely infallible if it is to be imposed on all as a condition of membership in the Church of Christ. As no creed is absolutely infallible, no creed can rightly be so imposed.

That none of the Creeds can be regarded as necessarily and absolutely infallible follows of course from the general fact that they are all partially human productions,[8] and more especially from the fallibility of the Church that fashioned and adopted them.[9] For the purpose of the

[1] Headlam, *op. cit.* 224, 268; *Lambeth Appeal*, intro.

[2] Cf. Headlam, *op. cit.* 289 f; *Lambeth Resolution*, 12.

[3] Thurston in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 627ab.

[4] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 794 f; Forget in *op. cit.* xiii (1912) 529b, 532a.

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 246 f; Headlam, *op. cit.* 222; Heiler, *Kathol.* 633 ("Ja, Rom ist durch seine schroffe Abschliessung von allen anderen christlichen Gemeinschaften geradezu zur Sekte geworden . . ."). On the divisive effect of Roman policy see nos. 94 and 95 of the propositions of Quesnel condemned in 1713 (Mirbt 399).

[6] See above, pp. 235 f n. 4. [7] See above, pp. 59–61. [8] See above, pp. 162 f.

[9] See above, pp. 229–231, 237. In especial, note the words of Dr. Temple in *Foundations*, 352 ("If we consider, after full examination of the evidence, that an article of the

present discussion it is quite irrelevant to establish a very early date for the Apostles' Creed. Actual Apostolic authorship cannot be proved and is extremely unlikely.[1] It may have been quite right for Bishop Pecock in the fifteenth century to urge that, even if it were not written by Apostles, that would not destroy its value:[2] it is equally necessary to urge that, even if it were written by Apostles, that would not guarantee its infallibility, though it would of course add immensely to its authority and interest. We have seen above how inevitably men's vision of truth is qualified and limited and at times even somewhat perverted by their personal factor.[3] It is because the personal factor differs in different men that it is impossible to exact from any man *unconditional* assent to the statements of any other man. When we study the personal factor of the Christian fathers who framed the Church's Creeds, we find that it was in many ways special and widely different from our own. Their cosmology was geocentric, their eschatology in origin Jewish, their philosophy Stoic or Platonic:[4] their views of historical evidence, Scriptural authority, and human personality were of necessity such as cannot be adopted by us to-day. Allow for this personal factor, and you will see at once that it puts the infallibility of the Creeds out of the question.[5]

But if it is impossible to guarantee the infallibility of any of the Creeds or of any other definite attempt to state the Christian essentials, there must necessarily be something arbitrary in selecting one to which all must subscribe under pain of exclusion or expulsion. Many reasons may be given why, say, the Apostles' Creed, or the Nicene Creed, possesses special weight: but what exactly are the premises from which it

Creed is false . . ., we must, of course, reject"), Canon Rawlinson, *Authority*, 189 ("The view which I wish to repudiate is the view that there exists a kind of core or nucleus of Christian teaching, formulated and stereotyped for all time in terms so finally adequate as to constitute a series of doctrinal propositions which must be simply taken or simply left, and which are exempt from rational criticism, in a sense in which ordinary Christian teaching is not so exempt . . ."), and Rev. W. L. Knox in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 115.

[1] Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 163 f.

[2] Quoted in *Report of Archbishops' Committee on Church and State* (1917) 14.

[3] See above, pp. 168–178 (ch. ix).

[4] Cf. Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma* (Eng. trans.) ii. 229.

[5] Cf. Stanley, *Eastern Church*, [41] ("Figure to yourselves, as you read any creeds or confessions, the lips by which they were first uttered, the hands by which they were first written"); Curtis in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1914, 320 ("Place yourself at the standpoint of their framers and their age, allow for the fashion of their thought as you would allow for the idiom and vocabulary of their language, bear in mind the things they did not know, the history they had not read, the questions they had not raised and faced, the experience they had not enjoyed, the scholarship beyond their reach, and you will not do them the injustice of making them oracles for all time, or representing that their sceptre and their nod can arrest the tide of divine revelation and human science"). On the supposed infallibility of creeds, etc. generally, see also Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 263 f.

follows that acceptance of the one or the other should be made an absolute condition of entrance into the Church of Christ? Why these Creeds in particular? There have been other unanimous beliefs of the Church (e.g. the expectation of an early and visible return of Christ) which were clearly wrong: and we can all of us think of yet other doctrines, which are not included in our selected creed, but which are yet for us and many of our fellows true and fundamental.[1] In 1629 the Lutheran Calixtus proposed that all Christians might rally round the consent of the fathers of the fifth century; and the position of some of the early Tractarians was very similar. But why the fifth, we ask, rather than the sixth or fourth?[2] The attempt to constitute some exact and definite body of objective teaching not simply a declaratory manifesto of the Church's position, but a touchstone for determining fitness for Church-membership, is thus clearly a mistaken method—mistaken (if for no other reason) because of necessity arbitrary.

But—more seriously still—I plead, as a matter of vital principle, that any Creed, which is to serve as a ground for excluding from the Church of Jesus Christ those who cannot entirely accept it, but who desire to enter and remain within the Church, must be either absolutely and demonstrably infallible or else utterly and disastrously unfit for the purpose. Its fitness is not proved by the usage and precedents of the past, by its wide or even universal acceptance, or by any inherent merits that it may possess. Nothing less than complete and indubitable infallibility can suffice. For if this be lacking, then the margin of uncertainty or arbitrariness or relativity, however narrow it be, may prove to be the very flaw which causes the exclusion of some genuine Christian from that Church within which *as a Christian* he has an indefeasible right to stand. Those who are not prepared to prove their credal test to be infallible must admit, on their own premises, at least the possibility that, where a modern Christian cannot accept some clause in the Creed, he may be right and the clause wrong. But if so, why exclude him from the Church for denying the clause?[3] The Commonwealth-divines appointed by Parliament to draw up a list of the fundamental beliefs comprised in the profession of "faith in God by Jesus Christ" (which was to be the condition of religious liberty) soon found, Baxter tells us, "how ticklish a business the enumeration of fundamentals

[1] Dr. Headlam, for example, would apparently not require all members of the re-united Church to accept either the important formula of Chalcedon or the so-called Athanasian Creed (*Doctr. of the Church*, 233 f).

[2] Cf. Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 139 f, 142 (on the arbitrary selection of certain centuries by Anglicans).

[3] Cf. Chalybäus, *Speculative Philosophy*, 366: "granted, even, that Christianity is the pure truth, who can answer for the orthodoxy prevalent at any period being pure Christianity? A philosophical system which opposes the latter" (i.e. the prevalent orthodoxy) "may be more Christian than the latter itself."

was." [1] No wonder. Those who undertake to legislate—or to enforce the legislation of others—as to who are to be recognized to belong to the Church, may well feel, like members of the jury in a murder-case, that nothing less than certainty can justify a verdict of 'guilty.' Just as it is better for the guilty to escape than for the innocent to suffer capital punishment, so it is better for the errorist to be admitted to the Church than for the Lord's disciple to be excluded. No Creed, as we have already argued at length, is possessed of the requisite measure of infallibility: therefore no Christian applicant should be excluded from the Church on the ground of his refusal to subscribe a Creed.

The illegitimacy of requiring subscription to a Creed as a condition of membership in the Church early came to be a characteristic tenet of Congregationalism. It has also been observed—in whole or in part—by certain other bodies. It may however be said hardly to have received as yet, even among Congregationalists, that full explication and defence of which it stands in need. One cannot therefore be altogether surprised that it has been misunderstood. One Anglican writer, for instance, speaks of "the root fallacy of this modern Protestant position (which in its most logical and consistent form involves the rejection, upon grounds of principle, of sacraments and dogmas alike)." [2] But a distinction must in fairness be drawn between rejecting dogmas as tests of fitness for membership, even in the local church (which is what Congregationalists do), and rejecting them as authoritative though not infallible documents (which is what they do not do). Another writes as if "Christian societies which would repudiate the restraint of any creed" desire to use the Bible instead of the Creeds and in the same way in which Anglicans and Catholics use the Creeds, viz: as a sufficient basis for the unity of the Church.[3] But however confused some statements of such societies may be, their real and defensible position is not: The Bible only, and not the Creed; it is rather: Neither Bible nor Creed as infallible and ultimate, but both Bible and Creed and all other true and inspired writings as sources to be learnt from by the light of God's Spirit within us.[4]

The position here defended implies no quarrel with the Church's

[1] Quoted by Bruce, *Apologetics*, 300.

[2] Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 390. Cf. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 70 (". . . schism has there been erected into a system"), 179–181, 185 (depreciation of the non-credal position, but without any recognition of the serious and positive basis on which it rests).

[3] Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 238.

[4] On the revolutionary change inevitably involved in the abandonment of credal infallibility, and the slowness with which the issue is being faced, cf. J. S. Bezzant in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1926, 624 f.

formulation, publication, and teaching of Creeds as such,[1] or any insensitiveness to the deep and saving truths which the Creeds were intended to express. Although the Creed-makers themselves often regretted the necessity of formulating the faith,[2] although they sometimes tried to be precise in matters where precision was really beyond human reach,[3] and although the desire for an infallible formulation of 'the faith' as a means of excluding heretics was due to a certain waning of primitive spirituality,[4] yet the composition and defence of Creeds sprang, in part at least, from the thoroughly healthy and Divinely-implanted instinct which makes man desire to systematize his thought and experience into a tenable philosophy of life. The real trouble arose from—and is to-day widely perpetuated by—the failure to make allowance for the true character and seat of religious authority. Much bitterness and offence might have been avoided by more thorough and searching reflection on the psychological and philosophical aspects of this subject. It would then have been seen that the *ultimate* ground for accepting any credal statement as true is not the authority of the Church that imposes it: to appeal to that is but to push the problem one stage further back, and provoke the question, Why should the Church's judgment in this matter be trusted and obeyed? The only ultimate ground is rather the witness of God's Holy Spirit operating in the will, heart, and mind of the teachable believer. The aid of this witness, when its light is turned on the manifold data of religious history and experience, brings within the reach of men a large body of Divine truth, not all of it equally clear and certain, and not precisely defined or constant as to its limits, but sufficient in amount and reliability for the spiritual and moral needs of the day, and capable of being continually sifted, adjusted, and verified by comparison with the objective reality of things. But the whole process is qualified in each man by the personal factor, which limits and conditions and sometimes even distorts his learning, and does this in a way and measure special to himself, and beyond precise calculation or complete elimination. The operation of this personal factor in all human thinking, *for which the Catholic view of the determination of authoritative doctrine makes no allowance whatever*, does not indeed prevent much reliable learning of truth on the part of one man from the lips of another; but it does effectually debar any one man or any one set of men from defining *unconditionally* for another or others the essentials or fundamentals of Christian truth. Christians are entitled to teach and admonish, and even to warn and rebuke, one another in matters of doctrine: they are not entitled to

[1] Cf. Rawlinson in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 95 f; W. L. Knox in *op. cit.* 109 f.
[2] See above, p. 89 n. i.
[3] See above, p. 225.
[4] Grubb, *Authority*, 34, 45, 61, 90 f, 111 f.

unchurch one another because they judge differently of the essentials in doctrine. In the nature of the case, though we have the same God and the same Saviour Jesus Christ, yet the apprehensible essentials of Divine truth cannot be the same for us all. "Although the perfection of knowledge in matters of religion is an object of the most worthy ambition to every Christian for himself, something immensely less than the perfection of religious knowledge is all we are entitled to demand from others as the condition of holding with them Christian fellowship." [1] In the open-eyed Christian charity and wisdom which recognizes not only the limitations of all human attempts to understand the ways of God, but also the necessary differences in the attempts of different men, we have the one and sufficient basis for religious toleration.[2]

The Christian Church, from its very nature, cannot therefore be built up into any true unity by demanding from those who desire to enter it any defined minimum standard of attainment either in practical virtue or in belief. Perfection in belief, as in conduct, it is our duty to strive after, and the duty of the Church to assist us to attain. It may even at times become the Church's duty strongly to recommend a suspension of fellowship until penitence has atoned for some grave moral lapse. But just as there can be no exact *definition* of that measure of moral failure which deprives a man, *against his own desire*, of the Christian name, so there can be no exact definition of that measure of doctrinal imperfection which entitles others to exclude him *against his will* from the Church.[3] To fix on some particular Creed for the purpose is, as we have shown, mistaken in principle and calamitous in results. The same could be said of the alternatives sometimes suggested in place of the Creed, such as the Te Deum or the Lord's Prayer. The only condition of mutual

[1] Isaac Taylor, *Fanaticism* (1833) 349. On the abandonment of exclusive dogmatism in Independency, cf. Mackennal, *Evolution of Congregationalism*, 79–81, 165 f. Dr. Forsyth argues passionately that some line must be drawn by the Church and some objective standard erected (*Authority*, 244–246, 265–267: cf. *Ch. and Sacraments*, 41 [". . . no Gospel to test newcomers by, no belief to crystallise on, . . ."]). But he never gets to the point of showing how, if at all, the requisite standard may be formulated in words, or of distinguishing the use of such a standard as a manifesto from its use as an exclusive test of membership. With what he says about the evils of indifference to doctrine (*Authority*, 276–279) we cordially agree.

[2] Cf. H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, i. 11 ("As an historian I can disfranchise none who claim, even on the slightest grounds, the privileges and hopes of Christianity: repudiate none who do not place themselves without the pale of believers and worshippers of Christ, or of God through Christ"); Morley, *Gladstone*, ii. 105 ("Tolerance is far more than the abandonment of civil usurpations over conscience. . . . Tolerance means reverence for all the possibilities of Truth; it means acknowledgment that she dwells in diverse mansions, and wears vesture of many colours, and speaks in strange tongues; it means frank respect for freedom of indwelling conscience against mechanic forms, official conventions, social force; it means the charity that is greater than even faith and hope").

[3] See the interesting discussion of this point in J. R. Seeley's *Ecce Homo*, ch. 7.

recognition which Christians are entitled to exact from Christians, and which the Church is entitled to demand from candidates for membership, is the expressed wish for that membership, public avowal of faith in Jesus Christ, and acceptance of whatever that may be found to involve in the search for truth in belief and for righteousness in life.[1] That, and that only, is the real 'quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.'[2] If a Catholic-minded reader feel disposed at this point to burst in with the objection that this is after all exacting a credal test, I would remind him, in the first place, that it is simply a statement of the condition of things without which the question of the terms on which a man should be admitted to Church-membership would simply not arise, and in the second place, that, not being in any sense an elaborated intellectual statement, it is not open to the objections that we have raised against credal tests in the normal sense of the term. Catholics and Anglicans do not withhold the name of Christian from any baptized believer in Christ (not even from one whose baptism is, like the Quaker's, only Spirit-baptism or the baptism of desire)—however inadequate his theology may seem to them to be. The concession of this name logically involves far-reaching consequences. If Christian, then within the true Church: if within the true Church, then entitled to recognition as Church-member by all Christian Churchmen: if Church-member, then entitled to the right hand of fellowship and a place by our side at the table of our common Master. Why not? After all, only God can really tell whether any particular person is a member of His Kingdom, and so entitled to a place in the Church on earth, or not.[3] Therefore, even although the voluntary self-excommunication of the unfit may not secure perfect results, it is yet the only form of excommunication that is really valid.[4] Even some High Anglican writers have expressed themselves recently as inclined to take this view.[5] We are however still very

[1] Cf. J. Watson, *Cure of Souls*, 123: "It is to be hoped that every branch of the Christian Church will soon exact no other pledge of her teachers than a declaration of faith in Jesus as the Son of God and the Saviour of the world, and a promise to keep His commandments, and otherwise grant them the fullest freedom of thought and exposition." Cf. E. E. C. Jones in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1920, 177 (quoting F. E. Hutchinson's *Christian Freedom*); Pryke, *Modernism*, 169–175; Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 27.

[2] Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in Hist.* 343.

[3] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 11.

[4] Oman, *Vision*, 160. Cf. Coleridge, *Aids to Reflection*, 186 ("Resist every false doctrine: and call no man heretic. The false doctrine does not necessarily make the man a heretic; but an evil heart can make any doctrine heretical. . . . I assert that (in *my* sense of the word, Christian) Unitarianism is not Christianity. But do I say that those who call themselves Unitarians are not Christians? God forbid! . . .").

[5] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 185 f ("... in such a Church there will be no constraint save that of love . . . the Church will be able to afford to abstain from

far from seeing it generally accepted. It is commonly felt that, if we were to rely exclusively on the unfit excommunicating themselves, the Church would be flooded with unbelievers, and her unity, purity, and orthodoxy inevitably lost.[1] In reply to these assumptions we may well ask, Which of the existing schemes that succeed in perpetuating disunion succeeds in keeping only satisfactory and orthodox people within the Church? For the unity, purity, and orthodoxy of the Church we should do better to trust to the unifying, cleansing, and enlightening power of the Holy Spirit of God in her midst, rather than to humanly constructed ring-fences of dogma, which *admittedly* exclude multitudes of Christians from one another's fellowship. If bare profession of faith in Christ seems far too meagre to serve as a summary of the responsibilities which the Christian accepts, we must remember that the teachers of the Church will be as free as ever to expound to others all the many truths and duties involved in such a profession. When we recognize an errorist within the Church, and deplore his error, and endeavour to enlighten him, it is not because we disbelieve at bottom in the principle of private judgment,[2] but because his private judgment has in this case, through some cause of error, been rendered inconsistent with the real truth of things. What we do therefore is not to expel him, but to point out to him again the objective realities accessible in experience and thought; and whether we can convince him or not, we can rely upon objective reality ultimately to defeat him, if he really needs to be defeated. Just as we should refer a man who believes the earth to be flat to the objective data of science, without needing to belittle private judgment or to appeal to some infallible scientist, so we can refer mistaken Christians to the true facts again, confident that, whether we can convince them or not, God and man are sufficiently akin to ensure the ultimate victory of truth.[3] The exclusion of dangerous and irreformable errorists, if it be really desirable, can be expected to follow of itself, if only the atmosphere within the Christian community be sufficiently Christian. It has been said that, "without excluding any, Christ suffered

excommunicating men for heresy, and to prefer the rational authority of consensus to the dragooned uniformity secured by discipline at the price of schism")—also in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 96: cf. Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 111.

[1] See, for instance, the review of Canon Rawlinson's book in *Times Lit. Suppt.* 8 May 1924, 276. The Roman position (for which see Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v [1909] 678b; Wilhelm in *op. cit.* vii [1910] 259 f) is that the Church possesses the right of excluding and expelling the unworthy, simply because she is a society. For a criticism of this analogy, see above, pp. 232 f.

[2] Cf. Newman, *Private Judgment*, 338–341: he wrongly regards our regret at a friend's abandonment of beliefs formerly held by him in common with ourselves, as indicating disbelief in private judgment.

[3] So Grubb (*Authority*, 111 f) argues accordingly that the early Church should have trusted the instinctive "scent for truth" to operate in the heretics, rather than have cut them off from her communion.

the unworthy to exclude themselves. He kept them aloof by offering them nothing which they could find attractive." [1] Can the Church improve upon her Lord's policy in this respect? "We shall probably find that it is by keeping alight the central fires of devotion and dedication, and by more positive teaching on the practice or demands of church membership, rather than by over-guarding the entrance, that unworthy invasion will be prevented." [2]

We have fought our battle over the authority of the Church mainly around the question of the Creeds in their capacity as tests of fitness for membership. Completeness would require that we should now discuss the question of Baptism—in particular, the status of those who conscientiously refuse to practise it. But it is the less necessary to do so for two reasons.

In the first place, the case is really covered by what we have already said in regard to the Creeds. Let us assume for the sake of argument that we can prove from history that our Lord really commanded that everyone coming to believe in Him should be baptized. That would give us a right to commend Baptism strongly to such as refuse it: but it would give us no right to withhold from them the right hand of Christian fellowship, supposing that they remained honestly unconvinced that our proof really was a sound one.

In the second place, Catholics and Anglicans, while intending to insist strenuously on the Divine requirement of water-baptism, have yet a doctrine of Baptism by the Spirit or Baptism of Desire, which might be regarded as applying to those Christians who decline water-baptism. The doctrine is not meant to suggest that any other kind of baptism is a really permissible alternative to water-baptism: it is simply a hesitant and doubtful recognition of the fact that in the Providence of God such an alternative has in certain cases taken the place of water-baptism and may do so again; and it provides a loophole whereby some kind of a status within the ideal Christian Church can be verbally conceded to Quakers and Salvationists, without falsifying the absolute requirement of Baptism as a condition of membership in the Church. If that were a permissible use to make of it, there would be no further need of arguing against the *absolute* necessity for Baptism as one of the implicates of the authority of the Church.

[1] Seeley, *Ecce Homo*, 71 (ch. 6).

[2] *Pathways to Christian Unity: a Free-Church View* (1919) 204. Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 278; Orchard, *Necessity of Christ*, 125 ("The Creeds may be right: it is the anathemas at the end which have prevented their even being fairly studied. If the Church is following Christ, it needs no authority but that of love, no ambition but that of service, and no excommunicating power save that fire of the Holy Ghost burning in her midst which keeps out and drives out all who fear the fire").

This then is our answer to the challenge of Catholicism so far as it is concerned with the philosophy of authority. The necessarily controversial nature of our answer has involved a large infusion of the negative element. It is impossible to refute the position of the other side without using negatives. Before we finally quit the subject, therefore, let it here be said that the Protestantism we defend, so far from being a negative thing, is—by the very fact that it is unencumbered by an erroneous philosophy—capable of conveying far fuller and more positive truth than Catholicism can find room for. It builds, in happy confidence, on the presence of the Divine Spirit in man, and on the native kinship between the human mind and Divine truth, between the human heart and Divine righteousness. It finds new 'light and truth breaking forth' from all quarters of human experience and discovery: it does not deserve the reproach, mistakenly brought against it, of refusing to be taught by the wise of old: it is content to adapt itself deliberately and knowingly to those limitations and conditions of progressive knowledge which God has ordained. It distils the words of God from the pages of Scripture, without needing at every point to take refuge from glaring improbabilities by shutting its eyes to them: it looks to Jesus as the unique and abiding revelation of the Father, knowing that "God was in Christ, reconciling the world to Himself," and it reposes its trust in Him as Saviour and Guide. Finally, it treasures the heritage of the Christian Church, revering her story, her message, and her thoughts, endeavouring to learn wisdom from the record of her varied experience, and to copy the example of her most conspicuous leaders of earlier times by fearlessly looking at all the varied phases of truth within reach, and believing that the guidance of God is never lacking to those who bring diligence and honesty and reverence to the study of His ways.

PART III

THE ANSWER OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

A STORY is told of King Henry IV of France, that the mayor of a certain city he was once visiting apologized to him for omitting to fire a salute on his Majesty's arrival, and stated that he had nineteen good reasons for the omission, whereof the first was that he had no artillery: thereupon the King graciously told him that he would be excused enumerating the remaining eighteen. We have given the first of our reasons for declining to accept the Catholic yoke; and it is in its own nature so fundamental and decisive as to make further pursuit of the main controversy appear superfluous. It is a matter of common knowledge that to add to strong reasons reasons that are less strong often weakens rather than strengthens the argument as a whole.[1] The issue upon which everything really turns in the controversy with Rome is the question of the infallibility of the Church.[2] Having already fully discussed this in its philosophical aspect, and offered a disproof of it, we might leave the whole matter here to the reader's judgment. If we have not convinced him, what argument concerning anything less central will do so? If we have, what need of more? Yet, since different types of argument interest and affect different minds in different degrees and ways, good ground exists for supplementing our main plea, firstly, with an exhibition of the divergence between the tenets of Catholicism and the facts of history, and secondly, with an examination of the Church's claim to be a trustworthy guide in Christian morals. Subordinate as these matters are in comparison with the problem of authority, our answer is not, strictly speaking, complete until they have been dealt with: and we shall see that an investigation of them provides no slight confirmation a posteriori of that position of freedom which we have already fully vindicated along more theoretical lines.

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 13: ". . . If a book were written containing a hundred reasons for not admitting the claims of the Roman Church, and if ninety of them were thoroughly conclusive, a Roman Catholic advocate who could show that the other ten were weak, would be regarded by his own party as having given a triumphant reply, and as having entirely demolished his opponent's case . . ."

[2] *Ibid.* 17–19, 24, 45.

CHAPTER XIII

CATHOLICISM AND THE SCRIPTURES[1]

THE Romanist attitude to Scripture is open to criticism on two main counts.

Firstly,[2] since there is no logical place for a self-authenticating Bible beside an infallible Church, the Church is inconsistent in trying on the one hand to honour Scripture by defending its infallibility, appealing to its authority, and referring the faithful to its teaching, and on the other hand, in declaring its authority to be subordinate to her own and its guidance inadequate and even misleading without her interpretation, and accordingly, to some extent and in certain ways, keeping it in the background. If the Church possesses the infallibility which Catholics claim for her, there would not seem to be any need, or indeed any intelligible standing-ground, left for a body of inspired and infallible writings, other than the decrees of the Church herself. The attempt to maintain her own infallibility and at the same time the absolute authority of Scripture has led and still leads inevitably to a certain duality and inconsistency of attitude.[3]

A determination to limit and in a way even to depreciate appeals to Scripture is very clearly visible in Catholic teaching. The seventh General Council—held at Nicaea in 787 A.D.—anathematized those who should refuse to receive doctrines on the authority of Fathers and Councils or the tradition of the Church, unless they could be shown to be plainly taught in the Old or New Testament.[4] The general position accepted

[1] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 586: all Protestants "werfen der römischen Kirche Missachtung und Vernachlässigung der Schrift vor."

[2] The reader who wonders where "secondly" comes, may be referred to p. 278 below.

[3] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 305 ("Roman-Catholic writers will perhaps explain, where was the room for the appeal to Scripture and unbroken tradition as depositories of the faith, if the word of each successive Pope was itself 'the word of God'"); Hase, *Handbook*, i. 126; Salmon, *Infall.* 117 (". . . If a Christian, reading the Bible for himself, puts upon it the interpretation which the Church puts upon it, he is still no better off than if he had never looked at it, and had contented himself with the same lessons as taught by the Church; . . ."), 129 ("If Christians had begun with the notion that they had an infallible guide in the Church, they would never have said anything about Scripture or tradition"); Heiler, *Kathol.* 587 ("Dadurch, dass das Dogma der Kirche die höchste religiöse Instanz ist, muss notwendig die Schrift in den Hintergrund treten"); Hugo Koch in *Theol. Litztg.* 1927. 11. 261 ("Damit ist deutlich das kirchliche Lehramt nicht bloss der Überlieferung, sondern auch der hl. Schrift übergeordnet . . . Da nun aber Gott einmal der Kirche überflüssigerweise eine hl. Schrift aufgenötigt hat, so überweist eben die lehrende Kirche diese mit einer vornehmen Handbewegung der hörenden Kirche als göttliches Buch!").

[4] Neander, *Church History* (Eng. tr., Bohn) v. 320; Salmon, *Infall.* 320.

by Catholics is that it is impossible for the believer to ascertain the true doctrines of Christianity from the Scriptures only, that these do not lie on the surface of Scripture, that they must in the first place be learned from the teaching and traditions of the Church, and that only after that can Scripture be used with profit, in order to prove and illustrate what the Church has already asserted.[1] Jesus, it is pointed out, did not embody His teachings in any written document, but entrusted them orally to the care of His followers: the first converts believed on the authority, not of an inspired book, but of a spoken word. The Church is thus, both in time and dignity, prior to the Christian Scriptures. These, therefore, cannot be the sole and final rule of faith: nay, of themselves, without the infallible interpretation of the Church, they may even be positively dangerous.[2] Not only are their mysteries unintelligible to the simple,[3] but it is possible to prove from their unannotated pages any doctrines one pleases, even those of foolishness and infidelity. "The devil," as we know, "can cite Scripture for his purpose." [4]

Catholics therefore, disapprove in toto of the principle: 'The Bible and the Bible only is the religion of Protestants.' In this they stand on common ground with the modernists, who likewise refuse to regard Scripture as the ultimate authority. But whereas the modernist sees the ultimate authority in the Divine Spirit enlightening the individual and providing him with a final ground for venerating the truth both in Scripture and in the tradition of the Church, the Catholic simply substitutes Church-tradition (ancient and otherwise) for Scripture—one external and objective entity for another—as the final standard, and virtually ignores, for the purpose of his philosophy of authority, the basic character of the Spirit's work.

The Scriptures, then, according to Catholic theory, must have an infallible interpreter; and the only possible interpreter of this kind is the Church. The Church existed before the Christian Scrip-

[1] Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 323, *Apol.* 35, 47 (ii). This view is apparently shared by some Anglo-Catholics (see below, p. 258 n. 6).

[2] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 117; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 792a; Wilhelm in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 496b, 498a; Lattey in *The Bible*, etc. 12, 17.

[3] See the letter of Innocentius III (1199) in Mirbt 173 (40–48); see below, p. 260.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 12 (the Roman Catholic "in arguing with a Protestant . . . is quite ready to assail with infidel arguments the independent authority of the Bible"), 168 ("Roman Catholic controversialists have called the Bible a nose of wax, which any man can twist as he pleases").

> "In religion,
> What damnèd error, but some sober brow
> Will bless it and approve it with a text,
> Hiding the grossness with fair ornament?"
> (Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, III. ii. 77–80 [cf. I. iii. 98–103]).

tures; and they are authenticated by her, and are her exclusive property: they cannot therefore be used to prove anything against her own tradition. Such was the argument of Tertullianus' work, 'De Praescriptione Haereticorum' (about 200 A.D.); and it has been well used by Catholics ever since. Augustinus declared that he would not believe in the Gospel unless the Church's authority moved him thereto.[1] The Church therefore—however defined—has the sole right to say what the meaning of Scripture is. The Council of Trent decreed, "for the restraining of wanton spirits, that no one, relying on his own prudence, in matters of faith and morals which concern the building up of Christian doctrine, (and) twisting Sacred Scripture to (fit) his own meanings, should dare to interpret Sacred Scripture itself contrary to that meaning which holy Mother Church—to whom it belongs to judge of the true meaning and interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures —has held and (still) holds, or even contrary to the unanimous agreement of the Fathers, even if interpretations of this (authoritative) kind have never at any time had to be published abroad (in lucem edendae forent). Let those who contravene (this decree) be notified by the ordinaries, and punished with the penalties prescribed by law."[2] The so-called 'Creed of Pius IV' (1564) requires the Catholic to say: "I also admit the Holy Scriptures, according to that sense which our holy Mother, the Church, has held, and does hold, to which it belongs to judge of the true sense and interpretation of the Scriptures: neither will I ever take and interpret them otherwise than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers."[3] In 1870 the above-quoted decree of the Council of Trent was re-affirmed by the Vatican Council in almost identical terms, but without the threat of punishment at the end.[4] The principle is well understood and accepted by modern Romanists;[5] and appeal to it is often made, mutatis mutandis, by Anglo-Catholics also.[6]

It is, however, open to grave objection on two grounds:

Firstly, if, as is argued, the Church be the sole guarantor of what

[1] See above, p. 118 n. 1. Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 114; Salmon, *Infall.* 12; Heiler, *Kathol.* 101.

[2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv (in Mirbt 292 [21]). Cf. von Dobschütz in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 608a.

[3] Mirbt 339 (34).

[4] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 2 (in Mirbt 457 [28]; Salmon, *Infall.* 477, cf. 129).

[5] Cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 278 f, 282–304; Newman in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 191 f (§§ 15 f); Salmon, *Infall.* 128; Toner and Wilhelm as on p. 257 n. 2.

[6] Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 261 f, 292 f; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 12, 25 (quotation from Laud), 46. Goudge in *Priests' Convention*, 29 ("We believe that it is only interpreted rightly when it is interpreted by the abiding mind and living experience of the Catholic Church"), 30 f ("Too often, we . . . leave the interpretation of the Bible to those who do not share our faith, and so allow it to be misinterpreted: . . ."). The theory in general is fairly stated by Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 264b.

Scriptures are inspired and of how they are to be interpreted, it is clearly a purely circular and therefore fallacious argument to appeal to the Scriptures (as Catholics always do) for proof that the Church's claims to infallibility are justified.[1] It does not mend matters to urge that the Church's infallibility can be proved from Scripture regarded purely as a collection of historical documents, without claim to special inspiration, and that then the Church's infallibility guarantees the inspiration of Scripture.[2] The infallibility of the Church, in the Catholic sense, cannot—as we shall see later—be proved from the Scriptures treated merely as historical documents: if so treated, they must clearly come under the principles of biblical criticism and must be held to support the broadly accepted critical results, which certainly do not suffice to substantiate the claims of Rome. Those claims can be established from Scripture only when a single series of sometimes plausible, sometimes highly dubious, exegetical steps is selected—selected out of many possible alternatives, and selected too under the pressure of present-day Church-authority. Nor does the analogy of an ambassador vouching for the genuineness of his own credentials [3] make the circularity of the argument any less vicious. For the relations of the ambassador to his accrediting letter are very different from—and indeed much less sovereign and determinative than—the relations in which it is claimed the Catholic Church stands to the Scriptures. The analogy therefore is not close enough to prove anything.

Secondly, in regard to the time-priority of the Church to the Scriptures, the argument based on this priority is vitiated by the fact that the centre of interest in the New Testament is not the Church-authors, but Jesus Christ—who was prior not only to the New Testament, but to the Church also. It is true that the Gospels are given us by the Church: but they obviously derive their chief value from the degree of truthfulness with which they tell us about One who preceded the Church. And when the Church's doctrines and practices are seen to be in conflict with the spirit and teaching of that One, it is to no purpose that the Church advances the Tertullianic 'praescriptio' and argues that all such criticism is in the nature of the case out of order.[4]

[1] Curtis, *l.c.* See also below, p. 273 n. 4.

[2] So Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 791a. On this offer to treat the Scriptures, for purposes of argument, as human documents, see below, p. 331.

[3] Bishop Forbes and Dr. Wiseman quoted in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 46.

[4] Cf. Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 264b. Dr. D'Arcy, in his discussion of the matter in *Anglic. Ess.* 14–20, defends the appeal of Tertullianus to the Church's Rule of Faith as the norm for interpreting Scripture, and, according to his reviewer in *Times Lit. Suppt.* 22 Feb. 1923, 117, "harmonizes the claims, so often artificially opposed, of Scripture and ecclesiastical tradition . . .". But as he lays stress on the still higher authority of Christ Himself (20–23) and the validity of private judgment (10 f), his resultant position is not very different from our own.

The Catholic theory of the priority and virtual superiority of the infallible Church to the difficult and obscure Scriptures clearly implies, if taken strictly, that Bible-reading is both a risky and an unnecessary proceeding. The Roman Church has never definitely committed herself to that implication, and to-day indignantly repudiates it: but there is a great deal in her history to show how strongly she has been drawn towards it.[1] Augustinus' casual remark that "a man supported by faith, hope, and charity, and firmly holding them, has no need of Scriptures except to instruct others,"[2] ought perhaps not to be pressed; but it is ominous of what was to become customary in the Middle Ages. The laity gradually gave up the private use of the Bible, and indeed largely lost the ability to read anything; but when the art of reading revived, the Church put all sorts of obstacles in the way of the Bible being widely read.[3] Thus, in 1080, Pope Gregorious VII refused a request from Prince Wratislaw of Bohemia to allow the Divine Office o be performed in the Slavonic language instead of in Latin, alleging as his reason that God had purposely caused Scripture to be in places obscure, "lest, if it should be openly clear to all, it might perchance grow cheap and be exposed to contempt, or, being wrongly understood by ordinary people (mediocribus), lead (them) into error."[4] Late in the next century, in the diocese of Metz, groups of people began to meet privately to read parts of the Bible in French and to expound it to one another; and they protested on Scriptural grounds against interference on the part of unlearned priests. In 1199 Pope Innocentius III ordered these conventicles to be suppressed. "The secret mysteries (sacramenta) of the faith," he wrote, "ought not to be exposed to all. . . . For so great is the profundity of Divine Scripture, that not only the simple and uneducated, but even the wise and learned are not fully equal to investigating its meaning. Wherefore Scripture says that 'many have failed in their search.' Whence it was once rightly ordained in the Divine Law that a beast that should touch the mountain should be stoned, obviously lest any simple and unlearned person should presume to reach as far as the sublimity of Sacred Scripture, or to preach it to others." The Pope's letter was embodied later in the Decretals.[5] The ignorance of the priesthood in the thirteenth century

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 117.

[2] Aug. *Doctr. Christ.* i. 43 (Migne, *P.L.* xxxiv. 36).

[3] Von Dobschütz in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 607ab, 608a; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 291 f.

[4] Mirbt 158 f: cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 8, 13, 36 f, 57, 67 f (the Protestant disputant understands "quibusdam locis" to refer—not to Scripture-passages—but to regions where Latin was not spoken: wrongly, I think); Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 23 f, 372.

[5] Mirbt 173 (15): cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 8, 13, 37, 58, 68–70; von Dobschütz in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 608a; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 30–35, 327, 372, 384.

appears to have been in places a scandal; many of them knew very little Latin.[1] The Council held at Toulouse in 1229—in the midst of the Church's struggle with the Albigenses—decreed, with the approval of the Pope: "We also forbid that laymen should be permitted to possess the books of the Old or New Testament, unless perhaps anyone wishes for devotional purposes to possess a psalter or a breviary for the Divine Offices or the hours of the Blessed Mary. But we most strictly forbid them to possess the aforesaid books translated in the vulgar (tongue)." [2] In 1234 the provincial council of Tarragona ordained "that no one should possess the books of the Old or New Testament in the Romanic (dialect)," i.e. the vernacular of Spain, France, and Italy. "And if anyone possesses them, let him within eight days . . . hand them over to the bishop of the place to be burnt, and unless he does this, whether he be cleric or lay, let him be held as suspected of heresy, until he has cleared himself." [3] In 1242 the Dominicans were forbidden by their chapter-general at Bologna to translate any sacred books.[4] In 1246 the provincial council of Béziers gave orders: "In regard to the point that laymen ought not to possess theological books in Latin, and neither they nor clerics in the vulgar (tongue), . . . insist on whatever ye know to be just and legal being fully observed." [5] It became the general practice of Inquisitors to treat vernacular Bible-reading as presumptive evidence of heresy, and to burn vernacular translations wherever they found them.[6] It is therefore hardly to be wondered at that, in the later part of the thirteenth century, the Bible-knowledge of the heretics was contrasted by a Catholic with the ignorance of his co-religionists.[7] English pre-Wyclifite manuals of devotion never suggest English Bible-reading.[8] In 1369 the Emperor Charles IV, in decreeing the suppression, by the Inquisitors, of heretical books in German, refers to the Church-regulations under which lay-folk of either sex were forbidden to make use of any books of holy Scripture, written in the vernacular ("libris vulgaribus quibuscunque

[1] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 156–163, 188–198; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 23; cf. 24 top (complaint of Roger Bacon [about 1214–1294] regarding the illiteracy of the clergy).

[2] Mirbt 194 (9): cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 6, 8, 13, 37, 58 f, 71; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 35–37, 372, 384.

[3] Mirbt 194 (15): cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 8, 13, 37 f, 59, 71 f; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 34 n.1, 48, 61.

[4] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 37.

[5] Mirbt 198 (27); cf. Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 38. A similar prohibition was enacted at a later Council of Tarragona in 1317 (Rietschel in Hauck, *Realenc.* ii [1897] 703; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 48 f).

[6] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 34 f, 39, etc.; cf. 18 f, 21, 47 f.

[7] Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 23.

[8] *Op. cit.* 24. Cf. Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 21, etc.

de sacra scriptura").[1] About 1380–1390 were produced the two English versions of the Scriptures associated with the name of Wyclif. It seems uncertain how far Wyclif himself carried out the actual work of translation: that he did not do the whole of it is beyond doubt. The attempt, however, on the part of some modern Catholic scholars to prove that the so-called Wyclifite Versions were borrowed from a pre-existing Catholic version has been proved to be quite untenable.[2] Great opposition was offered by ecclesiastics in general and by friars in particular to indiscriminate vernacular Bible-reading on the part of the English laity during the period from 1380 onwards.[3] Wyclif's younger contemporary, the continuator of Henry Knighton and (like Knighton himself) a canon of Leicester Abbey, wrote (apparently about 1400): "The gospel which Christ delivered to the clergy and doctors of the Church, that they themselves might sweetly administer (it) to the laity and to weaker persons, according to the need of the times and the wants of men . . . did this master John Wycliffe translate out of Latin into the English, not the angelic, tongue; whence through him it becomes common, and more open to the laity and to women who can read than it is wont to be to highly educated and intelligent clerics. And thus the gospel-pearl is cast abroad, and trodden under foot by swine, and thus that which is wont to be precious to both clergy and laity, is now rendered, as it were, the common jest of both: and the jewel of the clergy is turned into the sport of the laity, so that what had formerly been the heavenly talent of the clergy and doctors of the Church is (now) a 'commune aeternum' to the laity."[4] In 1408 a provincial Church-council at Oxford ordained "that no one henceforth is to translate on his own authority any text of Sacred Scripture into the English or any other language, by way of book, booklet, or treatise; nor is any such book, booklet, or treatise, composed recently in the time of the said John Wyclif or since or hereafter to be composed, to be read in whole

[1] Mirbt 226; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 83–88. The facts are rightly represented by Miss Deanesly and by Dr. Coulton (in *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 25 f) as a prohibition of *Scripture itself* in the vernacular: the latter defends this interpretation (*op. cit.* 41 f) on the ground that the words used might perfectly well mean, in mediaeval Latin, "books *of* Scripture." The rendering "books *about* Scripture," though linguistically *possible*, is open to objection on historical grounds.

[2] The point is argued out with great fulness and cogency by Miss Deanesly in *Loll. Bible*, 225–267, esp. 249–251; cf. 275, 280, 314 f, 334, 371 f, 377: cf. also Workman, *John Wyclif*, ii. 149–200; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 8 f, 31–36.

[3] Cf. Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 282 f, 288–298, 342 f, 348, 370–373, 399–437; and on the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries generally, von Dobschütz in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 608a.

[4] Translated from *Henrici Knighton Leycestrensis Chronicon* (ed. Lumby) ii. 151 f: cf. R. Vaughan, *Life and Opinions of . . . Wycliffe* (2nd. edn. 1831) ii. 43 f (loose translation); *Dict. of Nat. Biog.* xi. 270; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 239 f (explains "commune aeternum").

or in part, publicly or privately, under penalty of major excommunication, until the translation itself has been approved by the diocesan of the place, or, if necessary, by the provincial council. Let him who contravenes (this rule) be punished just like one who favours heresy and error."[1] In 1485 Berthold, the Archbishop of Mainz, issued an edict forbidding the printing and publication in his diocese of German translations of Greek or Latin religious books (apparently including the Scriptures), except with the approval of the University-authorities.[2] Cardinal Ximenes, Archbishop of Toledo, strongly opposed the translation of Scripture into the vernacular for the use of the laity of Spain.[3] The significance of the story of Luther's discovery of a Latin Bible in the university-library at Erfurt in 1503 must not be over-done;[4] but it does illustrate the gross ignorance of the times in regard to Scripture, and we know that some theological professors discouraged the study of it as dangerous.[5] Sir Thomas More, though denying that there was any law forbidding the reading of the English Bible as such, yet says that the clergy were unsympathetic towards it and had failed to provide a pure translation: moreover he advocated keeping the practice under the close control of the bishops.[6] Strenuous efforts were made, both in Germany and England, to suppress the various issues of Tyndale's translation of the New Testament (1525–1535)—proceedings for which some colourable justification could be pleaded in view of defects in the translation itself and of the supplementary matter with which certain of the editions were furnished.[7] In 1527 the Theological Faculty at Paris issued 'censures' in reply to certain propositions set forth by Erasmus in defence of biblical translations.[8] Dr. John Driedo, of Louvain, who died in 1535, wrote a tract denying that Paul's epistles could be understood in the

[1] Mirbt 227 (8): cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 8, 13 f, 38, 59, 72 f; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 3, 6–9, 294–296, 315, 319, 326 f; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 25–27. Sir Thomas More alluded to the prohibition of the Wyclifite Scriptures. On the fifteenth century generally, Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 329, 348.

[2] Mirbt 245 f. Cf. Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 124 f; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 25 f; von Dobschütz in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 608a ("This caused printers of the Bible not perhaps to suspend operations, but to omit their names from their work").

[3] *Papacy and Bible*, 9, 14, 38, 59 f, 73 f. Cf. Herzog and Benrath in Hauck, *Realenc.* xxi (1908) 581.

[4] Cf. McGiffert, *Martin Luther*, 35; Anon. *The Cath. Church and the Bible* ('Cath. Truth Soc.') 9.

[5] McGiffert, *loc. cit.*

[6] *Papacy and Bible*, 59, 72 f n; Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 10 f; Coulton, *op. cit.* 26 f. The fullest discussion of the significance of what More said in his *Dialogue* with 'the Messenger,' is in Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 1–17, 173, 331 f, 370–373. See below, p. 275 n. 5.

[7] A. C. Paues in *Encyc. Brit.* iii. 898; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 371 mid.; Binns, *Reformers and Bible*, 35.

[8] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 387 f.

vernacular.[1] In 1543 Henry VIII (then undergoing a reaction towards more conservative views) forbade the sale of Tyndale's work "and the reading of the Bible in churches, or by yeomen, women, and other incapable persons." [2] In 1544 Matthew Ory, a friar, wrote a pamphlet in French, denying that Scripture ought to be communicated indiscriminately to all.[3] Under Henry VIII, and still more under Mary (1553–1558), the wholesale burning of English Bibles was frequently associated with the persecution of Protestants.[4] In 1564, as an outcome of the Council of Trent, Pope Pius IV, on the avowed ground that more injury than advantage arose from indiscriminate Bible-reading in the vernacular, enacted that only those whom the ecclesiastical authorities thought likely not to suffer harm, but to gain an increase in faith and piety, by reading, should be allowed to possess and read translations of the Scriptures, and that even these should be allowed to use only Catholic translations.[5] In 1565 there was published an English translation of an 'Apology,' written by Frederic Staphylus, councillor of the Emperor Ferdinand, giving reasons why the laity should not have the Bible in the vulgar tongue.[6] A number of eminent Catholics during and after the period of the Council of Trent wrote in a similar strain.[7] Thus, about 1570 we find Stanislas Hosius, the vehement Polish cardinal, declaring himself against Bible-translations generally, on account of the harm they had done: the Bible, he said, beyond the Roman Church to which it belonged, was worth no more than Æsop's fables.[8] No version of the New Testament in current English was provided for Catholics before 1582, and no version of the whole Bible before 1609. Pope Sixtus V ordained in 1590: "Sacred Bibles or parts of them, even when translated by a Catholic into any vulgar tongue whatever, are not allowed anywhere without new and special licence of the Apostolic See; and popular paraphrases are altogether forbidden." [9] In 1595 these regulations were apparently confirmed by Pope Clemens VIII.[10] In the latter part of the seventeenth century, the demands made by the Jansenists called forth a number of Catholic

[1] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 383. [2] So Hallam, *Constit. Hist.* i. 83 n.

[3] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 383. On the general Catholic attitude during the sixteenth century, *op. cit.* 50 n., 109.

[4] *Papacy and Bible*, 9, 14, 38–40, 60 f, 74 f.

[5] Mirbt 341 (10: ". . . Cum experimento manifestum sit, si sacra biblia vulgari lingua passim sine discrimine permittantur, plus inde ob hominum temeritatem detrimenti quam utilitatis oriri, . . ."): cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 4, 9, 14, 40 f, 61, 75 ; Salmon, *Infall.* 123 n.; von Dobschütz in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 608a (". . . Practically this was almost the withdrawal of the Bible . . .").

[6] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 383, 389–391. [7] *Op. cit.* 383.

[8] *Papacy and Bible*, 9, 14 f, 41, 59 f, 75 f; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 151; *Encyc. Brit.* xiii. 790 b.

[9] Mirbt 353 (31).

[10] Limborch, *Hist. of the Inquisition* (Eng. tr. by S. Chandler, 1731) i. 225–227.

treatises defending the Church's action in discouraging vernacular Bible-reading.[1] In 1699 the Jansenist Quesnel's annotated translation of the New Testament in French was ordered to be publicly burnt, on account of the errors said to be contained in the notes;[2] and in 1713 Clemens XI condemned in the strongest terms 101 statements extracted from Quesnel's notes, among which were the following: "79. It is useful and necessary at every time, in every place, and for every kind of persons, to apply oneself to, and to know, the spirit, piety, and mysteries of Sacred Scripture. 80. The reading of Sacred Scripture is for all. 81. The obscurity of the holy Word of God is not a reason why laymen should excuse themselves from reading it. 82. The Lord's Day ought to be sanctified by Christians by readings of piety and —above all—of the Sacred Scriptures. It is injurious (damnosum) to wish to hold back a Christian from this reading. 83. It is illusory to persuade oneself that knowledge of the mysteries of religion ought not to be communicated to women by the reading of the sacred books. Not from the simplicity of women, but from the proud knowledge of men, has abuse of the Scriptures arisen, and heresies been born. 84. To snatch the New Testament from the hands of Christians, or to keep it closed to them by taking from them the means of understanding it, is to stop up for them the mouth of Christ. 85. To forbid to Christians the reading of Sacred Scripture, especially of the Gospel, is to forbid the use of light to the sons of light, and to cause them to suffer a kind of excommunication." These propositions the Pope declared to be "false, captious, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, scandalous, pernicious, temerarious, injurious to the Church," etc. etc.; and he condemned and proscribed them accordingly.[3] Pope Benedictus XIV (about 1740) put obstacles in the way of the production of a new version of parts of the Scriptures in Persian.[4] In 1794 Pius VI, in condemning the enactments of the Synod of Pistoia, affirmed: "The doctrine which declares that only real inability excuses (us) from reading the sacred Scriptures, (and) adds further that it is exposing the eclipse which has arisen from the neglect of this precept over the primary truths of religion—is false, temerarious, disturbing to the peacefulness of souls, (and) elsewhere condemned, (viz:) in (the case of) Quesnel."[5] The various European Bible-Societies which sprang up in the early years of last century incurred from the outset the steady hostility of the Roman Church. In 1816 Pius VII, in reply to an inquiry from the Polish bishops, expressed in strong language his horror at

[1] Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 383 f. [2] *Papacy and Bible*, 9, 15, 42, 62, 77–79.

[3] Bull *Unigenitus* (partly in Mirbt 398 [22–36]). Cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 9, 15, 41 f, 61 f, 76 f.

[4] *Papacy and Bible*, 9, 15 f, 43, 62, 79.

[5] Bull *Auctorem Fidei* in Mirbt 412 (prop. no. 67).

the danger with which the Bible-societies were threatening the foundations of religion.[1] The same year he rebuked the Archbishop of Mohilew for advising his people to welcome and study the new biblical translations then becoming available.[2] In 1824 Leo XII issued an encyclical, deploring the world-wide activity of 'the British and Foreign Bible Society,' and calling upon the leaders of the faithful to safeguard their flocks from the deadly pest.[3] The same year Catholic agitations and protests were made in Ireland against indiscriminate Bible-reading.[4] In 1829 Pius VIII issued another general and strongly-worded warning against the danger of the Bible-translations that were being distributed: [5] yet another, against the Bible-societies in general, was published by Gregorius XVI in 1844,[6] and another by Pius IX in 1846.[7] In 1853 a Catholic wrote: "considering the shameful forgery of the Protestant Bible, I would prefer that a Catholic should read the worst books of immorality than this forgery in God's Word, this slander of Christ." [8] At this period, unauthorized Bible-reading was actually punished with imprisonment in Tuscany.[9] A case of Bible-burning under Catholic influence occurred near Sheffield in 1860.[10] In 1864 the Bible-societies (grouped with socialism, communism, secret societies, and clerico-liberal societies) were included in the Papal 'Syllabus' among the errors of the age. "Pests of that kind," it says, "are often and in the severest terms condemned in (encyclical) letters."[11] It was only under certain most stringent conditions and after considerable delay that papal sanction was obtained in 1872 for the dissemination of a new translation of the Old Testament in French.[12] Cardinal Manning complained of the Catholic "reaction against the popular use of the Holy Scriptures in England." [13] In 1887 Henri Lasserre, a French Catholic, produced a fine translation of the Gospels in French: in his preface he states that the great mass of Catholic lay-folk are profoundly ignorant of Scripture:

[1] Brief *Postremis litteris* in Mirbt 427 (16: ". . . vaferrimum inventum, quo vel ipsa religionis fundamenta labefactantur . . . ad eam pestem, quoad fieri possit, curandam delendamque . . . eamque fidei labem gravissimumque animarum periculum . . . nefarii imprimis consilii malitiam . . ."). Cf. *Papacy and Bible*, v, 2, 10, 17, 44, 63 f, 81 f; von Dobschütz in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 608b ("Hardly had the Jesuit order again attained influence when the Bible Societies in Catholic spheres were everywhere suppressed").

[2] Mirbt 427 f.

[3] Mirbt 434 (27) (". . . Ad quem pestem . . . a lethiferis hisce pascuis . . ."). Cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 10, 16, 43, 62, 79 f.

[4] *Papacy and Bible*, 10, 43.

[5] Mirbt 435 (2).

[6] Mirbt 443 (5): cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 10, 16, 44, 62, 82, and 75 (quotation from Perrone).

[7] *Papacy and Bible*, 10, 16, 44, 82; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 2 bott.

[8] Rev. D. W. Cahill, D.D., in *Tablet*, 17 Dec. 1853, 804 (col. 2).

[9] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 95, 151 n., 152; Bain, *New Reformation*, 2.

[10] *Papacy and Bible*, 80 n.

[11] Mirbt 451 (40).

[12] Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 94–96.

[13] Purcell, *Manning*, ii. 778.

his own version was however after a short time prohibited by the Pope.[1] In 1894 a case was quoted of a Catholic priest openly avowing that, being a spiritual physician and not a poisoner of souls, he did not allow his flock to read the Bible at all.[2] The Catholic scholar who reported the fact frankly and repeatedly admitted the virtual neglect of the Bible by his co-religionists.[3] In 1895 Father Bampfield expressed his approval of the burning of Protestant Bibles, though he declared that he had not known it done.[4] "If I chance to speak to a continental Catholic," wrote Dr. Horton in 1898, "I am always told that he must not read the Bible." [5] In 1899 a Catholic priest wrote: "My experience has been that the Catholic laity are positively unwilling to read the Bible. . . . The Bible *as a book* is one in which they feel very little interest." [6] In 1921 it was admitted that "the Scriptures are not largely read by the faithful generally." [7] It seems that Biblical scholarship to-day, even among Catholics of eminence, is at times sadly lacking.[8] The Catholic system does not in fact facilitate a growing knowledge of the contents of Scripture, on the part of modern believers.[9] "The Church, of course," writes Father Lattey, "can never be for 'the open Bible' at *any* price": "first of all we must accept the Church as our God-given teacher, and then she will explain to us inspiration." [10]

Criticism of the Catholic treatment of the Scriptures has of course been very variously expressed [11]—no doubt sometimes (in view of certain

[1] Particulars and quotations in Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 9 f; Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 129–134, 317, 350; Salmon, *Infall.* 123 f note; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 35 f, 47 f; Horton, *England's Danger*, 111; Whitley in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 756a. For the scarcity of the New Testament in Rome, Salmon, *Infall.* 324.

[2] *Contemp. Review*, Apl. 1894, 578 n. [3] *Op. cit.* 577 f, 601, 606 f.

[4] Bampfield, *England and the Bible*, 13. Not having been able to get access to this work, I quote at secondhand—from 'Protest. Press Bureau' Tract No. 45.

[5] Horton, *England's Danger*, 110; cf. 111 f: also Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 185 n.

[6] *Catholic Times*, 29 Sept. 1899, 9 (col. 4).

[7] *The Universe*, 6 May 1921, 11 (col. 1).

[8] Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 23, 37 f, *Death-Penalty*, 16 f.

[9] Heiler, *Kathol.* 588 n. (". . . Freilich hat auch im Hinblick auf die Bibellektüre die Kirche nur halbe Erziehungsarbeit getan; sie hat es versäumt, die reiferen Frommen stufenweise zu einer fruchtbaren Benutzung der biblischen Schätze anzuleiten"), 589; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 268 f (". . . 'Who reads the Evangelists?' is even to-day a question by which the Italian Papini can rebut the objection that it could not be necessary for him simply to retell the story of Jesus, . . .").

[10] Lattey in *The Bible*, etc. 12, 17.

[11] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 144, 151; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 9–12; Salmon, *Infall.* 11 f, 117, 123; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 35 (". . . a practical discouragement of the laity from searching the Scriptures for themselves . . ."), 36; Horton, *England's Danger*, 112, 116; Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 1 (" 'The Catholic Church fears and hates the Bible, and does all she can to keep it a closed book. In fact Catholics may not read the Bible.' This in a few words is the genuine belief of many Protestants . . ."); von Dobschütz in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 593a ("Attempts are frequently made to show that the Roman Church has always zealously furthered the study of the Bible, but the arguments which have been gathered . . . only prove the opposite"); Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 382, 384; Coulton, *op. cit.* 2, 28.

other evidence yet to be adduced) in exaggerated terms. But it can be safely asserted

(1) that the Catholic Church is and always has been vehemently opposed to the use, by the faithful, of any translations of the Bible, other than those that are not only made by Catholics, but also have been issued under her own official authority;

(2) that she has again and again taken official measures which hindered fuller knowledge of the Scriptures coming to the laity;

(3) that she tolerates no general reading of Scriptural interpretations other than her own;

(4) that she has up to within the last few decades done surprisingly little (when we bear in bind her claims and position) to familiarize her members even with Scripture as she herself interprets it.

Four reasons are given by Catholics in defence of this general attitude.

(1) It is maintained in the first place that the non-Catholic versions have been gravely inaccurate. Thus, Luther is censured for insisting on the insertion of the word 'allein' in Rom. iii. 28, in conformity with his view of justification by faith *alone*. Tyndale is charged with having mistranslated ἐκκλησία 'congregation' instead of 'church,' and with having wilfully omitted in some editions some words found in 1 Peter ii. 13 f, which speak of the duty of obeying the government. The Authorized Version translates ἤ 'and' instead of 'or' in 1 Cor. xi. 27, thus unwarrantably favouring communion in both kinds. And so on.[1] It is difficult to treat criticism of this kind seriously. All translations are to some degree imperfect; and no doubt instances can be found where the fluctuating ethics of translation or some strong doctrinal interest or perchance mere error or accident has been the occasion of introducing an objectionable blemish into this or that Protestant version. But to discriminate in this respect between Catholic and Protestant versions in favour of the former is ridiculous. In regard to the specific errors complained of—Luther, to begin with, was perfectly justified in translating Rom. iii. 28 as he did.[2] He was quite deliberately not attempting a literal version, and his German truthfully represents the meaning of the Greek.[3] Nor is it any more possible to deny that Tyndale's word 'congregation' is a legitimate translation of ἐκκλησία. The com-

[1] K. Vaughan in *Papacy and Bible*, 4 f, 16; Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 16–20; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 34 f; W. Barry in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 100 (". . . if ever the Authorized Version, its errors purged away, . . ."!); Lattey, *First Notions*, 74; Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 132. On Luther, Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 355 f.

[2] "So halten wir nun dafür, dass der Mensch gerecht werde ohne des Gesetzes Werke, allein durch den Glauben."

[3] Cf. Ficker in *Theol. Litzg.* 1926. 19/20. 498: "So ist denn auch zu hoffen, dass der gegen Luther erhobene Vorwurf, er hätte in seiner Übersetzung Fälschungen begangen, für die katholische Kirche verschwinde."

plaint about Tyndale's omission in 1 Peter ii. 13 f seems to rest on the fact that in *two* out of the numerous editions of his translation of the New Testament—viz: one published in the year of his martyrdom (1536), and one republished twelve or thirteen years later—the words "unto the Kynge as unto the chefe heed; other" (i.e. "or") are omitted in these verses. The omission was almost certainly a printer's blunder, and not a wilful act on Tyndale's part: for (1) apparently all the other editions, especially the earlier ones supervised by Tyndale himself, contain the missing words; (2) if he wanted to suppress the clause, he would have had also to alter the words "whether it be" and "sent by him"; and (3) Tyndale himself published in 1528 a treatise entitled 'The Obedience of a Christian Man,' in which he laid down the rule of full submission to the temporal sovereign.[1] As for 1 Cor. xi. 27, while ἢ ('or') is undoubtedly the right reading, yet Codex Alexandrinus and quite a number of other authorities actually read καί ('and'). Thus, the Authorized Version of the passage may rest on a real preference for a variant reading. But supposing it was a slip or even an intentional paraphrase, what is its significance? If Romanists object that it furnishes a fictitious Scriptural basis for communion in *both* kinds, we ask in reply, How can you claim that the true reading ἢ justifies communion in *one* kind, when the verses immediately preceding and following this one three times speak distinctly of eating *and* drinking?

But in any case, what are these—taken at their fullest—in comparison with the innumerable textual inaccuracies permanently fastened upon the Roman Church in consequence of the retention of the Latin Vulgate as the official version?[2] Protestant errors in translation have been few,

[1] There is a great deal of useful information about Tyndale and all his works in Dr. H. Guppy's two monographs, *Sketch of the Hist. of the Transmission of the Bible*, prefixed to John Rylands Library Exhibition *Catalogue*, 1925, and separately republished in 1926, and *William Tyndale and the earlier translators of the Bible into English*, reprinted from the Library *Bulletin*, 1925.

[2] How gravely the Vulgate may mislead in matters of doctrine is illustrated by its mistranslation of ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον in Rom. v. 12. As all now admit, the words really mean "because all sinned"; but the Vulgate, in common with the Old Latin Version and the Latin commentators, adopted the mechanical rendering "*in quo* omnes peccaverunt," which has been generally understood to mean that in Adam all his descendants had (implicitly) sinned. Thus, the words were quoted at the Council of Trent (sess. v, can. 2, in Mirbt 293 [36]) in support of the doctrine of original inherited sin. They are quoted for the same purpose by Dr. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 6. In the modern Catholic 'Westminster Version,' vol. iii, ad loc. 'because' is said to be, not only the one permissible rendering of ἐφ'ᾧ, but "perhaps the right rendering of *in quo*, as in Philip. iii. 12. It is not said explicitly that all had sinned *in Adam* (nor can we say that 'all had sinned' here refers *exclusively* to original sin), but, as just explained, original sin is clearly *included*," etc. etc. This attempt to exculpate the Vulgate is a failure. 'In quo' in Latin cannot mean 'because'; and the traditional exegesis, according to which the passage *does* explicitly say that all had

almost entirely accidental,[1] open to the light of day, and speedily eliminated by the production of successive new versions: Catholic errors are innumerable; and until quite modern times no thorough effort has been made to remove them by abandoning the Vulgate and going back to the originals. It is therefore childish to argue that "the English Protestant translation of the Bible has been changed many times and gave false meanings in very important passages . . . you must remember what I have told you about the Catholic Church *encouraging Bible-reading in correct translations*."[2] That the plea of Protestant inaccuracies is not the real reason why the Catholic Church has discouraged Bible-reading is seen in the fact that the agents of 'the British and Foreign Bible Society' have frequently been hindered in the attempt to distribute in Catholic countries even translations made by Catholics, approved by the Church-authorities, and specially issued (though without the Catholic notes and comments) for distribution by the Society.[3]

(2) The second Catholic objection to Protestant versions of the Scriptures is that they are defective in omitting the Old Testament Apocrypha. This omission is given as one of the reasons why the Church forbids the circulation by Protestants of their own impressions of Catholic translations.[4] The Apocryphal books were religious compositions written by Jews in Greek[5] during the last two centuries B.C. and the first century A.D. They were never included in the scriptural Canon of the Jews of Palestine, and have no place in the Hebrew Bible: but they were embodied in the Septuagint (the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek), and thus passed into general use in the Christian Church. They were, however, recognized as standing on a

sinned in Adam, is clearly right—so far as the Latin is concerned. The trouble is that the Latin is a gross mistranslation, and that what Paul wrote here does *not* assert or imply original sin in the Catholic sense.

[1] Cf. Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 62 n., 65 ("there was not, before the Reformation, any question as to the orthodoxy of the contents of particular translations, only as to the propriety of their existence"), 230 f, 238, 240, 334, 371 (as to faithfulness of the Wyclifite translation).

[2] Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 17: on 15 the author speaks of "the inspired sense of God's Word as it was in the original Hebrew, Greek, *or Latin*" (italics here and in the text mine). Bellarmine (1542–1621) admitted that really safe translations could not be produced: "Nam non semper inveniuntur idonei interpretes; atque ita multi errores committerentur, qui non possent postea facile tolli, cum neque pontifices neque Concilia de tot linguis judicare possint" (*De Verbo Dei*, lib. ii. c. 15 near the end [*Works*, ed. Sforza, 1872, i. 89 f]).

[3] *Papacy and Bible*, 44, 63, 80; Kilgour, *Bible Translations in Eight European Languages with special reference to "Vulgate" Versions, and "Approbations"* ('Bible House Papers,' No. XII, 1927) (full details regarding the editions issued by the Society). See also below, pp. 272 f n. 6.

[4] *Papacy and Bible*, 16, 63, 86.

[5] Hebrew originals existed in the case of some, but are extant only in fragments.

different footing from that of the Hebrew Canon; but their exact status was never determined until the sixteenth century. The Council of Trent, perhaps in opposition to Luther (who stood for the exclusive recognition of the Hebrew Old Testament Canon), decided in 1546 that the books of the Apocrypha were to be placed on a level with the rest of the Old Testament and the New Testament as Sacred Scripture.[1] As the Roman Church has thus made the full canonicity of the Apocrypha a matter of faith by anathematizing those who do not accept it, she is naturally opposed to the circulation of Bible-translations which, by omitting the Apocrypha, suggest that it is uncanonical. We do not propose to argue the case on its merits, having already given reasons for repudiating the hard and fast distinction in kind between canonical and uncanonical as arbitrary and irrational.[2] We may however say in our defence—not to Rome, since Trent has spoken—but to the impartial reader, that Rome herself, prior to 1546, distinguished between the Apocryphal and the other Old Testament books, treating the former as being on a lower level of inspiration, and that, in 1546, many leading Catholic scholars were in favour of the distinction being retained. Can therefore the bare fact that a translation of the Bible is unaccompanied by the Apocrypha, suffice in fairness to damn it? In particular—and this we may say to Rome—can the absence of the Apocrypha discredit Protestant *New* Testaments?[3] As a matter of fact, public readings from the Apocrypha are permitted and provided for in the Church of England; and many editions of the English Bible, both Authorized and Revised Versions, now have the Apocrypha included within their covers.[4] Clearly we have not in the omission of the Apocrypha Rome's *real* ground for her bitter hostility to the Protestant Scriptures.

(3) Passing mention only is necessary of the Catholic objection to the notes and other supplementary matter inserted in some of the condemned translations. This is mainly a matter of history. The Wyclifite

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv (Mirbt 291 f): cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 45; Porter in H.*D.B.* i (1898) 121 f; Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 128; Lattey, *First Notions*, 57 f; Clays in *The Bible*, etc. 80 f, 86–91, 107 f (on 90 the extraordinary statement is made that "*Our Lord* and the Apostles accepted and approved the Alexandrian Canon . . ." [similarly on 108: italics mine]. The few and mostly dubious parallels between the Gospels on the one hand and the apocryphal books of Wisdom and Ben Sirach on the other [Adeney in Hastings' *Dict. of Christ and Gospels*, i (1906) 100 f] show at most that our Lord may have known and quoted these books, but certainly not that He "accepted and approved the Alexandrian Canon").

[2] See above, esp. pp. 180–182: and cf. Grubb, *Authority*, 55 f.

[3] *Papacy and Bible*, 81.

[4] 'The British and Foreign Bible Society' does not admit the Apocrypha to the versions which it circulates; but it has sometimes in the past aided the circulation on the Continent of Bibles which contain the Apocrypha conformably to local usage (see W. Canton, *Hist. of the B.F.B.S.* i. 334–340).

version was frequently recopied during the fifteenth century, and seems therefore to have been allowed by the ecclesiastical authorities, when unaccompanied by its controversial prologue.[1] Quesnel's version of the New Testament was condemned on the ground of alleged errors in its notes.[2] It has, however, long been customary among Protestants to print Bibles and Testaments without notes: indeed, one of the principles observed by 'the British and Foreign Bible Society' since its inception in 1804 (and therefore prior to all papal condemnations of the Bible-societies) is that the Scriptures which it circulates should be "without note or comment."

(4) We come to closer grips with the real issue when we recall the frequent mention in Catholic public and private utterances of the inviolable majesty, sanctity, and mystery of the Bible, its liability to become cheapened and despised if too commonly known, its obscurity, and the consequent danger of unlearned or perverse people deceiving themselves and others as to its meaning. Hence the almost universal custom of providing Catholic translations of the Scriptures with explanatory notes in the interests of Roman doctrine.[3] It is, of course, true that not every Christian possesses the ability to use the Bible with advantage, unless he receives the help of others.[4] But the Church's claim to be the sole judge as to who is capable of profiting by the use of the Bible [5] has been exercised in so wholesale and violent a way that—taken in conjunction with her backwardness in extending such use—it betrays a deeper and more significant dread. Were Rome's position truly scriptural, her cause would not be so immensely and fatally endangered by the principle of the 'open Bible' as she clearly feels it to be. One cannot prevent a few ignoramuses here and there coming to erroneous conclusions as a result of an unsupervised reading of Scripture: but Rome's apprehensions clearly spring from a far more serious peril than that. She has been unwilling to allow even her loyal members free access to the unadorned word of Scripture, because such access (apart altogether from special ignorance or perversity) almost inevitably undermines their faith in her pretensions.[6] Rome,

[1] Paues in *Encyc. Brit.* iii. 897b; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 334, 371 f.

[2] See above, p. 265. Tyndale's version also contained controversial marginal notes.

[3] Cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 44, 63, 81 f.

[4] Heiler (*Kathol.* 588 n.) observes this as evincing "eine gewisse pädagogische Weisheit" in the Church's restrictions.

[5] *Papacy and Bible*, 51: "Let . . . anyone . . . produce from the history of the Church a single *true* 'fact' which may show that the Church has withheld the Bible from those whom she believed would understand it, and profit by its reading." Of course not: but what value is there in an apologetic which simply pleads: You cannot prove that I have ever done what I thought to be wrong?

[6] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 144; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 11; Horton, *England's Danger*, 112, 116. J. M. Gillis gives the Catholic case away when he says (*Cath. Encyc.* ii [1907] 545b), à propos of complaints of Catholic opposition to Bible-Society

therefore, would be in a stronger and more logical position, if she rested her claims exclusively on her a priori infallibility and frankly abandoned the attempt to build also on a scriptural basis. She has been most consistent when she has been most opposed to all appeal to the authority of the Bible. There is indeed no room for two supreme authorities.[1]

Nevertheless, despite the radical inconsistency and dualism involved, the Church acclaims the inerrancy of the Scriptures and professes zeal in disseminating the knowledge of them.

Augustinus crystallized the belief of his time in saying that he believed that the authors of Holy Scripture were preserved from every error in writing them.[2] Such indeed was the general assumption of Catholics and Protestants alike down to the dawn of modern criticism.[3] In 1870, i.e. in the opening years of what we may call the critical period, the Vatican Council laid it down that the books of Scripture were to be held as sacred and canonical, and that the Church holds them to be so, "not as if they had been brought into being simply by human diligence and had then been approved by her own authority, nor merely on the ground that they contain revelation without error, but because, being written by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, they have God as their originator (auctorem), and as such have been themselves handed to the Church.[4] . . . Further, all those things, which are contained in the written or transmitted word of God, . . . are to be believed by the divine and Catholic faith." [5] Newman, struggling in 1884 with the growing problem of Bible-criticism, urged that, although (in view of the Conciliar decisions) biblical inspiration was connected explicitly with matters of faith and morals, yet this surely included its statements as to matters of fact.[6] "No passage of the inspired Word of God, in its right meaning," wrote Dr. Faà di Bruno, "can really

work: "The societies do not offer to supply Catholics with Catholic Bibles, fortified with the ecclesiastical Imprimatur, *and supplied with the necessary notes of explanation*" (italics mine). The former of these two statements is inaccurate (see Kilgour, quoted above, p. 270 n. 3): the latter (in italics) is the real ground of opposition.

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 117, 123 with note, init.

[2] Aug. *Ep.* lxxxii. 3 (Migne, *P.L.* xxxiii. 277), *De Nat. et Grat.* lxi (71) (Migne, *P.L.* xliv. 282). Cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 300 n.; Lattey in *The Bible*, etc. 145 f.

[3] See above, pp. 109–111. "Scripture cannot be extravagant" (Newman, *Apol.* 278 [appx. 4]).

[4] *Conc. Vat.* sess. iii, cap. 2 (Mirbt 457 [23]). The reader will observe that the last clause ("ecclesiae traditi sunt") is hardly consistent with the argument that the Church produced, and is therefore prior to, the Christian Scriptures (see above, pp. 256–258)

[5] *Ibid.* cap. 3 (Mirbt 458 [16]). The Council anathematized anyone who should not receive as sacred and canonical "sacrae scripturae libros integros cum omnibus suis partibus," or should deny that they were Divinely inspired (Mirbt 460 [30]).

[6] *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 188–190.

contradict another passage in matters of faith, of morals, *or of fact*." [1] In 1893, provoked by the growing tendency of many Catholic scholars to accept the more obvious conclusions of Old-Testament criticism, Leo XIII issued an encyclical, the 'Providentissimus Deus,' in which he laid it down at great length that, since the Scriptures were inspired and God was their author, it was impossible that they should contain errors of any kind.[2] In 1920 Benedictus XV issued another encyclical, the 'Spiritus Paraclitus,' in which—with many allusions to the views expressed by Saint Hieronymus and by Leo XIII in the letter just mentioned—he insisted in the fullest and most emphatic manner that the Bible, having God for its author, did not contain the slightest error, even in regard to matters of secular history. No distinction between primary and secondary elements in Scripture, or between the relative and absolute truth of certain parts of it, was admissible.[3] And modern Catholic writers continue with one accord to speak of the complete inerrancy of Scripture. "Inspiration," write the authors of what professes to be an explanation of the Catholic standpoint, "necessarily involves the absolute veracity of every statement of the Bible; for as God wrote it, and God cannot lie, the Bible cannot contain error of any kind." [4] "The historical significance of the Encyclical," writes Father Lattey, with reference to 'Providentissimus Deus,' "lies in the fact that the Church now stood forward plain for all to see, not merely as the sure guardian of Holy Writ, but as the only sure guardian." [5] "The Word of God," he says, "is of necessity true. It should be noticed, therefore, that we do not arrive at the truth of Scripture by a careful examination of every sentence that it contains. We come to Scripture knowing *already* that it is true; knowing it *a priori* as a fact of revelation, not *a posteriori* by induction." [6]

In reply to the charge of withholding the Scriptures from the laity

[1] *Cath. Belief*, 31 f (italics mine); cf. 346. Cf. also Salmon, *Infall.* 83.

[2] Mirbt unfortunately has no copy of this encyclical. Cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 185–196, *Holy Spirit*, 194 f, *Infall. Book*, 48; Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 165–172; Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 496b; Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 6 f; Lattey, *ibid.* v, *First Notions*, 30 f, 38, 99 f, and in *The Bible*, etc. 135 ff, 146–154. As Dr. Gore, however, points out, not all Catholics regard the encyclical itself as infallible! (See above, pp. 29 f). A vigorous criticism of it, from the pen of a Catholic signing himself 'The Author of "The Policy of the Pope," ' appeared in *Contemp. Rev.* Apl. 1894, 576–608. "The position of intelligent Catholics," he wrote, "is pitiable" (606).

[3] The text of the encyclical is obtainable separately, both in a Latin-German and in an English form. Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 34, 78.

[4] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 5; cf. 2, 6 ("Any statement which is the direct assertion of a certain fact must be true, for God can neither deceive nor be deceived"), 8 (every word of the Bible inspired and God responsible for it). Cf. Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 492a, 493b, 497a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 352.

[5] Lattey, *First Notions*, 4.

[6] Lattey in *The Bible*, etc. 136: cf. *First Notions*, 106 f.

and generally frowning upon the use of them, Catholics are able to appeal to various historical facts evincing (as they contend) the real and constant zeal of the Church in promoting under proper conditions the earnest study of the Bible. They can point to the fondness of the early pre-Tridentine fathers for it, and their profound knowledge of it; the way in which Hieronymus, Chrysostomus, Benedictus, and others strongly inculcated its use; the diligent collection and transcription of manuscripts of the whole or parts of the Bible in the monasteries; the universal dissemination of Scriptural knowledge through the ordinary offices of the Church (the use of psalters, breviaries, prayer-books, the custom of preaching, and the exhibition of pictures and images, and spectacular and dramatic shows); and finally the publication —even before (as well as after) the Reformation—of numerous printed editions of the Scriptures both in the Latin of the Vulgate and in sundry vernacular translations (though these latter did not always—or even usually—enjoy official authority and approval).[1] Prohibitions of unauthorized Bible-reading were sometimes accompanied by commendations of zeal for a knowledge of Scripture as such. Thus Innocentius III's decree of 1199 acknowledges that "the desire of understanding the Divine Scriptures and the zeal for exhorting (others to live and believe) according to them, ought not to be blamed, but rather commended."[2] Prominent ecclesiastics like Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1175–1253), and Thursby, Archbishop of York (1373), were strongly in favour of granting the use of the Scriptures to the laity. Practical exemplification of this attitude is seen in the work of the orthodox 'Brethren of the Common Life,' who in the fourteenth and following centuries effected a revival of piety in Holland.[3] Friar Otto of Passau in 1386 recommended the laity to read the Bible in their own tongue. In England, Walter Hilton, a pre-Wyclifite devotional writer, advised those who could read to study the Latin Gospels before meditation.[4] Sir Thomas More is quoted as vouching for the use of the English Bible by the laity prior to the times of Wyclif.[5] The Council of Trent issued decrees for the

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 112; *Papacy and Bible*, 14 f, 38, 42 n., 58, 63, 70, 71 n.; Salmon, *Infall.* 117–122; Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 4–14, 20; A. C. Paues in *Encyc. Brit.* iii. 898a top; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 117, 121–126, 130, 171, 186; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 25 f; Barry in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 98 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 587 f; Binns, *Reformers and Bible*, 9, 26; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 291 f; Darlow in *Congreg. Quart.* Oct. 1926, 429.

[2] Mirbt 173 (35).

[3] S. H. Gem in H.*E.R.E.* (1909) ii. 841 b; Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 130 (cf. 75, 372 f). Thomas à Kempis owed much to their influence: his familiarity with Scripture is obvious (cf. Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 7).

[4] Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 24, 38.

[5] See above, p. 263 n. 6. Cf. Deanesly, *Loll. Bible*, 131–140, 146, 164, 168, 172–174, 185, 192 f, 206, 215–222, 230 (full discussion of pre-Wyclifite English Bible and extent to which it was used); *Papacy and Bible*, 73 n. (quotation from Cranmer)

reading and exposition of Scripture in Churches and cathedrals, and for the better education of the clergy for this purpose.[1] In 1757 Benedictus XIV freely permitted all Catholics to read the Scriptures in their own language, provided the translation was approved by Rome and furnished with comments similarly approved.[2] In 1778 Pius VI wrote to Martini, the Archbishop of Florence, concurring in his opinion that the faithful ought to be exhorted to read Scripture, and commending him for having published translations of the Bible in the vernacular, to which had been added "comments which, being drawn from the most holy fathers, may remove any danger of abuse." [3] During the nineteenth century, duly authorized versions of the Bible, or of various parts of it, have been frequently published for the use of English-speaking Catholics both in Great Britain and in Ireland, and circulated with the approval of the hierarchy, usually, if not always, accompanied by notes, which, in the case of one of the early Irish versions, breathed a most vehement spirit of intolerance and persecution against so-called heretics.[4] In 1820 Pius VII urged the English Bishops to encourage the faithful to read the Scriptures.[5] In 1844, in his encyclical condemning the Bible-societies, Gregorius XVI included a long defence of the Holy See against the charge of trying through many centuries to keep the faithful from the knowledge of Scripture.[6] In 1873 the brother of Archbishop Vaughan was engaged in publishing a Spanish New Testament for use in South America.[7] The Tridentine regulation allowing the use of translations of the Scriptures only to those who had received written ecclesiastical licence has fallen into virtual desuetude throughout the Catholic world.[8] Exhortations addressed by Catholic leaders to the faithful under their charge, urging them to read the Bible—particularly the Gospels—in some translation duly approved by the authorities, have been by no means infrequent in recent decades.[9] Leo XIII (1878–1903) lent his powerful assistance to the same cause. His encyclical of 1893 drew attention to the importance of the right understanding of Scripture by Catholics. In 1898 he promised rewards,

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. v, cap. 1 (heading only in Mirbt 294 [35]), sess. xxiv, capp. 4, 7 ("... necnon ut inter missarum solennia aut divinorum celebrationem sacra eloquia et salutis monita eadem vernacula lingua singulis diebus festivis vel solennibus explanent ...").

[2] Rietschel in Hauck, *Realenc.* ii (1897) 707 top: cf. Mirbt 411 (27).

[3] Mirbt 411: cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 4, 81 n. (where it is stated that Martini's *unannotated* version is on the Index of Prohibited Books); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 34.

[4] *Papacy and Bible*, 16 f, 63; Salmon, *Infall.* 188–190 (see below, p. 574 bott.).

[5] Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 2.

[6] Summary reference in Mirbt 443 (18).

[7] *Papacy and Bible*, 5–7, etc.

[8] *Ibid.* 82: see above, p. 264 n. 5.

[9] Cf. Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 35, 48; Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 3 f; Horton, *England's Danger*, 110 f.

in the shape of Indulgences, for regular and systematic Bible-reading by the laity. In 1902 he established a permanent Biblical Commission, one of the duties of which should be to further the progress of scriptural exposition.[1] His successor, Pius X, before his election to the papal throne in 1903, was patron of the 'Society of Saint Girolamo,' which has circulated throughout Italy enormous numbers of copies of the Gospels and the Book of Acts, translated into modern Italian, accompanied by notes speaking courteously of Protestants, and sold at an extremely low price.[2] In 1910 he established at Rome a Biblical Institute, where priests might be able to pursue courses of Scriptural study for limited periods. In 1920 the next Pope, Benedictus XV, in his already-mentioned encyclical 'Spiritus Paraclitus' (issued in anticipation of the forthcoming fifteenth centenary of Hieronymus' death), quoted the saint's dictum that ignorance of Scripture means ignorance of Christ, and emphasized the need, not only of biblical study by the clergy, but of the daily reading of Scripture by the laity.[3] In 1921 the memory of Hieronymus was celebrated in England by a 'Catholic Bible Congress' at Cambridge, and the utterances there delivered were duly published in book-form under the title : 'The Religion of the Scriptures.'[4]

All this is no doubt excellent, and it justifies the Catholic Church in denying that she has ever categorically refused to the faithful access to the Scriptures as such—justifies her even in claiming that she has thrown considerable efforts into the task of teaching the Scriptures to them.[5] But, after reviewing as impartially as we can the two sets of facts,[6] we cannot fail to observe, firstly, that a great change has taken place since the Reformation in the practical policy of the Church in regard to the popular use of Scripture, and secondly, that, even allowing fully for all that that change has meant, yet the numerous safeguards and provisos with which permission to read Scripture is still accompanied reveal clearly enough the instability of her scriptural prop. She tolerates to-day—yes, and can truthfully claim to promote—the private reading of the Bible, but only so long as she retains the sole

[1] See below, p. 288.

[2] Anon. *op. cit.* 2 f; Bain, *New Reformation*, 210 f; von Dobschütz in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 608b.

[3] See the last half of the text of the encyclical: and cf. Lattey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, v f.

[4] Cf. Arendzen in *The Bible*, etc. 196 f: "In some less informed quarters there may still linger the legend that the Catholic Church is against the Scriptures, but more careful thought has brought unbiassed men to see that against the Scriptures she could not possibly be . . . the Catholic Church, so far from hiding or destroying or discountenancing the Scriptures, incessantly proclaims them as the written record of how she was founded by the Son of God."

[5] Hase, *Handbook* i. 143; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 33; Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 1, 4, 7–9, 19.

[6] See above, pp. 260–268 and 274–277.

and unchallenged right to censor the translations of it and to tell the faithful precisely what it does, and what it does not, mean. In the light of this latter insistence on her own supremacy, her ascription in other terms of supremacy to the Bible, and her attempt to justify to human reason her own position from its pages, is an undeniable dualism and inconsistency.

The second way [1] in which Romanism does violence to the real character of Scripture is inevitably involved in the first. In order to ensure that Scripture shall be interpreted only in conformity with Roman views, the Church has been compelled to resist the application to Scripture of the normal canons of historical truthfulness. This is seen in three ways:

1. Rome's treatment of the *text* of Scripture.
2. Rome's repudiation of *Higher Criticism*.
3. Rome's appeal to *Tradition* as of equal weight with written records.

1. *The Text of Scripture.* Textual criticism is a subject in which it is not easy to interest the general reader, especially when the attempt has to be made to present a brief and accurate digest of some section of its multifarious and intricate details. It is, in substance, the task of restoring as far as possible the original wording of some ancient composition out of the often seriously divergent evidence of the surviving manuscripts, which (in the case of the Bible) were all actually written out centuries later than the autographs from which ultimately they were derived. For the perusal of any ancient author, it is a matter of some importance that a pure text should be available: but in the case of the Bible—and particularly the New Testament, on the true meaning of which Christians depend so much for the guidance of their life and thought—the provision of as truthful a text as can possibly be obtained is a matter of paramount urgency, and should naturally be one of the most pressing concerns of any institution claiming to lead and direct the lives of Christian men. The Church of Rome, however, though by no means inactive, has been wofully slow and incompetent in this task, and its performances have altogether lagged behind the diligent labours and helpful achievements of Protestant scholars. A brief review of the facts will show that this language is not unjustified.

In the early centuries of our era, little attention was given, in quoting, copying, or translating the words of Scripture, to the need of precise verbal accuracy. Translations of parts, first perhaps of the New Testament, then of the Old, into Latin began to be made—probably as early

[1] See above, p. 256, for the first.

as the second century: but by the latter part of the fourth they had become so numerous and so discrepant that Pope Damasus requested the great scholar Hieronymus (Jerome) to produce a new and better version of the Bible in Latin—by revising the existing versions of the New Testament from manuscripts in the original Greek, and of the Old Testament by reference (not to the original Hebrew, but) to the Greek of the Septuagint. Hieronymus produced his new version about 383–405 A.D., translating the Old Testament (except Psalms) direct from the original Hebrew, and revising the earlier Latin version of the Gospels fully and carefully, the Epistles somewhat more superficially. The work was doubtless a great achievement for the age and for one man: but it was admittedly imperfect, Hieronymus himself avowing that he had left small inaccuracies uncorrected rather than change the language already familiar to the people, and further committing through limitation of knowledge a certain number of fresh mistranslations.[1] His version was officially adopted at Rome; and, although the earlier translations long remained in use locally, it ultimately secured universal recognition and later received accordingly the title 'Vulgata.' Imperfect as it already was in the capacity of a translation, its text speedily became still further corrupted with errors through repeated copying. Several important attempts were made between the sixth and the sixteenth centuries to secure a better text of Hieronymus' work: but these were all unofficial and only partially successful, the Popes giving hardly any help.[2] The introduction of printing brought little improvement in this respect, though Cardinal Ximenes, by printing (1514–1517) the Greek and Hebrew along with a special revision of the Latin, pointed Christian thought in the direction of a closer investigation of their differences. The Council of Trent, in 1546, "considering that no little advantage could accrue to the Church of God if it could be known which, out of all the Latin editions of the sacred books in circulation, ought to be regarded as authentic, decides and declares that this same old and customary (vulgata) edition, which has been approved in the Church itself by the long use of so many centuries, is to be regarded, in public readings, discussions, preachings and expositions, as authentic, and that no one is to dare or presume to reject it on any pretext." It was also decreed that "henceforth the Sacred Scripture, but especially this same ancient and vulgate edition,

[1] See Kenyon, *Textual Criticism of the N.T.*, 217 f; W. Barry in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 96 ("It must be granted, I think, that he added emphasis to some Messianic allusions"); Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 114 (quotation of Hieronymus' admission): also, on all questions relating to the Vulgate, Westcott's admirable article in Smith, *Dict. of the Bible*, iii. 1688–1718.

[2] Westcott in *op. cit.* 1702–1704; Kenyon, *op. cit.* 218 f; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 17, 19–21.

should be printed as accurately as possible (quam emendatissime)," and that unauthorized editions were not to be printed at all.[1] No effective steps, however, were taken to provide a reliable edition of the Vulgate, though in the sermon delivered at the close of the Council (1563) the boast was made that, "in order that no difficulty might be able to arise from the different versions in regard even to the words" of Scripture, the Council "has approved a certain definite translation from the Greek and Hebrew."[2] One can understand that certain practical advantages might be secured by proclaiming a single version as the official standard; but the outcome of it—so far as concerns the production of a pure text and accurate translation of the Scriptures for Catholics—has been simply disastrous.[3] After the lapse of some years, Sixtus V published (in 1590) an authoritative edition of the Vulgate, in the detailed preparation of which he had himself taken a large personal share. In the preface he declared, "by the fulness of Apostolic power," that this edition was to be received and held as "true, lawful, authentic, and unquestionable (indubitata) in all public and private disputations." He forbade the publication of variant readings in copies of the Vulgate, and declared all that differed from his own edition to be without authority for the future. The version was, however, speedily found to be so replete with errors that the credit of the Holy See demanded its emendation or withdrawal. The difficulty was eventually overcome in the following way. In 1592 Clemens VIII recalled and suppressed Sixtus V's edition, and issued a new one, which differed from its predecessor in about 3000 places, but still bore the name of Sixtus, and was furnished with a preface by Bellarmine stating that Sixtus V had intended to recall his edition on account of the numerous inaccuracies in the printing. All this was done, as Bellarmine himself tells us in his autobiography, on his own advice and for the purpose of protecting Sixtus' reputation ("salvo honore Sixti V. pontificis"): he seems to have thought of many of Sixtus' errors as wilful alterations ("permulta perperam mutata," "quae male mutata erant"), and he tells us that it was his own suggestion that the preface should state that "some mistakes either of printers or of others had crept into Sixtus' first edition owing to haste." For the accuracy of this ascription of

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv (Mirbt 292 [15, 34]). After enumerating, in the preceding decree, the canonical books, the Council anathematized all who should not receive them "as sacred and canonical, as they have been wont to be read in the Catholic Church and as they stand in the ancient Vulgate Latin edition." Cf. Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 120–122.

[2] Tauchnitz edit. (1842) of *Conc. Trid.* 210. Cf. Westcott in *op. cit.* 1705 f.

[3] Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 139 ("Perhaps the most astounding blunder ever made as to the province of Church authority in this respect was the decree of the Council of Trent that the Vulgate edition of the Scriptures was alone to be considered authentic . . ."), 216; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 2, 21, 46.

the mistakes to the printers and of the further statement that Sixtus had intended to recall and revise his edition, there seems to be very little evidence, apart from the presumptive truthfulness of Bellarmine. The latter claims, we observe, that in thus saving Sixtus' honour, he was returning good for evil, since Sixtus had put one of Bellarmine's book on the Index. Bellarmine further admits in the preface that in this version "some things, which seemed to need change, have been purposely left unchanged, . . . because Saint Hieronymus more than once advised that this course should be taken in order to avoid (giving) offence to the peoples." The Clementine edition has remained the standard official version of the Roman Church from that day to this.[1] "In order the more to ensure its authority, the bull" (rather, the official preface) "with which Clement accompanied its issue forbade the slightest alteration in it, or any insertion of various readings in the margins. By this measure the textual study of the Latin Bible was effectually killed in the Church of its home, although increasing knowledge has shown beyond the possibility of doubt that the text issued by Clement is by no means an accurate representation of the version as it left the hands of Jerome" (still less of course did it represent accurately the original meaning of the Biblical writers). "For over three hundred years it was left to scholars of other countries, and of other branches of the Christian Church, and especially to those of England and Germany, to undertake the task of recovering the true text of the Vulgate." [2] The version normally used by English Catholics —known as the Rheims and Douay version—was produced in the times of Elizabeth and James I. It was a translation, not from the original Greek and Hebrew, but from the Latin Vulgate. Its antiquated wording has been somewhat modernized in later editions; but as a whole it is for purposes of exact study almost totally useless.[3] Partial exceptions to the discontinuance of textual criticism in the Catholic Church are furnished by Martianay's and Vallarsi's critical editions of the Vulgate as parts of their editions (1693 ff and 1734 ff respectively) of Hierony-

[1] On the Sixtine and Clementine editions, see the bull of Clemens printed at the beginning of the Vulgate, and the personal statement of Bellarmine printed by Mirbt (355): also Westcott in *op. cit.* 1706 f (full citation of original passages); *Papacy and Bible*, 30, 48, 64; Salmon, *Infall.* 225–228; Kenyon, *Textual Crit.* 220–222; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 2, 21 f, 46. The story is told apologetically by Lattey in *First Notions*, 58–67, and passed over with the greatest brevity by Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 127.

[2] So Kenyon, *Textual Crit.* 221 f. Cf. the official prefaces printed at the beginning of the Vulgate; also Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 135 n.

[3] Paues in *Encyc. Brit.* iii. 901 f; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 28 top; Guppy, *Sketch* (see above, p. 269 n. 1), 54 f; Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 129–133. A Catholic writer in *The Universe* for 6 May 1921, 11, col. 1, says: "It is little likely to be disputed that the Douay version is in large measure unintelligible to ordinary readers."

mus' complete works.[1] But of going behind the Vulgate there was as yet no question. Quesnel's book was in 1713 condemned, among other things, for deserting, in favour of a French version, "the Vulgate edition which . . . ought to be held as authentic by all the orthodox."[2] Only one or two Catholic names—like those of Hug (1765-1846) and Scholz (1794–1852)—can be mentioned in the long array of eminent scholars who during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries pushed forward so rapidly the urgent task of the textual criticism of the New Testament.[3] Perrone, the Catholic apologist (1794–1876), is quoted as declaring that Catholics need not worry about the criticism of Scripture, as they already possess the complete article.[4] The Catholic editions of the important manuscript preserved at Rome, Codex Vaticanus, published in 1857 and 1859, were so faulty that the work had to be done again. It was done again—by Vercellone and Cozza—between 1868 and 1881, but still with numerous errors. Not until 1889–1890 did the papal authorities issue a photographic facsimile of the whole manuscript: and this was still further improved upon in the edition of 1904–1907.[5] In 1860 Vercellone published a collection of variant readings in the Vulgate, but without a continuous text.[6] In 1884 we find Newman acknowledging the uncertainties of variant readings, and confessing that, unless our text is true, we have not the Divine gift in its fulness.[7] Modern Catholics, however, not only usually speak of the Latin Vulgate in terms of the most extravagant eulogy, but refer to it at times as original and inspired, and even as superior to the original Greek and Hebrew.[8] The scholars who have led the way towards the pro-

[1] Kenyon, *op cit.* 221 n.

[2] Bull *Unigenitus*, near the end.

[3] The truth of this becomes abundantly clear on reading Prat's art. on 'Criticism, Textual' in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 497b–503b. Cf. Souter, *Text and Canon*, 100, and see also below, p. 287 n. 1.

[4] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 460. I have not been able to verify Hase's quotation, as he gives no reference.

[5] Kenyon, *op. cit.* 78 f; Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, iii. 432; Coulton, *op. cit.* 22 f, 37 (note 9).

[6] Kenyon, *op. cit.* 221 n.: cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 449; Westcott in *op. cit.* 1710 ff; Lattey, *First Notions*, 56 f (". . . that great pioneer of Vulgate textual criticism, Father Vercellone, the Barnabite, . . .").

[7] In *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 198 f.

[8] See Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 24 f, 304 (Vulgate held superior to Greek and Hebrew by Catholic scholars writing in 1833 and 1856); Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 15 ("the inspired sense of God's Word as it was in the original Hebrew, Greek, or Latin"); bull *Spiritus Paraclitus*, Sept. 1920, middle (merits of Vulg.); Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 18 top; Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 110 (Hieronymus "the greatest Hebrew, Greek and Latin scholar, not only of his own time, but probably of any time"!), 126 ("The authenticity of these texts" [Hebrew and Greek], "however, differs from the authenticity of the Vulgate in two ways. In the first place the Catholic Church has not exercised the same care or vigilance with regard to them"[!], "and they have not been in the same public use for centuries. Secondly, besides that

duction of a critical edition of the Vulgate New Testament in modern times have not been Catholics, but Protestants like Lachmann, Wordsworth, White, and Nestle.[1] In 1907, however, Pius X, at the suggestion of the Biblical Commission appointed in 1902, requested the Benedictine Order to undertake to produce a fresh edition of the entire Vulgate, based on a comprehensive re-examination of the whole available material. This important work is still proceeding—the book of Genesis was published in 1926 at a cost of about £2 10s. Doubts have however been raised as to the competence of those who have it in hand, and in any case—even if completely successful—it will give not by any means the original words and sense of the biblical writers, but simply the very imperfect Latin version of Hieronymus.[2] The Catholic attempts to go behind the Vulgate to the real originals have been few, partial, and unofficial, and bear no comparison whatever with the great volume of excellent scientific work produced by Protestant scholars during the past half-century or so, and familiar to all who have studied the original Greek and Hebrew Scriptures in detail. The first Catholic version of the New Testament in English—the Rheims version of 1582—was "translated . . . out of the authentical Latin . . . diligently conferred with the Greek and other editions in divers languages." But no English Catholic translation based on the original Hebrew and Greek appeared until 1836—three centuries later than Tyndale's epoch-making work. Another Catholic translation, based on the originals, was brought out in 1898.[3] In 1920, when Protestants had for over half a century enjoyed the use of a number of good critical editions of the New Testament in Greek, one was at length brought out by a German Catholic, H. J. Vogels. His preface refers to the novelty of his enterprise,[4] and bears eloquent witness to the comparative absence of Catholic scholars from the field. In the preface to his second edition, he says it had been suggested to him by a reviewer to print, along with the Greek Text, the Latin version accompanied by an apparatus criticus of variant readings,

foundation of extrinsic authenticity which, in their measure, they have in common with the Vulgate, namely that they were used for centuries in the Catholic Church, the Vulgate has that solemn and public dogmatic definition of authenticity which they do not possess. The Vulgate edition, therefore, in this sense stands alone. It has its own place, as it is the authoritative version of the sacred Scriptures").

[1] Kenyon, *op. cit.* 222–224.

[2] Kenyon, *op. cit.* 224; Souter, *Text and Canon*, 52; Corbett in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 557b; Coulton, *op. cit.* 2, 22, 28, *Rom. Cath. Hist.* 14; Lattey, *First Notions*, 67; Lietzmann in *Theol. Litzg.* 1925. 2. 32–36 (review of Quentin's *Mémoire sur l'établissement du texte de la Vulgate*—Dom Quentin being one of the official revisers); Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 127–129.

[3] Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 133.

[4] He speaks of his edition as "prima post longum temporis spatium a parte catholica secundum criticas quales nunc vigent rationes adornata" (H. J. Vogels, *Nov. Test. Graece*, etc. Düsseldorf [Schwann], ed. 2, V).

but to his regret the laws of the Church forbade it.[1] Two volumes of a new translation of the Old Testament (and Apocrypha) from Hebrew (and Greek) into German, by P. Reissler, have also appeared within recent years: the book states that, although the Vulgate is the official Catholic text, "yet the Church by no means rejects the original text." It records divergences between the Hebrew on the one hand and the Septuagint and Vulgate on the other: but the translation is made direct from the Hebrew, purged of its obvious blunders.[2] It is only within the last fifteen years that a really worthy attempt has been made to furnish English Catholics with a satisfactory version of the Bible in their own tongue. The first part of 'the Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures' was published by Messrs. Longmans, Green and Co. in 1913. The general editors are Father C. Lattey, S.J., and Father J. Keating, S.J. When complete, it will provide a new translation of the whole Catholic Bible from the original languages. The New Testament is not yet quite complete, and no part of the Old has yet (1928) appeared. The parts are excellently got up; the translation modern and good; the introductions and notes concise and pertinent. The work is in every way commendable, and the editors are to be congratulated on the way in which it is being done. But scriptural literature fully equal to 'the Westminster Version' in efficiency, scholarship, and presentableness, has been in the hands of Protestant readers and students for a far longer period than fifteen years. And even 'the Westminster' has not altogether escaped the paralysing effect of the traditional veneration felt by Catholics for the Vulgate text.

A particularly notorious case of textual untruthfulness—exceptional in its interest and importance, but very typical of the doublefacedness inseparable from the Catholic position—is the treatment accorded by the Church to the variant readings in 1 John v. 7, 8. The original text of that passage, as both Catholic and Protestant scholars now agree, ran as follows: (7) "For there are three that bear witness—(8) the Spirit and the Water and the Blood; and these three are in accord" (εἰς τὸ ἕν εἰσιν: not "are one" as in the Authorized Version). At some time not earlier (so far as we know) than the fourth century, the passage was enlarged so as to read: "For there are three that bear witness *on earth*—the Spirit and the Water and the Blood; and these three are one *in Christ Jesus. And there are three who bear witness in heaven—the Father, the Word, and the Spirit; and these three are one.*" The longer reading is found in no Greek manuscript or Greek quotation prior to the

[1] ". . . ne id ad effectum adduci possit, leges ecclesiae obstare dolendum est" (*op. cit.* IX).

[2] I owe these particulars to the impartial review of vol. 1 by P. Volz in *Theol. Litzg.* 1926. 14. 369.

fourteenth century: it was not included in Hieronymus' own translation (as the earliest manuscripts of the Vulgate show): traces of the knowledge of it are sparse prior to 450 A.D. and non-existent prior to 350 A.D. It is found, however, (with insignificant variations of order, etc.) in one or two manuscripts (sixth century and later) of the Old Latin Version, was eventually introduced into the common text of the Vulgate, and as such stands in the official editions of Sixtus V and Clemens VIII. The documentary spuriousness of the longer reading is obvious and undisputed, whatever may be thought of its inherent truth. Accordingly, on 12 January 1897, the following question was submitted to the Congregation of the Roman Inquisition (a committee of Cardinals): "Whether it may be safely denied, or at least called in question, that the text of St. John, in the first epistle, chap. v, verse 7, which runs as follows: 'For there are three who bear witness in heaven—the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one,' is authentic?" The Cardinals replied in the negative, and three days later Leo XIII approved and confirmed their decision.

Observe now. In 1546 Trent anathematizes those who do not receive as sacred and canonical "the books themselves entire with all their parts, as they have been wont to be read in the Catholic Church and as they stand (habentur) in the ancient Vulgate Latin edition."[1] The spurious words in 1 John v are twice quoted as part of Scripture in the 'Roman Catechism' issued in 1566.[2] In 1590 Sixtus V issues an edition of the Vulgate containing the words in question, and preceded by a preface which requires the edition to be received without question and forbids the publication of variant readings along with it. In 1592 Clemens VIII issues another edition, differing in many points from that of Sixtus, but still under Sixtus' name and still containing the spurious words. He forbids the slightest alteration in it or the printing of variant readings along with the text itself.[3] In 1897 the Pope rules that it is not to be denied or called in question that the spurious words are the authentic text of the passage. Notwithstanding all this, it is privately explained to Cardinal Vaughan that 'authentic' means nothing more than 'official' and that textual criticism as such is not touched. Intimation to this effect is published in 'The Guardian' and the 'Revue Biblique.' Catholic theologians know—and say that they know—that the words are spurious: a few of them venture to say so in print. Vogels, for instance, in his critical edition of the Greek Testament (1920), relegates them rightly to the margin.[4] The editor of the 'Westminster

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv (Mirbt 292 [7]). See above, p. 280 n. 1.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* I. ii. 14, I. ix. 4 (7).

[3] See above, pp. 280 f.

[4] Their ungenuineness is treated as almost certain by Arendzen in *The Bible*, etc. 52 f.

Version' is not quite so bold: he includes the spurious words in his translation, but adds a note which feebly pleads: "In the opinion of nearly all critics and of most Catholic writers of the present day the words were not contained in the original text; at the same time, until further action be taken by the Holy See, it is not open to Catholic editors to eliminate the words from a version made for the use of the faithful."[1] The latest defence explains that Trent declared the Vulgate 'authentic'[2] not in the sense of 'textually flawless,' but only as safe and official, and that the decree of 1897 declared the spurious passage to be authentic "in the same sense; that is, it was part of the then official Vulgate, and such it was to remain"[3]—as if anyone was ignorant of its being part of the then official Vulgate. This apologetic—so far from being "so decisive as practically to dispose of the whole matter"[4]—leaves us unsophisticated Protestants simply gasping. We charge no one with personal dishonesty; but the whole proceeding is what in ordinary life we should simply call evasion.[5]

Summing up we may say that, in comparison with the work of Protestants, the efforts of the Catholic Church to make accessible the true text of Scripture have been belated, meagre, and inadequate; and, in the light of the facts we have reviewed, reproaches levelled by Catholics at the inaccuracy of heretical translations, and Catholic professions of the Church's great desire for a pure text, are nothing short of ridiculous.[6]

2. *Higher Criticism.* We have already explained at length the nature of biblical criticism—both higher and lower[7]—and vindicated it as a scientific procedure indispensable for the acquisition of the truth in regard to those great past epochs of which the Bible speaks. There is no need to argue further here in its defence. We take it as proved that biblical criticism stands on the same footing as the investigation of other fields of literature and history and, broadly, on the same footing as scientific research generally. It has indeed had to fight its way

[1] *Westm. Vers.* iv. 146.

[2] See above, p. 279.

[3] Lattey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 109. For this playing with the meaning of the word 'authentic,' cf. Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 87 f, 239, 360; Lattey, *First Notions*, 69; Forbes in *The Bible*, etc. 122–126.

[4] Lattey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 109.

[5] See, on the passage in question, Westcott and Hort, *Select Readings*, 103–106; Kenyon, *Text. Crit.* 133, 138, 204, 208, 270 n.; the apparatus criticus to Souter's and Vogels' editions of N.T.; Mirbt 492 (16); 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 861; Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 224–241, 360 (history of controversy up to 1902); Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 18 f, 44–52, 54 (the full text of the decree of 1897); Lattey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 107–112.

[6] *Papacy and Bible*, 12, 47 f, 86; Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 17 f: cf. Coulton, *op. cit.* 28 f.

[7] See above, pp. 186–204.

forward against the most violent opposition of traditionalists. It has, like these other studies, its broad penumbra of disputed questions; like them it has its inevitable sprinkling of eccentric speculations—in particular it has its sceptical left wing. But it possesses too its recognized and accredited canons of procedure, and its substantial and growing body of agreed and verifiable conclusions. Confident attacks are from time to time delivered, with the help of the critical method, against one or other of the generally accepted findings of higher criticism: but usually without achieving any radical reversal of them. Without such criticism it is literally impossible to reconstruct the facts of which Scripture speaks: in other words, it is—for those who form opinions about those facts—an absolute pre-requisite of objective truthfulness.

What now has the Catholic Church to say about higher criticism? To begin with—as with textual criticism, so here—Catholic scholarship has lagged far behind Protestant. None of the great and permanent achievements of scholarship in regard to the date, authorship, and interpretation of the several parts of the books of the Bible has been the work of Catholics.[1] The reason for this is simply that criticism as such and Catholicism as such are incompatible and mutually exclusive. There are, of course, sundry declarations to be quoted on the other side: but, broadly speaking, the Church has set her face against all that can properly be called criticism. She has done this by pledging herself to the inerrancy of Scripture.[2] If you bind yourself *seriously* to the inerrancy of an ancient document, you can of course *discuss* the date and authorship of its several parts, but you can hardly be said—in the normal sense of the words—to investigate: for it is of the essence of the investigation of ancient literature that the investigator should be free to draw inferences from discrepancies and errors in his documents, instead of being obliged to shut his eyes to them. However that may be, the

[1] "The questions were agitated only in countries where Protestantism predominated" (Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv [1908] 493b). Cf. the anonymous Catholic in *Contemp. Rev.* Apl. 1894, 577, 583 f ("The Catholic Church of to-day numbers but very few scholars, laymen or ecclesiastics, who are qualified, by their intellectual training and by their knowledge of the Bible and its history, to form an independent opinion on the subject"), 592; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 11 f, 14 f (poor Catholic contribution); Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 287 (quotes words of Father Durand, a conservative Catholic, in 1901: "L'outillage des études orientales et biblico-critiques sont presque en entier des officines hétérodoxes ou incroyantes de l'Allemagne et de l'Angleterre. Textes polyglottes, dictionnaires, traités d'archéologie, grammaires des deux Testaments, concordances, commentaires historiques à jour: les protestants ont tout cela à profusion; tandis que de notre côté c'est la pauvreté, et, sur plus d'un point, la pénurie. Pas une édition classique du texte original de l'Ancien Testament; il faut en dire autant pour le texte critique des Septante et du Nouveau Testament,—Scholz étant démodé. Il n'est pas jusqu'à la récension critique de notre Vulgate latine, dont nous n'ayons laissé l'entreprise à l'évêque anglican Wordsworth"), 368 (Leo XIII's appeal in instituting the Bible-Commission).

[2] See above, pp. 273 f.

Catholic attitude to criticism has been predominantly and severely hostile. In 1884 a Catholic writer argued that Rome would be able to wait till criticism had established something certain, before needing to consider how far her traditional teaching would have to be modified. The whole responsibility of the effort to discover something certain in regard to the critical questions of Scripture is thus thrown on private investigators outside the Roman communion.[1] In 1887 the authorities at Rome placed on the Index the somewhat earlier work of the great Catholic archaeologist, François Lenormant, who had abandoned the unity of the authorship of the Pentateuch, recognised legendary and mythical elements in Genesis, and, without denying biblical inspiration, demanded liberty for the critic in the matter of dates and authorship.[2] The expression of similar views by other prominent Catholics occasioned Leo XIII to issue in Nov. 1893 his encyclical 'Providentissimus Deus,' "in which the total inerrancy of the Bible was declared to be the necessary consequence of its inspiration. . . . The unwarranted concessions of Catholic writers to rationalistic criticism and the exclusive use of internal arguments against historical authority were condemned as contrary to correct principles of criticism."[3] In 1898, in a letter to the General of the Franciscans, and in 1899, in one to the French Clergy, he repeated and emphasized the doctrines and warnings of 'Providentissimus.'[4] In 1902 he appointed—under Jesuit influence—a Biblical 'Commission,' consisting of cardinals and consultors, who were charged with the duty of seeing that the encyclical of 1893 was duly obeyed. They were to protect the integrity of the Catholic faith in biblical matters, to settle biblical controversies between Catholic scholars, to answer enquiries, and generally to promote up-to-date and enlightened scriptural study. Their decisions, as arrived at from time to time, are ratified by the Pope, and not only must they not be questioned in public, but they must be obeyed with interior assent. In 1920 Benedictus XV, in his encyclical 'Spiritus Paraclitus,' reaffirmed the total inerrancy of the Bible, and rejected all critical views and principles which deviate in any way from this belief. The decisions already given by the Commission are—are we shall see—almost all hostile even to the most widely accepted critical conclusions.[5] The

[1] See the quotations from W. S. Lilly, *Ancient Religion and Modern Thought* (1884), in Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 59–61—with the latter's criticism.

[2] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 496b. Cf. Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 104–110, 130–132, 138 f, 141, 197, 246: the whole book is replete with interesting details regarding the growing struggle between traditional and critical views among the French Catholics during the nineteenth century.

[3] Reid, *ibid.* See above, p. 274.

[4] Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 272 f.

[5] Anon. *The Cath. Ch. and the Bible*, 2; Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 292 f, 345, 356 f, 360, 366–371 (French version of the papal letter of institution); Corbett in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 557 f; Reid in *op. cit.* iv (1908) 496 f, 497b (". . . it is for ecclesiastical

writer on 'Higher Criticism' in 'The Catholic Encyclopedia' says frankly that "its undeniable effect is to depreciate tradition in a great measure," and that even the moderate criticism of British Protestants is incompatible with Catholic orthodoxy, because incompatible with any strict notion of biblical inerrancy.[1] Modern Catholic exponents sometimes permit themselves to speak of the labours of critics in a contemptuous and very superficial way.[2] From time to time, Catholic scholars who express in print their agreement with the conclusions of critics meet, not only with the vehement dissent of their co-religionists, but also with official rebuke or punishment.[3] Much modern Catholic apologetic on the subject of the Scriptures simply avoids entering on the specific questions which criticism raises.

Yet alongside of this rigid antagonism even to the most moderate and amply justified conclusions of critical scholarship, we find quite emphatic protestations of a willingness to be reasonable, to face facts, and to practise to the full what is known as 'sound criticism.'[4] Several Catholic periodicals, devoted to scientific biblical research, are published on the Continent. The papal encyclical of 1893 and the letter formally establishing the 'Biblical Commission' in 1902 both expressed commendation of progressive critical study on sound lines.[5] Similar commendation was conveyed in the official condemnations of Catholic

authority to decide how far they" [hypotheses] "consist with the deposit of faith or are expedient to the welfare of religion"); Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 9, 15; Bird, *ibid.* 29 n.; Heiler, *Kathol.* 241, 314, 320 ("Ihre Lösung ist stets verblüffend einfach: die kritische Theorie wird abzewiesen, die traditionelle, ungeschichtliche Auffassung der scholastischen Dogmatik behält Recht. Das Prinzip, nach dem die Bibelkommission verfährt, ist ein extremer Inspirationsbegriff, der die absolute Irrtumsfreiheit der Bibel (auch in 'profanen' Dingen) behauptet . . ."); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 34. Cf. Wilfrid Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 685 (specialists must be warned off when their theories endanger Christian faith, etc.).

[1] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 491 f, 493b, 495a.

[2] E.g. Lattey, *First Notions*, 38 ("it is the vagaries of a so-called 'higher' criticism that do the mischief, . . ."), 97 (". . . Often enough, by the time the 'higher critic' has done with a document, if his conclusions are to be accepted without question, the only 'natural' thing to do will be to relegate it to the waste-basket. But no one who lays serious claim to practise historical criticism will take his sources upon faith from the 'higher critic' in the way postulated by these writers; . . ."), 99 f. Who wants the conclusions of critics to be accepted "without question"? Cf. Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 30.

[3] See Salmon, *Infall.* 253 f (Mivart—eventually excommunicated: cf. *Encyc. Brit.* xviii. 628); Houtin, *Question Biblique*, saepe; Lilley in *H.E.R.E.* viii (1915) 765 (Baron von Hügel); *Times Lit. Suppt.* 10 July 1924, 428 (Duchesne); Coulton, *The R.C. Church and the Bible*, 50, 52 f (various); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 109 (Vigouroux, etc.).

[4] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 9 ("Catholic Biblical scholars are untrammelled in their scientific research work with regard to the Bible"), 15, 17.

[5] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 496 f. See abov p. 274 n. 2; also the extracts from *Providentissimus* in Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 165–168.

Modernism in 1907 and in the encyclical 'Spiritus Paraclitus' of 1920. "The Church," we are told, "warmly recommends the exercise of criticism according to sound principles unbiassed by rationalistic presuppositions."[1]

But what does all this enthusiasm for 'sound criticism' amount to? No one in his senses could attach the stigma of rationalism, in the sense of irreligion, to the arguments which have led the overwhelming majority of critics to deny the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch and the historical accuracy of certain large parts of it.[2] If such processes of argument are to be disallowed as 'rationalistic,' no human reasoning whatever with regard to the past has the slightest value. What Catholics call their 'sound criticism' consists of a handful of pitifully meagre and wholly inadequate concessions to the demands of common sense. Thus Newman essayed in 1884 to state the Catholic attitude to criticism which was necessitated by the fixed decisions of the Church. At the outset he urged that considerations of charity towards others and deference towards the existing authorities and towards the general voice of the Church may often make it a man's duty to refrain from publishing abroad a novel view about Scripture, of the truth of which he is firmly convinced and which is not demonstrably heretical.[3] He then admitted a number of quite minor departures from absolutely rigid literalism (some of which we shall note in due course) and advanced one or two general critical principles—such as, that casual and minor statements of fact which have no doctrinal significance (like the statement in the Book of Judith that Nebuchadnezzar was King of Nineveh) may be inaccurate, that departures from correct chronology are not an infringement of inspiration, and so forth.[4] It has however been pointed out that the encyclical of 1893 gave authoritative judgment against him.[5] In 1905 the Biblical Commission made it known that, if solid arguments can be produced for regarding any passage in Scripture as an unacknowledged quotation by a sacred writer from an uninspired document and as one for the truth of which the quoter does not mean to vouch, such a passage may be regarded by Catholics as fallible. A little later the same year the Commission declared that it was not lawful to question the historical character of books hitherto regarded as historical, except in cases where the sense and judgment of the Church allowed and where

[1] Reid in *op. cit.* 497b. Similarly Lattey, *First Notions*, 6, 93 (". . . this practice of sound criticism . . ."), 96 ("Thus everywhere there is much room, much need for critical and scientific study, such as the supreme Pontiffs have been endeavouring to foster: not for that kind of criticism which prides itself upon a cynical whittling away of the evidence: . . .").

[2] See above, pp. 185 f, and below, pp. 300 ff; and cf. Gray, *Crit. Intro. to O.T.* 13–17.

[3] In *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 187, 191.

[4] *Ibid.* 197 f.

[5] Lattey in *The Bible*, etc. 152.

it could be proved by solid arguments that the sacred writer did not intend to write history.[1] These and other decisions of the Commission, though binding so far as obedience is concerned, are not regarded by Catholics as technically infallible and therefore not as unchangeable. "We are not hindered from private study of the reasons on which they are based, and if some scholar should find solid arguments against a decision they should be set before the Commission."[2] It is hardly to be wondered at, that, under this system of occasional distribution of infinitesimal scraps of mental liberty, coupled with a general refusal of it, intelligent and truth-loving men should grow restive. Priests and laymen cannot be prevented from reading about the critical study of the Bible and from accepting—sometimes in an extreme form—the conclusions of critics.[3] Sometimes the note of complaint and protest is heard.[4] Sometimes it is bravely maintained that really progressive criticism is a real possibility within the Catholic Church. There is however considerable uncertainty as to how far such criticism actually goes in concrete issues, and how far it will be allowed to carry on its operations unimpeded by the authorities. What is certain is that it evokes the strongest opposition from other Catholics.[5] The position, as it has been truly said, is simply this: "Serious scientific work is possible for the Catholic Bible-scholar to-day only on the outermost margins of Old- and New-Testament science."[6]

So far, therefore, as higher criticism is needful to a knowledge of the historical truth behind Scripture, it may safely be said that the dualistic attitude which Rome has to take up towards criticism—replete as that attitude is with inconsistencies, ambiguities, hair-splittings, and evasions—is one that does grave injustice to those laws of

[1] Corbett in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 558a; Reid in *op. cit.* iv (1908) 497a; Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 10 f (tacit-quotation-theory to be used only with great caution); Lattey, *First Notions*, 89 f, and in *The Bible*, etc. 154–156.

[2] Corbett *in op. cit.* 558a: cf. *Religion of the Scriptures*, 9, 29 n.

[3] Houtin, *Question Biblique*, passim; Bain, *New Reformation*, 126 (French priests); Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 492a ("Catholic biblical critics . . . admit in a large measure the literary and historical conclusions reached by non-Catholic workers in this field, and maintain that these are not excluded by Catholic faith . . . a reverent criticism is quite within its rights . . . inspiration does not dispense with ordinary human industry in literary composition"); H. C. Corrance in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1925, 155–159; Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 5 (inerrancy of Scripture "does not . . . of necessity imply that every statement must be taken in a literal sense, and as true in that literal sense"); *Times Lit. Suppt.* 12 May 1927, 329 ("If . . . we are to assume that von Hügel accepted the official theological view of the necessity and infallibility of the Church, his own reserves—as in the matter of Biblical criticism—are puzzling").

[4] E.g. 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 862 f. Cf. Hermelink *Kath. und Prot.* 109.

[5] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 497a.

[6] Heiler, *Kathol.* 320 (my translation).

evidence by obedience to which alone the truth of history can be reached.[1]

3. *Tradition.* Side by side with the Scriptures—the written Word of God—Rome places, as an equal, independent, and co-ordinate source of knowledge in regard to Christian origins and consequently as an equal authority for regulating the faith and usage of the present, the unwritten Word of God, i.e. the Tradition of the Church.[2] Here are the words in which the ecclesiastics assembled at Trent expressed the Roman view: speaking of the truth and discipline of the Gospel, the Council, they said, "perceiving that this truth and discipline are contained in the written Books (of Scripture) and in unwritten traditions, which have come down to us, having been received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ Himself, or passed on (traditae), as if by hand, by the Apostles themselves—the Holy Ghost dictating (to them), . . . receives and venerates with equal piety and reverence all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament . . ., and also the traditions themselves pertaining both to faith and to morals, as if (tanquam) dictated either orally by Christ or by the Holy Spirit, and preserved by continual succession in the Catholic Church."[3] The so-called 'Creed of Pius IV' (1564) requires the pledge: "I most steadfastly admit and embrace the Apostolical and Ecclesiastical Traditions, and all other observances and constitutions of the same Church:" then follows immediately the acceptance of Scripture.[4] The Vatican Council (1870) repeated in almost precisely the same words the decree passed at Trent, saying that it was according to the faith of the whole Church,[5] and laid it down that "all those things

[1] It is but mere evasion to run away from the unanswerable arguments of higher critics on the plea that one must suspend judgment. See above, p. 100, for Newman's view, and cf. Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 171 f (counsel of Leo XIII in *Providentissimus*) and the amazingly feeble words of Father Lattey in *The Bible*, etc. 150 ("Almighty God has never promised that the moment a difficulty has been brought forward against the truth of Holy Writ, it shall at once be disposed of convincingly and triumphantly. There is a certain sense in which 'Wait and see' is an eminently Catholic saying; the Church of God can afford to wait, for even if in the meantime the objector should have gone to his grave, she will not go to hers. In time, no doubt, the matter will be cleared up. But we are not compelled to wait for that in order to know that nothing can be absolutely proved which is contrary to the truth of Scripture; either it has not been absolutely proved, or it is not really contrary to Scripture").

[2] Cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 279, 282–292; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 14–24; Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 29–36, 47; Stanton, *Authority*, 219; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 32–37, 403 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 587; Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 14–25; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 165–172.

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv, can. script. init. (Mirbt 291 [37]). Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 126; Stanton, *Authority*, 143, 146, 148 f; H. Koch in *Theol. Litzg.* 1926. 3. 64.

[4] Mirbt 339 (33); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 239.

[5] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 2 (Mirbt 457 [18]: also Salmon, *Infall.* 476).

are to be believed which are contained in the Word of God written or handed down (tradito). . . ."[1]

Support for this view of tradition is sought in those passages of the New Testament in which mention is made of the Word of God or the common beliefs or customs of the Church, unaccompanied by any allusion to their being couched in written form.[2] The Divinely conferred infallibility of the Church is advanced as a sufficient guarantee that this Tradition has been maintained throughout the centuries without diminution or addition or error or perversion.[3] It is thus made to cover the whole vast range of Catholic doctrine and usage. Whatever the Church has come to believe or practise as a matter of pious obligation can, on the strength of her infallibility, be defended as traditional, however silent Scripture or the early Fathers may be in regard to it. Indeed, it is argued that, if such and such a thing has no support in Scripture or the early Fathers, then it actually does possess—by a necessary inference—the support of unwritten Tradition.[4] A great number of doctrines and customs, of all degrees of importance, are vindicated in this way. Some of them we shall have occasion to note in the sequel. Examples of the most important class are the doctrines of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin and the Infallibility of the Pope. According to Trent, Scripture and Tradition are twin authorities: Tradition cannot, any more than Scripture, be rejected without the guilt of unbelief being incurred. In the Tridentine Decrees and the 'Roman Catechism,' scriptural evidence is adduced, if it is forthcoming: if not, Tradition is quoted in support—with no apparent consciousness of inferior cogency.[5] If, however, the question be pressed, Which of the two is the clearer and safer? the answer is Tradition, "because Tradition can testify in its own behalf through the many authorized witnesses who carry this Tradition in themselves, whilst Holy Scripture cannot make good its

[1] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iii, cap. 3 (Mirbt 458 [16]; Salmon, *Infall.* 478).

[2] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 14–19 (quoting Mt. xxviii. 19 f; Mk. xvi. 15 f; Lk. x. 16; Ac. iv. 31, xiii. 4; Rom. x. 8, 14 f, 17; 1 Cor. xv. 3; Col. i. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 13; 2 Thess. ii. 15; 2 Tim. ii. 2).

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 119; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 15–17.

[4] Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 370 (". . . the profession and the developments of a doctrine are according to the emergency of the time, and . . . silence at a certain period implies, not that it was not then held, but that it was not questioned"); Hase, *Handbook*, i. 111, 130; Pusey, *Eiren.* 148 f (". . . In the old words, the '*quod ubique*' was to be, *ipso facto*, a test of the '*quod semper*' . . ."); Salmon, *Infall.* 28 f, 33, 127 f, 133 f; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 208 f (Rome "in effect claims that 'tradition' means what at any period the Roman Church has come to hold, whatever the records of the past may say"), 253 (". . . And this idea of an unwritten tradition has in effect been used to render the whole appeal to Scripture and antiquity null and void. The living voice of the Church at any period, once established, *is* tradition, and must be assumed to have always been so . . .").

[5] For examples, see below, p. 403, 417 f.

authority without referring to Tradition to testify to its inspiration and preservation"; also because Tradition is needed in order to explain the ambiguities of Scripture.[1] It is impossible not to connect with this exaltation of Tradition above Scripture that aspect of Roman policy which has evoked the suspicion and the charge of unwillingness to let Scripture be freely and widely used.[2]

Such then is the doctrine: how does it deserve to be dealt with? Stay of execution might conceivably be asked for on the ground that the Tridentine Council meant to distinguish between apostolical Tradition and ecclesiastical Tradition, and to declare only that the former was entitled to rank as equal with Scripture,[3] or on the ground that the decree is quite consistent with the view that the Tradition referred to is simply the explanation and interpretation of Scripture itself, and that this was the view of its earliest Roman exponents.[4] It is, however, impossible to accept either of these pleas. The distinction between apostolic Tradition and ecclesiastical Tradition is never adverted to in the Tridentine decrees or the 'Roman Catechism': it is thoroughly foreign to the normal Catholic mode of thought, and is—I venture to think—entirely illusory. The Decree of Trent speaks of the apostolical Traditions as "preserved by continual succession in the Catholic Church": and the 'Creed of Pius IV' pledges the believer to accept "the apostolical and ecclesiastical Traditions." On the second plea, the only names I have seen quoted in support of the milder interpretation are those of Cassander (1513–1566), whose views were regarded by Catholics as unsatisfactory, and of High Anglicans like William Palmer. Their view, as Palmer himself has shown, has not been the teaching of many eminent Catholics.[5] It is very hard to believe that it can have been the meaning of the Tridentine fathers: for it was their chief concern to meet effectively the complaint of Luther and the Reformers that Scripture was the sole authority for the Church and that a great deal in the Roman system could not be justified on scriptural grounds alone.[6] A Tradition therefore that was nothing more than the explanation and interpretation of Scripture would have been insufficient for their purpose; for it would have left the door open to a constant appeal to Scripture against Tradition, which is exactly what the Roman apologetic could not admit. Thus neither of these pleas in extenuation of the

[1] So Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 20–23; cf. 16–19 (sinfulness of disbelief); Salmon, *Infall.* 127; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 34 f.

[2] Ottley in *op. cit.* 35.

[3] Cf. Hugo Koch in *Theol. Litzg.* 1926. 3. 64.

[4] Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 30–33.

Cf. Palmer, *Treatise on the Church* (3rd edn. 1842) ii. 12, 33–48; Stanton, *Authority*, 148 n., 149, 219; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 201.

[6] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 116–119; Salmon, *Infall.* 29, 130; Stanton, *Authority*, 143 f.

Church's high-sounding claim in the matter of tradition can be admitted as valid.

It is, of course, the case that oral tradition played a considerable part in moulding the life and thought of the early Church. The New Testament, as Catholics truly urge, contains several allusions to it.[1] Papias, Bishop of Hierapolis at the beginning of the second century, preferred "the living and abiding voice" to written records. Irenaeus appealed to tradition in order to vindicate the generally received beliefs of the Church as Apostolic against the doctrines and scriptural misinterpretations of the Gnostics. It was these traditional Church-beliefs which were summarized in the Old Roman Creed and the other early Rules of Faith. Tertullianus refers to various traditional usages of a ceremonial kind. Origenes appeals, as Irenaeus had done, to ecclesiastical and apostolical tradition as the norm of truth. Cyprianus regarded tradition as the digest of scriptural teaching accepted by the Church. Cyrillus of Jerusalem (315-386 A.D.) speaks of the baptismal creed being written not on parchments, but in memory on the heart. Basilius (326–378 A.D.) spoke of the unwritten apostolical traditions—very much as they were spoken of at Trent—as an alternative source of doctrine alongside of Scripture. Chrysostomus referred to Church-tradition as a final settlement. Augustinus regarded whatever was universally observed in the Church as having virtually Apostolic sanction. Vincentius of Lérins (434 A.D.) acclaimed as the final standard what had been believed by all Christians everywhere and always.[2]

It is, further, not in itself inconceivable that some teachings and practices of the earliest Christians should have survived to modern times, without happening to have been committed to writing. Up to a point, indeed, we may admit the plea[3] that an unauthenticated tradition, being as it were in possession, has a primâ facie claim to be accepted as true. Gallican and Anglican divines have not been averse to admitting its value as an aid in pointing the way to the sense in which Scripture is to be understood.[4] But all this does not bring us anywhere near the Roman position. When we consider the bulk of the extant Christian literature produced in the second, and still more in the third, fourth and following centuries, we realize that there is an immense balance of improbability against any important usage or belief having been adhered to in the early stages of Christian history, without having left any mark on the

[1] See above, p. 293 n. 2.

[2] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 109–111, 114 f; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 19 f; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 11 f, 46 f; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 173 n.

[3] Newman, *Gramm.* 371.

[4] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 213 (Du Pin's view); K. Vaughan in *Papacy and Bible*, 55; Stanton, *Authority*, 123 f; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 19 (Du Pin).

literature of the times. To regard the prevalence at any particular time of a custom, the origin of which is forgotten, as a ground for believing that it was observed centuries earlier, despite the silence of literature which would have been likely to mention it had it existed, is a proceeding which, in the study of secular history, would not be tolerated for a single moment. For practical purposes, literary evidence alone justifies the definite inclusion of an item in a historical reconstruction, particularly where literary information generally is abundant and knowledge fairly extensive. The evidence of mere tradition is at least precarious, and cannot be made the basis of categorical affirmations in regard to the past.[1] It is therefore a valid and sufficient answer to the Roman doctrine of Tradition to urge that our written records of early times are often silent (in some cases, for many centuries) in regard to the things which Tradition is supposed to guarantee, that, had these things existed during those centuries, they would almost inevitably have been mentioned, and that what the records do mention and imply is often quite incompatible with the supposed Tradition.[2] Examples of this will appear as we proceed. Not only is historical evidence often silent or unfavourable in regard to beliefs and usages claimed as traditional, but it is also distinctly adverse to the existence in the early centuries of such a *doctrine* of Tradition as Rome lays down, namely, of Tradition as an independent and co-ordinate source of guidance alongside of Scripture. The early Fathers might value tradition as an aid to the interpretation of Scripture; but assertions of tradition for which the sanction of Scripture could not be claimed they did not regard as fully authoritative. The orthodox appeal to tradition in the second and third centuries was to a tradition strictly of the former kind. It was 'unwritten' only in the sense of not being in Scripture. There was nothing secret about it, and the course of controversy led to its being speedily reduced to writing.[3] The idea of a Tradition independent of Scripture was an argument of the Gnostics, which orthodox writers were particularly concerned to repel. Cyprianus repudiated by an appeal to Scripture the Bishop of Rome's refusal to re-baptize converted heretics—a refusal based on the fact that it had been the tradition of his predecessors not to re-baptize them. Athanasius declared that the Holy Scriptures were sufficient for the preaching of the truth. Basilius indeed, as we have seen, once used almost Tridentine language about Tradition: but this can be matched

[1] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 166; Stanton, *Authority*, 124–126, 218; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 253.

[2] Salmon, *Infall.* 30, 128, 133, 137. It is this fact which is pleaded in defence of the Anglican *Articles* vi and xx, according to which no belief is necessary for salvation which either is not vouched for by Scripture or cannot be proved from it (Stanton, *Authority*, 146 f, 218; Ottley in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 36; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 254, 280 f).

[3] Cf. Harnack, *Origin of the N.T.* 174–176, 182 f.

with other passages in his writings where he refers to Scripture as sufficient and ultimate, and condemns the introduction into the faith of things that are not there. Hieronymus denied the authority of things not written in Scripture: and Augustinus similarly asserted that Scripture contained the whole of faith and morals.[1] From the latter part of the second century A.D. onwards, we find allusions in Christian literature to the custom of withholding certain deeper Christian doctrines from immature catechumens and concealing them and some of the more sacred observances of the Church from the gaze of the unbaptized (the so-called 'Disciplina Arcani'). But this method of reserve did not mean that these things were not written about and perfectly well known to mature and educated Christians.[2] Neither this custom, therefore, nor the isolated words of Basilius, justify the belief that the early Church accepted any such doctrine of Tradition as Rome now teaches.[3] It grew up during the middle ages, and was reinforced by the great prestige of Thomas Aquinas, who seems to have used indiscriminately and uncritically any passage from any of the Fathers as of equal authority, for purposes of argument, with a passage of Scripture.[4] Prior to Trent, however, there were still eminent Catholics who did not pay equal respect to Scripture and to Tradition.[5] The Tridentine doctrine is simply an extraordinarily clever device for vindicating Roman ordinances against the charge of novelty. It is clever, because it is just beyond the reach of complete literal refutation, is capable (if admitted in principle) of proving anything that Rome may desire to prove, and offers a plausible test, which at the same time none but Rome herself can use.[6] It is, however, a palpable device, not only devoid—as we have shown—of historical justification, but forming, just like Scripture, an erratic boulder in the Catholic system. We observed above that Catholics regard Tradition as, on the whole, a safer and more useful guide than Scripture[7]—clearly for the reason that Tradition is more closely related than Scripture is to the direct voice of the infallible Church. In fact, without the infallibility of the Church, Tradition would be utterly worthless. On the other hand, given the infallible Church, Tradition is as much a superfluity as Scripture is.[8] Hence the tendency in the Catholic apologetic of the nineteenth century to substitute for the idea that all Catholic dogmas and usages were primitive, a kind of doctrine

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 108 f, 111 f, 114; Salmon, *Infall.* 28 f, 135, 143–145, 147, 154; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 67 f; Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 188; *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 46, 64; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 173 with n., 253.

[2] See my *Early Church and the World*, 152 n. 2, 219 n. 4, 232 n. 2, 303, 474 f.

[3] Stanton, *Authority*, 125 f, 143 f, 149.

[4] Stanton, *op. cit.* 145; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 200.

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 117.

[6] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 130–132.

[7] See above, pp. 293 f.

[8] Cf. H. Koch, as quoted above, p. 256 n. 3.

of 'development,' according to which the presence of these dogmas and usages in the early Church was purely implicit, and the guarantee of Tradition becomes simply the right explication, in the course of centuries, of all that is genuinely involved in the original gift of Christ.[1] This view is clearly much less open to objection on historical grounds, though it must often be a matter of controversy as to precisely what *is* involved in that original gift. But in any case, the theory of development is not really an alternative explanation of the doctrine of Tradition, but a virtual though unacknowledged abandonment of it.[2]

In conclusion, the Tridentine doctrine of Tradition and the use made of it in the Catholic interpretation of the New-Testament Scriptures violates the true character of those Scriptures as historical documents, by precluding the application to them of the accredited canons of all historical investigation. Like the adhesion to the once-for-all authorized Vulgate text and the repudiation of all higher-critical methods and conclusions, so too the reliance on Tradition as a valid source of information for the first century, simply exhibits the blind determination of Rome to prevent the evidence of Scripture ever being effectually turned against her. The determination is blind, because it involves defiance of historical truth. Under the reiterated reproaches of Protestant scholarship, Catholicism has begun by tiny degrees to open its eyes. It is a painful process: but new editions and translations of the Scriptures, infinitesimal concessions on the part of the Biblical Commission and of private scholars, the vogue of the doctrine of development, and the perilous candour of a few modern Catholic historians, all bear witness to the fact that the process is going on. The unfortunate thing for Rome is that the more this eye-opening proceeds, the more patent does the untenability of her position become.

Anglo-Catholics are in a far better position in regard to the Scriptures than are Roman Catholics. They are not under the necessity of defending themselves against the charge of keeping the Bible out of Christian hands. Their doctrines of authority and of the infallibility of the Church are as yet far too fluid to bring them into any serious difficulty as to how to find a logical place in their system for an inspired book. At all events they are not in the least afraid of the Bible. They have not foolishly pinned their faith to one standard version or edition; and so far from being unfriendly to the task of textual criticism, they are just

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 129–131; Salmon, *Infall.* 31, 130–132; Stanton, *Authority*, 124, 142 f, 149–151; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 201, 209. On the theory of development, see above, pp. 38 f.

[2] Salmon, *Infall.* 32 (". . . this theory of development . . . exhibits plainly the total rout which the champions of the Roman Church experienced in the battle they attempted to fight on the field of history . . .").

as willing to argue a textual problem on its merits as any German savant. Indeed, by far the greater part of the very valuable contributions made by English scholars to textual criticism have been the work of Anglicans. Quite the same cannot be said of the Anglo-Catholic attitude to higher criticism and tradition.[1] British criticism is as a whole recognized, even by Catholics, to be less daring and therefore nearer to orthodoxy than German criticism:[2] and the Anglo-Catholic ranks include not a few Old- and New-Testament critics of great learning and insight. In problems of a purely documentary character, their judgment is normally as unfettered as on textual questions, allowing perhaps for a somewhat exaggerated aversion to abandon the Apostolic authorship of the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline authorship of the whole of the Pastoral Epistles. When, however, it becomes a matter of the historical reconstruction of our Lord's life and the story of the early Church, Anglo-Catholic scholarship usually displays in a somewhat marked degree the influence of the Catholic tradition. It is perhaps almost inevitable that it should be so—that, in matters where a margin for conjecture exists, the judgment should incline to that one of the alternative solutions which harmonizes best with the critic's own deeply-held religious convictions. Doubtless this general tendency is true of others besides Anglo-Catholics. Nevertheless, the purity of our search for truth is compromised unless, as far as we consciously can, we eliminate the influence of our personal religious value-judgments from our quest for historical facts. Probably, most Anglo-Catholics would be sincerely willing to subscribe to this rubric, however difficult some might find the task of approximating to it in practice. In theory and intention at least, Anglo-Catholic scholarship is unfettered, and in this —whatever its habitual leanings may be—it is separated by a great gulf from the biblical scholarship of Rome.[3]

[1] Cf. Canon H. L. Goudge in *Priests' Convention*, 29: "But small indeed, I fear, has been the contribution made to this new knowledge by those who most value the name of 'Catholic,' and small also the use we have yet made of the labours of others."

[2] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 493b, 494a, 495b (". . . Excellent service has been done in the defence of contested books by the British divines J. B. Lightfoot, B. F. Westcott, W. H. Sanday, and others"). Cf. Turner in *Congress-Report 1920*, 26.

[3] See above, p. 199 n. 4. Prof. C. H. Turner's paper on 'The Faith and Modern Criticism' in the Anglo-Catholic *Congress-Report 1920* (20–33) is interesting and instructive in this connexion. He quite unwarrantably regards the critical objections to the Pauline authorship of Ephesians as "at bottom only doctrinal" ("those to whom the idea of the Church is alien are reluctant to conclude that it was not alien also to the Apostle"); he also thinks the objections to the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles to be partly so and not to amount to disproof (26); he speaks of the modernist attempt to furnish a satisfactory interpretation of the resurrection-narratives as "the assault on this bastion of the Christian tradition" (31). But he frankly abandons the genuineness of 2 Peter (27) and refuses to dogmatize as to the authorship of the Fourth Gospel (28 f).

CHAPTER XIV

CATHOLICISM AND THE OLD TESTAMENT.

It is more or less customary with Roman Catholics, as with Protestant Fundamentalists, to speak disparagingly and sometimes harshly of the extravagant and mutually inconsistent theories of the higher critics.[1] That a considerable amount of wild and unsuccessful speculation has taken place is, of course, not to be denied: but such speculation is the inevitable by-product of free investigation in any field of research, and its existence no more discredits higher criticism than the existence of erroneous medical theories discredits medicine. And just as erroneous theories in scientific or historical research do not stultify or cancel the main body of ascertained truth, so the extravagances and failures of individual theorists do not upset or impair the established results of the higher criticism of the Bible. There must necessarily be some room for difference of opinion as to the precise boundaries of this field of established results: but there is a considerable number of results that are well within it.

Among these is the post-Mosaic and composite authorship of the Pentateuch. It is obviously impossible to reproduce completely in these pages the arguments on which this firmly-settled critical conclusion is based. A very brief summary of the salient points is all that can be given. In favour of the view that the Pentateuch as a whole was the work of Moses, two reasons may be advanced: (1) the dogmatic declaration of the Roman Church that it was so (with the value of this authority for Christian belief we have already dealt[2]), and (2) the Jewish tradition. This tradition is reflected in the language of the New Testament, even in sayings ascribed to Jesus. Some of these latter, being given to us on the sole authority of the Fourth Gospel (e.g. John v. 46), must be considered as historically doubtful:[3] but there is a sufficient number of well-attested sayings recorded in the Synoptics (e.g. Mark i. 44, vii. 10, x. 3f, xii. 26, and parallels) to show that Jesus did conform to the Jewish custom of His time and spoke of the Pentateuch and its contents as Moses' work.[4] We have already given in full the reasons why His conformity with Jewish usage in this respect cannot be regarded as settling the historical problem as to the actual origin of the books in

[1] Cf. e.g. Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 30; Bird in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 29 n. See also above, p. 289 n. 2.

[2] See above, pp. 87–101.

[3] See below, pp. 339–341.

[4] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 15.

question.[1] It is probable enough that the tradition goes back at least to the time of the formal establishment of the Pentateuch as the basis of the Hebrew Scriptural Canon. This event cannot be dated earlier than about 444 B.C., i.e. some 750 years after the latest date that can be reasonably assigned to Moses. Prior to 444 B.C. references to the Law of Moses sometimes occur, but none that can be shown to allude to the entire Pentateuch—a point sometimes ignored in the older apologetic.[2] The existence of the tradition as a historical fact, such as it was, is quite inadequate as a proof of its own accuracy, and can naturally and readily be accounted for as an uncritical extension to the whole law-book of the popular belief (doubtless in some sense justified) that Moses had been the original lawgiver of the nation.[3]

Against the Mosaic authorship there is a solid array of clear observable facts within the Pentateuch itself. To begin with, it contains itself no claim to be the work of Moses. A few of the more obvious indications of the post-Mosaic origin of at least certain portions of the Pentateuch are thus enumerated by one of the most scholarly and careful critics of recent times: "The closing section of Deuteronomy" (which refers to Moses' own sepulchre being unknown "unto this day"!) "must have been written after the death of Moses; the list of Edomite kings (Gen. xxxvi. 31–43) that reigned 'before there reigned any king over the children of Israel' must have been written at least as late as Saul, the first Hebrew King; Gen. xiv. 14, which alludes to Dan" (must have been written) "at least as late as the period of the Judges, when the ancient city of Laish first received the name of Dan (Judges xviii. 29); such statements as 'the Canaanite was then in the land' (Gen. xii. 6, xiii. 7)" (must have been written) "after the period of the Judges when the Canaanites still continued to be an important part of the population of the land (Judges i. 27, 29, 32, 33). . . . Og, according to the story, was a contemporary of Moses, but his bed in Rabbath is to the writer of Deut. iii. 11 a curious relic of a bygone age. . . . Moreover, it is to be observed that Moses, no less than Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, is throughout treated as a figure in the history of a past age: judgment is passed upon him in an entirely objective way: 'the man Moses was very meek, above all the men which were upon the face of the earth' (Num. xii. 3)".[4]

[1] See above, pp. 212–217, esp. 216 nn. 2 and 3.

[2] E.g. Dom Chamard, quoted by Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 249. The argument used by Father Knox (*Belief in Caths.* 80) for the pre-exilic date of the Pentateuch (viz.: the fact of its having been accepted by the Samaritans) had already been effectually disposed of by Skinner (*Divine Names in Genesis*, 118–121).

[3] Cf. Driver, *Introd. to Lit. of O.T.* (1909) i–xi; Gray, *Crit. Introd. to O.T.* 13–17.

[4] Gray, *Crit. Introd.* 16 f. See also above, pp. 185 f, for certain unhistorical features (other than miracles), which exclude the authorship of a contemporary and an eye-witness such as Moses was.

Apart from these and other indications of post-Mosaic date, there are abundant proofs of composite or multiple authorship. The first and in some ways the most important clue to this multiplicity is the variation in the use of the Divine names. 'Yahweh' (the personal name given by the Hebrews to the God they worshipped, and translated by 'the LORD' in our English versions) alternates with the common noun 'Elōhim' (translated simply 'God'). In Exod. iii. 13–15 (see Revised Version, margin) and vi. 2–3, the name 'Yahweh' (or Jehovah) is divulged—apparently for the first time—to Moses: it would therefore seem reasonable to infer that the authors of these passages, when they were dealing with *pre*-Mosaic times, would not make (or represent the characters in the story as making) free use of the name 'Yahweh'. When one separates out those parts of Genesis in which the name 'Yahweh' *is* freely used, one observes that they form a series of vivid and simple narratives, closely resembling one another in general point of view and in literary style. To this series, which it seems natural to suppose once existed as a separate document, the conventional symbol 'J' (Jehovistic) has been assigned as a name. The residue of Genesis is not uniform. Certain sections of it stand out clearly from the rest, being marked by a very special style, a fondness for numbers, and a love of symmetry, schematism, and repetition. The bulk of the Book of Leviticus and large sections of Exodus and Numbers are in the same style. This group of passages is known by the symbol 'P', which was suggested by the priestly character of its main interest. There remain the other sections of Genesis that belong neither to J nor to P. These differ from J and resemble P in using the word 'Elōhim' in preference to the name 'Yahweh' prior to Moses' call: but they resemble J and differ from P in their simple and popular narrative-style. They have been given the name 'E' (Elohistic). J and E cannot very easily be distinguished from one another *after* the call of Moses, owing to the fact that both now use the name 'Yahweh' freely (E however sometimes preferring to retain 'Elōhim'). The bulk of the Book of Deuteronomy is characterized by a well-marked style and range of interests of its own, and is accordingly marked off as another document ('D'). There are, of course, obscurities and differences of opinion over details in the analysis of these sources: and there are further complications, which we do not need to study here—notably the combination of J and E (prior to their embodiment in the Pentateuch) into a single narrative by a compiler ('R^{JE}'), and the incorporation into P of an earlier code, the so-called 'Law of Holiness' (Lev. xvii–xxvi—'H'). The general distinction of the documents from one another is, however, quite clearly marked. Moreover, none of them can have been the work of Moses. The post-Mosaic features enumerated above are drawn from

all four of them, and the same could be said of a great many more features which we have no space to enumerate here. P is with fair unanimity dated about 500 B.C. The date of D is at the moment under discussion again: but it seems very doubtful whether the critical theory which was for long generally accepted (and which dated the book between 720 and 620 B.C.) is likely to be improved upon. E is normally assigned to about the eighth century B.C., J to the ninth. Both J and E embody codes of law and poetical fragments that go back to very early times: but it is difficult to prove that any of these was actually composed by Moses. An arguable but by no means conclusive case can be made out for the Mosaic origin of the Ten Commandments, and of the substance of some of the earliest laws. The poetical fragments of Exod. xv. 21 and Numb. xxi. 27–30 also probably belong to the period of Moses. More than this cannot be said with any confidence. The fact that the art of writing was well known in Palestine and Western Asia generally in the time of the Patriarchs, and that Moses himself had been trained in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, forbids us indeed to use the argument that written records could not have existed among the Hebrews in these early times:[1] but it is not on that argument that critics rely. The diffusion of culture in Palestine does not prove that the Patriarchs could write: still less does the possibility that Moses could write make it at all probable that he actually did write what traditionalists ascribe to him. Nor does it establish a pre-exilic date for P to urge that P contains allusions to many legal customs and enactments of pre-exilic times. A given law or custom may be very ancient; but its antiquity is no evidence whatever that any particular literary formulation of it must be ancient likewise.[2]

Apart from the settlement of the details, we may say that the analysis of the Pentateuch into four main sources, the arrangement of these in the following time-sequence:—J, E, D, and P, and the assignment of them to the approximate dates just given, are thoroughly well-established critical

[1] Cf. Bird in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 23 f.

[2] Father Bird remarks: "I know that, especially since the discovery of the Elephantine Papyri, it is becoming the fashion to say that the Priests' Code may contain some traditional matter. But if concession along this line is to continue, the Development or Evolutionary Hypothesis will soon lose its meaning" (*Religion of the Scriptures*, 25). There is very good reason why it should become the fashion to say that P contains traditional matter, seeing that the fact was clearly recognized and fully stated in the first edition of Dr. Driver's very widely used *Introduction* (135 f), which appeared in 1891—twelve years before any of the Elephantiné papyri were published. But the recognition does not in the slightest degree deprive the critical hypothesis of its meaning. The 'concession'—if so it be—has been repeatedly made during the last thirty-five years at least: yet the critical hypothesis still shows no sign of being injured thereby. Most of Father Bird's refutation of the higher critical theory (*op. cit.* 18–29) is covered by this 'concession,' and does not therefore touch the main line of the higher critical argument. But the details cannot be discussed further here.

conclusions. They have been built up—not hurriedly—but after close and repeated study. They rest, not only (as some suggest) on the distinction of the Divine names (which, as we have seen, does not distinguish E from P at all, and consistently distinguishes E from J only before Exod. iii), but also on a large number of other peculiarities of style and thought that are found to run within the same boundaries.[1] It is not the work of any single man, but the fruit of the labours of many. Every step of the reasoning that has led to it has been examined and re-examined. In regard to its detailed application and the remoter problems connected with it, differences of opinion naturally exist; but in its main outlines it is accepted as indubitable by the vast majority of those who come to the evidence with an open mind.[2] From time to time it is assailed, and its downfall confidently announced: but it has successfully withstood so many of these attacks that it seems unlikely now that it can ever be reversed. Detailed study of the Hebrew text in the light of it solves innumerable problems, great and small, for which without it only the most far-fetched and indeed impossible solutions can be suggested.

What, then, is the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to all this? She maintains doggedly that Moses was the author of the Pentateuch. She maintains this in defiance of that great array of historical and literary evidence which has sufficed again and again to convince reverent and religious men who have come to the problem independently of one another, and with no prepossessions but a desire to ascertain from the facts the truth in regard to them. The 'de fide' decree of Trent speaks of "the five (books) of Moses."[3] In June 1906, the Biblical Commission at Rome declared that the arguments alleged by critics do not (in view of the internal evidence) prove that the Pentateuch was not substantially the work of Moses: but it permitted the view that, in composing it, Moses may have availed himself of the help of secretaries, who wrote, not at his dictation, but under his inspired guidance, "in such a way that . . . the work, . . . approved by this same Moses, the chief and inspired author, should be published in his name." It also made certain allowances for the use of earlier sources and the insertion of later additions.[4] "Thus there is no likelihood," we are told, "of Catholic scholars *rashly* abandon-

[1] Bird in *Religion of the Scriptures* (26) speaks quite erroneously as if the difference in the Divine names was the one considerable criterion for distinguishing J and E (cf. Driver, *Intro.* etc. 116 f). Even if it were the only one, and were as indecisive as Bird argues, that would not dispose of the unmistakeable separateness of P from both J and E. See Skinner, *Divine Names in Genesis*, 6–10.

[2] The large measure of agreement between the earliest critical analysts powerfully impressed Baron von Hügel (Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 254 f).

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv, can. script. (Mirbt 291 [48]). Cf. Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 87.

[4] Cf. Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 497a; Corbett in *op. cit.* ii (1907) 558a; Bird in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 29; Lattey, *First Notions*, 12, 28 f, 104, and in *The Bible*, etc. 30 f, 34, 158 f; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 34, 78.

ing the Mosaic authorship of *the bulk* of the Pentateuch. First of all, they retain greater liberty in face of the formidable array of modern non-Catholic scholars, who proclaim as settled acquisition of modern learning the well-known J. E. D. P. H. R. division of the Hexateuch."[1] In what way greater liberty is secured by submitting to the authority of a decree which forbids the one conclusion felt by unbiassed minds really to satisfy the data, is not explained. Catholics, however, are very far from thorough-going submission. Probably many believe with the critics, but utter nothing for fear of consequences. Some publish their protests, but do so anonymously under assumed names.[2] Another, the late Baron von Hügel, makes no secret of his acceptance of critical conclusions, and is officially rebuked.[3] "Quite recently," writes Prof. C. H. Turner, the Anglo-Catholic scholar, "the articles contributed to a French *Dictionnaire Apologétique* by the Abbé Touzard have been condemned at Rome, because it is not 'safe' to deny the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch; and the Abbé has made a 'very edifying' submission. Yet we know that Moses was not the author of the Book of Deuteronomy."[4]

But much hedging and qualifying is possible short of that open denial which calls for disciplinary suppression. Thus we are assured that, although the Church could, if she wished, define infallibly the human authorship of the sacred books, she has not, as a matter of fact, ever yet done so.[5] In 1897 the Catholic scholar Lagrange put forward an explanation of what was meant by Mosaic 'authorship,' which, if accepted, would virtually leave room for the higher critical view:[6] this however was prior to the pronouncement of the Biblical Commission on the matter. Father Bird, after arguing that the variation in the Divine names in Genesis is editorial and not original, and thus dismissing the usual documentary theory, adds: "From all this it does not follow that the Pentateuch is altogether the work of Moses."[7] "Mosaic authorship," writes another Catholic scholar, " . . . need not imply that Moses wrote with his own hand or dictated all of it; the books may have been composed by secretaries to whom he suggested

[1] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 15. Note the qualifying words which I have italicized.

[2] E.g., 'Author of "The Policy of the Pope" ' in *Contemp. Rev.* Apl. 1894, 584 f, 590 f, 602–606; 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 859.

[3] See Lilley in H.*E.R.E.* viii (1915) 765: also above, p. 291 n. 3.

[4] *Congress-Report 1920*, 22. The Commission's decision of June 1906 "has necessarily modified" (so we are naïvely told) "the attitude of such Catholic writers as favoured in a greater or less degree the conclusions of the Graf-Wellhausen hypothesis" (Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv [1908] 497a).

[5] Arendzen and Downey in *op. cit.* 5: cf. Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 128.

[6] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 497a. An interesting account of the views of French Catholics on the matter prior to 1902 is given by Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 242–261.

[7] *Religion and the Scriptures*, 28.

the thoughts and whose work he approved as principal and inspired author."[1] Again, Moses may quite well have incorporated earlier documents in his work, imparting of course to what he had borrowed the stamp of inspiration.[2] Finally, his authorship "does not exclude the presence of such additions or imperfections in the present text as would leave it substantially and integrally the work of Moses." [3]

We find the same extraordinary combination of credulous traditionalism, scornful of 'the critics,' and historical sense, cautiously whittling down the tradition, when we look at a few of the opinions expressed by Catholic teachers on particular parts of the Pentateuch. Thus Genesis i–x, it is maintained, contains history, not myth or merely moral truth: nevertheless the history may have been told metaphorically, the facts "clothed to some extent in symbolic phraseology." "How far the metaphor goes the Bible itself does not decide."[4] In 1909 the Biblical Commission insisted explicitly on the historical, as against the legendary, character of Genesis i–iii.[5] The schematic framework of the Creation-story in Genesis i is "an *artificial* framework of a week," adopted in order to impress the Israelites with the sanctity of the Sabbath.[6] On the narrative of the creation of sun and moon, Pope Innocentius III based an argument for the superiority of the papal to the imperial power of the Middle Ages.[7] 'The Universe' regards as fatal Dr. Gore's denial that Adam and Eve were historical individuals;[8] and Monseigneur Farges attributes to Adam a supernatural aptitude for science and philology, because he conferred suitable names on the animals.[9] On the other hand, "the biblical account of the origin of man's body is certainly partially metaphorical, for God has no physical breath to breathe into the human form He made."[10] The story of the Fall in

[1] Corbett in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 558a—summarizing the Biblical Commission's decree of June 1906.

[2] Newman in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 195; Corbett in *loc. cit.* Father Bird (*Religion of the Scriptures*, 28 f) thus ascribes Gen. ii.4–iii and many of the earlier sections of J and E to Abraham: he also recognizes that Gen. i.–ii.3 come from another hand—his, namely, who wrote "the Pentateuchal Law," presumably Moses.

[3] Corbett in *loc. cit.* (the Biblical Commission's decree): cf. Newman in *loc. cit.* 196.

[4] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 13, 16.

[5] Cuthbert in *God and the Supernatural*, 154 n.; Lattey, *First Notions*, 76 f, and in *The Bible*, etc. 158 f; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 110; A. Lunn in *Rev. of the Churches*, Apl. 1927, 200. For an earlier Catholic protest against Evolution, cf. Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 220 n.

[6] Bird in *op. cit.* 34 n. (italics mine).

[7] Salmon, *Infall.* 461.

[8] 23 July 1926, 10, col. 1.

[9] In *Mystical Phenomena*, quoted by E. Underhill in *Rev. of the Churches*, July 1926, 385. Per contra, cf. the protests of 'Romanus' against the supposition that these chapters are historical, in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 859 f.

[10] Arendzen and Downey in *op. cit.* 16. Cf. the claim of D'Arcy (*Cathol.* 28, 74, 76) that Catholic dogma does not imply "a belief in the literal and scientific character of all the details in the Bible story."

Genesis iii fills an important place in Catholic, as in Pauline, teaching; and, whether we consider the Tridentine Canon which anathematizes those who do not accept the Roman view of the consequences of the Fall,[1] or whether we look at the modern Catholic exposition of the meaning of original sin,[2] the case is the same with both—the theory necessarily presupposes the historical and indeed literal accuracy of the narrative.[3] We are indeed informed that one eminent Catholic scholar has suggested that the biblical writer employed a piece of Semitic folk-lore in order to teach the doctrine of the Fall, Eden representing the supernatural order, the tree of life sanctifying grace, and so on. But the very characteristic comment is appended: "The employment of a folk-lore story, if van Hoonacker's theory be admitted, in no way militates against the authenticity of the Scriptural narrative as setting forth the 'facts 'of the Fall which are embodied in the Christian Faith, viz. that our first parents lost their original state of supernatural grace through disobedience to a divine law at the instigation of the devil, and in consequence were cast out of the Paradise of their primeval innocence. The Church in her dogmatic teaching, is concerned with these facts; not with the literary form in which they are set forth by the inspired writer."[4]

The words of Genesis iii. 3: "Ye shall not eat of it . . . lest ye die," are taken by Perrone to apply to the danger of indiscriminate Bible-reading.[5] In Gen. iii. 15 God says to the serpent, referring to the seed of the woman: "He shall bruise thee on the head, and thou shalt bruise him on the heel." There is no doubt at all about the true text of the passage, or about its original meaning: it refers to the perpetual warfare waged between the race of serpents and mankind ('seed' in this sense is nearly always collective, and, where individual, refers to immediate offspring, not remote posterity). The warfare is one in which ultimate victory is promised to neither. The Jewish Targums, however, regarded it as a Messianic prophecy; and Christian exegesis of the patristic and especially the mediaeval period saw in it in one way or another an allusion to Christ. Thanks to higher criticism, Protestants are now in possession of the true sense of the passage. With Catholics, however, it is otherwise. The authorized text of the Vulgate mistranslates the words thus: "*She* shall bruise thy head," etc. and Catholic scholarship finds in them a confirmation

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. v, can. 1 (Mirbt 293 [25]).
[2] Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 29; Watkin, *ibid.* 149. Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 363.
[3] Lattey in *The Bible*, etc. 159.
[4] Father Cuthbert in an editorial footnote in *God and the Supernatural*, 154.
[5] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 144.

of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary and of her ascent to Heaven.[1]

The prodigiously long ages of the Patriarchs from Adam to Noah (Gen. v) and from Shem to Abraham (Gen xi) are among the most obviously legendary elements in the book. This conclusion is forced upon us, not only by the inherent improbability of the figures themselves, but also by the late date of the document (P) in which they are found, and by the analogy of the high figures given in the fabulous genealogies of other ancient peoples. What puts the artificiality of these figures beyond question is the interesting fact that the Hebrew text, the Samaritan text, and the Septuagint version, all differ—not totally, but widely—from one another in the numbers they give. The Septuagint in both chapters gives higher figures than the other two, and is therefore perhaps the least original of the three: but between the Hebrew and the Samaritan texts, no man can say for certain which is the nearer to what was originally written. The very existence of the variations discredits the chronological methods of the age. The Vulgate, like the English versions, follows the figures of the Hebrew;[2] but Catholic readers have no right to assume that these are more accurate than what the Samaritan text would give them. But instead of frankly recognizing that these sets of figures are purely legendary and unhistorical, Catholic theologians go about to defend their truth, though confessing that they do not know what they mean. "Some fact—not merely a moral or philosophical idea—underlies them. Above all they are not merely childish folklore to fill up gaps of unknown history. But what that fact is the Church has never authoritatively settled. At present we seem to have lost the key to these enormous numbers," etc.[3]

The 'Roman Catechism' can plead the support of the First Epistle of Peter in regarding the Flood as a "figure and similitude" of baptism[4] —though the typology is that of an age now long past.[5] Somewhat similarly Newman was only judging with the majority when he built arguments on the fivefold promise (Gen. xii. 3, xviii. 18, xxii. 18, xxvi.

[1] Pusey, *Eiren.* 124 n.; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 134; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 203 f; Skinner, *Genesis* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') 79–82; Maas in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 464Ba ("The reading 'she' (*ipsa*) is neither an intentional corruption of the original text, nor is it an accidental error; it is rather an explanatory version expressing explicitly the fact of Our Lady's part in the victory over the serpent, which is contained implicitly in the Hebrew original . . ."); Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 19; Heiler, *Kathol.* 365 n.

[2] Except in Gen. xi. 13, where for some reason the Vulgate follows the Samaritan in giving 303 years, while the Hebrew has 403, and the Septuagint inserts an additional generation.

[3] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 16.

[4] *Cat. Trid.* II. ii. 8: cf. 1 Pet. iii. 20 f.

[5] For the discussions of French Catholics during the nineteenth century regarding the historical reality of the Deluge, see Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 186–205.

4, xxviii. 4) that in Abraham and his seed all the families of the earth should be blessed:[1] though as early as about 1100 A.D. Rashi had anticipated modern exegesis by advocating the sense: "By thee (i.e. by reference to, or comparison with, thee) shall all the families of the earth invoke blessings on themselves" (cf. Gen. xlviii. 20). Pope Pius X in 1904 stated in an encyclical that the patriarchs and other leading Old-Testament characters foresaw the coming of the Virgin Mary, and found consolation in the thought of her in the solemn moments of their lives.[2] In Gen. xviii. 21, the Lord says of Sodom: "I will go down and see whether they have actually done according to the report which has come to Me." In Pope Innocentius III's decree at the Lateran Council in 1215, this passage is quoted as supplying scriptural authority for the principle that the reported misdeeds of ecclesiastics should be duly investigated by their superiors.[3] In Gen. xxi. 10, the hard-hearted Sarah says to Abraham of Hagar and Ishmael: " Drive out this slave-girl and her son; for the son of this slave-girl shall not be heir with my son—with Isaac." Paul, using the unhistorical methods of the Rabbinic exegesis of his day, twists these simple words of a simple narrative into a scriptural warrant for the Christians' view of the rejection of the Jews in their favour! (Gal. iv. 22–31). What however was excusable in Paul's day is not necessarily excusable in ours. Such interpretation is clearly untrue to the historical meaning of the passage in Genesis; yet Newman cites it as an illustration of the principle that the text of Scripture, resulting as it does from the cooperation of the Divine and human minds, often—possibly always (with certain obvious exceptions)—has a double sense. Another instance which he gives of the same thing is Abraham's answer to Isaac recorded in the next chapter: "God will Himself provide an animal for a burnt-offering" (Gen. xxii. 8)—presumably an allusion to our Lord's death.[4] 'El Shaddai' was an old name for God, used some five times in Genesis, frequently in Job, and occasionally elsewhere: its exact meaning is unknown; a probable etymology makes it mean 'God the Destroyer.' Yet because it is usually translated in the Vulgate by the words 'Deus omnipotens,' the 'Roman Catechism' adduces two of the passages in which it occurs

[1] Newman, *Gramm.* 436: cf. Skinner, *Genesis*, 244 f.

[2] Encyclical *Ad Diem Illum*, 2 Feb. 1904 ("Mariam utique, serpentis caput conterentem prospiciebat Adam, obortasque maledicto lacrymas tenuit. Eam cogitavit Noe, arca sospita inclusus; Abraham nati nece prohibitus; Jacob scalam videns perque illam ascendentes et descendentes angelos; Moses miratus rubum, qui ardebat et non comburebatur; David exsiliens et psallens dum adduceret arcam Dei; Elias nubeculam intuitus ascendentem de mari. Quid multa? Finem legis, imaginum atque oraculorum veritatem in Maria denique post Christum reperimus"). Cf. Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 143.

[3] *Conc. Lateran.*, printed in the Tauchnitz edit. (1842) of *Conc. Trid.* 254 f.

[4] *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 192 f.

as scriptural assertions of the Divine Almightiness.[1] The old poem given in Gen. xlix, in which the several tribes of Israel are characterized, almost certainly belongs to the period of the Judges and (as regards Judah) to the reign of David or Solomon.[2] Yet Catholics accept as historical the statement of J (Gen. xlix. 1, 28a) that it was actually spoken by the aged patriarch Jacob on his deathbed; and they regard the obscure words in which the coming glories of the Davidic empire are celebrated as a long-distance prophecy of the coming of Jesus.[3]

The bush which Moses is said (Exod. iii. 2) to have seen burning but unconsumed, is mentioned in the 'Roman Catechism' as prefiguring the Virgin-Birth of Christ.[4] The 'Catechism' also follows up the suggestion, put forward by Paul in 1 Cor. x. 1 ff, that the passage of the Red Sea signified Christian baptism.[5] From the command that a beast that should touch Mount Sinai should be stoned (Exod. xix. 12f), Pope Innocentius III inferred that simple and unlearned persons should not presume to scale the sublimity of sacred Scripture or to preach it to others.[6] Newman professed his belief that the Ten Commandments were actually written by the finger of God on the tables of stone without the use of a human medium: it was the only part of Scripture, he said, which was so written.[7] Nothing is known as to how the Ten Commandments were distributed on the two tables: but the 'Roman Catechism' tells us that we learn "from the holy Fathers" that the first table contained nos. 1–3, the second nos. 4–10.[8] The 'Roman Catechism' explicitly pronounces guiltless the great massacre carried out by the Levites, as described in Exod. xxxii. 27–29, on the ground that it was specially ordered by God.[9] Most interesting is the Catholic explanation of the two accounts given in Exodus of the Tabernacle. One of these—the longer—gives a very full and detailed account of the structure and its furniture and ritual. The passages (Exod. xxv–xxxi, xxxv–xl) are assignable, on the strength of their marked linguistic style, to P; and portions of Numbers in the same style (i. 47–iv) tell us that it was kept in the centre of the camp, and attended to by an organized body of several thousands of Levites. In Exodus xxxiii. 7–11—a passage which higher critics assign to E—we have another account of the Tabernacle. As in P's account (Exod. xxvii. 21, xxviii. 43, xxix. 4, 10f, Lev. i. 1, 3, etc. etc.), so here, it is called 'the Tent of Meeting'; and P's Tabernacle, though in the main a centre for sacrifice and other ritual, yet resembles E's in being a place for private converse

[1] *Cat. Trid.* I. ii. 15.
[2] See Skinner, *Genesis*, 510 f.
[3] Lattey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 54.
[4] *Cat. Trid.* I. iv. 15: see also above, p. 309 n. 2.
[5] *Cat. Trid.* II. ii. 8.
[6] See above, p. 260.
[7] *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 190, 192.
[8] *Cat. Trid.* III. v. 4.
[9] *Catech. Rom.* III. iv. 6 (4).

between Moses and God (Exod. xxv. 22; Lev. i. 1; Numb. vii. 89), as well as for more public purposes (Exod. xxxiii. 7b). There are, however, striking differences between the two accounts: in contrast to P, E says that the Tent was pitched *outside* and away from the camp, and implies that it was a comparatively simple structure, guarded by a single attendant—Joshua, of the tribe of Ephraim (cf. Numb. xiii. 8; and contrast i. 51, iii. 10, 38, xviii. 21f). The critical explanation of these data is as follows: the two accounts are mutually inconsistent descriptions of the same Tent; E's account, being the simpler and older, probably reflects with accuracy the actual condition of affairs. P's account, being of late date, and being also at variance with itself,[1] with the older narrative of E, with the allusions to Hebrew worship in the historical books, and with the inherent probabilities of the case, is regarded as the imaginative creation of a later idealizing age.[2] Such a solution of the problem is, of course, excluded by Catholic presuppositions. The Catholic apologist is obliged to accept the historicity of *two* Tents, and regards that mentioned in Exod. xxxiii. 7–11 simply as "Moses' own private oratory, where also he heard cases of dispute."[3] But this, of course, does not explain why it is called, when first spoken of, "*the* Tent," nor why it has the *same* name as P's, viz: "the Tent of Meeting," nor why, like P's, it is visited, not only by Moses, but by "everyone who sought Yahweh"; nor does it help us to get over the mass of other objections to the historicity of P's description.

The story in Numbers xvii about Aaron's rod budding alone among the rods of the chiefs of Israel is quoted in the 'Roman Catechism' as one of the Scriptural figures of the Virgin-Birth of Christ.[4] The use of human speech by Balaam's ass (Numb. xxii) was used by an old-time Jesuit professor at Mainz as an argument for believing that a thoroughly ignorant Pope might very well be infallible.[5] Balaam's prophecy about the star rising out of Jacob (Numb. xxiv. 17) has, since the second century, been regarded as a prophecy of Christ, and Newman as a Catholic clung to that interpretation, though (as modern criticism insists, and as Newman himself admitted) the prophecy was adequately fulfilled in the conquests of David.[6] Newman also quotes, like the author of 'Hebrews,' the words: "Let all the angels of God worship him," as referring to Christ. Now these words do not occur in the Hebrew of the Old Testament at all, nor in the Vulgate; they are found only in the Greek Septuagint version of Deut. xxxii. 43. The Greek here contains several clauses which are not in the Hebrew; but there is no ground

[1] See, for instance, above, p. 185.
[2] See the full array of arguments in Driver, *Exodus* ('Camb. Bible') 358 f, 426–432
[3] Bird in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 20 n.
[4] *Catech. Rom.* I. iv. 15.
[5] Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 276a.
[6] Newman, *Developm.* 150; Gray, *Numbers* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') 370 f.

for believing that they formed part of the original text, and in any case the poem of Deut. xxxii has no reference whatever to Christ; it deals entirely with the people of Israel and their foes.[1]

Critical opinion cannot at the moment be said to be unanimous in regard to the date of Deuteronomy. It was long held by nearly all critics that the book—or at least the legal code which forms the bulk of it—was identical with the law-book discovered in the Temple in 621 B.C. and made the basis of the energetic reforms of King Josiah (2 Kings xxii f). The central point of the legislation, as of the reform, was the abolition of the local places of sacrifice up and down Palestine and the concentration of all sacrificial worship in one sanctuary at the capital. The composition of the book was usually assigned to some date in the century prior to 621 B.C. Within the last few years other dates have been advocated, two scholars arguing for a much later date, and one for an earlier. It is, however, noteworthy that the latter makes no attempt to re-establish the Mosaic authorship of the book; and it is extremely doubtful whether his argument even for a date in the early monarchy will win acceptance. The probability is that the previously accepted critical date will remain in possession. The grounds for this date are extremely strong, but space forbids an enumeration of them here: they are set out by Dr. Driver with characteristic moderation and cogency, in his 'Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament' and in his 'Commentary.'[2] Catholicism, however, sets them all at defiance, and maintains the Mosaic authorship. Such arguments as are put forward for this view can all be met and abundantly counterbalanced by 'the critics.' Thus, Father Bird urges that King Hezekiah abolished the local 'high places' a hundred years before Josiah (2 Kings xviii. 4), and argues that, if Deuteronomy was the motive of Josiah's reform, it must have been the motive of Hezekiah's also.[3] In answer we do not need to deny the historicity of Hezekiah's reform, though it is clear from the subsequent story that it was speedily reversed by his successors, and it is likely enough that the account of it is exaggerated. The action of Hezekiah is explicable as due to the growth of the same conviction that the composition of Deuteronomy was due to, viz: that the high places were a source of idolatry and immorality, and had better be abolished in favour of the Temple at Jerusalem. Josiah's statement that the regulations of Deuteronomy were known to "our fathers" was simply his inference from the mistaken notion that the book was Mosaic. That it was not written in the time of Hezekiah or earlier is proved by the fact that the writing prophets of the eighth century—Amos, Hosea,

[1] Newman, *l.c.*
[2] Driver, *Intro.* 86–89, *Deut.* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') xxxiv–lxv.
[3] *Religion of the Scriptures*, 30 f.

and Isaiah—reveal no knowledge of its characteristic legislation and no indebtedness to its influence, and is amply confirmed by a number of other considerations.

This review of the Catholic treatment of the Pentateuch abundantly illustrates the utterly unsatisfactory conditions under which Catholic scholars have to study it, and the hopelessness of any really truthful reconstruction of the facts of the past as long as those conditions prevail. What could be more patent than the irreconcilable antagonism between scientific method and Catholic tradition? On the one hand, we see the profoundest deference to whatever 'the Church' has said; the inviolable traditions of Mosaic authorship, plenary Divine inspiration, and total inerrancy; the acceptance of the Vulgate version as reliable; the depreciation of the 'higher critics'; and a host of allegorical or typological interpretations totally alien to the natural meaning of the passages interpreted. On the other hand, behold the pitiful attempts to justify all this at the bar of human reason—the remarks that the Church has not made matters of authorship 'de fide,' that papal encyclicals and decisions of the Biblical Commission are not formally infallible, that Catholic scholars are quite 'free' in their investigations of Scripture, that only the 'bulk' of the Pentateuch need be regarded as Mosaic, that the early chapters of Genesis are metaphorical, that different parts of the Pentateuch are by different hands, that Moses' secretaries did much of the writing, that Moses embodied earlier documents, that his work was in later times interpolated but not so much as to prevent it still remaining substantially his, that the Tabernacle of E was a different building from that of P, and was only Moses' private oratory, and so on, and so on. What a mockery the whole thing is of candid and truth-loving research! If our human reason can be trusted to tell us as much as this, is it not deserving of trust when it tells us with much greater force that the whole idea of Mosaic authorship is erroneous, and that the Pentateuch is composed of documents written at intervals over a period of several centuries? Far better than this timid tinkering with the data, this lip-service to reason and scholarship by means of infinitesimal concessions, would be the frank defiance of reason altogether in the use of Scripture. The Catholic attitude to the Pentateuch would not be more acceptable to Protestants, but it would be far worthier of their respect, if it finally abandoned the hopeless task of trying to show that it is compatible with historical evidence and with common sense.

A few scattered allusions to other parts of the Old Testament will serve but to confirm the impression hitherto formed. The 'Roman Catechism' represents Naaman's sevenfold bathe in the Jordan (2 Kings v. 14) as pre-figuring Christian baptism.[1] Gregorius the Great

[1] *Catech. Rom.* II. ii. 8.

wrote a Commentary on the Book of Job in thirty-five books (commenced before his elevation to the papacy): he allegorized the whole book as an account of the Christian Church and its Sacraments and a condemnation of heresy. Whatever other value it may possess, it is totally valueless for the purpose of understanding the meaning of the Hebrew author.[1] In Job xli. 34 the poet terminates his magnificent description of the crocodile with the words: "He is king over all the sons of pride." The 'Roman Catechism' says plainly that it is the devil who is here described.[2] The Council of Trent named "the Davidic Psalter of 150 Psalms" among the canonical books of Scripture[3]; and the 'Roman Catechism' repeatedly and explicitly specifies David as the author of passages quoted from the Psalms.[4] As Newman, however, rightly observed, the Church is not committed to the belief that David was the actual author of them all,[5] and prominent Catholics have not hesitated to suggest different names,[6] though it has to be observed that it was the higher criticism of Protestant scholars that first really proved how few of the Psalms can actually have been David's work.[7] Modern as well as ancient Catholic exegesis, however, strays as far from the actual meaning of the Psalms as it does from the actual meaning of the Pentateuch. St. Bonaventura, followed by St. Alphonso dei Liguori, regarded a large number of the passages addressed to God in the Psalter as addressed to the Virgin.[8] 'The Catholic Encyclopedia' quotes as prophecies of the Christian Church Psalm ii. 7–12, xxii. 27f, lxxii, cx. 4, and cxvii. 1, and, as a prophecy of the Christian priesthood, Psalm xlv. 16: "Thou shalt make them princes over all the earth."[9] In Psalm xl. 6, the original Hebrew reads: "Ears hast Thou digged for me," perhaps referring to God 'opening' the Psalmist's ears. The Septuagint, followed by the author of 'Hebrews,' rendered the words: "A body hast Thou prepared for me"—a phrase unintelligible in the context and resting probably on an early error in the Greek text. In 'Hebrews' (x.5) the words of the Septuagint are taken to refer to the crucified

[1] Milman, *Latin Christianity*, ii. 107–109; Salmon, *Infall.* 166.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* IV. xiv. 10.

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv, can. script. (Mirbt 291 [50 f]).

[4] Cf. e.g. *Catech. Rom.* I. v. 6 (". . . ut Davidem omittamus, qui omnia praecipua redemptionis nostrae mysteria in psalmis complexus est, . . .").

[5] *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 195 f.

[6] Briggs, *Psalms* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') i. lvi f. Newman (*loc. cit.* 196 f) mentions that many Catholics had denied that Psalm xc was the work of Moses.

[7] Father Bird's recently published *Commentary on the Psalms* (Burns, Oates) attributes 60 or 70 psalms to David, and less than ten to the Exile or later, but describes the dates of many others as uncertain. For the view that Jesus' own supreme authority can be quoted for the Davidic authorship of Psalm cx, see above, pp. 212–217.

[8] Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 170.

[9] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 745ab. I have adjusted the numeration of the chapters and verses to the English system.

body of Jesus. Newman remarks: "Nor do we find a difficulty, when St. Paul appeals to a text of the Old Testament, which stands otherwise in our Hebrew copies; as the words, 'A body hast Thou prepared Me.' We receive such difficulties on faith, and leave them to take care of themselves."[1] Many instances of the misuse of the Psalter occur through the habit of quoting the Vulgate version as if it were authoritative. Thus, in Psalm lxiv. 6, in a passage in which the Psalmist is complaining of the subtlety and cunning of his opponents, there occur three words which are translated in the Revised Version: "We have accomplished, *say they*, a diligent search." The Septuagint, followed by the Vulgate, introduced the idea of failure—ἐξέλιπον ἐξερευνῶντες ἐξερευνήσει, "defecerunt scrutantes scrutinio." The passage is, indeed, somewhat obscure; but the idea of failure is quite foreign to the immediate context, and its introduction almost certainly erroneous. Nevertheless, the passage was quoted by Innocentius III as illustrating the great difficulty of fully understanding the meaning of Scripture.[2] Again, in Psalm xcix. 5, we have the quite simple and intelligible words: "Worship at His footstool, (for) He is holy," and in Psalm cl.1: "Praise God in His sanctuary," or "for His holiness." In the Vulgate, these become respectively: "Adorate scabellum pedum Ejus," and "Laudate Dominum in sanctis Ejus." These two Latin mistranslations are quoted by Newman, after a series of quotations from the *English* Authorized Version for other purposes, as supporting the Catholic custom of paying honour to animate and inanimate creatures. In the more accurate English version, these two passages would, of course, give no support whatever to his fanciful exegesis.[3] In the 'Roman Catechism,' parts of Psalms lxix. 4 and cx. 4 are quoted as the words of *Christ*.[4]

The Song of Songs, a collection of Hebrew love-lyrics, has lent itself to some extraordinary uses. iv. 7 ("Thou art all fair, my love, and there is no spot in thee") is used in modern Catholic books to prove the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary.[5] vi. 9 ("My dove, my undefiled, is but one," etc.) was—in imitation of Cyprianus—quoted by Bonifatius VIII, in his famous bull 'Unam Sanctam' (1302), as proving the necessary oneness of the Church, outside which there is no salvation:[6] and this interpretation is also suggested in a footnote

[1] Newman, *Developm.* 150.

[2] See above, p. 260.

[3] Newman, *Developm.* 112: cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 216.

[4] *Catech. Rom.* IV. xiv. 24 ("Hujus generis debitum fuit, quod Christus Dominus locutus est ore Prophetae: Quae non rapui, tunc exsolvebam"), II. iv. 81 ("ipse enim Salvator sacerdotem secundum ordinem Melchisedech se in aeternum constitutum declarans"). This misuse of Ps. cx cannot be explained by reference to Mk. xii. 36 and parallels, since both *Catech. Rom.* and *Conc. Trid.* (sess. xxii, cap. 1 [Mirbt 322 (30)] represent Jesus as making this declaration at *the Last Supper*.

[5] Salmon, *Infall.* 158.

[6] Mirbt 210 (21).

to the passage in the nineteenth-century editions of the Douay Bible.[1]

Catholic exegesis of the Prophetical Books is chiefly characterized by an excessive desire to discover in them allusions to Christ and the Church. Here Catholics have, of course, the support of the compiler of the Gospel of 'Matthew' and other early Christian writers: but all modern critics, including even High Anglicans, recognize that, from the point of view of historical truth, this use of the Old Testament is a misinterpretation of its meaning. Thus, Isaiah vii. 14 ("the young woman has conceived, and will bear a son, and will call his name 'God-with-us' ") tells of a sign that was to be given to King Ahaz (about 735 B.C.) to assure him of speedy relief from the troubles of hostile invasion. It contains no allusion to a virgin-birth, nor does the child's name mean that he will be Divine, but only that his birth will synchronize with a new assurance of the Divine presence through a national deliverance. If the words had reference to an event destined not to occur for another seven centuries, what interest could the sign have had for the afflicted king and his subjects? The Greek-speaking Jews of Egypt, however, translated the Hebrew word meaning 'young woman' by the Greek word παρθένος, meaning 'virgin.' Their reasons for this mistranslation are not clear: probably they assumed that a God-given sign must have had something miraculous about it. However that may be, the passage—in its Greek form—came to be regarded by the early Christians (Mt. i. 22 f) as a prophecy of the Virgin-Birth of Jesus. In view of the wide acceptance of this interpretation among Christians of all periods and schools, it is not to be wondered at that modern Catholics should accept it.[2] The same, of course, applies to Hosea xi. 1 ("I called my son out of Egypt"), which quite obviously refers to the Exodus of the people of Israel under Moses, but which—inasmuch as it refers to God's 'Son'—was taken by some early Christians (Mt. ii. 15) to allude to an incident in Jesus' infancy, and is so understood by Catholics generally.[3] The Messianic interpretation of such passages is held neither to exclude the truth of the historical meaning, nor to imply that the Old-Testament author was necessarily conscious of any but the historical meaning. But enormous and arbitrary prior assumptions are needed to make credible what runs so counter to all *verifiable* religious experience. Despite the sanction which this figurative exegesis derives from certain books in the New Testament, modern criticism has no option but to

[1] For types of the Virgin in Canticles, see Maas in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 464 DE.

[2] Newman, *Developm.* 150; Maas in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 464B f. For the exegesis of the passage in question, see G. B. Gray in *Expos.* Apl. 1911, 289–308 and *Isaiah* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') 122–136.

[3] Newman, *l.c.*, and in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 193; footnote to Douay version (edns. 1837 and 1874).

draw attention to the unscientific mentality which conditioned its rise, the patent discrepancy between the real and assumed meanings of the passages concerned, and therewith the historical baselessness of the whole method. It is, perhaps, needless to add that this deference to historical truth casts no slur on the sincerity of those who have thought differently, and, as really a deference to the God of truth, can necessitate no diminution in the religious value of the Old-Testament Scriptures.

Again, 'The Catholic Encyclopedia' sees prophecies of the sacerdotal Catholic Church in Isaiah ii. 2–4 (=Micah iv. 1 ff), ix. 6 f, xxxv. 8, lii. 1, lxvi. 18, Jeremiah xviii. 6 (? a mistake for xxiii. 4), xxxi. 31, 34, xxxiii. 20, Ezekiel xxxiv. 23, xxxvii. 24–28, Zechariah viii. 3, ix. 10, xiv. 8, Malachi i. 11.[1] The principle seems to be that every prophetical passage expressing the Jewish apocalyptic hope of a glorious future for Israel is really a prophecy of the Christian Church. It is, indeed, open to us to argue that the Christian Church became in history the answer to that longing for a better time of which the Jewish apocalyptic is an expression, and indeed that God foresaw that it would be so; just as we may argue that our suffering Redeemer was the great exemplification in history of the sublime vision in Isaiah liii. But this is a very different thing from saying that these long-subsequent realizations are the 'meaning' of the passage in question. To speak of them as such opens the door to endless fancifulness. Thus, the 'Roman Catechism' finds a figure of the Virgin-Birth of Jesus in the door of the sanctuary which Ezekiel (xliv. 2) saw closed.[2] The Council of Trent interprets Malachi's allusion (i. 11) to a "pure offering" with reference to the sacrifice of the Mass.[3] Occasionally, as before, a mistranslation of the Vulgate is cheerfully accepted as providing the true interpretation of a passage. For instance, in Isaiah xii. 3, it is written: "Ye shall draw water with joy out of the fountains of salvation"—a metaphorical allusion in the Hebrew manner to Israel's joy in the acceptance of God's favours. The Hebrew text is clear and, being confirmed by the Septuagint, virtually certain. In the Vulgate, however, it becomes—quite wrongly: "Ye shall draw waters with joy out of the *Saviour's* fountains," and can thus serve as an allusion to the Christian Sacraments[4]

Not only the pious beliefs, but the hierarchical claims, of the Church are supported by the same methods of interpretation. Thus the words in which Jeremiah received his prophetic commission (Jerem. i. 10): "See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms,

[1] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 745ab. Dr. Faà di Bruno (*Cath. Belief*, 228) says that Isa. lx. 18 also refers to the Church.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* I. iv. 15. [3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxii, cap. 1 (Mirbt 322 f).

[4] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 55.

to pluck up and to break down, to destroy and to overthrow, to build and to plant," were applied by Innocentius III to his own authority as Pope.[1] In a similar way, Isaiah lix. 21 was quoted in the Preface to the Vatican Decrees (1870) in support of the doctrine of ecclesiastical infallibility.[2]

The changes demanded by higher-critical study in the traditional views regarding the authorship and dates of the prophetical writings, though far-reaching, have not been quite so revolutionary as in the case of the Pentateuch, where large parts of the narrative have had to be relegated to the realm of the unhistorical. Hence, it is not uncommon to find Catholics admitting, with various provisos, some of the more indubitable results of the higher criticism of the prophets. But the concessions fall very far short of what historical truth requires, especially in cases where the Biblical Commission has spoken, as the first example to be cited will show.

One of the conclusions on which all higher critics are agreed is that chapters xl-lxvi of the Book of Isaiah contain no writings by Isaiah himself, but were written at least a century and a half after his time—during the Exile and shortly after the Return—by a person or persons whose names are not known to us. The grounds for this view may be conveniently summarized in the words of a Catholic scholar: "With the exception of one or two passages, the point of view throughout this section is that of the Babylonian Captivity; there is an unmistakable difference between the style of these twenty-seven chapters and that of the 'First Isaias'; moreover, the theological ideas of xl–lxvi show a decided advance on those found in the first thirty-nine chapters. If this be true, does it not follow that xl–lxvi are not by the same author as the prophecies of the first collection, and may there not be good grounds for attributing the authorship of these chapters to a 'second Isaias' living towards the close of the Babylonian Captivity? Such is the contention of most of the modern non-Catholic scholars."[3] The only ground for hesitating to draw this quite inevitable conclusion as to authorship is the fact that chs. xl–lxvi have, as a matter of fact, come down to us as part of a book bearing Isaiah's name. But to suppose that at some period a collection of anonymous prophecies got attached to a collection of Isaiah's writings, in such a way as to lead later on to the mistaken notion that they too formed part of Isaiah's book, is not a very far-fetched or extravagant supposition for the modern student to be asked to make, particularly when we bear in mind that about 300 B.C. these wandering chapters, in whole or in part, passed, in certain circles, under the name

[1] Salmon, *Infall.* 461.
[2] Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 265a: cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 17.
[3] Souvay in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 182b.

of *Jeremiah*.[1] So forcible in fact is the argument against the unity of authorship of the Book of Isaiah, that in 1884 Newman observed that it did not matter whether one or two Isaiahs wrote the book, provided it were believed that both of them were inspired.[2] Nevertheless, the book is officially entitled Isaiah's; therefore Isaiah's it must and shall remain. Vigouroux's 'Dictionnaire de la Bible' (at the beginning of this century) defends the traditional view; and in 1908 the Pope's Biblical Commission made a pronouncement to the same effect. Its substance has been thus summarized and interpreted: "(1) Admitting the existence of true prophecy; (2) There is no reason why 'Isaias and the other Prophets should utter prophecies concerning only those things which were about to take place immediately or after a short space of time' and not 'things that should be fulfilled after many ages.' (3) Nor does anything postulate that the Prophets should 'always address as their hearers, not those who belonged to the future, but only those who were present and contemporary, so that they could be understood by them.' Therefore it cannot be asserted that 'the second part of the Book of Isaias (xl–lxvi), in which the Prophet addresses as one living amongst them, not the Jews who were the contemporaries of Isaias, but the Jews mourning in the Exile of Babylon, cannot have for its author Isaias himself, who was dead long before, but must be attributed to some unknown Prophet living among the exiles.' In other words, although the author of Isaias xl–lxvi does speak from the point of view of the Babylonian Captivity, yet this is *no proof* that he *must* have lived and written in those times. (4) 'The philological argument from language and style against the identity of the author . . . is *not* to be considered weighty enough to compel a man of judgment, familiar with Hebrew and criticism, to acknowledge in the same book a plurality of authors'. Differences of language and style between the parts of the book are neither denied nor underrated; it is asserted only that such as they appear, they do not compel one to admit the plurality of authors. (5) 'There are no solid arguments to the fore,[3] even taken cumulatively, to prove that the book of Isaias is to be attributed not to Isaias himself, but to two or rather to many, authors.' "[4] Father Lattey observes that the Commission simply keeps the question open, and that it merely denies that the critics' arguments are absolutely final: "it is very careful," he says, "in what it lays down, and does not positively oblige us to contradict the internal evidence."[5] But if any Catholic *does* follow the internal evidence, and

[1] Detailed proof of this, based on 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22, is given by G B. Gray, *Isaiah* ('Intern. Crit. Comm'.) xxxii f, xxxvii–xxxix.

[2] *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 196.

[3] "To the fore": ? a printer's slip for "therefore."

[4] Souvay in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 182 f.

[5] Lattey, *First Notions*, 104 f.

infer a plurality, or at least a duality, of authors, he will do so on the ground that the linguistic, historical, and exegetical arguments for such a belief are cogent. As their cogency is precisely what the Commission authoritatively denies, it is hard to see in what way the Commission "does not positively oblige us to contradict the internal evidence."

Another case in which higher critics have done yeoman service in making historical truth clearer to us is that of the Book of Daniel. On the basis of a large number of independent and exceedingly strong arguments, they have shown that the book is not a history written, in part at least by Daniel himself, during the sixth century B.C., but a largely fictitious story, abounding—not merely in startling miracles—but also in palpable historical errors, coupled with a set of pseudonymous apocalyptic oracles composed about 165 B.C. for the purpose of heartening the Jews against the tyrannical persecution of Antiochus Epiphanes, King of Syria.[1] Critics do not deny that a man named Daniel existed, or that a kernel of historical truth may have formed the nucleus for the story-part of the book; but the late date of the book and the fictitious character of the bulk of its narratives very largely hang together, and depend on much the same arguments. Catholics are forbidden to admit that there are any errors in the Bible; and they are therefore bound, not only to maintain the historical character of the story,[2] but to deny its very patent historical blunders. They are, however, free (for the present) to form their own opinions as to its *date*; hence a few, very cautiously, accept the manifestly correct Maccabaean date. Newman, for instance. was prepared to surrender the theory that Daniel himself wrote the book, his authorship not being necessary to its inspiration.[3] The late date has been accepted by other Catholics since his time.[4] Dr. Gigot, for instance, writing in 'The Catholic Encyclopedia,' might almost be said to plead for the critical view in that matter, though he observes: "Despite the fact that some of these arguments against the Danielic authorship have not yet been fully disproved, Catholic scholars generally abide by the traditional

[1] It is impossible to summarize the critical arguments here: they may be seen in Driver's *Introduction*, 497–515, and the same author's commentary on Daniel in the 'Cambridge Bible,' xlvii–lxxvi. Cf. Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, iii (1909) 263–267. A lucid exposure of the inaccuracy of the book as regards Belshazzar is given by Rev. H. H. Rowley in *Expos.* Sept. 1924, 182–195, and Oct. 1924, 255–272.

[2] Note, however, the cautious language of Gigot (*Cath. Encyc.* iv [1908] 624a): "*rationalistic* critics are decidedly wrong in denying *totally* the historical character of the Book of Daniel" (italics mine).

[3] *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 195 f. It is, of course, particularly difficult to maintain that the long additions to the book found in the Greek version of it (which contain the story of Susanna, etc.) and included in the Vulgate, can have come from Daniel's pen.

[4] Cf. 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 859.

view, although they are not bound to it by any decision of the Church."[1] As regards the apocryphal additions found only in the Greek version of the book, Dr. Gigot admits that these "seem to contain anachronisms."[2] Another Catholic scholar, Lagrange, agrees with the critical view that there is an error in the chronology of Dan. ix. 24–27, 434 years being allotted to an interval consisting of 367 only, viz: 538–171 B.C.[3] Father Lattey, after noting the unanimous non-Catholic view of Daniel as belonging to the class of pseudonymous apocalyptic works, says: "not a few Catholic writers do not, to say the least, oppose an unqualified denial to the hypothesis. . . . Taking the question entirely in the abstract, could a work of this sort have found its way into the canon? . . . it does not appear safe to return a negative answer to this question. . . . .With regard to the question of the Book of Daniel in the concrete, however, this newer exposition is a drastic re-adjustment (if the word be strong enough) of the traditional standpoint, too revolutionary to be regarded with anything but disfavour. It does not appear to be clearly and absolutely opposed to the Catholic faith as such; that is the most that can be said for it, and we may leave it at that."[4] To leave it at that means, of course, to abandon the attempt to reconstruct truthful history, so far as it has to do with the composition and contents of this book. That fact of itself—the data being what they are—is a sufficient condemnation of the standpoint which necessitates it. But we would ask two further questions: how is the admission of 'anachronisms' and of at least one error in chronology in Daniel to be harmonized with the inerrancy of the Scriptures? and, what will become of the arguments for the Maccabaean date, which are so strong as to convince some at least of the best Catholic scholars, if and when the Biblical Commission pronounces them to be devoid of cogency?

The real prophet Jonah flourished in the first half of the eighth century B.C. (2 Kings xiv. 25); but the book that bears his name cannot, on linguistic grounds, be dated before about 500 B.C.[5] The author's aim was to impress upon his narrowly patriotic fellow-countrymen that their God had a loving concern for Gentiles as well as for Jews, for sinners as well as for saints, and for animals as well as for men. The narrative by means of which he does this belongs undoubtedly to that large and well-recognized division of Jewish narrative-literature, viz:

[1] *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 624 f; cf. 623ab,624a (conservative arguments).

[2] *Op. cit.* 626a.

[3] Lagrange in *Revue Biblique*, 1904, 512 f (he explains at length why such an error is not incompatible with inspiration, concluding: "La chronologie du passé n'est plus alors qu'une question purement scientifique sur laquelle l'auteur n'affirme absolument rien de son cru au nom de l'autorité divine"): cf. Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, iii (1909) 267.

[4] Lattey, *First Notions*, 87 f.

[5] Dr. Driscoll (*Cath. Encyc.* viii [1910] 498b) raises no objection to this date.

Midrash, or edifying fiction. That it is not a fact-narrative appears, not only from the staggering miracle of the fish, but also from (1) the statement that Jonah composed a psalm (Jonah ii. 2–9) in the fish's belly, (2) the unfitness of this psalm to Jonah's supposed situation, (3) the omission to *name* the King of Assyria,[1] (4) the designation of him by the inaccurate title, "King of Nineveh," (5) the total absence of any trace —on the monuments or elsewhere—either of Jonah's epoch-making visit to Nineveh or of the profound religious change he is said to have effected in the city's life.[2] It is a purely arbitrary assumption to suppose that a piece of ancient narrative, simply because it occurs in the Bible and (unlike the parables spoken by Jotham, Nathan, our Lord, and others) happens there to fill a complete book, instead of only a chapter or part of a chapter, *must* be a fact-narrative. Certainly the acceptance of it as a fact-narrative by late Jewish writers and by the Christian Fathers[3] does not warrant us in accepting it as such ourselves.

The trump-card, however, of the Catholic apologist in this case consists of the allusions to Jonah in the Gospels. In Mt. xii. 38–42 (cf. xvi. 1–4) = Lk. xi. 29–32, our Lord speaks of "the sign of Jonah." He alludes to the men of Nineveh and the Queen of Sheba as furnishing grave and instructive contrasts to His own morally insensitive and unresponsive hearers. In particular, stress is laid by traditionalists on the words of Mt. xii. 40: "For as Jonah was in the whale's belly three days and three nights, so will the Son of Man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights." Catholics insist that by these words Jesus casts the aegis of His own infallible omniscience over the historical truth of the story about the fish. "If, then," it is argued, "the stay of Jonas in the belly of the fish be only a fiction, the stay of Christ's body in the heart of the earth is only a fiction. If the men of Nineve will really not rise in judgment, neither will the Jews rise. Christ contrasts fact with fact, not fancy with fancy nor fancy with fact. It would be very strange, indeed, were He to say that He was greater than a merely fancy-formed man," and so on.[4] In reply, we urge firstly that our Lord in all probability never spoke the words ascribed to Him in Mt. xii. 40. For (1) they rest on the unsupported testimony of 'Matthew,' whose passion for adducing parallels between the Jewish Scriptures and Jesus' life is well-attested by other passages;[5]

[1] Dr. Driscoll answers (*ibid.*) that this and other omissions merely prove that the book does not conform to the habits of *modern* historians. But do not *ancient* historians also usually give the names of monarchs that figure prominently in their narratives?

[2] The best that can be done in this matter is to urge that the reigns of Ashur-dan (772–754 B.C.) and Ashur-nirari (754–745 B.C.) were periods of national disaster to Assyria (Driscoll, *ibid.*; cf. *Camb. Ancient Hist.* iii. 30 f).

[3] So Driscoll, *ibid.* 498ab.

[4] Driscoll, *ibid.* 498a: he presses also the analogy of the allusion to the historically real Queen of Sheba.

[5] See above, pp. 209–212.

(2) in the Lucan version, their place is taken by the far more probable words: "For as Jonah became a sign to the Ninevites, so will the Son of Man be to this generation" (Lk. xi. 30)—words which, unlike Mt. xii. 40, harmonize with the immediate context, and do not introduce a second and extraneous version of 'the sign'; (3) had Jesus really spoken as Mt. xii. 40 reports, it would have been impossible for His hearers, whatever their goodwill, to understand Him; and it was not His custom to be unintelligible except to the thoughtless and unsympathetic; (4) according to the Gospels, Jesus was not in the heart of the earth "three days and three nights," but only from Friday afternoon to Sunday morning, i.e. *two* nights, one whole day, and parts of two other days: so that if, in accordance with 'Providentissimus,' the historicity of Mt. xii. 40 is to be maintained, then, according to 'Matthew,' Jesus must have uttered an inaccurate prediction. This verse, then, as a saying of Jesus, is decidedly ungenuine, and cannot be appealed to as committing Him to a belief in the fish-miracle. Nevertheless, it is to be admitted that He did allude to the story of Jonah's mission to Nineveh as if it were a story of real fact, and that He probably did regard it as real fact. Whether that of itself should convince us that the story *is* one of real fact is a question which we have already discussed and given reasons for answering in the negative.[1] This answer is, of course, anathema to Catholics[2]; and the grounds for it cannot be repeated here. One may remark only, that to ascribe to Jesus infallibility and omniscience in regard to events of past history and literature is an entirely arbitrary proceeding, which finds no real support in the records of His life and teaching. The critical case as regards the Book of Jonah is overwhelmingly strong: and although the vast majority of Catholics refuse to accept it, yet "in the works of some recent Catholic scholars there is a leaning to regard the book as fiction."[3]

The Council of Trent (following up a prior decree of the Council of Florence, 1439) pronounced an anathema against any who should not receive as canonical the Council's list of the books of Scripture. That list included, besides the books of the Hebrew Canon (i.e. our Old Testament), the following books, which are classed together by Protestants as 'the Apocrypha':—Tobit, Judith, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, Baruch, 1 and 2 Maccabees. (Certain additional chapters of the Books of Esther and Daniel, by virtue of their inclusion in the Vulgate, were also covered by the canonical list). That is to say, the full canonicity of these writings is a 'de fide' dogma of the Church,[4] and, as such, is held to have been part of the belief of the Church ever since its inception

[1] See above, pp 212–217.

[2] Cf. Driscoll, *ibid.* 498ab.

[3] Driscoll in *Cath Encyc.* viii (1910) 498a. Cf. 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 859 f.

[4] See above, pp. 270 f.

in the time of the Apostles.[1] This, however, is at variance with historical facts. It is quite true that the Apocryphal books were widely read and often quoted as if possessing scriptural or quasi-scriptural authority: but it is also true that, prior to the Council of Trent, the great majority of Christian writers who deal with the matter at all recognize a very real distinction between the full canonicity of the Hebrew Old Testament and the subordinate rank of the Apocrypha, and several Fathers of great eminence definitely exclude the latter from the Church's Canon. How can it be said that the full canonicity of the Apocryphal books was part of the primitive faith of the Church, when they are all (with the possible exception of Wisdom) absent from Melito's list of Old-Testament books (about 175 A.D.), and all (with the doubtful exception of Maccabees) absent from a list given by Origenes (about 225 A.D.),[2] when the number of Old-Testament books is normally given as twenty-two (thus excluding the Apocryphal books), when Athanasius explicitly characterized the bulk of the latter as not canonical (though suitable for perusal by catechumens), when Rufinus and even the learned Hieronymus himself definitely declared them to be uncanonical (though suitable for reading in church), when Gregorius of Nazianzus and Amphilochius omitted them, and when mediaeval Catholics like Hugo of St. Victor, Peter of Clugny, Nicolaus of Lyra, and above all the great Cardinal Ximenes (as well as Eastern scholars like Metrophanes Critopulos and Cyril Lucar) regarded them as outside the Canon?[3] The explanation offered is this: "The Church as a whole received them, though individual Fathers of great name rejected them."[4] But if their full canonicity had been authorized by the Apostles, and had been a part of the Church's faith since the Apostolic age, how came so many "Fathers of great name" to contradict it; and, if they *were* contradicting it, why did not the infallible papacy correct them till the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries?

However that may be, Catholics are bound to believe in the canonicity, plenary inspiration, and inerrancy of all these additional books. This does not apparently imply, in the absence of a papal definition, that the Book of Wisdom, though called 'The Wisdom of Solomon' and written in Solomon's name, must be believed to be that king's work; and the Douay Bible, at least as early as 1837, definitely says that "it is uncertain

[1] See above, pp. 27 f, 36 f. Cf. *Cath. Dict.* 110b ("It can . . . be proved from tradition, that the full list of Old Testament books (including Wisdom, Machabees, &c.) was authorized by the Apostles"); Gigot in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 626b ("there cannot be the least doubt that in decreeing the sacred and canonical character of these fragments" [apocryphal additions to Daniel], "the Council of Trent proclaimed the ancient and *morally unanimous* belief of the Church of God." Italics mine).

[2] Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* IV. xxvi. 14, VI. xxv. 1 f. Yet Origenes argued against Julius Africanus for the acceptance of the story of Susanna (addition to Daniel).

[3] Porter in H.*D.B.* i (1898) 120–122 (where full references are given); *Cath. Dict.* 110b.

[4] *Cath. Dict.* 111a.

who was the writer."[1] But it does mean that the narrative books have to be regarded as inspired records of fact. Yet several of them are unquestionably of the nature of edifying fiction.

The Book of Judith, for instance, bristles with anachronisms. There is no known period of history into which its narrative can be satisfactorily fitted. The story is laid in the times of Nebuchadnezzar, who is with glaring inaccuracy described as being king of the Assyrians in Nineveh (i. 1). To make matters worse, it also falls in the times when the Jews had recently returned to Judaea and Jerusalem from their captivity (iv. 3, v. 18 f): moreover, the general of the Assyrian army and his eunuch bear *Persian* names.[2] It is, of course, impossible to prove that no real incident lies behind the story: but, as a whole, the book is unquestionably fictitious, and the most reasonable supposition as to its origin is that it was composed during the Maccabaean Wars (about 160 B.C.) with a view to heartening the people against the national foe. Yet—"Catholics with very few exceptions accept the Book of Judith as a narrative of facts."[3] They do, indeed, make the attempt to meet some at least of the critical objections. Newman conceded that the description of Nebuchadnezzar as King of Nineveh, being a mere 'obiter dictum,' might be regarded by Catholics as erroneous[4]—a view which 'Providentissimus' by implication clearly forbade in 1893.[5] Vigouroux's 'Dictionnaire de la Bible' (1903) raised no objection to dating the book in the Maccabaean period—a date which is clearly hard to reconcile with its historical trustworthiness. Efforts have been made to get over the historical difficulties by identifying Nebuchadnezzar with Ashurbanipal (669–626 B.C.) and by equating the captivity and restoration to which the book refers, not with the well-known events of the sixth century B.C., but with the captivity and restoration of Manasseh, King of Judah. 2 Chron. xxxiii. 11–13, however, does not tell us that anyone was taken captive and restored except the king himself. Moreover, in Judith, the Jews are under highpriestly, not royal, government (iv. 6, v. 3). Much use is made in the Catholic argument of uncertainties in the text. The book was originally written in Hebrew; but only the Greek version and other translations made from that are extant. These naturally leave much room for conjecture as to the accidental alteration of proper names, etc. The hope has even been expressed

[1] Cf. Newman in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 197 (he assumes the same freedom of judgment in the case of the canonical book Ecclesiastes); Lattey, *First Notions*, 84 f.

[2] Cf. also the allusions to the Persians in ii. 7 and xvi. 10. Dr. Hugh Pope (in *Cath. Encyc.* viii [1910] 554 f) enumerates thirteen serious difficulties in the way of regarding the book as historical.

[3] Pope in *op. cit.* 554b. Cf. Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, iii (1909) 232, 234, 237; Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 328.

[4] *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 197–199.

[5] Cf. Lattey in *The Bible*, etc. 152.

that the discovery of a short version of the story in Hebrew, in which Holofernes and Bethulia disappear, Jerusalem is the city besieged, and the arch-enemy is not an Assyrian, but Seleucus, may put us in possession of the original form of the story and thus solve many of the difficulties.[1] Unhappily, none of these suggestions will suffice. In regard to the last-named—a number of Hebrew versions of the story are known; but "None of these is in any sense a translation of the Greek, still less the original form of the book. They are free sketches of a well-known story, set down from memory, . . . in more or less detail according to the taste of the writer. They are usually short, and of no great antiquity."[2] Besides, let us suppose that we could accept the theory that a brief Hebrew narrative, devoid of historical impossibilities, were the original book, and that the divergences of the Greek and Vulgate Latin versions could be treated as textual corruptions introduced by the ignorance of translators and copyists. Even so, we should not be out of the wood. For how could the very drastic textual expurgations so necessitated be acquitted of the charge of disobedience to the Council of Trent, which anathematizes anyone who "does not receive as sacred and canonical the books themselves entire with all their parts, as they have been wont to be read in the Catholic Church, and as they stand in the ancient Vulgate Latin edition"?[3]

The Second Book of Maccabees (which is professedly an epitome of a larger work by Jason of Cyrene) is regarded by nearly all competent investigators as of considerable historical value: but its narrative is at many points at variance with that of the equally inspired First Book of Maccabees. The discrepancies prove that both books cannot be equally accurate; and the prevalent opinion is that of the two the Second is the less reliable, and that it undoubtedly contains a certain number of unhistorical statements.[4] Here however is the modern Catholic judgment upon it: . . . "the Fourth Gospel and II. Maccabees are equally inspired. But you may ask what does inspiration in the case of II. Maccabees really come to? It is only an abridgment of the five books of Jason. . . . To this we answer it was God who wrote II. Maccabees, using the material of Jason's book, hence God reaffirmed his statements and made them His own by His selection and endorsement and embodiment in His book, thus becoming truly author of them as they stand in II. Maccabees."[5]

[1] Pope in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 555b. The suggestion about Manasseh also occurs in a note prefixed to the Book of Judith in the Douay Bible (edns. 1837, 1874).

[2] A. E. Cowley in Charles, *Apocr. and Pseudepigr.* i. 247.

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv, can. script. (Mirbt 292 [7]).

[4] Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, iii (1909) 482–485.

[5] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 9 f. Similarly Lattey, *First Notions*, 18, 21.

CHAPTER XV

CATHOLICISM AND THE GOSPELS.

It is my purpose in this and the following chapters to institute as fair a comparison as possible between the historical facts attested or implied by the Gospels with regard to the circumstances and events of our Lord's earthly life, and that dense tissue of pious fancies which Catholicism has woven round them. It is at no time a congenial task to belittle the objects of other people's veneration: but when other people throw us on the defensive for not thinking and worshipping precisely as they do, it becomes our duty to accept their challenge and to set forth our case. Truth, whose claims are supreme, demands of us that we state clearly our historical, as well as our philosophical, objections to admitting Rome's insistent claims, though we shall remember in doing so the sanctity of what we touch.

> Sacred be the flesh and blood
> To which she links a truth divine.

We shall not confine ourselves to exhibiting the incongruity between Catholic beliefs and the statements of Scripture as these latter stand, but shall point out the still greater incongruity between Catholic beliefs and the more precise historical truth as criticism enables us to discern it behind those statements.

Although the Old Testament is an integral part of the Holy Scriptures accepted by the Church as inspired, yet it is not so nearly related to the central themes of the Christian faith as is the New Testament. Moreover, it was on the field of Old-Testament study that higher criticism first challenged the mind of Christendom; and so cogent were its reasonings and so clear and helpful its broad conclusions, that—when the first outbursts of opposition had spent themselves[1]—its triumph was speedily established far and wide, uninstructed Protestant Fundamentalism and unbending Catholic dogmatism alone refusing to submit. Even so, the Catholic opposition has maintained itself only with difficulty, as is clear from the various small concessions that have been offered from time to time in response to the pressing demands of scientific research.[2] Opposition to criticism—both within and without the Roman

[1] Heiler truly observes that all Christian bodies vigorously opposed the first champions of biblical criticism (*Kathol.* XXVIII note).

[2] See above, pp. 289–292.

Church—is however immensely strengthened when the field of operations is shifted from the Old Testament to the New. "O.-T. criticism," writes a Catholic scholar, "has been developed along the lines of linguistic and historic research. Philosophico-religious prejudices have been kept in the background. But in respect to the N.T., criticism began as the outgrowth of philosophic speculations of a distinctly anti-Christian character and, as exercised by rationalists and liberal Protestants, has not yet freed itself from the sway of such a priori principles, though it has tended to grow more positive—that is, more genuinely critical—in its methods . . . Catholic scholars who were willing to accept some of the critical theories have drawn a line of distinction between the criticism of the Old and that of the New Testament, not only because of the greater delicacy of the latter field, but because they recognize that the documents of the Old and New Dispensations were produced under quite different conditions." [1]

This is not the place to fight over again the battle of higher criticism: our 'contentio veritatis' has already occupied many of the preceding pages. It must however be observed that to admit critical principles, methods, and conclusions in one field, and to repudiate them in another, is an absolutely untenable position. Neither the scepticism of the earliest New-Testament critics, nor the greater sensitiveness naturally felt by Christians in regard to the subject-matter of the New Testament, nor even the different conditions under which the two sets of documents were produced, justifies us in drawing such a distinction. Despite all differences of theme, style, and provenance, the laws of literary and historical probability which hold good for the study of the Old Testament hold good also for the study of the New. Free critical examination of historical documents is an absolute necessity as a condition of ascertaining the facts with which they profess to deal; and this principle applies to the New Testament quite as much as it does to the Old. Its applicability is not disproved either by the transcendence of the topics with which the New Testament deals,[2] or by the numerous disagreements of critics on various concrete points,[3] or even by the seeming heterodoxy of certain widely accepted conclusions.[4]

[1] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 492b, 497a.

[2] See above, pp. 221 f.

[3] See above, pp. 191 f. Cf. Martindale in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 59: "As for the reliability of our New Testament, I consider that the different rationalist schools have defeated one another."

[4] Cf. Father Michael Müller, C.SS.R., *Catholic Dogma*, 67 (see above, p. 56 n. 4):

("Question: Have Protestants any faith in Christ?

"Answer: They never had.

"Q.: Why not?

"A.: Because there never lived such a Christ as they imagine and believe in.

Roman Catholics, however, will not have it so. Their theologians are to a very large extent unacquainted with the problems which Gospel-criticism handles.[1] Modern Catholic treatises on our Lord's life show little attempt to examine scientifically the literary and historical character of the documents out of which they have to be constructed.[2] Even when notice is taken of the problems of criticism, it is nearly always for the purpose of rejecting all critical conclusions.[3] Criticism, indeed, in the ordinary sense of the word, is ruled out when one commences the investigation and comparison of historical documents with the a priori assumption that they are entirely free from error. Yet that is precisely the assumption which Catholics feel bound to make in regard to Scripture in general[4] and the Gospels in particular. When Gospel-criticism was in its infancy, this assumption could be made with some show of ordinary reasonableness. Thus Newman wrote in 1870: "In quoting His" (Jesus') "own sayings from the Evangelists . . . , I assume (of which there is no reasonable doubt) that they wrote before any historical events had happened of a nature to cause them unconsciously to modify or to colour the language which their Master used."[5] Now that criticism has shown that this assumption is open to the gravest doubt,[6] it is nevertheless still tacitly made in Catholic works on the

"Q.: In what kind of a Christ do they believe?
"A.: In such a one of whom they can make a liar with impunity, whose doctrines they can interpret as they please, and who does not care what a man believes, provided he be an honest man before the public");

Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 495b (certain liberal critics "by critical procedure eliminate from the Gospels, or at least call into doubt, all the miraculous elements, and reduce the Divinity of Christ to a moral, pre-eminent sonship to God, and yet, by a strange inconsequence, exalt the saving and enlightening power of His personality").

[1] "Wem freilich die ganze Problematik der Bibelkritik und Dogmengeschichte völlig fremd ist, oder wer sie nur vom Hörensagen kennt—und das ist leider bei sehr vielen katholischen Theologen der Fall, wie die katholische Kritik der Vorträge nur zu deutlich erwiesen hat—, mit dem kann man über diese Dinge sich überhaupt nicht auseinandersetzen" (Heiler, *Kathol.* XXVII).

[2] Cf. E. Lohmeyer in his review of three such works in *Theol. Litztg.* 1926. 11. 292–294 (". . . Zwar sind sie" [Gospel-questions among Catholics] "bisher noch kaum wissenschaftlich gestellt; . . . Schlicht und mit liebenswürdiger Innigkeit, aber von den wissenschaftlichen Problemen des Lebens Jesu am weitesten und *bewusst* entfernt geben sich die beiden Bände Joseph Wittigs . . . Es" [Reatz's life of Jesus] "ist ein Ineinander, das zwar keiner der beiden Seiten gerecht wird, das auch aus fester gläubig katholischer Betrachtung heraus nirgends genügend die Fundamente prüft, auf denen es ruht, . . ." Italics mine).

[3] Cf. Lohmeyer in *op. cit.* 293 (". . . Fremde Kritik wird wohl" [i.e. by Reatz] "gekannt, auch zurückgewiesen, aber mit leichtem und unangefochtenem Herzen"); Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 497ab ("In the province of N.-T. higher criticism, Catholics have defended the traditional authenticity, integrity, and veracity of the books in question").

[4] See above, pp. 273 f, 287.

[5] *Gramm.* 443 f.

[6] See, e.g., above, pp. 209–215.

life of Jesus,[1] and is explicitly defended in modern Catholic apologetic. "With regard to the words put on the lips of Our Lord and His Apostles in the New Testament, the Church, which hands us the books as inspired, also hands them to us as historically correct in detail. . . . With regard to the words of the Saviour Himself, mere common sense would suggest that unless they were truly His as they stand, and not merely the historian's idea of what the situation demanded, they would be valueless."[2] But common-sense should also suggest that the value or otherwise of a passage of Scripture for us ought not to be allowed to determine the question as to whether or not it is a statement of fact. How does the value of Jesus' words for us prove that any particular purported record of them is true? Again, "Mistakes in report would be irreconcilable with the veracity of the Primary Author, *i.e.* God; . . . For Catholics the speeches in the New Testament are recorded by the Holy Ghost Himself, for He is the Primary Author of the Sacred Books, hence inaccuracy, as far as it implies any element of untruth, is utterly excluded; . . . the Church . . . gave these gospels to her children as in the strictest detail historical throughout."[3]

It perhaps hardly needs to be said that if, for Catholics, the Evangelists are absolutely infallible, much more so is the human Jesus Himself. Protestant disbelief on this point is denounced by the less temperate Catholic writer as making Christ a liar:[4] by the more temperate it is tacitly contradicted.[5]

It seems indeed as if it were almost a characteristic of Catholicism to lay down sweeping general propositions, regardless of the difficulty of establishing their truth in particular cases, and then to attempt to meet this difficulty by infinitesimal concessions utterly inadequate to the purpose and inconsistent in substance—if not in terms—with the

[1] Lohmeyer in *op. cit.* 293 (". . . Nirgends verleugnet sich aber auch die dogmatische Starrheit und Gebundenheit dieser Anschauung . . . In freundlichem und geschickt harmonisierendem Bemühen sind die evangelischen Berichte nachgezeichnet, unter der stillen Voraussetzung, dass religiöse Wahrheit und geschichtliche Treue in ihnen sich decken müssen").

[2] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 11.

[3] Arendzen and Downey in *op. cit.* 11 f.

[4] See above, pp. 328 n. 4.

[5] Cf. Cuthbert in *God and the Supernatural*, 185 ("in the human intelligence of Christ there can exist nothing contradictory to the divine truth . . . there can be no activity of intellect or will which is not called forth by the call of the divine life in which the humanity of Christ is wholly absorbed . . ."), 189 ("in His own personal life there can be neither intellectual error nor sin but all is as the clear light of God Himself; . . ."). Father Woodlock (*Modernism*, 39) asserts with emphasis the omniscience of Christ, and in regard to His own words to the contrary (Mk. xiii. 32) explains as follows: "Jesus' 'ignorance' of that hour was not real ignorance but only a 'withheld knowledge.' It was under the aspect of the Divine Teacher that one could say 'He knew not the hour'; He knew not as the Father's messenger to men, 'with communicable knowledge.' " Could artificiality go further?

general proposition concerned. Thus, Catholic apologists have sometimes been incautious enough to offer to regard the Gospels (for purposes of argument) simply as human, i.e. uninspired, documents, and to undertake then to establish by the evidence they afford the great Catholic dogmas in regard to Christ, the Church, and so on.[1] But it is idle to profess to treat the Gospels as purely human historical sources, and then to make no allowance for the fact that, as such, they may contain erroneous statements, and to make no attempt to find out how far they actually do so. To treat the Gospels as purely historical sources is to accept (so far as the literary and historical problems are concerned) the higher-critical standpoint, and therewith to commit oneself to whatever higher criticism, if unimpeded by dogma, would really establish: and one of the least mistakable of its conclusions is that the Gospels are not infallible, which, of course, is not for a moment what Catholic apologists mean to admit. As soon therefore as the challenge along this line is seriously accepted, it has to be speedily withdrawn.

Again, emphatic as Catholic declarations of the infallibility of the Evangelists and of Jesus are, yet we come across carefully worded qualifications, which do not verbally contradict these declarations, but suggest at least a partial abandonment of them. Thus: "The Church has never taught . . . that we should regard our Lord as making clear to us the mysteries of science or as unfolding to us the experimental truth of our earthly existence which we properly come to know by the use of our natural intelligence. We are not told to seek in Christ the knowledge of logic or history or the art of politics. . . . In His human life amongst us, He is not the teacher of the knowledge of this world . . . All natural excellence was implicit in His human nature, . . . ; but its manifestation or expression was conditioned by the unique constitution of His humanity in its union with the divinity."[2] But now, how much does this mean? If it means that some of the statements made by Jesus on matters of science and history were not strictly accurate, what is this but to admit that Jesus was not infallible?[3] But if it does not mean this, what does it mean?

And yet again, interlaced with bold declarations of the inerrancy of

[1] One instance (Bishop Clifford) is quoted by Salmon, *Infall.* 56. For others, cf. Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 791a (". . . we appeal to them merely as reliable historical sources, and abstract altogether from their inspiration . . ."); Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 627b ("Using the Gospels simply as historical documents and without reference to their inspired character, the Roman theologian . . infers . . ."); Lattey, *First Notions*, 8 f, 11 f, 99; M. C. D'Arcy, S.J., in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1927, 467 f, and *Cathol.* 71; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 95, 102, 164. The same argument is used by Dr. Gore, on behalf of the Anglo-Catholic position, in *Holy Spirit*, vi, 38, 62, 254, 275.

[2] Cuthbert in *God and the Supernatural*, 178.

[3] See our discussion of this point above, pp. 212 f, 215–217.

the Gospels, come qualifications of this kind: "Since . . . trifling variations occur in the same speeches as recorded by different evangelists, and since . . . these speeches of Our Lord are only given in a Greek translation, not in the Aramaic original, it is plain that inspiration did not supply as it were shorthand reports of the words as actually spoken, but as a veracious listener of truthful memory would correctly render a speech which he had heard . . . imperfection, not implying falsehood, God might of course allow . . . such imperfections and lack of completeness as may arise from the imperfection of the secondary or instrumental cause, *i.e.* the human author, may be admitted."[1] And once more, we Protestants press the question, What is meant here? What are these imperfections which are yet not inaccuracies or mistakes, and which leave the Gospel-records of Jesus' words "historically correct in detail"? Presumably, they include the divergences between the report of a saying by one evangelist and the report of the same saying by another. For instance, in Luke xi. 13 we read: "how much more will your Father who (? gives gifts) from heaven give (the) *holy Spirit* to those that ask Him?" In Matt. vii. 11 we read: "how much more will your Father who (is) in heaven give *good things* to those that ask Him?" Which of the two did Jesus really say? Clearly not both, for in that case the omission of some words in both versions would have to be explained: moreover the two versions do not here lend themselves to conflation. But whichever we decide to regard as right, we unavoidably pronounce the other erroneous. Or even if we call it only imperfect, how can that imperfection be reconciled with the inerrancy of the Gospels, which the Church gives us "as in the strictest detail historical throughout"? In Mark x. 18 = Luke xviii. 19, Jesus says: "Why callest thou me good?": in Matt. xix. 17, He says: "Why askest thou me about goodness?" Which is right? Critics say the former; but even if they be mistaken, one or other of the two versions is 'imperfect,' i.e. erroneous. It is to no purpose to plead that these variations are few and 'trifling.' They are certainly not few, as a glance at any harmony of the Gospels in Greek will show us. Nor are they trifling: the one last quoted, for instance, and that which concerns the sign of Jonah, are of very considerable theological interest. Our Catholic friends refer to "trifling variations" and call them "imperfections." But what of the variations that are not trifling? And do "imperfections" mean inaccuracies? If they do, what has become of the inerrancy of the Gospels? And if they do not, what do they mean? And in any case how are the serious and mutually exclusive variations to be explained?

There is only one word that can be used to describe this kind of apologetic: it is evasive. It has indeed the best of reasons for being evasive,

[1] Arendzen and Downey in *Religion of the Scripture*, 11.

for only so can it avoid destroying itself by the patent manifestation of its own untenability. Before the onset of persistent inquiry, the only course open to Rome is an obstinate struggle 'pro aris et focis.' It is of no avail to point out to her that, on her own premises, criticism—as the exercise of human reason—is entitled to her approval,[1] or that the life-force of Catholicism is not imperilled by critical operations.[2] There is a deeply-rooted incongruity between the Catholic system on the one hand, and on the other the teaching of Scripture in general and of the New Testament in particular.[3] It is therefore a vital matter for the Roman Church to resist free and untrammelled investigation, and to maintain her own historical pre-judgments.[4] And forasmuch as free and untrammelled investigation is a sine quâ non for the discovery of the truth, it is a vital matter for Protestants to call these pre-judgments in question and to press the claims of scientific criticism.[5]

After so full an exposure of the radical antagonism between the higher-critical and the Catholic views of the Gospels, it would serve no useful purpose to go over all those numerous conclusions which most critics accept, but which Catholics generally either deny or ignore. We limit ourselves, therefore, to a few points of special interest.

Criticism has no quarrel with the traditional view as to the authorship

[1] "Auch muss diese Kirche, welche das Recht der *naturalis ratio* so nachdrücklich verficht, konsequenterweise der historischen Kritik ebenso Raum gewähren wie der philosophischen Spekulation, die beide nur verschiedene Äusserungen derselben Vernunftkraft sind" (Heiler, *Kathol.* XXVIII note).

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* XXVII bottom.

[3] See above, pp. 272 f, 298. Cf. Horton, *England's Danger*, 127 (young man, after interviewing priest, remarks: "That priest was an exceedingly able man, but from my knowledge of the Gospels I found that what he was saying did not square with the teaching of our Lord"); Richard Roberts in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1924, 29 ("But the Papacy made the mistake of leaving the New Testament about, which contained news of another kind of God, whose nature was love, whose instrument was grace, and whose method was conversion and persuasion. It was the difference between a God of authority and a God of freedom; and it was this contradiction that lay at the back of the movement which culminated in the Reformation"); Harnack, *Origin of the N.T.* (Eng. trans.) 157 f (in early times "the official Church had begun to consider whether she could tolerate members that with a certain recklessness held up the mirror before her, and she ended by deciding that she could not. Her judgment to-day is still the same. Yet . . . what assaults have been made upon the Church from the base of the New Testament! What foes have drawn their weapons from this armoury and have forced the Church to fight hard for life! . . .").

[4] "Nicht der wissenschaftliche Standpunkt des Verfassers ist ein Historismus, sondern der der römischen Kirchenbehörde, die in der Annahme, als könnten historische Erkenntnisse der lebendigen Religion einen Schaden zufügen, alle modernen bibelkritischen und dogmengeschichtlichen Einsichten verurteilt hat" (Heiler, *Kathol.* XXVII).

[5] Heiler, *Kathol.* XXVII ("Wer hier von 'Radikalismus' spricht, dem muss man sagen . . . dass der auf das T a t s ä c h l i c h e gerichtete Wahrheitssinn des wissenschaftlichen Forschers nie 'radikal' genug (d.h. ja lediglich bis zur Wurzel greifend) sein kann . . ."), XXVIII top.

of the Gospel of Mark: but it declares unhesitatingly that the last twelve verses of the Gospel as they stand in the Latin Vulgate and in the English versions are no part of the original work. With almost equal unanimity it holds that the original ending of the Gospel is either lost or was never written. The best ancient manuscripts have nothing after Mark xvi. 8: a large number of secondary ones have the twelve verses usually printed (the 'Longer Ending'); a much smaller number have in place of them a short passage of three or four lines (the 'Shorter Ending'); whilst one ancient copy has an ending nearly as long as the 'Longer' but entirely differing from it throughout its latter half. The 'Longer Ending' was the most widely received, and, having been included by Hieronymus in the Latin Vulgate, is regarded by Catholics as a part of Holy Scripture, as having therefore God as its originator, and as being inspired in quality and of course entirely credible in content.[1] Yet it has no claim whatever to be an integral part of the Gospel of Mark, has by no means a strong claim to be regarded as historically exact, and has no more antecedent claim on our credence than either of its two rivals.[2]

We have already referred, at an earlier point in our discussion, to certain features in the Gospel of 'Matthew' to which modern criticism has drawn attention and on which are based a certain number of very widely admitted conclusions.[3] Every one, however, of these conclusions is either denied or rejected as uncertain by Catholics, the ground of this attitude being that the conclusions in question do not harmonize with traditional beliefs.

[1] Cf. Newman in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 196 ("whether or not the last verses of St. Mark's, and two portions of St. John's gospel, belong to those Evangelists respectively, matters not as regards their inspiration; for the Church has recognised them as portions of that sacred narrative which precedes or embraces them"); MacRory in *Cath. Encyc.* ix (1910) 679a (". . . But they are canonical scripture . . . Hence, whoever wrote the verses, they are inspired, and must be received as such by every Catholic"); Arendzen in *The Bible*, etc. 49 f. Dr. Faà di Bruno (*Cath. Belief*, 38) quotes the words of Mk. xvi. 16 as if they were subject to no question whatever on the score of historical credibility.

[2] It is said in a tenth century Armenian MS. to have been written by the "Presbyter Ariston"—a disciple of Jesus who lived on into the second century A.D.; but even if true, this origin would not guarantee its accuracy, and Streeter (*Four Gospels*, 344–347) gives several weighty reasons for disbelieving the ascription. The fullest discussion of the whole matter is in Westcott and Hort, *Select Readings*, 28–51. Dr. MacRory (in *Cath. Encyc.* ix [1910] 677b–679a) halfheartedly defends the Marcan authorship of the Longer Ending: but neither of the two suggestions he makes in order to account for its omission by our best authorities (678b) sounds at all likely. Moreover, he overestimates the difficulty of accounting for the wide acceptance of the Longer Conclusion, if non-Marcan (678b); and he under-estimates (while recognizing) the force of the objections to it on internal grounds (678 f). He rightly urges that Mark could not have intended to conclude his Gospel with xvi. 8 (679a); but his objections to the hypothesis of an accidental loss of the real ending are fanciful (*ibid.*).

[3] See above, pp. 209–212.

Thus, it is agreed with virtual unanimity by higher critics that our 'Matthew,' while clearly incorporating sayings of Jesus translated into Greek from Aramaic, was written as a book originally in Greek, and is not itself a translation of an Aramaic or Hebrew Gospel. This fact is established by the general style of the book: it reads quite differently from Greek writings (such as the Septuagint) which we know to have been translated from the Semitic; and it has none of the linguistic awkwardnesses almost invariably present in a translation. Its dependence on the admittedly Greek Gospel of Mark adds to the unlikelihood of the translation-hypothesis. Finally, while some of its quotations from the Old Testament depart widely from the Septuagint, others closely conform to it, and both the variation in procedure and the indebtedness to the Septuagint are irreconcilable with the supposition that the work is a simple Greek version of an Aramaic Gospel.[1] There was, however, an early tradition to the effect that the Apostle Matthew wrote his Gospel in Hebrew (probably thereby meaning Aramaic). We shall discuss in a moment the real meaning and value of this tradition: but at this point we observe that, on the strength of it, Catholic scholars still maintain the clearly inaccurate view that our present 'Matthew' is a translation from the Aramaic. Not only is the truth of the tradition assumed (which is reasonable), but (what is far more hazardous) its reference to our Gospel of 'Matthew' is taken for granted; and the cogent reasons for believing the latter to have been originally written in Greek are one by one and often on the flimsiest grounds declared to be inconclusive.[2]

Next, the overwhelming majority of impartial investigators believe that 'Matthew' was written later than, and was partly based upon, Mark.[3] It is also held to have been partly based on a collection of sayings of Jesus originally compiled (probably by the Apostle Matthew) in

[1] Cf. Bartlet in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 297b; Peake, *Crit. Introd. to New Testament*, 112; Box, *Saint Matthew* ('Cent. Bible,' 1922) 4.

[2] See Jacquier in *Cath. Encyc.* x (1911) 58b, 59a (quotation of the tradition), 59ab (idiomatic style of Greek of 'Mt.' explicable by translator's knowledge and freedom, and countered by presence of occasional Hebraisms. "Still, it remains to be proved that these Hebraisms are not colloquial Greek expressions"), 59b, 60a (style unlike the translation-Greek of Septuagint, but "the unity of style . . . would rather prove that we have a translation"(!): reports of Jesus' words must be translations, and are in same style as rest of book), 60ab (quotations from Old Testament [Septuagint and otherwise] discussed).

[3] Dr. Streeter (*Four Gospels*, 164) says: "How anyone who has worked through those pages" (i.e. Hawkins, *Horae Synopt.* 114–153) ". . . can retain the slightest doubt of the original and primitive character of Mark I am unable to comprehend. But since there are . . . ingenious persons who rush into print with theories to the contrary, I can only suppose, either that they have not been at the pains to do this or else that—like some of the highly cultivated people who think Bacon wrote Shakespeare, or that the British are the Lost Ten Tribes—they have eccentric views of what constitutes evidence."

Aramaic, and later accessible in Greek versions. The patristic tradition that Matthew wrote his Gospel in Hebrew or Aramaic, which was in all probability wholly dependent on Papias (about 125 A.D.), may be perfectly true if it referred originally to the collection of sayings, but is mistaken if thought to refer (as it erroneously was by the Fathers, possibly even Papias himself) to *our* 'Matthew.' Matthew's name would be ascribed to the latter because it embodied so much of his work. It is thus quite possible to do justice to the tradition while yet maintaining that our 'Matthew,' as it stands, is a Greek work, not a translation from Aramaic, is not the work of the Apostle Matthew, and is later than, and partly based upon, Mark. All this, however, is rejected by Catholic scholars, who persist in treating our 'Matthew' as a translation of the Apostle's own Aramaic Gospel,[1] and in consequence are obliged to frame far-fetched hypotheses about the use of the oral Aramaic catechesis, about Matthew and Mark making independent use of a written Aramaic record of "the Petrine tradition," about the translator of Matthew borrowing from the Greek of Mark, and so on.[2] As a matter of fact, the papal Biblical Commission laid it down in 1911–12 that the three Synoptic Gospels were written in the order in which they stand in our Bibles, and all of them before 70 A.D., and that the 'Two Document Theory' (to the effect that 'Matthew' and Luke were both dependent on Mark and on a common collection of Jesus' sayings) is to be rejected.[3] Catholics rest objections to the priority of Mark on 'Matthew's' omission of certain details given by Mark, and on the alleged tradition that Matthew's Gospel was the first to be written.[4] But 'Matthew's' omissions are simply due to his obvious desire to abbreviate narrative-details, probably in order to gain space for what he regarded as more important matter. As for the unanimous tradition that Mark's Gospel was written after Matthew's, this seems to rest simply on the authority of Irenaeus (III. i. 1), who wrote about 185 A.D., and just possibly inferred it from something in Papias. The allusions to it by later writers mostly just re-echo him. His statement was made about a century after the time when the Gospels were composed. It is

[1] E.g. Lattey, *First Notions*, 47; Arendzen in *The Bible*, etc. 51.

[2] MacRory in *Cath. Encyc.* ix (1910) 681b, 682a; Jacquier in *Cath. Encyc.* x (1911) 61b, 62a. In touching on the right solution the latter says: "even though we should suppose that Matthew were the author only of the *Logia*, . . and that a part of his Greek Gospel is derived from that of Mark, we should still have a right to ascribe this First Gospel to Matthew as its principal author."

[3] Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 110.

[4] So MacRory in *Cath. Encyc.* ix (1910) 679b (Irenaeus' "testimony, supported by all antiquity, in favour of the priority of Matthew's Gospel to Mark's"), 680b ("all early tradition represents St. Matthew's Gospel as the first written; and this must be understood of our present Matthew, . . . not a single ancient writer held that Mark wrote before Matthew"), 681a, 681b, 682a (similar), 681b (Mt's omissions, etc.): cf. Jacquier in *Cath. Encyc.* x (1911) 58a.

probably based partly on an uncritical belief that the Apostle Matthew wrote the canonical Gospel that bears his name, and partly on the comparatively greater popularity of that Gospel. If besides this it has any historical value—which is doubtful—that will depend on its being referred not to the canonical Gospel, but to the Apostle Matthew's collection of sayings of Jesus largely embodied in the Gospel. In any case, it has no weight against the obvious priority of Mark to 'Matthew' as they now lie before us.

From all these considerations it follows that the Apostle Matthew (who would never have based his story of Jesus upon Mark's work) cannot be spoken of as the author of our Gospel of 'Matthew' except in a quite unusual sense, and that the Gospel in all probability was not written until A.D. 75–85.[1] Yet Catholic scholars habitually refer to the author as 'St. Matthew,'[2] and describe him as having written it on the eve of his final departure from Palestine, or at any rate at some date between 40 and 70 A.D.[3]

A recent Catholic statement tells us that, "though St. Matthew is still more disputed than St. Mark, and St. John than either, it remains that a Catholic, who would have looked a fool in learned eyes if, thirty years ago, he had maintained the traditional dates and authorships, can do so now and find himself coinciding with the conclusions of much independent scholarship.[4]" This assertion is, as regards the Gospel of 'Matthew,' pointedly inaccurate, and simply betrays the speaker's ignorance of what modern scholarship is saying on the matter.[5] Criticism —even the moderate criticism of Anglican scholars—is still virtually repudiated in toto by Catholics generally. As usually happens in such questions, minute concessions are made, with much show of scholarly candour. "There is no reason," we are confidently assured, ". . . why Catholics should be timid about admitting, if necessary, the dependence of the inspired evangelists upon earlier documents, . . . "[6] It is recognized that in 'Matthew' there are numerous "omissions or altera-

[1] Cf. Moffatt, *Introd.* 213; Streeter, *Four Gospels*, 516–524; Box, *Saint Matthew* ('Cent. Bible') 4.

[2] E.g. Jacquier in *Cath. Encyc.* x (1911) 63ab. See above, p. 211.

[3] See Jacquier in *op. cit.* 62b, 63b, 64a. Dr. Faà di Bruno (*Cath. Belief*, 18) speaks of "the twelve years which elapsed between the Ascension . . . and the writing of the first Gospel, the Gospel of St. Matthew"—with apparent reference to the tradition that the Apostles dispersed from Jerusalem after an interval of this length, and to the statement of Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* III. xxiv. 6) that Matthew wrote his gospel when about to leave the Hebrews and go to other peoples.

[4] Martindale in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 58 f.

[5] Father Knox is similarly in error in urging (*Belief of Caths.* 101 f) that "we are no nearer the solution of" the Synoptic problem than we were a hundred years ago, and that "we can, without attracting the derision of scholars, treat the first three Gospels as documents dating back behind A.D. 70 . . . "

[6] MacRory in *Cath. Encyc.* ix (1910) 682a.

tions" made with a view of avoiding anything apparently derogatory to our Lord or unfavourable to the disciples.[1] It is admitted too that the Matthaean chronology is artificial and incorrect.[2] We are even told that not a few Catholics in America, England, and Germany, share the view prevalent among Protestant scholars in regard to the priority of the Gospel of Mark to those of 'Matthew' and Luke, and the use made of it in them.[3]

But all this amounts to very little: it does not impair the broad fact that Catholicism rejects the findings of higher criticism in regard to this book, as in regard to others. This is seen not only in the facts just reviewed, but in the Catholic attitude to the historicity of the book. We have on an earlier page given in detail a considerable amount of evidence which proves—if thought and language mean anything—that, however valuable and truthful much of the Gospel may be, it certainly contains a large number of inaccuracies, in regard both to the sayings of our Lord and to the incidents of His life, inaccuracies introduced either unintentionally or for doctrinal and apologetic purposes.[4] The Catholic case, so far as it rests on Scripture, rests very largely on a few passages in 'Matthew'; and here therefore, if anywhere, will the Church defend the complete historical accuracy of the biblical record. No straightforward explanation of the several phenomena can be furnished other than that they are in very large part historical errors. Yet a case is put forward for the complete inerrancy of the Gospel as a whole, by assuming that Jesus imparted to the Apostles a complete and exactly defined body of doctrines, and that shortly after His death the Apostles drew up by mutual agreement an 'oral catechesis' in Aramaic, setting these doctrines forth in more or less precise terms: it is then argued that the presence of any inaccuracy in 'Matthew's' report of Jesus' words would amount to a stark denial and glaring contradiction of some portion of this well-defined and well-learnt catechesis, and would therefore prove, either that deliberate collusion had taken place among the Evangelists, or that Jesus himself was "in contradiction to the society in which He moved, and must be ranked with the least intelligent sections among the Jewish people." The clear impossibility of either of these alternatives rules out the possibility of 'Matthew' having at all changed or perverted the true tradition of what Jesus did or said.[5] This argument is, however, quite inconclusive. The idea that Jesus laid down a fixed set of doctrines, and that these were

[1] Jacquier in *op. cit.* x (1911) 61a; cf. 65a end (special selection and presentation of materials in 'Matthew' for apologetic purposes).

[2] Newman in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 198; Jacquier in *op. cit.* 62a.

[3] MacRory in *op. cit.* ix (1910) 681a.

[4] See above, pp. 209–212.

[5] So, in substance, Jacquier, in *Cath. Encyc.* x (1911) 64a–65a.

deliberately embodied in a closely defined oral catechesis shortly after His death, is a pure figment of the imagination. There is no warrant for it in Scripture, and it is contrary to all the probabilities of the case. That Jesus' teaching was remembered and quoted and taught, and later on recorded in writing, is of course true; but it is quite improbable that its content and limits were precisely defined in the manner supposed. The central thing in the Apostolic Church was the impulse of the Spirit which Jesus had given, not a fixed set of new doctrines imparted by Him and scrupulously safeguarded by His Apostles against either addition or subtraction. There was a freedom of the Spirit, a fluidity of memory, and a spontaneity of utterance, which in an unscientific age would leave ample room for such modifications of historical truth as those to which critics point in the Gospel of 'Matthew.'[1]

The Gospel of Luke—being acknowledged by most critics to be the work of Luke the companion of Paul—does not raise the same amount of controversy on the part of Catholics as does that of 'Matthew.' The critical contention that the Gospel of Luke in its present form depends partly on the Gospel of Mark, as well as on another document containing the sayings of Jesus, is widely admitted by Catholics.[2] The question however of the absolute historical accuracy of the record would come up here as elsewhere. Scientific study has gone far to establish the historical sense of the author and the great historical value of his work; but we can no more assume total inerrancy in details here than we can elsewhere.

In the case of the Fourth Gospel, while individual views still range widely, it is possible to discern in the recent course of critical opinion a gradual reaction against the somewhat extreme negative attitude formerly held by many scholars. The historical value of much of the Johannine narrative, the superiority of its evidence to the Synoptic evidence touching the number of Jesus' visits to Jerusalem and the date of His crucifixion, the identity of the Beloved Disciple with John the son of Zebedee, his survival at Ephesus until the end of the century, and his responsibility for at least some things in the Gospel—these positions, while by no means unanimously admitted, are nevertheless widely held and are capable of strong scientific defence. This movement of thought has naturally not escaped the notice of Catholic scholars.[3] Making however all allowances for it and for the proverbial uncertainty of the future, it must be said that the reaction towards the traditional view has not

[1] Dr. Jacquier's apologia is particularly at fault when he assumes that the historicity of 'Matthew' (in detail) is given with the admitted historicity of Mark (*op. cit.* 64a,b: similarly Moxon, *Modernism*, 132 f). It is precisely on the *differences* between 'Matthew' and the other two Gospels that the critical case rests (see above, pp. 209 ff).

[2] Cf. Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 497b; MacRory in *op. cit.* ix (1910) 681a, 682a.

[3] Cf. Martindale in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 58 f.

gone—and is by no means likely to go—the length of re-establishing belief either in the composition of the whole book by the Apostle John, or in the historical accuracy of all its details (particularly as regards miracles), or in the trustworthiness of its reports in regard to our Lord's discourses and conversations. This last point is particularly important. The sayings ascribed to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel are (1) widely different in content and style from those reported by the Synoptists, and (2) identical in content and style with the comments of the Fourth Evangelist himself. The bonâ fide ascription of fictitious speeches to real historical characters is not a proceeding customary in modern historical literature; but it was a familiar usage in earlier times, and we can see it exemplified in the histories of Thucydides, Sallustius, Josephus, Tacitus, etc., in the Socratic dialogues of Plato, in the early and later Apocryphal Gospels and many of the non-canonical Sayings of Jesus, in other early Christian literature,[1] in devotional works like the 'Imitatio Christi,' in some familiar modern hymns, and of course in modern historical novels otherwise true to fact (such as Lord Lytton's 'Rienzi'). The critical contention is that the Johannine discourses of Jesus belong to this type of speech rather than to that of actually remembered sayings. A very large number of orthodox scholars, including some who accept the Apostolic authorship of the Gospel, frankly admit to-day that the Johannine discourses do not give us the ipsissima verba of Jesus even in the sense in which the Synoptists can be said to give them, but are rather a paraphrase or interpretation of what He said. This view leaves space open for wide divergences of judgment in detail; and the point is frequently made that it does not deny the substantial truth of the discourses or the existence of a historical basis for them.[2] Nevertheless, Protestant critics must needs press their plea that, if these discourses are not reports of Jesus' ipsissima verba, but rather an interpretation of His teaching, then the distinction between the teaching itself and the interpretation of it ought to be kept, and the discourses used, not as if to all intents and purposes Jesus had spoken them, but simply as revealing the effect that His teaching had had on the mind of one (in all probability not a personal disciple) seventy years after His death. But the observance of such a distinction would involve a very considerable revision of much Catholic apologetic.

When we turn to the Catholic view of the Fourth Gospel, we find little allowance made even for the most moderate critical contentions.

[1] Eusebius in *Demonstr. Evang.* X. viii. 499–501 (Eng. trans. [S.P.C.K.] ii. 225 f) puts a long imaginary speech into the mouth of Jesus.

[2] This is precisely the position, e.g., of Dr. Gore (*Holy Spirit*, 54, 58, 111, 115n., 165 [". . . But as to the *manner* of our Lord's teaching, I think we cannot doubt that it is more truly represented by the Synoptists than by St. John . . .], 247). Cf. also Moxon, *Modernism*, 134–136; N. P. Williams in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 379.

Not only in ancient works like the 'Roman Catechism,'[1] but in those of modern times, the truth of the traditional position is assumed. Thus Dr. Faà di Bruno informs his readers, as if there were full knowledge on the point and no question about it, that the Gospel was written in the year 99 A.D. and that its author, the Apostle, died in 101 A.D.[2] In 1907 the papal Biblical Commission declared that it is historically certain that St. John wrote the Gospel and that it narrates actual facts and speeches of our Lord's life.[3] Later the same year the papal decree 'Lamentabili' condemned not only the view that the Johannine narratives were not properly history and that they exaggerated the miraculous, but also the view that the discourses were theological meditations devoid of historical truth.[4] The concession is indeed made by some Catholic exegetes that "St. John's theology indicates reflection and development over and beyond that of the Synoptists"; but it is explained that they hold at the same time the Johannine authorship and historic quality of the work.[5] This can mean only that, although the Johannine Jesus speaks precisely as does the Johannine evangelist, and although the theology of the Johannine evangelist indicates development beyond the Synoptic, nevertheless all the words of the Johannine Jesus were actually spoken by the Jesus of history. So once again is historical probability set at defiance.

The inevitable result of the Catholic method of handling critical questions is that the Catholic picture of Jesus' life on earth is unhuman, unattractive, and above all untrue to fact.[6] We shall have occasion later to discuss some detailed points in the story; but we may note here some miscellaneous samples of what Catholic exegesis means. The 'Praxis' prefixed to the 'Roman Catechism' advises the priest to use the occasion on which the parable of the Good Samaritan has to be read, to interpret the wounded man as meaning humanity, the Samaritan as Christ, the oil and wine as the Sacraments, and the inn as the Church (entrusted by Christ to one man).[7] The words "Thou shalt by no means

[1] Cf. *Catech. Rom.* I. iv. 3 (John the evangelist, who leaned on the Lord's breast, assumed to be the author of the prologue to the Gospel).

[2] *Cath. Belief*, 18.

[3] Corbett in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 558a: cf. Lattey, *First Notions*, 7–11, 104. One finds the sayings ascribed to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel quoted as if really His in the Anglo-Catholic *Congress-Report 1923*, 1, 49 f, 82.

[4] In Mirbt 506 (2).

[5] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 496a.

[6] "Aus dem wunderbaren Menschen Jesus . . . ist ein kaltes, blutleeres Schemen, ein Begriffsgespenst geworden, an dem man bisweilen kaum noch menschliche Züge entdecken kann" (Heiler, *Kathol.* 364. In note 8 he quotes a Catholic dogmatist who ascribes to the human soul of Jesus full and conscious insight into the incarnation and the triune character of God and knowledge of the whole province of truth, including nature and history).

[7] *Praxis Catechismi evangeliis singularum anni dominicarum accommodata*, 12th Sunday after Pentecost (in *Catech. Rom.* [ed. 1831] xxx).

come out thence till thou hast paid the last farthing" (Mt. v. 26 = Lk. xii. 59)—probably spoken as a terrible pictorial warning to the Jews of the consequences of pressing their feud against Rome[1]—were referred by Newman to Purgatory.[2] The charge laid against the dishonest steward in the parable: "What is this that I hear about thee? give in the account of thy stewardship; for thou canst be steward no longer" (Lk. xvi. 2), was quoted by Innocentius III in 1215 as supplying scriptural authority for the principle that the reported misdeeds of ecclesiastics should be duly investigated by their superiors, and that if necessary they should be removed from their positions of trust.[3] Sanction for persecution by the Church was seen by Augustinus in the words: "Compel them to come in" (which occur in Luke's version of the parable of the Feast—Lk. xiv. 23); and his exegesis has been quoted with approval by Catholics of later times. Lk. ix 55 is held not to forbid persecution, and Mt. xiii. 29 to forbid it only when it cannot be practised without danger and disturbance.[4] The obscure passage about the two swords in Lk. xxii. 38 was exploited by Bonifatius VIII in his famous bull 'Unam Sanctam' as referring to the spiritual power of the Church and the material power of the State, whereof even the latter was to be used at the Church's bidding and on her behalf.[5] It is maintained by modern Catholics that Jesus, no less than the Apostles and Fathers, foretold the coming of heresy, and that His words: "I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Mt. x. 34), foretold the conflicts between heretics and Catholics, wherein the greater number of victims of the sword have been Catholics![6]

Catholic imagination has been especially busy with the records of the last days of our Lord's life on earth. All four Gospels state that the crucifixion took place on Friday and the resurrection on Sunday; but, whereas the Synoptists represent the Friday to have been the fifteenth of the month Nisan, thus making the Last Supper a passover, the Fourth Gospel makes the Friday the fourteenth of Nisan, whereby Jesus' death synchronizes with the slaying of the paschal lamb on the afternoon prior to the passover-meal. Catholic exegesis has been put to as much difficulty as Protestant over this discrepancy, except that Catholics cannot logically avail themselves of the only possible solution, viz: that one or other of our informants is somehow mistaken.[7] The Fourth Gospel says that Jesus "went forth bearing the cross for himself"

[1] Cf. C. J. Cadoux in *Expos.* Mar. 1925, 190.
[2] Newman, *Developm.* 421.
[3] *Conc. Lateran.* printed in Tauchnitz edn. (1842) of *Conc. Trid.* 254 f.
[4] See Salmon, *Infall.* 188 f n., 190 n.
[5] Bull *Unam Sanctam* (1302) in Mirbt 210 f.
[6] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 259a, 262a.
Cf. 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 860.

(Jn. xix. 17), the Synoptics that the soldiers "impressed" Simon of Cyrene to carry the cross: Luke tells us that Jesus was followed by a number of women whom He addressed as "Daughters of Jerusalem," but whose names are not mentioned (Lk. xxiii. 27-32). Catholic devotion embroiders the narrative by inventing further details: on the way to Golgotha Jesus met His disconsolate mother; three times did He fall through weariness under the weight of the cross; Veronica handed Him a cloth wherewith to wipe His face; and so on.[1] The 'Roman Catechism informs us that the suffering, death, and burial of Jesus apply to Him as man, but not as God, "for suffering and death beset human nature only"[2]—although the reconciling presence of God in Christ would seem to imply suffering on God's part also. The words of Jesus to the penitent thief: "*To-day* thou shalt be with me in paradise" (Lk. xxiii. 43), are clearly inconsistent with the view suggested by the words of the Roman Creed: "suffered under Pontius Pilatus, was crucified, dead, and buried: He descended to the lower regions: on the third day He rose from the dead"—for in Jewish parlance, paradise stood for the abode of the blessed and could not well be located in the infernal regions. Yet the 'Roman Catechism' says that the promise to the dying thief was established or carried out ("comprobatum est") when Christ imparted the blessed vision of Himself to the souls of the pious in the underworld.[3]

We cannot discuss here the critical treatment of the inconsistencies and other obscurities of the Gospel-narratives of Jesus' appearances after the resurrection. The immense difficulties in the way of believing in the physical ascension of our Lord, and a consideration of the psychological necessity which compelled Palestinian Jews to regard the future life as bound up with bodily resurrection, have combined to push modern thought away from a literal trust in the narratives as they stand, and towards some form of the 'vision-theory,' which would do justice to the central conviction that Jesus had triumphed over death, and incidentally would be reconcilable with His words to the penitent thief, but would not involve the actual revivification of His material flesh.[4] This view, however, is treated by Catholics simply as a denial of the fact of the resurrection,[5] and a leading Anglo-Catholic seems to refer to

[1] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 288; Heiler, *Kathol.* 542 f, notes 120 f.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* I. v. 12.

[3] *Ibid.* vi. 9. George Fox narrates in his *Journal* (ed. N. Penney [1924] 239) that by quoting (among other passages) Christ's words to the thief he reduced to silence a papist who maintained that Christ was three days and three nights in hell.

[4] I have set forth the arguments for this view more fully in my booklet, *The Resurrection and Second Advent of Jesus* (Independent Press, 1927).

[5] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 499b ("The fundamental fact of Christ's Resurrection is an historical fact no longer; it is but another freak of the believing mind").

it as "blasphemy."[1] The Catholic apologetic, however, does not help to remove the real difficulties inherent in the Resurrection-narratives, but contents itself with an easy refutation of theories which the best criticism does not defend, and with a simple retreat to the entrenchments of absolute miracle.[2] Jesus is declared to have ascended into heaven, with both body and soul, as man—for as God He fills all places and thus was never absent from Heaven.[3]

At the close of the Gospel of 'Matthew,' the risen Saviour is stated to have said to the disciples: "Full authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me: therefore go and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, . . ." (Mt. xxviii. 18f). Such is probably the true text of the passage, since all our manuscripts and versions support it; but it is certainly strange that Eusebius in his earlier works quotes the saying several times as if it ran: "Therefore go and make disciples of all the nations in my name"—a reading which (as we shall see in a moment) would in one way more truly reflect the practice of the early Apostolic age, but which nevertheless may have arisen from the influence of Lk. xxiv. 47 on Eusebius' mind. While, however, the usual wording probably gives the true text of the Gospel, it is open to serious doubt whether Jesus ever really spoke the words here ascribed to Him.[4] Two weighty reasons may be given why they should be taken rather as reflecting the usage of the Church at the time when the Gospel was written (i.e. about 85 A.D.). (1) Early Christian baptism was always in the name of Jesus, not in the name of the Trinity (Acts ii. 38, viii. 16, x. 48, xix. 5; Gal. iii. 27; 1 Cor. i. 13, 15, vi. 11). Apart from this passage in 'Matthew,' there is no trace in Christian literature of baptism in the name of the Trinity earlier than the words of the 'Didache' (vii. 1: but in ix. 5 we have "those who have been baptized in the name of the Lord"), i.e. about 90 A.D. (2) The early Jewish Christian Church showed very considerable reluctance to undertake the evangelization of the Gentile peoples (see Gal. ii. 6–9; Acts x, xi. 1–18, esp. xi. 18). This reluctance is quite unaccountable if one of the latest utterances of Jesus on earth had been an explicit command in the terms of Mt. xxviii. 18–19. The universalism of Jesus' Gospel of the Kingdom of God was *implicit* in it from the start; it found overt expression from time to time in the course of

[1] See below, p. 348 n. 3.

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 353 f (". . . die katholische Durchschnittsapologetik . . . glaubt als lorbeergekrönte Siegerin im Geisterstreite hervorgegangen zu sein, wenn sie einige alberne Anschuldigungen, die nie ein ernster Historiker vertreten hat, niedergerungen hat").

[3] *Catech. Rom.* I. vii. 3 (1): ". . . credere oportet, eum . . . ut homo est, in coelum, corpore et anima, ascendisse: nam, ut Deus est, nunquam ab eo abfuit," etc.

[4] Cf. N. P. Williams in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 380 f.

His teaching; and in the early Church—after some hesitation—it was clearly seen, fully admitted, and vigorously acted upon. But it obviously took time to come to full recognition; and the hesitation is unaccountable if any explicit command of Jesus had been given, and the passing away of the hesitation is easily accountable without any such command.[1]

It is, however, important for Catholic apologetic to be able to appeal to these words as an actual injunction spoken by the Master Himself.[2] The 'Roman Catechism' accordingly offers two explanations (which incidentally exclude each other) of the divergent evidence in regard to the baptismal formula. In the first place it suggests that, in the early years, baptism was performed (despite the Lord's parting instructions) in the name of Jesus, in order that "His Divine and unmeasured power might be the more recognized (magis celebraretur)"; and it observes in addition that he who names Jesus, names also by implication the other two Persons of the Trinity.[3] Then it goes on to say that possibly New-Testament allusions to baptism in the name of Jesus simply characterize such baptism as distinct from that of John the Baptist and as implying faith in Christ, and that they do not necessarily mean that the actual formula used was different from the Trinitarian one given by Christ Himself.[4]

I do not happen to have seen any Catholic explanation of the unwillingness of the early Church (in the face of Christ's supposed positive command) to undertake the Gentile mission. Doubtless such explanations exist. Those for whom the solution of historical problems usually has to precede and be independent of the examination and discussion of the data are never at a loss for an explanation of some sort. "The Catholic Encyclopedia," however, puts forward a defence of the historicity of Mt. xxviii. 18f. It takes the form of a defence of Jesus' universalism as a whole, with special reference to passages like Mt. xxiv. 14, xxvi. 13 (and their parallels), and xxviii. 18 f. It advances three arguments for believing that these sayings originated with Jesus Himself. (1) The primitive Christians were narrowly particularist (vide Acts) and therefore could not have invented them. (2) These Christians are stated by critics to have believed in the early return of Jesus to earth, and therefore could not have framed sayings to the effect that all lands would be evangelized before His return. (3) Paul and his disciples could not have originated these teachings, for "long before St. Paul could have exercised

[1] See M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 435–437. On the further question as to the character of post-Resurrection sayings, see below, pp. 374, 413 f.

[2] It is one of the scriptural proofs of the Church's infallibility and of the principle 'Extra Ecclesian nulla salus' (Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 791b); Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 534 f: cf. the Bishop of St. Albans in *Congress-Report 1920*, 200.

[3] *Catech. Rom.* II. ii. 15.

[4] *Ibid.* II. ii. 16.

any influence over the Christian conscience, the Evangelical sources containing these precepts had already been composed."[1] But all this supplies no proof that Jesus could have spoken as Mt. xxviii. 18f says He did. To begin with, it confuses the issue to treat the denial of the historicity of these words as if it were a denial of our Lord's universalism as a whole. That universalism is a well-attested fact, which most critics willingly recognize, though there is room for difference of opinion as to the precise form it took and as to the genuineness of some of the sayings in which He is reported to have expressed it. It is, for instance, quite possible to imagine our Lord speaking as He is stated to have done in Mt. xxiv. 14 and xxvi. 13, and in many other universalist passages, and yet to have serious doubts about His having given a direct injunction like that of Mt. xxviii. 18f. The attitude of the early Church may be held to disprove the last; but it is not necessarily inconsistent with the others. Then in regard to the specific arguments. (1) The particularism of the primitive Christians is better explained by the absence of an explicit universalistic injunction than by its presence. Moreover, the critical view does not ascribe this injunction to the *primitive* Christians, but to the missionary-minded Church of later decades. There is no strong reason for supposing that the Gospel of 'Matthew' was compiled before 75–85 A.D.; and by that time there were plenty of Christians who believed that it was the Lord's will that the Church should evangelize the heathen nations. The *inherent* universalism of Jesus' Gospel, the pressure of the Holy Spirit, and the magnificent work of Paul, would amply suffice to produce this belief without Jesus Himself having actually given the order. (2) There is thus no need to date the composition of the disputed words so early that they would contradict the expectation of the Lord's early return. After the first ten or twenty years had passed without His reappearing, expectation of His early reappearance might quite easily be found alongside vigorous propagandist views. (3) Lastly, we are quite unable to say what Gospel-sources had been composed before Paul's influence made itself felt. It is quite possible that the Apostle Matthew's collection of Jesus' sayings was put together not later than Paul's missionary journeys, though this cannot be proved. That collection doubtless contained universalist utterances (e.g. Mt. viii. 10–12 = Lk. vii. 9 + xiii. 28-30); but none of the three most distinct passages which we have quoted stood in it. Two of them, Mt. xxiv. 14 and xxvi. 13, were taken by 'Matthew' from Mark's Gospel (xiii. 10 and xiv. 9), which was in all probability written after Paul's death, and in any case could not have been written very long before it. The words with which we are chiefly concerned (Mt. xxviii. 18 f) stand in 'Matthew' only, and it is impossible to prove that they existed anywhere in writing

[1] Jacquier in *Cath. Encyc.* x (1911) 63a, 64 f.

or otherwise before the year 70 A.D. It is one thing to admit that universalistic sayings of Jesus dwelt in the memory of His followers prior to the exercise of Paul's influence: it is quite another thing—and a wholly indefensible thing—to claim that Mt. xxviii. 18f must have stood in some Gospel-source at the same early date.

CHAPTER XVI

THE MOTHER OF JESUS

BELIEF in the Virgin-Birth of Jesus is, of course, not peculiar to Romanism or even to Catholicism in the wider sense. It has been an element in traditional Christian belief as recognized in nearly all sections of Christendom from very early times. It can claim the unequivocal support of the Gospel of 'Matthew,' in some sense at least that of the Gospel of Luke also; it is emphatically professed by Ignatius (about 115 A.D.), and by the earliest forms both of the eastern and of the western Creeds. It may be said to derive additional justification from the difficulty of accounting for its rise on any other assumption than that of its historical truth. At the same time, it has in the course of the last century or so become increasingly difficult of acceptance——not simply among sceptics and agnostics, but among sincere, intelligent, and enthusiastic disciples of Jesus. Among modernist and liberal Christians, disbelief in it may be said to be fairly general.[1] Let us repeat—what we have already said in another connection[2]—that the ground of this disbelief is not a philosophical rejection of all miracles a priori (though doubtless the knowledge that over large areas of life they are demonstrably non-existent has had great influence), but is rather the fact that the historical evidence strikes so many candid and reverent enquirers as insufficient to make Virgin-Birth more probable than normal birth. While therefore the refusal of some Christians to express belief in the Virgin-Birth inevitably pains those to whom this belief is precious, and while also it is impossible for any modernist to prove conclusively that our Lord was not virgin-born, human reasonableness and Christian charity alike demand that the convictions of fellow-Christians should be respected and that the matter should be discussed, if at all, only with mutual toleration and respect.[3]

Here then, in brief outline, are the chief grounds on which the Virgin-Birth of Jesus—and with it, much of the Birth- and Infancy-narratives in 'Matthew' and Luke—are by many Christians regarded as historically doubtful or even in all probability untrue.

1. There is fairly clear evidence that belief in the Virgin-Birth was

[1] Cf. Pryke, *Modernism*, 146–151.

[2] See above, pp. 195 ff.

[3] Contrast the words of Rev. L. Pullan in *Congress-Report 1920*, 76: "*Blasphemy* concerning the Birth and Resurrection and Person of our Lord has been treated by our bishops more tenderly than Benediction" (italics mine).

not by any means universal in the Church even down to the early part of the second century. Thus:—

(a). *As a whole*, the New Testament ignores it. There is no trace of a knowledge of it in Mark, or Peter, or Paul, or 'John.' Granted the historicity of the Birth-stories, is it conceivable that none of these should have known it, or that, if they knew it, all mention of it in their extant writings should have been lacking? Paul speaks of our Lord as "born of a woman, born under the Law" (Gal. iv. 4) and as "born of the seed of David according to the flesh" (Rom. i. 3). Could he have so written, when actually dealing with the Divine Sonship of Jesus, if he had known of and accepted the doctrine of His Virgin-Birth? The Fourth Gospel makes not only the Jews (vi. 42; cf. Mt. xiii. 55) but Jesus' own followers (i. 45) refer to Him as Joseph's son, and nowhere corrects them. In vii. 41, 42, the puzzled multitude asks: "Does the Messiah come out of Galilee? Has not the Scripture said that of the seed of David and from Bethlehem, the village where David was, the Messiah comes?" It has been urged[1] that the evangelist here is subtly ironical, he and his readers (unlike the puzzled Jewish multitude) knowing that Jesus was of the seed of David and had really been born at Bethlehem. Yet it is equally arguable that he regarded the Jews as right in their assumptions regarding Jesus' birthplace (possibly even in regard to his non-Davidic descent, which elsewhere he never mentions: cf. also Mark xii. 35–37), and wrong only in their inference that for this reason He could not be the Messiah.

(b). The presentation of two genealogies of *Joseph* as being also genealogies of Jesus points to the existence of a belief that Joseph was His real father. Jesus is repeatedly described in the New Testament as descended from David (Mt. ix. 27, xv. 22, xx. 30f, xxi. 9, 15; Mk. x. 47f, [xi. 10]; Lk. i. 32, 69, xviii. 38f; Ac. ii. 30, xiii. 23; Rom. i. 3; 2 Tim. ii. 8; Rev. v. 5, xxii. 16: cf. Heb. vii. 14), and so is Joseph (besides the genealogies, Mt. i. 20, Lk. i. 27, ii. 4): but Mary's tribal origin is not stated.[2] The supposition that she also was of Davidic descent is a pure expedient for harmonizing the assertions of Jesus' Davidic descent with the story of the Virgin-Birth. Even so, it does not harmonize them, for the theory would require the genealogies to be genealogies of *Mary*, whereas they are not so. The assertion that, as Joseph was the husband of Mary and therefore the 'legal' father of Jesus, his genealogy would be in place even though Jesus were not his real son, is arbitrary. The descent of Joseph, as distinct from the descent of Mary, could have interest only for those who believed that Jesus was really his son. The

[1] Ramsay, *Was Christ born at Bethlehem?* 95–97.

[2] Some early Christians thought she belonged to the tribe of Levi (Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, iii [1909] 345 f n. [Eng. tr. II. iii. 120]).

difficulty of harmonizing the genealogy of Joseph with the Virgin-Birth appears in the awkward parenthesis of Lk. iii. 23: "being the son—as was supposed—of Joseph," etc.

(c). The oldest of the two old Syriac versions known to us reads in Mt. i. 16: "Jacob begot Joseph; Joseph, to whom was betrothed Mary the Virgin, begot Jesus who is called Christ," in i. 21: "she shall bear *to thee* a son," and in i. 25: "she bore *to him* a son." These are not usually regarded as the original phrases used by 'Matthew,' for they are even more glaringly inconsistent with the rest of the narrative than is the genealogy itself. A good case, however, can be made out for the originality of the variant in i. 16. The Syriac version in question is probably at least as old as the middle or earlier part of the second century, and many of its readings are very primitive. As a whole, the version quoted does not deny the Virgin-Birth; but its alteration (if so it be) of Mt. i. 16 would not be easy to account for. At the very least, it is an unintentional confirmation of the argument of our last paragraph, and thus an intrusive witness of a real belief in Jesus' normal birth; whereas if it is, as Dr. Kenyon thinks possible, an approximation "to the text of the document from which St. Matthew's genealogy was derived, and in which our Lord would of course be entered as the son of Joseph," it confirms the argument of the last paragraph very strongly indeed.[1]

(d). A considerable section of the Ebionites denied the Virgin-Birth. These Ebionites came to rank in the eyes of the Church, from the middle of the second century onwards, as heretics: but they were professing Christians of Jewish origin dwelling in Palestine; and in this and other ways they were closely connected with places and circles where Jesus had been personally known. We cannot quote their disbelief as a disproof of the Virgin-Birth: but it is the less easy to account for it, if really cogent evidence for it was available in the first century.

(e). The first two chapters of Luke *in their present form* certainly support the Matthaean assertion of Virgin-Birth; but the support is far from being unequivocal, and there are several suggestions of a parallel belief in normal birth, which have significance, however hard it may be to determine the precise way in which the present narrative came into being. Thus in ii. 5, the old Sinaitic Syriac and three manuscripts of the old Latin version read, instead of "Mary who was betrothed to him," "Mary his wife"—a reading which is indirectly supported by several other authorities who give "Mary his betrothed wife," and which is quite likely to be original. In ii. 27 Joseph and Mary are referred to

[1] Westcott and Hort, *Select Readings*, 140–142; Sanday in H.*D.B.* ii (1899) 644 f; J. B. Mayor in *op. cit.* iii (1900) 287a; Kenyon, *Text. Crit.* 153–155; Box, *Virgin Birth*, 215–218.

as "the parents," in ii. 41, 43 as "his parents," in ii. 33 as "his father and mother." In ii. 48 Mary says to Him: "Thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing." In iv. 22 the crowd at Nazareth ask: "Is he not Joseph's son?" It has been claimed that, in preserving the popular references to Jesus as Joseph's son, the Gospel conforms to psychological and historical truth.[1] This apology no doubt covers the words of the Nazarene crowd—possibly also those spoken in the Temple by Mary; but it is a very poor explanation of the four or five other instances where the *author himself* in his own person uses language implying normal paternity. To have avoided such language, so far from laying the author open to the charge of violating the canons of historical and psychological truth, would simply have meant ordinary consistency.

Apart from the awkward parenthesis in iii. 23 already referred to, the only Lucan passage that can be quoted as affirming the Virgin-Birth is i. 34, 35. These verses do not *explicitly* mention the miracle; and, unless they are interpolated, the mention of "the throne of his father David" in i. 32 (cf. i. 27, ii. 4) would suggest that they do not imply it. On the other hand, they are difficult on independent grounds. Mary's doubt (in i. 34)—unlike Zachariah's (18–20)—passes unrebuked: 35 is simply a doublet or variant of 30–32: 34 and 35 separate easily from the context, and leave it (if they *do* imply virgin-birth) self-consistent. Hence several scholars have suggested that they are interpolated. It is no reply to this to urge that their Hebraistic style is the same as that of their context (for an interpolator can imitate and Luke may quite well have later added the words himself), or that immediate and miraculous conception is implied by Mary's haste in i. 39 (for other explanations of the haste are easily imaginable) or by the mention of "Elisabeth . . . also" in i. 36 (for the extraordinary character of Mary's conception is sufficiently indicated by the prophecies of i. 32). It is certainly striking that, whereas in the story of John the Baptist's birth the father is more prominent than the mother, in the story of Jesus' birth the mother is more prominent than the father. Our ignorance of the exact process by which the Lucan Protevangelion attained its present form makes it impossible to explain this fully: but the Virgin-Birth, while it would furnish an explanation, can hardly be considered the only possible explanation, and furthermore does not remove the other inconsistencies. To those already mentioned, one still remains to be added, namely, Luke's statement in ii. 50 that Joseph and Mary did not understand Jesus' assertion that He must be in His Father's house. This comes strangely after all the wonderful intimations they are said to have received in connexion with His birth.

[1] Cf. Box, *Virgin Birth*, 4 f.

2. The narrative in Mt. i and ii—apart from the two miracles of the Virgin-Birth and the Star—is historically unsatisfactory. Thus—

(a). The general character and style of the Gospel, as shown by a comparison with the other two Synoptics, is not such as to inspire confidence in its reliability when it narrates extraordinary or miraculous incidents or sayings which are not attested by any other authority.[1]

(b). The Matthaean Birth-stories are inconsistent with the Lucan. The genealogy is mostly quite different from Luke's, and the liberties which the compiler took with historical facts is seen in the artificial schematism of his genealogy—procured by the intentional omission of several generations here and there. Again, whereas Luke represents Joseph and Mary as both residing at Nazareth until just before Jesus' birth, in 'Matthew's' account Bethlehem is their home prior to Jesus' birth, and they settle at Nazareth for the first time on their return from Egypt. The discrepancies can indeed be overcome by conjectural harmonizations; but these—taken in conjunction with the general dissimilarity of the two accounts—would indicate that the authors of both had only the most partial and imperfect knowledge of the facts.

(c). The words of Mt. i. 22–23 suggest the real source of belief in the Virgin-Birth, viz: Christian reflection based on the Septuagint-translation of Isaiah vii. 14 into Greek. Of the original meaning of this passage in Isaiah, and the consequent impropriety of treating it as a prophecy of Jesus' birth, something has already been said.[2] The Hebrew of the passage ran: "Behold! a (or the) young woman has conceived, and will bear a son, and will call his name Immanu-'el" ("God-with-us"). The Septuagint translators in the second century B.C. rendered this: "Behold! the virgin will conceive, and will bear a son; and thou shalt call his name Emmanouel." It used to be said confidently that the Greek translators purposed in this way to represent the birth as both miraculous and Messianic, and that therefore, as a Messianic prophecy, the passage naturally suggested to Christian minds the idea that Jesus must have been miraculously born. Doubt has indeed been cast on these premises: it has been argued that the Septuagint implies, not a miraculous birth at all, but simply birth from a woman who was a virgin at the time of the utterance of the prophecy; and it has also been pointed out that there is no evidence whatever that either the Septuagint-translators or other Jews ever understood the passage to refer to the Messiah. Hence, it is claimed, the passage in the Septuagint cannot be the origin of the Christian belief in the Virgin-Birth of Jesus. Now it seems to the present writer very difficult to believe that the Septuagint-translators, in choosing παρθένος ('virgin') to translate a Hebrew word which admittedly means simply a sexually mature young woman, did

[1] See above, pp. 209–212.

[2] See above, p. 316.

not intend to express their belief that the birth referred to would be miraculous. But let us suppose that they had no such intention, and that neither they nor the Jews of later times regarded the passage as Messianic or believed that the Messiah would be virgin-born: and this is all for which any kind of agreement of recent scholars can be claimed. Does it necessarily follow that the Septuagint-passage could not have been the source of Christian belief in the Virgin-Birth? Not at all. Christians, believing that the Scriptures abounded with Messianic prophecies, and that Jesus was the Messiah, would naturally infer that He must have fulfilled them all. Coming to Isaiah vii. 14 in the Greek version (and Mt. i. 23 has "the virgin" just like the Septuagint of Isaiah vii. 14), they would quite readily fix upon it as a Messianic passage —in view of the 'sign,' the name 'Immanuel,' and so on—irrespective of whether the Jews had already regarded it as Messianic or not. The Messianic reference, once suggested, would be denied by no eager Christain believer, and, once accepted, would be regarded quite seriously as *evidence* that Jesus had been born of a virgin. There is no need to urge that pagan myths recounting virgin-births were responsible for the Christian doctrine, though it is not impossible that such myths (which were very widespread) may have exercised some influence both on the Septuagint-translators of the Old Testament, and also on certain early Christian circles.

3. The narrative in Luke ii. 1–39, though it is the work of one who had far more sense of history than the compiler of 'Matthew,' is historically unsatisfactory. The idea that Luke derived his information from Mary is no more than a plausible possibility. Great efforts have been made to vindicate the truthfulness of the story; but while some difficulties have been overcome, others remain. Only the barest outline of the argument is possible here.

(a). There is no adequate historical confirmation of the statement that an imperial enrolment took place in Syria and Palestine at the time of Jesus' birth (Lk. ii. 1 f), assuming that the tradition preserved in Mt. ii (cf. Lk. i. 5) that Jesus was born before the death of Herodes (spring, 4 B.C.) is correct. It has indeed been proved that an enrolment took place *in Egypt* in 20 A.D., that enrolments there took place every fourteen years, that there *might* therefore have been enrolments in Egypt in 8 B.C. and 6 A.D. (as there certainly was in Palestine in 6 A.D.), inasmuch as Augustus was fond of imperial statistics; but all this does not prove that there was an imperial enrolment *in Syria* in 8–4 B.C. —though the fact is not in itself improbable.[1] Even if one took place in

[1] Tertullianus (*Adv. Marc.* iv. 19) does indeed say that a census was held in Judaea by Sentius Saturninus, who was legate of Syria 9–6 B.C.; but his statement is easily explicable as a further particularization of Luke's chronology (cf. Ramsay, *Was Christ*, etc. 154–156; Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, i [1901] 321).

the Roman province of Syria, it is extremely unlikely, if not quite impossible, that Augustus would have ordered one in the territory of Herodes, who, though obliged to be obedient and obsequious to the Emperor, was nevertheless regarded as an independent sovereign so far as the internal administration of his own dominions was concerned.

(b). Quirinius certainly was not governor of Syria *in the ordinary sense* at the time of Jesus' birth. M. Titius was governor about 10 B.C.; G. Sentius Saturninus, about 9–6 B.C.; P. Quintilius Varus 6–4 B.C. (till after Herodes' death). It has indeed been shown to be probable that Quirinius (who was certainly governor in 6 A.D. and onwards) held that office twice; but his earlier period of office either fell about 4–1 B.C., which is too late for Luke's purpose, or was an extraordinary military command in the *northern* part of the province of Syria about 9–7 B.C., in which case we are without satisfactory explanation as to why Luke should use his name, rather than that of the regular governor, in order to date the enrolment.

(c). Even if an imperial enrolment *did* take place in Herodes' dominions some time about 8–4 B.C., it is difficult to see why Joseph should have had to travel from Nazareth (which Luke leads us to understand was his home) to Bethlehem "because he belonged to the house and family of David." Nothing seems to be known of any special *Jewish* method of enrolment by clans or families, such as the conciliatory Emperor is supposed to have permitted as a concession to the feelings of Herodes' subjects. A papyrus has indeed been discovered in Egypt in which the governor in 104 A.D. orders all who are absent from their nomes or districts to return to their own hearths in view of a forthcoming census.[1] This would give us an analogy for Joseph's journey, provided Bethlehem was—as 'Matthew' indeed suggests—his ordinary home at the time. But Luke's version almost excludes this: he tells us that Joseph went to Bethlehem, not because his home was there, but because he was descended from David, and that when he arrived there he went, not to his own house, nor yet to his relatives, but to an overcrowded inn. Nothing is known of David's family being settled at Bethlehem after David transferred his parents to Moab for safety during the reign of Saul (1 Sam. xxii. 3 f). In Micah v. 2, Bethlehem, as the well-known place of David's birth and early life, is acclaimed as the place of origin of the future Messiah. Jesus, being unquestionably the true Messiah, must have been born at Bethlehem: so the early Christian would inevitably argue (cf. Jn. vii. 42; Mt. ii. 4–6). Luke, accepting the belief

[1] In *Expos.* Dec. 1912, 481–495, Ramsay abandons the theory of a Jewish method of tribal or clan-enrolment (which he had defended in *Was Christ*, etc. 107 f, 185–190, 196 n.), in favour of the view that a return of all citizens to their original homes was a regular feature of the Imperial census throughout the Eastern provinces.

on trust, doubtless did his best to reconstruct the story out of his data, and has not succeeded in avoiding all anomalies.

(d). Even supposing Joseph had to go to Bethlehem, that does not account for the journey of Mary. She would not be wanted for census-purposes, and, being on the eve of her confinement, would hardly be in a condition to take a journey of seventy miles on an animal's back. Joseph's obligation and wish to take her under his protection as his wife does not explain why she should need to accompany him on what Luke represents as a temporary visit for State-purposes to another part of the country.

4. Some Christian scholars are willing to confess that the historical evidence for the Virgin-Birth of Jesus is inadequate of itself to command belief; but they plead in support of it its dogmatic fitness. It seems to them peculiarly appropriate that the incarnate and sinless Son of God should have assumed His human body in a uniquely pure and wonderful way.[1] But to appeal to doctrinal propriety as ground for believing that a certain historical event must have actually occurred is a most precarious proceeding. God's ways have not always been what earnest men thought they must have been and ought to have been. And apart from that, it is open to question whether the claim of dogmatic propriety can in this case be admitted. If it was necessary that Jesus should be exempt from the taint of human parentage, why was not the office of the mother—as well as that of the father—dispensed with?[2] Modern Christian thought has well outgrown that notion of the quasi-uncleanness of the sex-life which is pre-supposed in the dogmatic argument for the Virgin-Birth. We know that wedded love is a joining of lives together by God; and the holiness of a child's birth is in nowise enhanced by the miraculous elimination of one of his parents. Also, how is it possible to think of Jesus as truly man, if He was born without a human father?

It does not follow that, if Jesus was not virgin-born, He must have been an illegitimate child. Had He been so, the fact would almost certainly have been known, and made by His enemies a matter of reproach. It is generally agreed that Joseph died before Jesus' ministry began. Mary is never mentioned after the first chapter of Acts, referring to the events of about 30 A.D., when she must have been at least fifty years of age. Jacob, the brother of Jesus, was martyred about 62 A.D. How long His sisters and other brothers lived we do not know. Grandsons of His brother Judas were living in Palestine in Domitianus' reign (81–96 A.D.). The Gospels of Luke and 'Matthew' were probably written

[1] See the Catholic statement of this by Father Cuthbert in *God and the Supernatural*, 193 f. Cf. J. K. Mozley in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 201 f.

[2] So Melchizedek, a type of Christ, is observed by the author of 'Hebrews' (vii. 3) to have been "without father, without mother, without pedigree."

about 80–85 A.D. But even supposing members of the family were available for consultation when they were written, is it not perfectly likely that they would have been quite unable to correct the proposed versions of events that had taken place eighty or ninety years previously? How many of us—even if our parents are living—can describe the circumstances of our own births or those of our elder brothers and sisters? If Jesus was the first child of Joseph and Mary, born in obscurity at Nazareth about 5 B.C. (his known *age*, as a grown man, would guarantee the approximate date), the story that He had been born at Bethlehem, while His mother was still a virgin, could quite well have arisen amongst His followers, forty or fifty years after His death, out of their reverence for His person and their reflection on Old Testament prophecies which they were certain He had fulfilled.

Passing on now to other allusions to Mary in the New Testament, we cannot but be struck by their paucity and general trend. In Luke ii. 41–52 we have the incident of the boy Jesus in the Temple at the age of twelve; in John ii. 1–12 we have the miracle at the marriage at Kana, followed by a stay with Jesus and His brothers and disciples at Kapharnaum. In Mark iii. 21 we are told that Jesus' "relatives" (such seems to be the meaning of οἱ παρ' αὐτοῦ) "came out to get hold of Him, for they said, 'He is out of his mind,' "; then in vv. 31–35 (and the parallels) we read that His mother and brothers came and asked to be allowed to see Him, and that Jesus, on hearing of their arrival, observed that whoever did God's will was His brother or sister or mother. In Luke xi. 27 f, a woman in the crowd pronounces a blessing on Jesus' mother, to which He replies: "Nay rather, happy are they who hear God's word and keep it." It is impossible to feel that any very close understanding between mother and son is indicated by these allusions: indeed the contrary is rather the case. As a boy of twelve, He tells her that she might have known that He would have to be in His Father's house; and she and Joseph do not understand Him. At Kana He meets her suggestion with: "Woman, what have I to do with thee?"—words not discourteous, but plainly distant. She seems to have suspected Him, at one period of His ministry, of being mentally unbalanced, and to have taken part in an attempt "to get hold of Him" (Mk. iii. 21 [κρατῆσαι αὐτόν]; cf. 31–35 and parallels). On hearing her blessed, He blesses those who hear and keep God's word. A certain estrangement or divergence of ideals is certainly suggested: and this fact is by no means altered by the other two allusions to Mary in the New Testament—the account of what took place at the foot of the cross (Jn. xix. 25–27) and the mention of her as present in the first gathering of Christian disciples after the Ascension (Acts i. 14). On the other

hand, from the place which the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the analogy from human fatherhood fill in Jesus' teaching, we may gather that the relationships between Him and Joseph had been of a particularly intimate and tender kind.[1]

Such being in brief outline what history tells us of Mary's life, let us now look at the portrait of her which Catholicism presents.

In the first place, of course, profession of belief in the Virgin-Birth is definitely demanded by the Roman and Anglican Churches—as a condition of Church-membership. Only, in the latter it is an open secret that many who hold modernist views do not regard themselves as personally and literally bound by this particular clause in their credal pledge. The event itself cannot indeed be disproved: but we have seen to how many grave objections belief in it is open. Is a man to be excluded from the Christian Church because, in face of these objections, he cannot honestly declare his belief in it? We contend that any system which either refuses Church-fellowship to those who disbelieve it, or brands such disbelief as blasphemy, or exacts profession of belief in words while permitting disbelief in fact, stands condemned as either excluding, or tempting to unreal profession, those whom Jesus Himself would admit without any such conditions.

The Roman Church furthermore teaches that Mary was descended from David,[2] though as we have seen there is no authority for this in the Gospels other than the conjecture of harmonizers. It also teaches that she was sinless,[3] though Scripture by no means affirms this, and Irenaeus, Tertullianus, Origenes, and Chrysostomus clearly did not believe it.[4] It teaches that she brought forth her son without pangs or loss of virginity through the opening of the womb[5]—though on this also Scripture is totally silent. It teaches that, in the words she is said by Luke (i. 34) to have spoken to the angel Gabriel, she implied that

[1] Cf. J. A. Robertson, *Spiritual Pilgrimage of Jesus*, 31 f.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* I. iv. 12: "Maria enim . . . a Davide rege originem duxit."

[3] This is obviously *implied* by the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception (see below, pp. 358 ff.) Cf. also Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 200 f, 203; *Cath. Dict.* 559b; Cuthbert in *God and the Supernatural*, 194.

[4] See Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 135; J. B. Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 289a, 290a; Maas in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 466b, 467a. It was apparently in the latter half of the fourth century that the doctrine of her sinlessness was first suggested: its growth was fostered by Augustinus' sharp doctrine of original sin (e.g. *De Nat. et Grat.* xxxvi [42] [Migne, *P.L.* xliv. 267]).

[5] *Catech. Rom.* I. iv. 13, 14 (". . . Maria hac lege soluta est, ut quae, salva virginalis pudicitiae integritate, sine ullo doloris sensu, ut antea dictum est, Jesum Filium Dei peperit"). Cf. J. B. Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 288a with note †; Maas in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 464Hb (pangless parturition said to be implied by her laying her babe in a manger [Lk. ii. 7], and further to be fitting in view of Gen. iii. 16), 466a.

she had previously taken upon herself a vow of her perpetual virginity —a vow which was supposed by some to have been taken by her at the age of three, when she was presented by her parents in the Temple, and which she observed throughout life [1]: yet Jesus' brothers and sisters are mentioned (Mk. iii. 31, vi. 3 and parallels; John ii. 12, vii. 2–9; Acts i. 14; 1 Cor. ix. 5), and, since no allusion is made to another wife of Joseph, the presumption is that they were her children,[2] though this of course cannot be proved.

In 1854 Pius IX issued a bull in which he declared that "the doctrine, which holds that the most blessed Virgin Mary in the first moment of her conception was—by the singular favour and privilege granted by Almighty God, in view of the merits of Christ Jesus the Saviour of the human race—preserved immune from every stain of original sin, has been revealed by God, and therefore is to be firmly and constantly believed by all the faithful. Wherefore if any presume to think in their heart otherwise than has been defined by us—which God avert!—let them learn and further know (for certain) that they are condemned by their own judgment, and have suffered shipwreck as regards the faith, and have fallen away from the unity of the Church, and moreover that they render themselves by their own act liable to the penalties determined by law if they dare to make known by word or writing or any other external way what they think in their heart."[3] The doctrine of the 'Immaculate Conception' of the Virgin was thus made one of the 'de fide' doctrines of the Roman Church. The declaration was made by the Pope on his own responsibility and initiative, and pronounced in the presence of an assembly of bishops. It was not the decision of a General Council, though the Pope had previously consulted the bishops throughout the Catholic world by correspondence.[4] Since no revealed dogma accepted 'de fide' in the Roman Church can be held to be new, but all are regarded as parts of the primitive deposit of faith,[5] it is implied by the papal bull of 1854 and certainly maintained by Catholics that the Church from the beginning believed that the Virgin Mary was immaculately conceived.[6]

[1] Cf. J. B. Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 289b; Lobstein, *Virgin Birth*, 132 f (list of Protestant echoes); Maas in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 448ab, 464Fb, Ga, 466ab; Heiler, *Kathol.* 393. E. Arbez (*Cath. Encyc.* i [1907] 530b) calls Anna (Lk. ii. 36–38) "the aged prophetess, of whom legend knows that she had had Mary under her tutelage in the Temple."

[2] Cf. also Mt. i. 18 ("before they came together"), 25 ("he knew her not until she had borne a son"); Lk. ii. 7 ("she bore her *first-born* son").

[3] Bull *Ineffabilis Deus*, 8 Dec. 1854, in Mirbt 446 f: cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 200, 201 f.

[4] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 121–180, 351–407; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 140–148; Salmon, *Infall.* 20 f, 182 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 303.

[5] See, for evidence, above, pp. 27–29, 36–39.

[6] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 148 f, 384, 402 f; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 141, 144; Salmon, *Infall.* 20, 182.

Pius X is stated to have declared that the Hebrew patriarchs were familiar with the doctrine.[1]

Let us now see how this declaration compares with the facts of history. Of any belief in the sinlessness of the Virgin, or even of the payment of any special honour to her, there is—apart from the birth-stories in the Gospels—no certain trace in the New Testament[2] or in the Christian literature of the first three and a half centuries.[3] It is only in the writings of some of the fathers in the latter part of the fourth century that we see the process beginning.[4] It had become customary to apply to Mary the epithet θεοτόκος—'she who bore God'; and in the course of the fierce Christological conflicts of the fourth and fifth centuries, greater stress came to be laid on her right to this title. Meanwhile, Augustinus, who does not seem to have approved the use of the word θεοτόκος, encouraged, by his emphasis on original sin, the nascent idea of Mary's sinlessness[5]; and from that arose, by an easy process of reasoning, the notion of her having been born sinless.[6] In the ninth century, Paschasius Radbertus argued that she was sanctified in the womb; and in the eleventh Anselm taught that, though born in original sin, she was made sinless before Jesus' birth.[7] The first clear emergence of the belief that she was conceived free from original sin seems to have occurred in the twelfth century, when in the south of France an older festival in honour of the Conception of the Virgin was developed into a celebration of her Immaculate Conception. Catholics maintain that belief in this doctrine was part of the original deposit of faith accepted by the Church: yet here we see that it does not appear in history for—let us say—at least the first eight or nine hundred years of the Church's life; and when it does appear, so far from being recognized by leading Churchmen and

[1] See Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 143.

[2] Catholics indeed find her mentioned in the vision of the woman arrayed with the sun, in Rev. xii (e.g. Newman, *Developm.* 385). But while mention is made here of the mother of the Messiah, and it is just possible that the author was influenced in his insertion of the passage by the current belief in Jesus' Virgin-Birth, the figure of the woman is clearly symbolical, and as such stands far more probably for Israel —in particular the true or ideal Israel, the messianic community or Church, than it does for the personal mother of Jesus. Such at least was the general opinion of all the earliest commentators. Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 123, 162; Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 286b; Lobstein, *Virgin Birth*, 123; Box in *Virgin Birth*, 150 f, 163, 167; Moffatt in *Expos. Gk. Test.* ad loc.; Maas in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 469b–470a.

[3] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 112 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 32 f, 38, 161 f.

[4] The attempt made in *Cath. Dict.* 442b to prove that the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception was actually held by St. Ephraim late in the fourth century, does not carry conviction.

[5] Cf. Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 289. For the official Catholic doctrine of original sin, see *Conc. Trid.* sess. v and vi, capp. 3 f (Mirbt 293 f, 295 f); *Catech. Rom.* I. iii. 2.

[6] See the quotations from fifth century fathers in Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 204. Pusey observes (*Eiren.* 315–317) that Leo I (440–461 A.D.) spoke of Jesus as the *only* human being to be born sinless.

[7] Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo?* ii. 16 (see ftn. in Prout's Eng. trans.), 17.

Popes as part of the Christian faith, it is vehemently disputed for several centuries more, and meets with vigorous resistance from great saints and teachers. Thus the great and holy Bernard of Clairvaux (1091–1153), though accepting the view that Mary was sanctified before birth, protested strongly against belief in the Immaculate Conception as superstitious and opposed to the tradition of the Church! The doctrine was also rejected by the Pope Innocentius III (1160–1216 A.D.), and by the 'Angelic Doctor' Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274).[1] The great Franciscan, Duns Scotus, however, maintained the appropriateness of the doctrine (about 1300); and it became the theme of bitter and long-continued disputes between the Franciscan and the Dominican Orders.[2] In 1439 the Council of Basle declared that Mary was immune from original sin. In 1476 Sixtus IV offered indulgences to those who should celebrate masses in honour of her Immaculate Conception; and in 1483 he issued a bull condemning those who declared belief in and celebration of the Immaculate Conception to be heretical, and gave his approval to such recognition of the doctrine, while at the same time he forbade those who believed it to charge those who disbelieved it with heresy or mortal sin, "since (the matter) has not yet been decided by the Roman Church and Apostolic See."[3] In 1546 the Council of Trent, in deference to Sixtus IV's decrees, explicitly excepted Mary from the statements in the decree concerning original sin; but in view of the difference of opinion still existing, it deliberately refrained from making belief in the Immaculate Conception an article of faith.[4] In 1567 Pius V condemned, among the errors of Baius, the proposition that "no one besides Christ is without original sin; hence the blessed Virgin died on account of the sin contracted from Adam, and all her afflictions in this life, like those of other righteous persons, were punishments of sin actual or original."[5] In the years immediately preceding the definition of 1854, the Catholic bishops were consulted as to the advisability of the Immaculate Conception being declared 'de fide.' None of them expressed disbelief in the doctrine, and a large majority were in favour of the proposal; but a considerable number deprecated it,

[1] Pusey, *Eiren.* 177 f, 316–318; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 135 f; Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 290a.

[2] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 136–138; Salmon, *Infall.* 179 f; Mayor in H.*D.B.* l.c.

[3] For these and other details of the controversy, see Pusey *Eiren.* 172 ff; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 270 n., ii. 137 f, 147; Salmon, *Infall.* 180; Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 128 f, *Five Centuries*, i. 444 n.2; *Cath. Dict.* 440–443. The decree of 1476 is in the Tauchnitz edn. (1842) of *Conc. Trid.* 260 f; that of 1483 *ibid.* 261–263 and in Mirbt 243.

[4] *Conc. Trid.* sess. v, pecc. orig. fin. (Mirbt 294 [31]); Salmon, *Infall.* 180 f, 259; Heiler, *Kathol.* 148. For the contemporary story that St. Bernard had in heaven to wear a stain on his white robe because of his opposition to the belief, see Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 129, *Five Centuries*, i. 293 (with n.5), 501.

[5] Mirbt 347 (no. 73).

chiefly on the grounds that it was not contained in Scripture and that it would give a handle to the Protestant complaint that Rome was in the habit of inventing new dogmas.[1]

Now, whatever meaning is attachable to the declaration that belief in the Immaculate Conception was a part of the primitive deposit of faith, the history of the Catholic attitude to the doctrine proves beyond question that it was not capable of being directly proved from Scripture, and that the early Church had no explicit tradition on the subject. Prior to 1854 this was frankly recognized by Catholics. Even now, it is admitted that the dogma does not rest on historical evidence, but upon direct Divine revelation. When the question is asked, Why did not the Church of Rome, if capable of infallibly deciding the contested point, decide it long before these weary centuries of dispute and conflict had come to an end?, no answer is vouchsafed. The real answer clearly is that a papal decision given before the controversy had died down, would probably have caused a large minority (or even majority), despite their belief in the authority of the Pope, to secede from the Church. But if this is the real answer, it throws a strange light on the Catholic profession of trust in papal guidance.[2]

In explanation of the disagreement of Catholics prior to the definition of 1854, it is urged that "such diversity of opinion commonly precedes and leads up to an ecclesiastical definition. The Divine assistance does not preclude the necessity of diligent enquiry," also that some of the technical terms involved had not yet been clearly defined.[3] But how does this get over the difficulty that a doctrine cannot truly be said to be a part of the original deposit of faith accepted and believed by the Church, when nothing is heard of it for eight or nine hundred years, and when for several centuries after its appearance the Church is deeply divided on the question of its truth, several of the most eminent mediaeval Churchmen (men like Bernard and Thomas Aquinas) vehemently opposing it? Only by doing extreme violence to language can the historical truthfulness of the Church on this point be defended.

The doctrine itself is defended on the ground of its logical congruity with the doctrine of the Incarnation. "The Christian mind shudders at the thought that she who was to be the living Temple of God Incarnate should have been permitted by God, who could prevent it, to be first

[1] See the interesting summaries and quotations in Pusey, *Eiren.* 115 f, 121–153, 188–190, 351–407; cf. 116 f, 153 ff, 161, 332 f, 407–409.

[2] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 388 f; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 145, 147; Salmon, *Infall.* 20, 42, 133, 179–186, 259; Thorpe in *Anglic. Ess.* 234–237; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 177 n., 192 f; *Universe*, 23 July 1926, 10 (virtual admission of lack of historical evidence). The unsigned protest in *Irish Eccles. Journ.* Jan. 1852, 8b–10a, is of interest as having been issued just *prior* to the declaration of 1854.

[3] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 201.

the abode of the devil."[1] But abstract logical inferences from facts taken in isolation from other facts, and in detachment especially from concrete experiences, are an exceedingly unsafe basis for deductions as to historical happenings. It would be possible, by reasoning in this fashion, to prove that the Virgin Mary must have been not only immaculately conceived, but that she must also have been virgin-born, and indeed that her mother and ancestors back to the beginning of time must have been virgin-born and conceived free from original sin. Only so, it might well be argued in the abstract, could the evil taint of Adam's sinful bequest be entirely averted from our Lord's Mother.[2]

Not only does the Church teach that Mary was conceived free from original sin, but also that after death she was—physically and bodily—translated to heaven. "The Church signifies her belief in this fact by celebrating the feast of her Assumption on the fifteenth of August . . . it is plain that the Church encourages and approves this belief from the fact that she selects for the lessons during the octave a passage from St. John Damascene in which the history of this corporal assumption is given in detail. This pious belief is recommended for its intrinsic reasonableness; for surely it is natural to suppose that our Lord did not suffer that sacred body in which He himself had dwelt and from which He had formed His own sacred humanity to become a prey to corruption. It is confirmed by the testimony of St. Andrew of Crete, of St. John Damascene, and of many ancient Martyrologies and Missals. . . . It is, moreover, a striking fact that, notwithstanding the zeal of the early Church in collecting and venerating relics, no relics of the Blessed Virgin's body have ever been exhibited. Much weight, too, must be given to the common sentiment of the faithful. . . . The corporal assumption is not an article of faith. Still Melchior Cano sums up the general teaching of theologians on this head when he says:—'The denial of the Blessed Virgin's corporal assumption into heaven, though by no means contrary to the faith, is still so much opposed to the common agreement of the Church, that it would be a mark of insolent temerity.' "[3]

Observe now how much Catholic professions of loyalty to historical evidence are worth. Here is a pious fancy for which there is no particle of historical evidence whatever. There is no trace of its existence among orthodox writers before 400 A.D.[4] The festival of the Assumption

[1] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 201; cf. 200, 202 f, 205 f.

[2] Cf. Lobstein, *Virgin Birth*, 85 f. Anglo-Catholics, it may be observed, seem to accept the view that Mary was sinless, but not the doctrine of her Immaculate Conception (Father Huntington in *Congress-Report 1923*, 27).

[3] *Cath. Dict.* 58 f. Cf. Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 501 top; W ight, *Rom. Cath.* 167 f; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 165 f.

[4] Epiphanius (315–402 A.D.) was unacquainted with any accepted traditions on the subject of Mary's later life, and the *Apostolic Constitutions* (about 375 A.D.) roundly condemned the Apocryphal Gospels, in which many fanciful details were given (Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii [1900] 287b, 288b).

was instituted early in the seventh century. Of the two writers whose 'testimony' is said to confirm the belief, Andrew of Crete lived in the seventh century, and John of Damascus in the eighth. As in the case of the Immaculate Conception, so here, abstract logical propriety is coolly substituted for historical evidence; and any denial of the doctrine so established is treated as a grave sin, a piece of insolent temerity, a 'sententia haeresi proxima.'[1]

The ascription of honours of a special and quasi-divine character to the Virgin Mary can be traced through the centuries in an ever-growing scale. No prayer or worship of any kind is offered to her (except by one minute fourth-century sect) during the first four centuries: for the first five centuries she receives no unique glorification in Christian Art, such as begins to be customary from the middle of the sixth century onwards. In the seventh century the festival of her Assumption to heaven is founded. In the eighth the lavish use of images in connexion with the invocation of the Virgin and of other saints called forth the futile efforts of the Iconoclasts; and John of Damascus gave her the highest place in heaven next to the Trinity. Despite the protests of certain eminent Churchmen, Mariolatry advanced apace. In the ninth century art enthrones her as Queen of Heaven, and Paschasius Radbertus declared that she was sanctified in the womb. In the tenth, the festival of her Nativity is established. In the eleventh, Saturday is appropriated to her worship by the Clergy. In the twelfth, the recognition of her Immaculate Conception becomes prominent in the West, the festival of her 'Presentation' by her parents in the East; the 'Ave Maria' comes into use as a regular Church-formula; and in art the Virgin is now enthroned side by side with Christ as His equal. In the thirteenth, the Rosary and the 'Angelus' are introduced, the appropriation of Saturday to her worship is made applicable to the laity, and Thomas Aquinas and still more the Franciscan Bonaventura heap honorific phrases and titles upon her. In the fourteenth, the festival of the 'Presentation' becomes known in the West, and that of the 'Visitation' (of Mary to Elizabeth) is instituted; and even Wyclif in an early sermon proclaimed it to be necessary for everyone to obtain her help. In the fifteenth, the doctrine and celebration of her Immaculate Conception received formal papal approval (though the denial of it was not anathematized); and in the sixteenth, this was confirmed by the Council

[1] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 107, 114 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 42; Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 288b (with note ‡, which quotes Cath. statement in Wilhelm and Scannell: "Mary's corporeal assumption into heaven is so thoroughly implied in the notion of her personality as given by Bible and dogma, that the Church can dispense with strict historical evidence of the fact"), 291b; Heiler, *Kathol.* 240 f, 365 n.; Thorpe in *Anglic. Ess.* 231–233; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 192 n.; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 89 top.

of Trent.[1] Luther complained that some commentators of his day discovered an allusion to the Virgin Mary wherever they found a word of the feminine gender in Scripture.[2] Ignatius, the founder of the Jesuits, prayed daily to her for hours, and constantly depended on her help.[3]

In more recent times, the expression of Catholic devotion to the Virgin Mary has often gone to extreme lengths, such as have provoked the vigorous remonstrances of Protestants, not excluding some of the most loyal Anglicans. The devotional work written in 1750 by Alphonso dei Liguori, entitled 'The Glories of Mary,' has been in a special way a mark for such attacks, both on account of its extravagances, and also on account of its popularity and the eminence of the author, who was canonized in 1839 and in 1871 was declared a 'Doctor of the Church.'[4] A fairly recent Catholic statement tells us: "Theology sums up the function of our Lady in the body of Christ when it terms her the neck through whom the vital influx derives from the Head to the members. Certainly this conception is absent from St. Paul and is the result of a later doctrinal development. But the reason for this absence is easy to show. As the Epistle to the Colossians shows us, the early Christians were often slow to grasp the unique headship of Christ and in grave danger of co-ordinating with Him angelic mediators between themselves and God. Until the Headship of Christ had been firmly established in the consciousness of Christians, the doctrine of the neck could not have been stated without inevitable misunderstanding and abuse. But none the less St. Paul is the precursor of St. Bernard."[5] It has indeed to be observed that, whatever be the prevalence of extreme views and practices in this connexion, the Church has not officially committed herself to them—not even to the teachings of Liguori: her full dogmatic sanction has been limited to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception promulgated as 'de fide' in 1854. At the same time, beliefs expressed and sanctioned by representative Catholic teachers and by Catholic usage generally, even if not 'de fide,' must yet be treated as being real characteristics of Catholicism; and, if they are open to objection, it is Catholicism that must accept responsibility for the defect.[6]

The gravamen of the Protestant charge is that the Catholic devotion

[1] For the foregoing, see Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 289a–292a.

[2] Milner, *Hist. of Ch. of Christ*, v. 303 (quoting Luther's *Comm. on Deut.*). For the extravagant discovery of types of the Virgin in the Old Testament, see Maas in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 464 DE.

[3] Heiler, *Kathol.* 150.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 193–195; Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 291a; Thorpe in *Anglic. Ess.* 192–215, esp. 206 ff.

[5] Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 255; cf. 275 (". . . the Head is there already and the neck and so many fair members"). The comparison of Mary to an aqueduct and a neck also appears in Pius X's encyclical *Ad diem illum* of 2 Feb. 1904.

[6] Cf. Hase, *Hamdbook*, ii. 122.

to Mary, besides having no warrant in the known facts of history and experience, necessarily leads in practice to an exaltation of her above the Saviour Himself. Thus it has been observed that out of the 433 churches and chapels in Rome, no less than 121 are dedicated to Mary, whereas only fifteen are dedicated to Jesus, five to the Trinity, four to the crucifix, two to the Sacraments, and two to the Holy Spirit. In Southern India the Protestant churches used to be called by the natives 'Jesus-Churches,' the Catholic ones 'Mary-Churches.'[1] God's love for Mary is described in extravagant terms: she has been identified with the Wisdom said in Proverbs viii to have been possessed by the Lord in the beginning as His daily delight; an eleventh-century Cardinal (Damiani) described God as burning with love toward her, singing in her honour the Song of Songs, and being mollified in His wrath by her beauty.[2] The idea that in the Eucharist the communicant partakes, not only of the flesh of Jesus, but also of the flesh of Mary, was taught not only by Ignatius Loyola (1491–1566) and Cornelius à Lapide (1567–1637), but by more recent Catholic writers like Heinrich Oswald (whose 'Dogmatische Mariologie' was published at Paderborn in 1850) and Faber (1814-1863), and was known by Pusey to be prevalent among the poorer classes in Rome.[3] Bernardinus de Bustis (who died 1500 A.D.), in his 'Mariale,' wrote: "Since the Virgin Mary is Mother of God (and God is her son, and every Son is naturally inferior to his Mother and subject to her, and the Mother is preferred above and is superior to her Son), it follows that the Blessed Virgin is herself superior to God, and God Himself is her subject by reason of the humanity derived from her."[4] The popular title given to her, 'Stella Maris,' rests partly on a verbal play on her name, partly on the identification of her with the old pagan deity Venus Marina;[5] and other indications of the survival of heathen goddess-worship can be clearly traced in the cult of the Madonna. In spite of the emphatic denial by the authorities of the Church that the Virgin is regarded as a goddess and is accorded Divine worship,[6] yet in actual practice—and particularly in popular usage—the distinction between veneration and Divine worship is not maintained.[7] Wherever a special

[1] Pusey, *Eiren.* 107.

[2] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 108 f.

[3] Pusey, *Eiren.* 168–172: cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 121.

[4] I borrow the quotation from *Anglic. Ess.* 206. Similar utterances of this and other Catholic writers are quoted by Pusey, *Eiren.* 103. Dr. Faà di Bruno (*Cath. Belief*, 194–197) explains precisely what is meant by the important title 'Mother of God.' On the honouring of Mary above Jesus, cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 184.

[5] Gilavert, *Influence of Cath.* 106 (Mary as Patroness of Mariners); Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 289b; Thorpe in *Anglic. Ess.* 209; Heiler, *Kathol.* 186, 190. On Venus Marina, cf. Horatius, *Carm.* I. iii. 1, III. xxvi. 5, and IV. xi. 15.

[6] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 215; Heiler, *Kathol.* 183.

[7] Heiler, *Kathol.* 183 f (mediaeval poets, etc. called her 'goddess'), 572–574 (forgiveness and mercy, which Jesus declared to be attributes of the Heavenly Father, and Paul connected with the crucified Christ, are attached by Catholics primarily to the figure of Mary).

image or shrine of the Madonna is attended with observances, she there assumes in popular fancy a special individuality of her own; and each of the numerous local titles the Virgin thus acquires represents practically a separate individual patroness—'Our Lady of' so-and-so. How close an approximation this to the polytheism of pagan times![1]

What Protestants must needs regard as the most pernicious of all the imaginary prerogatives assigned by Catholics to our Lord's Mother is the virtual transfer to her, as intercessor, of the Divine qualities of pity and forgiving love.[2] Mary not only hears prayer and helps Christians amid their earthly troubles;[3] but she intercedes in heaven on their behalf.[4] Not only does she intercede for them, but her intercession is an indispensable necessity for them.[5] Not only is her intercession necessary, but it is to be preferred to that of Christ Himself.[6] He who is aggrieved by the justice of God can take His case to Mary.[7] She has virtue to stay the Divine wrath—even the wrath of her Son. She holds

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 130 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 189 ("Es gibt nicht nur e i n e Madonna im Himmel, sondern viele Madonnen auf Erden, entsprechend der Vielzahl der Madonnenheiligtümer, genau so wie es in der altkananäischen Religion so viele *Be'âlîm* und *'Astaroth* wie Kultstätten, *ašerîm* und *masseboth* gab. Die Muttergottes von Lourdes ist für naive Katholiken nicht dieselbe wie die von Loretto oder Einsiedeln oder Altötting; von einfältigen katholischen Frauen kann man sogar die Redewendung hören, die Altöttinger Muttergottes könne besser helfen wie die von Maria Eich"). Cf. the remark made in V. B. Ibañez's novel, *The Matador* (ch. 10; Eng. trans. 365), about a Spanish lady: "She did not know this Virgin" (the 'Virgin of the Dove' at Madrid), "but surely she must be gentle and kind, like the one in Seville, to whom she had prayed so often"). In 1794 Pius VI condemned as "temerarious, offensive to pious ears, (and) especially injurious to the veneration owed to the Blessed Virgin," the statement of the Synod of Pistoia that special titles ought not to be assigned to images of the Virgin other than those sanctioned by Scripture (bull *Auctorem Fidei*, prop. 71, in Tauchnitz edit. [1842] of *Conc. Trid.* 318 f).

[2] See n. 7 on previous page.

[3] Heiler, *Kathol.* 184 f.

[4] *Catech. Rom.* IV. v. 6; Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxxix f (a Catholic Bishop in 1864 proves her power of intercession from the story of the miracle at Cana), ii. 111, 115, 120; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 199.

[5] See the quotations in Pusey, *Eiren.* 101–103 ("God gives no grace except through Mary" [Liguori]; "it is morally impossible for those to be saved who neglect the devotion to the Blessed Virgin," etc.), 107, and Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 290a bott. ("nullus potest jam caelum intrare nisi per Mariam transeat tanquam per portam" [Bonaventura]), 291a n. (recent defence of statement that 'God grants no grace except on the intercession of Mary').

[6] Cf. quotations in Pusey, *Eiren.* 103 ("it is safer to seek salvation through her than directly from Jesus"), 108, and in Thorpe in *Anglic. Ess.* 206 (Anselm quoted by Liguori). The belief is picturesquely represented in the oft-quoted vision of Leo, a companion of St. Francis: he saw two ladders—one red, at the top of which was Christ, and the other white, at the top of which was Mary; those who attempted to climb the first always failed; being warned by a voice to climb the second, they complied, and so attained Paradise (Liguori quoted by Pusey, *Eiren.* 103 f n. 4, Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 120, Thorpe in *Anglic. Ess.* 207, and Coulton, *Five Centuries*, 153).

[7] Bernardinus de Bustis ap. Thorpe in *Anglic. Ess.* 206.

back Jesus from vengeance;[1] and when He will have no mercy, the Christian may have recourse to her.[2]

No doubt much may be said in defence of this Catholic veneration for the Virgin Mary. Were abstract logic, starting from transcendental premises, of itself a safe guide to truth, a great deal of the Roman system could be shown to be truthful. We have seen, for instance, how the dogma of the Immaculate Conception can be deduced by an apparently irresistible train of purely abstract reasoning from the great major premise of the Incarnation. In somewhat the same way, the duty of loving, exalting, and praying to the Virgin can be logically deduced from the fact that she was the Mother of our Saviour, and that He Himself loved and honoured her.[3] Moreover, the cult of the Virgin has been in many ways a blessing to mankind. It has been the vehicle whereby the consoling love of God has been brought home to many of His simple-minded and troubled children.[4] It has stood for the quickening of art, the exaltation of womanhood, the cultivation of the gentler virtues, the supercession of polytheism and immorality by a serious profession of the worship of one God and a serious effort after purity of life.[5] At the same time, a religious institution which owes so much as the Madonna-cult owes to abstract logic unchecked by historical evidence, to credulous onesidedness in the interpretation of Scripture, to the riotous imaginings of mediaeval piety, to the untruthful presentation of late dogma as primitive Christian faith, and to superstition and fancy in general, cannot but be fraught with immense moral and spiritual danger to those who are inseparably committed to it.[6]

[1] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 104–106; Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 292a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 111 (Bernard), 138 (Dante), 184, 573; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 140, 147 f, 153–157, 162, 367 f, 500, 507 f, 515.

[2] So Liguori ap. Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 289; cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 105 f n.8.

[3] So Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 197–199.

[4] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 199 f.

[5] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 213 f; Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 292ab.

[6] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 113 f ('development' will not get over objection of unscripturalness); Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 214 f; Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 292 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 364 ("Die ganze Mariologie trägt denselben abstrakten Charakter wie die Christologie; sie konstruiert durch künstliche Begriffskombinationen einen Mariengestalt, die mit der schlichten und einfältigen Mutter Jesu nichts, mit der wundersamen Helferin und Mutter der Marienfrömmigkeit nur wenig gemeinsam hat").

CHAPTER XVII

THE FOUNDATION OF THE CHURCH

It could probably be said with truth that one of the essential elements in the Anglo-Catholic position is the belief that Jesus intentionally and deliberately founded the institution known as the Christian Church, that He foresaw its age-long continuance, and that He laid down, at least in outline, the method by which it was to be governed.[1] It is in any case certain that such a belief is absolutely essential to Roman Catholicism, as is also the further belief that Jesus bestowed upon Peter the headship or primacy of the Church, in such a sense that both he and his successors in office should not only enjoy supreme jurisdiction, but should be enabled to pronounce infallibly in regard to the faith and morals of the Church.[2]

It is our task in this chapter to examine the historical basis for these beliefs: and in doing so, we shall copy the example of the most recent Romanist and Anglo-Catholic scholars, and start by examining the Gospels simply as human and historical documents;[3] but we shall understand this as permitting *in principle* the critical treatment of the documents,[4] and we shall make it our aim to investigate what is obscure by the light of what is clear, and not vice versa.

Now in the sayings of Jesus recorded in the four Gospels, 'the Kingdom of God' or 'of Heaven' is mentioned nearly seventy times—not counting either parallel-sayings or allusions to the Kingdom by the Evangelists as distinct from our Lord. Only twice is Jesus represented as speaking of 'the Church.' It seems reasonable therefore first to make sure, if we can, of our Lord's view of the Kingdom, and then to study the Church-sayings in the light of our findings.

Without being able in this place to argue out in detail every aspect of so wide and controversial a subject, I would submit the following four propositions in regard to our Lord's doctrine of the Kingdom in the earlier part of His ministry.

1. Since we cannot ascribe detailed foreknowledge of history to Jesus without stultifying our belief in His true humanity (besides incurring other grave difficulties of a philosophical kind), we are free to believe —what is inherently likely—that He did not from the outset of His

[1] See the moderate statement by Dr. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 35–71: cf. D. Stone in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 624ab.

[2] See above, pp. 19–28.

[3] See above, p. 331.

[4] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 18 top.

ministry foresee as a certainty that His fellow-countrymen would reject Him and compass His death. No Jew then believed that the Messiah must die. The joyous and triumphant tone of the early Galilaean ministry (e.g. Mt. xi. 19, xii. 29 and parallels), the language of bitter disappointment with which Jesus spoke later of the nation's rejection of Himself (Lk. xiii. 34, xix. 41-44), and the comparative lateness of practically all His recorded allusions to the Passion, combine to indicate that at first He hoped and expected, not ultimate crucifixion, but ultimate coronation. His early application to Himself of some of the prophecies about 'the Servant of Yahweh' (Isa. xlii. 1–4, xlix. 1–6, l. 4–9, and lii. 13–liii. 12; cf. lxi. 1–3) do not prove that *from the first* He applied to Himself the martyr-story in Isa. liii, as at the end of His life He certainly did (eg. Lk. xxii. 37); nor can we press, against the bulk of evidence on the other side, the precarious date of the isolated reference to the passion in Mk. ii. 20 and its parallels.

2. In much of Jesus' early teaching, it seems to be tacitly assumed that the Jews, as a whole and as a class, would form, if not the sole members, at least the nucleus and first instalment, of the Divine Kingdom. The number of the Apostles clearly had reference to the number of the Hebrew tribes (Mt. xix. 28 = Lk. xxii. 30). He spoke of His followers as 'brothers,' a word which to a Jew meant 'fellow-Jews'; and He frequently contrasted the ways of the Kingdom with the ways of 'the Gentiles.' He hesitated—for whatever reason—before performing a miracle on behalf of a Phoenician woman. At the end of His life He admitted the truth of His title, 'The King of the *Jews*.' This evidence confirms, what indeed we should have expected in the case of one convinced of His own Messiahship and expecting to be received as such and not repudiated, viz: that Jesus at first visualized the Kingdom as comprising primarily the sound bulk of the Jewish people.[1]

3. The Kingdom of God was destined to come in the near future, and cataclysmically. The cataclysmic nature of this coming was not dependent upon the rejection of Jesus by the Jews, but was a natural and necessary implicate of the prophetic, and in particular of the apocalyptic, world-view. Old-Testament prophecy, the general outlook reflected in the apocalypses, the proclamations of John the Baptist, and the actual records of Jesus' early teaching—all lead us to believe that, while recognizing fully in a real sense the presence of the Kingdom wherever and whenever God's work was being done (e.g. Mt. xii. 28

[1] The evidence on this point is abundant, but its significance has been strangely missed. I have collected it in detail in an article in *Expos. Times*, Nov. 1926, 57–60. In addition to what is referred to above in the text, see Lk. xiii. 16, xix. 9, Mt. v. 35, viii. 12 (where "sons of the Kingdom" clearly means 'Jews'), xiii. 52 (where "scribe" is to be taken literally, see M'Neile *ad loc.*), xxi. 43.

= Lk. xi. 20; Lk. xvii. 20 f), He yet looked forward to a great and cataclysmic intervention on the part of God, which would involve a world-judgment and an establishment of the Kingdom on a grand historic scale.[1]

4. The coming of the Kingdom involved the transmutation of the feud between the Jews and Rome into a peaceful friendship—as a result of the manifestation of gentleness and love on the part of the former. That the priority of Israel in the Kingdom on earth did not exclude the world-wide extension of its benefits to all mankind, is clear from many passages of our Saviour's teaching.[2] Nor did the Divine climax by which the Kingdom was to be definitely and triumphantly established exclude the initial and progressive realization of it by moral and spiritual changes effected preparatorily in the present. And since resentment against the Roman (and Rome-supported Herodian) dominion was the most prominent element in the Jewish view of contemporary world-politics, it follows that no Messianic programme for the establishment of God's Kingdom on earth—however spiritual—could have afforded to ignore the problem presented by Judaeo-Roman enmity. If we re-read the Gospels with this fact in mind, we shall observe a great deal of our Lord's teaching which has fairly clear reference to the international situation and indicates the policy which He commended to His fellow-countrymen as the only wise solution of its difficulties.[3] This policy was:—that by gentleness, goodwill, and religious leadership, Israel should change the suspicious and oppressive tyranny of Rome, and the dislike felt by the Gentile world, into a peaceful fellowship, and should thus become the guide, philosopher, and friend of the human race, and the builders of the world-wide and glorious Kingdom of God. It was clear that the only ultimate alternative to this Divine way of salvation was—what actually happened as a result of Israel's refusal of it—a bloody fight with Rome to a finish.[4]

As long as it was possible to hope that the Jews as a whole would rise to this grand Messianic challenge, it is not likely that any idea of a 'Church' shaped itself in our Lord's mind, apart from His conception of a purified and growing Israel making real the sublime universalism

[1] Owing to the later prominence of the Parousia-prophecy, it is not easy to gather passages demonstrating the catastrophic coming of the Kingdom independently of Jesus' own suffering and return: but see Mt. iii. 2, 7–12, iv. 17, vi. 10, vii. 24–27, x. 15, xii. 41 f, xiii. 36–50, and their parallels; Mk. iv. 29.

[2] See the evidence collected in my article in *Expos. Times*, Dec. 1926, 136–140.

[3] Re-read for instance, from this point of view, Mt. iv. 8–10, v. 38–48 (esp. 41), xi. 20–24, Lk. xi. 49–51, xii. 54–xiii. 9, xiii. 34–35, xix. 41–44, xx. 20–26, xxiii. 27–31, Mk. xiii. 2, 8, 14–20, and the parallels (where they exist).

[4] The evidence is more fully presented and discussed, and the literature on the subject given, in *Expos.* Mar. 1925, 187–192, and *Expos. Times*, Dec. 1926, 139 f.

forecast in some of the visions of the Old-Testament prophets.[1] A tragic shadow, however, soon began to dim the glory of these golden hopes, and eventually overclouded the whole outlook. It became practically certain that the nation as a whole, and in particular its religious leaders, would not follow Jesus: they became offended with Him on various grounds, not least, probably, on account of the political bearing of His Gospel of the Kingdom. Their hostility ultimately became so bitter that the continuance of His public work was likely to be violently obstructed. Since abandonment of His task was out of the question, the only two alternatives were armed rebellion and martyrdom. Many voices would have advocated the former: the wars of the Old Testament, its prophecies of the military glory of the Messiah, the heroic struggles of the early Maccabees, and the fiery religious patriotism of a nation in bondage—all pointed in this direction. But the same Gospel of Divine and human love which had fashioned the policy of reconciliation with Rome excluded the policy of attempting to overcome Jewish opposition by force of arms. Every door therefore was shut but the one that led to the Cross, and through that door our Saviour was determined to go.

Tremendous results waited upon His decision. It was destined to effect a potent revelation of the mind and heart of God to a sin-stained and disobedient race—a revelation that was in itself the great saving act of Divine love in human history, so far-reaching in the changes it has wrought, that Christian minds have not yet come to rest, in the attempt to analyse and explain it. Into that rich field we cannot enter here: we are concerned rather with the immediate effects of our Lord's decision upon His thoughts in regard to the coming of the Kingdom. The obvious political result of the nation's rejection of His Gospel would be a struggle à outrance between the Jews and Rome—appalling in its horror and disastrous in its issue.[2] But swiftly ensuing, it would seem, upon this catastrophe, would come the Divine vindication of Jesus Himself. On a day and at an hour known only to God, but within the lifetime of most still living, the humiliated and crucified Son of Man would return on the clouds in His Father's glory and with the holy angels. There is room for doubt as to precisely how our Lord's language about this Coming or Parousia is to be interpreted: there is no room for doubt (unless the Gospels are wholly unreliable) as to His having prophesied that He would return in triumph before that generation had passed away, and that His return would inaugurate the

[1] There is thus much historical justification in Dr. Gore's argument that Jesus did not found, but that He rather *re*-founded, the Church (*Holy Spirit*, 26 f, 31, 35–51, 60; esp. 42 f, 51).

[2] See the passages quoted in n. 3 on the previous page.

definitive establishment of the Kingdom of God. The evidence on these points is quite explicit and unexceptionable, and is not cancelled by the obvious tendency of certain of the Gospel-documents to exaggerate our Lord's eschatological teaching. Nor does the justifiable contention of most modern scholars (as against the extreme eschatological school) that His expectation of His Parousia did not always dominate His whole thought and teaching, at all suffice to prove that this expectation was not entertained by Him in a very real and vivid way.[1]

Such then is the background against which we have to consider the question as to whether or not Jesus founded the Church, and as to how far the Church-sayings attributed to Him are genuine and mean what Catholics claim them to mean. There has been a tendency on the part of some writers to draw from the well-established eschatological teaching of Jesus the inference that, since He expected the early advent of the Kingdom, He could not in any real sense have intended to found a 'Church,' i.e. a permanent society of followers, still less could He have laid down regulations as to its constitution and government.[2] But the question is not so simple as to lend itself to a monosyllabic answer of either kind. If it could be proved that Jesus felt certain that His return would occur within, say, five years of His death, the argument would indeed have considerable force. But there is no evidence that He was confident that the interval would be so short. Usually, His limit is simply 'this generation'; and He normally assumes that at least the majority of those to whom He was speaking would live to see the fulfilment of His prophecies. We cannot therefore stretch the period to sixty or seventy years, as one passage (Mk. ix. 1 and parallels) might seem to permit: but we may fairly claim that His outlook allowed an interval of anything

[1] Let the candid reader turn up the following passages and their parallels, and ask himself whether what is stated above is not abundantly justified:—Mk. viii. 31–ix. 1, xiii. 3 f, 24–32, xiv. 62, Mt. xxiv. 26–28, 37–44. The attempt made by Rev. N. P. Williams (*Congress-Report 1923*, 170–172) to show that Jesus dissociated His parousia by an indefinite interval (possibly of many generations) from the fall of Jerusalem, is—in the light of these passages—a total failure: it involves a degree of scepticism in regard to the value of Gospel-evidence, which would be surprising in a rationalistic critic and, in the case of an Anglo-Catholic, is simply incomprehensible. In *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 404, he seems more disposed to accept the usual eschatological view. A recent statement of the case from the critical point of view is given by Rev. H. J. Flowers in *Congreg. Quart.* Jan. 1927, 8–15. For the Romanist treatment of the evidence, see below, pp. 374 f. Mt. x. 23 has probably been adapted to the times of the early Christian mission to the Jews; but it at least reflects—as indeed does the early Christian eschatology generally—what our Lord was believed to have said in regard to the comparatively early date of his return.

[2] Cf. Holtzmann, *N.T. Theol.* i. 265, 268 f, 271 f; Oman in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 618 f; Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 249; and especially Heiler, *Kathol.* XXVII, 3 f, 18 f, 24 f, 37, 43, 278 f, 311, 608, 627. The view is passionately repudiated from the Anglo-Catholic standpoint by Frere (*Congress-Report 1923*, 115: cf. N. P. Williams in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 383 f).

from (possibly) a few months to, say, forty years. That He did think of what His followers (as distinct from either Jews or Gentiles) would be doing during this indefinite interval is clear from a number of passages in which He likens them to servants in a house waiting for their Master's return. It is at least clear that He wished them to maintain their fellowship with one another, to obey His teaching, to proclaim His Gospel, to endure persecution bravely for His sake, and to be watchful and ready against His return. And it was precisely by doing this, and in proportion as they did it, that His followers after His death actually did form the Christian Church. There is thus a real sense in which Jesus may be said to have founded the Church and to have legislated for its life.[1]

This, however, is as far as we can go, if we mean to have regard to the historical evidence. That Jesus laid down detailed rules for the conduct of the Church's affairs, that He defined the conditions of membership and the methods of procedure, that He instituted a class of officials with sacred privileges in which the rank and file of His followers could not share, that He handed to them a fixed deposit of true doctrine to be preserved intact, that He appointed any one person or set of persons to govern on His behalf as supreme and infallible head, and that He prescribed various forms of sacramental worship (over and above the baptism of admission and the common meal of commemoration)—all this is contrary to the evidence of history. It is, in the first place, in view of all that we clearly know about Jesus, inherently improbable. The striking paucity even of reported sayings that can be appealed to as justifying the Catholic view[2] is of itself highly significant. How comes it that the doctrines which for the Catholic are the very foundation of all things fill at most so very small and odd a place in the record of the Master's teaching? Again, the constant antagonism which Jesus, without formally breaking with the Jewish religion of His day, displayed towards its externalism and ceremonialism makes it in the last degree unlikely that He thought of His own followers as an exclusive organization, such as the Roman Church has become, or that He concerned Himself in elaborating and sanctioning fixed external rules for its business-procedure.[3] Secondly, as we shall see in our next chapter,

[1] Cf. Holtzmann, *N.T. Theol.* i. 265–268; Oman in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 618 f; A. L. Lilley in H.*E.R.E.* viii (1915) 767 b; Heiler, *Kathol.* 626 f.

[2] See above, p. 368.

[3] See Martineau, *Seat*, 166, 168; Heiler, *Kathol.* 25 ("Dennoch können wir aus den Evangelien die Stellung Jesu zum späteren katholischen Kirchentum deutlich entnehmen . . ."), 26–34, 35 (". . . Es ist ein Zeichen für Jesu überragende Grösse, dass er die traditionelle Religion ohne formellen Bruch überwand, dass er die heiligen Institutionen der Vergangenheit ohne bewusste Zerstörungsarbeit auflöste. An Jesu Stellung zum jüdischen Religionssystem können wir sein Verhältnis zum Katholizismus ohne weiteres ablesen . . ."), 36 (". . . Jesus hingegen ist innerlich gleichgültig gegen jedes K i r c h e n ideal . . ."), 37 (". . . Jesus kann nicht der eigentliche

there is no evidence that Jesus called the baptism and the supper which He probably enjoined 'Sacraments,' or that He instituted any other Sacraments. Positive evidence that He laid down other Church-regulations there is none, apart from four passages the import of which will need shortly to be discussed in detail. Older Catholic exegesis did indeed discover allusions to the Church in odd places in the Gospels. Innocentius III found the primacy of Peter and his successors set forth in Mt. xiv. 29, where it is stated that Peter walked upon the waters, and Jn. xxi. 7, where it is stated that he leaped into the sea, the sea standing symbolically in Scripture for the nations of the whole world, over which Peter was to rule.[1] The 'Praxis' prefixed to the 'Roman Catechism' observes in regard to the parable of the leaven: "They" (i.e. the doctors of the Church) "interpret this woman (of) the Church, which is declared by tradition (traditur) to be incapable of erring in the teaching of faith or morals—(teaching here) being designated by leaven." In regard to Lk. v. 3, it says: "Christ entered Peter's ship, not that of any other of the Apostles, that by this act of His He might intimate that Peter with his successors is the head and chief of the pastors of the Church."[2] The ascription of a number of recorded and unrecorded Church-regulations to His teaching during the period between His Resurrection and Ascension is itself a tacit admission that very little teaching of this kind had been given during His earthly life. The glaring discrepancies between all surviving narratives of the post-Resurrection days, our uncertainty as to the precise nature of the Resurrection-appearances, and the well-known custom of the later Church of dating back (in a quite imaginary way) certain ecclesiastical regulations into this same interval, combine to make extremely precarious all assertions, whether in the Gospels or elsewhere, in regard to specific instructions said to have been then given by Jesus.[3]

With her theory as to the immediate relation between the ascended Christ of faith and the Church on earth, Rome could well afford to surrender the declaration that Jesus founded, not only the Catholic Church, but also the hierarchy and the seven Sacraments, during His life on earth.[4] But she will not do so.[5] The very clear and indeed unmistakable evidence that Jesus expected to return in triumph within the

Stifter der katholischen Weltkirche sein; . . . sein Evangelium ist überkirchlich und unkirchlich; sein Urteil über das jüdische Kirchentum trifft auch das erstarrte christliche Kirchentum der späteren Jahrhunderte . . .").

[1] Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 9 f.

[2] *Praxis Catechismi*, etc. 6th Sunday after Epiph., and 4th after Pentecost.

[3] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 627 f. See also above, pp. 344–347, and below, pp. 413 f.

[4] Cf. Heiler, *loc. cit.*

[5] For a typical Catholic statement of the view that Jesus founded the Church in the full sense, see Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 746 ab. Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 18, 278, 575, 627.

life-time of His own generation is tacitly set aside on altogether insufficient grounds. To view the Kingdom as eschatological, we are told, "renders inexplicable the numerous passages in which Christ speaks of the kingdom as present, and further involves a misconception as to the nature of Jewish expectations, which . . . together with eschatological traits, contained others of a different character."[1] That the Jewish expectations were not *exclusively* eschatalogical does not prove that they were not predominantly so: and Jesus' allusions to the Kingdom as already present do not cancel His still more frequent allusions to its future cataclysmic coming and to His own Parousia, which are rendered hopelessly inexplicable by the Catholic view of the Kingdom as simply identical with the Catholic Church. Yet in the bull 'Lamentabili,' issued against the Catholic Modernists in 1907, the two following propositions were, among many others, condemned as pernicious errors: "33. It is evident to anyone who is not led by preconceived opinions that either Jesus uttered an error in regard to the early coming of the Messiah, or else that the greater part of His teaching contained in the Synoptic Gospels is unauthentic." "52. It was alien from the mind of Christ to found a Church as a society destined to last on earth for a long series of centuries; nay rather, in the mind of Christ the Kingdom of Heaven was destined to arrive very soon together with the end of the world."[2] In 1910 the Pope ordained, as a further measure against Modernism, that all professors in Roman Catholic institutions of learning and all ordinands should take an oath, one clause of which is as follows: "With equally firm faith I believe that the Church . . . was instituted immediately and directly by the true and historic Christ Himself, when He lived among us, and that it was built on Peter, the chief of the Apostolic hierarchy, and on his successors for ever."[3] In 1915 the papal Biblical Commission declared that the Parousia had not been regarded as imminent even by the Apostles.[4]

There are only two passages in the Gospels in which the actual word 'Church' occurs: and, besides one of these, there are only two other passages which Catholics seriously claim as proving that Jesus conferred the primacy of the Church on Peter. These four passages we must now proceed to examine: and we will begin with a careful translation of them, arranging them in the order of their relative difficulty:—

(a) John xxi. 15–17. Jesus' words to Peter: (15) "Feed My lambs,"

[1] Joyce *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 746b.
[2] Mirbt 506 (33), 507 (31): cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 22 note.
[3] Motu Proprio *Sacrorum antistitum* (Mirbt 516 [19]): cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 17, 355 f.
[4] Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 110.

(16) "Tend" (or "be a shepherd to") "My sheep," (17) "Feed My sheep."

(b) Luke xxii. 31–32. (31) "Simon, Simon, behold! Satan has asked for you (plur.) that he may sift (you) like wheat. (32) But I have prayed about thee (singr.) that thy faith may not fail: and do thou, when thou hast turned," (or perhaps simply, "in thy turn"), "strengthen thy brothers."

(c). Matt. xviii. 15–18. (15) "But if thy brother sin, go (and) rebuke him (as) between thyself and him alone: if he listen to thee, thou (wilt) have gained thy brother. (16) But if he listen not, take along with thyself one or two more, in order that 'on the word of two witnesses or three every case may be validly settled.' (17) But if he refuse to listen to them, tell the Church (*τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ*). But if he refuse to listen even to the Church, let him be to thee like the Gentile and the tax-collector. (18) Truly, I tell you, whatever things ye bind on earth will have been" (strictly not "will be") "bound in heaven, and whatever things ye loose on earth will have been" (strictly not "will be") loosed in heaven."

(d) Matt. xvi. 17–19 (spoken at Caesarea Philippi after Peter had acknowledged that Jesus was the Messiah): (17) "Happy art thou, Simon, son of Yona; for flesh and blood did not reveal (this) to thee, but My Father in heaven: (18) and I (in turn) tell thee that thou art a Rock (*Πέτρος*), and upon this rock (*πέτρᾳ*) will I build My Church, and the gates of Hades will not overpower it. (19) I will give thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; and whatsoever thou bind on earth will have been" (strictly not "will be") "bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou loose on earth will have been" (strictly not "will be") "loosed in heaven."

Prior to the questions of interpretation are the questions of genuineness and historicity. In regard to documentary genuineness (as distinct from historical accuracy),[1] it may be said at once that there are really no grounds for doubting that all four passages are integral and original parts of the contexts in which they now appear. Indeed, it is only our uncertainty as to the documentary structure of 'Matthew' and 'John' that makes us hesitate to say without qualification that they are all original parts of the 'books' now containing them. But their historical accuracy is another question, and calls for fuller discussion.

(a). Jn. xxi. 15–17 is clearly integral to Jn. xxi as a whole; but the chapter is almost certainly an appendix added to the Gospel after it was complete. This is indicated, in the first place, by the occurrence of an obvious conclusion to the book in xx. 30f. It is confirmed by the fact that, although xxi. 1 contains the word "again," and xxi. 14 characterizes

[1] These two questions are often treated confusedly as one (so Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi [1911] 746a); but they are really quite distinct.

the incident as the third appearance of the risen Master, yet the description of the disciples' hesitating recognition of Him shows the story to have been originally concerned with a *first* appearance. A saying which is ascribed to our Lord (1) after His Resurrection,[1] (2) in the Fourth Gospel,[2] (3) in a late appendix to that Gospel, specially edited for its present place, must needs lie open to some suspicion of having been framed by the devout imagination of His followers. The suspicion is further justified (1) by the close resemblance between the story of the great draught of fishes in Jn. xxi and that in Lk. v. 1–11 (suggesting that we have in Jn. xxi a misplaced and expanded narrative), and (2) by the appearance of some kind of tension between Peter and the Beloved Disciple (Jn. xxi. 20–23) and of an attempt to adjust their rival claims by an appeal to a sentence of Jesus' Himself. It is true that, in verse 24, the Beloved Disciple is referred to as the one "who bears witness concerning these things and who wrote these things": but the precise extent of "these things" is not indicated; and the general justice of this reference to the Beloved Disciple does not prove that the story told in the preceding verses has not been transposed and largely expanded by those who edited it. It must therefore remain doubtful whether Jesus actually said to Peter what Jn. xxi. 15–17 ascribes to Him.

(b). The words of Lk. xxii. 31 f rest upon the sole authority of Luke; but there are no literary or historical grounds for calling in question the substantial truth of the report.

(c). The historicity of Mt. xviii. 15–18 has been very widely doubted, and that on grounds which cannot be regarded as devoid of force. The greater part of the passage has no parallel in any other Gospel, and must share therefore the historical doubtfulness of all that rests on the sole authority of 'Matthew,' especially as it contains the rare word 'Church.'[3] Its opening words have a close parallel in Lk. xvii. 3, and its sequel (Mt. xviii. 21 f) in Lk. xvii. 4. An alternative version of these Lucan verses stood in the 'Gospel according to the Hebrews'; but neither it nor Luke presents any parallel whatever to Mt. xviii. 16–20. This intervening Matthaean section thus certainly wears the appearance of being an ecclesiastical enlargement of an original saying of Jesus about forgiveness.[4] Some find strong confirmation of this view in the apparent inconsistency between the words: "Let him be to thee like the Gentile and the tax-collector," and the normally gentle and sympathetic attitude of our Lord to these classes of people.[5] On the other hand, it has to be admitted that the passage is very Jewish in tone (cf. 'binding'

[1] See above, p. 374. [2] See above, p. 340.

[3] See above, pp. 209–212, 368, 373 f.

[4] Cf. Weinel, *Bibl. Theol. des N.T.* 121; Streeter, *Four Gospels*, 281 f.

[5] M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 266b, 267a; Emmet in *The Lord of Thought*, 255; Heiler, *Kathol.* 38, 42 f.

and 'loosing,' quotation of Deut. xix. 15, etc.); and, although this might be explained by the theory that Jewish Christians had produced the passage, no parallel can be quoted for the use of the term 'tax-collector' as equivalent to 'outcast' in the early Palestinian Church after our Lord's life-time. Further, the fact that a closely parallel saying about 'binding' and 'loosing' occurs in another part of the Gospel (xvi. 19b) suggests that we may have here a duplicate saying derived from the same origin as that parallel. To the compiler of the Gospel, indeed, "the Church" of Mt. xviii. 17 meant either the Christian Church generally, or the community of Palestinian Jewish Christians generally, or the local Christian community; but none of these meanings can be easily ascribed to Jesus Himself. For *ἐθνικός*, in company with *τελώνης*, must mean 'Gentile' as distinct from 'Jew,' not (as later) 'pagan' as distinct from 'Christian.' Any reference to Gentile Christians is therefore excluded. But reference to Jewish Christians as distinct from other Jews would seem to be equally impossible; for then some allusion to these unbelieving Jews would almost be desiderated. The pointed contrast between the *ἐκκλησία* on the one hand, and the *ἐθνικοὶ* and *τελῶναι* on the other, probably gives us the clue to the original meaning. The background of the words seems to be purely Palestinian. Before the antagonism between the Christians and the Jews had become inveterate, not only was the Greek word *συναγωγή*, which etymologically means simply 'assembly,' sometimes used of purely Christian gatherings,[1] but the word *ἐκκλησία*, or 'church,' was used of the whole congregation of Israel (so, frequently, in the Septuagint and the Apocrypha, e.g. 1 Macc. iv. 59: cf. Acts vii. 38) and of special popular assemblies of Jews (e.g. Ben Sirach xv. 5; Judith vi. 16, xiv. 6), and may thus sometimes have served as a synonym of *συναγωγή*[2] There seems therefore no strong reason why in Mt. xviii. 17 it may not mean simply the Jewish synagogue or Jewish assembly generally. If so, the words may really have been spoken by Jesus, and may belong to that stage of His teaching, when He assumed that the Jews quâ Jews would be His followers.[3] The command: "Let him be to thee like the Gentile," etc. is not necessarily an expression of harshness and lack of sympathy, but may be simply a recognition that really close fellowship is impossible between spiritual and profane persons—a recognition analogous to the counsel given to the disciples to shake the dust off their feet at those who would not listen to them.[4] Our conclusion, therefore, is that the

[1] As in Ep. of Jacob ('James') ii. 2; Ignat. *Polyc.* iv. 2: cf. Heb. x. 25.

[2] Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, ii (1907) 504 n. (Eng. trans. II. ii. 58 f); Hort, *Christian Ecclesia*, 3–7; Strack and Billerbeck, *Komm. zum. n. T.* i. 733–736, 791–793.

[3] See above, p. 369. Cf. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 5.

[4] For analogies elsewhere in the teaching and conduct of Jesus, see my *Early Church and the World*, 17 f. Cf. on the historicity of the passage, Holtzmann, *N.T.*

passage may give us a real saying of Jesus; but if so, it is a saying that refers, not to the Christian Church of the future, but to the Jewish synagogue of the present: if, on the other hand, the passage refers distinctively to the Christian Church (as the great majority of critics believe), then it must be, like so much else in this Gospel, a production of the consciousness of His followers after His death. It should, however, be observed that the historicity of the ἐκκλησία-verse and the two that precede it (15–17), even if accepted, does not guarantee the historicity of the verse about 'binding' and 'loosing' (18). The latter must be judged on its own merits, and, if accepted as historical, may well have been spoken on quite a different occasion.[1]

(d). We come now to the great passage Mt. xvi. 17–19, which for the Roman Church is of absolutely fundamental importance. The historicity of the words and the interpretation of them in a certain way are central and essential elements in the Roman apologia on its scriptural side. The Catholic sense of the importance of the passage finds imposing expression in the fact that its central clauses are inscribed in enormous letters round the inside of the dome of St. Peter's at Rome.[2] Romanists, indeed, profess to be able to establish their position historically—even as regards the primacy conferred on Peter—by starting from the Gospels as simply human documents.[3] This is a most unwise proceeding from the point of view of the Roman case. In using an ordinary historical document, you cannot assume at the outset that its statements are throughout true to fact. That is what you have to investigate; and, in investigating, while you ought not to be unreasonably sceptical, you certainly must not exclude the possibility of finding in your document one or more inaccurate statements. But no Roman apologist, however generous be the concessions he makes to historical critics, ever means to admit that any statements in the Gospels are inaccurate, least of all that this passage about Peter can be so. The very suggestion is repudiated with the all-sufficient stigma of 'rationalism,' even when the offer to argue from the Gospels simply as historical sources without regard to their inspiration has been expressly made only a few pages before.[4]

Theol. i. 270 top; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 266 f; Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 31–33; Weinel, *Bibl. Theol. des N.T.* 121, 259; Heiler, *Kathol.* 38, 42 f, 285; Streeter, *Four Gospels*, 257 f, 265, 281 f.

[1] Streeter (*Four Gospels*, 259) assigns them to his conjectural document M, a Jerusalem-source used by 'Matthew' and strongly marked by Jewish-Christian editorial interest.

[2] Heiler indeed argues (*Kathol.* XXVII bott.) that the abandonment of the historicity of the passage would not threaten "die Lebenskraft der grossen katholischen Organismus." This is doubtful; and Heiler himself adds that this "Lebenskraft" is not the same thing as "der Machtwille der römischen Kurie."

[3] See above, p. 331.

[4] See Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 791a ("when we appeal to the Scriptures for proof of the Church's infallible authority we appeal to them merely as reliable

That Jesus actually spoke the words here attributed to Him, and thereby conferred the infallible primacy of the Church on Peter, must necessarily be regarded by Roman Catholics as absolutely certain.[1]

For those, however, who do not start with the Catholic presuppositions, a free examination of the evidence is necessary. There is, as we have said, no reason to suspect that the passage is an interpolation in the Gospel (as distinct from its component documents): it is a true and original part of the work in which it now stands.[2] In favour of its historical accuracy are the thoroughly Jewish tone of the whole passage,[3] and the probability that the words of Mt. xvi. 17 at least stood also in the very early Gospel according to the Hebrews.[4] These indications, however, do not amount to proof. The testimony of the Hebrew Gospel is not final, either for Protestants or Catholics. The Jewish tone could be accounted for by supposing that the passage emanated from a Jewish-Christian circle. On the other hand, there are several weighty facts which make the use of these words by Jesus highly questionable. (i) *They are absent from the other canonical Gospels*, though both Mark and Luke are in close agreement with 'Matthew' in what immediately precedes and in what immediately follows the Matthaean passage in question. To say nothing of the omission of all notice of such epoch-making words from the Fourth Gospel and from the rest of the New Testament, their absence from Luke strongly suggests that they did not stand in Q, the Apostle Matthew's collection of the Lord's sayings. What is still more significant is their absence from Mark, the Gospel which was written by Peter's companion and interpreter and on the

historical sources, and abstract altogether from their inspiration. Even considered as purely human documents they furnish us, we maintain, with a trustworthy report of Christ's sayings and promises; . . . Having thus used the Scriptures as mere historical sources . . ."), 791 f (Mt. xxviii. 18–20 discussed), 792b (Mt. xvi. 18 discussed), 796 f (Mt. xvi. 18 etc. discussed in connexion with the Petrine claims: "*unless by denying with the rationalist the genuineness of Christ's words*, there is no logical escape from the Catholic position." Italics mine).

[1] Mgr. P. Batiffol has even argued (*Journ. of Theol. Studies*, July 1925, 399–404) that the date on which the conversation took place is preserved in that of the old Roman festival 'Natale Petri de Cathedra,' now celebrated on 18 Jan., but formerly always on Feb. 22. But records of the festival go back only to the fourth century, and of this explanation of its date only to the fifth; and, as Mgr. Batiffol says, the festival was unknown in the East. Gospel-chronology is too uncertain to afford any confirmation of the theory: and it seems far more likely that the date (22 Feb.) was chosen because it was that of the old pagan festival 'charistia' (remembering of deceased kinsfolk) than because it had been accurately remembered or recorded ever since the days of Jesus. Cf. de Waal in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 552b.

[2] See above, p. 376, and cf. Moffatt, *Introd.* 252 f; Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 33 n.1 (ii); Weinel, *Bibl. Theol. des N.T.* 121.

[3] E.g. "flesh and blood," "Father in heaven," "Gates of Sheol (Hades)," "bind" and "loose" (Allen in *Studies in the Syn. Problem*, 279; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 240b; Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 33 n.1 (i); Heiler, *Kathol.* 38 f.

[4] Burkitt, *Gospel History*, 343.

basis of Peter's recollections, which was called by Justinus "the Memoirs of Peter,"[1] and in which from first to last this apostle fills a very prominent place.[2] That Mark should not record everything that happened to Peter is perfectly natural: but that he should not record words which, if spoken at all, must have been among the weightiest which Peter ever heard from the Master's lips, is very hard to believe. The words being what they are, the doubtfulness attaching to all purely 'Matthaean' statements is in this case very considerably increased.[3]

(ii) *Jesus would hardly have so addressed Peter, just before rebuking him as 'Satan.'* The Matthaean narrative tells us that, immediately after making His great ecclesiastical promise, Jesus enjoined secrecy as to His Messiahship, and then foretold His passion; that Peter protested against this, and was rebuked by Jesus with the stern words: "Get behind me, Satan, . . . for thou settest not thy mind on the things of God, but on the things of men" (Mt. xvi. 20–23). In all this, 'Matthew,' as in the section immediately preceding xvi. 17–19, closely follows Mark. Luke also copies Mark, omitting however the final protest of Peter and its answer. Now is it conceivable that, immediately after telling Peter that he had received a Divine revelation, that he was to be (in some sense) the foundation on which the Church should be built, was to receive the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and was to have power to 'bind' and 'loose,' Jesus should rebuke him as a stumbling block, with the reproachful term 'Satan,' and tell him that his thoughts were astray from God? The historicity of the rebuke is unquestionable, resting as it does on Mark's authority and being incapable of later invention. Unless, therefore, we are prepared to break up altogether the sequence of Mark's sections (here supported by both 'Matthew' and Luke), the legendary character of Mt. xvi. 17–19 is proved.[4]

(iii) *Jesus at other times strenuously discouraged the idea of precedence among the Twelve.* Had He really spoken these 'Matthaean' words to Peter, in the hearing (so the narrative suggests) of the other disciples, how could strife have arisen among them a little later as to who was the greatest (Mk. ix. 33–37 and parallels), and how could Jacob and John have advanced with their request for seats on His right and left hand in His Kingdom (Mk. x. 35–45 and parallel: cf. Lk. xxii. 24–27), and why should Jesus have met these unseemly displays of ambition, not by referring them to the 'prince of the Apostles,' but by inculcating upon all a greater humility (cf. also Mt. xxiii. 8–12), and how finally could

[1] See the evidence in Swete, *St. Mark*, xxiii f, xxx.

[2] Holtzmann, *N.T. Theol.* i. 493 n.3; cf. 270 n.2.

[3] Cf. Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 621b; Goetz in *Zeitschr. für die nt. Wiss.* 1921. 3. 168; Heiler, *Kathol.* 37, 41.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 341 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 40 f, 42. The *immediate proximity* of the rebuke to the promise is ignored by Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 746a bott.

Peter himself have asked the question: "Behold, we have left all and followed thee. What then shall we get?" (Mt. xix. 27: cf. the parallels)?[1] (iv) *The meanings here given to 'Church' and 'Kingdom' are unique in Jesus' teaching.* It is not indeed legitimate to say that Jesus could not have spoken of His followers as (after His death) forming a 'Church.'[2] Yet the fact remains that, so far as we know, He did not do so on any other occasion.[3] The language of Mt. xvi. 18 is strikingly dissimilar to anything that Jesus is ever reported to have said elsewhere: and the dissimilarity and uniqueness call for explanation. The same may be said of the idea of the Kingdom presupposed in verse 19. Among the scores of passages in which Jesus is reported as speaking about the Kingdom of Heaven, there are barely two (Lk. xix. 12 and xxii. 29) which reflect—and that but doubtfully—an idea of the Kingdom at all akin to what is represented here.[4] (v) *It is not probable that* both *passages about 'binding' and 'loosing' (Mt. xvi. 19b and xviii. 18) are historical.* As we have remarked, the duplication *may* go back to two independent documents, thus pointing to a very early tradition as their source.[5] But it is not likely that both versions of the saying are equally original, and that both were actually uttered. As between the two, there can be little doubt that the one in Mt. xviii. 18 is the more original, since it occurs in the more easily defensible context, and, being couched in the plural, is free from several of the other difficulties connected with Peter's supposed primacy. If Mt. xviii. 18 is original, Mt. xvi. 19b would represent a secondary application of the saying to the special case of Peter.[6] The future-perfect tense used in both these verses occurs very rarely. Unless the choice of it is a purely fortuitous variation of style (as Lk. xii. 52 f and Heb. ii. 13 [cf. the Heb. of Isa. viii. 17] show to be *possible*), it marks a distinction from the simple future which the Aramaic language used by Jesus could not express:[7] in that case there would be a linguistic reason for doubting whether either saying could have been actually spoken by Jesus.

On these grounds, a great many modern critics have concluded that our passage is, in whole or in part, not a report of an actual utterance of Jesus, but a production of some circle in the early Church. Differences of opinion as to who was really the greatest of the Apostles survived, after the Lord's bodily departure, among the early Christians: we find

[1] Salmon, *Infall.* 334; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 243a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 40; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 66.

[2] Cf. Allen in *Studies in the Syn. Prob.* 280; Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 33 n. 1 (iv).

[3] For Mt. xviii. 15–17, see above, pp. 377–379, and below, pp. 386 f.

[4] Cf. M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 243a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 38.

[5] See above, p. 378.

[6] So M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 243b.

[7] On the question of the tense used, see also below, pp. 386 f.

traces of the dispute in Paul's warnings to the Corinthians (1 Cor. iii), in the story of his own relations with the Jerusalem-leaders (Gals. 1, ii, etc.), and in sundry hints and allusions in later literature. The tension seems to have been greatest between those who looked to the loyal Judaist Jacob (the brother of Jesus and the leader of the Church at Jerusalem), and those who looked to Paul as the bold evangelist of the Gentiles. Altogether apart from the passages here under discussion, the Gospel of 'Matthew' displays numerous signs of having been carefully framed to meet the needs of a developed community-life. In particular, the co-presence within its pages of numerous Judaistic and numerous universalistic passages strongly suggests that its compilation registers a compromise or concordat between two divergent parties within the Church for the sake of the common cause. The Apostle Peter, as the foremost of the Twelve, and as one who had been prominent both at Jerusalem and among the Gentile Churches, would be a persona grata to both wings at a place like Antioch or Cæsarea; and the acceptance of his name and tradition as a working basis of unity would commend itself to Christians of every type. Some words which Jesus was remembered to have spoken in commendation of him when he declared that his Master was the Messiah, may well have been 'interpreted,' by means of enlargement and addition, as an authoritative appointment of him as the 'rock' on which the Church was to be built. Probably the need of emphasizing the authority of the clergy was another factor at work in the formation of the passage.[1]

It is probable that the form given to the saying in Mt. xvi. 18 owes something to a current rabbinical idea of Abraham as the rock on which God was pleased to build the world. Literary attestation of this idea is indeed not forthcoming prior to the middle ages. In a vast rabbinical work of the thirteenth century, the 'Yalkut Shim'oni,' is found "a parable of a King who wished to build. He dug deep, and wished to lay a foundation; but he found a watery swamp, and so in many places. He did nothing, but dug in another place, and found a rock (petra) beneath. He said, 'Here will I build, and lay a foundation'; and he built. Thus the Holy One—blessed be He—wished to create the world; and He sat and considered the generation of Enosh and the generation of the Flood. He said, 'How shall I create the world, when these wicked men rise up and provoke me?' But when the Holy One—blessed be He—saw Abraham, who would arise, He said, 'See! I have found a rock (petra) on which to build and found the world.' Therefore, He called

[1] Cf. Holtzmann, *N.T. Theol.* i. 270 n.2; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 240ab; Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 621b; Weinel, *Bibl. Theol. des N.T.* 121; Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 33 n.1 (iii); Heiler, *Kathol.* 41 f (observes the parallel between σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα in Mt. xvi. 17 and the expressions in Gals. i. 12 and 16), 64, 285 f; Streeter, *Four Gospels*, 258 f.

Abraham 'Cliff' (çûr), as it says, 'Look at the cliff whence ye were hewn;' . . ." In the somewhat earlier rabbinic work 'Shemoth rabba' (eleventh or twelfth century), a similar passage occurs, in which the patriarchs in general, not Abraham alone, fill the place of the cliff. The resemblance to Mt. xvi. 18 is striking, extending as it does to the use of the same word 'petra' ; and some connexion between the passages seems likely. The rabbinical idea, which in any case must be much older than the works in which it is now recorded, is hardly likely to have been borrowed from the Christian Scriptures, which the mediaeval Jews naturally regarded with dislike: and it is by no means impossible that it was current in the first century A.D., and that it suggested the words used in Mt. xvi. 18, whether these were originally spoken by Jesus, or (what is perhaps more likely) fashioned by His followers towards the close of the century.[1]

On the assumption, however, that all the passages are historically true, what would they mean?

(a). If considered in complete isolation from their context, the words of John xxi. 16: "Be a shepherd to My sheep," might perhaps be interpreted as the conferment of a monopoly, i.e. as constituting Peter 'shepherd' in a sense in which no one else was to be a shepherd. Even so, the conclusion would not be necessary; and, as things stand, the story-context proves that it is by far the less likely alternative. The threefold question: "Lovest thou Me?" and the threefold charge to tend the flock, seem unmistakably to point back to Peter's three-fold denial of his Master, and so merely to announce the restoration of his Apostleship. It is all very well to say that there is no evidence that Peter had by his denial forfeited his Apostolic commission, so as to need to be reinstated in it[2]: but, if we do not over-press the official meaning of Apostleship, that is precisely what the passage does indicate —not to mention the patristic opinion to the same effect.[3] Three-fold denial by an Apostle is a lapse not to be overlooked; some reinstatement of the defaulter is certainly called for: what purpose does the question, "Lovest thou Me?" serve, except in connection with a reinstatement? Thus Peter is here reassured—on the strength of his really sincere love—of his Apostolic functions. He is to be *a* shepherd, not *the* shepherd. He was no more the only shepherd than he was the only lover. If his

[1] Cf. Taylor, *Sayings of the Jewish Fathers* (1897), 160; Goetz in *Zeitschr. für die nt. Wiss.* 1921. 3. 166–168; Strack and Billerbeck, *Komm. zum n. T.* i. 733.

[2] So Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 262a: he appeals for proof to the statement made in Jn. xx. 19–23 (the eleven, *including Peter*, receive a commission); but this of course ignores the fact that xxi is an appendix based on a narrative originally independent of what now precedes it, and quite possibly dealing with a prior occasion.

[3] Cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 81.

natural position as the leading spirit of the Apostolic band is not denied, it can hardly be said to be explicitly recognized: while of primacy in any other sense, or of an infallible headship promised to his successors in office, there is not the remotest hint.[1]

(b). The meaning of the words in Luke xxii. 31 f are, if anything, still more clear. Jesus is contemplating His impending execution, and speaks of the strain which it will bring to the loyalty of the Twelve as a sifting by Satan. He sees in Peter the man whose fundamental loyalty should prove a centre round which the wavering confidence of his colleagues might rally; and He has prayed for him that his faith may not fail, and bids him, when the time comes, confirm his brethren. It has been suggested that the words may have been spoken at an earlier time than the Lucan narrative states; and Peter's confession at Cæsarea Philippi has been proposed as the most fitting occasion.[2] In that case, his denial is not contemplated; and the words ποτε ἐπιστρέψας should be translated, not "when once thou hast turned again," but simply "in thy turn" or "again" (cf. Psalm lxxxv. 6 in Hebrew and Greek [lxxxiv. 7]). But, precise chronology apart, it seems more likely that Jesus was counting on Peter's ultimate faithfulness, not upon his immunity from lapse during the dark Passion-hour. It can be considered only as a striking fulfilment of this hope, that, after His death, Peter's faith was so fortified by the Risen Master's first and decisive appearance to him, that he apparently did 'strengthen his brethren' in a most effective way, and re-won for himself that position of leadership for which his characteristic steadfastness had already seemed to qualify him.[3] In these words, then, Jesus looks to Peter to strengthen the faith of his fellow-disciples in the coming crisis. Whatever uniqueness here attaches to the part he is to play lies in the special nature of the crisis, not in the duty of 'confirming'; for it often became the duty of Christian people to 'confirm' one another, in the sense of strengthening one another's faith.[4] Nothing whatever is said of any designation of Peter as permanent ruler or teacher of the Church, or of any special endowment of infallibility, or of any descent of Peter's qualification to a line of successors.[5]

[1] Cf. *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 1 (Mirbt 462 [11]): "Atque uni Simoni Petro contulit Iesus post suam resurrectionem summi pastoris et rectoris iurisdictionem in totum suum ovile dicens: 'Pasce agnos meos; pasce oves meas.'"

[2] So O. Holtzmann, *Life of Jesus* (Eng. trans.) 328.

[3] Lk. xxiv. 34; 1 Cor. xv. 5; McGiffert, *Apostolic Age*, 48; Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 271a; Weinel, *Bibl. Theol. des N.T.* 120 (sees in Lk. xxii. 31 f "nur eine Anspielung auf die Auferstehungserscheinung, die zuerst dem Petrus zuteil werden soll"), 235 f.

[4] Cf. Acts xiv. 22, xv. 32, 41, xviii. 23; 1 Thess. iii. 2; Rom. i. 11; Jac. v. 8; 2 Pet. i. 12: Salmon, *Infall.* 342 f.

[5] Dr. Merry del Val (*Papal Claims*, 10 f) admits that the evidence of this passage is useful cumulatively—in the light of other passages—rather than as an independent

(c). In discussing the historicity of Mt. xviii. 15-17, we have already indicated the only meaning attributable to the words, if they be accepted as real words of Jesus.[1] Catholic exegesis, of course, not only accepts them as genuine words of Jesus, but refers them to the Catholic Church, and—what is more—to the rulers of that Church.[2] But the extreme rarity of 'ecclesiastical' passages in our Lord's reported teaching, His plain distaste for rules of an official kind, and the naturalness of an allusion here to the Jewish synagogue, combine to rule out, as an interpretation of the passage, a reference to 'the Christian Church' in the later sense of those words. The verse about 'binding' and 'loosing' (18), however, demands separate discussion. As already remarked, it may—even if historical—have been originally uttered on quite a different occasion, since the addition of it as a sequel to the ἐκκλησία-verse is by no means indispensable. The separateness of the two passages is made more likely by the probable meaning of verse 18 taken by itself. The metaphor of 'binding and loosing' was a familiar one with the Jewish rabbis; and its meaning is clearly known. 'To bind' meant to pronounce a certain course forbidden from the point of view of the Jewish Law, as orally and traditionally interpreted: 'to loose' meant to declare a thing permissible from the same standpoint. The term 'to loose ' was also used occasionally in the sense of forgiving or remitting sins: the term 'to bind,' however, was apparently never used in the sense of refusing forgiveness or condemning. In any case, the objects of the binding and loosing are always things, not persons.[3] Taken by themselves, therefore, the words of Mt. xviii. 18 mean that the community—whether local or universal, whether Jewish, or Jewish-Christian, or simply Christian —will, in the solution of its ethical problems, come only to such decisions as have been already sanctioned and approved by God. That is the meaning required, strictly speaking, by the future-perfect tenses used: it is somewhat doubtful whether we are entitled to treat them—as writers usually do—as if they were simple futures, for in that case why did not the author take the simple futures δεθήσεται and λυθήσεται? Only if we are warranted in ignoring the distinction of

demonstration of the Petrine primacy. The Vatican Council quoted it as the basis of the patristic belief that Rome as the see of Peter would remain unstained by any error (Mirbt 465 [8]).

[1] See above, pp. 378 f.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 13 ("Interdum quoque Ecclesiae nomine ejus praesides ac pastores significantur: Si te non audierit, inquit Christus, dic Ecclesiae: quo in loco praepositi Ecclesiae designantur"): cf. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 746ab.

[3] Cf. Dalman, *Words of Jesus*, 213–217; J. K. Mozley in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 618 f, 619ab; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 243a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 38 f (if Heiler be right in thinking that Jesus' words *originally* referred to loosing men from demonic possession [cf. Lk. xiii. 16], they must have been strangely garbled, for Jesus never permitted 'binding' in this sense); Streeter, *Four Gospels*, 258; Strack and Billerbeck, *op. cit.* i. 738–741, 792 f.

tenses, can we interpret the words as meaning that whatever the community (or Peter) decides, God will, subsequently as it were, endorse.[1] There is apparently no parallel instance in rabbinic writings in which the twin terms 'loosing' and 'binding' are used in the sense of forgiving and condemning (or excommunicating). It is therefore not probable that Jesus used the pair in that sense. There is, however, sufficient analogy between this interpretation and the original meaning to make the development of the former out of the latter intelligible. Such development would be sufficient to explain why the evangelist placed the words immediately after the sentence: "Let him be to thee as the Gentile and the tax-collector," and why the Fourth Gospel ascribes to Jesus the promise: "Whosesoever sins ye forgive, to them they are forgiven: (and) whosesoever (sins) ye retain, they are retained" (Jn. xx. 23). This passage will be discussed in our next chapter; but in the meantime we may note that it ought not to be used as Catholics use it, in support of an improbable interpretation of Mt. xviii. 18 and xvi. 19b.[2] The only defensible exegesis of Mt. xviii. 18 treats it as a promise, couched in the sweeping and unqualified phraseology characteristic of Jewish rabbinism, that God will help and guide His assembled followers in their conscientious search for truth and right. The relative trustworthiness of the sincere conscience is what is in mind: absolute and unqualified infallibility is not guaranteed, unless the words be pressed in a literal way altogether out of place in the interpretation of rabbinic phraseology; and even then it is far from clear who precisely are to be the recipients of the gift—the only certainty being that it is *not* bestowed exclusively upon a single individual, but upon a group.

(d). When we turn to the examination of the great Petrine passage in Mt. xvi. 17–19, the first question we have to determine is whether (as Catholics contend) Peter himself is declared in verse 18 to be the rock on which the Church is to be built. The older Protestant contention that the difference between the words πέτρος and πέτρα sufficed to prove that it was not so, has now been generally abandoned: the difference is simply due to the necessity that the personal name should be masculine, whereas the usual Greek word for a 'rock' was the feminine πέτρα. The same Aramaic word would stand behind both. It must not however be assumed that, because the words are synonymous or

[1] See above, p. 382. The verbs in the precisely parallel passage (Mt. xvi. 19b) are treated as equivalent to simple futures by Protestants and Catholics alike: e.g. M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 243a; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 261b, 265b. Per contra, J. R. Mantey (in *Expos.* June 1922, 470–472) insists that the verbs must be rendered strictly as future perfects.

[2] Cf. Dalman, *Words of Jesus*, 215 f; J. K. Mozley in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 619a, 621b; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 261b, 265b (with reference to Mt. xvi. 19b); M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 243b (on xvi. 19b), 267a (on xviii. 18). On Jn. xx. 23, see below, pp. 413 f.

rather (in the original) identical, Peter himself is the rock-foundation of the Church. We invite our Catholic brethren to admit that, were this the right interpretation, we should certainly have expected the words "*on thee* will I build my Church," since Peter himself is being addressed. What explanation can they offer of the sudden change from the second person to the third: "upon this rock," and then immediately back to the second: "I will give thee the keys"? That change is, however, easily explained if the play on the words be taken to indicate that the rock-foundation of the Church was to be, not the Apostle himself, but the truth in which he had just exhibited such firm faith. This interpretation is not advanced as certain; but it is at least as likely to be true as the other.[1] Supposing, however, that the Church was to be built on Peter himself, we are still far from Romanism: for the expression is clearly metaphorical, and at most asserts of Peter a primacy the exact nature of which is so far quite undefined.

The Gates of Sheol (in Greek, 'Hades'), which—it is said—will not overpower the Church, should (according to scriptural parlance) stand, not for the powers of evil in general, but simply for death—in this case, the contemplated death of the Messiah Himself and (by implication) the martyr-deaths of certain of His persecuted followers.[2] This gives excellent sense; and we do not need to look further. The cause of Jesus, founded on faith in His Divine commission as expressed by Peter, or possibly on Peter as expressing that faith, would not be overthrown though Jesus Himself and some of His disciples would have to suffer death.

"I will give thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven" may quite well mean 'I make thee my Grand Vizier' (cf. Isa. xxii. 22). Peter is to be the first among the servants and ministers of the Kingdom's royal head. Here again the language is clearly metaphorical, and, stripped of its metaphor, means simply that Peter was to be foremost among the witnesses and interpreters of Jesus and the agents by which His Church was to be established.[3] The analogy of the court-official, however, is not pressed: and it is possible that the verse refers to the leading part actually taken later by Peter in determining the conditions on which converts should be admitted to the Church (cf. Acts x. 47 f, xi. 17, xv. 7–11). A certain 'power of the keys' belonged, not only to the King's chief minister, but to the teaching scribe, who was

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 339 f; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 10, 47; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 796b; Kirsch in *op. cit.* xi (1911) 746a; Joyce in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 261a; Holtzmann, *N.T. Theol.* i. 270 n. 2; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 241ab; Heiler, *Kathol.* 38; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 48 n. 2. Cf. Mt. vii. 24–27; 1 Cor. iii. 10 f; Strack and Billerbeck, *op. cit.* i. 731–733.

[2] M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 242.

[3] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 341; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 261b, 265 f; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 242 f; Streeter, *Four Gospels*, 258.

supposed to hold the key of knowledge (Lk. xi. 52: cf. Mt. xxiii. 13); and in that case the ensuing words about 'binding and loosing,' would suggest that Peter is pictured rather as the authoritative teacher than as the quasi-political ruler. Jesus declares that Peter will be a competent and accredited rabbi, who will be Divinely helped and guided in the fulfilment of his task as the leading interpreter of his Master's mind.[1]

It is not to be denied that, if Jesus really spoke thus, He did confer upon Peter a primacy in some sense of that word.[2] The question is, Was it a primacy of honour, the precedence of one who is 'primus inter pares,' who is the leader and inspirer of his colleagues; or was it rather a strict supremacy, a real legislative and judicial sovereignty? The Vatican Council has invested its answer to this question with the authority of a binding dogma: "If therefore anyone says, that the blessed Peter the Apostle was not constituted by Christ the Lord chief (principem) of all the Apostles and visible head of the whole Church militant, or that he received directly and immediately from the same Jesus Christ our Lord the same primacy of honour only, but not that of a true and proper jurisdiction; let him be anathema."[3] Catholic explanations of what was involved in this primacy are normally couched in fairly sweeping terms; but they are all variations on the same central theme: "Peter was invested with supreme spiritual authority to legislate for the whole Church; . . . in one word, to exercise as supreme head and ruler and teacher and pastor all spiritual functions whatever that are necessary for the well-being or existence of the Church."[4] Every indication, however, that the narrative actually gives, goes to show that, if Jesus ever conferred any primacy on Peter, it was a primacy of the other kind. Primacy in the Roman sense could not have been conferred on him without leaving some unmistakable mark in the Gospel-story, and indeed without radically altering some of its episodes.[5] His faith, which called forth the Lord's great promises, was not peculiar to himself, but was to be shared by all: not he alone was to be teacher; his fellows also were to fill that office. In particular, the most emphatic words of all—those about 'binding and loosing'—were also addressed on another occasion (so we are told)

[1] Cf. Dalman, *Words of Jesus*, 216; O. Holtzmann, *Life of Jesus* (Eng. trans.) 328–330; J. K. Mozley in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 619a; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 243a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 39; Strack and Billerbeck, *op. cit.* i. 736 f.

[2] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 39; Streeter, *Four Gospels*, 258.

[3] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 1 (Mirbt 462 [20]; Salmon, *Infall.* 483).

[4] So Murray, quoted by Salmon, *Infall.* 333: cf. Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 12 f; Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 628a; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 261a, 265b. Hase mentions (*Handbook*, i. 287 f) that at the Vatican Council a Sicilian Bishop stated that the Virgin, in reply to an enquiring deputation of Sicilians, had declared that she remembered being present when her Son imparted this prerogative to Peter!

[5] See especially above, pp. 381 f.

to all the Apostles: and there is no justification for giving the words one meaning in one place, and a different one in the other.[1] There is no more reason for discovering a promise of infallibility in Mt. xvi. 19b than there is for discovering it in Mt. xviii. 18.[2] We have therefore ample ground for thinking that whatever was conferred upon Peter was conferred upon him not as an absolutely unique individual, but as the leader and representative of the whole Apostolic company. This, however, the Vatican Council denies as the opinion of those "who, distorting the form of government established by Christ the Lord in His Church, deny that Peter alone was invested by Christ with a true and proper primacy of jurisdiction, in pre-eminence over (prae) the other Apostles, whether severally or collectively . . ."[3] and subsequent Catholic exponents contend for the same view.[4] Finally, it has to be said that the dogma (on which Rome's claim to authority essentially depends), declaring that the unique prerogatives of Peter were meant by Jesus to devolve successively upon those who should follow him in the tenure of a localized ecclesiastical office, and that this office is the Roman episcopal see, has no warrant whatever in the Gospel-story. It is nothing more than a highly dubious inference arbitrarily drawn from an erroneous interpretation of a single passage containing elements of very doubtful historicity.[5]

[1] Joyce, for instance, argues (*Cath. Encyc.* xii [1911] 265 f) that the gift of 'binding and loosing' to Peter was connected with the power of the keys (as if we knew perfectly well what the latter meant), whereas the gift to the Twelve (Mt. xviii. 18) "was received by them as members of the kingdom, and as subject to the authority of him who should be Christ's vicegerent on earth . . ." But what is this except an insistence on interpreting 'obscurum per obscurius'? Cf. O. Holtzmann, *Life of Jesus* (Eng. trans.) 330 n.

[2] See above, p. 387. Per contra, Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 792b, 796 f.

[3] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 1 (Mirbt 462 [13]; Salmon, *Infall.* 483).

[4] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 797b; Joyce in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 261a.

[5] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 2 (Mirbt 462 [32, 41]; Salmon, *Infall.* 484) (". . . Si quis ergo dixerit, non esse ex ipsius Christi Domini institutione, seu iure divino, ut beatus Petrus in primatu super universam ecclesiam habeat perpetuos successores; aut Romanum pontificem non esse beati Petri in eodem primatu successorem; anathema sit), 3 (Mirbt 463 [6 f]; Salmon, *Infall.* 484), 4 init. (Mirbt 464 [13], 465 [13]; Salmon, *Infall.* 486 f). Cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 111 f, 312, 315, 317 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 341, 347; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 177; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 15 f, 20; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 796 f; Kirsch in *op. cit.* xi (1911) 746a; Joyce in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 262a, 263a, 265a; Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 270b; M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 241a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 286. For the extent to which patristic exegesis supports or contradicts the Roman interpretation, see below, pp. 475–480.

CHAPTER XVIII

JESUS AND THE SEVEN SACRAMENTS

THE sacramental system is one of the most characteristic, as it is one of the most interesting, features of Catholic Christianity. It has been the subject of endless debate and of almost equally endless misunderstanding and recrimination. Disagreement in regard to it seems to be one of the permanent barriers between Romanists and Protestants, and between High Anglicans and Free-Churchmen. It is no part of our present concern to enter here upon a discussion of all the points at issue between the various Christian bodies in relation to the Sacraments: we are concerned mainly with the Roman Catholic assertion that the seven Sacraments of the Roman Church were instituted and enjoined by Christ Himself during His earthly ministry. Although that is only one of the many controversial questions involved, it is nevertheless the most fundamental of them all. For upon it really turns the true settlement of all the others. If the Catholic view of the historical origin of the Sacraments be true to fact, every objection which Protestants might raise against the Catholic view of them as magical, non-moral, unessential, and so forth, is already met in advance by the decisive authority of our Lord Himself.[1] If, on the other hand, the seven Sacraments were not instituted and enjoined by Christ, then Protestants may rightly demand that their several other objections should be considered on their merits. The issue is plain; and it is the question of historicity, therefore, to which we must primarily address ourselves.[2]

The Judaism in which our Lord was born and brought up might indeed be described as in some sense a sacramental religion, in that it prescribed the performance of a large number of regular as well as special and occasional acts and observances—on the ground that they had been commanded by God and that the Divine blessing or some other religious interest was thereby secured. Examples of such 'sacraments' are circumcision and animal-sacrifice. Some uncertainty exists

[1] Cf. N. P. Williams in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 373 f, 420; W. Spens in *op. cit.* 429 ("From all merely human symbolism . . . the sacraments are . . . differentiated . . . by the fact that these are determined by the will of God Himself; . . .").

[2] It will not do to say, as Dr. Orchard does (*Foundations*, iii. 97), that "this is no longer an acute issue, for it is merely a question of what act of Christ constitutes an institution, or whether the word 'sacrament' should be employed to describe certain rites." Similarly Father Knox (*Belief of Caths.* 209 f) argues that, despite the late date at which the meaning of the word 'Sacrament' became fixed, the seven usages in question were regarded as unique from the time of Christ onwards.

as to the precise attitude of Jesus to these ritual requirements of the Jewish law; but, however unenthusiastic He may have been in regard to the animal-sacrifices, there is no reason to believe that His feeling towards the system as a whole was one of simple negation or unconcern. We observe, for instance, that He was in the habit of wearing upon the corners of His outer garment those tassels of violet cord which the Law required the pious Jew to wear as a reminder of God's commandments and of his own holy vocation (Mt. ix. 20 = Lk. viii. 44; Mk. vi. 56 = Mt. xiv. 36: cf. Numb. xv. 37–40, Deut. xxii. 12, Mt. xxiii. 5). A good case can be made out for believing that Jesus commanded His disciples to admit new members into fellowship with the general body of His adherents by means of the rite of Baptism, and that He also originated the formal practice by which they were to partake of bread and wine together in memory of His death, although the precise origin of both of these institutions is in some respects very obscure. But we observe

(1) that neither of these two customs is called a Sacrament in the Gospels;

(2) that the word 'sacrament' (*μυστήριον*) is used on only one occasion in the Gospels (Mk. iv. 11 = Mt. xiii. 11 = Lk. viii. 10), and that was when Jesus was referring, not to anything resembling the Sacraments of the Church, but to the nature and principles of the Kingdom of God—the matters concerning which His teaching to the general public was figurative or parabolic;

(3) that no mention whatever occurs in the Gospels or in the rest of the New Testament of Jesus having enjoined upon His followers any other regular ritual observances of the same formal nature as Baptism and the Lord's Supper; still less is there any trace of a group of *seven* Sacraments;

(4) that if the five other practices called Sacraments by the Roman Church (viz. confirmation, penance, extreme unction, ordination, and marriage) are entitled by the Gospel-evidence to be so called, there is quite a considerable number of other practices which have an equal right to sacramental rank, e.g. preaching,[1] feet-washing,[2] and even the shaking of dust off the feet.[3] There is grave difficulty—as we shall see—in the way of believing that Jesus definitely enjoined every one of the seven practices called Sacraments by Rome; but, assuming that in some form He did so, there is absolutely no single common mark which, according to the Gospels, characterized every one of these, but did not characterize any of the others.

[1] So Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 192.

[2] So Bernard of Clairvaux: cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 150; G. A. F. Knight in H.*E.R.E.* v (1912) 817b.

[3] So Oman, *Vision*, 301–310 ("A forgotten sacrament").

It may therefore be said *with perfect certainty* that Jesus did not institute seven Sacraments.

The history of Christian thought concerning the Sacraments during the early centuries of our era is far too large a topic to enter upon in detail here. It is sufficient to observe that, at first, Baptism and the Lord's Supper were apparently regarded as the sole Sacraments, though the precise meaning of the word (which was not used of them at all for the first century after Christ) was still quite undefined. Then they were regarded as being the chief ones—the precise number of the others being either undefined or fixed differently by different authorities. There is no trace in Christian literature of a set of precisely seven Sacraments until the early part of the twelfth century; and even then the seven were not exactly the same as those now recognized by Rome. The first author to give us the now familiar seven is Peter Lombard, about the middle of the twelfth century. In the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas accepted this group as part of the Catholic system, and was the first to trace back all of them to the instructions of Christ. In the fifteenth century, the seven were accepted by the ecclesiastics of the Greek Church at the Council of Florence.[1] In 1547 the Council of Trent decreed: "If anyone says that the Sacraments of the New Law were not all of them instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord, or that there were more or less than seven, namely, baptism, confirmation, eucharist, penance, extreme unction, ordination, and marriage, or that any one of these seven is not truly and properly a Sacrament, let him be anathema."[2] The 'Creed of Pius IV' pledges the faithful to "profess that there are truly and properly seven Sacraments of the New Law instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord, and necessary for the salvation of mankind, though not all for every one," and it proceeds to enumerate them.[3] In 1859 a Catholic professor at Rome showed Hase an old fresco from the catacombs depicting seven baskets filled with fragments at the feeding of the five thousand, and adduced it as evidence that the Church in the first centuries had precisely seven Sacraments.[4] In the nineties, belief in the institution of seven Sacraments by Christ was being exacted from members of a High Anglican Church in Southwark, despite the fact that the Prayer Book lays it down that there are only two.[5] A few pitiful tentative efforts have been made by Catholic theologians to explain that the Tridentine decree leaves it open to us to interpret institution by Christ as meaning,

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 149–153; H. G. Wood in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 398b; T. A. Lacey in H.*E.R.E.* x (1918) 905; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 149, 299.

[2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, can. 1 (Mirbt 303 [27]); cf. sess. xxiv init. (Mirbt 330 [6]): "ipse Christus venerabilium sacramentorum institutor atque perfector."

[3] In Mirbt 339 (38).

[4] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 120.

[5] Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 179: cf. in *Prayer Book*, the *Catechism* and *Article* xxv.

in the case of some Sacraments, mediate institution through the Church on His authority.[1] This would have been a very convenient way of escape from the obvious charge of historical falsehood: but in 1907 Pius X blocked it up by condemning in the decree 'Lamentabili' among other modern propositions the following: "39. The opinions concerning the origin of the Sacraments with which the Tridentine Fathers were filled and which undoubtedly obtained entry into their dogmatic canons are very different from those which now deservedly prevail among the historical investigators of Christian things. 40. The Sacraments took their rise from the fact that the Apostles and their successors interpreted some idea and intention of Christ under the persuasion and pressure of circumstances and events."[2] Consequently, no alternative is left to the modern Catholic but to abide by a palpable historical untruth; for "the Catholic Faith teaches that all the Sacraments she uses—other than which there are none—were instituted by Christ Himself: in consequence, they were neither the invention of the Apostles, nor the gradual creation of the Christian community."[3]

Seeing, therefore, that the authority of Christ for the Roman sacramental system as a whole simply does not exist, Protestants are entitled to go further with their criticism. Institution by the historical Jesus being disproved, the only ground left for believing the system to have Divine sanction is its adaptation to the needs of men and its conformity to the sense of truth and justice which the Holy Spirit has implanted in them. That adaptation and that conformity are both of them very partial, in spite of the fact that the system is in large measure helpful and salutary as a means of bringing home to multitudes of humble and devout minds the presence and the claims of the Divine. Thus the Council of Trent anathematized those who should say "that the Sacraments of the New Law are not necessary for salvation, but superfluous, and that men obtain the grace of justification from God without them or the wish for them, through faith alone."[4] The modern Catholic apologist explains that there is no "harsh doctrine such as that *only* through the Sacraments God can or does give grace. Our teaching is that those who know about the Sacraments, and can obtain them, are bound to respect God's covenant, and to make use of them . . . *one* way is covenanted: it we must use, once we know of it," but God can and does bless in a thousand ways those who do not know of or cannot

[1] See T. A. Lacey in *H.E.R.E.* x (1918) 906a.

[2] Mirbt 506 (45)–507 (3).

[3] Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 282. Well does Heiler observe: "am häufigsten . . . drückt sie" (die Kirche) "ihr Wesen in einer grossen Geschichtsfiktion aus" (*Kathol.* 627).

[4] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, can. 4 (Mirbt 303 [34]).

reach the Sacraments.[1] If this be the modern meaning of the Tridentine Canon just quoted, what is it but an infringement of that canon of the Vatican Council which forbade the attachment to a dogma of a different meaning from that which the Church had always understood?[2] For it could hardly be maintained that this charitable modern interpretation, which makes the necessity of the Sacraments dependent upon our knowledge that they are Divine and necessary, truly represents the mind of Trent. And if God can and does bless in a thousand ways those who do not know that the Catholic Sacraments are Divinely ordained, what is the sense of maintaining that these Sacraments are necessary for salvation, and does not the contention that Protestant Sacraments (other than Baptism and Matrimony) are not really Sacraments become a purely verbal matter?

One important mark of the Catholic Sacraments is their definitely objective character. They are not admitted to be simply symbols whose helpfulness depends on the spiritual receptivity of administrant and participant. "If anyone says that the Sacraments . . . do not contain the grace they signify, or do not confer grace itself on those who do not place a barrier (of mortal sin in their way), as if they were only outward signs of the grace or righteousness accepted by faith, and certain marks of the Christian profession, by which believers are distinguished from unbelievers amongst men, let him be anathema. . . . If anyone says that through the Sacraments themselves . . . grace is not conferred ex opere operato, but that faith alone in the Divine promise suffices for the acquisition of grace, let him be anathema."[3] This does not mean that the actual effect of the Sacrament depends solely on their being correctly administered and not at all on the spiritual fitness of the worshipper[4]: but it does mean that the correct administration sets at work a certain special grace-giving activity on the part of God[5] which is otherwise not set at work. A valid Sacrament may be rendered ineffective for good by coldheartedness on the part of the recipient, but it is not rendered either invalid or ineffective even by mortal sin on the part of the officiating priest.[6]

[1] Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 304. Cf. N. P. Williams in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 421 f; Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 100, 136 f. For another apologetic reduction of the meaning of the Roman doctrine, see Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 100–102.

[2] See above, p. 37.

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, can. 6 and 8 (Mirbt 303 [38]).

[4] "The lack of spiritual desires in the case of an adult prevents him from being spiritually benefited by the sacramental gift . . ." (Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 25).

[5] According to *Conc. Trid.* sess vii, can. 7, whenever the Sacraments are correctly received, grace is given always and to all "quantum est ex parte Dei."

[6] The views of Wyclif and Hus to the contrary were condemned in 1418 (Mirbt 229 [31, 44, i.e. nos. 4 and 15], 230 [38, i.e. no. 8]); and the principle itself laid down as a dogma at Trent (sess. vii, can. 12: "Si quis dixerit, ministrum in peccato mortali existentem, modo omnia essentialia, quae ad sacramentum conficiendum aut con-

It is hard to resist the impression that we have here an unduly mechanical view of the conferment of grace. If we grant that God has deliberately willed that His grace should be obtainable through the performance of certain external rites, doubtless the inference is defensible that such rites do not lose their efficacy through the unworthiness or even the mortal sin of the officiating agent. We can illustrate this point to ourselves by reflecting how the sight of a fine sunset, the smell of a fragrant bloom, the sound of true music or true poetry or true Scripture might mediate something of Divine grace to us, even if brought within our reach by an unspiritual or immoral person. But is God's most special means of grace transmitted mechanically from Him to men, as if it were a certain quantity of matter, irrespective of the moral character of the human transmitter? Such a belief seems to Protestants to go beyond what is involved in a devout view of the sacramental potentialities of all material things,[1] and in a due appreciation of the religious necessity of Sacraments as expressing what mere words cannot so well express.[2] It appears to them to be psychologically and morally alien from the nature and methods of a spiritual Being. It is this mechanical element that has evoked the criticism that the Catholic Sacraments are magical. Naturally it depends on how one defines 'magic' whether the charge is justified or not. It has indeed been earnestly, nay hotly, repudiated; and no doubt there are senses in which it does not hold good. Magic, it is said, is non-religious, because it implies the coercion of an unwilling Deity—whereas the Catholic Sacraments are not of this nature. All the same, if it be magic to set in motion some Divine activity by means of a prescribed external procedure, irrespective of the moral condition of the person carrying out that procedure and necessitating only his willingness to carry it out, then the Catholic Sacraments must be said to partake in some measure of the nature of magic, despite the context of spiritual ideas within which they are presented and by which they are—as we know—normally accompanied. The objection could, of course, be effectively met, if it could be proved that God had explicitly commanded us to celebrate all the Sacraments as the Church ordains. But where is the proof that He has done so? Certainly not in the Gospels.[3]

ferendum pertinent, servaverit, non conficere aut conferre sacramentum: anathema sit" [Mirbt 304 (6)]), and embodied in *Catech. Rom.* (II. i. 23: ". . . ita ut gratiae fructum nulla res impedire possit, nisi qui ea suscipiunt, se ipsos tanto bono fraudare et Spiritui sancto velint obsistere . . ."). It should, however, be added that the Council of Trent made great efforts to remove priests of evil life. Cf. also Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 495–499.

[1] Cf. A. T. G. Beveridge in *Congress-Report 1923*, 80 f; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 99.

[2] Cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 226; W. Spens in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 428 f, 446 f.

[3] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 155–157 (distinguishes a former magical view from a later spiritual view among Catholics); Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 270 f; Martindale

THE LORD'S SUPPER

In the present state of critical enquiry, it has to be admitted that several questions that suggest themselves in connection with the historical origin of the Eucharist cannot be answered with any certainty. It is difficult in the first place to be quite sure whether Jesus really gave orders for the rite to be repeated by His followers. Our earliest witness, Paul, declares that He did so (1 Cor. xi. 24 f—about 54 A.D.); and such we may perhaps believe to have been the case, for it would most adequately account for the constant practice of Christian groups from the beginning. It is however strange that the good early account in Mark's Gospel (which is very closely followed by 'Matthew') does not contain the slightest allusion to any order on Jesus' part for the repetition of the rite. Next, the correct text of the Lucan account is uncertain: if we prefer the shorter text, we get the cup before the bread (which is the order assumed by the 'Didache,' about 90 A.D.), and we have no words commanding repeated observance; if we prefer the longer text, we include these latter words, but we get two cups, one before and one after the bread. But even assuming the truth of the traditional view, viz: that there was one cup, that it followed the bread, and that Jesus enjoined repeated observance of the rite, it still remains obscure what precisely Jesus intended the rite to convey. It certainly seems as though it was at least primarily one of those object-lessons or acted parables which the Old-Testament prophets are frequently described as giving.[1] More than one significant idea was doubtless meant to be conveyed. All accounts introduce the giving of thanks to God (hence the name 'the Eucharist'), the idea of Jesus' redemptive death (sacrificially conceived and related to God's new covenant), and the associated idea of the reception of nourishment on the part of the disciples: but the three Synoptic accounts also make it equally clear that the rite was an anticipation of the forthcoming triumphant Messianic feast (Mk. xiv. 25 = Mt. xxvi. 29 = Lk. xxii. 16, 18),[2] while some emphasis appears

in *God and the Supernatural*, 303 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 167 f, 221, 222 ("... Schon der eine Umstand, dass nach katholischer Sakramentauffassung die subjektive Gesinnung erst *in actu secundo* in Frage kommt, lehrt unverkennbar das Übergewicht der dinglichen Vorstellung"), 225, 227, 230, 698 f (notes to S. 167 f, 221 ff); Rawlinson, *Authority*, 154 f, 176 f; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 24–26; J. K Mozley in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 241–243; Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 126, 175: more generally, Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 246–254.

[1] Cf. Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 215, 233, 283 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 431 f.

[2] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 49; Pryke, *Modernism*, 176–200. Rev. N. P. Williams, in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 399–407, suggests that by the forthcoming Messianic feast Jesus simply meant the Catholic Eucharist, and that "the Apostles at the Last Supper did not feed upon Christ, as we do now, in reality, but only in figure; their first real and sacramental Communion in the body and blood of Christ can only have been made

also to be laid on the brotherly fellowship and common loyalty by which all the disciples are to be bound together. We purposely refrain from more closely investigating here how far this list of associated ideas is complete,[1] and what was their relative importance and their precise connexion with one another, because we have no wish to base objections to the Roman view on theories which, however reasonable, would necessarily be—in view of the obscurity of the problem—to some extent uncertain.

It will be sufficient to pass at once to the Catholic interpretation of the incident. As is well known, the Roman Church takes the words: "This is my body," and "This is my blood," in an absolutely literal sense, and teaches it as one of her dogmas that, when the words of consecration are pronounced, though the 'accidents' (that is, the outward and perceptible qualities) of the bread and wine remain unchanged, their whole underlying 'substance' is converted into the very body and blood of Christ.[2] We do not propose here to trace the inception and growth of this remarkable belief down the centuries; for the exegesis that finds it present in the Gospels is equally capable of discovering it in the simple utterances of the early Christians: it must suffice to say that, when proper allowance is made for what is simply their repetition of the actual Gospel-words in question and for the exaggeration natural to devotional feeling, the Roman idea of transubstantiation is simply not to be found in the earliest centuries.[3]

Our chief objection to the Catholic Eucharistic doctrine lies in the

after that body and blood had been glorified and freed from spatial limitations by the resurrection" (423). This leads, of course, to the paradoxical conclusion that the only occasion on which the bread and wine of the Eucharist were *not* the body and blood of Christ was the one occasion on which Christ Himself said that they were! For a truer interpretation, see R. H. Kennett, *The Last Supper* 35–38.

[1] Cf. Bartlet in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1927, 493–496 (paper read at Lausanne 'Conference on Faith and Order').

[2] See *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiii, esp. capp. 1, 3 f, and the canons (Mirbt 305–309); *Catech. Rom.* II. iv, esp. 25, 37, 43; *Creed of Pius IV* (Mirbt 339 [46]–340 [6]: "Profiteor pariter in Missa offerri Deo verum, proprium et propitiatorium sacrificium pro vivis et defunctis; atque in sanctissimo Eucharistiae sacramento esse vere, realiter et substantialiter Corpus et Sanguinem, una cum anima et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi, fierique conversionem totius substantiae panis in Corpus, et totius substantiae vini in Sanguinem, quam conversionem Catholica Ecclesia Transsubstantiationem appellat. Fateor etiam sub altera tantum specie totum atque integrum Christum verumque sacramentum sumi"); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 69–77; Heiler, *Kathol.* 223–227. The Wyclifite doctrines that the *substance* of bread and of wine remains after consecration, that Christ is not present "identice et realiter propria praesentia corporali," and that it is not established in the Gospel that He ordained the Mass—were condemned in 1418 (Mirbt 229 [29–33]). A good statement of the modern High Anglican position is given by W. Spens in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 439–445.

[3] For the development of the idea of transubstantiation, see Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 239–256; Heiler, *Kathol.* 400–409; Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, 160 ff, 184 ff, 440 ff; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 100–106; E. J. Price in *Congreg. Quart.* Apl. 1927, 143 f.

fact that it does violence to the plain meaning of Scripture. The word 'is' would not be uttered at all by Jesus, speaking in the Aramaic; so that emphasis on it in the Greek or Latin (as by Luther) was due to ignorance, and is no longer allowable. In any case, even when supplied in thought, the word is capable of a number of different meanings; and it is altogether arbitrary to insist that in these particular sentences it can mean only physical identity of substance. The Bible presents any number of instances in which, as here, the simple copula is used (or understood) to express, not physical or 'substantial' identity, but parabolic or symbolic parallelism. Thus, "the seven good cows are seven years" (Gen. xli. 26); "This" (viz. Ezekiel's hair) "is Jerusalem" (Ezek. v. 5); "These great beasts . . . are four kings" (Dan. vii. 17); "The seed is the word of God" (Lk. viii. 11); "The field is the world" (Mt. xiii. 38); "Thou art a rock" (Mt. xvi. 18); "Which things are allegorical; for these women are two covenants" (Gal. iv. 24); "The rock was Christ" (1 Cor. x. 4); "The seven stars are the angels of the seven churches, and the seven lamps are seven churches" (Rev. i. 20), and so on. In all these cases the copula does not mean 'is identical with' or 'is composed of' or 'is transmuted into,' but 'stands for,' 'represents,' 'symbolizes' or 'is symbolized (or represented) by.' Why may it not bear the same meaning in the story of the Supper?[1] It is no answer to this to say that, whenever our Lord uses allegory, the symbol is always the predicate and the reality the subject of the sentence, as in: "I am the living bread."[2] In all but one (Mt. xvi. 18) of the analogous cases just quoted, the symbol is the subject and the reality the predicate. The similarity between: "This is my body," and Ezekiel's: "This is Jerusalem," is patent. Still less can any objection to this view be based on the fact that "this" is neuter, whereas the word for bread is masculine.[3] The masculine οὗτος, as referring to bread, would sound very awkward in a speech in which bread had not been previously mentioned; whereas the neuter τοῦτο, meaning simply 'this thing,' is perfectly natural and intelligible.[4] And if the grammar of the sentence does not necessarily imply transubstantiation, there can be no question as to which of the two interpretations is psychologically and historically the more probable.

A second objection to the Catholic doctrine is that it presupposes and is dependent upon the highly questionable and now generally abandoned

[1] Trent explicitly anathematized those who said of the Eucharist that Christ's body and blood "tantummodo esse in eo, ut in signo, vel figura aut virtute" (*Conc. Trid.* sess. xiii, can. 1 [Mirbt 309 (9)]). But cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 237 f; Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 242, 281 f; Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 61 f note, 66, 74.

[2] Knox in *Religion of the Scriptures*, 82.

[3] So Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 71.

[4] For analogies, cf. A. T. Robertson, *Gram. of Gk. N.T.* 410 f.

scholastic metaphysics, which distinguished sharply between the 'accidents' (or perceptible qualities of a thing) and its underlying 'substance.' In the Mass the 'accidents' of the bread and wine remain hence the articles undergo no perceptible change; but their whole 'substance' becomes the true flesh and blood of Christ. The fact that the word 'accidents' is not actually used in the Tridentine Decrees and Canons does not prove that the mediaeval doctrine of substance and accidents is not involved.[1] That philosophy is quite plainly presupposed by the repeated use of the word 'substance': the 'accidents' do not happen to be mentioned because the fact that they underwent no change was not in dispute; moreover the word does occur in the 'Roman Catechism,' which is an official (though not infallible) document based on Trent.[2] Belief in transubstantiation is impossible without this mediaeval substance-and-accident philosophy—a philosophy which was unknown in the Church in the early centuries, is to-day no longer held, and cannot indeed be held if it allows that substance and accidents, besides being distinguishable for thought, are actually separable in reality.[3]

It is often claimed that the Catholic Mass represents, for those who believe in it, the meeting-place of heaven and earth, the tryst between Christ and the soul, and the penetration of the human by the Divine, in a way so unique that none of the other means of grace—such, for example, as are open to Protestants—can at all compare with it in richness, immediacy, and depth.[4] Doubtless for Catholics this is psychologically true: and it would ill become a Protestant apologist in any way to doubt or depreciate the reality of that communion with God through Christ which normally takes place before Catholic altars. But it is one thing to pay reverence to the inner reality of the Catholic experience: it is quite another thing to assent to the Catholic's own interpretation of that experience or to his insistence on the necessity for all to use the

[1] I must differ here from Dr. Orchard (*Foundations*, iii. 125).

[2] *Catech. Rom.* II. iv. 25 (3). Dr. Orchard is further mistaken in saying (*loc. cit.*): "it should be carefully noted, since it often seems to be overlooked in popular Roman Catholic exposition, that the substance of the bread and wine is not declared to be converted simply into the Body and Blood of Christ, but into the *substance* of the Body and Blood; when all possibility of carnal misunderstanding is removed." But the second Tridentine Canon says: "Si quis . . . negaverit . . . mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius substantiae panis *in corpus*, et totius substantiae vini *in sanguinem*, manentibus duntaxat speciebus panis et vini, . . anathema sit" (Mirbt 309 [10]: italics mine). The risk of "carnal misunderstanding" must therefore be held to remain.

[3] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 256 f; Pusey, *Eiren.* 229 f.

[4] Cf. Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 392; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 128; F. Underhill and C. S. Gillett in *Congress-Report 1923*, xix (". . . the Mass, which is (and will *always* be) the one assured and tested way whereby the redeemed find union with their Redeemer"); Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 175.

means that he uses. It is obvious in the first place that the experience itself is not dependent on Romanist orthodoxy; for Anglicans claim—and doubtless rightly—to have it at their own celebrations.[1] But we may go further and claim that precisely the same real and sweet experience of the Divine Presence is possible for Christians of another type of mind without the assistance of the belief that the Saviour's body and blood are being consumed by them in the form of bread and wine. Only the belief that the Catholic doctrine and ceremonial are Divinely enjoined upon all could make such a claim unwarranted. But evidence for such an injunction is not to be found in history, and is not borne out by experience. Rapt experience in prayer and meditation gives many quite as real a sense of special Divine presence as the Mass gives the Catholic. We may recall the words of the Catholic Brother Lawrence: "The time of business does not with me differ from the time of prayer, and in the noise and clatter of my kitchen, . . . I possess God in as great tranquillity, as if I were upon my knees at the Blessed Sacrament."[2] This type of experience is not rare in Protestant Christianity, least of all in a body like the Society of Friends. We do not, of course, quote Brother Lawrence's words as showing that Christians need not or should not celebrate the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, just as we would not quote them as justifying the neglect of special times of prayer: we quote them as evidence that no particular observance, however helpful, and no particular theory about it, however august, is a sine-quâ-non for true communion. We may fairly challenge our Catholic brethren to explain in what verifiable way the sacramental experience of the Divine presence at a Catholic altar actually differs from the (supposedly non-sacramental) experience of it at a Free-Church Communion-Service, or even at a Friends' Meeting.[3]

We proceed to notice a few of the more untoward consequences and accompaniments of the doctrine of transubstantiation, in regard to Catholic teaching and practice. Thus the 'Praxis' prefixed to the 'Roman Catechism' encourages the priest to interpret the words: "Prepare ye the way of the Lord" (Lk. iii. 4), of preparation for the Eucharist, to deal with the adoration of the host in connection with the story of the adoration of the infant Saviour by the Magi (Mt. ii. 11), and to strengthen simple people's faith in transubstantiation by the story of Jesus turning

[1] Cf. Adderley in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1914, 765 ("The Holy Communion is to me the great assurance that Christ is a living Master and King. I feel about it what Maurice felt when he said: 'If I had not been to communion this morning I should be inclined to say that the devil reigned' "); Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 26 f. See also above, n. 4 on previous page.

[2] *Practice of the Presence of God* (ed. 1906) 26.

[3] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 263–265; and J. Bevan's art. in *Christian World*, 7 Oct. 1926, 5.

water into wine (Jn. ii. 1–11).[1] Nothing is said in the Gospel-narratives about Jesus having mixed water with the wine, though of course it is quite possible that He did so. The Council of Trent, however, laid it down that in the Mass water was to be added to the wine, partly because Christ was believed to have done so, partly because blood and water flowed together from His side, and partly because the mixture typifies the union of Christ with His people (peoples being called waters in Rev. xvii. 1 and 15); and it anathematized those who should say that water ought not to be mixed with the wine "on the ground that it is contrary to the institution of Christ."[2] The 'Roman Catechism' reproduces the substance of these enactments, adding that "it is proved both by the authority of the Councils and by the testimony of Saint Cyprianus" (!) that Christ had mixed water with the wine, that the Church maintained this custom perpetually on the basis of Apostolic tradition, and that failure to mix water with the wine, though it did not invalidate the Sacrament, was yet a mortal sin.[3] The same authorities assert that at the Last Supper Jesus declared Himself to be a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek[4] and also constituted His apostles and their successors priests, with the intention that they and they alone should thenceforth be authorized to repeat the sacred rite.[5] To one however who reads the New Testament with an open mind nothing could be more clear than that this discovery of a sacerdotal ordination in the story of the Last Supper is simply an importation into the narrative from without.[6] If, as Catholic theory demands, the passage limits to priests the right of administering the sacrament, it also limits the right of participation to the same class, for the words "Take, eat" were addressed to none but the Apostles.[7] The 'Roman Catechism' lays it down that, in the consecration of the cup, the following words

[1] *Praxis Catechismi*, etc., fourth Sunday in Adv., Epiph. Sund., and second Sund. after Epiph.

[2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxii, cap. 7 and can. 9 (Mirbt 324 [10], 325 [8]).

[3] *Catech. Rom.* II. iv. 17. Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 225 n.

[4] See above, p. 315 n. 4.

[5] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxii, cap. 1 (mid.) and can. 2 ("Si quis dixerit, illis verbis: *Hoc facite in meam commemorationem*, Christum non instituisse Apostolos sacerdotes; aut non ordinasse, ut ipsi aliique sacerdotes offerrent corpus et sanguinem suum: anathema sit"), sess. xxiii, cap. 1 and can. 1, 3, 4, 6 (Mirbt 322 [37], 324 [35], 326 [32], 327 f); *Catech. Rom.* II. iv. 72, 80, vii. 2 (2), 57 (2). In *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, sacram. can. 10 (Mirbt 304 [3]), an anathema is pronounced upon those who say that all Christians have power in the word (preaching) and in the administration of all the Sacraments.

[6] Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 168 f ("He never gave the name of priest either to Himself or to any disciple . . ."); Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 139 n. ("There is nothing in the New Testament which gives any indication as to who might or who might not preside at the eucharist . . ."), 142, 144.

[7] Cf. P. Carnegie Simpson in *Construct. Quart.* Mar. 1922, 68; Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 90, 105.

are to be used: "This is the cup of my blood, of the new *and eternal* testament, *the mystery of the faith*, which will be poured out on behalf of you and of many for the remission of sins."[1] This formula, which clearly purports to be the one used by Jesus Himself,[2] is for the most part a somewhat rough conflation of the different versions of the words of institution given in the four New-Testament narratives; but it also includes certain words ("et aeterni" and "mysterium fidei"), for which there is absolutely no scriptural or other historical warrant whatever. Nevertheless, the 'Catechism' declares that "sacred tradition, the interpreter and guardian of Catholic truth, teaches us those words"; and it adds a full exegesis of them.[3]

Another implication of the Catholic exegesis is that the Sacrament of the Mass is a true sacrifice of Christ Himself, not exactly a repetition, but as it were an actual part, of the sacrifice on Golgotha.[4] This conception leads on to the strange belief that, in the celebration of the Lord's Supper, we present again before God the body of Christ like that of a sacrificial victim, and thus render Him more propitious to our prayers.[5] Christian thought is thus launched on an artificial course. The Saviour's simple metaphorical allusion to His death as a ransom and a covenant-sacrifice is hardened into a doctrine on the lines of the old rudimentary sacrificial system of the Hebrews, with all its unethical implications. Does our heavenly Father need to have the body of His

[1] *Catech. Rom.* II. iv. 21. [2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 225.

[3] *Catech. Rom.* II. iv. 21 and 23. Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 405 n.27; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 102 n.1; Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 105 f.

[4] Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 13 f. In contrast to this the official Anglican view is that this Sacrament was ordained "for the continual *remembrance* of the sacrifice of the death of Christ, and of the benefits which we receive thereby" (*Prayer Book, Catechism*: cf. *Articles* xxviii–xxxi).

[5] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxii, can. 1 (Mirbt 324 [33]: "Si quis dixerit, in missa non offerri Deo verum et proprium sacrificium, aut quod offerri non sit aliud quam nobis Christum ad manducandum dari: anathema sit"). In 1567 Pius V condemned the statement of Baius that the Mass was a sacrifice only in the general sense in which every act done to keep man close to God is a sacrifice (Mirbt 347 [34]). Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 268 f (Epistle to 'Hebrews' declares that Christ's sacrifice is complete and final); Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 175–178; Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 255–257; C. J. Smith in *Congress-Report 1920*, 124–137, esp. 128 ("In the Eucharist the sacrifice of Calvary is in a very real way brought before God." "Cf. (e.g.) the reference to the prayer of consecration as the sword whereby Christ is symbolically slain in Gregory Naz., *Ep.*, clxxi"); Father Jenks, in *Priests' Convention*, 134 f; G. A. Michell in *Congress-Report 1923*, 89 f; W. L. P. Cox in *Anglic. Ess.* 146–154; Moulsdale in *The Sacrif. of the Mass* (*Congress Books*, no. 26) 10 (quotes hymn:—

"See, Father, thy beloved Son,
Whom here we now present to thee;
The all-sufficient sacrifice,
The sinner's one and only plea");

Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 126 f; W. Spens in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 430–439; Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 80–100.

crucified Son placed before Him, in order to be reminded of our title as redeemed Christians to His forgiving love?

Furthermore, as the consecrated elements contain God Himself,[1] and as the consecration depends on the use by the priest of the needful formula, it follows that the priest possesses the extraordinary power of being able to compel God to descend upon the altar. This prerogative obviously opens the way to grossly irreverent boasting about the sacerdotal power to impose orders on the Almighty and to create the Creator.[2]

Considerations of space forbid that I should dwell on certain other notions attached to the Catholic Sacrament of the Mass, which, though valued by Catholics, inevitably appear arbitrary and in a measure artificial to Protestants. I refer to the withholding (by Rome) of the cup from the laity (a mediaeval innovation), the imaginary duty of taking the Sacrament before any other food is eaten (qualified by occasional permission to take *liquid* food before the Sacrament),[3] the reservation of the Sacrament, and the saying of Masses (in return for regular payment) on behalf of the dead in Purgatory.[4] Enough has been said to show that the Catholic view of the Eucharist, though it commands our sympathy and deep respect in so far as it helps to bring home to people the nearness and graciousness of God through Christ, is yet associated with and in large part dependent upon a considerable number of clear historical errors, with which the equally sacramental and more authentic communion-service of Protestants is happily unencumbered.

BAPTISM

We have spoken first of the Lord's Supper, because that is the Sacrament for the perpetual observance of which our Lord's personal authority may with most assurance be claimed. His precise intentions in regard to Baptism are rather less easy to determine. Ritual washings and bathings, partly or originally perhaps in the interests of physical cleanliness and health, were a long-established feature in the Jewish legal

[1] Cf. Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 272 mid.

[2] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 155, ii. 292; Kurtz, *Church. Hist.* iii (1893) 248 (quotes a priest as saying [1872]: "We priests . . . occupy a position superior to that of the mother of God, who only once bare Christ, whereas we create and beget him every day. Yea, in a sense, we stand above God, who must always and everywhere serve us, and at the consecration must descend from heaven upon the mass," etc.); Horton, *England's Danger*, 20 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 181, 226 (similar quotations from eminent and responsible Catholics); Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 74 f, 107.

[3] "We do well to bear in mind Bishop Jeremy Taylor's saying that he who disregards this rule 'shows only the signs of an evil mind' " (Hockley in *Congress-Report 1920*, 165).

[4] Cf. Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 71–74 for sundry minor extravagances connected with the Roman Mass.

system; and in our Lord's day it had become the practice to baptize all proselytes on their conversion from paganism to Judaism. John the Baptist instituted a "baptism of repentance for remission of sins" as part of his Messianic revival-movement. Jesus Himself underwent that baptism at the very commencement of His public life (Mk. i. 9 and parallels), and some of His earliest adherents had apparently done the same (Jn. i. 35–42). During the first period of His public ministry, Jesus is said to have carried on a mission of baptism contemporaneously with that of John and apparently similar to it, the actual rite of immersion, however, being administered, not by Himself, but by His disciples (Jn. iii. 22–26, iv. 1 f). The Gospels contain no other historically reliable allusions to baptism being practised or enjoined by Jesus. The baptisms referred to in Mk. x. 38f and Lk. xii. 50 are obviously metaphorical allusions to the Passion. The statement made to Nicodemus (Jn. iii. 5) that, unless a man is born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the Kingdom of God, cannot be accepted confidently as an actual saying of Jesus, since it rests on the unsupported testimony of the Fourth Gospel[1]: it represents rather the mind of the Church at the end of the first century A.D. Mt. xxviii. 19 is open to grave doubt on grounds that have already been fully stated.[2] Mk. xvi. 16 occurs in a paragraph which is not a part of Mark's Gospel; and its historical reliability can therefore not be vouched for.[3] The only real evidence that Jesus commanded His disciples to baptize those who should believe in Him is the fact that, apparently from the earliest days after His death, they always did baptize converts, and that it came to seem to them appropriate to ascribe to Him an order to do so.[4] The pronouncement of some such order by Him may therefore be considered probable, though it cannot be regarded as quite certain. The precise relation between John's baptism and the baptism which Jesus Himself administered through His disciples and possibly later on instructed them to administer after His death, is obscure. The early chapters of the Fourth Gospel suggest that during Jesus' earthly ministry the two baptisms were similar in significance, viz: as preparatory for the Kingdom of God, with its effusion of the Holy Spirit. Such a Spirit-baptism, due to Jesus' personal influence as exalted Messiah (Act i. 5), came at Pentecost, in fulfilment of Joel's prophecy (Acts ii. 16–21, 33), and was thenceforth an essential accompaniment of Christian water-baptism (Acts x. 47, xi. 15–17). About twenty-four years later, we hear of a group of

[1] See above, pp. 339 f. Cf. N. P. Williams in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 379.

[2] See above, pp. 344–347. [3] See above, p. 334.

[4] Canon Rawlinson (*Authority*, 144) suggestively says: "Perhaps the very fact that it was ascribed to the *risen* Jesus betrays the realisation that it was not directly instituted by Jesus during His life upon earth." Cf. Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 164; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 52–54; N. P. Williams in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 407–419.

men at Ephesus who had received only the baptism of John, i.e. they had no experience of 'holy-Spirit' baptism (Acts xix. 2) through Jesus: they were therefore re-baptized by Paul "into the name of the Lord Jesus." Whatever Christian baptism came to mean in the Gentile churches of the first centuries, there can be little doubt that, immediately after our Lord's ministry (during which it was prophetically symbolic), it was sacramental only in the proper Christian (experimental) sense. Justice is most fully done to all the early allusions to it by the view that it was suggested and accepted as a supreme act of personal confession and devotion to Jesus as Lord—couched in the deeply expressive language, not only of words, but of symbolic rite—an action acknowledged in turn by God and 'sealed' with the gift of the Holy Spirit. This originally experimental character of baptism, which to-day reappears in principle on the mission-field, tended in the early Church more and more to fade, as faith became hereditary, and infant-baptism (a purely symbolic form of the rite) more and more the rule.[1]

In Catholicism, however, the original meaning of Baptism has been so overlaid with later growths of thought and fancy, that both history and indeed common sense have been largely forgotten, and Baptism comes as near to being pure magic as it is possible for a Christian observance to be. Apparently on the basis of a remark of the imaginative Ignatius, who says that Jesus "was baptized in order that by (His) passion He might cleanse the water,"[2] the 'Roman Catechism' teaches that Jesus, "having been baptized by John, imparted to the water the virtue of sanctifying. For Saints Gregorius Nazianzenus and Augustinus testify that at that time there was given to the water the power of generating, that is, unto spiritual life. And elsewhere he has left it so written: 'Ever since Christ was dipped in (the) water, (the) water washes away all sins.' . . . But this can be sufficiently (well) perceived by us, that, when Baptism was undergone by the Lord, (the) water was, by the touch of His most holy and pure body consecrated to the salutary use of Baptism, but in such a way that this sacrament, though instituted before the passion, should yet be believed to have drawn (its) power and efficacy from the passion, . . ."[3] The practice of marking with the sign of the cross the ears, eyes, breast, and shoulders of children in Baptism is justified by the example of Jesus in putting His fingers into the deaf man's ears (Mk. vii. 33).[4] The effect of Baptism is declared to be the application to the baptized, whether child or adult, of the merit of Jesus Christ, whereby the original sin incurred through descent from Adam is

[1] See Bartlet in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 375–379; K. Lake in *op. cit.* 379–390; Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, 44–46, 149 f, 158–160, 193 ff; Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 160–213.

[2] Ignat. *Ephes.* xviii. 2.

[3] *Catech. Rom.* II. ii. 19 f; cf. II. iii. 8.

[4] *Praxis Catechismi*, etc., 11th Sund. after Pentecost.

as it were expiated or washed away, the attainment of eternal life made possible, and an indelible spiritual stamp impressed upon the soul.[1] A very important incidental effect is that baptism puts a man under the control of the Catholic Church and makes him subject to its discipline. A man is baptized as a child without his own consent; yet when he is grown, he must come under the coercive control of the Church. So it is only the baptized that are liable to excommunication: the devil, for instance, though he may be anathematized, yet—because he has not been baptized—cannot be excommunicated; and the same is true of unbaptized infidels, such as Jews, Mohammedans, and (we infer) Quakers.[2]

Nothing can exceed the clarity and emphasis with which Baptism has been officially pronounced to be necessary for salvation. It is the more needful to draw attention to this pronouncement, in view of the unwillingness of modern Catholics to admit that their charitable modern interpretations of what it implies are in essence a radical abandonment of it. The Council of Trent declared that translation from a state of nature to a state of grace "cannot since the promulgation of the Gospel be effected without the bath of regeneration or the wish for it, as it is written, 'Unless a man is re-born of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the Kingdom of God.' " It speaks of Baptism as the Sacrament of faith, "without which no one ever obtained justification"; and it anathematizes those who should say "that baptism is optional (liberum), that is, not necessary for salvation."[3] The 'Roman Catechism,' on the basis of the same Johannine passage, teaches that men, "unless they are reborn to God through the grace of Baptism, are brought forth by their parents, whether these be believers or unbelievers, unto eternal misery and death."[4] Baptism is thus indispensable, unrepeatable, ineffaceable.[5]

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. v, can. 3 and 4, sess. vii, sacram. can. 9 (Mirbt 293 f, 304 top); more fully expounded in *Catech. Rom.* II. ii. 41–58. Cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 58 f. According to the Anglican baptismal service, the child is by Baptism "regenerate, and grafted into the body of Christ's Church."

[2] See *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, bapt. can. 8 and 14 (Mirbt 304 [31], 305 top). Dr. Wilhelm seems to ignore this 14th canon when he says: "No one is forced to enter the Church, but having once entered it through baptism, he is bound to keep the promises he freely made . . ." (*Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 261ab). Cf. *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 12; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 27–29, 55–59, 66 f, 81; Thurston in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 761a ("breaking the engagements made by them, or by sponsors in their name, when they became members of the Church of Christ"). On the devil, etc. cf. Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 681b. Hase (*Handbook*, i. 83–85) narrates that in 1858 the papal government forcibly removed from his parents a Jewish boy who had been surreptitiously baptized by a Christian servant.

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vi, cap. 4 and 7, sess. vii, bapt. can. 5 (Mirbt 295 f, 297 top, 304 [26]). Cf. in the Anglican *Prayer-Book*, the words used in the public baptism of adults (Jn. iii. 5 quoted; then: "Whereby ye may perceive the great necessity of this Sacrament, where it may be had").

[4] *Catech. Rom.* II. ii. 30.

[5] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, sacram. can. 9 (". . signum quoddam spirituale et indelebile,

It is arguable that we ought to believe, in view of the probable injunction of Jesus and the traditional usage of Christian people, that God desires that every human being should be baptized. But it would be hard to regard the evidence as amounting to a demonstration, and harder still to believe that God withholds salvation or any other gift of His mercy from those who, either through the impotence of infancy, or through an error of historical judgment, fail to undergo this particular outward rite.[1] And it is abundantly clear that the Catholic conception of the objective efficacy of Baptism as conferring grace 'ex opere operato' brings the Sacrament very near to being pure magic. It appears from the story of the Jesuit missions in South America early in the seventeenth century that, while efforts were made, wherever possible, to impart some Christian teaching to the natives before baptizing them, Baptism was regarded, both by missionaries and converts, as of itself a passport to heaven, and hence was freely desired by (and for), and freely administered to, any (old or young) who were near to death.[2] There is, moreover, no doubt that in the mission-field generally, Baptism was often administered very hurriedly and indiscriminately, in the idea that it would avert the otherwise inevitable damnation.[3] In the latter part of the seventeenth century, a Franciscan friar found great superstition prevailing among the Algonquins evangelized some years earlier by the Jesuits. "He avers that these 'salvages' would 'suffer themselves baptized six times a Day for a Glass of *Aqua Vitae* or a Pipe of Tobacco.' "[4] Such was the nemesis of over-emphasizing the objective validity of the Sacrament to the neglect of its moral and subjective significance.

It follows naturally from the Catholic view of the way in which Baptism operates that, if the rite be performed with the use of the proper Trinitarian formula, and with the intent (easily presumed) of doing what the Church does, it is a perfectly valid Baptism, by whomsoever it be performed, whether priest or layman, man or woman, Catholic or Protestant, believer or infidel. A baptized heretic or schismatic, therefore, although his Baptism is of itself inadequate for salvation, is

unde ea iterari non possunt: . ."), bapt. can. 11 (baptism not to be repeated in the case of a converted apostate) (Mirbt 304 [1 and 38]); Fanning in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 265a–266a; Boudinhon in *op. cit.* v (1909) 678b.

[1] Cf. W. E. Channing, on 'The Church' (*Works* [ed. 1843] ii. 276 f), in regard to the ascription to God of arbitrary, external, and non-moral conditions of receiving grace.

[2] Interesting details regarding these missions are to be seen in Dr. R. Offor's translation of *Annual Letters from the Province of Paraguay of the Colleges and Missions of the Company of Jesus for . . . 1626 and 1627* (259, 269, 309 f, 316, 321, 324, 326, 351, 376, 388, 405)—a copy of which is kept in the Library of Leeds University, and was kindly lent to me by the Librarian, Dr. Offor himself.

[3] Cf. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 103.

[4] Hennepin (1698) quoted in *H.E.R.E.* i (1908) 322a.

yet counted as a Christian, and therefore as legally subject to ecclesiastical discipline; if converted to Catholicism, he is never re-baptized, except 'sub conditione' in cases of uncertainty.[1]

Another obvious implication is that infants must be baptized at the earliest possible moment after their birth.[2] The unbaptized child is regarded as being in the possession of a (or the) devil, whose departure baptism alone can effect (contrast 1 Cor. vii. 14).[3] The need is of course especially urgent if there is any danger of the child not living long. In so mechanical a way, indeed, has the rite come to be regarded, that, in cases where the child is in danger of death during the process of parturition, its salvation in the next world is ensured by the Baptism of whatever part of its body has emerged from the womb. If pre-natal death is feared, it is actually baptized by the nurse within its mother's body by means of water conveyed through a syringe. In such cases, Baptism is usually repeated after birth 'sub conditione.' Regulations on all these points are duly laid down in the recently published 'Codex Juris Canonici' (1917).[4]

Infants who die unbaptized cannot be saved and cannot go to heaven. Catholic logic requires us to say that our merciful and loving Heavenly Father sends such children straight to hell, in view of the taint of original sin which they have inherited from Adam. That logic has largely controlled Catholic thought on the matter; and throughout the greater

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, sacram. can. 9, bapt. can. 4 and 6–11 (Mirbt 304 [1, 24, 27]): cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 167; Lylburn, *Our Faith*, ii (1908) 83 f, 86; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 285 (". . . whosoever . . . so pours the water and so speaks the words, . . . does indeed 'baptize' and cause the supernatural life to spring up within the soul").

[2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. v, cap. 3, sess. vii, bapt. can. 12 f (Mirbt 293 [44], 304 [40]); *Catech. Rom.* II. ii. 34 (immediate baptism after birth needful "cum praesertim propter aetatis imbecillitatem infinita pene vitae pericula illis impendant").

[3] See above, p. 79 n. 2. Moreover, infant *communion*, the 'reductio ad absurdum' of the Catholic notion of 'objective' Sacraments, became the privilege of baptized infants in ancient Catholicism.

[4] Canon 746 of the *Codex Juris Canonici* reads: "1. Nemo in utero matris clausus baptizetur, donec probabilis spes sit ut rite editus baptizari possit. 2. Si infans caput emiserit et periculum mortis immineat, baptizetur in capite; nec postea, si vivus evaserit, est iterum sub conditione baptizandus. 3. Si aliud membrum emiserit, in illo, si periculum immineat, baptizetur sub conditione; at tunc, si natus vixerit, est rursus sub conditione baptizandus. 4. Si mater praegnans mortua fuerit, fetus ab iis ad quos spectat extractus, si certo vivat, baptizetur absolute; si dubie, sub conditione. 5. Fetus, in utero baptizatus, post ortum denuo sub conditione baptizari debet" (Mirbt 545 [6–14]). Mirbt enumerates in a footnote a considerable number of Catholic treatises and articles on the subject of intro-uterine Baptism; one book that deals with the subject—Capellmann's *Pastoral-Medizin* (edited by Bergmann)—reached its nineteenth edition (duly imprimatured) in 1923 (cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 223 [with note 55], 698 [note to S.223]). In regard to the dangers of the process, the book observes: "Der zu befürchtende Nachteil für die Mutter und die Beschleunigung des Todes für das Kind kämen hier nicht in Betracht gegenüber der nötigen Sorge für das ewige Heil des Kindes."

part of the pre-Reformation period, the view normally taught and widely accepted was that such infants suffer the pains of eternal fire. There were, it is true, individual theologians who from time to time qualified this terrible belief in various ways: but it was certainly the regnant view during the first eight or nine centuries of distinctive Catholicism, and was very widely held even later. It has now become usual to say that children dying unbaptized go, not to hell properly so called, but to a place on the outskirts of hell or just within its confines, the 'limbus puerorum' or 'infantium,' where they suffer no pain, and may even enjoy a kind of natural happiness, but where they are forever excluded from the joy of seeing and communing with God.[1] When a Catholic theologian, Hermann Schell, argued in 1893 that unbaptized children might be admitted to heaven, a storm of protest arose, and his work was placed on the Index.[2] It is impossible not to feel that we have here a system of magic utterly alien from the spirit and teaching of Him who said that the angels of these little ones always behold the face of His Father in heaven, and that the Kingdom of Heaven consists of such as they. Had the children of whom He said this been baptized?

Modern Catholic concessions as to the possible salvation of non-Catholics usually explain that Baptism is a necessary condition of such special salvation.[3] But even here, the ecclesiastical logic displays its usual elasticity. A leading Anglo-Catholic explains that the Holy Ghost works outside the limits of the baptized through gifts of "actual grace."[4] A leading Romanist suggests that a pagan dying unbaptized may be regarded either as capable, through some obscure means, of salvation or as being treated like unbaptized children: "technically they are 'in hell,' but they are far from suffering."[5] And then there is always the mysterious 'Baptism of desire' or 'Spirit-baptism' which may assist in the evasion of awkward implications arising from Catholic teaching.[6] When we recall the fact that in 1441 it was authoritatively laid down in a papal bull (which apparently possesses all the qualities of

[1] See Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 359–364; Fanning in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 265ab, 266b–267b; *Cath. Dict.* 524 f (art. 'Limbo'); Heiler, *Kathol.* 222; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 338 n. (represents this "natural happiness" as "surpassing, as we may well believe, all that earth offers of delight . . . Let not, then, the Catholic faith be accused of cruelty towards such . ."). Even Dr. Orchard (*Foundations*, iii. 110 f) feels himself obliged to accept the doctrine. For Pius VI's defence (1794) of the doctrine of 'limbo' against the Synod of Pistoia, see bull *Auctorem Fidei*, prop. 26. On the general question, see below, pp. 530 f, 537 f.

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 222.

[3] E.g. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 217 f.

[4] Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 30 f.

[5] Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 338 n. The writer naïvely adds: "I mention it to show that Catholic thinkers are not unaware of the grave difficulty which this part of their faith occasions for many, especially nowadays." Exactly—but what shall we say of a system that makes such difficulties inevitable?

[6] On this, see above, pp. 59–61, and below, pp. 538 f.

an 'ex cathedra' statement) that all those who die outside the Catholic Church, whether as pagans, Jews, heretics, or schismatics, depart into the eternal fire,[1] we shall realize how entirely these modern concessions to the humanitarian demands of Protestantism are in the nature of an afterthought, designed to rescue Catholicism from the reproach of outrageous cruelty. In proportion to their success in this connexion they do but prove themselves to be innovations. And in any case the concessions do not imply any real recognition of the Churchmanship of unbaptized Christians like the Quakers: for the practical purposes of Church-fellowship the door is still tightly barred by both Romanist and Anglican against Christians who have not been baptized with water, however well-entitled they are to be considered as baptized with the Spirit and so as belonging truly to the Soul of the Church.[2]

HOLY ORDER

The intentions of Jesus with regard to the leadership of His followers must have depended on His intentions with regard to His 'Church' generally, which we have already discussed. If we may here avail ourselves of the conclusions already reached, we would observe that the Gospel-evidence makes it well-nigh certain that Jesus expected to return in triumph and finally set up God's Kingdom at some time before the generation of His contemporaries had passed away (Mk. ix. i, xiii. 24–37, and parallels; etc.). He contemplates therefore the existence of His 'Church' on earth during a period of at most about forty or fifty years. He appointed twelve 'Apostles,' doubtless with reference to the twelve tribes of that Israel which He regarded as the proper nucleus and first instalment of the Kingdom of God (Mk. iii. 13–19; Mt. xix. 28 = Lk. xxii.29f). On another occasion He appointed seventy men for the purpose of a special mission (Lk. x). It is clear therefore that He realized the need for leaders in His community, and that He specially prepared the Twelve for that office.[3] Beyond that, there is nothing in His teaching about the establishment of a hierarchy of officials. Mt. xviii. 17, which Catholics interpret of their own sacerdotal discipline,[4] and which some Protestant critics reasonably suspect, if a genuine saying of Jesus at all, refers, not to the Christian Church as a whole, but either to the Jewish synagogue or, just possibly, to the local church as a corporate society.[5]

[1] See above, p. 46.

[2] Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 39 f.

[3] Cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 137 f, 302.

[4] "Si te non audierit, inquit Christus, dic Ecclesiae: quo in loco praepositi Ecclesiae designantur" (*Catech. Rom.* I. x. 13: cf. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii [1908] 746ab).

[5] See above, pp. 377–379. For Mt. xvi. 19, xviii. 18, see above, pp. 386 f, 388–390. It is admitted in the Anglo-Catholic *Congress-Report 1923*, 114, that the form of the Christian ministry was not laid down by Jesus.

His teaching as a whole applies either to the disciple as such (whether leader or not) or to the Twelve themselves under the special conditions of that time. He and they were indeed familiar with an official hierarchy in the Jewish priesthood; but His whole outlook and the whole trend of His teaching and method contrasted strongly with those of the priests and rabbis, and resembled rather those of the Jewish prophets. The natural inference from this fact and from passages like Mt. v. 5, 13–16, xxiii. 8–12, is that Jesus' thought was moving along a similar line to that of Moses when he wished that all the Lord's people should be prophets (Numb. xi. 29). He probably thought of Israel as a whole being enlisted in His cause and making itself a nation of missionaries in the service of humanity (cf. Isa. xlix. 6; Rom. ii. 17–21)—an ideal defeated only by the hostility of the Jews. The early Christian idea of the whole brotherhood of disciples being a nation of priests, which appears in 1 Peter ii. 5, 9, and Rev. i. 6, v. 10, xx. 6, and in several of the early Fathers, was thus in the true line of development from the thought of the Master Himself.[1] It is upon that thought that the distinctively Free-Church (in particular, the Congregational) theory of the Christian ministry rests.

Over against this historical evidence, the Catholic Church erects her own system of dogmas. The doctrine of the priesthood of all believers is declared to be illusory and contrary to history, tradition, and reason.[2] A visible and external priesthood, charged with the office, not only of preaching, but of celebrating the Eucharist and remitting or retaining sins, was, it is contended, set up in New-Testament times on the basis of the Sacrament of Ordination instituted by Christ Himself: this Sacrament impresses an indelible stamp on the ordained priest: the episcopate (including the papacy), the presbyterate or priesthood, and the diaconate are "of Divine institution" (meaning presumably that they were instituted by Christ personally); the other orders (sub-deacons, etc.) are of ecclesiastical institution: the laity are mere sheep, whose duty it is to obey, and who have no voice in the selection of the men ordained by bishops to the priesthood.[3]

[1] Cf. Justinus, *Dial.* 116 (. . . ἀρχιερατικὸν τὸ ἀληθινὸν γένος ἐσμὲν τοῦ Θεοῦ, . . .); Iren. *Haer.* IV. viii. 3 ("omnes enim justi sacerdotalem habent ordinem": so the Latin translation); Tertull. *Exhort. Cast.* 7 ("Nonne et laici sacerdotes sumus?"). For further quotations, see Hase, *Handbook*, i. 160 f, and Suicer, *Thesaurus*, s.v. ἱερεύς. Cf. also Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 170–172, 346.

[2] Cf. *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiii, cap. 4 (Mirbt 327 [19]: ". . . Quod si quis omnes Christianos promiscue novi testamenti sacerdotes esse, aut omnes pari inter se potestate spirituali praeditos affirmet, nihil aliud facere videtur, quam ecclesiasticam hierarchiam, quae est ut castrorum acies ordinata, confundere; . ."); Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 496 f. Yet the idea is sometimes accepted in a general sense e.g. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 220; Dunin-Borkowski in *Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 326a).

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiii, capp. 1–4, cann. 1, 3 (ordination is "vere et proprie sacramentum a Christo Domino institutum," and is not "tantum ritum quendam eligendi

PENANCE

In the teaching of Jesus recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, there are several allusions to the universal need for repentance or (as the word is perhaps better rendered) 'change of heart,' after or in view of sin (Mk. i. 15 = Mt. iv. 17; Lk. v. 32, xiii. 1–9, xv. 7, 10, xviii. 13f; Mt. xi. 21=Lk. x. 13; Mt. xii. 41=Lk. xi. 32). Passages like the Parable of the Prodigal and the petition for pardon in the Lord's Prayer (Mt. vi. 9, 12: cf. Lk. xi. 4, xv. 11–23) suggest that, in order to evoke forgiveness, repentance needs only to be sincere. No condition is laid down as to the necessity of repenting in any particular place or in the presence of any particular person. In addition, however, to the passages thus far considered, we find reports of Jesus conferring a power of binding and loosing on Peter (Mt. xvi. 19) and at another time on the Twelve (Mt. xviii. 18). We have already discussed the question of the doubtful genuineness of these sayings;[1] but we would further observe that, even if genuine, their reference does not extend to the forgiveness of sins, as is claimed by Catholic expositors,[2] but is properly limited to the settlement of what was permissible and what prohibited in the society of Jesus' adherents. In Jn. xx. 23, however, the risen Jesus is represented as saying to ten of the Twelve: "Receive (the) Holy Spirit. Whosesoever sins ye forgive, to them they are forgiven: (and) whosesoever (sins) ye retain, they are retained." Now it is clearly not allowable to insist that these words were actually spoken by Jesus. They are suspicious on three grounds: (1) they rest solely on the testimony of the Fourth Gospel[3]; (2) they are post-resurrection words; and the post-resurrection period was from an early date utilized as a convenient blank to which the pious imagination could refer all sorts of later rulings for which the Lord's express sanction was desired[4]—note in this connexion that the Gospels and Acts (including the supposititious endings to Mark) show clearly by their wide differences how open to local

ministros verbi Dei et sacramentorum"), 4 (indelibility), 6 (in the Catholic Church there is "hierarchiam divina ordinatione institutam, quae constat ex episcopis, presbyteris et ministris"), 7 (validity of orders conferred by bishops "sine populi vel potestatis saecularis consensu aut vocatione": none not so ordained are legitimate ministers of Word and Sacraments) (Mirbt 326–328). In 1794 the Pope condemned as heretical the view that the Church's pastors derived their authority from the community of the faithful (bull *Auctorem Fidei* in Mirbt 412 [7]). Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 154 (Jesuit General Lainez in speech at Trent, on laity as sheep); A. van Hove in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 323b, 324a; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 291 f (". . . through the material rites, and the words of the ordaining bishop, grace flows . . . ."). See also below, pp. 439–446.

[1] See above, pp. 377–384; cf. pp. 386 ff.

[2] Cf. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 265b.

[3] See above, pp. 339–341.

[4] See above, pp. 344 f, 374, 377.

influence was the tradition as to what Jesus had done and said after He rose; (3) they harmonize far better with the mind of the Church in 100 A.D. than with the best-attested other teaching of Jesus. In Church-History, we find mutual confession of wrongs (cf. Jac. v. 16) in the interests of brotherliness and morality, and a communal system of expulsion in the case of grave offence (1 Cor. v. 1–8). Later, regulations for the readmission of expelled members, after a series of public expressions of repentance, were elaborated. The church at Rome and other western churches observed from an early time a more or less public ceremony for the confession, absolution, etc. of such as had by their offences disqualified themselves for participation in the Eucharist.[1] For such sins, however, as did not create so public a scandal in the Church, there does not seem to have been in the first few centuries any rule making obligatory the confession of them to the priest. Chrysostomus, for instance (about 400 A.D.), speaks repeatedly of private confession to God alone exclusive of man.[2]

Yet in 1520 the Pope condemned Luther's statements that the three elements in penance, viz: contrition, confession, and satisfaction, were not established in Scripture and ancient Christian writers, and that any Christian—even a woman or a child—could do for one what the priest does in the Sacrament of Penance.[3] More than that, the Council of Trent laid it down as a 'de fide' dogma of the Church that penance was "truly and properly a Sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord."[4] Only priests possess the sacramental power of remitting sins;[5] Christ, "before He ascended into heaven, . . . granted that power to bishops and presbyters in the Church."[6] Mortal sin in itself does not incapacitate them for the office.[7] Originally, the formula in which the priest pronounced absolution was optative: "May the . . . Lord grant thee indulgence, absolution, and remission of thy sins," etc. But about 1200 A.D. this was superseded by the addition of the decisive words: "I absolve thee," etc., but was allowed to remain as a mere preliminary.[8]

[1] Sozomenus, *Hist. Eccles.* vii. 16.

[2] See Pusey's argument quoted by Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 59 f.

[3] Bull *Exsurge Domine*, props. 5 and 13, in Mirbt 257 (21, 40).

[4] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, poen. can. 1 (Mirbt 317 f); cf. sess. vi, cap. 14 (Mirbt 299 [28]: "Etenim pro iis, qui post baptismum in peccata labuntur, Christus Jesus sacramentum instituit poenitentiae, cum dixit:" here follows Jn. xx. 23 [wrongly quoted both in Tauchnitz edit. (1842) of *Conc. Trid.* and in Mirbt as Mt. xvi. 19]); *Catech. Rom.* II. v. 53 (same to be taught "sine ulla dubitatione fidelibus"). In 1877 Dr. Moberly, Bishop of Salisbury, stated in Convocation: "I cannot doubt that Confession and Absolution were enjoined by our Lord Himself, . . ." (Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 81).

[5] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, can. 10 (Mirbt 318 [41]).

[6] *Catech. Rom.* I. xi. 8.

[7] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, poen. cap. 6 and can. 10 (Mirbt 314 [23], 318 [39]).

[8] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 228 (with n. 60), 260.

Of this newer formula, "Ego te absolvo," the 'Roman Catechism' says that "not only may it be gathered from those words, 'Whatsoever ye loose on earth will be loosed in heaven also,' but we have received it, handed down by the Apostles, from the same teaching of Christ the Lord"![1] Although ultimately only God can forgive sins,[2] Rome does not allow that sacerdotal absolution is simply a declaration that the penitent is pardoned: it is a real conveyance or bestowal upon him of the Divine pardon itself.[3] The Tridentine Fathers further declared that a man is not truly absolved before God on the ground of his faith, either if he is without contrition, or if the priest's absolution is pronounced flippantly ("joco") and not seriously.[4] In the 'Creed of Pius IV' (1564) the adherent of Catholicism is required to "affirm that the power of Indulgences was left by Christ in the Church."[5] In 1567 Pius V condemned, among other statements of Baius, the following: "The penitent sinner is not renewed by the ministration of the absolving priest, but by God alone, who by prompting and inspiring penitence, renews and revives him: but only the legal guilt (reatus) is taken away by the priest's ministration."[6]

The sacramental doctrine of course gives rise occasionally to extraordinary boasting. In 1872 a Bavarian priest declared: "We priests stand as far above the emperor, kings, and princes as the heaven is above the earth . . . Angels and archangels stand beneath us, for we can in God's stead forgive sins."[7] In 1905 the Archbishop of Salzburg spoke publicly of the priestly absolution as "a word at which God's righteousness puts its sword in the sheath, at which the evil spirits flee, at which the insatiable flames, that were already prepared in hell for these sinners, are quenched."[8] The doctrine has also been supported

[1] *Catech. Rom.* II. v. 19.

[2] *Op. cit.* I. xi. 7. Cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 67; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 295 ("not he" [the priest] "is it who can ever *forgive*; . . . not he is the source of grace").

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, poen. cap. 6 (Mirbt 314 [26]), can. 9 (Mirbt 318 [36]: "Si quis dixerit, absolutionem sacramentalem sacerdotis non esse actum iudicialem, sed nudum ministerium pronunciandi et declarandi remissa esse peccata confitenti, modo tantum credat se esse absolutum, . . . anathema sit"): cf. *Catech. Rom.* II. v. 21 (". . . vere tanquam Dei ministri absolvunt, . . .").

[4] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, poen. cap. 6 fin. (Mirbt 314 [29-36]). According to Father Martindale (*God and the Supernatural*, 294), true repentance, of itself, secures forgiveness: but there must be involved in "that new act of chosen obedience" a resolution to confess to the priest. Even imperfect penitence, known as "attrition," coupled with the Sacrament, wins forgiveness. The Catholic *Catechism of Christian Doctrine* (1920) teaches similarly (53) that by perfect contrition "our sins are forgiven immediately, even before we confess them; but nevertheless, if they are mortal, we are strictly bound to confess them afterwards."

[5] Mirbt 340 (11).

[6] Bull *Ex omnibus afflictionibus*, prop. 58 (Mirbt 347 [38]).

[7] Kurtz, *Church Hist.* iii. 248.

[8] Heiler, *Kathol.* 227; Mirbt 498 (10).

by the wildest exegesis. The Douay version of the Bible, taking advantage of the Vulgate translation of μετανοεῖν ('repent') by 'poenitentiam agere,' introduces the phrase 'do penance' in several places in the Gospels, thus giving the entirely false suggestion that the Catholic system of confession and absolution was then in vogue:[1] while the 'Roman Catechism' finds an allusion to this Sacrament in the words spoken to the Apostles at the grave of Lazarus: "Loose him, and let him go,"[2] and the 'Praxis' prefixed to it does the same with the words "Ye will find an ass tied and a colt: loose them," etc.[3]

CONFIRMATION

There is not the slightest trace in the Gospels of any instructions given by our Lord with regard to a ceremony or Sacrament of Confirmation. At the Last Supper, He does indeed say to Peter. "And do thou, when thou hast turned," (or perhaps, "in thy turn"), "strengthen (στήρισον) thy brothers" (Lk. xxii. 32); but this obviously refers simply to unofficial support and help in Christian faith, not to any formal Sacrament or rite. In the records of the early Church we find mention of the laying-on of hands and the endowment of the Spirit as immediately ensuing upon Baptism.[4] At the beginning of the third century we find this confirmatory rite enlarged by the addition of anointing, but still closely associated in point of time with baptism. In the Eastern Church the connexion of the two has always been maintained. But in the West two factors contributed to their separation: (1) the limitation of the power of confirming to the bishops, and (2) the growth of *infant*-baptism. It was not, however, until the thirteenth century that baptism and confirmation were permanently separated, and a period of from seven to twelve years usually allowed to intervene.[5]

[1] Cf. *Papacy and Bible*, 46, 49; Horton, *England's Danger*, 26 f; Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 131–133. The 1837 and 1874 editions of the Douay Bible have the following note at Mt. iii. 2: "*Do penance* . . . Which word, according to the use of the Scriptures and the holy fathers, does not only signify repentance and amendment of life, but also punishing past sins by fasting, and such like penitential exercises."

[2] *Catech. Rom.* II. v. 54: cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 185.

[3] *Praxis Catechismi*, etc. for 1st Sund. in Advent: cf. 3rd Sund. after Epiph., where the subject is introduced in connexion with the command, "Go and show thyself to the priest."

[4] The clearest instances are Acts viii. 14–19 (cited as the first case of Confirmation by Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 98, 307; cf. *Catech. Rom.* II. iii. 10) and xix. 5–6. It was an exceptional experience when the Spirit descended *prior* to baptism (Acts x. 44–48). The only other allusions to confirmation in the N.T. are Hebs. vi. 2 and possibly 2 Tim. i. 6. It is not mentioned in connexion with the baptisms recorded in Acts ii. 41, xvi. 15, 33.

[5] Cf. Plumptre in Smith, *Dict. of Christ Antiq.* i. 424 f; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 175; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 132; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 31–33.

According to the Catholic Church, "Confirmation is a sacrament instituted by our Lord, by which the faithful, who have already been made children of God by Baptism, receive the Holy Ghost by the prayer, unction (or anointing with the holy oil called Chrism), and the laying on of the hands of a Bishop, the successor of the Apostles. It is thus that they are enriched with gifts, graces, and virtues," etc. etc.[1] Confirmation is not necessary to salvation, but cannot be omitted without sin. Its applicability to all is proved by Acts ii. 4 ("And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit"), since the beginning of the Sacrament goes back to the day of Pentecost, and the house in which the Apostles were then gathered was "a figure and image of the Church."[2] The institution by Christ is of course a piece of pure fiction:[3] nevertheless it is laid down as a binding dogma in the decrees of Trent,[4] and is repeatedly affirmed in the 'Roman Catechism.' After insisting on the sanctity of Confirmation, the 'Catechism' continues: "Therefore it must be explained by pastors, that Christ the Lord was not only its originator (auctorem), but that, on the testimony of Saint Fabianus, the Roman pontiff, He enjoined the rite of Chrism and the words which the Catholic Church uses in its administration: which indeed can easily be proved to those who confess that Confirmation is a Sacrament, since all sacred mysteries surpass the powers of human nature, and cannot be instituted by any other than by God."[5] It then explains that the Chrism must be compounded of oil and balsam; and, since Christ did not consecrate it by His own use (as He did water in His baptism), it must be specially consecrated by the bishop. For the determination of the ingredients appeal is made to Church-custom, the Councils, Saint Dionysius, and many other fathers, "and chiefly Fabianus the Pontiff, who testified that the Apostles had received the composition of the Chrism from the Lord and had left it to us." The instructions of Jesus as regards the composition of the Chrism and its consecration by the bishop are alleged to have been given at the Last Supper, on the supposed witness of Fabianus, Bishop of Rome from 236 to 250 A.D.:[6] It is needless to say that the value of his belief (even if he had any) as to what took place at the Last Supper is practically nil, and the same

[1] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 98.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* II. iii. 14 f; cf. 18 fin. (Jesus was referring to this Sacrament in Lk. xxiv. 49).

[3] This is in essence admitted by Anglo-Catholics (Frere in *Congress-Report 1923*, 114).

[4] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, sacram. can. 1, cf. confirm. can. 1 (Mirbt 303 [27: see above, p. 393], 305 [9]). This was Perrone's only evidence for the institution by Christ (Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 176).

[5] *Catech. Rom.* II. iii. 5.

[6] *Op. cit.* iii. 6, 8, citing the False Decretals of 'Isidore' in the ninth century!

applies to 'Saint Dionysius,' i.e. pseudo-Dionysius (about 500 A.D.), himself a fiction. As if half-aware of the weakness of the historical evidence, the 'Catechism' remarks in regard to the form of words to be used: "Even if it could not be proved by any other argument that this is the true and absolute form of this Sacrament, the authority of the Catholic Church, by whose instruction (magisterio) we have always been so taught, does not allow us to entertain any doubt concerning that matter"![1]

HOLY MATRIMONY

Jesus described the man and the woman who are legally united in a monogamous bond as "that which God has joined together" (Mk. x. 9 = Mt. xix. 6). He based this view upon the account of the marriage of Adam and Eve in Gen. i. 27, ii. 24, and explicitly inferred the impermissibility of divorce from the Divine sanction there said to rest upon the union of man and wife. The whole gist of His argument shows quite clearly that, high as was the measure of sanctity He ascribed to marriage, He thought of Himself, not as effecting any change in the nature of the institution, but rather as recalling His hearers' minds to its primitive and inherent sacredness. He is not recorded ever to have spoken of it as a Sacrament: and if we argue that it is He who prompts us so to regard it, we must add that He does so, not by changing its nature, but by enabling us to see better the nature which God intended it to have from the beginning.

The Catholic Church, however, not only teaches that marriage is one of the seven Sacraments of the New Law,[2] but makes it an article of faith to believe that it was instituted as such by Christ.[3] Marriages made prior to the establishment of the Christian Church and those made by unbaptized persons subsequently are legal and valid marriages; but all legal marriages between persons that have received Christian Baptism are in addition to this sacramental, and confer grace. They do so because Jesus elevated legal marriage to the status of a Sacrament.[4] As there is no record whatever in the Gospels of His having done this, there is naturally some difference of opinion as to when it was done. "Theologians are not agreed," says the 'Catholic Dictionary,' "about the time when Christ instituted the sacrament. Some say at the wedding in Cana; others, when He abrogated the liberty of divorce (Mt. xix.); others, in the great Forty Days after Easter"[5]—the usual resort in such cases. A marriage between two baptized Protestants is not only valid, but

[1] *Catech. Rom.* II. iii. 9.
[2] See above, pp. 80, 393 f.
[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiv, can. 1 (Mirbt 330 [22]).
[4] *Cath. Dict.* 550a.
[5] *Op. cit.* 552b.

is also sacramental,[1] in the sense that the parties would be entitled to and would receive sacramental grace if they repented of their state of schism.[2] As it is, apparently they do not receive it. In order to be sacramental the marriage needs only to be legal, and to this end the presence of a Catholic priest is not indispensable:[3] but if his presence is unnecessarily dispensed with, sin is incurred.[4] A marriage between two unbaptized Quakers would, according to Catholic theory, be legal and valid, but not sacramental and therefore void of sacramental grace. Whether a baptized person who marries (with ecclesiastical permission) an unbaptized person, besides entering into the contract of marriage, receives also the Sacrament of it, "is," we are told, "a matter on which theologians differ. Analogy seems to favour the affirmative opinion."[5]

EXTREME UNCTION

In recording the first mission-journey of the Apostles, Mark tells us (vi. 13) that "they anointed many sick persons with oil, and cured them." Jesus is not recorded to have used oil Himself in effecting cures, or to have instructed the Apostles to do so: but the narrative makes it clear that the oil was used in a medical, if partly psycho-therapeutic, way (in association with prayer), with a view to the patient's recovery.[6] In the Epistle of Jacob (our so-called 'James'), the counsel is given: "Is anyone among you ill? Let him send for the elders of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith will save him who is sick; and the Lord will raise him up; and if he has committed sins, he will be forgiven" (Ep. Jac. v. 14–15). It may be observed that the author makes no appeal here to the authority of the Master.[7] It may well be that this medicinal use of oil with prayer by the leading men of the Church in their ministry to the sick was in fairly general vogue from the earliest times, though there happen to be no other allusions to it in the New Testament; and the earliest non-canonical references describe not this, but a Gnostic anoint-

[1] "It is the teaching of the Church that legitimate matrimony between baptized persons can never be a mere contract, but is always also a sacrament" (Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 103). Father Malden (*Anglo-Caths.* 14) recognizes that non-Romanist matrimony (like non-Romanist Baptism) is sacramental.

[2] I infer this from what is said in *Cath. Dict.* 552ab on the marriages of Christians who are in mortal sin.

[3] *Cath. Dict.* 552 f. Catholic opinions on the subject have, however, differed; and Dr. Faà di Bruno (*Cath. Belief*, 103) distinctly states that where (as in England) the Tridentine Decrees are known, "the presence of the Catholic parish priest is essential for the validity of the sacrament."

[4] *Cath. Dict.* 556a.

[5] *Op. cit.* 553a.

[6] Cf. Isa. i. 6; Lk. x. 34; and other passages quoted by Swete in his *St. Mark*, ad loc.

[7] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 342; N. P. Williams in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 375.

ing of the dying or dead.[1] It seems, however, to be generally agreed that, down to about the eighth century, ecclesiastical anointing of the sick was always done with a view to, and in the hope of, their recovery.[2] Nor was the administration of it by any means exclusively confined to priests.[3] After the eighth century, the rite came to be administered only by priests, and almost exclusively to those who were believed to be at the point of death. About the twelfth century, it came to be called 'extrema unctio,' in the sense of the last anointing a man receives from the Church. It was not however wholly forgotten that the unction enjoined in Scripture referred to bodily healing[4]: and Cardinal Cajetanus, the opponent of Luther, in his commentary on the Epistle of Jacob, rightly denies that the words quoted could refer to the Extreme Unction practised in the Church.[5]

The present Catholic Sacrament of Extreme Unction, however, is not in any real sense a means of curing the sick, but to all intents and purposes simply a spiritual ministration to the dying.[6] The Council of Trent emphatically declared that this Sacrament was instituted by Christ, with a view to providing help for the end of life; that it was hinted at ("insinuatum") in Mark's Gospel,[7] but was commended to the faithful and promulgated by Jacob the Apostle and the Lord's brother; that in the words of Jac. v. 14–15, "as the Church has learnt from the Apostolic tradition received through the hands (of successive generations), he teaches the material, form, proper minister, and effect of this healthful Sacrament." Actual restoration of health is contemplated in some cases ("interdum"); but the rite is normally intended for those dangerously ill, "whence it is called 'the sacrament of the departing ones.'" Condemnation was pronounced against the opinion of those "who say that the rite and usage, which the holy Roman Church observes in the administration of this Sacrament, is incongruous with (repugnare) the meaning of Jacob the Apostle, and so ought to be changed into something different." In spite of the patent fact that Jacob was speaking about a healing treatment, while Extreme Unction

[1] Iren. *Haer.* I. xxi. 5: cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 345.

[2] Cf. *Apostol. Constitns.* viii. 29; W. E. Scudamore in Smith, *Dict. of Christ. Antiq.* ii. 1455b, 2004ab; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 343; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 65 f.

[3] Scudamore in *op. cit.* 2004b.

[4] *Catech. Rom.* II. vi. 3; Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 344 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 129, 157; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 67 f.

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 346.

[6] See the explanations of it given by Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 99 f, Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 292; Heiler, *Kathol.* 177 f, 228; *Cath. Dict.* 342–344; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 68. Cf. *Catech. Rom.* II. vi. 17 (19, in making it clear that the cause of approaching death must be illness, not other dangers, preserves a slight trace of the original purpose of the rite).

[7] Cf. Dr. Stone's suggestion (*Eng. Cath.* 64) that "in allowing His apostles to anoint the sick . . . He foreshadowed a sacramental use of oil."

was a spiritual comforting of those not expected to live, the Council of Trent insisted emphatically that the latter rite agreed in essentials with what Jacob had prescribed. Four canons anathematized those who denied any part of the main substance of these teachings.[1] The 'Roman Catechism' referred to the witness of several Councils and the binding declaration of Trent that "this" (viz: the sacramental significance) "had been the constant (perpetuam) teaching of the Catholic Church concerning Extreme Unction," and urged that its institution by Christ follows inevitably from the proof of its sacramental status,[2] and that Mk. vi. 13 refers to a "specimen quoddam" which the Saviour wished to give of this unction, pseudo-Dionysius, Ambrosius, Chrysostomus, and Gregorius the Great being mentioned as asserting that this anointing by the Apostles was not of their own devising but had been enjoined by the Lord and that its purpose was the healing of souls rather than the cure of bodies.[3]

Our survey will surely have sufficed to prove that, however helpful and however Divinely blessed the Catholic Sacraments may be, many of the official and even the 'de fide' statements in regard to their origin are, from the historical point of view, plainly untrue.

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, extr. unc. intro., capp. 1–3, cann. 1–4 (Mirbt 316 f, 319 [20]).

[2] Cf. *Cath. Dict.* 343a: ". . . for St. James could not have asserted that the unction would convey grace, unless Christ, the author of grace, had promised that the grace of forgiveness and spiritual healing should accompany the use of oil."

[3] *Catech. Rom.* II. vi. 5 (3) and 16; cf. 3 (". . . sacrarum unctionum quas Dominus Salvator noster Ecclesiae suae commendavit . . .").

CHAPTER XIX

THE APOSTLE PETER AND THE CHURCH AT ROME

In conformity with their view as to the nature of the Church and their interpretation of certain passages in the Gospels, Roman Catholics hold that all the Apostles possessed during their lifetime, by virtue of a personal prerogative, the power to teach infallibly and to govern authoritatively in the Church,[1] but that Peter, by virtue of the official primacy conferred on him by Jesus, besides possessing the privileges enjoyed by his colleagues, was the visible head of the whole Church and its supreme pastor and ruler, and at his death bequeathed these prerogatives to his lawful heirs, the successive Bishops of Rome. The precise moment at which the Apostolic infallibility and primacy of Peter actually came into effect is variously represented as the Ascension or as Pentecost.[2] Protestants, however, of all schools (including Anglo-Catholics), hold that the New-Testament evidence is decisively incompatible with these views, that the Apostles, though endowed with authority, were not infallible,[3] and that Peter, though enjoying throughout the Church a real primacy (based upon his personal ascendancy and upon the special recognition he had received from his Master),[4] was simply a 'primus inter pares,' and was not regarded as endowed either with infallibility or with ecclesiastical sovereignty.[5]

So remote is the idea of supreme rulership from the New-Testament representation of Peter, that it seems almost waste labour to examine each case where Peter is recorded to have done anything (particularly anything on his own initiative), and to prove that this involves at most nothing more than a primacy of influence among his peers. Yet some such survey is necessitated by the Catholic insistence on the other view. The Catholic argument assumes three forms:—

[1] Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 83, 99, 120; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 20, 63; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 747ab.

[2] The locus classicus for the Roman doctrine in regard to Peter's primacy is *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, intro. and capp. 1 and 2 (Mirbt 461 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 483 f). Cf. further, Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief* 111 (Peter's supremacy exercised from the day of Pentecost), 164 ("Saint Peter . . . became Pope on the Ascension of Jesus Christ"), 307 ("his Apostolic labours" begun at Pentecost); Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 6 f, 20; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 746b, 747b, xii (1911) 261 f; Toner in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 796b f; Kirsch in *op. cit.* xi (1911) 746a, 746 f. For the *succession*, see above, p. 390 n. 5.

[3] Rackham in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 100.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 341; Heiler, *Kathol.* 284 f.

[5] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 332; Rackham in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 100; Robertson in *op. cit.* 210; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 54 f; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 67, 213.

(1). records of subordination or error on Peter's part are minimized by the plea that primacy and infallibility do not involve impeccability, and that the errors in question did not occur in definitions of dogma;

(2). on the other hand, all acts of leadership on Peter's part are magnified as exemplifications of his supreme sovereignty;

(3). the absence or scantiness of positive declarations in the Roman sense is explained as due to early indefiniteness regarding the precise application of a truth which was nevertheless already unanimously held in principle, and also to the comparative rarity of occasions for its application.[1]

To this we reply that the case is emphatically one in which the argument from silence must be held to be cogent; for not only do our sources contain (as Catholics would admit) *no explicit statement* to the effect that Peter was head of the Church in the Catholic sense, but they do contain a great deal that would not be there, or, if there, would be put otherwise, had he been head in that sense, and not simply unofficial leader among his fellow-Apostles. Such is the issue on which the reader's judgment is invited in the episodes now to be enumerated.

In Acts i. 7f we have the last words Jesus is said to have spoken to the Eleven on earth. Yet He does not refer to Peter or to any superiority of one Apostle over another. "Ye shall be my witnesses," He says. The Catholic observes that, of course, all the Apostles were His witnesses, and that silence in regard to Peter's supremacy here is merely incidental and does not prove its non-existence. The Protestant urges that the words, "Ye are my witnesses," suggest equality, and that, *at such a moment*, Peter's supremacy, if it had really been already conferred, would have been mentioned.[2]

The election of Matthias (Acts i. 15–26) takes place at Peter's suggestion. There, says the Catholic, you have "an act of government on the part of the Prince of the Apostles."[3] The Protestant does not need to urge that, if supreme, Peter would have made the appointment on his own authority; but he may well ask, What here did Peter do that any leading spirit in a group of brethren might not have done?

On the Day of Pentecost, as well as on other critical occasions in those early times, Peter takes the lead as spokesman and representative of the Apostles[4]: but that is just as easily harmonized with personal ascendancy and initiative, as with rulership, of which latter there is no mention. Peter rebukes Ananias for his deceit, and Ananias falls down dead: he rebukes Sapphira, and tells her that those who have just

[1] Cf. Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 84 f; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 797b (as regards the early papacy).

[2] Cf. Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 55 f. [3] *Ibid.* 56 f: cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 346.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 341; Heiler, *Kathol.* 39 bott., 285.

buried her husband will carry her out, and she also dies (Acts v. 1–11). To Catholics, this is one of the "instances of the exercise of his supreme authority."[1] "Peter appears as judge of their action, and God executes the sentence of punishment passed by the Apostle. . . ."[2] But Peter was not judging and sentencing: Ananias collapsed at his mere rebuke, and Sapphira at his mere prediction. In any case, a very similar scene was enacted when Paul told Elymas that he would be smitten with temporary blindness (Acts xiii. 9–11), and he certainly exercised quasi-judicial functions in the Corinthian church (1 Cor. v. 3–5): yet no Catholic quotes these passages as proving that Paul was Prince of the Apostles and supreme head of the Church. The appointment of the seven almoners (Acts vi. 1–6) takes place at the suggestion of "the twelve," Peter and his precedence not being so much as mentioned.[3]

In Acts viii. 14, we read that the Apostles at Jerusalem, on hearing that some people at Samaria had believed and been baptized, "sent forth[4] unto them Peter and John." That surely is a strange way for the Apostles to treat the visible head and supreme ruler of the whole Church on earth. Not at all, comes the Catholic reply: for (1) Peter was among the senders and so sent himself; (2) nations ere now have 'sent' their sovereigns on important missions, as the people of Israel sent Phinehas and ten princes to the Reubenites (Josh. xxii. 13f) and as the Antiochians 'sent' Paul and Barnabas to Jerusalem (Acts xv. 2); (3) when Peter and John got to Samaria, it was Peter who took the leading part.[5] Such arguments appear to be simply special pleading. For (1) John also was among the senders, and so sent not himself only but Peter as well: (2) cases of nations 'sending' their sovereigns are not numerous in history, and in any case would presuppose a degree of democratic development altogether alien from the monarchical type of government attributed by Catholics to the early Church; the analogy of Phinehas and the ten princes cannot be relied on, for neither he nor they are clearly represented as holding supreme authority in Israel—that belonged to his father Eleazar the priest (Josh. xxiv. 33) and to Joshua; the case of Paul and Barnabas proves simply that a local church could request its leaders to undertake an embassy to Jerusalem[6]

[1] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 70, 84.

[2] Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 747a.

[3] Cf. Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 58.

[4] The verb (*ἀπέστειλαν*) is that used of Jesus' own action in 'sending forth' or commissioning the twelve 'Apostles' and the Seventy (Mk. vi. 7 and parallels; Lk. x. 1).

[5] So Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 58–60, 84. Cf. Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 747a ("Peter and John were deputed to proceed thither . . . Peter appears a second time as judge, in the case of the magician Simon").

[6] The word *ἀποστέλλω* is *not* used of the mission of Paul and Barnabas; but it reappears in the case of the subordinate figures of Judas and Silas (Acts xv. 27).

—it does not make it a natural thing to speak of *the Prince* of the Apostles being 'sent' by them: (3) the leading part played by Peter at Samaria did not by any means exclude activity on the part of John also (Acts viii. 15, 17–19, 25) and—like other exhibitions of initiative on Peter's part—is quite easily explained by his personal energy of temperament, and by no means requires us to regard him as supreme ruler, a position not naturally reconcilable with being 'sent' on this mission by others.[1]

The Apostle Paul tells us that, three years after his conversion, he went up from Damascus to Jerusalem "to visit Kephas," and that he stayed with him fifteen days.[2] The incident has been claimed by certain Catholic scholars as exemplifying Paul's recognition of Peter's headship. "So indisputable," writes one, "was his position that when St. Paul was about to undertake the work of preaching to the heathen the Gospel which Christ had revealed to him, he regarded it as necessary to obtain recognition from Peter (Gal., i, 18). More than this was not needful: for the approbation of Peter was definitive."[3] "Here," writes another, "the Apostle of the Gentiles clearly designates Peter as the authorized head of the Apostles and of the early Christian Church."[4] That Peter, as the foremost of the original Apostles of Jesus, was regarded by Paul with deference, and that Peter's leading position was the ground of Paul's visit, may quite frankly be recognized.[5] But to read more than this into the passage is to make unwarranted use of our imagination. For not only does Paul say that on this occasion he also saw Jacob, the Lord's brother (Gal. i. 19); but he declares in the same epistle that he had not received either his gospel or his apostolate from men, but that he had both direct from Jesus Christ (Gal. i. 1, 11 f); and, as we shall see in a moment, in referring to his next visit to Jerusalem, he speaks of both Peter and Jacob in terms altogether inconsistent with the view that he regarded either of them as any more authoritative in the Church than himself. Catholics are bound to admit that Paul was not dependent on Peter for the content of his Gospel; and the very utmost they can urge is that this independence of his was not incompatible with the supremacy and infallibility of Peter.[6] But the visit of Gal. i. 18 does not in the least necessitate the view that Paul believed in that supremacy and infallibility, and other things in the Epistle are altogether unfavourable to it.

In Acts x we have the story of how Peter was led to take the important

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 346; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 68. Incidentally, Jn. xiii. 16 is unfavourable to the Catholic view at this point.

[2] Gal. i. 18: the account of the same visit in Acts ix. 26–30 omits these details.

[3] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 747b.

[4] Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 747a.

[5] Heiler, *Kathol.* 285 top.

[6] So Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 76–78.

step, not only of baptizing Cornelius and a number of other Gentiles, but of lodging and eating with them and thus infringing the Jewish laws of ritual purity. On his return to Jerusalem, "they of the circumcision disputed" (διεκρίνοντο, Vulg. "disceptabant") "with him, saying: 'Thou wentest in to men uncircumcised, and didst eat with them!'" Peter thereupon explained the grounds on which he had acted: "and hearing this, they were silent (as to their charge), and glorified God, saying, 'So God has granted repentance unto life even to the Gentiles!'" (Acts xi. 1–18). Now, it is safe to say that, if the early Jewish-Christians had believed Peter to be what modern Catholics describe him as being, they would hardly have dared to 'dispute' with him, and, even if they had, their fellow-believers (if not Peter himself) would in reply surely have reminded them of the Apostle's unique prerogatives. Nothing could be more lame than the Catholic apologia on this point: thus (1) Peter's primacy is fitly recognized by the special revelation and commission granted to him in Acts x; (2) the Judaizers' complaint was "a very natural question . . . for those to put, who as yet were not aware of the full design of God's providence"; (3) if their disputing disproves Peter's infallibility, it disproves the infallibility of the other Apostles as well; (4) Job's servants are said (Job xxxi. 13) to have "contended" with him; (5) Saints Chrysostomus and Gregorius both commend Peter's humility in explaining, when he had authority to command.[1] Of these points (1) and (5) are quite irrelevant: (1) has no bearing whatever on the implications of the 'disputing'; (5) simply gives us interpretations from the standpoint of much later times. To (3), we can only reply, Yes, of course. (2) The Judaizers' criticism was not merely a "question,"[2] but a definite challenge: were Peter known to be infallible, not only would their question itself have been out of place, but their challenge would have been impossible. (4) Job permitted his servants to 'contend' with him just because (besides being unusually humane) he did *not* regard himself as infallible in his treatment of them: knowing his liability to go wrong, he carefully investigated their complaints.[3] This is no true analogy to the infallible Prince of the Apostles being taken to task by some Judaizing Christians supposed to believe the while in his sovereignty and infallibility.[4]

On the occasion of Paul's visit to Jerusalem which he himself describes in Gal. ii. 1–10,[5] he received recognition from the three 'pillars' of the

[1] So Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 61–65.

[2] So too Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 747a (". . . the strict Jewish Christians . . . asked him why . . .").

[3] See Driver and Gray, *Job* ('Intern. Crit. Comm.') 266.

[4] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 332 f, 341; Rackham in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 100 f.

[5] Repeated study has convinced me that this visit is to be identified with that recorded in Acts xi. 29 f, xii. 25 (not xv): but the point is of no consequence for our present purpose.

Church—Jacob (the Lord's brother), Kephas (Peter), and John (Gal. ii. 9). It is argued that there is nothing here inconsistent with the Catholic view of the Petrine primacy, and attention is called to the fact that a number of textual authorities place the name of 'Peter' first in the list.[1] No stress whatever can be laid on this possible priority of Peter's name: the textual evidence in support of it is weak in comparison with that against it, and is found almost entirely in so-called 'Western' authorities, which were likely to be influenced by Roman claims.[2] The order "Jacob and Kephas and John" is that given by the majority of the best manuscripts and versions, and as such was adopted by Hieronymus in the Latin Vulgate—a fact which we would specially commend to the notice of Catholic disputants. Not only, however, does Paul put Peter's name second, but he speaks of him and the other leaders in a way which makes it quite inconceivable that he thought of him as holding any sort of primacy or sovereignty beyond what was involved in his place of honour as the foremost of the Twelve. Here is a careful translation of the whole passage, Gal. ii. 6–9: let the reader judge whether it is natural language for one to use who regarded Peter as visible head and supreme pastor and judge of the whole Church on earth. "But from those who were reputed to be somewhat—whatever they were makes no difference to me—God does not pay attention to human dignity—for those of repute added nothing to me: but on the contrary, when they saw that I had been entrusted with the Gospel for the uncircumcised, just as Peter (had with that) for the circumcised—for He who was active in Peter for an apostleship to the circumcised was active in me also for the Gentiles—and when they had noted the grace that had been given to me, Jacob and Kephas and John, who were reputed to be 'pillars,' gave right-hands of fellowship to me and Barnabas, (on the understanding) that we (should go) to the Gentiles, but they to the circumcised." The evidence here speaks for itself, and that with emphasis.[3]

Paul tells us furthermore that, when Peter came down to Antioch, he made at first a practice of eating along with Gentile Christians, but that, on the arrival of certain Judaizing adherents of Jacob, he timidly withdrew from Gentile company, and was followed in this retrogressive step by the other Jewish Christians in the place: Paul adds that he took Peter publicly to task over this, because he and his friends "were not walking straight according to the truth of the Gospel," and he was

[1] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 78 f.

[2] Dr. Vernon Bartlet suggests to me that the change of sequence and the substitution of 'Peter' for the Aramaic 'Kephas' were probably due to a desire on the part of someone representing the church at Antioch to make the passage accord with later notions of the fitness of things.

[3] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 343; Heiler, *Kathol.* 39, 284 f; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 67 f.

therefore palpably open to censure (*κατεγνωσμένος ἦν*: Gal. ii. 11 ff). The best that Catholics can do with this very untoward incident is to argue that Peter's official infallibility did make him immune from a private error of judgment, that his temporary lapse was of a personal and private nature, since it did not occur in any doctrinal definition or dogmatic decree, and therefore does not disprove the fact of his supremacy and infallibility or the early Christian belief in it: there was no difference, it is argued, between Paul and himself on matters of dogma; Paul's evident anxiety over Peter's attitude is indirect evidence rather of his belief in Peter's supremacy: private individuals have ere now expostulated with Popes without denying their infallibility or incurring blame.[1] Admitting, however, the plea that Peter's error on this occasion did not occur in any ex-cathedra definition of doctrine, we must yet contend that the story, as Paul tells it, does not suggest any knowledge on Paul's part that Peter had been given by Christ "the jurisdiction of supreme pastor and ruler over His whole flock" or that he had been made by Christ "prince of all the Apostles and visible head of the whole Church militant." In view of the fact that nowhere in the New Testament is it said explicitly that Peter enjoyed this exalted rank, the incident at Antioch can only be said to tell heavily against it. In one so endowed, we should expect something more than immunity from error in ex-cathedra doctrinal definitions: we should expect him to be also beyond the need of a public rebuke from another apostle for setting a false example on a very cardinal question of Christian practice.[2]

In the account given in Acts xv. 1–29 of the Council held at Jerusalem on the responsibilities of Gentile converts with regard to the Jewish Law, Peter is described as taking an important part in the discussion. He says nothing whatever to suggest that he was supreme ruler of the Church; but he refers to the privilege previously given to him of converting the first Gentiles, and, on the strength of their acceptance by God, he pleads that they and other Gentile Christians should not have the yoke of the Jewish Law put upon their necks. Barnabas and Paul also spoke in the same sense, referring to God's works through them among the Gentiles. It was not Peter, but Jacob, who presided over the Council, and formulated its decision. It is urged from the Catholic

[1] So in substance Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 7, 70–76; Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 747 f, 748b. Hase (*Handbook*, ii. 460 f) refers to the older Catholic argument that the Kephas of Gal. ii. 11 ff was not identical with the Apostle Peter. In 1904 Romolo Murri, a Roman Catholic priest with democratic sympathies, was asked (in cross-examination by a Cardinal and a Bishop) whether he would always submit himself to the Pope as Paul had always submitted to Peter as the Vicar of Christ! (Bain, *New Reformation*, 210). Dr. Faà di Bruno passes over the Antioch-incident in silence in his full—though largely conjectural—reconstruction of Peter's doings (*Cath. Belief*, 307 f).

[2] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 333; Heiler, *Kathol.* 288 with n.

side that Scripture does not explicitly state that Jacob presided, that Peter was really the head of the assembly, that he "was the first to rise up and address the assembled brethren, who, as we may rightly presume, waited for him to speak," that Peter's words were "words of authority," that Jacob in summing up referred to them and not to what Barnabas and Paul had said, and was pronouncing, not the decision of the Council, but only his own judgment.[1] In reply, we must maintain that Scripture, if it does not say it in so many words, yet certainly does imply, that Jacob and not Peter was in the chair. That Peter's judgment was of great weight is not to be denied: but it is inaccurate to say that he spoke first and that others waited for him to speak; he spoke, we are told (Acts xv. 7), only after there had been much "debating" (ζήτησις), which implies a considerable number of speeches.[2] Jacob speaks last of all; and his διὸ ἐγὼ κρίνω (Acts xv. 19), ensuing solemnly on his preamble, and introducing the actual terms immediately afterwards embodied in the conciliar letter, does not read at all like the expression of a single councillor's private opinion, but surely suggests rather the utterance of a president not only delivering his own judgment, but gathering up therein the sense of the meeting. Once more, the Petrine supremacy and infallibility are simply not in the picture.[3]

If these comparatively detailed episodes narrated in Acts and Galatians fail to vindicate the extreme claims made by Romanists for Peter, much less can any confirmation of them be found in the few casual allusions to Peter in the other Pauline letters. The precise movements and doings of the leading Apostle were apparently left unrecorded! At all events they are unknown to us,[4] and can be reconstructed only in the scantiest measure.[5] The destination of Peter's Epistle suggests that he had travelled and worked in Asia Minor; the presence of a Kephas-party at Corinth may well have arisen from a visit paid by him to that city; ultimately, no doubt, Peter got to Rome: but the details and the chronology of all this are extremely obscure. Paul mentions him in connection with the parties at Corinth (1 Cor. i. 12, iii. 22), but thereby no more implies his supremacy than he does that of himself or Apollos, who were also—like Peter—wrongly regarded as party-leaders. In the same Epistle (1 Cor. ix. 5), he mentions "the rest of the Apostles, and

[1] So Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 65–70, 84: similarly Bossuet and Ballerini quoted by Collins in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 150 f note 3. Cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 309: also Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 748ab.

[2] Dr. Merry del Val's slip here is avoided by Dr. Faà di Bruno and Mgr. Kirsch (*locc. citt.*).

[3] Cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 68.

[4] As Kirsch rightly admits (*Cath. Encyc.* xi [1911] 747b, 748b).

[5] Dr. Faà di Bruno's sketch of Peter's journeys (*Cath. Belief*, 307–312) is full of the most wildly imaginative and improbable conjectures, e.g. Peter already Bishop of Rome in 42 A.D., visits Carthage, Egypt, etc., etc.

the Lord's brothers, and Kephas" as married and itinerant missionaries. His specification of Kephas by name may reflect his recognition of Peter's position as a leader; but it cannot possibly be twisted into an assertion of his official supremacy. Finally, he alludes to him as the first to have seen the risen Jesus (1 Cor. xv. 5). His twice-repeated assertion in the next epistle he wrote to Corinth (2 Cor. xi. 5, xii. 11) that he himself was not one whit inferior to "the super-pre-eminent Apostles" (a phrase perhaps suggested by what his critics had said), and his frequent mention simply of 'Apostles' (in the plural) as the first and foremost of the various groups of those who by their endowments and services were the leaders in the Church (1 Cor. xii. 28 f; Ephes. iv. 11: cf. 1 Cor. xii. 8–19, Rom. xii. 6–8; Ephes. ii. 20), proves clearly that he knew nothing of a central and fundamental primacy vested in one of the Apostolic group, and claiming recognition and deference from himself.[1]

According to a widely accepted Catholic belief, which is not however a compulsory doctrine, Peter founded the Church of Antioch, and was its first Bishop, holding that office for seven years before he went to Rome.[2] The tradition is certainly as old as the fourth century, but cannot be carried further back with any confidence.[3] That Peter visited Antioch we know from Gal. ii. 11 ff[4]; that he may have stayed on or re-visited it is by no means impossible, though it is not attested by any early author. But the narrative in Acts, especially xi. 19-26, makes it incredible that he founded the Church there, while (as we shall see) the description of him as a 'Bishop' (in the official sense) anywhere, is an anachronism. The tradition is simply a perfectly natural legendary enlargement of the fact stated in Gal. ii. 11.[5]

The (so-called First) Epistle of Peter does not contain the slightest allusion to any supremacy held by himself.[6] It is hardly sufficient to reply that Peter did not put all he believed into this one brief epistle:[7]

[1] Cf. Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 76–78; Heiler, *Kathol.* 285; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 67 f. See above, p. 428 n. 1 (quotation from Bain, *New Reformation*, 210).

[2] See Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 307 f, 312; *Cath. Dict.* 35a. Cf. Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 748a.

[3] Origenes' words (*Hom. in Lc.* vi [Lomm. v. 104: "Ignatium dico, episcopum Antiochiae post Petrum secundum"]), read in the light of Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* III. xxii (. . . *τῶν ἐπ' Ἀντιοχείας Εὐοδίου πρώτου καταστάντος* . . .) and xxxvi. 2 (*Ἰγνάτιος, τῆς κατὰ Ἀντιόχειαν Πέτρου διαδοχῆς δεύτερος*), exclude the view that Peter himself was as yet regarded as bishop. Nearly all the lists of Bishops of Antioch have Euodius as Ignatius' predecessor. See Harnack, *Chron.* i. 94, cf. 70 f; Chase in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 768ab.

[4] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 285.

[5] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 351, with note (suggests that the Antiochian episcopate of Peter arose out of a desire of the Antiochians to emulate, without contradicting, the honour of Rome).

[6] Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 68.

[7] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 79–81.

had he been conscious that he held the important office which Catholics ascribe to him, he could hardly have avoided betraying his knowledge of it in writing to the Christians of nearly the whole of Asia Minor. The fact that he does not do so, is evidence that he was conscious of nothing of the sort. It is absurd to argue that 1 Pet. i. 1 "suggests, to say nothing more, that he was conscious of his supreme authority," the regions named being those in which the other Apostles were still preaching. We have no knowledge that any others of the Twelve were labouring in these regions at the moment when Peter wrote: Paul was probably now dead, and his companions, Mark and Silvanus, were with Peter: and (except for the name 'Apostle') the terms of his greeting are no more authoritative than those of the Epistles of Jacob or Judas.

The position given to Peter in the Gospel-story written by Mark is simply that of a 'primus inter pares.' Luke regards him similarly, except that he is less critical than Mark towards all the Twelve, and he records the special charge given by Jesus to Peter to strengthen his brethren by his faith (Lk xxii. 31 f). The Fourth Gospel has as an appendix the story of how the risen Christ laid upon Peter the duty of being a shepherd to His flock, though this is certainly not understood by the author as making him the superior of the Beloved Disciple. In the Gospel of 'Matthew' alone is Jesus unambiguously represented as conferring any special pre-eminence on Peter; but it is questionable whether even here infallibility in the Roman sense is implied, and in any case the record in question probably owes far more to a desire to unite the divergent Pauline and Judaistic parties in the Syrian and Palestinian Church by acclaiming Peter as the accredited foundation of the whole, than to an accurate recollection of words really spoken by Jesus.[1] The wide popularity of the Gospel of 'Matthew' in the early Church, and the acceptance of it as canonical, inevitably and speedily established in Christian minds the idea of Peter's supremacy.

The Vatican Council of 1870 laid it down as a binding dogma that the Bishop of Rome is the successor of Peter in his primacy over the whole Church.[2] This doctrine clearly involves certain historical judgments; and although (so far as the present writer is aware) these have never been infallibly defined, yet logical necessity, as well as Catholic teaching, help us to see what these judgments are. The very minimum which the dogma implies would seem to be:

(1) that Peter visited Rome, and
(2) that, from the time of his visit, the Roman Church was governed by a series of monarchical Bishops, who are therefore necessarily his successors.

[1] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 285 f. See above, pp. 376–390.
[2] See above, p. 390 n. 5, and p. 422 n. 2.

All Catholics would doubtless add

(3) that Peter must have died at Rome,[1] and that he actually did die there as a martyr.

But current Catholic teaching—widely accepted and virtually uncontradicted, though not believed universally and as a matter of dogma—declares further

(4) that Peter laboured *for a long time* at Rome;
(5) that it was he who *founded* the church there;
(6) that he was its first *Bishop*;

A very popular tradition, believed by many, but criticized as unfounded by the best Catholic scholars, narrates

(7) that Peter was Bishop of Rome *for twenty-five years*.

Historical investigation shows that of these seven propositions, nos. (1) and (3) are certainly true, but that all the others, of course in varying degrees, are improbable and unentitled to acceptance. But (1) and (3) are clearly inadequate as a historical basis for the Vatican dogma.

It is happily needless at this time of day to marshal afresh the arguments for Peter's martyrdom at Rome. The fact that Catholics have a strong doctrinal interest in its truth does not, of course, constitute evidence in its favour; but neither ought it—nor to-day does it—prejudice the minds of Protestant historians against it. The patristic evidence in support of it is overwhelming.[2] If the 'First Epistle of Peter' be rightly ascribed to the Apostle, as is on several grounds probable, the 'Babylon' from which he wrote (1 Pet. v. 13) is—on the analogy of Rev. xiv. 8, xvi. 19, xvii. 5, (9f, 18), xviii. 2, 10, 21—easily identifiable with Rome, while the assumption that the real Babylon on the Euphrates, or some other city, is meant, is fraught with the greatest difficulties.[3]

Leaving over for the moment the question as to how far the government of the early Roman church was episcopal, we may consider here the traditions to the effect that Peter resided for a long time at Rome, and that he founded the church there. Modern Catholic scholars rightly concede that the evidence is not sufficient to prove that the popular Catholic opinion on these points is historically justified.[4] The

[1] Cf. Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 748b: "The essential fact is that Peter died at Rome: this constitutes the historical foundation of the claim of the Bishops of Rome to the Apostolic Primacy of Peter."

[2] See Chase in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 769 f; Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 748–750.

[3] Prof. E. T. Merrill's recent attempt (*Essays in Early Christian History* [1924] 279–283) to defend the Mesopotamian Babylon does not seem likely to prove successful. Cf. Chase in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 769a.

[4] Cf. e.g. Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1910) 748b, 750b, and (in regard to the chronology) Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 305 f.

most probable date for Peter's martyrdom is 65 or 66 A.D., for his Epistle implies, not only the outbreak of the Neronian persecution (July 64 A.D.), but the extension of oppressive measures against the Christians to Asia Minor and elsewhere (1 Pet. v. 9) and the receipt of news about these measures at Rome. The early traditional association of Peter's death with Paul's (which latter may have occurred as early as 61 or 62 A.D.) makes every year after 65 less likely.[1] On the other hand, there is strong reason to believe that, prior to his escape from prison in 41 or 42 A.D. (Acts xii. 1–19), Peter had made Jerusalem his headquarters, and, though occasionally absent on visits to other towns, had never been beyond the boundaries of Judaea and Samaria. An early tradition tells us that the Twelve Apostles did not definitely leave Jerusalem and go out into the world until twelve years had elapsed since the Ascension.[2] We may conclude therefore that in 42 A.D. Peter definitely began more or less distant mission-journeys. For the period between 42 and 66 A.D., we have only the following clues to guide us as to his movements:—

about 47 A.D., in company with Jacob and John, he makes a compact with Paul at Jerusalem (Gal. ii. 1–10); since under this compact Peter was to go "to the circumcision," it is unlikely that he had already visited Rome or that he did so within the next few years:

about 49 A.D., he is rebuked by Paul at Antioch (Gal. ii. 11 ff); later, he takes part in the Council at Jerusalem (Acts xv. 1–29):

between 53 and 55 A.D., he probably visited Corinth (1 Cor. i. 12, iii. 22):

about 55 A.D., he was known to be wont to travel about with his wife (1 Cor. ix. 5):

before 64 A.D., he had probably travelled in the provinces of Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithynia (1 Pet. i. 1):

in 56 A.D., when Paul wrote his Epistle to the Romans from Corinth, and in 60–62 A.D., when Paul was in prison at Rome and wrote his Epistles to the Colossians, Philemon, 'Ephesians,' and Philippians, and other letters of which scraps have been preserved in the Pastoral Epistles,[3] Peter was not in Rome, and had apparently not yet been there.[4]

[1] See Harnack, *Chronol.* i. 240–243. The much later date (after 80 A.D.) suggested by Sir William Ramsay (*The Church in the Roman Empire*, 279–295) has not found general favour.

[2] See Harnack, *Chron.* i. 243 f.

[3] See below, pp. 437–439.

[4] This seems a fair inference from the total absence of all allusions to him in these Epistles. Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 206 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 347 f, 350; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 305 f, 310; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 178. I might briefly mention in this place that, with the abandonment of the Pauline authorship of the Pastoral Epistles as a

While therefore chronological considerations cannot be said to exclude all possibility that Peter may have visited Rome before Paul's death in 62 A.D., the silence of the Pauline Epistles renders it extremely unlikely that he did so. It is very difficult to imagine that, if he had reached the city before then, and especially if he had been associated closely with Paul in work at Rome (as later it became customary to think[1]), the relevant writings of Paul would not have contained some allusion to him. A period of three or four years therefore (62 to 65/66 A.D.) is the utmost we can reasonably allow for Peter's stay in Rome; and this conclusion involves the abandonment of both the old beliefs (i) that Peter came to Rome in the reign of Claudius (41–54 A.D.)—the favourite date being 42 A.D.,[2] and (ii) that he *founded* the church at Rome. The oldest and apparently the only basis for the latter belief consists of two statements of Irenaeus (about 185 A.D.), in which however Paul also is said to have "founded" the Roman church, and in which therefore 'found' can obviously mean nothing more than 'establish' or 'strengthen.'[3]

Peter therefore did not found the church at Rome, nor did he labour there for a long period. He was however certainly there for some little time, possibly three or four years, and was certainly martyred there. But was he ever the Bishop of the Roman Church? Catholics are virtually unanimous in declaring that he was. Several Catholic treatises have been written to prove it.[4] We notice that modern Catholic lists of the Popes invariably begin with Peter's name. The Vatican Council virtually declares Peter to have been the first Bishop of Rome. "Peter . . .," it says, "lives and presides and exercises judgment to this very day and always in his successors, the Bishops of the holy Roman See founded by himself and consecrated by his blood. Wherefore, whoever succeeds Peter in this chair (cathedra) receives according to

whole, all evidence for the release and *second* imprisonment of Paul seems to vanish. The somewhat general and rhetorical language of Clemens of Rome (*Ep.* v, vi), writing after the lapse of thirty years, is not inconsistent with the supposition that Paul suffered in 62 A.D., Peter in 65 or 66 A.D., and other Neronian victims in July 64 A.D. and later.

[1] Dionysius of Corinth (170 A.D.) in Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* II. xxv. 8; Irenaeus (see below, n. 3); possibly also Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* IV. xxi. 2. Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 204; Chase in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 770; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 27 f; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 264b.

[2] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 164, 308; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 27 f; Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 750b. The tradition can be traced back as far as Julius Africanus, 221 A.D. (Harnack, *Chron.* i. 70 ff, 124, 201 f, and see below, pp. 451 f): cf. Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* II. xiv. 6.

[3] Iren. *Haer.* III. i. 1 (*τοῦ Πέτρου καὶ τοῦ Παύλου ἐν Ῥώμῃ εὐαγγελιζομένων, καὶ θεμελιούντων τὴν ἐκκλησίαν*), iii. 2 ("a gloriosissimis duobus Apostolis Petro et Paulo Romae fundatae et constitutae ecclesiae"), iii. 3 init. (similar): cf. Euseb. *loc. cit.* Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 305, 308, 315 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 347, 354 f; Merry del Val and Kirsch (as in last note).

[4] See the bibliog. in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 752b.

the institution of Christ Himself the primacy of Peter over the whole Church."[1] The regular celebration of feasts of 'the Chair of Peter' would, of course, be meaningless, without the assumption that he had once filled the episcopal office.[2] That he actually did so is stated and strenuously defended by Catholic scholars in works of learning, as well as in those of a more popular kind.[3] It is, indeed, somewhat remarkable that the excellent and learned article on 'Saint Peter' in 'The Catholic Encyclopedia,' though it deals in a thorough manner with all aspects of the Apostle's life, including his labours at Rome, and refers to the later traditions concerning his pontificate, yet refrains from any statement or argument to the effect that he himself was actually Bishop of Rome.[4]

It ought not, of course, to need saying, that to admit Peter's presence at Rome is quite another thing from admitting that he was Bishop there. But the tacit assumption on the part of Catholics that the one fact implies the other renders it necessary to insist on the distinction.[5] The question of his episcopate (in the official sense intended by Catholic arguments) is one that requires separate investigation; and the investigation has to begin rather far back. For the statement, if true, implies the belief that the church of Rome was, from the time of Peter onwards, governed by a series of monarchical bishops, i.e. bishops each of whom was, during his term of office, the sole and supreme president of the Roman church. But that belief itself needs to be carefully tested: and for this purpose it is necessary to make some enquiry into the ministry of the early Church generally.

Our sources of information in regard to this question consist of the New-Testament books and the works of the Apostolic Fathers. Among these a primary place is held by the Epistles of Paul, on account of their early date and direct pertinence. It is therefore of importance

[1] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 2 (Mirbt 462 [31]).

[2] Cf. A. de Waal in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 552 f.

[3] For Perrone see Hase, *Handbook*, i. 211: cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 112, 164, 304f, 308, 313 f, 318 (uses some extremely weak arguments, e.g. ". . . how is it that our opponents cannot tell us who first converted the Romans; and, if not St. Peter, who was their Bishop? . . . if St. Peter was not Bishop of Rome . . ., they ought to tell us of what other place he was Bishop," etc. In a quotation from Cave, he includes not only Irenaeus, but Ignatius and Papias, as witnesses for Peter's Roman *episcopate*, see below); Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 26–31; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 750a and xii (1911) 262a–263a (elaborate defence).

[4] Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 744–752, esp. 750b. Cf. Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 160.

[5] See Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 305 ("As it cannot be supposed that St. Peter had no See during the last twenty-five years of his life: . . ."). Cf. Joyce's assumption in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 749b, that Timotheus and Titus were sent to Ephesus and Crete respectively as *bishops*. Does the presupposition throw any light on Kirsch's silence as to Peter's episcopate at Rome? The presupposition is answered by Salmon *Infall.* 355.

to determine which of the New-Testament Epistles really come from Paul's hand. With characteristic loyalty to established custom, Catholic scholars persist in including among the Pauline letters four which we have the strongest ground for regarding as the work of others, viz: 'Hebrews,' and the three Pastoral Epistles (1 and 2 Tim. and Titus). Of these, 'Hebrews' does not tell us very much about the ministry, but its non-Pauline origin is morally certain. The reader must be referred to the standard books of reference for the arguments, which it is impossible to enumerate here.[1] The Epistle is not written in Paul's name. Its Pauline authorship was doubted by the best scholars of the early Church, especially in the West. When finally it was included in the New-Testament Canon, its canonicity was for some obscure reason understood as a recognition that it was Paul's work. The internal evidence against that view is absolutely decisive for any impartial enquirer; and it is doubtful whether there exists a single non-Catholic scholar who is not convinced by it. Nevertheless, the mediaeval Church in its ignorance accepted 'Hebrews' as Paul's: the Council of Trent included it accordingly by name among the "fourteen Epistles of Paul the Apostle" and quoted its teaching as his,[2] and the authoritative 'Roman Catechism' took the same position for granted.[3] One cannot indeed complain that, at that date, Catholic scholars knew no better, though it is worth noting that both Luther and Calvin did. The point is that this authoritative mediaeval error ties down Catholic scholarship even to-day. We find the words of the Epistle being quoted as Paul's, not only by Newman and Pusey[4], but in a recently re-edited and widely circulated popular manual like Dr. Faà di Bruno's 'Catholic Belief,'[5] and in an up-to-date Catholic statement like 'The Religion of the Scriptures.'[6] The evidence, however, on the other side is so strong that even Roman fortitude has to retreat a little before it. Thus Newman wrote in 1884: "the Epistle to the Hebrews is said in our Bibles to be the writing of St. Paul, and so virtually it is, and to deny that it is so in any sense might be temerarious; but its authorship is not a matter of faith as its inspiration is, but an acceptance of received opinion, and because to no other writer can it be so well assigned."[7] In 1908 it was stated that the assignment of 'Hebrews' to an Alexandrian Jewish convert, contemporary, or almost so, with Paul and a disciple of that Apostle, was "the view of Catholic exegetes of the new school."[8] In

[1] E.g. Moffatt, *Introd.* 433–443.

[2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. iv (Mirbt 292 [3]), sess. xxii, cap. 1 (Mirbt 322 [24]).

[3] *Catech. Rom.* I. ii. 8, ix. 5, IV. vii. 2 (3).

[4] *Developm.* 150; also in *Nineteenth Cent.* Feb. 1884, 188: similarly by Pusey in *Eiren.* (1865) 114 (quoting a statement he had made seventeen years earlier).

[5] 54, 64, 77.

[6] Martindale in *op. cit.* 64 f.

[7] *Nineteenth Cent.* Feb. 1884, 196.

[8] Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 496a: similarly Fonck in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 183ab.

1914, however, the papal Biblical Commission issued a decree stating that 'Hebrews' is to be included among the genuine letters of Paul, in view of the weight of tradition and of the internal evidence (!), but provisionally allowing the view that the form or language of the Epistle may be due to another.[1] The very recent 'Westminster Version' of the New Testament tells us: "Though the traditional Catholic view makes St. Paul the author of Hebrews, the sense in which that authorship is to be understood has been from the days of Origen . . . a matter of dispute. In modern times there is a strong tendency among Catholic writers to ascribe to St. Paul the conception and planning of the Epistle, and to explain the obvious differences of this Epistle from the other Pauline letters by ascribing its literary form and tone to the work of some friend or associate of the Apostle, to whom St. Paul entrusted its actual writing."[2] Here we have a glaring instance of the usual Catholic evasiveness in matters of historical enquiry, an evasiveness transparently foolish in its very skilfulness. The internal evidence is totally hostile to Paul's authorship: the epistle contains no news whatever about him: such belief in his authorship as existed in the early Church is very partial, is not primitive (first in Clemens of Alexandria, 185 A.D.), and in all probability rests simply on the facts that the Epistle was nameless and that it shows some affinity to Paul's teaching. The First Epistle of Peter also shows quite markedly the influence of Paul's teaching, and, but for the fact that its author mentions both himself and his amanuensis, might be ascribed to Paul's planning and included among Paul's "genuine letters" with as much reasonableness as 'Hebrews.' The evidence requires us to recognize that 'Hebrews' was written by some member of the Pauline circle; but it does not justify in the slightest degree the view that Paul had anything personally to do with the writing of it.

The case of the Pastoral Epistles is somewhat different. They contain considerably more information about the early ministry than 'Hebrews' does; and their non-Pauline authorship, though now virtually certain, is neither so absolute nor so widely recognized as is that of the latter Epistle. The somewhat elaborate Church-organization implied by the Pastorals is indeed difficult to harmonize with the indications in Paul's other letters; but, as this is the very point under investigation, it will be best to lay no stress on it as an argument against Pauline authorship. One must however protest against the suggestion[3] that distaste for

[1] Boylan in *Westminster Version, N.T.* IV, xi; Lattey, *First Notions*, 29, and in *The Bible*, etc. 31 f.

[2] Boylan in *op. cit.* x f. Cf. Clays in *The Bible*, etc. 93 ("The Epistle to the Hebrews is admittedly not the direct composition of St. Paul, but its doctrine and its arrangement are such that it can correctly be described as his").

[3] Cf. C. H. Turner in *Congress-Report 1920*, 26.

the authority of the Church and its traditions has anything to do with the historical arguments put forward by modern critics. Though, unlike 'Hebrews,' the Pastoral Epistles profess to be written by Paul, the external evidence in their favour is not strong. Similarities to their language found in the earliest Christian writers may just as well be due (to some extent, at least) to borrowing on the side of the author of the Pastorals, as vice versa. It cannot therefore be assumed that they are earlier than the Epistle of Clemens of Rome (96 A.D.), though it is probable that they were known to Ignatius and Polycarpus (about 115 A.D.). The earliest unmistakable piece of evidence about them, however, is that they were excluded by the heretic Marcion (144 A.D.) from his collection of Pauline letters. When we remember how devoted a follower of Paul Marcion was, and how easy it would have been for him to evade things in the Pastorals (as in the other Epistles) which he did not like, it is hard to believe that he could have excluded them on any other grounds than that he did not believe them to be Pauline. It is, however, the internal evidence—and in particular the evidence of language and style—which is really decisive. Apart from a few sentences and short paragraphs referring to personal matters (which are probably scraps of genuinely Pauline letters), the language of the Pastorals is noticeably different from that of Paul's acknowledged work. As long as the recognition of this difference was based on a few rough countings of un-Pauline words, it was always possible to defend Paul's authorship by general observations as to the natural elasticity of every writer's vocabulary, and by the analogy of Paul's own versatility of style as seen in the other Epistles. But in 1921 Dr. P. N. Harrison published, in 'The Problem of the Pastoral Epistles,' a full series of statistical tables and graphs, which proved that, while the vocabulary of the other (Pauline) Epistles naturally varied a good deal, the variations moved within certain fairly definable numerical limits, but that the peculiarities found in the Pastoral Epistles, when tested in every conceivable way, went far beyond these limits and (if Paul's authorship were real) required suppositions to which literary habit, so far as known, furnishes no analogy.[1] It is not too much to say that the non-Pauline authorship of the Pastorals, to which several previously-known arguments strongly pointed, has been put beyond question by Dr. Harrison's statistics; and one is confirmed in this view by the non-appearance, since his book was published, of any serious attempt to rebut his arguments.

[1] The argument is of course cumulative: but mention may be made of one striking feature, as a sample. Dr. Harrison gives (*Problem*, 34–38) a list of 112 particles, pronouns, prepositions, etc. frequently used by Paul. On each page of Paul's acknowledged letters, one or other of these is used on an average no fewer than *nine times* (including repetitions of the same word). Not one of them occurs in the Pastorals. Cf. also the analogous graph (62) of variations in the vocabulary of Shakespeare.

Even if it were true, therefore, (which it is not), that Protestant theories in regard to the early Christian ministry *necessarily* "involve the rejection of the Pastoral Epistles as being documents of the second century,"[1] this would be due to the very sufficient reason that (with the exception of the Pauline 'personalia' they contain) they were in point of fact probably not written before 100 A.D. The Catholic 'Westminster Version' of the New Testament, however, assumes that the parallels in Clemens of Rome are due to their having been borrowed from the Pastorals and not vice versa, ignores their rejection by Marcion, makes the most of the thoughts and phrases in them that re-echo the words of Paul, accounts for the peculiarities as due to novelty of theme, etc., and triumphantly concludes (against "crabbed criticism," which judges "by mere rule of thumb") that Paul is the author. The Catholic editor does not, however, appear to have studied Dr. Harrison's curves.[2]

We return from this digression to the subject of the ministry of the early Church. As we have already seen,[3] it is an important part of Catholic teaching that Jesus Himself instituted the Sacrament of Order, that this Sacrament—by impressing an indelible stamp on the ordained—sharply separates them from the Christian laity, that the latter are not priests,[4] and have no claim to a voice in the selection of those to be ordained as such, and that the episcopate, presbyterate, and diaconate—in distinction from the other orders—are of Divine institution (which presumably means that our Lord Himself ordered their establishment). The Roman Church further maintains that the Apostles established, in the Christian churches which they founded, a local hierarchy of

[1] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 750a.

[2] Gigot in *Westm. Version, N.T.* IV. xiii–xviii. Similar in its traditionalist basis and its perverse defiance of evidence is the Catholic adhesion to the Petrine authorship of 2 Peter. The position is similar to that of 'Hebrews.' Early external evidence is non-existent: the style of the Epistle is quite different from that of 1 Peter: it embodies a large part of the Epistle of Judas: it reflects the thought of the Church at the end of the first, or early in the second, century (impatience at delay of parousia, etc): it presupposes the general circulation and scriptural status of Paul's epistles (2 Pet. iii. 15 ff). All this points to its having been composed, not by Peter, but pseudonymously, early in the second century. Nevertheless, when once admitted to the Canon, its claim to Petrine authorship was necessarily conceded; and it figures accordingly as Peter's in the Decrees of Trent (sess. iv [Mirbt 292 (6)]), in the *Roman Catechism* (I. ii. 20, III. iii. 28 [9], IV. xv. 1), in Dr. Faà di Bruno's *Cath. Belief* (29, 310), in *Cath. Encyc.* (vii [1910] 259a), in *God and the Supernatural* (32), and in *The Bible: its History, Authenticity and Authority* (96). The Petrine authorship is defended in detail by Catholic writers in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 754a–755a, and in *Westm. Version, N.T.* IV. xxx–xxxv. It is, however, interesting to learn that *some* Catholics incline to date the Epistle in the second century (Reid in *Cath. Encyc.* iv [1908] 496a). Dr. Chas. Bigg defended the Petrine authorship in his *Commentary* in the 'International Critical' series (1901); but since that time it has been generally abandoned by Anglican scholars, even by those with Catholic sympathies (e.g. Prof. C. H. Turner in *Congress-Report 1920*, 27).

[3] See above, pp. 411 f.

[4] So *Conc. Trid.* as above, p. 412 n. 2.

ecclesiastical officials, distinct from, and in addition to, the unofficial and so-called 'charismatic' ministry of those endowed with special abilities by the gift (or 'charisma') of the Holy Spirit;[1] that all the seven orders later known in the Church (i.e. priests—including bishops and presbyters—deacons, subdeacons, acolytes, exorcists, readers, and door-keepers) existed in it from the earliest times[2]; that, in particular, the bishops are the successors of the Apostles as regards their power to govern, ordain, and confirm, and as such are superior to the priests,[3] who are the successors of the Apostles as regards the power of celebrating the eucharist and binding and loosing sins[4]; that the monarchical episcopate was established by the Apostles themselves;[5] that in Apostolic times each bishop was consecrated by three other bishops;[6] that "the elders of the church" mentioned in the Epistle of Jacob (v. 14) must, by dogmatic definition, be regarded either as bishops or as priests ordained by them;[7] that the seven almoners whose appointment is narrated in Acts vi. 1–6 were 'deacons';[8] and that the only valid Christian ministry is that which is guaranteed by Apostolic Succession, i.e. which has been conferred through regular ordination by bishops whose own office has directly descended from the Apostles themselves through a continuous series of formal consecrations.[9]

These views correspond well enough with the conceptions of the

[1] Cf. Joyce, in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 747b, 748b, 750a.

[2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiii, cap. 2 (Mirbt 327 [2]: "et ab ipso ecclesiae initio sequentium ordinum nomina, atque uniuscuiusque eorum propria ministeria, subdiaconi scilicet, acolythi, exorcistae, lectores et ostiarii in usu fuisse cognoscuntur, . . ."), reform. cap. 17 (not in Mirbt: "sanctorum ordinum a diaconatu ad ostiaratum functiones, ab Apostolorum temporibus in ecclesia laudabiliter receptae"); *Catech. Rom.* II. vii. 24 ("Docendum igitur erit hosce omnes ordines septenario numero contineri, semperque ita a catholica Ecclesia traditum esse, quorum nomina haec sunt, . . .").

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiii, cap. 4 mid. and can. 7 (Mirbt 327 [23], 328 [13]): cf. Dunin-Borkowski in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 342–343a.

[4] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxii, cap. 1 mid. (Mirbt 322 [35]); *Catech. Rom.* II. v. 71.

[5] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 749a–750a. So some Anglicans: e.g. Moxon, *Modernism.* 104 ("it is easy to show that Episcopacy has existed from the times of the Apostles"); cf. Bartlet, *Validity*, 3 f.

[6] *Catech. Rom.* II. vii. 52 ("episcopi ex apostolorum traditione, quae perpetuo in Ecclesia custodita est, a tribus episcopis consecrantur): cf. Rackham in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 110 ("probably of very early origin"). Per contra, Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 420 f.

[7] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, extr. unc. cap. 3 and can. 4 (Mirbt 317 [19], 319 [27]); *Catech. Rom.* II. vi. 26. Popular Catholic exegesis also finds bishops in Timotheus, Titus, the angels of the seven churches (in Rev. i-iii), and even Archippus (Col. iv. 17, Phm. 2: cf. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii [1908] 749b) and 'prelates' in the "leaders" of Heb. xiii. 7, 17, 24 (Dr. Troy's Bible-notes quoted by Urwick in *Papacy and Bible*, 49).

[8] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiii, cap. 2 with footnote (Mirbt 326 f).

[9] On Apostolic succession in Roman and Anglican thought, cf. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* i (1907) 641a–643b; Joyce in *op. cit.* iii (1908) 750b; Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 381–402, 409, 418–422; Bartlet, *Validity*, 5, 8–12; C. H. Turner in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 93–214; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 301 f.

ministry and its origin which came to prevail in the Church, partly in the second century, and partly later. But our primary sources for the Apostolic age proper tell us a very different story. They can hardly be said to justify a single one of the Catholic propositions just mentioned, and some of these propositions they virtually disprove.[1] We have already shown that the notion of Jesus having founded a Sacrament of Order is wholly imaginary.[2] As we read the Pauline and other Epistles, we do not hear very much about the ministers and officials of the Church, and nothing whatever about any deep cleavage between clergy and laity. The whole Christian fraternity is a nation of priests (cf. 1 Pet. ii. 5, 9; Rev. i. 6, v. 10, xx. 6): all are expected to minister to the common life according to their several Divinely-bestowed capacities or *χαρίσματα* (cf. 1 Cor. i. 4–7, xiv. 26, Col. iii. 16, 1 Pet. iv. 8–11, Heb. v. 12); there is no sharp dividing line between those who serve by prophesying or healing the sick, and those who serve by organizing and governing.[3] The monarchical episcopate is conspicuous by its absence. Four times over does Paul enumerate the most familiar forms of Christian ministering: here are his lists:—

I. (1 Cor. xii. 4–11) (1) the "word of wisdom," (2) the "word of knowledge," (3) "faith" (4) "gifts (*χαρίσματα*) of healings," (5) "workings of deeds-of-power," (6) "prophecy," (7) "discernings of spirits," (8) different "kinds of tongues," (9) "interpretation of tongues."

II. (1 Cor. xii. 28–30) (1) "apostles," (2) "prophets," (3) "teachers," (4) miraculous "powers," (5) "gifts (*χαρίσματα*) of healings," (6) "aids," (7) "*governings*" (i.e. administrative gifts), (8) different "kinds of tongues," [(9) interpretation of tongues].

[1] The non-primitive origin, for instance, of several grades of the hierarchy is now admitted by Catholic scholars: see below, p. 445 n. 3, and cf. the truly remarkable words of Dunin-Borkowski (*Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 334a): "The Divine institution of the threefold hierarchy cannot of course be derived from our texts; in fact it cannot in any way be proved directly from the New Testament; it is Catholic dogma by virtue of dogmatic tradition, i.e. in a later period of ecclesiastical history the general belief in the Divine institution of the episcopate, presbyterate, and diaconate can be verified and thence be followed on through the later centuries. But this dogmatic truth cannot be traced back to Christ Himself by analysis of strictly historical testimony." The impossibility of justifying Rome's contentions at the bar of history could hardly be more clearly stated.

[2] See above, pp. 411 f.

[3] The exaggerated stress which Catholicism has always put on the governmental character of the Christian ministry was perhaps partly responsible for the recent tendency in Protestant circles to emphasize the less formal services rendered by Christians with various special endowments. No doubt a broad distinction may be maintained; but, as has been rightly pointed out (cf. Dunin-Borkowski in *Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 331b–333b, 343b, A. J. Mason in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 30–32, and J. A. Robinson, in *op. cit.* 58–79), it is a mistake to confine the term 'charismatic' to the latter. *All* forms of Christian service, inasmuch as they depended on Divine endowment, were, strictly speaking, charismatic.

III. (Rom. xii. 6–8) (1) "prophecy," (2) "service" (διακονία), (3) "teaching," (4) "exhorting" or "consoling," (5) almsgiving, (6) *superintending* (ὁ προϊστάμενος), (7) showing mercy.

IV. (Ephes. iv. 11) (1) "apostles," (2) "prophets," (3) "evangelists," (4) "*pastors* and teachers."

It is perfectly clear from these lists, not only that the functions of administration and organization occupied, in comparison with the exercise of personal endowments of a more purely religious or philanthropic kind, a somewhat secondary place in the life of the Church,[1] but also that they—like the other duties that had to be done—fell, almost automatically, to those who had natural aptitude for them and who are referred to in quite general terms,[2] and were not entrusted to a distinct hierarchy divided into clearly marked grades.

Lapse of time would, however, tend to enhance the importance of the administrators, whose duties permitted of little or no intermission, as compared with that of the more spontaneous and unofficial ministers, many of whom (in particular, 'apostles' and apparently many of the prophets[3]) were itinerant, and could thus serve only on occasions, and who tended on the whole to decrease in numbers as years went on. Thus we are able to trace the emergence, in the several churches, of distinct groups of 'elders.'[4] It was only natural that leadership in the Christian groups should fall to the lot of sets of senior men, 'elders' as regards both age and Christian experience. A local ministry of elders thus came to be formed in virtually all churches (though it is impossible to mark the precise stage at which in each place the term 'elder' passed from its literal to its official meaning). Thus we find elders in charge of ecclesiastical affairs at Jerusalem (Acts xi. 30 [48 A.D.], xv. 2, 4, 6, 22f, xvi. 4 [49–50 A.D.], xxi. 18 [57 A.D.]), in the interior of Asia Minor

[1] This is frankly admitted by Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 747b–748b, though he strongly maintains that, alongside the 'charismatic' ministry, the local hierarchy also existed (750ab): but he makes the mistake of treating Paul's lists as lists of 'charismata' *in the narrow sense*, ignoring the fact that they include 'government,' 'superintendence,' and the pastoral office (748a).

[2] E.g. "those who labour among you and preside over (προϊσταμένους) you in the Lord and admonish you" (1 Thess. v. 12); κυβερνήσεις (1 Cor. xii. 28); "presidents" or "superintendents" (ὁ προϊστάμενος, Rom. xii. 8); "pastors" (Eph. iv. 11); "leaders" (ἡγούμενοι, Acts xv. 22; Heb. xiii. 7, 17, 24; Clem. *Ep.* i. 3). Cf. also 1 Cor. xvi. 15 f. Heb. xiii. 7 is re-echoed in *Ep. Barn.* xix. 9 (πάντα τὸν λαλοῦντά σοι τὸν λόγον Κυρίου) and *Did.* iv. 1 (τοῦ λαλοῦντός σοι τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ): cf. J. A. Robinson in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 63, 71, 92 n.

[3] On the status of the prophets, however, cf. J. A. Robinson in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 77–81.

[4] Πρεσβύτεροι or presbyters. Though the word happens to be the etymological antecedent of our English word 'priest,' the connotation of the two is quite distinct. Our 'priest' corresponds to the Latin 'sacerdos' (the usual Catholic designation) and the Greek ἱερεύς. This latter word is not applied in the N.T. to any class of Christian men distinct from the whole body of believers.

(Acts xiv. 23 [48–49 A.D.]; 1Tim. iv. 14 [49–50 A.D.]; 1 Pet. v. 1, 5 [65 A.D.]), at Ephesus (Acts xx. 17 [57 A.D.], 1 Tim. v. 1, 17–19 [120 A.D.]), in Crete (Tit. 1. 5f [120 A.D.]), at Philippi (Polyc. 'Ep.' v 3, vi. 1, xi. 1 [110–115 A.D.]), at Corinth (Clem. Rom. 'Ep'. i. 3, iii. 3, xxi. 6, xliv. 5, liv. 2, lvii. 1 [96 A.D.]), at Rome (Hermas, 'Vis.' II. iv. 2f, III. i. 8 [100–140 A.D.]), and elsewhere (Ep. Jac. v. 14 [?120 A.D.][1]; so-called 'Second Ep. of Clem.' xvii. 3, 5 [about 140 A.D.]). A further fact that is abundantly testified is that these officials, who because of their seniority were called 'elders,' were also—from the nature of their work—called 'overseers' or 'bishops' (ἐπίσκοποι)[2]. Passages like Acts xx. 28 (compared with 17), 1 Peter v. 2 (the reading of ℵ^c, A, etc., compared with 1), Titus i. 7–9 (compared with 5f), the 'Epistle' of Clemens xliv. 5 (compared with 1 and 4), Hermas, 'Vis.' III. v. i, 'Simil.' IX. xxvii. 2 (compared with 'Vis.' II. iv. 2f, III. i. 8) make it certain that, in wide circles of the early Church, the bishop was not a single supreme governor, nor even the president or chairman of a committee, but simply one of the group of administering elders.[3] This is clearly exemplified in Paul's greeting to the Philippians, which mentions "the saints . . . with (the) bishops and deacons" (Phil. i. 1; similarly 'Didache' xv. 1), possibly also in 1 Tim. iii. 1–7 (compared with v. 17–19). An episcopate of a monarchical kind is testified by a contemporary witness for the first time about 110-115 A.D. in the Epistles of Ignatius, who makes it clear that the churches in western Asia Minor and northern Syria were then being administered each by its own bishop, assisted by a college of elders and a body of deacons.[4] This arrangement had doubtless been existing for some time when Ignatius wrote: but its existence in western Asia Minor and Syria proves nothing for the rest of Christendom. Polycarpus' letter, for instance, written to Philippi immediately afterwards, mentions elders and deacons, but makes no reference to any bishop or president. It is

[1] If this Epistle be the work of Jacob, the Lord's brother, it must have been written in Palestine before 62 A.D. Internal evidence, however, points rather to a date about 120 A.D., and to some cultured Hellenist as the author. The place of origin must in that case be pronounced uncertain.

[2] Cf. the use of the abstract noun ἐπισκοπή of the Apostleship in Acts i. 20.

[3] The virtual identity of the earliest bishops with the presbyters is admitted by some modern Catholic scholars, e.g. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 748 f; Dunin-Borkowski in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 335b, 337a, b, 340a, 343b; Gigot in *Westminster Version, N.T.* IV. xv. It does not seem possible to discover any intelligible distinction between the two (yet see Joyce in *op. cit.* 749a; Dunin-Borkowski in *op. cit.* 335b; J. A. Robinson in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 83 f).

[4] Even a monarchical bishop could apparently still be called an elder: see Clem. Alex. quoted by Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* III. xxiii. 7 f, 12 f; Iren. *Haer.* IV. xxvi. 2–5, etc. (discussed by C. H. Turner in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 124–126); cf. Dunin-Borkowski in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 344a ("For a long time, however, the bishops were also called by the simple title of presbyter").

not impossible that the later tradition to the effect that the Apostles themselves (particularly John) appointed bishops of the monarchical kind may in some few cases (e.g. in Asia Minor) be true:[1] but the chronology of our earliest evidence cannot be said to prove it even there, and certainly makes it on any extensive scale exceedingly unlikely. The monarchical episcopate was for the most part a post-apostolic growth.[2]

In regard to the manner in which these Church-officers were chosen, it is quite impossible to substantiate the view that every elder or bishop owed his ordination or consecration to an Apostle or to other elders or bishops who stood in the Apostolic Succession as defined above. It was, of course, natural enough, when one Apostle or more happened to be present, that he or they should take a leading part in selecting and installing elders. This we know to have been the case in Southern Galatia (Acts xiv. 23); and we may presume it to have been the case also in Jerusalem (Acts xi. 30, etc.), though—in the analogous instance of the seven almoners (Acts vi. 1–6)—the selection was made by the "multitude" and only the installation by the Apostles. But it is impossible to suppose that every church that was founded must have been visited by some Apostle or apostolically ordained elder before it could have any lawful elders of its own: and our natural supposition that the local community had authority to appoint its own officers is strongly confirmed by the words of the 'Didache' (Syria, about 90 A.D.): "Elect therefore for yourselves bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord . . . For they themselves minister unto you the ministry of the prophets and teachers . . ." ('Did.' xv. 1 f). Ignatius tells us absolutely nothing as to the way in which bishops were appointed; and Clemens says simply that the Apostles appointed the first bishops and deacons, and ordained that, if and when these should fall asleep, they should be succeeded by "approved men" (δεδοκιμασμένοι ἄνδρες), who were to be chosen by "men of repute" (ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν), *with the consent of* (συνευδοκησάσης) *the whole Church*" (Clem. 'Ep.' xlii. 4f, xliv. 2f). The principle of popular election in the appointment of Church-officials, including bishops, and of popular consent in Church-affairs generally, maintained itself in force down to the middle of the third century (Cypr. 'Ep.' xiv. 4, lix. 6) and even later, but eventually disappeared with the development

[1] Cf. Dunin-Borkowski in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 338a, 344a, and J. A. Robinson in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 85–88 (quoting Lightfoot). It must not, however, be assumed that, every time the Apostles are said to have appointed bishops (e.g. Clem. *Ep.* xlii. 4, xliv. 1–4; Clem. Alex. in Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* III. xxiii. 6), *monarchical* bishops are meant.

[2] Cf. the guarded concessions of Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 301: also Bartlet, *Validity*, 3 f, 9 f. For Jacob of Jerusalem as the first monarchical bishop, cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 356: but no one calls him 'bishop' before Clemens of Alexandria (about 185–190 A.D.) (Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* II. i. 3).

of the mediaeval papacy. Modern Catholic scholars cannot altogether ignore the existence of these local privileges in the early Church; but they endeavour to disguise the glaring contrast between these early conditions and the present Catholic system (in which all such rights are denied to the laity) by insisting that the authority of the local Church was not self-given, like that of a modern democracy, but was bestowed by God and Christ, and furthermore that the local 'Church,' as a complete organism, *included* its rulers, and did not consist simply of the rank and file. In reply we observe (1) that Protestant scholarship has no concern to overlook or deny the Divine element in the autonomy and authority of the local church, (2) that the records frequently indicate that churches acted, in distinction from their rulers, in what we must insist on calling (without prejudice, of course, to what has just been said) a democratic or popular manner, and (3) that, all due qualifications admitted, the contrast between primitive Christian usage and Tridentine and post-Tridentine Catholicism remains unmistakable, unrecognized, and undefended.[1]

As for the other orders, little needs to be said. An order of 'deacons' grew up in Apostolic times, though the seven men named in Acts vi. 1–6 are not called 'deacons' either by the author of Acts or by anyone else before Irenaeus (185 A.D.). Of the other orders, said by the Council of Trent and the 'Roman Catechism' to have been established in Apostolic times, sub-deacons are mentioned for the first time in the middle of the third century, acolytes at the same period and then only as existing (as a distinct order) in the Western Church. There were certainly exorcists and readers in the earliest times, possibly also doorkeepers; but the first allusion to them as forming regular orders of the clergy occur, as to readers, about 200 A.D., and for the other two classes, about 250 A.D.[2] The late origin of these minor orders is candidly recognized in 'The Catholic Encyclopedia'[3]; but what then

[1] See especially Dunin-Borkowski in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 330a–331b, 333b, 334b, 336ab (minimization of *Did.* xv. 1 f), 338a (minimization of Clem. *Ep.* liv. 2, where Clemens inculcates submission to the injunctions of the Christian πλῆθος), 339a, 343a. Cf. also Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 418–422; Bartlet, *Validity*, 4; J. H. Bernard in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 230–232 (Cyprianic usage); Frere in *op. cit.* 274, 283, 286, 299–301; Brightman in *op. cit.* 400, 406 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 283, 700 (n. to S.283); Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 301 f (no *N.T.* evidence for local church's right to elect and appoint officers); Arendzen in *The Bible*, etc. 186 (similar to Dunin-Borkowski).

[2] Cf. Frere in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 295 f, 304–307.

[3] Cf. Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 711b: "the institution of these orders" (acolytes, exorcists, readers, and doorkeepers), "and the organization of their functions, seems to have been the work of Cornelius' predecessor, Pope Fabian (236–251)"; Dunin-Borkowski in *op. cit.* vii (1910) 326b ("it has been shown on incontestable evidence that the several grades of the hierarchy did not exist from the beginning in their later finished form, but grew up to it by various processes, partly of development and partly of self-differentiation").

becomes of the trustworthiness of Catholic tradition, so emphatically vouched for by the Tridentine authorities?

But what of Rome? Was not Rome perchance one of the places where the monarchical episcopate was developed comparatively early, possibly early enough to link the line of Roman monarchical bishops even with the Apostle Peter? Did there not exist in quite early times lists of the successive Bishops of Rome, beginning with his name; and why may not these lists preserve to us a record of the actual facts?

We shall come to the lists in a moment: but first of all something must be said on the general question as to how soon the monarchical episcopate became established at Rome. Now we happen to possess—for the period 50–150 A.D.—a series of documents which refer in some detail to contemporary conditions in the Church of Rome. Not one of them gives so much as a hint that at any point during this period the Roman Church was being governed by a monarchical bishop. The rulers of the Church are frequently referred to, but nearly always in general terms and in the plural number: when an individual is named, he is never characterized as sole bishop. Paul's letter to the Romans (about 56 A.D.), the story in Acts xxviii of his arrival and two years' imprisonment at Rome (about 60-62 A.D.), and the letters he wrote during that imprisonment (Col., Philemon, Eph., Philipp. and fragments in 2 Tim.), all refer to the period before Peter's death, and are unfavourable, not only to the theory that the latter was then supreme head of the Roman Church, but also to the theory that any one else was. About 96 A.D., Clemens, an official of the Roman Church, had occasion to write a letter of admonition to the Church at Corinth. He began: "The Church of God that sojourns at Rome to the Church of God that sojourns at Corinth," etc. He wrote throughout in the first person plural, never in the first person singular; he nowhere mentions himself or his own name or calls himself either 'bishop' or 'presbyter' or anything else. He simply makes himself the almost impersonal mouth-piece of the community. Yet this person is represented in the later papal lists as one of the Popes, and is believed by Romanists to have been for the time being supreme head of the Church of Christ. Fifteen or twenty years later, Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch in Syria, on his way to martyrdom at Rome, wrote a letter to the Christian Church there. Now Ignatius was an enthusiastic believer in monarchical episcopacy, which was obviously at this time already established in the churches of western Asia Minor and northern Syria. He could not, in fact, write a letter to one of these churches without emphasizing two or three times the absolute importance of obeying the bishop and remaining in union with him. Yet in his letter to Rome, written in the midst of his other letters,

he does not so much as mention their bishop. In writing to Ephesus, indeed, he speaks of "the bishops who have been appointed in the farthest parts (of the earth)" ('Ep. Ephes.' iii. 2): but even supposing that he has here in mind (as usual) monarchical bishops, he does not seem to have known of any such bishop at Rome.[1]

The 'Shepherd' of Hermas is a long work written by a Roman Christian for Roman Christians. Its date is not exactly known. The Muratorian Fragment (about 200 A.D.) states that it was written while Hermas' brother Pius was bishop: that would point to a date about 140–150 A.D. This may possibly be the period of its completion; but its composition probably occupied a long time. In one of its earliest sections ('Vis.' II. iv. 3), Hermas says an old woman (meaning the Church) said to him in a vision: "Thou shalt write two books" (i.e. copies of his book), "and shalt send one to Clemens and one to Grapte. So Clemens shall send (it) to the cities at a distance (ἔξω), for to him has (such duty) been entrusted. And Grapte shall admonish the widows and orphans. But thou shalt read it in this city, in company with the elders who preside over the church." If this allusion to Clemens is to be taken seriously, this part of the 'Shepherd' at all events could hardly have been written later than about 100 A.D. Some scholars, partly on this ground, and partly on other grounds, extend the period of composition over a very considerable number of years. Others are disposed to regard the reference to Clemens as a dramatic fiction, and accordingly can date the whole work later.[2] However that may be, the book is for our present purpose significant in two ways:— (1) it represents Clemens, not as supreme bishop (it does not even call him a bishop at all), but as foreign secretary to the Roman church: (2) though it refers frequently to the bishops and elders and governors of the church, it always does so in the plural, and gives no hint that there was any supreme presiding official.[3]

The first quite unmistakable trace of the existence of a supreme bishop at Rome is the report that in 154 A.D. Polycarpus, the Bishop of

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 380 f; Harnack, *Chron.* i. 175 f.

[2] Cf. Harnack, *Chron.* i. 257–267 (110–140 A.D.); V. H. Stanton, *Gospels as Hist. Documents*, i. 35–42 (110–125 A.D.). An interesting study of Hermas, based on the conviction that his work was written round about 95–100 A.D., has recently been offered by W. J. Wilson in *Harvard Theol. Rev.* Jan. 1927, 21–62.

[3] Harnack, *Chron.* i. 174 f, 192. The passages are *Vis.* II. ii. 6 (*προηγούμενοι*), iv. 2 (*πρεσβύτεροι*), 3 (see above), III. i. 8 (*πρεσβύτεροι*), v. 1 (*ἐπίσκοποι*, etc.), ix. 7 (*προηγούμενοι* and *πρωτοκαθεδρῖται*), *Mand.* XI. 12 (*θέλει πρωτοκαθεδρίαν ἔχειν*), *Sim.* VIII. vii. 4 (*ζῆλόν τινα ἐν ἀλλήλοις περὶ πρωτείων καὶ περὶ δόξης τινός*), 6 (similar), IX. xxvii. 2 (*ἐπίσκοποι καὶ φιλόξενοι*), xxxi. 5 f (shepherds). Dunin-Borkowski refuses to draw the inference that Hermas knew of no monarchical bishop at Rome (*Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 328a, 340a). His explanation is: "Just because he was the brother of the Head of the Church, he must have thought it more advisable to be silent concerning him and to antedate the abuses which he reprehends" (328a).

Smyrna, came to Italy, and paid a visit to the Roman Bishop Anicetus.[1] Clemens, and the others whose names appear in later lists of popes, must therefore, according to the evidence before us, have been, not monarchical bishops, but members of a college of presiding elders or bishops.[2] Peter, therefore, could have been neither Bishop of Rome himself, nor the first of a series of successive monarchical bishops.

We come now to the early lists of the Popes. The oldest of these seems to have been drawn up about 170 A.D., i.e. at a time when the monarchical episcopate had already well established itself even at Rome; and accordingly it represented the more prominent members of the body of governing elders or bishops during the period since 65 A.D. as holding supreme authority, each for a term of years (till death), in succession to one another. *It did not however represent Peter as the first bishop.*

We could place the compilation of this list ten to fifteen years earlier, and name its author, could we be certain as to the accuracy of the accepted text and usual interpretation of a passage in Eusebius' 'Church History' (IV. xxii. 2f). Eusebius there quotes Hegesippus, an Eastern Christian, as saying that he had stayed for some time at Corinth in the course of his voyage to Rome, and then as adding: "And having arrived at Rome, I made a διαδοχὴν until (the time of) Anicetus, whose deacon Eleutherus was; and Soter succeeded Anicetus, and after him (came) Eleutherus. And in each succession (διαδοχῇ) and in each city (the doctrine held) is just as the Law and the Prophets and the Lord proclaims." Now διαδοχὴ means 'succession'; and Hegesippus is usually understood to mean here, that he came to Rome in the time of Anicetus (154–165 A.D.), and compiled a list of successive Bishops of Rome down to Anicetus—his actual statement, as quoted, being written later under Eleutherus (174–189 A.D.). But can διαδοχὴ by itself mean 'a list of bishops'? It is very doubtful. Again, if Hegesippus did actually compile a list of Roman bishops, it is strange that neither Eusebius (who would have been particularly interested in it) nor any other writer (with the very doubtful exception of Epiphanius late in the fourth century) seems to have known anything about it? This and the philological difficulty are both removed, and the sentence better adapted to its context, if we suppose that διαδοχὴν is an old textual error for διατριβήν, i.e. 'sojourn.' If that be so, Hegesippus would simply mean that he arrived in Rome before Anicetus was bishop, and remained there until after Anicetus' accession to the chair. Eusebius

[1] Iren. *frag.* in Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* V. xxiv. 14–17. Irenaeus' allusion, for purposes of chronology, to Anicetus' two immediate predecessors (*Haer.* III. iv. 3; cf. Eus. *Hist. Eccl.* IV. xf) presupposes the accuracy of his own complete but questionable list of bishops from the time of Linus (as to which see below).

[2] Cf. Harnack, *Chron.* i. 176 f, 179 f, 192 f, 197–199.

indeed says elsewhere ('Hist. Eccles.' IV. xi. 7) that Hegesippus had recorded that he had been in Rome in the time of Anicetus and had stayed there until the time of Eleutherus. But this is possibly a misinterpretation of the passage just quoted, in which Hegesippus says nothing about remaining at Rome till the time of Eleutherus. If this very probable emendation of the text be accepted, Hegesippus—as a recorder of the early monarchical bishops of Rome—disappears from our ken. But even if it be not accepted, our papal list is still not earlier than 154 A.D. at the earliest, i.e. it is too late to deserve preference over the earlier evidence, and it brings us no nearer to the episcopate of Peter which it clearly did not record.[1]

It is with Irenaeus, who wrote 181–189 A.D., that we come for the first time on to the terra firma of actual record. Irenaeus accepted the (dubious) notion of a continuous line of single bishops dating back to the time of the Apostles—a notion developed as a helpful guarantee of the orthodoxy and apostolicity of Catholic teaching in contrast to Gnostic heresies; and he probably drew his particulars from the papal list the origin of which has just been discussed. But he did not describe Peter as Bishop of Rome. After having twice stated that Peter and Paul "founded" the Roman Church (by which he means, not that they began it—which clearly they did not—but that they consolidated it[2]), he writes: "So then the blessed Apostles, having founded and built up the church, entrusted" (*ἐνεχείρισαν*, not 'handed on,' as the Latin "tradiderunt" suggests) "the function of the episcopate to Linus. Of this Linus Paul makes mention in his letters to Timotheus. Anencletus succeeded him. After him, in the third place from the Apostles, Clemens had the episcopate assigned to him, who also had seen the blessed Apostles, and had had intercourse with them, and still had the preaching of the Apostles ringing (in his ears) and the(ir) tradition before his eyes: nor (was he) alone (in this) . . . Euarestus succeeded this Clemens, and Alexander (succeeded) Euarestus. Then—thus the sixth from the Apostles—Xystus was appointed. After him, Telesphorus, who was a glorious martyr. Then (came) Hyginus, then Pius, after whom (came)

[1] Cf. McGiffert's and Lawlor-and-Oulton's notes to Eus. *Hist. Eccles.* IV. xxii. 3; Salmon, *Infall.* 358–360; Harnack, *Chron.* i. 180–187, 192, 311–313; Turner, *Studies in Early Church Hist.* 156 f, and in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 117 f, 207; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 272b. Dunin-Borkowski (in *Cath. Encyc.* vii [1910] 340a) rejects the usual translation 'I made a list of successive bishops' as incredible, and the suggested emendation 'I abode there' (which he dates back to Rufinus, about 400 A.D.) as arbitrary. He amends *ἐποιησάμην* to *ἠρευνησάμην* or *ἐπονησάμην*, and translates: "I examined the series of the bishops," etc. But is not this equally arbitrary? Epiphanius' list makes Peter and Paul jointly the first bishops; but the evidence of Irenaeus, who also used the source from which Epiphanius drew (Harnack, *Chron.* i. 187), proves that such was not the statement of the source itself.

[2] See above, p. 434.

Anicetus. Soter having succeeded Anicetus, now—in the twelfth place from the Apostles—Eleutherus holds the position of the episcopate. By the same order and the same succession has the tradition in the Church and the preaching of the truth come down from the Apostles to us."[1] The ordinal numbers in this list, as well as its opening words, prove that, at the time when Irenaeus wrote, Peter was not regarded as having himself been Bishop of Rome; and Linus, the first Bishop, was believed to have been as much the successor of Paul as of Peter.[2] It is true that in two other passages of Irenaeus, where Eusebius preserves for us his original Greek, Hyginus is described as the *ninth* Bishop of Rome; and these passages are quoted in the Catholic interest as implying that Peter was the first bishop.[3] But it has to be observed (1) that the Latin version of Irenaeus has "octavus" in the second passage[4]; (2) that the probability of Irenaeus having originally written (or at least meant) 'eighth' in that passage is raised almost to certainty by the three ordinal numbers given in the list just quoted and by his description of Anicetus in the immediate sequel as "the tenth" (III. iv. 3); (3) that the "ninth" of Irenaeus' former passage (I. xxvii. 1), being inconsistent with three other statements of his, is probably a textual error, i.e. either a slip or an erroneous emendation. In any case, Irenaeus cannot be claimed as vouching for Peter's episcopate.[5]

How little real knowledge was available at this time in regard to the early Roman episcopate is seen in the fact that Tertullianus, writing about 200 A.D., describes *Clemens* as the first bishop of Rome, ordained to that office by the Apostle Peter[6]—a tradition resembling that of Irenaeus in excluding an episcopate of Peter himself, but otherwise totally irreconcilable with it. Clemens is given the same honourable place in the pseudo-Clementine 'Epistle of Clemens to Jacob' (written about 265 A.D.). It is inaccurate to say that "Tertullian by no means excludes the fact that Linus preceded Clement as bishop of that see,"[7] and irrelevant to urge that Tertullianus admitted Pope Callistus' claim (220 A.D.) to be the successor of Peter.[8]

In the course of the third century it became increasingly difficult for Christians to think of any Church existing without a bishop; and the generally accepted belief that the first Bishop of Rome, whoever he was, had been ordained by Peter, was easily transformed into the

[1] Iren. *Haer.* III. iii. 3 (= Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* V. vi).
[2] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 352 f; Harnack, *Chron.* i. 188.
[3] So Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 262b. The passages are Iren. *Haer.* I. xxvii 1 (= Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* IV. xi. 2) and III. iv. 3 (= Euseb. *loc. cit.* 1).
[4] As Joyce (*op. cit.*) recognizes.
[5] Cf. Harnack, *Chron.* i. 172 n.1; Turner in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 138–142.
[6] Tertull. *Praescr.* 32. [7] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 27.
[8] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 262b. Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 360–362; Harnack, *Chron.* i. 171 f, 190.

statement that Peter had actually been bishop himself. It seems impossible to determine precisely when this step was taken. The change was well on the way before the middle of the third century, for it is reflected in the writings of Cyprianus and Firmilianus, and in the pseudo-Clementine 'Epistle' (19) just referred to. But it cannot be shown to have been accepted either by Hippolytus or by Julius Africanus, both of whom drew up lists of the Bishops of Rome in the early decades of the third century. Hippolytus indeed, in a work written about 230 A.D., in calling Victor "the thirteenth bishop from Peter in Rome" definitely shows that he is using the enumeration of Irenaeus, which excluded Peter himself from the episcopal list.[1] The fact that the fourth-century Liberian Catalogue, which is *based* on Hippolytus' list, represents Peter as bishop, does not prove that Hippolytus himself did so. It is moreover of importance to observe that Eusebius himself (early fourth century), apart from the two dubious passages just discussed, uniformly excludes the Apostle-founders from his enumeration of bishops in all the great sees, including Rome.[2]

No purpose would be served by pursuing this enquiry further. All the papal lists compiled after the time of Eusebius show Peter as the first bishop. Even Eusebius, probably building on the chronological calculations of his predecessors Hippolytus and Julius Africanus, seems to have assigned to Peter a term of twenty-five years as head of the Roman Church. In this he was followed by the Liberian Catalogue (354 A.D.), which however has a series of early popes different from that of Eusebius and Irenaeus and running as follows: Peter, Linus, Clemens, Cletus (an imaginary doublet of Anencletus), Anaclitus, Aristus, Alexander, etc. In the 'Apostolic Constitutions' (vii. 46: 375-400 A.D.), Linus, the first Bishop of Rome, is ordained by Paul, and on his death Clemens, the second, is ordained by Peter. In Epiphanius, towards the end of the fourth century, we get the notion that Peter and Paul were joint-Bishops of Rome, which, though fictitious, is hardly more unauthorized than the view that Peter alone was bishop.[3]

[1] Hippol. quoted by Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* V. xxviii. 3: cf. Harnack, *Chron.* i. 152, 171 f, ii. 224–226. On Julius Africanus, cf. Harnack, *Chron.* i. 123 ff, 157 f, 171, 188: on Hippolytus, Cyprianus, and Eusebius, Salmon, *Infall.* 362 f (regards Hippolytus as the first to call Peter Bishop of Rome); Harnack, *Chron.* i. 149–158, 188; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 262b, 272ab; C. H. Turner in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 138–142.

[2] C. H. Turner in *loc. cit.*

[3] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 203, 211 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 353 n., 357–365; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 164, 305, 308, 310–318; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 179 (understates the evidence against Petrine episcopate); Harnack, *Chron.* i. 70–73, 82, 85, 87 f, 92, 107, 116 f, 133, 144 f, 149–153, 183–188, 193–202, 241 f; Chase in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 770 f; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 27 f; Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 750b; Joyce in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 262b–263a, 272ab.

In a sentence we may say that the Catholic belief that Peter was Bishop of Rome cannot be traced back with certainty to a date before about 250 A.D., that the earliest episcopal lists, particularly that used by Irenaeus and Eusebius, did not represent Peter as bishop, that therefore, even if the Roman Church *was* governed by monarchical bishops from the time of Peter's death, it is impossible to believe that Peter himself was bishop, that a fortiori he was not bishop for twenty-five years, and finally that evidence earlier and therefore more trustworthy than any of these lists shows that down to the second quarter of the second century the Roman Church was probably governed, not by a single episcopal head, but by a college of presbyter-bishops. In so far therefore as the Roman claim rests upon the theory of the Bishops of Rome inheriting Peter's rights by succession from him in a single line,[1] it is a claim that historical truthfulness cannot justify.

[1] See above, p. 390 n. 5, and p. 422 n. 2.

CHAPTER XX

THE PAPAL PREROGATIVES IN HISTORY

THE Vatican Council of 1870 laid it down

(1) that "the Holy Spirit was promised to Peter's successors, not in order that, by His revelation, they should lay open new doctrine, but that, by His assistance, they should sacredly guard and faithfully expound the revelation handed down through the Apostles, otherwise, the deposit of faith. And their Apostolic doctrine, indeed, all the venerable Fathers embraced and the holy orthodox Doctors revered and followed. . . ."[1]

(2) that ". . . that meaning of the sacred dogmas must be perpetually retained, which Holy Mother Church has once (for all) declared, nor must any departure ever be made from that meaning, under the pretence or plea of a deeper understanding . . . If anyone says that it can happen that sometimes, in conformity with the advance of knowledge, a different meaning ought to be given to the dogmas put forward by the Church, from that which the Church has understood and does understand, let him be anathema."[2]

(3) that the modern doctrine of the primacy of the Pope, i.e. his supreme jurisdiction and his doctrinal infallibility, has formed part of the beliefs of Christendom from the very beginning.[3]

Just as the earliest Christian literature not only fails to substantiate, but is positively inconsistent with, the Roman view of Peter's primacy, so the history of the Church not only fails to prove, but actually disproves the truth of the Roman claims in regard to the status of the Pope.[4] Facts, as we know, are stubborn things, and this is true of

[1] See above, p. 28.

[2] See above, p. 37 and p. 93 n. 1.

[3] See above, pp. 27 f. The doctrine concerning the Roman primacy was put forward "secundum antiquam atque constantem universalis ecclesiae fidem": that in the primacy "supremam quoque magisterii potestatem comprehendi, haec sancta sedes semper tenuit, perpetuus ecclesiae usus comprobat, . .": all the venerable Fathers and orthodox Doctors followed the deposit of faith, "plenissime scientes, hanc sancti Petri sedem ab omni semper errore illibatam permanere": the final decree of papal infallibility begins, "Itaque nos traditioni a fidei christianae exordio perceptae fideliter inhaerendo, . ." (*Conc. Vatic.* sess. 4, intro., cap. 4 [Mirbt 461 (42), 464 (14), 465 (7, 21)]).

[4] Dr. Faà di Bruno takes the Catholic version of the history for granted (*Cath. Belief*, 305: "If St. Peter was not the first Pontiff of Rome, they ought to be able to explain how since St. Linus the supremacy over the whole Church was ever claimed . . . by the Roman See, and not by any other . . .").

historical as well as of other facts; and the patent inconsistency of numerous episodes in Church-history with the claims in question have strained the resources of Roman apologetic almost to the breaking-point. The extraordinary subtlety with which these discrepancies are met is the best proof of their fatal significance. The actual determination of the question as to which papal utterances are infallible is left vague:[1] the decree of 1870 is stated not to be an innovation, because the Church *as a whole* has never admitted the contrary: the principle of Roman infallibility was always recognized, though the mode of its exercise has varied, especially in the direction of a centralization of power in the hands of the Pope[2]: primitive belief in papal infallibility was implicit, not overtly expressed[3]: if cases are on record of papal authority being resisted in early times, "let it be considered . . . whether all authority does not necessarily lead to resistance"[4]: and so on. With such skilful logical devices (of which no historian would stand in need if the evidence really supported his contentions) do Roman Catholic scholars endeavour to explain away the silences and the denials of history.

As in the case of Peter himself, so in that of the early Roman Church, the records reveal a certain leadership which, though quite unlike the sovereign domination posited by Catholic teaching, yet serves to provide that teaching with a superficial appearance of justification.[5] The leadership arose in a very natural way. As soon as the great Apostolic personages had left the scene, it was inevitable that the Church of Rome, altogether apart from its connexion with Peter and Paul, should speedily acquire a certain precedence of honour and dignity. It is doubtless a mistake to exaggerate the indebtedness of the papacy to the Roman Empire as its heir and to regard the power of that Empire as the sole cause of the power of its successor. But it would be equally erroneous to deny that the eminence and prestige of the early Roman Church owed much to its being settled in the imperial capital of the civilized world and to the privileges which it gained from such a position in the matter of numbers, wealth, quality of personnel, and general resources. It is a striking confirmation of the truth of this a priori

[1] See above, pp. 29–32.

[2] See above, p. 29: and cf. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 264b.

[3] See above, p. 29 n. 1. Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 367–369 (in regard to Newman's theory of 'development'); Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 85 f (no need or possibility of many papal decisions in earliest centuries).

[4] Newman, *Developm.* 24.

[5] "Die sporadischen altkirchlichen Dokumente für einen Vorrang der römischen Gemeinde werden—oft unter Ignorierung aller dagegen sprechenden Zeugnisse—so forciert, dass die Anerkennung des römischen Primats als *unanimis consensus patrum* erscheint" (Heiler, *Kathol.* 354). Of Mgr. Batiffol's study of the Petrine primacy a reviewer observes: "He so frankly notes the paucity of evidence for this during the first three centuries that anyone can see it is evidence only in the light of subsequent developments" (*Times Lit. Suppt.* 15 July 1926, 474).

probability that, half a century after Constantinople had become the capital of the Empire, its patriarch was able to vindicate his title to the second place in Christendom, simply and solely on the ground of the political importance of his city—'New Rome' as it was called—despite the lateness of its foundation, its total lack of Apostolic or other ancient traditions, and (we may add) the opposition of the Bishop of Rome.[1] When to the inherent advantages of locality there were added, firstly, the honour of having been served by the Apostles Peter and Paul and of having witnessed their martyrdom, secondly, the disappearance (in 70 A.D.) of the one other possible claimant to supremacy, namely, the mother-church of Jerusalem, and thirdly, the distinction of rendering from time to time pre-eminent services to the common cause, the hegemony of the Roman Church was sufficiently assured.[2]

It was, however, quite clearly a hegemony, and not a sovereignty. About 96 A.D., Clemens, a leader and representative of the church of Rome, had occasion to write a lengthy letter to the church at Corinth. The Corinthian Christians had dismissed some of their presbyters from office: possibly the ejected officials had come to Rome, and complained of injustice; in any case, a scandal had been caused; the matter was regarded at Rome as a discreditable breach of ecclesiastical peace and discipline; and, in the name of the Roman Church, Clemens wrote to admonish the Christians of Corinth, and to prevail upon them to reinstate and submit to their lawfully constituted officers. In doing so, he adopted for the most part the language of brotherly remonstrance; but in a couple of passages his tone became more sharp and imperious. "But if any are disobedient to what has been said by Him" (God) "through us, let them know that they will entangle themselves in no small transgression and danger; but we shall be guiltless of this sin" (lix. 1 f). "For ye will give us joy and exultation, if, in obedience (*ὑπήκοοι γενόμενοι*) to what has been written by us by means of the Holy Spirit, ye cut out the lawless anger of your jealousy according to the entreaty (*ἔντευξιν*) which we have made in this letter for peace and concord. And we have sent (to you) faithful and prudent men . . . who also shall be witnesses between you and us. And this we have done that ye may know that we have had and (that we still) have every concern

[1] *Second Council of Constant.* (381 A.D.) can. 3 (. . . *διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν νέαν Ῥώμην*) (Hefele, *Councils*, ii. 357–359).

[2] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 217; Salmon, *Infall.* 346, 356, 370–373; A. Robertson in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 211 f; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 92 (admits a Providential disposition in the establishment of Peter's Chair in Rome, but denies that papal authority owes its origin to the imperial dignity of Rome, as contrary to Scripture and the Fathers, as begging the question, and as exemplifying the fallacy 'Post hoc, ergo propter hoc'); Duchesne in *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 687a; Fawkes in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 620 f; R. M. Pope in *op. cit.* xii (1921) 728a, 729a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 84, 292; W. H. Carnegie, *Anglicanism* (1925) 26–29.

(*φρόντις*) for your speedy peace" (lxiii. 2–4). To Roman Catholic readers, this is a clear instance of the exercise of supreme jurisdiction on the part of 'Pope St. Clement I': its authoritative tone, its tacit assumption of the right to intervene and to demand obedience, and the recognition with which apparently it was met, all combine to set it forth in this light.[1] On the other hand, were the Roman view correct, we should expect the author to name himself and his unique personal office, to refer to the fact that he was the successor of the prince of the Apostles, and that he was writing by virtue of the supreme authority which his official position conferred upon him. The fact that he does none of these things is fatal to the Romanist interpretation. Clemens never once names himself, or calls himself bishop or successor of Peter or anything else: he writes throughout in the first person plural, on behalf of the church of Rome. He prays for the offenders "that they may yield not to us, but to the will of God" (lvi. 1). "Receive our counsel (*συμβουλήν*)," he says, "and ye will not regret it" (lviii. 2). He bases his intervention on the prompting of the Holy Spirit, not upon any official supremacy on the part of himself or of the Roman church. His words of remonstrance and his authoritative tone—such as it is—are consistent with the assumption of initiative by an important sister-church: they are not consistent with supreme jurisdiction inherent in the writer as monarchical Bishop of Rome.[2]

About 115 A.D., Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch in Syria, wrote from Smyrna his letter to the church of Rome. He refers casually to Peter and Paul as greater ones than himself (iv. 3): but he says nothing explicit about their martyrdom at Rome, nothing about the Roman bishop, and nothing about any supremacy enjoyed by the Roman church or its head over the rest of Christendom.[3] He simply greets the church, "which," he says, "has also the presidency (*προκάθηται*) in the place of the region of the Romans, worthy of God, worthy of honour, worthy of felicitation, worthy of praise, worthy of success, worthy in purity, and having the presidency of love (*προκαθημένη τῆς ἀγάπης*), ..." The natural meaning of the first of these phrases is that the Roman church was the leading church either of Italy or of the region around Rome: but however doubtful the precise significance may be, there is

[1] Cf. Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 317 (includes "Pope St. Clement I" and "St. Anacletus" among those "who all have asserted that they were successors of Peter, and sat in his chair"—a representation based solely on apocryphal fictions); Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 29 f, 86; Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 628a; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 797b; Joyce in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 263a, 264b. For the Anglo-Catholic point of view, see Robertson in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 214 f; C. H. Turner, *Studies in Early Church Hist.* 232 f.

[2] See above, p. 446, and cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 373 f, 377–379; Robertson (as in last n.); Denny, *Papalism*, 639–642; Fawkes in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 620b; Rogers, *Rome*, 27–32.

[3] See above, pp. 446 f.

no suggestion of a general primacy. The last phrase quoted clearly refers to the pre-eminence of the Roman church in generosity and helpfulness towards other and needier churches.[1] On the ground, however, that the word governed by προκαθῆσθαι must always be that of a place or society, some Catholic scholars have argued that the clause means 'being president over the community of love,' i.e. over the whole Church.[2] But there are no real analogies to so strange a use of the word 'love';[3] and even if the word could here mean 'loving community,' the community referred to could quite well be a locally limited one, such as is suggested by the first clause. It is impossible to make good an allusion in the passage to a general supremacy over Christendom.[4]

Sixtus I, according to the oldest papal lists, was Bishop of Rome about 115–125 A.D. In the 'Liber Pontificalis' (which belongs to the sixth century) he is stated to have issued three ordinances, one of which was to the effect that bishops who had been summoned to Rome were not to be received by their dioceses on their return, unless they could present letters of recognition from the Roman pontiff. The 'Liber Pontificalis' is a very unreliable authority for the second century, and it is only here and there that its accuracy can be seen to be more probable than its fictitiousness. In this case, all indications go to show that, even supposing (what we have already proved to be improbable) that there was at this period a monarchical Roman bishop named Sixtus, he could not have asserted the authority of his office in these stringent terms. Yet in Dr. Faà di Bruno's 'Catholic Belief,' a book issued with Cardinal Manning's imprimatur and republished frequently and as late as 1923, the statement of the 'Liber Pontificalis' about Sixtus is repeated as a statement of fact, with no indication of its original source, and no suggestion of its legendary character; and the offence is aggravated by assigning to Sixtus the certainly erroneous (and needlessly late) date 140 A.D.[5]

Certain well-attested events that occurred in the course of the second century are sometimes claimed by Roman Catholics as exemplifying the universal and generally recognized jurisdiction of the Roman

[1] For the Roman philanthropy, cf. Dionysius of Corinth in Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* IV. xxiii. 10. "Ignatius accounts for the consideration enjoyed by this Church by its good works and its local prestige" (Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix [1917] 620b).

[2] See Lightfoot's, Zahn's and Funk's notes in their respective editions of the Apostolic Fathers; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 263a.

[3] In all the passages referred to by Funk as similar, *the context* makes the meaning quite unambiguous: e.g. "the love of the Smyrnaeans and Ephesians salutes you."

[4] Cf. Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 797b; Denny, *Papalism*, 642 f.

[5] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 114. Cf. Duchesne, *Liber Pontif.* i. 56 f, 128 (he points out the historical inaccuracy of the statement). In *Cath. Encyc.* (xiv [1912] 31), the statements of the *Liber* are reported without comment as to their historical value.

church: but in point of fact these events prove nothing more than what every Protestant admits, viz: that Rome was a large, important, and influential church, the approval and support of which was a valuable asset in time of controversy. Thus about 139 A.D. Marcion of Pontus came to Rome, after having been condemned for heresy by leading Christian officials in Asia Minor. He was eager to propagate his peculiar doctrines, and would be able to do so the more effectively if he could gain a footing within so eminent a Christian community as the church of Rome.[1]

About 154 A.D., Polycarpus, Bishop of Smyrna, visited Anicetus, Bishop of Rome, and discussed certain points of difference with him, principally the method of fixing Easter. It is natural enough to assume that this discussion was the object of Polycarpus' voyage, though our informant (Irenaeus) does not say so. He tells us that the two bishops could not persuade one another, but simply agreed to differ and parted in peace, after Anicetus—as a mark of respect—had allowed Polycarpus to administer the Eucharist in the Roman episcopal church.[2] Catholics rightly refrain from any attempt to represent this incident as an *appeal* to Rome on Polycarpus' part; but to speak of "the Pope permitting the aged saint to celebrate on the day he had been accustomed to in the Church of Smyrna"[3] misrepresents the facts. What Anicetus conceded to Polycarpus was the honour of presiding at a eucharistic service *at Rome*: the right to celebrate Easter *at Smyrna* on the day there customary was retained by Polycarpus, not because the Pope graciously permitted it, but because (as Irenaeus expressly says) "Anicetus was unable to persuade Polycarpus not to observe (Easter) as he had always observed it along with John the disciple of our Lord and the other apostles with whom he had associated." In other words, the story reveals the perfect equality and reciprocity assumed to exist between the Smyrnaean and the Roman bishops, and inferentially but clearly excludes the belief that any supreme jurisdiction was enjoyed by the latter.[4]

The Roman Church was in the habit of contributing generous money-gifts to poor or needy churches in other cities of Christendom. Her size and resources enabled her to do this on an exceptionally large scale. These favours would of course be received with gratitude, and

[1] "Wer auf die ganze Christenheit Einfluss gewinnen wollte, musste in die Welthauptstadt gehen" (Harnack, *Marcion*, 23). Cf. Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 797b.

[2] Iren. ap. Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* V. xxiv. 16 f: cf. Denny, *Papalism*, 249–251; Brightman in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 394.

[3] Campbell in *Cath. Encyc.* i (1907) 514b.

[4] I observe incidentally that the *date* of this visit (154 or 155 A.D.) is erroneously given in *Cath. Encyc.* (l.c.) as 160–162 A.D., and the date of Polycarpus' martyrdom (23 Feb. 155 or 156 A.D.) is erroneously given by Faà di Bruno (*Cath. Belief*, 142) as 26 Jan. 166, in accordance with a chronology now long out of date.

sometimes with obsequiousness, and would add immensely to the weight of such counsel as Rome might from time to time feel called upon to offer to other Christian groups. Thus about 170 A.D. Dionysius, Bishop of Corinth, wrote to Soter, Bishop of Rome, thanking him for some generous gift, mentioning that Clemens' earlier letter to Corinth had been habitually read in the church, and respectfully adding: "To-day we have passed the Lord's holy day, wherein we read your" (ὑμῶν, plural) "letter: and whenever we read it, we shall always be able to be admonished, as also (when we read) the former (letter) written to us by (διὰ) Clemens."[1] Under the next Pope, Eleutherus (174–189 A.D.), the Montanists of Phrygia, having been condemned by a synod of bishops in Asia Minor, seem to have appealed to Rome: the initial decision there in their favour was however shortly afterwards reversed.[2]

Between 181 and 189 A.D. Irenaeus of Lugdunum (Lyons) was writing his great work 'Against Heresies.' The original Greek of it is lost (except for a number of fragments preserved by other writers); but the whole work is extant in a Latin translation. Irenaeus' great concern was to discredit as unapostolic and therefore unauthorized the strange doctrines of the Gnostics. One of his many arguments against these doctrines is that they were incompatible with the teachings everywhere professed by the bishops of the Christian churches, each of whom stood in a direct line of succession from the Apostles. "But since," he says, "it would be a very long (business) in such a volume as this to enumerate the successions of all the churches, we (will) confound all those who assemble in any manner otherwise than they ought, either through evil self-pleasing or vainglory or blindness and wrong opinion—(by) pointing out the tradition of the greatest and most ancient church, (one) known to all, founded and constituted at Rome by (those) two most glorious Apostles Peter and Paul, that (tradition, namely,) which it has from the Apostles, and (its) faith proclaimed to men, which comes through to us through the successions of the bishops. For to this church —on account of (her) more powerful leadership—there is a necessity that every church, that is, those believers who are from all quarters, should resort—(every [or, to this] church, I say), in which that tradition which is from the Apostles has ever been preserved by those who are from all quarters." He then proceeds to enumerate the Bishops of Rome from the days of the Apostles to his own, and thereafter to vindicate the Apostolic guarantee for the churches of Smyrna and Ephesus also.[3]

[1] Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* IV. xxiii. 10 f. Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 373–375 (refers to other instances of early Roman generosity), 379 f; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 30; Heiler, *Kathol.* 292.

[2] Salmon in Smith, *D.C.B.* iii (1882) 937 f; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 267 f.

[3] Iren. *Haer.* III. iii. 1, 2 (". . . Ad hanc enim ecclesiam propter potentiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique

This passage has always been a battleground between Catholics and Protestants, the former regarding it as a clear piece of evidence in favour of their own tenets. If, however, controversial interests can be kept subordinate to exact investigation, it ought not to be impossible to ascertain precisely how much the passage means. Taking the obscure Latin of Irenaeus' translator (for that is all we have) as it stands, one is justified in urging that "necesse est," which would correspond to the Greek *ἀνάγκη ἐστίν*, implies natural or logical necessity, not moral obligation, which would be expressed by *δεῖ* ('oportet'). In the absence of the Greek, the *precise* meaning of "potentiorem principalitatem" is uncertain: the force of the Latin word is satisfied by some such translation as 'leadership' or even 'origin,' and does not require (if it does not exclude) any notion of sovereignty. Neither can we be quite sure whether the sense of "undique" ('from every side'), as distinct from 'ubique' ('everywhere'), is to be pressed, and whether "convenire ad" must mean 'resort to' (i.e. by journeys of numerous individuals, or [?] by occasional corporate appeal or conference), or may mean 'agree with' (which is quite possible, but for which perhaps we should rather have expected either 'convenire' with the dative, or 'consentire'). The exact meaning of the concluding clause ("bis qui sunt undique") is also specially obscure.

What is, however, clear is that Irenaeus believed that the Apostolic doctrine was preserved by the episcopal successions in a large number of places, but that it was particularly secure in the Roman church, since this Church possessed a "more powerful leadership," which was based especially on her connexion with Peter and Paul, possibly also on Rome's civil greatness and centrality, so that by logical necessity all other genuine churches agreed with her in doctrine. No doubt, we have here an important witness to the real eminence which Rome now enjoyed in Christendom:[1] but of a sovereignty or supreme jurisdiction wielded by the Roman Church the passage does not speak, while of any special infallibility possessed by her bishops as distinct from others who stood in the Apostolic succession there is not so much as a hint.[2]

fideles, in qua semper ab his, qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quae est ab Apostolis traditio"), 3 (see above, pp. 449 f.).

[1] Cf. the words of Renan to this effect quoted by Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 82 f.

[2] See Hase, *Handbook*, i. 257 f; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 43 f, 117 (makes the quite inaccurate assertion that Irenaeus "had seen some of those who had seen our Lord"; he is thinking, of course, of Irenaeus' teacher, Polycarpus); Salmon, *Infall.* 381–383; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 97 n.; A. Robertson in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 217–221; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 83, 94, 101–110; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 797b; Joyce in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 263ab; Denny, *Papalism*, 233–249, 254–259, 643–645; Turner in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 106 f, 120–127; Heiler, *Kathol.* 290–292; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 202 n. 2; The words of Irenaeus were quoted in the decree of the Vatican Council on the Roman Primacy (sess. iv, cap. 2 [Mirbt 462 (37)]).

The 'potentior principalitas' of Rome is well exemplified in an incident that occurred about 190 A.D. The churches of Asia Minor had from the earliest times celebrated Easter-Day at the same time as the Jewish Passover, irrespective of the day of the week: virtually all other churches celebrated it on a Sunday, irrespective of the precise date. The conference between Anicetus and Polycarpus in 154 A.D. having led to no result, about 190 A.D. Victor, Bishop of Rome, felt called upon to bring the divergence of practice to an end. Councils of bishops were held in Palestine, Pontus, Oshroene, Gaul, and Asia Minor—the last-named, probably the others also, at Victor's request. He himself also held a Council at Rome. All these councils, except that of Asia, reported that Easter-Day should be observed only on Sunday. The Bishop of Corinth gave the same opinion. Polycrates, Bishop of Ephesus, however, wrote on behalf of the Asian bishops, to Victor and the church of Rome (apparently in reply to their threat of excommunication), vigorously defending their divergent practice as Apostolic, and refusing to abandon it. "I therefore, brethren," he wrote, "having (lived) sixty-five years in the Lord and having associated with the brethren from (all over) the world and having been through the entire Holy Scripture, am not affrighted by terrifying (words). For those who are greater than I have said, 'We ought to obey God rather than men.' " "At this," says Eusebius, "Victor, the president of the (church) of the Romans, attempted all at once to cut off from the common unity as heterodox the parishes of all Asia with the consentient churches; and by means of letters he publicly proclaimed all the brethren there as absolutely excommunicated. But this did not please all the bishops. They besought him just to consider the (claim)s of peace and neighbourly unity and love. And their words, as they very sharply upbraided Victor (*πληκτικώτερον καθαπτομένων τοῦ Βίκτορος*), are extant. And among them Irenaeus also, writing on behalf of the brethren in Gaul whom he led, maintained that the mystery of the Lord's resurrection should be celebrated only on the Lord's day, but fittingly exhorted Victor not to cut off whole churches of God that observed the tradition of an ancient custom. . . . And he conferred by letters on this (much-) discussed question not only with Victor, but with most of the other rulers of the churches."[1] We are not told that Victor formally withdrew his letters of excommunication: but it seems that the protests of Irenaeus and others led to his sentence remaining inoperative. The Asian churches were cut off, neither from the Church at large, nor apparently from Rome; and the question of the proper time to celebrate Easter remained unsettled until 325 A.D.

The incident strikingly confirms the view for which we have been

[1] Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* V. xxiii, xxiv, esp. xxiv. 7–11, 18.

arguing. The Roman church is naturally an important and influential church, and its bishop is able to initiate very weighty proceedings. But the other churches of Christendom quite obviously do not recognize any supreme jurisdiction vested in him or in his church. No bishop of course could be prevented from excommunicating other Christians if he wanted to do so (the bishops of Asia, for instance, had excommunicated Marcion and the Montanists): the only check on over-hasty excommunication lay in the risk of isolating oneself in a humiliating way if one's fellow-bishops refused to regard the sentence as valid. Polycrates of Ephesus obviously knew nothing of any right on Victor's part to command his obedience, and frankly dares him to do his worst. Victor not only threatens to excommunicate the Asiatics, but actually does so[1]: and his sentence has either to be withdrawn or else simply becomes a dead letter. The other bishops did not submit a humble recommendation to their supreme ruler, as Catholics usually represent them to have done, but "very sharply upbraided" their eminent colleague. Irenaeus evidently addressed his protest, not only to Victor himself, but to a great many other bishops; and it was probably this step that brought about the lapse of Victor's decree. The event illustrates, perhaps, the temptation which a Bishop of Rome naturally felt to increase his own power of control: but it certainly proves beyond question that he was not at the time believed to possess any kind of supreme jurisdiction over the Church at large.[2]

We find a view of the nature of Roman authority very similar to that of Irenaeus being taken by Tertullianus of Carthage, in his treatise 'De Praescriptione Haereticorum,' written about 200 A.D., before his lapse into the Montanist heresy. He challenges the heretics to produce evidence of apostolicity comparable to that of the great Christian sees, i.e. a succession of bishops springing from an initial Apostolic appointment. "For in this way do the Apostolic churches transmit their records," he says, "as the church of the Smyrnaeans records that Polycarpus was appointed by John, as (that) of the Romans (records) in like manner that Clemens was ordained by Peter. In the same way the other (churches) also exhibit those who were appointed to the episcopate by Apostles and whom they hold as transmitters of the Apostolic seed. . . ."

[1] This is quite distinctly stated by Eusebius (see above), and confirmed by Socrates (*Hist. Eccles.* v. 22).

[2] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 59; Salmon, *Infall.* 283, 380, 383–386; Rackham in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 123, 132; A. Robertson in *op. cit.* 211, 223–225; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 93–95 (wrongly says that Victor did not actually excommunicate the Asiatics, but only attempted to do so; ignores the 'sharp upbraiding' of Victor by the disapproving bishops, and notices only that Irenaeus "respectfully advocated" a milder course, and "hence he fully acknowledged S. Victor's authority"!); Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 263b (similar apologia; says without apparent authority that Victor withdrew the imposed penalty), 264b; Denny, *Papalism*, 251–254; Heiler, *Kathol.* 292.

Again, referring the heretics to the various "Apostolic churches, in which the very chairs of the Apostles preside to this day over their own localities (locis)," he says: "Achaia is very near to thee: thou hast Corinth. If thou art not far from Macedonia, thou hast Philippi, thou hast Thessalonica. If thou canst proceed to Asia, thou hast Ephesus. If, however, thou art near Italy, thou hast Rome, whence authority is to hand (praesto est) for us (in Africa) as well. How happy is that church (of Rome), for which the Apostles poured out their whole teaching with their blood, where Peter is conformed to the Lord's passion, where Paul is crowned with a death like John's, where the Apostle John, after being plunged into hot oil and suffering nothing, is banished to an island! Let us see what she has learned, what she has taught, (what creed) she has shared with the African churches also." And so on. We have here, just as we have in Irenaeus, tribute paid to the special privileges of the Roman church in its martyr-Apostles and to its consequent special influence over other churches. The African churches had apparently been founded from it and still maintained specially close relationships with it. But Tertullianus gives not so much as a hint of any generally recognized jurisdiction of the church of Rome over the rest of Christendom: on the contrary her authority, though distingushed by three Apostolic martyrdoms, is clearly of precisely the same character as that of any other church whose bishop stands in the Apostolic succession.[1]

Towards the end of his career, when he had long been as a Montanist out of sympathy with the Catholic Church, Tertullianus wrote a treatise 'De Pudicitia' (about 220 A.D.) in protest against certain disciplinary relaxations promulgated by Callistus, then Bishop of Rome. We gather from his words that Callistus in his edict had called himself "episcopus episcoporum," though it is possible that Tertullianus is simply mocking the presumption of Callistus by ascribing this haughty title to him.[2] In any case, all that is proved is that Callistus, as Bishop of Rome, was adopting a very absolute and peremptory style of official speech: we are not warranted in inferring from Tertullianus' sarcastic words that he (or others outside Rome) conceded to Callistus the right to speak of himself in these terms.[3]

[1] Tertull. *Praescr.* 32, 36: Hase, *Handbook*, i. 258 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 381; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 793b (*Praescr.* 36 quoted as a proof of the Church's infallibility); C. H. Turner in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 127–129; R. M. Pope in H.*E.R.E.* xii (1921) 729a; Heiler, *Kathol.* 290, 293.

[2] His words are: "Pontifex scilicet Maximus, quod est episcopus episcoporum, edicit: 'Ego et moechiae et fornicationis delicta paenitentia functis dimitto'" (Tertull. *Pudic.* 1).

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 218 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 389; Barmby in Smith, *D.C.B.* iv (1887) 1218b note (where the bishop in question in identified with Zephyrinus); Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 262b, 264a,b; Denny, *Papalism*, 645–648.

Certain facts relating to Hippolytus, the eminent Christian scholar who flourished about 200–235 A.D., are of significance for the status of the papacy in the Christian Church at this period. He was extolled as a martyr; and he came to be highly esteemed in the East: his works —composed in Greek—were widely circulated, and some of them translated into several eastern languages. In spite of this, a good deal of obscurity gathered about his memory; and it is only in comparatively modern times that the true facts about him have been brought to light. It is now known that he held the two bishops Zephyrinus (198-217 A.D.) and Callistus (217–222 A.D.) to be guilty of heresy of a patripassian and Sabellian kind, that he strongly objected to the laxity of Callistus' disciplinary regulations, and that during the episcopates of Callistus and his successor Urbanus (222–230 A.D.) he claimed to be and was recognized by a minority as himself 'Bishop of Rome.' Before his death in 235 A.D. he seems to have been reconciled to the bishop of the majority; and his own episcopal claims were consigned to oblivion in the West and kept in memory only in the East, and that without any full or clear record of his doings. The significance of all this for our present purpose is not the question whether Hippolytus' accusations of heresy and laxity were justified or not, or whether his own doctrines were orthodox or not, but the fact that a man of his learning, eminence, and wide influence in the Church could regard a Bishop of Rome (Zephyrinus) as holding clearly heterodox views, and the further fact that the church of Rome could be divided between two rival bishops, and the schism leave no trace in the Christian writings of the period. How could that have been, had all Christendom regarded the Bishop of Rome as its supreme head and ruler?[1]

We come next to the important evidence of Cyprianus, Bishop of Carthage (248–258 A.D.)—a figure of immense influence in the affairs of his time, and of central importance in the development of the doctrine concerning the Church. It is quite clear, from a great number of passages in his writings, that he thought of the body of Christian bishops as representing and embodying the ideal unity of the Church.[2] The members of that body he regarded as bound, of course, by the common obligations of brotherly love and of loyalty to orthodox tradition, but as independent of one another so far as jurisdictional authority was concerned. In an opening address to a Council of African bishops assembled in 256 A.D to discuss whether converted heretics should be rebaptized on admission to the Church (a question which the Roman Bishop Stephanus, who claimed very wide powers, answered

[1] Salmon in Smith, *D.C.B.* iii (1882) 86 ff (Art. 'Hippolytus'), *Infall.* 389–394, 400 f, 425; Bardenhewer, *Patrologie* (1910) 183–185.

[2] Heiler (*Kathol.* 282 f) gives a useful collection of quotations.

in the negative, contrary to the general feeling in Africa), Cyprianus said: "It remains that we should each declare what we think concerning this matter, judging no one (else), nor removing anyone from the right of communion if he thinks differently. For no one of us constitutes himself 'bishop of bishops,' or by tyrannical terror drives his colleagues to the necessity of obeying (him), since every bishop, by virtue of the free use of his liberty and power, has (the right of forming his) own judgment and cannot be judged by another, just as he cannot judge another. But let us all await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone has the power of advancing us in the government of His Church and of judging concerning our action." A little earlier he had himself written to Stephanus, stating the African view of the subject in dispute, and concluding: "In this matter we neither inflict violence nor impose a law on anyone, since each prelate has in the administration of the Church the free judgment of his own will, being due to give an account of his action to the Lord (alone)."[1]

Cyprianus did not recognize that the Bishop of Rome possessed any authority of finally adjudicating on matters concerning which appeal might be made to him from other quarters of the Church. In 254 A.D. a very significant instance occurred. Two Spanish bishops, Basilides and Martialis, had betrayed their faith by complying with the idolatrous requirements of the government in the persecution of 250–251 A.D. Their lapse had led to the loss of their episcopal positions, and successors had been appointed. Basilides, however, made his way to Rome, and, taking advantage of the ignorance of Stephanus, Bishop of Rome, obtained from him a decision favourable to himself. A certain number of the Spanish Christians, moreover, still treated him and Martialis as rightful bishops. Their two successors, however, brought a letter from their clergy and their flocks, to Cyprianus and the other bishops of Africa, requesting support. Cyprianus, in company with the African bishops, replied to them, ratifying the deposition of Basilides and Martialis, and observing: "It cannot cancel an ordinance rightly enacted, that Basilides, after his crimes had been detected and laid bare even by the confession of his own conscience, went to Rome and deceived Stephanus our colleague, (who was) placed at a distance and (was) ignorant of what had happened and of the truth, in order that he might succeed by entreaty in being unjustly replaced in the episcopate from which he had been rightly deposed. The result is that Basilides' faults are not so much abolished as heaped up, that the crime of deceit and trickery is added to his former sins. For not so much blame

[1] *Sent. Episc. lxxxvii*, pref., and *Ep.* lxxii. 3 (Hartel, i. 435 f, ii. 778). Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 407; Denny, *Papalism*, 280–284, cf. 433–438, 599–605; J. H. Bernard in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 242–247, 250, 253–255; Heiler, *Kathol.* 288, 700 top.

is due to him who was surprised through negligence, as execration to him who fraudulently surprised (him). But though Basilides was able to surprise men, he cannot (surprise) God," etc. etc.[1] Let anyone frankly ask himself whether these words—emanating as they do from a body of thirty-seven African bishops with Cyprianus at their head—are consistent with the view that the Church of the time believed the Bishop of Rome to possess supreme jurisdiction over the whole of Christendom. It is perfectly futile to plead in reply that "there was no room for a legitimate appeal, since the two bishops had confessed. An acquittal obtained after spontaneous confession could not be valid."[2] If this argument were right, the African bishops would surely have addressed themselves to Stephanus, and begged him to withdraw his decision. Instead of that, they coolly set his decision aside on their own responsibility. They obviously knew nothing of any final or supreme jurisdiction vested in him.[3]

Somewhat later, Cyprianus came into sharp conflict with Stephanus on the question whether converted heretics should be rebaptized. The former, supported by African usage, contended that they should, the latter that they should not. The controversy occupies many pages of Cyprianus' extant writings. He defended his views, not only at enormous length, but with the most unyielding persistence. He never for a moment admits that Stephanus has any official right to settle the point. The furthest he goes towards meeting him is to propose that each bishop should do what he thought right in the matter, and maintain Christian communion with those who differed from him. Stephanus, however, was bent on establishing his own supremacy as successor of Peter, and either renounced communion with or else definitely excommunicated the African churches and also the Asiatic which sided with them. The quarrel lapsed on the deaths of Stephanus in August 257 and of Cyprianus in September 258; and ultimately the Roman ruling prevailed throughout the Church. The point, however, for us to notice is that Stephanus' excommunication was not only defied by those against whom it was directed, but that St. Firmilianus, Bishop of Neo-Cæsarea in Cappadocia, wrote (about November, 256 A.D.) a letter to Cyprianus, in which he condemns Stephanus for his schismatic action in terms that are totally out of keeping with any general recognition at that time of the primacy of the Roman See as Catholic dogma represents it.[4]

[1] Cypr. *Ep.* lxvii. 5.

[2] So Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 268a.

[3] The whole story is in Cypr. *Ep.* lxvii. Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 73–76, 241; Salmon, *Infall.* 407–409; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims,* 113 f n; A. Robertson in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith,* 230–232; Denny, *Papalism,* 277–280.

[4] For the controversy in general see Smith, *D.C.B.* i (1900) 749–753, iv (1887) 727–730. A Latin translation (by Cyprianus) of Firmilianus' Greek letter is pre-

The actual attitude taken up by Cyprianus to the Roman See is clearly visible in these, as well as in other, episodes in his career. It is an attitude of fraternal love and deference. Doubtless he regarded it as a serious matter to be cut off from Christian communion with Rome. He records the anxious remark of the persecuting emperor Decius that he would much rather hear that a rival emperor was rising against him than that a new Bishop of Rome had been appointed.[1] But did he regard the Bishop of Rome as the leading bishop of Christendom in any more than the most purely honorary sense? It is very doubtful. There is at least one passage in which he quite clearly uses the phrase "one chair founded by the Lord's voice upon Peter," not of the Roman See, but of the Church's episcopate at large.[2] Elsewhere he remarks that Cornelius had been made Bishop of Rome, "when the place of Fabianus, that is, when the place of Peter and the rank of the sacerdotal chair, was vacant"[3]—words which perhaps imply that, while Cyprianus regarded

served in Cypr. *Ep.* lxxv. I subjoin a few sentences from it (italics mine). "Sed haec interim quae ab Stephano gesta sunt praetereantur, ne dum *audaciae* et *insolentiae* eius meminimus, de rebus ab eo *improbe* gestis longiorem maestitiam nobis inferamus" (3). "Atque ego in hac parte iuste indignor ad hanc tam apertam et manifestam Stephani *stultitiam*, quod qui sic de episcopatus sui loco gloriatur et se successionem Petri tenere contendit, super quem fundamenta ecclesiae collocata sunt, multas alias petras inducat et ecclesiarum multarum nova aedificia constituat," etc. (17). "Quin immo tu *haereticis omnibus peior es*" (23). "Lites enim et dissensiones quantas parasti per ecclesias totius mundi! *peccatum* uero quam magnum tibi exaggerasti, quando te a tot gregibus scidisti! *Excidisti enim te ipsum*, noli te fallere, si quidem ille est uere schismaticus qui se a communione ecclesiasticae unitatis apostatam fecerit. Dum enim putas omnes a te abstineri posse, solum te ab omnibus abstinuisti" (24). "Et tamen non pudet Stephanum . . . propter haereticos adserendos fraternitatem scindere, insuper et Cyprianum pseudochristum et pseudoapostolum et dolosum operarium dicere" (25). The letter was excluded from at least one early Catholic edition of Cyprianus' works (Barmby in Smith, *D.C.B.* iv [1887] 729b). Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 59 f; Hase, *Handbook*, i. 220; Salmon, *Infall.* xii, 144 f, 405–407; Robertson in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 230; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 98 f (objects to statement that Cyprianus and the African bishops declined to admit Stephanus' authority, on the ground that Cyprianus sends Stephanus the acts of the African Council, and thus "appeals to the judgment of the Roman pontiff"!); J. H. Bernard in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 248 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 292 f; Rogers, *Rome*, 43–45.

[1] Cypr. *Ep.* lv. 9.

[2] Cypr. *Ep.* xliii. 5 (the context clearly determines the reference of the words). The allusions to the 'cathedra Petri' in *Unit.* 4 are late interpolations. Cf. Fulford in *H.E.R.E.* xi (1920) 233 n. 8; J. H. Bernard in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 245–247. Merry del Val (*Papal Claims*, 96 f, appx. ix) quotes a number of Cyprianic passages (of which the chief is *Unit.* 4) connecting Church-unity with Jesus' words to Peter; but these passages say nothing whatever about the *Roman* See. It may be remarked here that the MSS of Cyprianus' works were in places glossed with interpolations in the Roman interest, and that it is therefore only the later critical editions that can be trusted to give the original text in its purity: cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 219; Salmon, *Infall.* 455; Hartel's edition, i. 212 f; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 112; Horton in *Shall Rome*, etc. 169 f; Denny, *Papalism*, 651–662; J. H. Bernard in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 250–253 (discussion of the improbable Catholic suggestion that one important interpolation in *Unit.* 4 comes from the hand of Cyprianus himself).

[3] Cypr. *Ep.* lv. 8.

the episcopate at large as in principle Peter's chair, he thought of the Bishop of Rome as the occupant of that chair par excellence.[1] There is yet another important passage in which he says that some opponents of his in Africa "dare to make a voyage and to carry to the chair of Peter and to the principal church, whence sacerdotal unity arose, letters from schismatics and profane people, and not to think that the Romans are they whose faith is praised in the Apostle's preaching, (and) to whom faithlessness cannot have access."[2] Here undoubtedly some kind of primacy is expressed, and the passage is repeatedly quoted by Roman writers in that sense:[3] but are the crucial words really those of Cyprianus himself? Is it not at least possible that he is quoting ironically the words of his opponents?[4] Even if so, it is by no means certain, and the closing words are clearly his own. He is writing to the Roman Bishop, and anxious to secure his support: hence he writes as graciously as possible, and pays 'Cornelius his brother' the compliment of alluding, as Irenaeus had done, to the 'potentior principalitas' of his see. When therefore Catholic writers insist that Cyprianus believed in the Roman primacy,[5] it has to be pointed out that belief in any primacy other than honorary or symbolic precedence (such as would naturally belong to the typical centre of the unity of the episcopate) can be discovered in Cyprianus only by ignoring his quite unmistakable trust in episcopal independence and by forcing from a few polite or rhetorical utterances implications which they do not naturally yield.[6] It is therefore refreshing

[1] Cf. J. H. Bernard in *op. cit.* 247–250. [2] Cypr. *Ep.* lix. 14.

[3] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 31, 96, 98; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 264a; Funk quoted by Rogers, *Rome*, 39.

[4] So Canon T. A. Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 84 n.: per contra Denny, *Papalism*, 264–271; J. H. Bernard in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 248, 250. See the interesting discussion on the point between Prof. C. H. Turner and another in *Times Lit. Suppt.* 11 Feb. 1926, 90, 18 Feb. 119, and 4 Mar. 163.

[5] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 96–101; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 264a; Funk quoted by Rogers, *Rome*, 38 f.

[6] Thus in *Ep.* xx, Cyprianus explains to the Roman clergy (during a vacancy in their episcopate) his action in fleeing under persecution: but this was a natural thing to do since his flight had been misrepresented to them, and it does not imply that he regarded the Roman church as having the rule over him. *Ep.* xlviii. 3 ("ecclesiae catholicae matricem et radicem") refers probably to episcopacy, not to Rome as distinct from other churches: see the context. *Ep.* lii. 2 ("plane quoniam pro magnitudine sua debeat Carthaginem Roma praecedere . .") is an allusion to Rome's greater size and imperial position. In *Ep.* lv. 1 Cyprianus equates communion with Cornelius and communion with the Catholic Church: this however is no assertion of Roman primacy, since Cornelius stands here simply in antithesis to Novatianus the schismatic (cf. *Ep.* lxviii. 1). In *Ep.* lxviii. 3 he asks Stephanus of Rome to excommunicate Marcianus, Bishop of Arles, not because he could not do it himself (an African council had already renounced communion with him), but because both as a Gaul and as an adherent of the Roman schismatic Novatianus, Marcianus naturally had to be dealt with by Stephanus. On these passages generally, cf. Denny, *Papalism*, 260–264, 271–277; J. H. Bernard in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 249 f.

to find Catholic writers candidly admitting that Cyprianus' attitude to the Roman bishop was definitely wrong in certain respects. They do not, however, seem to realize the significance of this admission. For if Cyprianus' views were wrong, so were those of the African bishops who nearly all agreed with him, and to a large extent those of the eastern bishops also. That their attitude was quite inconsistent with the dogma of 1870 is certain: whether it was wrong or not is for the moment not our question; nor are the actual merits of the Roman case against rebaptism relevant either. For our point is that the facts clearly prove that the Roman primacy as defined in 1870 was in the third century not a part of the Church's faith.[1]

It has seemed best to set forth in some detail the evidence bearing upon the status of the Roman church down to about the middle of the third century, in order that the full force of it may be unmistakable to the reader. But it is obviously impossible to treat on this scale the whole mass of facts relevant to the question before us. Limitations of time and space and human energy necessitate compression. In this part of the field of controversy the Protestant arm literally aches with slaughter, and the mind flags with the sheer tedium of the work of destruction. One takes up episode after episode in Church-history to discover that the Roman primacy declared in 1870 to have been a part of the Church's faith from the beginning is simply not there, to observe the gradual steps—honourable and otherwise—by which it eventually came to be, and to find Catholic writers straining and twisting every display of deference to Rome into an acknowledgment of papal supremacy, and skilfully explaining away every fact inconsistent therewith, however palpable the inconsistency.

Thus, Dionysius of Alexandria expounds his suspected theological views to his namesake of Rome (about 260 A.D.): therefore he must have acknowledged the supreme jurisdiction of the latter. In 272 A.D. the Emperor Aurelianus, being asked to adjudicate in the matter of Paulus of Samosata (who, despite his excommunication, refused to abandon the episcopal premises at Antioch), ordered the property to be handed over to "those to whom the bishops of the doctrine in Italy and in the city of the Romans should adjudge (it)"[2]: this shows that "even the pagans themselves knew well that communion with the Roman See was the essential mark of all Christian Churches."[3]

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 144, 405–407; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 99–101; Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 264a (Cyprian "undoubtedly entertained exaggerated views as to the independence of individual bishops, which eventually led him into serious conflict with Rome . . . it is not to be denied that his views as to the right of the pope to interfere in the government of a diocese already subject to a legitimate and orthodox bishop were inadequate. In the rebaptism controversy his language in regard to St. Stephen was bitter and intemperate . . ."), 264b.

[2] Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* VII. xxx. 19. [3] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 264b.

The case of the Donatists and the question of the rebaptism of converted heretics and schismatics were settled, not by the Bishop of Rome, but by the Synod of Arles (314 A.D.), which is not reckoned as Œcumenical by Romanists: nevertheless it was to Pope Miltiades that the Emperor had referred the Donatist dispute in the first instance, when appeal was made to him in 313 A.D.[1]

No one suggested referring the great and important Christological problem raised by Arius, and the question as to the settlement of Easter, to the decision of the Pope. They were taken up by the General Council of Nicæa (325 A.D.)—a Council in which Rome played an entirely subordinate part. Its decrees do not mention any general primacy possessed by the Pope; but Canon 6 prescribes for the Bishops of Alexandria, Antioch, and other great provincial sees patriarchal rights similar to those customarily enjoyed by the Bishop of Rome. Yet (Catholics urge) a conciliar decision is more impressive, solemn, and effective than a simple ex-cathedra pronouncement: hence the moral necessity for this and other Eastern Councils.[2] Moreover, Constantinus must have got the consent of Pope Silvester before summoning the Council; Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, who probably presided, must have done so as the Pope's deputy; the Pope must have confirmed the Council's decisions; and so on. As for Canon 6, this has in view simply his prerogatives as Western patriarch, and implies no denial of his general primacy.

It is part of the Catholic theory that the right of summoning a General Council belongs to the Pope. It is, however, well known that more than one General Council held in the East was summoned, not by the Pope, but by the Emperor. In such cases, if the prior consent of the Pope cannot be proved, we are referred to his consent post factum. If neither prior nor subsequent consent can be shown to have been explicitly given, we are to understand that it was 'presumed.'[3]

The Council of Antioch in 341 A.D. required Pope Julius to accept its decisions on pain of excommunication: but this proves nothing against the papal supremacy, for Julius replied that it was illegal for a Council to bind on the whole Church canons which had not received his consent.

In 343 A.D. a Council of Western bishops at Sardica laid it down, in the interests of the orthodox anti-Arians, that a bishop, if he considered himself wrongfully condemned, might appeal to the Bishop of Rome to sanction a new trial: this (we are told) must have been simply the confirmation of a custom that was primitive.

In 357 A.D. Pope Liberius, sick of the imprisonment to which the

[1] Joyce in *op. cit.* 268a.
[2] So Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 434ab.
[3] *Ibid.* iv (1908) 428ab.

Arian Emperor Constantius had sentenced him, signed an Arian creed in order to get reinstated in his office, and was roundly anathematized by the orthodox St. Hilarius for doing so: this however is no disproof of the Catholic claim, for his Arian confession was not technically an ex-cathedra statement.

At the second General Council, held at Constantinople in 381 A.D., Rome and the West were not represented; and its third canon enacted that "the Bishop of Constantinople should have the precedence of honour after the Bishop of Rome, because it" (Constantinople) "is New Rome." Rome long refused to acknowledge this canon as binding. But this Council was not œcumenical until it was recognized as such by Rome in the sixth century; and the third canon was not regarded as valid until the thirteenth century.

The claims of Pope Siricius (384–399 A.D.) to large powers were innovations and were confined—as were also those of Innocentius I (402–417 A.D.)—to western Christendom: on the other hand, Gregorius of Nazianzus rejoiced over Rome's fitting leadership in the matter of orthodoxy,[1] and Ambrosius, Bishop of Milan, addressed Siricius in terms of deference.

St. Augustinus admitted in principle that appeal might be made from the judgment of a Bishop of Rome to that of a General Council: yet he clearly had a very high notion of the dignity of the Roman See. Pope Zosimus (417–418 A.D.) acquitted Pelagius and Coelestius when they appealed to him, and informed the bishops of Africa, who thereupon assembled in synod and repeated their earlier sentence against the accused, in which sentence Zosimus himself soon concurred: the point, however, which we are asked to observe is that even heretics recognized the special doctrinal authority of the Pope and therefore appealed to him in the hope of getting the sentence against them reversed.[2] In 418 A.D. Zosimus attempted to reinstate a Mauretanian priest Apiarius, who had been excommunicated by his bishop, and claimed authority to do so on the strength of a canon of the Council of Nicæa, which was, however, in reality simply a canon of the Council of Sardica. An African synod had already declared that the African church would henceforth hold no communion with any priest or inferior cleric who should appeal to Rome. The matter of Apiarius was held over until the African bishops could verify the Nicene canon in question; and Zosimus' successor, Bonifatius I (418–422), was informed by them in due course that it was unauthentic. The case, however, came up again about 426 A.D., when Pope Coelestinus intervened afresh in Apiarius' favour. Thereupon the African bishops promptly met in council,

[1] *Carmen de Vita Sua*, 562–575 (in Migne, *P.G.* xxxvii. 1068).
[2] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 797b.

reaffirmed their condemnation of Apiarius, repeated that the so-called Nicene canon quoted by Zosimus was unauthentic, and wrote to Coelestinus, begging him, on the strength of a real Nicene Canon (no. 5), not to interfere for the future with the local jurisdiction of the African church. Here is the Catholic comment, resting on the fact that Africa did not positively deny the right of *bishops* to appeal to Rome, and that appeals did occasionally take place: "This letter, with all its boldness, cannot be construed into a denial of the Pope's jurisdiction by the Church of Africa. It simply voices the desire of the African bishops to continue the enjoyment of those privileges of partial home-rule which went by default to their Church during the stormy period when the theory of universal papal dominion could not always be reduced to practice, because of the trials which the growing church had to endure."[1]

Just as the convocation at Nicæa in 325 A.D. implies that no one thought of the papal infallibility as a solution of the problem raised by Arius, so the convocation at Ephesus in 431 A.D. suggests the same negative with regard to the doctrinal challenge of Nestorius: but here again, the plea about the greater impressiveness of a conciliar decision would apply. Pope Leo I was granted by the Emperor Valentinianus an edict (445 A.D.) recognizing his primacy over the whole Church, and giving his official regulations the force of law: it does not however follow from this that the imperial grant was the source of the pope's appellate jurisdiction; it was merely the civil sanction of that jurisdiction. The Œcumenical Council of Chalcedon (451 A.D.) confirmed, as Leo himself admitted, the doctrinal statement he had himself previously drawn up, and thus gave it dogmatic force. Its twenty-eighth canon stated that the precedence of the See of Rome was due to the predominant political position of that city, and that a like precedence reasonably belonged to the See of Constantinople. Yet the Council showed very great deference to Leo; and as for its twenty-eighth canon, Leo and his successors simply refused to accept it.

Pope Vigilius (537–555 A.D.), in the controversy as to whether the supposedly heretical 'Three Chapters' should be condemned, changed his mind again and again: the fifth General Council was held (at Constantinople in 553 A.D.) in opposition to him, and condemned him: he accepted the sentence and recognized the Council. But "the change in his position is to be explained by the fact that the condemnation of the writings mentioned was justifiable essentially, yet appeared inopportune and would lead to disastrous controversies with Western Europe,"[2] while the doubts felt in regard to the legality of the Council are "a proof

[1] Peterson in *Cath. Encyc.* i (1907) 594b: cf. Joyce in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 268b.
[2] Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 428a.

that the mind of the Church required the pope's consent for the lawfulness of councils."[1]

Pope Gregorius the Great (590–604 A.D.) emphatically repudiated as arrogant the title 'universal bishop,' which was assumed by the Patriarch of Constantinople. None of his predecessors at Rome, he said, had accepted it, and Peter had not put himself on a rank superior to that of his fellow-apostles. It has, however, been regarded as one of the normal distinctions of the papacy for many centuries. The inconsistency is, we are assured, only apparent: for Gregorius, unlike the Popes who have accepted the title, understood it to involve a denial of the authority of local bishops; and in any case he strenuously maintained his general jurisdiction over the faithful.

Gregorius the Great is often regarded as the last of the Fathers of the Latin Church: and it may therefore be convenient if, before we continue the historical survey, we digress a little at this point in order to consider the Catholic attitude to the Fathers generally, and to the patristic exegesis of the 'Peter-texts' in particular.

The Council of Trent in 1546 forbade anyone to interpret Scripture "contrary to that meaning which Holy Mother Church . . . has held and (still) holds, or even contrary to the unanimous agreement of the Fathers." The 'Creed of Pius IV' (1564) exacts the pledge: "I also admit the Holy Scriptures, according to that sense which our holy Mother, the Church, has held, and does hold, . . . neither will I ever take and interpret them otherwise than according to the unanimous consent of the Fathers." The Vatican Council repeated the words of the Tridentine decree,[2] and referring to the Apostles, declared: "their Apostolic doctrine all the venerable Fathers embraced and the holy orthodox doctors revered and followed."[3] It is, of course, patent to all who possess any acquaintance with the subject, that the matters on which any unanimous agreement of the Fathers can be said to exist are very few and, although fundamental, very general, and certainly do not embrace the exegesis of the obscurities of Scripture. There is, in fact, scarcely one of the Fathers who does not occasionally come into conflict with modern Roman teaching. We find, for instance, even the Council of Trent referring to the variety of patristic interpretations of John vi and to the obsolete patristic custom of giving the eucharist to infants.[4] The Tridentine stipulation, therefore, in the sharpened form given to it in the 'Creed of Pius IV,' would, if strictly understood,

[1] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 428b.

[2] See above, p. 258.

[3] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 4 (Mirbt 465 [6]).

[4] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxi, capp. 1 and 4. Newman, in his essay on *Private Judgment* (371), refers to the differences between the different Fathers and the impossibility of following them absolutely.

amount to a prohibition of all Scriptural interpretation whatever.[1] Furthermore, the attempt to maintain the harmony between the present teaching of the Church and the teaching of the Fathers is obviously inconsistent with the theory of Development which many Catholic apologists of to-day find so welcome a stand-by.[2] Various lame expedients are resorted to as a means of overcoming the impasse. Thus we are told that the 'Creed of Pius IV' refers only to points of faith or morals not yet defined by the Church, that when the Fathers agree on any such point it would be wrong to disregard their interpretation, but that it is mere cavilling to suppose that private persons are obliged by the 'Creed' to consult the Fathers[3]; or again, that the Fathers often comment upon the same text in different ways, and that the Vatican decree did not mean that they all expounded the Petrine supremacy every time they touched on one or other of the pertinent texts.[4] The most approved theory, however, is one much bolder than either of these. It produces a unanimous agreement of the orthodox Fathers, partly by explaining away, partly by excluding as unorthodox, patristic opinions that seem to be at variance with what the Church now teaches.[5] When the latter alternative is necessary, the general reputation of the Father in question may be saved by the plea that, in his day, the Church had not yet declared her mind on the point in regard to which he erred.[6] A telling exposure of this Romanist method of dealing with the Fathers was published by Newman as an Anglican in 1837, in his 'Lectures on The Prophetical Office of the Church.' In 1845, shortly after his conversion to Romanism, he reprinted it in his 'Essay on Development,' saying that, though he condemned its tone and drift, and thought its statements exaggerated, yet mutatis mutandis he acquiesced in it. I transcribe a few sentences from it. "However we explain it, so much is clear, that the Fathers are only so far of use in the eyes of Romanists as they prove the Roman doctrines, and in no sense are allowed to interfere with the conclusions which their Church has adopted; that they are of authority when they seem to agree with Rome, of none if they differ. . . . A Romanist, then, cannot really argue in defence of the Roman doctrines; . . . He assumes his Church's conclusions are true; and the facts or witnesses he adduces are rather brought to receive an interpretation than to furnish a proof . . . I consider, then, that when he first adduces the above-mentioned Fathers in proof of Purgatory, he was really but interpreting them; he was teaching what they ought to mean,—what in charity they must be supposed to mean,—what they might mean, as far as the very words went,—probably meant, consider-

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 128 f.
[2] *Op. cit.* 34 f, 275.
[3] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 239 n. §.
[4] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 3 f.
[5] Heiler, *Kathol.* 589 n.
[6] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 93 f.

ing the Church so meant,—and might be taken to mean, even if their authors did not so mean, from the notion that they spoke vaguely, and, as children, that they really meant something else than what they formally said, and that, after all, they were but the spokesmen of the then existing Church, which, though in silence, certainly held, as being the Church, that same doctrine which Rome has since defined and published . . . afterwards, in noticing what he considers erroneous opinions on the subject, he treats them, not as organs of the Church Infallible, but as individuals, and interprets their language by its literal sense, or by the context, and in consequence condemns it. The Fathers in question, he seems to say, really held as modern Rome holds; for if they did not, they must have dissented from the Church of their own day; for the Church then held as modern Rome holds. And the Church then held as Rome holds now, because Rome is the Church, and the Church ever holds the same. . . . It is quite clear that the combined testimonies of all the Fathers, supposing such a case, would not have a feather's weight against a decision of the Pope in Council, nor would it matter at all, except for the Fathers' sake who had by anticipation opposed it. They consider that the Fathers ought to mean what Rome has since decreed, and that Rome knows their meaning better than they did themselves. . . ."[1] This frank avowal by a learned Catholic convert furnishes not only a sufficiently true description, but at the same time a sufficiently damning criticism of Rome's treatment of the Fathers. We allude not to the rights or wrongs of the condemnation of this or that patristic opinion as untrue and unacceptable, but to the method by which Rome seeks to show that her later dogmatic utterances are simply statements of what was from the beginning a part of the Church's faith.

The Vatican Council of 1870 carefully refrained from actually stating in so many words that the three Petrine texts (Mt. xvi. 16–19, Lk. xxii. 31f, and Jn. xxi. 15–17) had always been interpreted by the Fathers as referring to the primacy of the Bishop of Rome; but the whole tenor, as well as certain particular phrases, of the bull 'Pastor Aeternus' (in which the conciliar decisions regarding the pontificate were promulgated) aim at conveying precisely that view. The preamble states that the doctrine would be put forth "according to the ancient and constant faith of the universal Church." The first chapter adduces Mt. xvi. 16–19 and Jn. xxi. 15–17 as proving that Christ conferred on Peter a real primacy of jurisdiction, and refers to the exegesis as "this

[1] Newman, *Developm.* 186–188. On the Church's attitude to the Fathers, cf. Moehler, *Symbolism*, 298–304, and Harnack *Gesch der altchr. Lit.* I. XXI–XXVIII, XXXV–XLVI.

so manifest teaching of the sacred Scriptures, as it has always been understood by the Catholic Church." The second chapter, which lays it down that Peter's primacy by Divine institution must descend to his successors, and that these successors are the Bishops of Rome, says: "It assuredly cannot be doubtful to anyone—nay rather, it has been known in all ages, that . . . Peter . . . received the keys of the Kingdom . . . ; who to this very day and always lives and presides and exercises judgment in his successors the bishops of the holy Roman See. . . ." The third chapter insists on the duty of obedience to the Pope. The fourth begins: "This holy See has always held, the perpetual usage of the Church proves, and the Œcumenical Councils themselves—that one especially in which East came together with West in a union of faith and love—have declared, that in the Apostolical primacy, which the Roman pontiff as successor of Peter the chief of the Apostles holds over the universal Church, there is contained also the supreme power of instruction (magisterii)." The quotation of Mt. xvi. 18 at the Council of Constantinople in 869 A.D. is then referred to: a little later, the introduction of new doctrine by Peter's successors is abjured and denied.[1] The passage continues: "Their" (i.e. the Apostles') "Apostolic doctrine all the venerable Fathers embraced and the holy orthodox doctors revered and followed, knowing full well that this See of Saint Peter ever remains unimpaired by any error, according to (our) Lord (and) Saviour's Divine promise made to the chief of His disciples: 'I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not, and do thou, when at length converted, strengthen thy brethren.' "[2] The final solemn declaration of papal infallibility begins with the statement that in it the Pope was "faithfully adhering to the tradition accepted since the beginning of the Christian faith."[3]

It cannot, of course, be judged an altogether unnatural process of thought that, when once the idea of the Roman Church as the seat par excellence of the great Apostle's labours had firmly rooted itself in men's minds, the primacy he had held—however it was to be interpreted—should be regarded as attaching to the Roman See. Especially was this bound to happen when the Bishops of Rome came to take an enlarged view of their responsibilities and privileges. The falsehood however consists in pretending that the Gospel-passages bearing on Peter's primacy were either primitively or uniformly referred to the leadership of Rome.[4] Thus, it seems impossible to find a single ancient Father who connects the words of Jn. xxi. 15–17 with the Bishop of Rome. Cyprianus (who died 258 A.D.), Epiphanius (who died 402 A.D.),

[1] See above, pp. 28, 453.
[2] See above, p. 28.
[3] See above, p. 27, and in general Mirbt 461–466.
[4] Heiler, *Kathol.* 290.

and Chrysostomus (who died 407 A.D.) are all quoted by Catholics as commenting on the text, but the quotations they adduce refer exclusively to the Apostle's personal status.[1] Augustinus connected the charge given to Peter with the episcopal succession generally. It is very much the same with Lk. xxii. 31f. A number of Chrysostomus' observations on the passage are mustered; but they deal simply with Peter's leadership, and say nothing whatever about Rome. The same applies to the comment extracted from Theophylactus (eleventh century). Pope Leo the Great (440–461 A.D.) seems to have been the first to connect the words with the duties of his see: but the Romanist interpretation appears quite clearly for the first time in a letter sent by Pope Agatho to the Emperor in 680 A.D. It is not until the eleventh century that testimonia in favour of the papal view can be produced in any force. We can hardly indeed be surprised to learn that many Catholics lay little stress on this passage and regard its evidence as mainly confirmatory. That is all very well: but the use made of it at the Vatican Council in 1870 is not thereby justified.[2]

Mt. xvi. 16–19 is, however, the passage on which Roman Catholics mainly rely. Now if the Roman interpretation of it were the right one, and if that interpretation were, as Romanists claim, primitive, we should find the early Fathers—both in the East and in the West—all in agreement with one another in applying the words to the Roman episcopal see. A text that is meant to serve as the foundation-charter of a great visible institution is not likely to be ambiguous as to its interpretation. But what do we find? The patristic explanations of this Matthaean passage vary in the widest possible way. No suggestion that it refers to the papacy is found in the Eastern Fathers before about 600 A.D. The earliest Westerners to claim it unambiguously for Rome in particular is the ambitious Pope, Stephanus (254–257 A.D.); and it is centuries before there is a wide acceptance of this sense even in Western Christendom.[3] The Catholic, therefore, who pledges himself in the terms of the 'Creed of Pius IV' not to interpret Scripture "except according to the unanimous agreement of the Fathers," is simply breaking his promise when he accepts the modern Romanist version of the meaning of this passage.[4] The following brief outline will give

[1] Cypr. *Hab. Virg.* 10: Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 81; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, appx. ix, xiv; Joyce, in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 261 f; Döllinger quoted in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 270b bott.

[2] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, xi, xiv f, 10 f, 41–44, 48–52, 57; Salmon, *Infall.* 343–345; Denny, *Papalism* 73–80.

[3] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 54, 155 f, 334 f, 341, 403; A. Robertson in *Auth. in Matt. of Faith*, 207 f; Döllinger quoted in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 270 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 289 f, 589 n.; H. Smith, *Ante-Nicene Exegesis of the Gospels*, i. 116.

[4] Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 271a.

some idea of what the 'unanimous agreement of the Fathers' (in the Catholic sense of the phrase) amounts to in this instance.

The Roman interpretation, as we said, begins (significantly enough) in Rome itself. Callistus (217–222 A.D.) had quoted the passage as justifying him in forgiving (i.e. restoring to communion) those who had committed sins of unchastity. From the fact that his argument was opposed by the Montanist Tertullianus, it does not follow that his interpretation of the passage was generally held by Catholics at the time. But in any case, he claimed the power of binding and loosing, not for himself as Bishop of Rome, but "for every church connected with Peter," i.e. (it would seem from Tertullianus' argument) every episcopally governed church. In reply, Tertullianus insists that whatever Christ conferred was conferred personally on Peter: if conferred in any sense on the Church, it was the Church of spiritual prophets, not of bishops exercising discipline.[1] The first person (so far as we know) to urge that the text warranted the Bishop of Rome, as Peter's successor, in insisting on his own view being accepted by other bishops, was Pope Stephanus (254–257 A.D.): but the reception accorded to his claims shows clearly how far his view was from representing the general mind of the Church. They were repudiated with scorn in the East, and vigorously resisted in the West.[2] His great contemporary, Cyprianus, interpreted the passage quite explicitly as setting forth the unity of the Church and indicating the promise made through the Apostles to the episcopate.[3] Precisely the same exegesis was taken for granted by Firmilianus, Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia.[4]

Origenes (185–254 A.D.), the older contemporary of Firmilianus, though frequently alluding to Peter's personal status, yet applies the promises spoken of in Mt. xvi. 17–19, not only to all good bishops, but to all good Christians who possess the same faith that Peter displayed.[5] Still nothing about Rome. In the Pseudo-Clementine 'Epistle of Clemens to Jacob' (Syria, about 265 A.D.), Clemens reports how Peter appointed him as his successor in the episcopal chair at Rome, and

[1] Tertull. *Pudic.* 21 (". . . idcirco praesumis et ad te derivasse solvendi et alligandi potestatem, id est ad omnem ecclesiam Petri propinquam . . ."): Salmon, *Infall.* 341n., 387–389, 403; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, appx. vii; Heiler, *Kathol.* 287 f; H. Smith, *Ante-Nicene Exegesis*, i. 113 f.

[2] Cypr. *Ep.* lxxv. 17: Salmon, *Infall.* 144 f, 405, 407; Heiler, *Kathol.* 292 f. See above, pp. 466 f.

[3] Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, 96 f, appx. ix; Heiler, *Kathol.* 283, 288; H. Smith, *Ante-Nicene Exegesis*, i. 114 f. See however, above, pp. 467 f.

[4] Cypr. *Ep.* lxxv. 16 f; H. Smith, *l.c.* On Tertull., Cypr., and Firmil., cf. Mozley in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 619 f. See also above, pp. 462 ff.

[5] Salmon, *Infall.* 335, 336 n.; Merry del Val, *Papal Claims*, xiii f, 36–40, appx. vii–x; Heiler, *Kathol.* 287 f; H. Smith, *Ante-Nic. Exeg.* i. 112 f; Mozley in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 620a.

conferred upon him the power of binding and loosing. But this power is treated simply as a part of the episcopal office; the rock-foundation of the Church is not mentioned; and "the bishop of bishops, who rules . . . the churches everywhere," is not Peter, but Jacob the Lord's brother. Eusebius of Caesarea (260–340 A.D.) does not connect the Matthaean passage with Rome, and lays but slight stress on Peter. Didymus of Alexandria (about 300–400 A.D.) emphasizes Peter's leadership, but does not connect it with Rome. The same is true of Epiphanius of Cyprus (about 315–402 A.D.), Cyrillus of Jerusalem (315–386 A.D.), Gregorius of Nazianzus (325–390 A.D.), and Gregorius of Nyssa (335–395 A.D.). Chrysostomus of Antioch and Constantinople (347–407 A.D.) made much of the personal eminence of Peter, and on the occasion of his exile wrote a letter of appeal to Pope Innocentius I; but he interpreted the 'rock' as Peter's faith, and says nothing whatever about the persistence of the Petrine privileges in the Bishops of Rome as distinct from other bishops. Cyrillus of Alexandria (376–444 A.D.) also interpreted the 'rock' as Peter's faith, and regards the privileges promised to him as conferred upon all the Apostles. Among the Latin Fathers the same type of interpretation is found in Hilarius of Poitiers, who died in 367 A.D. The earliest non-papal author to claim universal supremacy for the Bishop of Rome, on the basis of the Matthaean text about the keys, is Optatus, a Numidian bishop who wrote about 370 A.D. His great contemporary Hieronymus took the same view, identifying the Roman See, as the Chair of Peter, with the rock on which the Church was built, and submitting accordingly with somewhat fulsome obsequiousness to the decision of Pope Damasus (about 378 A.D.). Damasus' successor, Pope Siricius (384–399 A.D.), claimed that Peter's authority was passed on to his successors at Rome. Ambrosius (340–397 A.D.), Bishop of Milan, laid emphasis on the general leadership of Peter, and, while identifying the rock with Peter's faith, regarded him as typical 'sacerdos' of the Roman Church, and always therefore delighted to pay deference to the Bishop of Rome. The delegates of Pope Coelestinus at the Council of Ephesus in 431 A.D. were not backward in claiming for him as Peter's successor the prerogatives of which the text speaks. On the other hand, Augustinus (354–430 A.D.), the enthusiastic champion of Catholic ecclesiasticism, though frequently alluding to the Matthaean text, nowhere connects it with the Roman papacy. In his earlier days, he identified the 'rock' with Peter; in his maturer years, he identified it with Christ: but in any case, the power of the keys conferred on Peter was simply a symbol for the unity of the Church: in reality, the other Apostles received what he received. In a word, Augustinus' view resembles, not only that of Cyprianus, but also and very closely the 'pravae sententiae' condemned by the Vatican Council

of 1870.[1] A few decades later, Pope Leo the Great (440–461 A.D.), without altogether abandoning the Cyprianic reference of the words to the episcopate generally, yet applied them also to himself and his office in justification of his imposing claims; and his exegesis was admitted by the Eastern bishops. The same line was taken by Pope Hormisdas (514–523 A.D.). The view however that Christ Himself was the 'rock,' and that the power of binding and loosing spoken of in Mt. xvi. 19b was conferred upon the whole church, reappears in Pope Gregorius the Great (590–604 A.D.). With the steady growth of papal power, the papal reference of the passage came at length to be almost universally accepted. The Œcumenical Council of Constantinople in 869 A.D., in its endeavour to heal the growing breach between East and West, repeated the formula of Hormisdas. Innocentius III (1198–1216 A.D.) argued that the passage gave the Roman pontiff power over all earthly rulers. Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274) formulated the Romanist interpretation as a standing item in Catholic teaching. The Greeks accepted it at the Council of Lyons in 1274. The strictly mediaeval testimony is thus fairly solid; but in this respect it contrasts strikingly with the exegesis of the earlier writers, of the 'Fathers' par excellence. Our summary will have shown, with regard to them, what an absolute figment is that 'unanimous agreement of the Fathers,' according to which the Catholic interpretation of the Scriptures in general and of the Peter-texts in particular is professedly governed.[2]

We resume, then, our rough survey of significant incidents in papal history.

Pope Honorius (625–638 A.D.) wrote a couple of official letters to Sergius, Bishop of Constantinople, in which he seemed to commit himself to the heretical view that there was only one will, not two, in Christ. He was accordingly anathematized as a heretic at the sixth General Council, held at Constantinople in 680–681 A.D.: the condemnation was concurred in and signed by the papal delegates there, and subsequently by Pope Leo II (682–683 A.D.), was repeated by the Trullan Council (692 A.D.), by the Seventh and Eighth General Councils (Nicæa, 787 A.D., and Constantinople, 869 A.D.), and by each successive Pope in his election-oath from the eighth down to the eleventh century, and was included in editions of the Roman Breviary down to the eighteenth century. But Catholic dialectic is equal even to

[1] *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 1 (Mirbt 462 [14]): cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 335–337; Merry, *Papal Claims*, xiii f, 36–40, 44–47, appx. iii f, xiv; Heiler, *Kathol.* 42, 288 f, 289 n. For a Catholic explanation (which does not however reverse the evidence collected by Heiler), see Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 266a.

[2] On the patristic exegesis of Mt. xvi. 18, cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 85–92, 198; Denny, *Papalism*, 29–51; Rogers, *Rome*, 4–7, 41.

this striking historical disproof of the modern papal theory. The earlier effort to deny the authenticity of the relevant documents is a thing of the past: but several alternative loopholes are available. Some Catholic apologists have argued that Honorius' letters were in reality orthodox (on the ground that all he intended to deny was that there were two *divergent* wills in Christ), and that therefore he was unjustly condemned: others, that he was orthodox in intention, but that his wording was faulty, and therefore deserved censure: others, that the Council condemned him for heresy, but that Leo II, who alone could give validity to the sentence, changed it into one for negligence in the suppression of heresy: others, that though deservedly condemned as a heretic, he was one not in the sense of being a convinced Monothelite, but because he contributed by his acts to the suppression of the orthodox formula. The burning question for Catholics to-day, however, is whether Honorius' letters were ex-cathedra statements. Prior to 1870 most Catholic scholars appear to have believed that they were; and this seems to the unsophisticated student of history a reasonable view. For the letters were admittedly official replies to an official enquiry on a matter of doctrine, and there seems no sound reason for denying that, in writing them, Honorius, "in the performance of his function as pastor and teacher of all Christians," was "defining by virtue of his supreme Apostolic authority a doctrine concerning faith . . . to be held by the universal Church." If the letters were ex cathedra, one might—prior to 1870—have adopted any of the above-mentioned lines of explanation. The last of them—or something very much like it (to wit, that Honorius was a real heretic)—was a characteristically Gallican view, though as such it was usually declared not to compromise the general orthodoxy of the Roman See. When however in 1870 ex-cathedra definitions were declared to be infallible, the possibilities open to the loyal Catholic were considerably narrowed. The eminent Church-historian Hefele, who was convinced that the letters of Honorius were ex cathedra, found grave difficulty on this ground in accepting the Vatican decree of 1870: finally he did accept it, arguing that, though the letters were ex cathedra, they were incorrectly worded, that the Council condemned the words as monothelite, but that Leo II defined the sense of the condemnation otherwise. Most Catholics, however, since 1870 have found it preferable to avail themselves of the never-failing indefiniteness of what is ex cathedra, and simply to deny that Honorius' letters come within the meaning of the act. Since it seems open to any Catholic scholar either to affirm or to deny as occasion requires the ex-cathedra character of any official papal utterance (apart from a few unmistakable entities like the canons of Trent and the decrees of 1854 and 1870), it is only natural that so convenient a

means of defence should be largely used. But it is a defence which by its very convenience discredits those who use it as serious interpreters of history. The whole story makes it abundantly patent that as late as the seventh and eighth centuries, the pope's official position was not regarded as securing him against the possibility of heresy. That fact alone—not to mention the amazing subtlety and variety of other Catholic interpretations—is sufficient disproof of the historical truth of the Vatican decree.[1]

The growing accumulation and centralization of power in the hands of the mediaeval Popes was in very large measure facilitated by the production and unsuspecting acceptance of an extraordinary series of forged documents. The earliest of these dates from the pontificate of Symmachus (498–514 A.D.): a number of others appear in the 'Liber Pontificalis' of the sixth century: the notorious 'Donation of Constantinus,' according to which that Emperor bestowed on Pope Silvester spiritual supremacy over the other patriarchs and temporal dominion over Italy and the western provinces, was apparently composed at Rome about 775 A.D.: about 850 A.D. there was compiled in the province of Tours the great collection now known as 'the false Decretals,' consisting of fabricated letters ascribed to various popes of the first six centuries and interspersed with a certain number of genuine documents. These forgeries were accepted by all as genuine down to about the middle of the fifteenth century. In the course of the next two centuries, largely by dint of Protestant criticism, their falsity was completely proved, but not before the unsuspecting belief in them during the Middle Ages had again and again contributed to the legalization and consolidation of papal prerogatives. The forgery was admitted: "but the system built upon the forgery abides still."[2] Well might the Catholic Lord Acton say: "The passage from the Catholicism of the Fathers to that of the modern Popes was accomplished by wilful falsehood; and the whole structure of traditions, laws, and doctrines that support the theory of infallibility, and the practical despotism of the Popes, stands on a basis of fraud."[3] Well might a teacher of ecclesiastical law exclaim: "In no department has there been such barefaced forgery and lying as here."[4] To all this it is replied that the False Decretals were not produced in Rome, that they were accepted as genuine in good faith, and that the very fact of their acceptance proves that they did not introduce any great innovations,

[1] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 317; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 111 f n.; Salmon, *Infall.* 433–442; Chapman in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 452–456; Toner, *ibid.* 798 b; Denny, *Papalism*, 395–404, 482–492.

[2] Pusey, *Eiren.* 255 f: cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 121.

[3] In *North British Review*, Oct. 1869, 130.

[4] Quoted by Hase, *Handbook*, i. 231.

but at worst furnished an imaginary historical foundation for the established usages of the days in which they were composed.

The 'Great Schism' (i.e. the division of the Catholic world between two series of popes), which lasted for nearly forty years (1378–1415 A.D.), was an extra-constitutional crisis of such magnitude as to spoil altogether the historical confirmation of the Catholic theory that in the papacy God has provided a constant and reliable authority for the guidance of Christian people. For both the opposing Popes agreed in this: that the Christian who adhered to the wrong Pope was imperilling his eternal salvation; and yet it was well-nigh impossible for a great many Christians to be sure which of the two was the rightful Pope. No Catholic explanation—to the effect that either Pope might safely be followed—suffices to remove the manifest absurdity of the Vatican doctrine of the papacy in face of the Great Schism.[1]

No one can read the history of the fifteenth century—the story of the Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basle—without seeing plainly that the superiority of the Pope to a General Council (such as is admittedly involved in his infallibility[2]) was no part of the faith of the Church at that period. Had it been so, how could so large a section of the Church and so many of its eminent leaders have firmly believed the contrary?[3] The Catholic reply that those who believed a Council to be superior to a Pope were in error, and that these particular Councils were œcumenical only in so far as their decisions received papal sanction, does not reverse the mass of evidence as to what was the faith of the Church at the time. The same argument applies to the evidence furnished by the history of Gallicanism and Febronianism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[4] Individual Popes had for a long time been acting and agitating on the tacit and sometimes the explicit assumption that their office endowed them with infallibility[5]; but special stress seems to have been first laid on it in the sixteenth century. Leo X (1520) declared that his predecessors had never erred in their canons and constitutions.[6] The Council of Trent refrained from enunciating the infallibility of the Pope as a dogma (in spite of the wish of some of his supporters that it should do so) and displayed at times a tendency to limit his authority: but on the whole it was kept well in hand, and had

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 395–400; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 190; Poynter, *Rome from Within*, 52–54.

[2] Cf. *Conc. Vatic.* sess. iv, cap. 3 (Mirbt 464 top).

[3] See above, pp. 22–26. Dr. Faà di Bruno entirely ignores this important point in his brief account of the Council of Constance, at which the superiority of Council to Pope was emphatically asserted (*Cath. Belief*, 129 f). Cf. Denny, *Papalism*, 497–522.

[4] See above, pp. 24 f.

[5] E.g. Agatho, 678–682 A.D. (cf. Moberly in Smith, *D.C.B.* i [1900] 60 f).

[6] Mirbt 259 (9).

to listen to some strongly worded assertions of papal supremacy. Its decisions were all submitted to the Pope, and in the bull of confirmation he claimed for the Apostolic see the exclusive right of interpreting any questions that might arise in connection with them.[1] The 'Roman Catechism' says a good deal about the primacy of the Pope,[2] but nothing about his infallibility: papal infallibility was explicitly asserted, under conditions, by Bellarmine at the beginning of the seventeenth century.[3] But though maintained since then with increasing fervour by Jesuits and Ultramontanes, it was not for a long time so widely accepted that it could be truthfully described as part of the faith of the Church. Thus in 1789 a manifesto signed by 1500 English Catholics (including bishops, priests, and leading laymen) affirmed: "We acknowledge no infallibility in the pope."[4] The Irish archbishops and bishops in 1826, prior to the granting of full emancipation for Catholics, denied that it was an article of the Catholic faith that the Pope was infallible.[5] Moehler, the liberal Catholic apologist (1796–1838), said that infallibility belonged to no individual as such, but resided in the agreement between the episcopate and the papacy.[6] Successive editions of Keenan's 'Controversial Catechism,' duly imprimatured and widely circulated, contained, at least as late as 1853, the following question and answer: "Must not Catholics believe the Pope in himself to be infallible?" "This is a Protestant invention; it is no article of the Catholic faith; no decision of his can oblige, under pain of heresy, unless it be received and enforced by the teaching body,—that is, by the bishops of the Church." Nevertheless, after 1870, and after the death of the author, the book was reissued in what purported to be an unaltered condition, but with these tell-tale lines silently omitted and their omission disguised by a skilful re-spacing of the page.[7] The declaration in 1854 of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin[8] was a palpable venture in papal infallibility, preparing the way for the decree of 1870. Ten years later another blow was levelled at historical truth. One of the beliefs con-

[1] Bull *Benedictus Deus* in Mirbt 338 (5–28). Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 197 f, 271 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 302. See also above, p. 24.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 15, II. vii. 50: Hase, *Handbook*, i. 198.

[3] Newman, *Developm.* 125; Pusey, *Eiren.* 291 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 437 f.

[4] Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 123; St Cyres in *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 497b.

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 289: cf. Coulton in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 107 f; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 39, 74 f. Evidence, extending over the years 1757–1822, to the effect that Irish Catholics did not regard themselves as obliged to believe in papal infallibility, is collected by Gladstone, *Vaticanism*, 37–52, 62 f.

[6] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 277.

[7] See Gladstone, *Vaticanism*, 124–126; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 123 n. 3; Salmon, *Infall.* 26 f; Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 137, in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 107 f, *Death-Penalty*, 39. Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 192 (similar declaration on the part of an American Catholic Priest that papal infallibility was a Protestant forgery).

[8] See above, p. 358.

demned by the Pope in 1864 was that "the view of those who regard the Roman pontiff as a free ruler exercising functions throughout the whole Church is a view which (first) became prevalent in the Middle Ages."[1]

When the time came for holding a General Council at the Vatican, at which the infallibility of the Pope should be formally enunciated, many eminent Catholic scholars felt the gravest misgivings, in view of the patent incompatibility of the dogma with historical truth. Newman wrote in misery and alarm to his bishop. Döllinger agitated busily against the decree. Hefele suffered the torments of protracted doubt. At the Council itself the adverse minority was first argued with, and then found it best to absent itself; and the decree was finally passed with only two dissentient votes. Döllinger refused to submit, and was excommunicated. With him went a large number of Catholic clergy, who formed themselves into the body known as the 'Old Catholics.' Hefele eventually persuaded himself that he could submit without committing a historical falsehood. Strossmayer held out until nearly the end of 1872, but then submitted. Most of the doubters simply stifled such doubts as they had and bowed at once to the powers that be.[2] The decision of 1870 made it more than ever a necessity for Catholic historians to work in shackles. Those who have a deficient sense of what constitutes historical evidence wear their chains lightly: but the more learned either develop a special and extraordinarily subtle logic, which enables them—by dint of reading a great deal into the sources which is not there—to square their historical study with their dogmatic commitments, or else they simply record the facts and stop short of explicitly drawing inferences which might conflict with Catholic dogma, leaving these inferences however sufficiently noticeable to the unprejudiced reader, and incidentally running serious risk of getting into hot water themselves with the authorities.

[1] Mirbt 452 (no. 34: "Doctrina comparantium Romanum pontificem principi libero et agenti in universa ecclesia, doctrina est quae medio aevo praevaluit").

[2] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 278–329; Salmon, *Infall.* 21–27, 51, 311, 323–328, 330; Bain, *New Reformation*, 36–38; Boudinhon in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 512ab; Heiler, *Kathol.* 303–305.

CHAPTER XXI

FICTITIOUS MARVELS

ALTOGETHER apart from obscurantism in the treatment of Scripture and perversity in the misinterpretation of historical records, Roman Catholicism is characterized by the habitual acceptance and utilization of a vast amount of pious fiction masquerading as fact. The sources out of which this great system of phantasy, mendacity, and credulity grew up lie far back in those strange experiences and imaginings which gave rise in good faith to certain of the miracle-narratives of the Bible, and which were to some extent reproduced in the healing work of the early Christian Church. Not simply the accurate recollection and truthful record of real works of healing, but the imaginative exaggeration and invention of wonderful deeds both of healing and of other kinds, and the uncritical readiness to accept all descriptions of such deeds as true, launched the Church on a career of romance, from which the Roman section of it has never recovered.[1]

Without either re-opening or pre-judging the question of biblical miracles, which has already been discussed,[2] it is possible and desirable to glance at this field of Catholic fiction, since the existence of it has a real bearing on the important question of Catholic truthfulness. The literature dealing with it is, of course, far too great to be surveyed in this place: for our immediate purpose, the subject must be considered by means of more or less casually chosen samples.[3]

The pious imagination of Catholics plays over the whole field of the past; and even pre-Christian times have contributed something to the nourishment of it. Things like a rung of Jacob's ladder, Moses' horns, Jesse's root, and a feather from Michael's wing, enjoyed in the Middle Ages a transitory veneration. The skull of St. Anna, the mother of the Virgin, was brought to Berne in 1516; but it was soon afterwards discovered that her body was preserved entire at Lyons.[4] St. Joseph, the reputed foster-father of Jesus, was in 1870 declared by Pius IX to be the tutelary patron of the Church.[5] The actual house occupied by

[1] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 396–399 (an incisive indictment of mediaeval ecclesiastical mendacity).

[2] See above, pp. 195–198.

[3] Cf. generally Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 82–92, 101 (on canonization); Heiler, *Kathol.* 212–215 (miracles), 215 (legends).

[4] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 363, 365. On fictitious relics generally, see McCabe, *Popes*, 56 f, 75.

[5] Heiler, *Kathol.* 192 n.

the Holy Family at Nazareth is believed to have been transported through the air by angels, in successive stages between 1291 and 1295, to its present site at Loreto near the east-coast of Italy; but the earliest testimony of the event is 180 years later than its supposed date.[1] From Loreto was derived a full-size pattern of the sole of the Virgin's shoe; and Popes John XXII and Clemens VIII offered generous indulgences to those who should kiss it (or, later, a copy of it) three times and say three Ave Marias over it.[2] The Virgin herself has been laid under special contribution.[3] Eight churches are said to preserve specimens of her milk.[4] Numerous stories are told of her as having appeared to favoured individuals and made special revelations to them. Thus, in 1251, she appeared at Cambridge to Simon Stock, General of the Carmelite order, gave him a scapular or shoulder-cloth, commanded that all Carmelites should wear one, and promised that no one dying with it on him should suffer eternal fire. The oldest record of this incident is dated 1389.[5] In the fourteenth century, she appeared to St. Birgitta of Sweden and assured her of the truth of the Immaculate Conception.[6] The deceptive attempt of some Dominicans—shortly before the Reformation—to create belief in a similar miraculous assurance by the Virgin herself in regard to her *non*-immaculate conception, being contrary to the trend of Catholic opinion at the time, was investigated, proved, and punished.[7] Similar supposed appearances of the Virgin are recorded even in comparatively modern times.[8] In 1842 Ratisbonne, a sceptical Jew, was suddenly converted to Christianity by seeing the Virgin step forth alive from a picture of her hung in the church of St. Andrea della Fratte at Rome.[9] In 1846 she appeared to some children at La Salette in Dauphiné; and the wide acceptance of their story soon created a most extraordinary sensation. Others, however, were less credulous; and it was eventually shown that the children had in all probability been taken in by a half crazy nun named Constance Lamerlière.[10] In 1858 she appeared eighteen times, at Lourdes

[1] Stanley, *Sinai and Pal.* 444–450; Salmon, *Infall.* 196 f; Thorpe in *Anglic. Ess.* 234; *Cath. Dict.* 535–537.

[2] Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 141 f, 149.

[3] See above, pp. 357–367. On the mediaeval Mary-legends in general, cf. Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 499–516.

[4] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 366. For *legends* regarding the Virgin's milk, see Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 158, 162, 499 f, 504.

[5] Mayor in H.*D.B.* iii (1900) 291b; *Cath. Dict.* 756 f.

[6] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 137.

[7] *Ibid.* 138.

[8] On Virgin-appearances generally and some instances not specified in the text, see McCabe, *The Lourdes Miracles*, 14–18.

[9] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 115 f, 369; Ott in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 659a.

[10] Hase *Handbook*, ii. 116, 118; Salmon, *Infall.* 218–220; Clugnet in *Cath. Encyc.* ix (1910) 8a–9a (non-committal and half-sceptical); McCabe, *The Lourdes Miracles*, 16–18.

in Gascony, to a poor girl of fourteen who was said to be subject to hallucinations, and said to her: "Je suis l'Immaculée Conception." From this incident have arisen the enormous annual pilgrimages to the shrine of Lourdes, with their moderate proportion of faith-cures. A similar manifestation occurred later at Marpingen, near Trier in Germany.[1] In 1870 a Sicilian bishop told the Vatican Council that his people had sent a deputation to the Virgin, and that she had replied to them that she remembered to have been present when our Lord imparted the prerogative of infallibility to Peter.[2] After 1870, children on the French border were said to have seen threatening Madonnas, pointing towards Germany.[3] In 1879 and 1880 the Virgin, with St. Joseph and another, appeared to several persons outside the Catholic chapel at Knock in Ireland: cures were subsequently effected for those who visited the chapel or swallowed particles of mortar from its wall.[4] In 1907 there fell at Remiremont in the Vosges hailstones which were found split in two, the flat inner face of each bearing the image of the Madonna as locally venerated.[5]

Relics connected with the life of Jesus Himself are of course not wanting. His swaddling clothes, a ray from the Wise Men's star, the tears He shed at Lazarus' grave, bits of the ass upon which He rode, the stone which He said the builders had rejected—such things were brought to Europe in the days of the Crusaders.[6] As in the case of His grandmother Anna, so in the case of Lazarus, more than one place claimed to possess the head of the deceased.[7] Early in the twelfth century, a piece of the bread that Jesus had eaten was shown in the presence of Guibert, Abbot of Nogent, by a wandering preacher, who publicly appealed to him for confirmation: Guibert tells us that he refrained from exposing the shameful fraud only out of deference to the man's patrons.[8] In Rome, a set of twenty-eight stone steps, encased in wood, and surrounded with roof and walls, have for some centuries been believed to be the steps of Pilatus' palace at Jerusalem, up and down which Jesus walked, and which Helena, the mother of Constantinus, later brought to Rome. A notice at the foot of them informs the

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 116–119, 374; Salmon, *Infall.* 220f; *Cath. Dict.* 538 f. See the drastic criticism of Catholic claims in regard to Lourdes in Joseph McCabe's *The Lourdes Miracles: a candid enquiry*, 1925: its conclusions are based entirely on Catholic statements of the evidence.

[2] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 287 f.

[3] *Op. cit.* ii. 116.

[4] Salmon, *Infall.* 220 f note.

[5] Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 164 f, 169.

[6] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 365 f, 372. Pious mediaeval fancy even busied itself with the question as to what had become of the severed foreskin of the circumcised Christ-child (Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 517–520).

[7] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 362; Bain, *New Reformation*, 115.

[8] Coulton in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1926, 297.

public that Pius VII (1800–1823) has granted the Christian worshipper a release of nine years from Purgatory for every step ascended by him on his knees in prayer. In 1908 Pius X granted a plenary indulgence for every devout ascent. No authority, however, for the alleged origin of the stairs can be produced prior to the Middle Ages.[1] Our Lord's seamless coat was exhibited at Trier in 1844; but various other places have professed to possess fragments of it.[2] The actual cross on which Jesus had died, and which must have totally disappeared in the course of the decades following His death, was supposed to have been found at Jerusalem by Helena, the mother of Constantinus, about 327 A.D.: part of it was kept there, and part sent to the Emperor: fragments of it of course found their way to innumerable churches and monasteries.[3] There is still preserved at Turin a remarkable strip of cloth, showing an impress of the back and front of the Saviour's body (the back scarred with scourge-stripes down to the heels), as if the body had been laid length-wise on it, and the cloth then folded over the head and so down to the feet. This is called the 'Sudarium of Turin' and is supposed to be the *σουδάριον* mentioned in connexion with Jesus' burial. It is certainly true that the marks are those of a real body; and Catholics claim that both scientific and archæological tests verify their view as to the identity of the cloth. Yet it cannot be *proved* to have existed earlier than the fourteenth century; and no veneration of any sacred grave-cloth is mentioned in literature earlier than 670 A.D. Furthermore, the Gospel-accounts suggest that our Lord's body was wound round and round in a broad linen cloth, not simply laid within a doubled strip[4]; and the *σουδάριον* mentioned is certainly a small head-cloth, not a long shroud (Jn. xx. 7: cf. xi. 44, Lk. xix. 20, Acts xix. 12). In the church of 'Domine, quo vadis?' outside Rome, is shown a footprint of Christ impressed upon the rock.[5] The written Gospels came in the Middle Ages to be treated very much as relics and talismans in general are treated.[6]

Passing on from Scripture to the saints of later times, we may take note of a few typical examples.

St. Christopher was probably baptized by Babylas, Bishop of Antioch in Syria, and martyred about 250 A.D. in Lycia. A host of extraordinary

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 355 f; Oliger in *Cath. Encyc.* xiii (1912) 505b; *Cath. Dict.* 755.

[2] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 370–373.

[3] Gibbon, *Decline* (ed. Bury) ii. 456; *Cath. Dict.* 243 f; Cabrol in *Cath. Encyc.* iv (1908) 529b–532a, 533a. For full presentation and discussion of the evidence, see Argles in Smith, *D.C.B.* ii (1880) 882b–885a.

[4] Cf. Mk. xv. 46 (*ἐνείλησεν τῇ σινδόνι*); Mt. xxvii. 59 = Lk. xxiii. 53 (*ἐνετύλιξεν αὐτὸ σινδόνι*); Jn. xix. 40 (*ἔδησαν αὐτὸ ὀθονίοις μετὰ τῶν ἀρωμάτων*). Lk. xxiii. 55 f, xxiv. 12 do not add materially to our knowledge of the details.

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 373.

[6] Von Dobschütz in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 611a.

legends have gathered about his name: but the latest belief about him is that he is the patron-saint of motor-cars; and his protection is assured (by the sprinkling of holy water and the fixation of a seal) to those who bring their cars to the church of the Immaculate Conception in Pittsburg.[1] On what conceivable knowledge of reality does this connection between St. Christopher and motor-cars rest?

St. Philumena is widely honoured amongst Catholics as a virgin, martyred under Diocletianus in 286 A.D. The veneration of her has twice received papal sanction: her biography has been published with an episcopal imprimatur. Yet on what evidence does belief in her existence rest? It rests on two second-century earthenware slabs, found in 1802 in the catacombs, and bearing the words PAX TECUM FILUMENA. These slabs had however apparently been transferred from their original position, and used to close a *later* grave: this later grave contained the bones of a girl. It was assumed that the girl was a virgin; and, from the fact that the grave contained a glass vessel, it was (quite erroneously) inferred that she had been a martyr. The supposed virgin-martyr was (probably wrongly) thought to have borne the name Philumena. Her bones were transferred to Mugnano near Naples in 1805, and the details of her biography were revealed to a local nun in a dream or vision. Her name, however, does not occur in early Christian literature; and there was no persecution of Christians under Diocletianus in 286 A.D.[2]

St. Januarius, Bishop of Beneventum, was martyred in 305 A.D. The traditional story of his death abounds in miracles. His body was eventually removed to Naples. His cult there is at least as old as the fifth century. Since the end of the fourteenth century at latest, the supposed liquefaction of his blood has more or less regularly taken place. The blood is kept in two small phials sealed up in a glass-sided box. It is normally solid: but three times a year (in May, September and December), it liquefies, expands, and bubbles, when held near a silver bust said to contain the saint's head. It is claimed by Catholics that neither fraud, nor heat, nor any law known to science, explains the occurrence of the phenomenon. In 1921, however, the following statement by Dr. Frederic Newton Williams, L.S.A., L.R.C.P., a fellow of the Linnaean Society, was published: "When at Naples several years ago, I visited the municipal hospital; and after going round called at the hospital dispensary to have a talk with the American pharmacist under whose superintendence the department was. While

[1] Stuart Chase in *Nation* (New York), quoted in *Christian World*, 30 Dec. 1926, 9.

[2] Salmon, *Infall.* 197–200; Kirsch in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 25 (admits that the story—including the supposition of martyrdom—is fictitious). The saintly Jean Baptiste Marie Vianney, curé of Ars (1786–1859), was zealously devoted to the cult of St. Philumena (*Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1927, 301, 304, 306).

there, a young acolyte from the Cathedrale di San Gennaio (St. Januarius) came in and asked the pharmacist for the usual mixture for use at the feast which was to take place the next day (the first Saturday in May). With a smile and a few words of banter, the pharmacist prepared a mixture of ox-bile and crystals of Glauber's salt (sulphate of soda), and, keeping the written message, handed it to the messenger to take back to the cathedral sacristy. After thus dismissing the acolyte, the practical pharmacist simply remarked to me that miracles took place nowadays, and this one was prepared in a hospital pharmacy with very satisfactory results. The next morning the pharmacist and myself sat in a café and watched the solemn procession of the liquefied blood from the church of Santa Chiara on its way to the cathedral. Thanks to my genial companion, the 'miracle' was quite successful. He also explained that at the second celebration, which takes place on 16th December in the cathedral only (without a procession), the liquefaction is slower on account of the cooler weather."[1]

St. Mary of Egypt is another saint in whom Catholics believe. After spending seventeen years of her life as a prostitute in Alexandria, she was suddenly converted at Jerusalem, and then lived for forty-seven years alone in the desert east of the Jordan. The sources of the story may go back to the fifth century: but the saint's biography seems to date from the seventh, and in all probability belongs simply to the domain of legend. Some Catholic authorities date her death in 321 A.D., others in 421 A.D., and yet others in 521 A.D.[2]

St. Maurilius, Bishop of Angers, who died in 427 A.D., was said to have raised St. Renatus of Angers (later Bishop of Sorrento) from the dead. Albert Houtin (the ex-catholic-priest who died recently), when engaged on the task of writing the history of the diocese of Angers, refused to believe the miracle, and was thus rebuked by his bishop: "If you do not admit the resurrection of St. René, you can no longer believe in that of the Widow's Son at Sarepta, or in that of Lazarus." It was this kind of experience which eventually drove Houtin from the Church.[3]

Another story that has found acceptance in Roman Breviaries and other highly respected authorities is that God showed St. Patrick

[1] Quoted by T. R. R. Stebbing in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1921, 156: cf. Stebbing's earlier article in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1920, 354 f. Further on the alleged miracle, cf. Newman, *Apol.* 287 (appx. 5: 'Ecclesiastical Miracles'); Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 362 f; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 143; Thurston in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 295–297; Delehaye in *Encyc. Brit.* xv. 155b.

[2] J. Gammack in Smith, *D.C.B.* iii (1882) 830a; MacRory in *Cath. Encyc.* ix (1910) 763 f; *Times Lit. Suppt.* 15 Apl. 1926, 281.

[3] A. Houtin, *Une Vie de Prêtre : Mon Expérience* (1926) 197. Cf. Goyau in *Cath. Encyc.* i (1907) 489a (". . . the tradition . . . seems to have no real foundation").

(fifth century), in response to his prayer, a dark pit in a desert, and said: "Whosoever shall remain in this cave a day and a night shall be delivered from all his sins." "This passage of the Roman Breviary" (of 1522), it is said, "was afterwards suppressed, then restored, then finally suppressed again, on account of the evil comments of Protestants and Rationalists."[1]

St. Edmund, King of East Anglia, died in war against the Danes in 870; and his body was preserved at Bury St. Edmunds at least until the dissolution of the monasteries. In the nineties of last century, a Catholic writer claimed to have proved that the bones were preserved at Toulouse. His proof was widely accepted; and on the strength of it the bones were transferred with pomp to Arundel. A Protestant scholar, however, demonstrated the baselessness of the identification so completely that even Catholic authorities were compelled to admit that they had been misled.[2]

The story of the great Benedictine monastery at Fleury during the centuries preceding 1100 A.D. is replete with miraculous narratives of a kind which fails to convince even the critical Catholic.[3]

A story of how St. Dominic (1170–1221) heard the confession of, gave communion to, and held conversation with, the severed head of a murdered woman, and how he learnt from her the relief secured to souls in purgatory by the recitation of a rosary on their behalf, is solemnly repeated by that highly honoured 'doctor of the Church,' St. Alphonso dei Liguori (1696–1787).[4]

Salimbene, the thirteenth century Franciscan chronicler, "tells us in the same breath of the real miracles worked by Brother Gerard of Modena, and of the bogus miracles which Gerard concocted to impress the people at his mission sermons. Yet Gerard was 'one of the first Brethren of our Order, . . . He was an intimate friend of St. Francis, and at times his travelling companion.' " [5]

In 1263 an unbelieving priest, while celebrating mass at Bolsena, was convinced of the truth of transubstantiation by the appearance of blood on a consecrated wafer. Raphael has depicted the scene in one of the Stanze in the Vatican. In consequence of the miracle—and also of certain visions seen earlier by a woman of Liège named Juliana—the Pope, Urbanus IV, decreed (1264) the regular celebration of the festival

[1] Salmon, *Infall.* 211 f. The pit, it was said, was occasionally visited, sometimes with disastrous results.

[2] Burton in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 85b (". . . a commission of investigation was appointed by the Holy See, but no report has been published"); Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 6–8.

[3] Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 245 n. 1, etc.

[4] Liguori, *Glories of Mary* (Eng. trans. 1852) 196 f.

[5] Coulton in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1926, 297 f.

of Corpus Christi.[1] On 17 February 1925, the House of Clergy of the English Church-Assembly passed a resolution in favour of observing this festival, under another name, in the Church of England. One of the ceremonies connected with the celebration of Corpus Christi at Rome consists in bearing the Pope aloft through the streets in a conveyance, in which he kneels before a small altar and a monstrance. Since this ceremony lasts a considerable time, it puts a strain upon the Pope's physical powers. The way in which this difficulty has sometimes been overcome, while it is not a case of the falsification of history, yet does illustrate that extraordinary insensitiveness to the moral evil of deception which is so abundantly exemplified in the Catholic stories we have been considering. A false kneeling figure was carefully constructed, and so attached to the Pope's person as to give the appearance of a kneeling figure, while he himself was actually seated comfortably within. It is on record that Pius IX (1846–1878) availed himself of this expedient in his old age; but it was certainly not unknown earlier, as the reproaches of Carlyle in the early forties testify.[2]

St. Ives of Brittany died in 1303, and was buried at Tréguier. There every year, on the occasion of his festival, his skull is carried through the streets in solemn procession, and is supposed to effect cures. In this case it is not, of course, impossible that the skull may be really that of St. Ives, for the period was one in which relics were eagerly sought. We know for instance, that in 1226, when St. Francis died, special precautions had to be taken to prevent the body being torn to pieces, and in 1231, on the death of St. Elizabeth of Hungary, the hair, ear-lobes, and nipples were immediately cut from the body as souvenirs.[3]

In 1924 a prominent Catholic journal was maintaining that Amsterdam owed its rise—from an insignificant fishing-village to a great centre of trade—to a miracle that occurred in the fourteenth century: a eucharistic wafer thrown into the fire remained unconsumed.[4] Catharine of Siena is stated to have received in the year 1375 the Saviour's wound-marks imprinted on her body; but her prayer of humility that they might be made invisible to mortal eyes was granted![5] Several Catholic women even in the nineteenth century have claimed to possess genuine

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 252; Baedeker, *Italy* (Alps to Naples, 1909), 190, 280; Heiler, *Kathol.* 547 with n.; *Cath. Dict.* 91b, 233f. For other miraculous incidents of the same purport, see Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 102.

[2] Carlyle, *Past and Present* (1843), bk. iii. ch. i (". . . wool-and-iron rumps, artistically spread out . . ."); Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 393 (". . . these unreal, artificial limbs of the Pope symbolize impressively the whole position of the Papacy towards Christendom").

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 365.

[4] Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 116.

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 375; Salmon, *Infall.* 396 n.; Gardner in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 447a; Poulain in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 294b.

stigmata of this kind.[1] There was published a few years ago a collection of narratives of miraculous healings wrought in England—soon after 1471—by invoking the name of the saintly deceased king, Henry VI. The book was originally compiled within a few decades of 1471; and the healings need not be regarded as all fictitious, though doubtless the evidence in the case of many of them falls short of what scientific and historical rigour would demand. In any case, the collection gives useful specimens of the better type of Catholic miracle-story.[2] In 1621, when Francisco de Xavier—who had died in 1552—was canonized, a considerable number of miracles were, after the usual enquiries, officially ascribed to him: these included floating in the air and several raisings from the dead; but the evidence actually adduced was quite inadequate to justify belief.[3]

The now widely spread, popular, and pictorial devotion of Catholics to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, owes its origin to the vision of a hysterical nun, Marguérite Marie Alacoque, who lived in the latter part of the seventeenth century. Jesus appeared to her with His heart visibly burning: He declared that the worship of it was most acceptable to Him: He spoke in flattering terms of the Jesuits: He sent a message to Louis XIV, calling him 'dear son,' and promising that continual victory should attend his arms if he adorned his banners with the picture of the Sacred Heart. The Jesuits advocated the new cult: the Jansenists opposed it, and were rebuked. It was increasingly practised in the course of the eighteenth century; in 1856 it was extended to the whole Church; and in 1864 Marguérite Marie Alacoque was 'beatified.'[4]

Let us now make the fullest possible allowance for all that can be said in defence of beliefs and practices of this kind. Let us credit with full subjective sincerity the Catholic repudiation of idolatry and superstition.[5] Let us recognize the value of that marvellous elasticity and comprehensiveness which enables the Roman Church to provide a home for the simplest and most primitive religious types, as well as for the most highly cultured mystical piety.[6] Let us grant that prayer

[1] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 375 f; Poulain in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 295ab.

[2] See *Miracles of Henry VI*, edited by Fr. R. Knox and Shane Leslie, Cambridge, 1923, passim. esp. 16 f, 21 f, 28.

[3] Cf. Edith A. Stewart (now Mrs. Jas. A. Robertson), *Life of St. Francis Xavier*, 336–342; also *Times Lit. Suppt.* 15 Apl. 1926, 281.

[4] Salmon, *Infall.* 222–224; Hoensbroech in *Theol. Litzg.* 1922. 8. 177; *Cath. Dict.* 401 f.

[5] Cf. *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxii, cap. 3 (Mirbt 323 [20: no sacrifice offered *to* saints when masses are said in their honour]), sess. xxv (Mirbt 333 f: "De invocatione, veneratione et reliquiis sanctorum, et sacris imaginibus").

[6] See above, p. 72. Cf. Knox, *Belief of Cathₛ*. 184 ("And if, here and there, a taint of superstition (properly so called) infects the devotion of ill-instructed souls, the Church will rather smile at their folly than hold up reproving hands; she knows how to deal with children").

on behalf of the dead and belief in their prayer on behalf of us is no more unreasonable than the intercession of the living for one another,[1] and that there is, in Protestantism, room for further clarification of thought and development of practice in this regard. Let us acknowledge also the true sacramental value of material objects which serve to remind us, by force of association, of those whom we have loved and lost. It is an exhibition, not of folly, but of wisdom, when men

> go and kiss dead Caesar's wounds
> And dip their napkins in his sacred blood,
> Yea, beg a hair of him for memory,
> And, dying, mention it within their wills,
> Bequeathing it as a rich legacy
> Unto their issue.

I will not therefore remove the crucifix from my study-wall. I would not part with my Father's portrait, or with the Bible he gave me when I was seven years old, or with the one letter I have that he wrote me, for all the wealth of Ormus and of Ind. The great religious value that may attach to the celebration of saints' days, to the sight of images, and to the veneration of relics (if undisturbed by suspicions of sham), must be taken into account, if any just estimate of their value is to be formed.

Yet all this is not sufficient to plead, nor the force thereof sufficient for an apologia. What of the fact that no small proportion of the locally venerated saints and madonnas are simply Christianized editions of pagan deities, and that much of the ceremony enjoined or permitted by the Church is merely an adaptation of pre-Christian heathen usage?[2] What of the comparative poverty of the physically unusual as a vehicle or expression of that which is truly Divine?[3] What of the danger of neglecting the Deity Himself in the too constant resort to and dependence upon human, though heavenly, mediators?[4] What of the preposterous idea that God or the Virgin or such and such a saint desires to be worshipped in one locality more than another, and that a pilgrimage to this locality will secure a readier answer to the Christian's prayer than if he stays where he is?[5] What of the innumerable trivialities

[1] Cf. Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 90, 99.

[2] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 94 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 163 ff, 188 ff, 221 ff, 229 f (e.g. survival of an ancient sexual fertility-rite in the consecration of baptismal water on Easter-eve). Cf. C. Reade, *The Cloister and the Hearth*, ch. 72; N. P. Williams, in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 394 f; C. E. Lart in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1928, 511–524.

[3] See above, pp. 197–200. Cf. Martineau, *Seat*, 129 ("External criteria,—that is, *un*-moral rules for finding moral things, *physical* rules for finding spiritual things,—there can be none").

[4] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 94–99 (e.g. [96] the saying about St. Francis: "He hearkens to what God Himself hears not"); W. R. Halliday in *Camb. Ancient Hist.* ii. 603 ("in Roman Catholic countries a local saint has sometimes a more intense reality in the religious life of his people than the Virgin or the members of the Trinity").

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 359; Heiler, *Kathol.* 189.

involved in the detailed prescription and exact performance of the observances which it is supposed that God requires of His worshippers?[1]

But what finally—and this is our chief concern here—of the flagrant untruthfulness of a very great deal of this cult of the saints? The Council of Trent, indeed, laid it down that no new image was to be erected, no new miracles accepted, and no new relics recognized, except with the approval of the bishop, who was to take counsel with experts on the matter of genuineness.[2] But however honestly intended, such precautions have not gone very far to meet the need. There is room for much legitimate difference of opinion as to the precise limits and the moral quality of the untruthfulness involved: but about the existence of it in plenty we do not need to argue, since educated and learned Catholics—thanks, largely, to the stimulus of Protestantism—no longer deny it. Modern Catholic scholars make most creditable—if not always sufficiently thorough—attempts to separate truth from fiction in the lives of the saints. As soon indeed as any proper allowance is made for the manifold elements which render human testimony doubtful,[3] particularly when given under the stress of religious enthusiasm, the falsity of a great many of these miraculous or semi-miraculous narratives becomes palpable. It is usual to urge that, inasmuch as neither the lives of the saints, nor the various papal decrees commending belief in their miracles and enjoining the celebration of them in worship, are infallible definitions of doctrine, any Catholic is free to disbelieve them if he so wishes.[4] "The approval of the Holy See," writes Father Thurston, "which may be accorded from time to time to such popular devotions as that of the *Scala Santa*, does not involve any infallible pronouncement upon a question of pure history. It implies that reasonable care has been taken to exclude fraud or the probability of error; but that such care is necessarily proportioned to the canons of historical criticism prevalent at the period at which the approbation was first granted."[5]

While recognizing the good faith and scientific value of these modern

[1] Samples of usages practised and commended by High Anglicans, but probably borrowed from Romanism, are given by Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*. They include prayers for a blessing on a Mother Superior's Pastoral Staff and Ring of Office (137), the blessing *and exorcizing* of water and salt (289 f), endless instructions as to what to do with the hands and fingers at Mass (169, 278), and even the giving of water, in which the officiating priest has rinsed his fingers, to the sick to drink (170, 176)!

[2] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxv (Mirbt 334 [34]).

[3] Cf. the leading article on investigations into this question in *Times Lit. Suppt.* 18 Aug. 1921, 521 f.

[4] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 143 f (general disbelief in modern miracles among educated Catholics); Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 91; Salmon, *Infall.* 196; Woodlock, *Modernism*, 66.

[5] Quoted in *Cath. Dict.* 755b; cf. 537b (similar words in regard to Loreto), 757ab (Catholic admission that the story about the Carmelites' scapular is legendary).

concessions to the historical spirit, we cannot admit that they suffice to clear the Catholic religion from the reproach of untruthfulness. The modifications of belief actually admitted under present-day canons of evidence touch only a certain proportion of the mass of accepted legends, and are for the most part made either sub rosa by the more enlightened of the laity or by the comparatively small group of historical experts and special students. On the whole, Catholicism is characterized to-day by almost as much gross credulity as marked it in the Middle Ages. The official leaders of the Church have allowed themselves to be led rather by the ignorant and superstitious groups within the Church than by the cultured and intelligent. No real effort is made from headquarters to wean Catholics from the crude superstitions of popular Catholicism. The clergy encourage the laity to believe in the quasi-magical powers of the priesthood, to maintain the cult of the saints in the traditional manner, and to rest content with the stories on which the cult is built. The veneration of relics, though less popular than in previous centuries, is still very prevalent, particularly in the Latin countries. Intelligent Catholics are unwilling to expose the excessive credulity of their co-religionists, in order to avoid, on the one hand, scandalizing pious minds, and on the other, seeming to surrender to the reproaches of Protestantism.[1]

But there is yet another and a very sinister reason why the work of truth must not be rashly pushed forward. It is all very well for Catholic scholars to urge that papal instructions on these matters are not technically infallible. That plea is indeed their one and only means of beating off the attacks of criticism: but we have already shown that, however convenient as an apologetic device, its real basis, whether in logic or in ecclesiastical usage, is plainly quite insecure.[2] With the work of sober scholars, which is not likely to be read by more than a limited number, the authorities do not normally interfere, so long as the criticism is kept well within respectful and moderate limits: if the repudiation were expressed too publicly and emphatically, it would be open to rebuke as 'temerarious.'[3] As it is, the expression of disbelief often calls forth vigorous protest. A Catholic Manual published in connection with the miracle of La Salette[4] complained: "The truth of the apparition of La Salette is incontestable; . . . Yet because it is not of faith, that is to say, because a man will not be damned for not believing it, the faith of some who call themselves Catholics is so ungenerous and thrifty, that they refuse their assent. . . . In matters of faith, God

[1] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 368; Salmon, *Infall.* 203 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 168, 181, 219 f, 703 (quotation from Söderblom).

[2] See above, pp. 29–35.

[3] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 196; *Cath. Dict.* 537.

[4] See above, p. 487.

loves a cheerful giver: He is not pleased with those who seek what is the very minimum of belief which will secure their salvation. In these days of infidelity, supernatural faith, cultivated for safety's sake to the very utmost, is the only security against the vilest errors."[1] It is interesting to learn that the critical article on the 'Scapular' in 'The Catholic Dictionary,' on its first appearance in 1883, caused widespread dissatisfaction in Catholic circles, so much so that, when the fourth edition appeared in 1893, its suppression was speedily called for.[2] The public utterances of modern Popes display no sort or kind of intention to expose or disown the innumerable deceptions and unrealities of the past. As late as 1870 Pius IX informed the faithful that St. Joseph, our Lord's foster-father, was the tutelary patron of the Church.[3] Not only have forty-seven Popes (not to mention countless saints) expressed their belief in the story about the house at Loreto; but as late as 1894 Leo XIII fervently confessed his acceptance of it.[4] In 1903 the Holy Office (acting during a vacancy in the Roman See) informed the Archbishop of St. Jago in Chile, in response to his enquiry, that it was permissible to swallow little paper pictures of the Virgin, either dissolved in water or made up as pills, in order to recover health, "provided all vain observance and danger of falling into it be removed."[5] Pope Benedictus XV, shortly before his death in 1922, asked that prayers on his behalf should be addressed especially to the Madonna of Pompeii.[6] It is evident, therefore, that Rome has not freed herself, and she does not seem likely to free herself, from that bondage to the fanciful which is so marked a feature of her past history.

[1] Quoted by Salmon, *Infall.* 218 f.
[2] *Cath. Dict.* 757a.
[3] Heiler, *Kathol.* 192 n.
[4] *Cath. Dict.* 537b: see also above, pp. 486 f.
[5] Mirbt 497 (7): cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 219 f.
[6] Heiler, *Kathol.* 189 n.

CHAPTER XXII

CATHOLICISM AND TRUTHFULNESS

TRUTH has come to be generally regarded, among thinkers of widely different schools, as one of the three great ultimate values, the other two being beauty and moral goodness. Further, inasmuch as truth is co-extensive with that which is, we have, in love for truth and the loyal pursuit of it, something that unifies or at least links together the distinguishable, and therefore often separated, worlds of fact and value.[1] It is this strange synthetizing quality which gives to truthfulness a somewhat unique position among ethical obligations. More frequently far than beauty, has truth been treated in the higher religions as standing for the sum and substance of the religion itself. Certainly it may be claimed that the fearless love and eager quest of truth is a religious obligation, the discovery and possession of it a religious experience,[2] the impartation of it to others a religious ministry,[3] and the general dissemination of it a religious value and advantage.[4] This unquestioned majesty of truth predisposes us to regard the obligation of loyalty to it as absolute, that is, as exempt from the liability (which besets most moral principles when applied to a practical dilemma) to be intercepted or overridden by a higher loyalty.[5] There is a peculiar self-contradictoriness about a direct falsehood—as well as a fatal potency to undermine confidence, and so to render the further employment of the method of falsehood useless: and these characteristics seem to mark it off from all other moral wrongs. However that may be, it is certainly remarkable how often the sensitive human conscience has proclaimed that to the

[1] Cf. A. T. Cadoux, *Essays*, 12 f, 20 f; also Mair in H.*E.R.E.* ii (1909) 461b ("We believe with the heart as well as with the head. The search for truth itself is supported by its emotional coefficient—love of truth . . .").

[2] "By Truth I mean right thinking, the correspondence of our minds with the nature of things. Here, too, is something that stands firm in its own right. . . . This, too, is why the work of the scholar, the scientific investigator, and the philosopher, is a branch of the larger priesthood, a direct worship of God" (Inge in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1920, 653).

[3] "You distribute the alms of the intellect," says Maria to her husband Giovanni Selva, in Fogazzaro's *The Saint*, 156. Cf. also Martineau, *Essays*, iv. 91.

[4] Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 71 (". . . it is equally true that nothing that is true in science can be false in religion, or in any way alien or hurtful. . . . No true knowledge can be anything but helpful to true religion, and when we think otherwise, either the religion or the knowledge is false . . ."), 72 (". . . It means a belief that the actualities are the best," etc. etc.). See also above, pp. 202 f.

[5] I have discussed the general problem of moral compromise in an article on 'Christianity and the Conflict of Duties' in *Contemp. Rev.* July 1922, 72–80.

moral law prohibiting falsehood there are simply no exceptions. A story is told, for instance, of a Turkish atheist, who disbelieved in the future life, but, being asked at the stake to utter a recantation which would save his life, replied: "Although there is no recompense to be looked for, yet the love of truth constraineth me to die in its defence."[1] From the Christian standpoint the same principle has, mutatis mutandis, often been enunciated.[2]

Yet the sharp dilemmas of practical living, coupled perhaps with the ease of confusing a direct and positive falsehood with a mere concealment or withholding of information, have occasioned, not the 'profanum vulgus' alone, but also at times the 'musarum sacerdos,' to believe and declare that a lie is occasionally justified. Following the example of Plato, the Alexandrian father Clemens advocated in a mild way the use of the medicinal lie. It came in as part of the policy of 'reserve' (or prudent concealment of truth on certain occasions) which characterized the Alexandrian School generally; and it was accepted by quite a number of the early Fathers.[3] It is possible to collect from the works of a series of important Protestant writers—such as Grotius, Milton, Jeremy Taylor, Samuel Johnson, William Paley, Sir Walter Scott, James Anthony Froude, and Henry Sidgwick—passages showing that they regarded it as right under certain circumstances to tell lies.[4] Some may recall the defence of this view put by Browning into the mouth of "Mr. Sludge, 'the Medium.' "[5] And certainly situations do occur in actual life, and certainly one can picture many possible situations, in which there seems to be at least a primâ facie case for believing that it is better to tell a lie than not to tell one. Dr. A. H. Sayce, for instance, was in 1870 arrested in France as a Prussian spy, condemned immediately, and placed against a wall to be shot: the French

[1] Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 371.

[2] Cf. Longfellow, *Giles Corey of the Salem Farms* (one of the *New England Tragedies*) V. ii:

> "But if a word could save me, and that word
> Were not the Truth; nay, if it did but swerve
> A hair's-breadth from the Truth, I would not say it!"

Other examples may be seen in Neander, *Church History* (Eng. trans. Bohn) ii. 31 (referring to early Christianity); Carlyle, *Sartor*, II. vii (ed. 1889, 100) and especially *Hero as King* (ed. 1889, 364) (". . . On the whole, there are no excuses. A man in no case has liberty to tell lies. . . . The lies are found out; ruinous penalty is exacted for them. No man will believe the liar next time even when he speaks the truth," etc. etc); Mrs. Gaskell, *Mary Barton*, ch. 30 end, *North and South*, ch. 46 near end; Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*, 'Fantine,' VII. i, VIII. v (à propos of Sister Simplice); Horton, *England's Danger*, 69 ff.

[3] Cf. Grote, *Plato*, iii. 333 f; Clem. *Strom.* VII. ix. 53; Bigg, *Christian Platonists* (ed. 1913) 87, 123 f, 167, 177–186, 290, 354.

[4] Cf. Newman, *Apol.* 316–322 (appx. 8); Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 395 f; Rev. S. F. Smith, S.J. *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness* ('Cath. Truth Soc.') 4, 7 f, 13–16, 22.

[5] Near the end (*Works*, i. 621).

Commandant's wife, however, secured for him a second examination, at which he was saved by the lying assertion of the Commandant's son that he was well-acquainted with him.[1]

Nevertheless, it must be considered doubtful whether, if the distinction between lie and concealment be preserved, a sound case for the occasional 'medicinal' lie can be made out. The usual assumption that the disaster to be averted by the lie is certain to occur without it is not necessarily justified. The analogies used to defend lying are mainly drawn, not from medicine alone, but from two other practices—widely accepted indeed, but from the Christian standpoint gravely open to question—viz: killing in war, and capital punishment. The inherent nature of falsehood warns us that the prohibition of it approaches that generality or universality which inheres in those basic ethical principles, such as love, justice, etc., which admit of no exceptions. The Jesuit casuists, as we know, worked out in great detail the conditions under which a Christian might tell lies. Modern Catholics plead that such teaching is no more reprehensible than what they can readily quote from Protestants like Grotius, Milton, Johnson, and the rest. Apart, however, from the probability or possibility that both parties may be wrong, there are two or three reasons why this Catholic apologetic does not altogether satisfy. The Jesuit casuistry, for instance, seems to have admitted as justifying falsehood a much wider range of circumstances than Protestantism has ever done. Further, it provided not only for the falsehood, but for an oath in confirmation of it, which (so far as I know) none of the Protestants in question ever did.[2] And again, how comes it that Protestant teaching (even including its occasional admission of the permissible lie) has never offended the conscience of humanity or given ground for such serious moral reproach—even from co-religionists—as did the casuistry of the Jesuit fathers? It would not, of course, be fair to saddle even the whole Jesuit order, still less the whole Catholic Church, with the faulty teaching of a single group of Jesuit moralists: and the notion current in certain Protestant circles that Romanists are systematically and avowedly indifferent to the claims of truthfulness is simply ridiculous. The fact, however, remains that Catholicism produced and sheltered a school of casuists, the laxity of whose teaching on lying, as well as on other matters, earned

[1] A. H. Sayce, *Reminiscences*, 60 f.

[2] The extent of analogous ethical teaching among Tractarians is not serious. We have W. G. Ward's exclamation: "Make yourself clear that you are justified in deception, and then lie like a trooper" (*W. G. Ward and the Oxf. Movement*, 31; S. F. Smith, *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness*, 15 f), Dr. Pusey's permission to Confessors to swear that they did not know what had been told them in confession (Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 57, 283 f), and the doctrine of 'economy' and 'reserve' generally (Fairbairn, *Cathol.* xvi), as exemplified in the famous *Tract XC.*

for their order an exceedingly bad name.[1] That such evil reputation was partly the result of the prejudice and ignorance of opponents, one may readily believe: that it was altogether so is far from likely. Without pretending to have plumbed the depths of the abstract ethical problem, without forgetting that here and there Jesuit teaching may have been misrepresented and misjudged, and without denying even that there is a true place in the Church's life for the exercise of casuistry, one cannot but conclude that the existence of the Jesuit record and reputation reveals at least some measure of weakness in the Romanist ethic of truthfulness in general.[2]

However that may be, the modern apologists for Catholicism reiterate with the utmost emphasis their Church's recognition of the duty of telling the truth and of the wrongfulness of lying and falsehood.[3] They are never weary of appealing to the facts of history and professing their loyalty to historical evidence[4]; at times they even go so far as to offer to argue from the Scriptures regarded simply as historical documents.[5] Precisely analogous claims are made (and made with better grace) for Anglo-Catholicism.[6] The great debt which historical study owes to Catholic scholarship in connexion with the accessibility of documents has indeed to be thankfully acknowledged.[7] Nor must it be forgotten that

[1] Cf. Dumas, *Twenty Years After*, ch. ix: " 'My dear Bazin,' said D'Artagnan, 'I am delighted to see with what wonderful composure you can tell a lie even in church!' 'Sir,' replied Bazin, 'I have been taught by the good Jesuit fathers that it is permitted to tell a falsehood when it is told in a good cause.' "

[2] Cf. Pascal, *Lettres écrites à un Provincial*, no. 9; Newman, *Apol.* 239–250 (end of vii), 297–322 (appx. 8); Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 54–58; Horton, *England's Danger*, 60–63, 69–80; S. F. Smith, *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness*, passim, esp. 7, 10, 16–31; McCabe, *Popes*, 171.

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiii, reform. 5 (". . . mendacium, quod tantopere Deo displicet"); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 217; S. F. Smith, *Dr. Horton on Cath. Truthfulness*, 3 f, 30 f; J. W. Poynter in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1924, 549 ("Plato, however, is my friend; but truth is my divinity!"); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 128 f.

[4] Newman, *Gramm.* 371 (". . . we have no right in argument to make any assumption we please. Thus, in historical researches, it seems fair to say that no testimony should be received, except such as comes to us from competent witnesses, . . ."); Gilavert, *Influence of Cath.* 62; Catholic Bishop of Northampton quoted by Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 12 ("When the truth of facts has been ascertained, no Cause, however sacred, can be served by ignoring or questioning them . . . the same courageous spirit has always animated the Catholic schools . . . such convictions will certainly restrain us from hastily adopting the latest loosely-constructed theory of the Higher Criticism, but will not induce us to juggle with evidence").

[5] See above, pp. 331, 379.

[6] C. H. Turner in *Congress-Report 1920*, 24; C. S. Gillet in *op. cit.* 116 bott., 118 f; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 74; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, v–vii.

[7] Cf. Hase *Handbook*, ii. 69, 434, 449, 451 f, 454 n.; St. Cyres in *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 489 f, 495b; F. M. Powicke in *History*, Jan. 1924, 264 ("it should be noted that, but for the labours of Roman Catholic scholars during the last four centuries, three-fourths of Mr. Coulton's material would have been inaccessible to him").

there has grown up a school of Catholic historians (among whom the most conspicuous are Hefele, Duchesne, F. X. Funk, and Batiffol), whose scrupulous eagerness to avoid the distortion of historical evidence has won the acknowledgment and respect of Protestant critics.[1] These facts certainly ought to suffice to protect Catholic historians as a class from the charge of unveracity, in the sense in which some of the Jesuit casuists were open to it. They do not, however, suffice to clear Catholic historiography in general from the reproach of such perversity as amounts to objective untruthfulness, whatever may be the precise measure of responsibility on the part of individual Catholic historians.

We cannot indeed demand of one another that we shall carry on our investigation of historical records without any presuppositions of a philosophical or religious kind. The bare fact, therefore, that the Catholic comes to the documents with certain presuppositions ought not of itself to be regarded as necessarily a ground for reproach.[2] We may, however, ask of one another as seekers after truth, to see to it that our a priori and transcendental theories, however dear to us, shall not repeatedly compel us to impose on the historical data forced and unnatural interpretations, to lay the main stress of historical credence, not upon what is written, but upon what we have to read between the lines, and to leave standing side by side inferences so incompatible with one another that they can be harmonized only by exercising the most subtle dialectical skill. The observance of such a demand as this is what we mean by the scientific method as applied to history.[3] Catholics find no difficulty in adopting it as a condition of truthfulness in the matter of modern scientific research (Creation-story and certain miracles apart). Their modernism in this field is an admission of the justice of the scientific method in general.[4] Our charge is that, though this method

[1] See, e.g., the cordial appreciation of Duchesne and Batiffol in *Times Lit. Suppt.* 10 July 1924, 428, 18 Sept. 1924, 564, and 15 July 1926, 474, and of Funk in *Theol. Litzg.* 1927. 11. 247: cf. also F. M. Powicke in *History*, Jan. 1924, 264 (". . . the differences between a genuine Catholic and a genuine Protestant scholar are due to something far deeper than their attitude to veracity").

[2] So far, Newman's argument (*Developm.* 180 f; cf. 133–135) that in historical study we must make use of "antecedent probabilities" is justified.

[3] See above, p. 194. Cf. Wm. Robertson, *Charles V*, 109 (". . . there is not a more copious source of error, than to decide concerning the institutions and manners of past ages by the forms and ideas which prevail in their own times"); G. P. Gooch in *Recent Developments in European Thought*, 157 (Ranke's "greatest service to scholarship was to divorce the study of the past from the passions of the present, and, to quote the watchword of his first book, to relate what actually occurred"); S. J. Case in *Journ. of Relig.* Jan. 1921, 11 ("In discussing the question of genesis he" [the scientific historian] "insists that the fountains of empirical knowledge are to be exhausted before the problem is passed on to the metaphysician").

[4] O. C. Quick in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1923, 132 ("the truest knowledge of reality is only won through self-denial, *i.e.* by those who have learned in the stern school of science that existing facts will not suffer them to believe what they like").

has an equal right to be treated as a condition of truthfulness in historical research, Catholics will not and do not apply it there. That is our meaning when we reproach the Catholic treatment of history with untruthfulness.[1]

"The appeal to antiquity," wrote Manning in 1865 (and he repeated it in substance later in reply to the objections to the infallibility-decree of 1870), "is both a treason and a heresy. It is a treason because it rejects the Divine voice of the Church at this hour, and a heresy because it denies that voice to be Divine."[2] "A Catholic," writes the translator of Mgr. Batiffol's 'Catholicism and Papacy,' "rests his faith not on his reading of history, but upon the teaching of what he believes to be the One Catholic Church of Christ; if then his reading of history should clash with the teaching of the Church, he will know that his reading of historical facts has in some way been deficient and erroneous."[3] Exactly: one's reading of historical facts must be doctored, manipulated, twisted, and forced, if it cannot otherwise be harmonized with the

[1] Cf. Bousset, *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* 54 ("mit einem gewissen Recht kann man sagen, dass der Glaube der Feind der Geschichte sei"); O. C. Quick in *Hibb. Journ.* Oct. 1923, 131 ("Everywhere you will find that the apologetic tendency, the desire to be edifying, has been the worst enemy of truth, and has in fact defeated its own best aim by destroying those greatest values of human life, sincerity and freedom"); Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 751a (connects mediaeval Catholic mendacity with the doctrine of exclusive salvation).

[2] Manning, *Temporal Mission of the Holy Ghost* (first edn. 1865) 226, (1892 edn. 238); cf. 28 f (all appeals to Scripture and antiquity "essentially rationalistic"), 202, 203 (". . . the enunciation of the faith by the living Church of this hour, is the maximum of evidence, both natural and supernatural, as to the *fact* and the *contents* of the original revelation. I know what are revealed there not by retrospect, but by listening"), 204 f, 226 ("How can we know what antiquity was except through the Church? No individual, no number of individuals can go back through eighteen hundred years and reach the doctrines of antiquity . . ."), 227: also in *Daily Telegraph*, 8 Oct. 1875, 5, col. 7 (reaffirmation of words quoted in text, with protest against objectors' disregard of their context: "They have always and all alike suppressed my argument, which is as follows: The appeal *from* the living voice of the Church to any tribunal whatever, human history included, is an act of private judgment and a treason, because that living voice is supreme; and an appeal from that supreme voice is also a heresy, because that voice by Divine assistance is infallible. My critics have universally evaded and suppressed the premiss—that the supreme voice of the Church is Divine. I have seen much misrepresentation of my argument, but I have never seen an answer. Unless the premisses can be refuted no answer can be made. And this I believe to be the reason why it has been so studiously misrepresented"). Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 126 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 31, 42–44, 46 bott. ("And, consequently, a thoroughgoing Infallibilist like Manning, is consistently a foe to all candid historical investigation, as being really irreconcileable with faith in the Church's authority"), 132; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 12 f; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. xli, *Rom. Cath. Hist.* 5, 9 f.

[3] Quoted in *Expos. Times*, June 1926, 403b, and in *Congreg. Quart.* July 1926, 390. Cf. Gilavert, *Influence of Cath.* 62 f (historian "must not depend solely on his own judgment, but on the common opinion"; writers of history fall into error "when they are deficient in that fixed and absolute rule which is not to be found but in the bosom of the Holy Catholic Church").

dogmatic pronouncements of the Church. And what is that but untruthfulness?[1]

In the foregoing pages we have made an effort to compare the Catholic attitude and Catholic beliefs with the available evidence in a number of departments of historical enquiry, viz: the Scriptures generally, the Old Testament, the Gospels, the life of our Lord's mother, the origin of the Church and the Sacraments, the career of the Apostle Peter, the early history of the Christian ministry and of the Roman church, the development of the papal prerogatives from the first to the nineteenth century, and the lives, miracles, and relics of the saints. In every department we have found the Catholic view characterized by untruthfulness, in the sense already explained. A large proportion of these departments of historical study are biblical: hence Rome's wholesale rejection (not of the odd vagaries, but) of the unanimously held and patently probable conclusions of higher criticism, is rightly felt to be in some ways the most offensive and disastrous of all the difficulties of the Roman position. We could name at least one eminent and profoundly religious teacher in modern Europe who, in spite of his love for the Catholicism in which he had been nurtured, drifted out of it largely in consequence of the initial shock his loyalty to it received when he first came to realize the Church's hostility to all serious scientific investigation of biblical problems. That too was one of the principal issues in the struggle between the earlier Catholic Modernists and the authorities at Rome. In Catholic priests who feel the compelling power of cogent scientific argument, but who yet remain loyal to the Church, there is often perceptible a painful state of resignation and exhaustion consequent upon the unrelieved tension of their minds. On the Church's blind rejection of the most obvious necessities of truthful Bible-study, a nemesis is bound to follow.[2] Her recent successes are only too likely to prove Pyrrhic victories: her hostility to biblical truth is the Achilles-heel of her whole appeal to the past.[3] Nor is it at all easy to see how a way out of the impasse can be found without

[1] Cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 12–14; Coulton in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 180 (distinction between 'truth' and 'Catholic Truth'); Heiler, *Kathol.* 318 ("Die zweite grosse Sünde des Papsttums gegen die Wahrheit ist die Beurteilung der theologischen und religiösen Probleme unter dem Gesichtspunkt ihres Kirchenrechts und ihrer Kirchenpolitik. . . . Diese juridische Grundeinstellung kann jenen reinen Wahrheitssinn und Wahrheitswillen nicht aufkommen lassen, der die Grundvoraussetzung für ein religiöses 'Lehramt' bildet . . ."), 367 ("Der Historiker muss auf Schritt und Tritt gegen die Missachtung der Geschichte durch die *a priori* konstruierende Spekulation protestieren, . . ."), 635.

[2] On the New Testament as the armoury of the Church's critics, see above, p. 333 n. 3.

[3] Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 34 f: "Und das ist eben die Achillesferse dieses stolzen Fortschreitens, hier bleibt der tiefe Schatten im strahlenden Bild! . . ."

fatally discrediting that authoritative rule which is of the essence of the Catholic system. The way of evasion, of course, is open: it has often proved a way of escape from awkward situations, and resort to it in this particular matter has been advocated:[1] but could the Church survive such measure of evasion as would be needed in order to enable Catholics generally to adopt critical views?

In the province of Church-history, the position is almost equally serious. It is not merely that throughout the Middle Ages a vast use was made of fiction in the supposed interests of edification.[2] Were that all, it could be dealt with as modern Protestants deal with the mass of mistaken notions which their forefathers entertained in the matter of biblical exegesis, viz: by simply abandoning them. Catholicism, however, while permitting (to a very limited degree) the abandonment of exploded fictions, is so closely wedded to its characteristic interpretation of Church-history that real historical truthfulness is excluded in advance. The most damning testimony to this effect comes, not from Protestant critics (by whom naturally Catholics are unwilling to be convinced), but from no less a champion of Catholicism than John Henry Newman, and that after nearly nineteen years' experience of what the system meant. In his 'Apologia,' published in 1864, he put forward a defence of the infallibility of the Church against the charge of narrowing the independence of individual minds, arguing in particular from the intellectual activity of the mediaeval schools, and saying that, were the charge true, the individual thinker "would be fighting, as the Persian soldiers, under the lash, and the freedom of his intellect might truly be said to be beaten out of him. But this has not been so."[3] Yet in the first half of 1863, he had himself been complaining bitterly, if resignedly, that the Office of Propaganda at Rome was ruling with arbitrary military power. "How can I fight," he asked, "with such a chain on my arm? It is like the Persians driven to fight under the lash. . . . There are no schools now, no private judgment (in the religious sense of the phrase), no freedom, that is, of opinion. That is, no exercise of the intellect."[4]

[1] Cf. 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 859: "'Liberal Catholics' are not so unreasonable as to expect authority to retract any of its past decrees; the dexterity of theologians will always be amply sufficient to find convincing reasons why any obnoxious decision should, on account of some technical defect, be devoid of binding force, or else that the real signification of such decision is quite contrary to what has been antecedently supposed and accepted or what appears to be its true meaning. There are probably very few *ex cathedrâ* decrees which could not be evaded by one or other of these processes."

[2] See above, pp. 486 ff, and cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 396–399; Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 624b; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 11.

[3] Newman, *Apol.* 235–239 (vii).

[4] W. Ward, *Life of J. H. Card. Newman*, i. 584–589. See the letters quoted by Coulton, *Rom. Cath. Hist.* 12; cf. 13, 15. On Acton's opinion of Newman as "that splendid Sophist," cf. his words, quoted by Coulton, *op. cit.* 12.

How this condition of things affected, in his judgment, the Catholic study of history, appears from a letter he wrote in July, 1864—the very year of the 'Apologia'— in reply to a suggestion as to the foundation of a historical review for Catholics. "Nothing would be better," he wrote, "than an Historical Review—but who would bear it? Unless one doctored all one's facts, one should" (sic) "be thought a bad Catholic. The truth is, there is a keen conflict going on just now between two parties, one in the Church, one out of it[1]—and at such seasons extreme views alone are in favour, and a man who is not extravagant is thought treacherous."[2] The words are an ominous comment on the complaint he had made as an Anglican in 1834: "In the corrupt Papal system we have . . . the craft, and the ambition of the Republic; . . . its craft in its falsehoods, its deceitful deeds and lying wonders."[3]

No single event has done more to expose the Roman Church to the reproach of mendacity than the declaration of 1870 that the infallibility of the Pope had always been an item in the faith of the Church. It is common knowledge that, not Protestant scholars alone, but the most eminent Catholic authorities in Church-history were at the time convinced that such a declaration was historically false. Under this common conviction, different groups acted in different ways. Some, like Döllinger, refused to submit and were excommunicated. Others, like Hefele, delayed, and eventually found some means of making a conscientious submission. Others simply submitted straight-away, and endured the violation of their sense of truth as the lesser of two evils. Newman deplored the impending decision as historically most difficult to defend, but he bowed to it as to an inscrutable Divine visitation. At the Council itself the historical objections were circumvented in various skilful ways —as they are still circumvented by Catholic apologists; or else it was urged that historical facts must give way before the clearness and certainty of doctrine. The spectacle of a number of learned Christian men solemnly accepting and proclaiming, at the bidding of their ruler, a historical proposition which they had hitherto known and declared to be untrue to fact, is—morally speaking—one of the ugliest scenes in the history of the Roman Church, and a standing offence to those outside, whom Rome professes herself to be anxious to re-win.[4] And

[1] An allusion apparently to Ultramontanists (then pressing for a declaration of infallibility) and Protestant scholars.

[2] The words appear in a letter printed in the Catholic journal, *The Month*. Jan. 1903, 4. Cf. also Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 109, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 4, 29, *Rom. Cath. Hist.* 4, 6, 8, and in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 9–11, 180, 198, 214.

[3] Quoted by himself in *Developm.* vii.

[4] See above, pp. 28–30, 483–485. Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 62 n. (Father Hotzl published a book at Vienna in 1870, opposing the doctrine of infallibility; but afterwards he accepted it), 286, 298, 316–322; Salmon, *Infall.* ix (". . . there can be no union

the most telling condemnation of it again comes from a Catholic pen. Lord Acton wrote to Mr. Gladstone in 1876 as follows: "In short, I do not believe there are Catholics who, sincerely and intelligently, believe that Rome is right and that Döllinger is wrong. And therefore I think you are too hard on Ultramontanes, or too gentle with Ultramontanism. You say, for instance, that it promotes untruthfulness. I don't think that is fair. It not only promotes, it inculcates, distinct mendacity and deceitfulness. In certain cases it is made a duty to lie. But those who teach this doctrine do not become habitual liars in other things."[1]

While the infallibility-decree of 1870 is for us to-day the most spectacular instance of the historical untruthfulness of Catholic dogma, it is unhappily only one among a whole series of similar misstatements of fact. For every dogmatic, or 'de fide,' pronouncement of the Church is asserted to be, as such, a part of the original 'deposit of faith' accepted in the time of the Apostles.[2] In the course of our study, we have repeatedly had occasion to observe the falsity of this view. Many of the statements contained in dogmatic canons—those, for example, concerning the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin, the institution of the seven Sacraments by Jesus, transubstantiation, the primacy of Peter, and various detailed points of doctrine—were demonstrably not parts of the primitive belief of the Church. The very subtlety of the efforts made to rebut this criticism does but confirm the justice of it. Newman's plea that doctrines were explicitly developed only as the times called them forth[3] is precisely the contention of Protestants: but the natural inference from it is that, prior to such developments, the doctrines concerned were unknown, not that they were simply unquestioned.[4] It is futile to urge that, prior to their expression, they were held 'implicitly'[5]: it is doubtful whether such a use of the word

with her except on the terms of absolute submission; that submission, moreover, involving an acknowledgment that we from our hearts believe things to be true which we have good reasons for knowing to be false"), 22 f, 238, 254 f; Stanton, *Authority*, 220 ("History, if studied dispassionately, is strongly against the claims of Roman infallibility, on every count of the controversy . . ."); Bain, *New Reformation*, 36–38; Curtis in *H.E.R.E.* vii (1914) 275a (on Newman); Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 135–137 f; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 40 f; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 203 f ("And lastly, what is the most serious point of all, the facts of history being what they are, the maintenance of the Roman claim has involved a constant perversion of truth. This is an awful charge . . .").

[1] *Letters of Lord Acton to Mary . . . Gladstone* (ed. H. Paul, 1904) lv (1913, xlix); Figgis and Laurence, *Selections from the Correspondence of . . . Lord Acton*, i (1917) 41–43; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 15, in *Anglic. Ess.* 109, 133, in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 9, 12, 62, 214, *Rom. Cath. Hist.* 5 f, 9, 11.

[2] See above, pp. 36–38, 453.

[3] Newman, *Developm.* 145.

[4] As Newman argues (*Developm.* 370, for which see above, p. 293 n. 4).

[5] See above, p. 29.

'implicit' is legitimate, and whether (even if so) it can claim to represent the Church's official view. But in any case, if what develops out of primitive beliefs can be defended as being implicitly a part of them,[1] why have not Protestant developments as good a right to be accounted parts of the 'deposit of faith' as the papal decrees of 1854 and 1870?[2]

The Anglo-Catholic attitude to history is not entangled in such desperate errors as the Roman, for its really indispensable historical beliefs are limited to a comparatively few propositions, most of which are at least fairly arguable. But its fondness for the Vincentian test of Catholicity—"Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est"—is a constant source of difficulty in connexion with historical facts. It has been truly said of the Tractarian use of this test, "the 'semper' did not mean 'always,' or the 'ubique' everywhere, or the 'ab omnibus' by all; but only such times, places and men, or even such parts and sections of times, places and men, as could be made to suit or prove the theory."[3] Hence the need for continual 're-assessments' of the Vincentian canon, on the inevitable but unavowed basis of private judgment.[4]

But to proceed with the Romanist lack of candour. Particulars were given a few pages back regarding the issue of an edition of Keenan's 'Controversial Catechism,' from which certain words about papal infallibility, which had appeared in it prior to 1870, were thereafter omitted in such a way as to lead the reader to think that there had been no omission.[5] The authorized American translation of the Catholic Alzog's 'Kirchengeschichte' was published in 1874, and a second edition of it in 1879. In the preface to the latter, the most emphatic assurances of the faithfulness of the translation were given; nothing, it was stated, had been altered or omitted, but amplifications and additions were avowed, besides (of course) notes. Yet the result of the process is that, with regard to the definition of infallibility, Alzog's original and the 'translation' represent diametrically opposite points of view.[6] A modern Catholic's edition of St. Bernard's letters translated into English silently drops an allusion on Bernard's part to the Pope's permission as one of

[1] Cf. Guardini's pretty analogy of the unlikeness, and yet the identity, of seed and plant (quoted by Heiler, *Kathol.* XII).

[2] Cf. Rawlinson, *Authority*, 41 f.

[3] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 311. Cf. Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in Hist.* 343 f. As Sir John Frazer has pointed out (*Golden Bough*, i. 236): "If the test of truth lay in a show of hands or a counting of heads, the system of magic might appeal, with far more reason than the Catholic Church, to the proud motto, '*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*,' as the sure and certain credential of its own infallibility."

[4] Cf. the sub-title of Moxon's *Modernism and Orthodoxy*—"an attempt to re-assess the value of the Vincentian Canon in regard to modern tendencies of thought."

[5] See above, p. 484.

[6] I borrow the facts from Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 118 f: cf. id. *Rom. Cath. Hist.* 13.

the conceivable, but inadequate, excuses for doing something wrong.[1] Again, the Catholic translation of Catharine of Siena's 'Dialogue,' published in 1907, is stated on the title-page to be "abridged"; but the abridgement consists chiefly in the omission of fourteen chapters in three batches (amounting to thirty-six quarto pages), in which the monks and priests of St. Catharine's day are censured; the omission of them, however, is not indicated by the insertion of the original chapter-numbers.[2] Nor are these by any means the only cases in which the proceedings adopted in the production and issue of Catholic literature have been obscure and misleading to a surprising degree.[3] It is said of the papal encyclical 'Pascendi,' issued against the Modernists in 1907, that it "not only throws down the gauntlet to the whole of modern science, but it is morally defective, because it seeks to deal deadly blows against the sense of truth, as it has ever more surely developed itself. . . . ; it is the outcome of a spirit that has hardened itself against the intellectual and moral conscience we have gained."[4] Historians of unimpeachable capacity and trustworthiness are harshly censured in the Roman Church when the facts they record are unacceptable to Roman dogmatism. Thus Ranke was characterized by Perrone as an ignorant, crafty, deceitful calumniator of the Popes.[5] Official and unofficial censure has been frequently meted out in recent decades to the writings of Catholic Church-historians; and eminent scholars like Duchesne and Batiffol have not been exempt.[6] As for Catholic stories about the saints, the absolute untruthfulness of many of them is widely admitted.[7] Alphonso de' Liguori died in 1787. He was declared 'venerable' in 1796, was beatified in 1816, canonized in 1839, and constituted one of the nineteen 'Doctors of the Church' in 1871. Yet his works cannot be trusted

[1] "How then," the Catholic editors make Bernard say, "can either the permission of your abbot avail to make that permissible which is (as I have already shown beyond question) wholly evil?" Bernard's actual words were " . . . vel abbatis jussio vel Papae permissio . . ." (Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 292 n.).

[2] Coulton in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1926, 590 f.

[3] See, for instance, Salmon, *Infall.* 26 f.

[4] Harnack, quoted by Loofs in *Theol. Litzg.* 1926. 1. 7 (my trans).

[5] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 451. Yet Catholic historians do not hesitate to represent the characters of immoral mediaeval popes in an unfairly favourable light: see McCabe, *Popes*, 15–113.

[6] Lilley in *H.E.R.E.* viii (1915) 764a; Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 198, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 29 f, 49 (complaints to this effect by Catholics themselves); Heiler, *Kathol.* 320 (". . . Wer die Forschungsarbeit der kritischen katholischen Theologen überblickt, der glaubt ein Friedhof zu sehen, in dem Leichenstein an Leichenstein steht, ein jeder mit der Aufschrift: *Laudabiliter se subiecit*").

[7] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 369, 459 f; Salmon, *Infall.* 200, 212 f, 215, 216 n. ("It is strange that Roman divines do not find out how they repel Protestants by the defective appreciation of the claims of truth exhibited in their distinction as to what may be said in controversial and uncontroversial books. To people of their own community they assert things as positive facts which they run away from defending the moment an opponent grapples with them . . ."), 217, 221.

for a reference to his authorities, and he narrates numbers of the grossest fables. Döllinger pronounced his writings "a storehouse of errors and lies."[1] The falsehoods told on the occasion of the festivals of the saints have become proverbial among the Swabian clergy.[2]

It is then not without solid ground that the Catholic Church has rendered herself in Protestant eyes thoroughly suspect, as regards the shakiness of her ethics of truthfulness in general, and as regards her falsification of history in particular.[3] The existence of this suspicion is well known to Catholic leaders,[4] and is hotly resented as unjust.[5] Doubtless it has sometimes been intemperately expressed; and for that we put forward no defence (only we would ask, Have Catholic criticisms of Protestantism always been charitable and temperate?). But in the main the charge must be pressed home. The justice of it, as we have seen, has been frankly recognized by those who have known the Roman system from within and been strongly attached to it.[6] In so far as it has been made out, it cannot but be a quite fatal and decisive disproof

[1] Döllinger, *Declarations and Letters* (1891) 119. Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 205 f.

[2] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 394 n.: ". . . Daher das Sprichwort der schwäbischen Geistlichen: 'Gelogen wie in der zweiten Nokturn.'"

[3] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 316 f, ii. 395; Urwick in *Papacy and Bible*, 88; Horton, *England's Danger*, 19 f, 58–60, 75–80; Heiler, *Kathol.* 317 ("Seitdem die Suprematie über die gesamte Kirche das höchste Ziel alles päpstlichen Strebens geworden war, hat Rom (samt seinen Trabanten) den Blick für die W a h r h e i t eingebüsst"); Coulton, *Rom. Cath. Hist.* 4 f.

[4] Cf. the words of the Catholic Bishop of Northampton, quoted by Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 12 ("If we are convinced of the solidarity of all truth . . . such convictions . . . will not induce us to juggle with evidence. Yet that is precisely the suspicion entertained about Catholic scholars in many quarters; and it has led to a systematic and undeserved 'boycotting' of Catholic biblical literature. How often is the Catholic view of a biblical problem referred to in such works of reference as Hastings's Dictionary of the Bible, or even a Catholic writer named in the various bibliographies? . . ."): also the liberal Catholic *Rambler's* protest against hierarchical warning and rebuke, quoted by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 34 ("We" [Catholics] "have to encounter the belief that we are not only crafty and false, but actually afraid of the truth's being known. This belief has to be vanquished, not by an angry denial of its justice, not by taunts, not by *braggadocio*, but by proving our courage by our acts. It is useless to proclaim that history and science are in harmony with our religion, unless we show that we think so by being ourselves foremost in telling the whole truth about the Church and about her enemies").

[5] See last note, also above, pp. 502 f.

[6] See above, pp. 506–508. Cf. 'Romanus' in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 858 (liberal Catholics "are profoundly convinced not only that the God of truth can never be served by a lie, but that the cause of religion can never be promoted by clever dodges, by studiously ambiguous utterances, by hushing up unpleasant truths, or (when such can no longer be hidden) by misrepresenting or minimising their significance—trying to disguise the consequences which logically follow from them by a series of subtle devices"); Tyrrell (a year or two after excommunication) quoted in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1926, 325 (". . . that all-permeating mendacity which is the most alarming and desperate symptom of the present ecclesiastical crisis"); Poynter, *Rome rom Within*, 25 (". . . Personally . . . I have found that spirit to permeate Roman propaganda through and through . . .").

of the justice of Roman claims. It is not a mere flaw, such as might seem preferable to Protestantism, on the principle of choosing the lesser of two evils.[1] Nor is the case mended by the reflection that a knowledge of historical facts is not the only, or even the most, fundamental value to be conserved in religion.[2] Rome herself would be the first to insist—as she insisted against her own Modernists—that the historical truths she accepts are of the very essence of her system:[3] and the interdependence of doctrine and history is generally acknowledged among Christians of nearly all schools of thought.[4] A religious system which professes to be loyal to truth and to base itself on historical facts, but which yet refuses to accept with regard to those facts conclusions established by the same laws of reason as have verified themselves in human experience over and over again, and are expected to vindicate the system itself to normal human minds, stands self-condemned.[5]

It is interesting to compare the treatment which the Catholic Church accords to history with the treatment she has accorded to science. There was a time when she thought scientific progress and discovery to be as incompatible with her doctrinal position as she now thinks historical criticism to be.[6] Her avowed belief in the inerrancy of the Bible involved indeed nothing less. Hence she attempted to coerce science, and made herself for ever ridiculous by formally condemning (1616, 1633) Galileo's belief in the Copernican theory of the motion of the earth round the sun, and by maintaining the prohibition of this theory for some two hundred years afterwards. Catholic apologists astutely plead that the condemnation was no tan 'ex-cathedra' definition, and that Galileo was really condemned for being too positive in the assertion of his view. Anyhow, the fact remains that the Roman Inquisition, with the Pope's official approval, condemned an opinion which probably every Catholic now holds to be true.[7]

[1] Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 185 f: "If the Catholic hypothesis is true, it neither needs nor is benefited by unfairness. Adverse facts should be acknowledged; explained if but apparent; accounted for if real; *or let alone and borne patiently as being fewer and lighter than the difficulties of other hypotheses*" (italics mine).

[2] Cf. Quick, *Liberalism*, 25 f, 29, 36 (liberal Protestantism criticized for its too exclusive insistence on historical facts); Heiler, *Kathol.* 5 (". . . Die historische Erkenntnis darf nicht das ausschlaggebende Moment bei der Beurteilung des Katholizismus bilden; . . .").

[3] See above, p. 90.

[4] Cf. Rawlinson, *Authority*, 123.

[5] This is our answer to the criticism recently levelled (in the form of an innuendo) by an anonymous reviewer at the anti-Roman view of Christianity. He commends his author's sympathy and human interest, which, he says, "enable him largely to transcend the limitations of a view that regards Christianity as though it were an apple of which only the core was valuable" (*Times Lit. Suppt.* 12 May 1927, 330).

[6] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 609 f.

[7] Mirbt 367, 372–374; R. D. Hampden, *Scholastic Philosophy* (1833) 546; Newman, *Apol.* 235 f (vii) (case of Galileo the exception that proves the rule!); Lecky,

Modern Catholics take up the study of astronomy and of the other physical sciences without fear of hindrance on the score of contradicting the Scriptures. How the numerous and manifest discrepancies between Scripture and science are dealt with—how, for instance, a Catholic geologist would harmonize the biblical chronology with his scientific knowledge of the vast antiquity of human life on this globe—I confess I do not know: I surmise that the question is either discreetly avoided or else settled by some more or less manifest subterfuge.[1] However that may be, so long as the inference that the Bible is in error is not overtly drawn, the modern Catholic may, as a scientist, freely follow the guidance of his own reason, even if it leads him to embrace what the rulers of the Church in former days emphatically and wholeheartedly repudiated.[2] In 1864 Pius IX solemnly condemned the statement that "the decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Roman Congregations hinder the free progress of science," and in 1907 Pius X similarly denied that "the Church shows herself hostile to the progress of the natural and theological sciences." Not content with this avowal of sympathy with science, the 'Syllabus' of 1864 further denied, in defiance of history, that "the method and principles with which the ancient scholastic doctors carried on theology, are by no means compatible with the necessities of our time and with the progress of the sciences."[3] The Catholic scientist is, therefore, relatively free. But inasmuch as the Bible and Christian doctrine touch on historical far more closely even than they do on scientific matters, the historical student cannot be granted the liberty which his scientific colleagues enjoy. In every experiment that involves the measurement and comparison of evidence, he is tied down to the use of weighted balances.

In philosophy proper mankind cannot be said to have attained

Rationalism, i. 272–276 (on the gross ignorance and credulity engendered by the Church's opposition to science); Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 318–325; Salmon, *Infall.* 228–255 (full account of Galileo's case, insisting that the papal condemnation of his views was 'ex cathedra'), 260 f, 444; Martineau, *Seat*, 150 f; Houtin, *Question Biblique*, 23 n., 63, 362; Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 792b (Galileo would have been justified in refusing internal assent to the view of the tribunal, "provided that in doing so he observed with thorough loyalty all the conditions involved in the duty of external obedience"), 798b, 799ab; Heiler, *Kathol.* 319.

[1] See above, pp. 100 f. Houtin (*Question Biblique*, passim, esp. ch. ix) gives a number of the various desperate suggestions advanced by Catholics prior to 1900 for dealing with the difficulty.

[2] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 253. In Gilavert's *Influence of Cath.* (ix f, xiii, xix, xxi), the view that Catholicism is hostile to science is indignantly repudiated, and Galileo is actually lauded among the Christians who have shone in science! In *God and the Supernatural* (153) Watkin claims that in several ways (e.g. new psychology) modern science confirms "the supposedly outworn theology" of the Church.

[3] Mirbt 451 (nos. 12 and 13), 507 (no. 57): cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 446; Heiler, *Kathol.* 320 f. Similar professions are made, with much better ground, on behalf of Anglo-Catholicism (Milner-White in *Congress-Report 1920*, 93).

anything like that measure of unanimity and certainty which it has reached in physical science, or even in the more contentious field of historical research. Of any set opposition, therefore, between Catholicism and generally accepted philosophical conclusions, we cannot speak.[1] Nay, Rome has her own philosophers; and the whole Scholastic tradition is evidence of her profound interest in their work. In the 'Syllabus' of 1864 she asserted her right to be heard on philosophical questions.[2] Yet of that venturous spirit of enquiry, that untrammelled intellectual freedom, which is of the very essence of true philosophical research, she knows nothing and allows nothing. In the thirteenth century, Gregorius IX endeavoured (as it proved, vainly) to prevent the teaching of the Church being invaded by Aristotelianism.[3] The philosophical studies prescribed for or allowed in the Jesuit colleges from the sixteenth century onwards were circumscribed in the closest and narrowest way.[4] In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at Rome after seven years' imprisonment, because his free speculations were adjudged heretical. Modern philosophy proper began with Descartes: but his theories were condemned at Rome, and the printing and reading of his books forbidden.[5] Other philosophical pioneers like Bacon and Locke are 'bêtes noires' to the Catholic mind.[6] Without necessarily confessing oneself a Kantian, one may safely say that there are few names more significant and epoch-making in the history of philosophical thought than that of Kant. Yet for him and for the whole idealistic philosophy of the eighteenth and following centuries, Catholicism has no place or appreciation, and still defends the mediaeval Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas as a sufficient and satisfactory philosophical alternative.[7]

Naturally enough, the claim has often been advanced that the Roman Church has favoured and fostered intellectual culture in general.[8] Nor must it be forgotten that, in the Dark Ages, the monastic orders kept literature alive, that in the period of the Renaissance the hierarchy patronized art and learning, and that the Jesuits have usually been

[1] This statement implies no concession affecting the validity of our philosophical argument in Part II of this book.

[2] The following proposition is condemned: "Ecclesia non solum non debet in philosophiam unquam animadvertere, verum etiam debet ipsius philosophiae tolerare errores, eique relinquere ut ipsa se corrigat" (Mirbt 451 [no. 11]).

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 428; Heiler, *Kathol.* 318 f.

[4] Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 439; Littledale and Taunton in *Encyc. Brit.* xv. 342a (small print).

[5] Hase, ii. 483; R. D. Hampden, *Scholastic Philos.* (1833) 546; Wallace in *Encyc. Brit.* viii. 82a, 89a.

[6] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 406 with n.

[7] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 462 f, 476, 483 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 609 f; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 15–19, 74 (note to S. 17 and 19), 104–108, 133, 135 f. For the Anglo-Catholic disapproval of Kant, see C. Harris, *Creeds or No Creeds?* 13 ff, 61 ff.

[8] See esp. above, pp. 95 f and cf. *Pope and People*, 94 f, 121 f.

zealous and efficient in the education of the young. Nevertheless, there are in the Catholic system, besides crude survivals capable of being either avoided or dropped (such as magic and exorcism), a certain number of features which are quite inseparable from it, but which at the same time are bound in the nature of the case to have a paralysing effect on intellectual progress. Such, for instance, is the Church's inveterate and instinctive horror of innovations as such. In the 'Syllabus' of 1864 the following proposition was condemned: "The Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile and adapt himself to progress, liberalism, and present-day civilization"[1]; and in 1870 the contention that the dogmas of the Church need occasionally to be re-interpreted in a new sense owing to the advance of knowledge, was forbidden and anathematized.[2] In 1897 Herman Schell, a Roman Catholic professor, published a book entitled 'Catholicism the Principle of Progress'; but the authorities placed it on the list of prohibited books.[3] Sometimes the Church's antagonism to novelty is defended on the ground that, though the novelty in question may be true, yet the publication of it would be untimely and 'temerarious.'[4] Again, what could be better calculated to ensure intellectual sterility than the policy of appealing constantly, not only to the infallible dogmas, but also to the general teaching, of the Church, and endeavouring to confine the conclusions of scholars within the limits which that teaching sets?[5] In the 'Syllabus' of 1864 the Pope authoritatively condemned the statement that "the obligation by which Catholic teachers and writers are absolutely bound is solely confined to those things which are put forward by the infallible judgment of the Church, as dogmas of the faith to be believed by all."[6] How can intellectual culture really be said to be fostered and to flourish

[1] Mirbt 454 (no. 80): ". . . cum progressu, cum liberalismo et cum recente civilitate sese reconciliare et componere."

[2] See above, pp. 37, 92 f, 453. Cf. the protests of 'Romanus' against Roman fixity in *Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 865 f.

[3] Bain, *New Reformation*, 16–21: cf. D'Arcy in *God and the Supernatural*, 51 ("Such being the nature of Revelation and development, the error of new theologies lies precisely in this that they are new . . . they resemble a man tired with the strain of keeping to the point, . . ."). It is sheer paradox to infer from the subtle and elastic adaptability of Catholicism that "on the whole it seems true to say that the characteristic genius of Catholicism is liberal, that of Protestantism conservative" (O. C. Quick, quoted approvingly, though with qualifications, by J. K. Mozley in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 517; cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 609).

[4] Cf. Newman, *Apol.* 231 f (vii) and in *Nineteenth Century*, Feb. 1884, 187 (instancing Galileo), 191; W. Ward in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1903, 679.

[5] See the exemplifications of this reported by Hase (*Handbook*, ii. 444–483). Tanquerey (*Synops. Theol.* 531(b)) grants that the theory of private judgment stimulates mental activity more than Catholicism does; but over against this he sets the immense production of Protestant errors, the waste of labour they involve, and the Catholic passion for imparting saving truth to the lowliest of mankind.

[6] Mirbt 452 (no. 22).

when, by means of the censorship which every book written on religion by a Catholic has to pass, and by means of the Prohibitory and Expurgatory Indexes, the official and systematic attempt is made (though with imperfect success) to keep from Catholic eyes all writings that contain any damaging criticism of the Roman Church and her ways? And it is equally patent that the spirit of persecution, whether carried out into practice (as in former times), or simply maintained and defended as an abstract theory (as to-day), is essentially hostile to the spirit of candid enquiry after truth, which is indispensable to the true cultivation of man's mental powers.[1]

Educational statistics, such as would demonstrate clearly the extent to which Catholicism has helped or hindered intellectual progress, are hard to come by: but one may safely hazard the general statement that Protestantism has led the way in the matter of the general education of the people, and that the average intellectual level attained in the Protestant countries of the world is very considerably higher than it is in countries where Romanism is dominant.[2] The modern Catholic zeal for education is very largely the inevitable outcome of the challenge of Protestant culture. As for the wide-spread alienation of educated and thoughtful men from the Church in various Catholic countries, while no doubt this phenomenon is largely accounted for by sheer religious indifference, there is no doubt whatever that the outrages which Catholicism attempts to inflict on a free and healthy intellect are in no small measure responsible for the general lapse.

If the various considerations here adduced be carefully pondered, it will be seen how much ground exists to justify that profound distrust which non-Catholics feel in regard to the Church's whole attitude to the rightful claims of the human intellect. As on specific pieces of evidence, so on the general situation, the warning against obscurantism has been sounded not only by outsiders, but by some of the Church's loyal sons.[3] The accusation implied in this warning and this distrust is serious enough as it stands. It appears the more serious, the more closely one looks at what is involved in it. For seeing that the intellect

[1] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 49, 274–276, ii. 29 f, 87 f; Turner, *Creeds*, 84.

[2] On illiteracy among Catholics, see McCabe, *Popes*, v f, 178–180.

[3] Cf. the statements quoted from Döllinger (1863) by Hase (*Handbook*, ii. 476 f; cf. 482 mid.), and from Schell and Ehrhard by Bain, *New Reformation*, 16 f, 21 f: the latter noted "a widespread and earnest conviction that Catholicism is the enemy of modern culture, hinders its progress, and is to blame for modern culture not having produced more speedy and fruitful results . . ." In 1897 'Romanus' voiced the regrets of liberal Catholics at the "unscrupulous carelessness in dissociating the Church from scientific progress and identifying it with stupid, ignorant obscurantism" (*Contemp. Rev.* Dec. 1897, 859).

is the main instrument with which truth is grasped, to belittle or oppress the intellect is to do despite to truth.[1] Now whatever obscurity may still exist in the popular mind as to the need of untruth in certain extreme, unusual, and critical circumstances, the modern world entertains no doubt whatever that, in the field of history as in the field of science, in the field of religious history as in the field of secular history, the duty of truthfulness, i.e. the duty of proportioning one's belief to the varying strength of the evidence, is absolute.[2] This conviction is not, for the most part, the achievement or gift of Catholicism, but "may be said to date more especially from the writings of the great secular philosophers of the seventeenth century."[3] But whatever its origin, it has come to stay. The humanity of the future, we may safely predict, will not tolerate the giving of precedence, in matters of history, to any other interest than truthfulness in point of fact. "We may hear, if we will," wrote Edwin Hatch in 1888, "the solemn tramp of the science of history marching slowly, but marching always to conquest. It is marching in our day, almost for the first time, into the domain of Christian history. . . . It marches, as the physical sciences have marched, with the firm tread of certainty. It meets, as the physical sciences have met, with opposition, and even with contumely. . . We may march in its progress, not only with the confidence of scientific certainty, but also with the confidence of Christian faith. . . ."[4] Thus did Hatch reaffirm the great bond that links scientific history with religious experience. Scientific history brings us closer to the real truth of things, that is to say, closer to God. It is only in the pure love of truth that we reach a unity between the world of intellect and the world of morals. Intellectual accuracy is the inseparable counterpart of moral truthfulness. And the most unquestionable of all the attributes of God is truth.

Let the Roman Church look well to its own case in this matter. The arguments we have used are not sectarian arguments: they are simply human—and, what is more, human arguments founded on our

[1] "Rom, das allzeit die freie und wahrhaftige Forschung unterbunden, die wertvollsten wissenschaftlichen Werke verboten, die begabtesten und emsigsten Gelehrten verurteilt und zu demütigem Widerruf gezwungen hat, dieses Rom wagt noch vor aller Welt seine Feindschaft gegen die wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt abzuleugnen. Wer kann da an den Wahrheitssinn und Wahrheitswillen dieser Hierarchie noch glauben?" (Heiler, *Kathol.* 321). Cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 112 f ("perhaps there is nothing which gives to the minds of intelligent and truth-loving men so invincible a prejudice against the Ultramontane system and temper—nothing which so radically convinces them that it is not divine—as the certainty that Ultramontane writers will always be found manipulating facts and making out a case, will never behave as men who are loyally endeavouring to seek the light and present facts as they are").

[2] Cf. the powerful words of Huxley quoted by Sir Oliver Lodge, *Life and Matter* (1906) 70.

[3] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 401 f.

[4] Hatch, *Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages*, etc. 23 f.

belief in the truthfulness of that Holy Spirit with which God endows every man, and on the rationality and self-consistency of the universe that He has made. If our criticism of Rome is unjust, how comes it that it is so widely felt to be just, and that the effort to rebut it entails such a deal of highly subtle and often very evasive explanation? Indeed, it really seems as if, in their controversies, Protestants and Catholics were meaning widely different things by the common word 'truth,' which expresses what they both profess to be pursuing. To the Catholic a thing is true because the Church teaches it, and God has made the Church infallible: to the Protestant it is true because specific record or specific experience or specific reasoning substantiates it. "Stand thou on that side, for on this am I." Modern Protestantism has no skeleton in the cupboard—in the shape of awkward historical evidence which, because it can be neither annihilated nor accepted, must be either ignored or disguised. Its motto is 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.' With such a pledge as that, it is content to go on its way rejoicing, though it lack the thousand-and-one dignities and adornments that make those who condemn it seem more venerable.

> No blazoned banner we unfold—
> One charge alone we give to youth,
> Against the sceptred myth to hold
> The golden heresy of truth.

PART IV

THE ANSWER OF HUMAN JUSTICE

THE Roman Church proclaims herself to be infallible not only in matters of faith, but in the sphere of morals also. One way of expressing her pretensions in this latter field is to predicate of herself that 'holiness' which from New-Testament times (Ephes. v. 27) has ranked as a mark of the idealized Church of Christ. This title is not understood to mean that all her members on earth are free from moral blemish—indeed, the negative of this is frankly confessed; it means, in the first place, that her members are, on the whole and as compared with the members of other groups, pre-eminent in the exhibition of Christian saintliness; and, in the second place, that the official teaching of the Church is an absolutely reliable guide in the settlement of ethical questions. The Church expects the world to admit this claim: but if the men of the world are to admit it, clearly they can do so only if they possess some reliable means of measuring ethical values. If indeed the claim to be recognized as 'holy' is treated as a mere implicate of the general claim to infallibility, then it can be dealt with only as a fundamental philosophical problem; and we have already set forth our answer to it in that sense. But if the claim to 'holiness' is to be treated on its own merits, then it presupposes that prospective or potential believers already possess as outsiders moral vision sufficiently valid to enable them to know a holy Church when they see one. It is this moral vision that we mean here by 'human justice.' We need not suppose that it endows each individual with infallibility in the determination of special problems in ethics: but we must maintain that in the broad it is none other than God's own revelation of His holy Will to men. To say that on a particular point the conscientious conviction of an individual may need to be corrected by the truer conscientious conviction of the Church, is a general statement to which in the abstract no exception can be taken. But to defend the traditional ethic of the Church against the general, emphatic, and considered judgment of the most advanced sections of the human race, is to repudiate that very standard of human righteousness without which any intelligent recognition of the Church's moral excellence is impossible.

Now when the test here spoken of is applied to the Catholic system, there are found to exist in it—besides a number of phenomena which render its moral pre-eminence in practice questionable—two clear features that run so counter to the best ethical judgment of mankind that they can be regarded only as a fatal and final disproof of the Church's 'holiness' in the sense in which she claims it. These two features are—the doctrine of eternal punishment, and the policy of persecution.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE DOCTRINE OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT

The Christian doctrine of hell has its roots in the eschatology of late pre-Christian Judaism. It is true that views as to the punishment of the wicked after death were entertained and taught in certain religious circles among the Greeks, particularly the Pythagorean and Orphic brotherhoods: we find echoes of this teaching in the writings of Plato[1]; and it is not impossible that the wide diffusion of it may have exercised some influence on the development of patristic and mediaeval thought. But there can be little doubt that the chief elements in the Christian doctrine came from the Jewish seed-ground in which the Church sprang up.[2] The Christian belief, for instance, in the resurrection of the body is quite clearly a Jewish and not a Greek conception. Again, the idea of fire as an instrument of future punishment, while it bears some resemblance to the Stoics' ἐκπύρωσις, is far more closely related to Old-Testament and Jewish apocryphal teaching. In the Old Testament itself we find a general belief in Divinely-bestowed rewards and punishments, largely of a material nature, and the common assurance that God will one day wreak vengeance on the powerful foes of His chosen people. The unrighteous ones among the Israelites themselves would of course have to share this punishment; and a late passage (Isa. lxvi. 24: cf. l. 11) describes in gruesome terms the scene of their slaughter, without however necessarily implying that they were tormented after death. During the last two centuries before Christ—the period during which most of the Jewish apocryphal books were written—the doctrine as to the future punishment of the wicked developed extensively in variety and detail: and it is not very difficult to understand the psychological conditions that gave rise to it. Conscientious Jews looked with impotent wrath on the tyranny and impiety of the great heathen powers around them, and endured with the profoundest resentment the wrongs which these powers inflicted. Their time-serving fellow-countrymen who betrayed the religion of their fathers that they might enjoy the favour of the powers that be, they regarded with equal or even greater abhorrence. Normally powerless to restrain or to punish these various malefactors as they deserved, religious Jews projected their thirst for

[1] Cf. MacCulloch in *H.E.R.E.* v (1912) 374 f.

[2] Lecky, indeed, says of the Church's teaching: "Judaism had had nothing like it" (*Rationalism*, i. 313); but he wrote this in 1865, before the Jewish apocryphal literature had been fully studied or become widely known.

vengeance, as well as their longing for betterment, on to the screen that pictured for them the world to come. The more they suffered and the more impotent they felt, so much the more terrible was the fate they prophesied for their enemies. "Woe to the nations who rise up against my race: the Lord Almighty will punish them on the Day of Judgment, by putting fire and worms into their flesh: and they will weep and feel their pain for ever."[1] The precise description was of course complicated by the problem of the death of individuals; hence we read: "And many of them that sleep in the dusty ground will awake —some to eternal life, but some to reproaches, to eternal abhorrence."[2] Whether the Greek and Hebrew terms here translated 'for ever' or 'eternal' necessarily imply absolute perpetuity is open to doubt. In strict grammar they need not, but in the popular understanding they probably came to do so. Josephus, speaking of the Pharisees at the beginning of the first century A.D., ascribes to them belief in "*perpetual* punishment."[3] The Jewish writings of the period 200 B.C.–100 A.D. present an extraordinary variety in their detailed descriptions of future punishment: but torment and destruction by fire are constant features. By the beginning of the Christian era at latest, it had apparently become customary to locate the scene of punishment in 'Gehenna' (originally Ge-Hinnom, a valley south of Jerusalem): it was customarily spoken of as eternal, and this was in all probability usually understood to mean lasting torment; but it would be hazardous to deny that the phrases used might often indicate rather 'age-long' punishment or else final annihilation.

Now it is obvious that, if such was the origin of the Jewish conception of the hereafter, we to-day can allow that conception no higher authority than properly belongs to the vindictive fancy of the Jewish people—a people, indeed, highly moral and religious, and with grounds for their vindictiveness, but a people that had not yet seen a clear vision of the love of God, nor had yet learnt the Divine secret of trying to conquer evil with good. We have not the slightest ground for supposing that these Jewish writers knew by Divine inspiration more about the

[1] Judith xvi. 17 (. . . *ἐν αἰσθήσει ἕως αἰῶνος*): cf. Ben Sirach (vii. 17), xxxv. 18 f, xxxvi. 9; Enoch lxii. 11.

[2] Daniel xii. 2 (לְחַיֵּי עוֹלָם . . . לְדִרְאוֹן עוֹלָם).

[3] Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* II. viii. 14 (. . . *ἀϊδίῳ τιμωρίᾳ κολάζεσθαι*), *Antiq.* XVIII. i. 3 (. . . *εἱργμὸν ἀΐδιον* . . . .). It was undoubtedly one of the weak points in Farrar's *Eternal Hope* that, by pressing the strict meaning of עוֹלָם and *αἰώνιος* and rejecting the evidence of Josephus in favour of the later Talmud, he denied that the Jews of our Lord's day believed in everlasting punishment (xli, 80–83, 123 note, 196, 207–214, 219). On this point Pusey's reply in *Eternal Punishment* (46–49, 74–94, 98–102) was perfectly justified. There seems to be no clear evidence for a Jewish belief in a Gehenna of *limited duration* prior to the time of Akiba early in the second century; and the belief was far from unanimous even after that.

actual conditions of the future life than we do ourselves. Romanists would readily admit this in the case of those apocryphal books which do not happen to be included in the Latin Vulgate, for example, the Books of Enoch. Protestant traditionalists would for the most part admit it for all the apocryphal books, i.e. for virtually all the pertinent writings. In so far therefore as the Catholic doctrine of hell is dependent on this Jewish eschatology, we must be free to measure the truth and value of it by those tests whereby we measure the validity attaching to the varied contents of Scripture generally.

But, it will be asked, did not our Lord Himself give His sanction to the sharpest elements in this Jewish scheme of teaching?[1] The question is an important one and not easy to answer simply. It is however possible to outline the conditions under which our answer must be framed. In the first place, we must set aside those sayings of Jesus which have often been taken to refer to the life after death, but which are much more likely to have been warnings addressed to the nation against the folly of rejecting Jesus and drifting as a consequence into a bloody war with Rome (Lk. x. 12–15 = Mt. xi. 21–24; Lk. xii. 59 = Mt. v. 26; Lk. xiii. 3, 5, 6–9). Next, sufficient allowance has to be made for the doubtfulness that attaches to sayings reported only in the Gospel of 'Matthew.' The general grounds for this suspicion have already been given.[2] In the particular matter before us these grounds are strengthened by the obvious tendency of this Gospel to reinforce and emphasize our Lord's eschatological teaching. It is highly significant that the bulk of Jesus' reported sayings about future punishment are (as we shall see) found in 'Matthew.' The probability of exaggeration in one instance is so clear as almost to amount to demonstration. Mt. xxii. 6–7 does not fit the story of the marriage-feast at all well; it has no parallel in the Lucan version (Lk. xiv. 21); and it is almost certainly a late allusion 'post eventum' to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. When therefore we come to the great description of the Last Judgment in Mt. xxv. 31–46, which speaks of "the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels" (41), and where alone in the Gospels occurs the phrase "eternal punishment" (46), we cannot allow the tacit assumption that these are our Lord's ipsissima verba to pass unquestioned. The only interpretation that makes this parable really intelligible is that which treats it as an early Christian attempt to answer the naturally puzzling question as

[1] Dr. Orchard, for example, seems to build throughout on the assumption that all the words ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels were actually spoken by Him and are virtually infallible (*Foundations*, iv. 71 f, 113–115, 124, 165, 175).

[2] See above, pp. 209–212. At the same time it may be noted that Dr. Streeter's recent arguments in favour of assigning higher authority to Luke's material (e.g. *Four Gospels*, 221–235, etc.) lends additional weight to the *Lucan* version of sayings common to Luke and 'Matthew.'

to how *Gentiles* (πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, 32), who happened never to have been evangelized, would fare at the Last Judgment: the answer is that they will be judged by the kindness or neglect they had shown to poor and persecuted Christians in their midst—the Lord's lowly brethren. Some genuine saying of Jesus may lie at the basis of the passage; but if so, it cannot be exactly delimited, and we have no special reason to think that it must have included the words of verses 41 and 46. Another purely Matthaean phrase is that about being "cast out into the outer darkness" (Mt. viii. 12, xxii. 13, xxv. 30): two of its three occurrences (viii. 12, xxv. 30) are rendered still more doubtful by their divergence from the Lucan parallel (Lk. xiii. 28, xix. 27). The phrase "the weeping and the gnashing of teeth" was in all probability actually used by Jesus: but Luke records it only once (xiii. 28) and 'Matthew' six times (viii. 12, xiii. 42, 50, xxii. 13, xxiv. 51, xxv. 30), five of these six being otherwise dubious (three by association with the suspicious 'outer darkness,' and two [xiii. 42, 50] by their appearance in the interpretations of the parables of the Tares and the Net); and in any case the phrase says nothing about endless or fiery torment. It is probable also that Jesus spoke of Gehenna: but here again 'Matthew' leads the way as regards frequency. He includes the word in five of our Lord's sayings, only one of which has a parallel in Mark, and only one in Luke (Mk. ix. 43–48 = Mt. v. 29 f = Mt. xviii. 8 f; Lk. xii. 5 = Mt. x. 28: also Mt. v. 22, xxiii. 15, xxiii. 33): the latter is more concrete than its Lucan parallel (Luke, "cast into Gehenna": Mt., "destroy both soul and body in Gehenna"). But we are not told what precise meaning He gave to the word: He may well have been using it as part of the general machinery of His fellow-countrymen's thoughts, without committing Himself to a considered endorsement of its literal and most stringent meaning. The command to pluck out the offending eye and hew off the offending hand or foot (Mk. ix. 43–48 = Mt. v. 29 f, xviii. 8 f) is by general consent figurative: it is therefore in every way probable that the immediately ensuing words about Gehenna are figurative also.[1] The concluding phrase with which the passage is rounded off in Mark's version of it ("where their worm dies not, and the fire is not quenched") is simply a quotation from Isa. lxvi. 24, and originally described not torment, but the destruction of the bodies of the slain. In Mt. vii. 13f Jesus speaks of 'perdition' and the easy way to it which many take: but here again the Lucan parallel (xiii. 23 f) is briefer and does not mention 'perdition' ; and in any case 'perdition' (ἀπώλεια) does not mean *irreparable* loss, for the Greek word is simply

[1] Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 121–123. The fact that Jesus denied that the sexual relation would exist in the future life (Mk. xii. 25 = Mt. xxii. 30 = Lk. xx. 35 f) also points away from a literal and materialistic interpretation of His words.

the noun derived from the verb meaning 'to lose,' and 'the lost' were precisely the people our Lord came to seek and to save (Mt. x. 6, xv. 24, [xviii. 11]; Lk. xv, xix. 10). Terrible sayings like Lk. xvi. 23f and xix. 27 occur in parables, and cannot therefore be pressed, least of all in their literal sense. The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus simply takes the current cosmology for granted, while Luke's termination to the parable of the Servants entrusted with money belongs to the curious additional motif (king and citizens) worked into it, and may therefore be just as dubious as the differing Matthaean conclusion (Mt. xxv. 30). As for the necessary endlessness of future punishment, the announcement of few and of many stripes (Lk. xii. 47) excludes it: and it is nowhere else clearly threatened, except in the passages about the so-called unpardonable sin (Mk. iii. 28–30; Mt. xii. 31f; Lk. xii. 10). Even there, when we have made due allowance for the diversity in the form of the saying and as to the precise nature of the sin in question, it is doubtful whether we have more than an idiomatic declaration of its intense moral gravity. We must remember that there is such a thing as the idiom of thought as well as the idiom of words. To declare a sin unforgivable was an idiomatic Jewish way of branding it as supremely or uniquely sinful (e.g. Numb. xv. 30 f; 1 Sam. iii. 14; Isa. xxii. 14). How prone Jewish lips were to use words which in their strict meaning imply perpetuity, when the speaker did not really mean to convey such a sense, is seen from the phrase, which occurs thrice in the Psalms: "How long, O Yahweh, wilt thou . . . for ever?" (Ps. xiii. 1, lxxix. 5, lxxxix. 46). Just as our words 'constantly,' 'continually,' etc. are often used quite seriously by a well-understood hyperbole, when they are not meant in the absolute sense, so was it with the analogous terms in Hebrew and Aramaic. "If the Lord spoke as a Jew to Jews, and used a type of expression current in His day, and derived from the O. T., He meant, and would be understood to mean, no more than that blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, by whose power He worked, was a terrible sin,—more terrible than blasphemy against man."[1]

It has, however, to be admitted that such methods of criticism and exegesis, though perfectly legitimate, do not of themselves quite suffice to prove that our Lord did not believe in fiery torment and eternal punishment. This view is indeed tenable on the strength of the documents: but the documents do not *demonstrate* it. We cannot settle the problem without raising the question as to how far we may expect our Lord's teaching

[1] M'Neile, *St. Matthew*, 179b. On the unpardonable sin and on the precise meaning of *αἰώνιος*, etc. cf. Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 78 f, 112 n., 197–202, 216; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 38–46; Rashdall, *Idea of Atonement*, 56–58; A. D. Martin in *Congreg. Quart.* July 1925, 306–313.

to conform to our modern standards of consistency. The discrepancy between the teaching in the Gospels about Gehenna, etc., and the teaching about God's love for men, has appeared to some so profound that they have felt compelled to maintain that either the one or the other could not have emanated from Jesus at all, and that the former as the less original must have been erroneously ascribed to Him by His followers.[1] But it is doubtful whether this argument ought to be applied to more than that portion of the Gehenna-teaching which there are *other* special reasons for doubting. For the rest, it is probable that the solution may have to be sought in another direction. Our Lord was educated from infancy by parents and elders; we are told that He "increased in wisdom." Virtually all Christians admit that from such education He derived many beliefs which were generally held by His contemporaries in regard to past history and to the world of nature, but which modern research has now made untenable. If that be granted, is it possible to draw a sharp line of demarcation around such beliefs, and maintain that they included nothing concerning God's dealing with the world? If Jesus accepted the Aramaic language and idiom, the teaching of the Old Testament generally, and the current thoughts of His race and time on secular matters, it is not unreasonable to suppose that He would take for granted the main outlines of that eschatological theodicy with which the apocalyptists had familiarized the Jews, using it as the quasi-symbolic vehicle of His own spiritual appeal, advancing immeasurably beyond it in the richness and profundity of His own evangel, but not necessarily amending it in every detail in order to produce an entirely consistent scheme. Such a view ought not to be dismissed as derogatory to His supremacy as our Lord and Master; for it is by virtue of that very Spirit which proceeds continually from Him that we are helped to distinguish between the temporal and the eternal in the utterances which He is stated to have made on earth. The Gospel-teaching, therefore, while it convinces us unmistakably of the tragic seriousness of sin and the just severity with which our loving Father visits it, cannot fairly be claimed as necessitating belief in the unending torment of hell-fire or even in the final and irreparable perdition of a single soul.

The early Christian Church speedily found itself in a position very analogous to that of the post-exilic Jewish community. That is to say, the Christians were compelled to witness the iniquities of heathendom and to suffer its cruelties, not only without possessing any speedy means of restraint or cure, but even without that ethical sanction of human

[1] This, roughly, is the position taken up by Miss Dougall and Mr. Emmet in *The Lord of Thought* (1922).

resistance and vengeance which, under the Maccabees, had for a time afforded relief to the feelings of the Jews. It was therefore almost inevitable that Christian minds should avail themselves of the eschatological scheme lying ready to their hands as a means of discharging those vindictive passions which persecution naturally aroused, but which Christians believed themselves forbidden to indulge through actual human relationships. It is, however, of interest to observe that it needed the experience of persecution to bring out the full terror of the Christian forecast of the future. Paul has a doctrine of a fiery testing for Christians (1 Cor. iii. 12–15), and of "eternal destruction" of rebellious and hostile pagans (2 Thess. i. 6–9; etc., etc.): but he says nothing about never-ending or fiery torment. In 'Hebrews' it is somewhat similar, though the irremediable lapse of some (through apostasy) is more explicitly contemplated (Hebs. vi. 4–8, x. 26–31). It is only in the latest books of the New Testament, particularly in the Apocalypse (written as it was under the stimulus of a brutal persecution) that the doctrine is materially sharpened. In that book, indeed, the perpetual torment of idolaters and sinners is expressly taught (Rev. xiv. 9–11, xix. 3, xx. 10, 14f, xxi. 8). In the so-called 'Apocalypse of Peter' (120–140 A.D.) we have for the first time a detailed description—in the manner of Dante—of the various tortures assigned to various classes of sinners. Of the development of the doctrine in the early Fathers, we can say only that, despite much individual variety in detail and emphasis, much use of vague or inconclusive language, and a few tentative efforts in the direction of a more humane and spiritual view, the general tendency is towards an ever more and more precise doctrine of physical torment by material fire, throughout the whole unending future, for all who do not die in the fellowship of the Christian Church. The cessation of persecution about 313 A.D., and the consequent liberation of greater ecclesiastical resources for the contest with heresy, did but help to clarify and fix the teaching. Augustinus accepted it in all its unflinching barbarity; and the weight of his great name so fastened it on the neck of the Church that several centuries elapsed before the mildest deductions in the interests of common charity found acceptance.[1] The theory of Origenes and some others, to the effect that the future punishment of the wicked was not absolutely endless, but of limited duration and remedial, was condemned in a series of Synods, seemingly also in the Fifth Œcumenical Council of 553 A.D., and finally in the Lateran Council of 649 A.D.[2] Subject to certain very partial modifications to be mentioned presently, the

[1] See the extraordinary catena of passages collected by Pusey (*Eternal Punishment*, 150–284) from Christian writers of the second to the sixth centuries.

[2] Dale in Smith, *D.C.B.* iv. 142–156; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 1, 130–149.

doctrine of eternal hell-fire in the crude literal sense dominated the mind of Europe down to the seventeenth century.

Let us look again at the main features of this appalling picture of man's future. To begin with, the fate of each individual is believed to be unchangeably fixed for all eternity at the moment of physical death. The custom of praying for the dead indicates indeed that for a time the doctrine was not quite water-tight; but the looseness thus indicated was infinitesimal and transient. As to the infinite duration of the penalty, the repeated condemnation of Origenism left no doubt whatever. The view that condemned souls might possibly be annihilated does not seem to have been represented at all during the Middle Ages. Whatever forms beatitude or damnation might assume, as states they were believed by all to remain in perpetuity.[1]

Further, it followed from the supposedly well-known conditions of salvation, that only a small fraction of the human race could be saved; the overwhelming majority were destined to endure unending torment.[2] Included in the category of the damned, we have first of all, the Devil and his satellites the demons. The possibility that even the Devil might ultimately be redeemed was suggested by Origenes and discussed for a century or two by speculators who took an interest in his teaching. Finally, the question was decided in the negative; and the theory of the Devil's salvability figured as one of the flagrant heresies of the great Alexandrian scholar.[3] Then, hell contained also the countless millions of the heathen world, both of past and of present times: the

[1] See the summary of the preaching of Berthold of Regensburg (who flourished 1250 A.D.) quoted by Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 450 ("The tortures will endure as many thousand years as there are drops in the sea, or as the number of all the hairs that have grown on man and beast since God first made Adam; and then . . . the pains will only be at their beginning"). St. Bonaventura contended that the damned merit even more pain than they actually suffer (Coulton, *op. cit.* 72). Farrar (*Eternal Hope*, 67 f note) quotes the following, from the Catholic mystic Heinrich Suso (1300–1366): "Give us a millstone," say the damned, "as large as the whole earth, and so wide in circumference as to touch the sky all round, and let a little bird come once in a hundred thousand years and pick off a small particle of the stone not larger than the tenth part of a grain of millet, and after another hundred thousand years let him come again, so that in ten hundred thousand years he would pick off as much as a grain of millet; we wretched sinners would desire nothing but that thus the stone might have an end, and thus our pains also: yet even that cannot be!" Cf. *Catech. Rom.* I. viii. 11 ("neque ulla spes eos consolari poterit, fore aliquando ut tanto bono perfruantur"), I. xii. 14 ("eidem etiam divinae justitiae consentaneum fuit, ut . . . mali . . . sempiternas poenas luentes, quaererent mortem et non invenirent; optarent mori, et mors fugeret ab eis. Atque haec quidem immortalitas bonis malisque communis erit").

[2] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 311, 314–316, 319, 321, 367, *Morals*, ii. 219 f; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 12 f, 67 f, 145 f, 369, 430, 445–449 (quotation of a number of extraordinarily pessimistic mediaeval estimates).

[3] Cf. Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 158 (quoting Burns' well-known lines); Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 28–30, 35, 125 f, 130 f, 148, 231–234, 236, 238, 242, 280.

virtues shown by the heroes of classical antiquity were acknowledged; but—since the men themselves lacked faith—their virtues were but 'splendida vitia,' and at the best could secure for them but a somewhat lighter degree of torment. The ninth century biographer of Gregorius the Great (about 540–604 A.D.) relates that this Pope, struck with the virtues of the former Emperor Trajanus, prayed for his salvation, and in reply was promised that, though not withdrawn from hell, Trajanus should be freed from the torments which the other pagans endured, on condition that Gregorius should never offer such a prayer again. Along with the pagans went the unconverted Jews and also the heretics and schismatics. The doctrine was laid down with the utmost precision in the bull issued in 1441 by Eugenius IV from the Œcumenical Council of Florence: it stated that the Roman Church "firmly believes, professes, and preaches, that none who are not within the Catholic Church, not only (not) pagans, but neither Jews, nor heretics, nor schismatics, can become partakers of eternal life, but that they will go into the eternal fire, 'which has been prepared for the devil and his angels,' unless they are gathered into the same (Church) before the end of life: . . . and that no one, however much almsgiving he may have done, even if he has poured out his blood for the name of Christ, can be saved, unless he remains in the bosom and unity of the Catholic Church."[1] Finally, infants that die without undergoing baptism are consigned to the torments of hell. Again it was Augustinus whose influence committed the Western Church to this belief. He repudiated the Pelagian suggestion that such children were sent to a special region between heaven and hell, and insisted that they were punished in the eternal fire, though with a "mitissima poena." The logic of the position was irresistible: every child is born with the stain of original sin upon it; that stain can be wiped away only by baptism; if therefore the child dies unbaptized, it departs into the next world unreconciled to God, and must therefore suffer the full consequences. It costs us an effort to-day to believe that this outrageous doctrine, in all its naked cruelty, was the accepted view of Western Christendom (for the Eastern Fathers were less ruthless) during many centuries. That children dying unbaptized went, not simply to hell, but to the torment of eternal fire, was declared in more or less express terms by the Gallican Archbishop Avitus (about 450–523 A.D.), by the influential African Bishop Fulgentius (468–533 A.D.), and by the Spanish scholar Isidorus of Seville (about 560–636 A.D.). Odo, abbot of Cluny in

[1] Bull *Cantate Domino* in Mirbt 237 (34): see above, pp. 44–47. Cf. Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 69 f, 449 f (evidence for popularly accepted view about 1250 A.D.); also Lecky, *Morals*, ii. 219 f. On Trajanus, cf. Lecky, *l.c.*; Daniell in Smith, *D.C.B.* iv (1887) 1041b; Coulton, *op. cit.* i. 450. The matter in question is ignored in K. Löffler's article on 'Trajan' in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 15 f.

the tenth century, speaks of God condemning such infants to all eternity. In the eleventh century, the saintly Anselm holds the same view. In the thirteenth, Thomas Aquinas forbade mothers to pray for the unbaptized children they had lost. In 1439 the Œcumenical Council of Florence, following the example of the Œcumenical Second Council of Lyons in 1274, declared that "the souls of those who depart in actual mortal sin *or in original* (*sin*) alone, descend forthwith to hell, to be punished, however, with different penalties." The inexorable statement of the doctrine by Fulgentius was enshrined in the Canon Law of the Church, and was quoted as such by the great fifteenth-century preacher Meffret. In the sixteenth century, the Council of Trent insisted in the clearest terms on the absolute necessity of baptism as a condition of salvation, and refrained from anathematizing the Lutheran view that children dying unbaptized suffered eternal torment. In 1564 the 'Roman Catechism' declared that men, "unless they are reborn to God through the grace of baptism, are brought forth by their parents, whether these be believers or unbelievers, unto eternal misery and death."[1]

In regard to the nature of the punishment suffered by the damned, this consists essentially of complete severance from God and the loss of every help and consolation for which men are dependent upon Him.[2] That of itself involves the most unutterable misery. But that is not all. Christian authors are unanimous in using the word 'fire' to describe the torment suffered; and there is no doubt whatever that this word was normally understood in its literal and physical sense. Apart from the fact that its primâ facie meaning suggests the most intense physical suffering, the explicit statements of many of the fathers from the second century onwards prove beyond question that the literal and natural interpretation was usually taken for granted.[3] The official 'Roman Catechism' repeatedly insists that both the punishments and the rewards of the future life will be perceptible to the senses, and connects this view directly with the doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh.[4] The notion of enduring the utmost conceivable physical

[1] See above, p. 407. Cf. also Mirbt 234 (20); Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 360–367, 386; Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 208a; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 45, 68, 73, 172 f, 430, 442–445, 451.

[2] For a full account of what is included in the so-called 'poena damni,' see Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 210b, 211a,b.

[3] Cf. Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 28, 344, 348 n. 2.

[4] *Catech. Rom.* I. vi. 23 (2), viii. 6 (3), 8, 11 ("Sequitur deinde: In ignem aeternum, quod quidem alterum poenarum genus, poenam sensus Theologi vocarunt: propterea quod sensu corporis percipiatur, ut in verberibus et flagellis, aliove graviore suppliciorum genere: inter quae dubitari non potest, tormenta ignis summum doloris sensum efficere; cui malo cum accedat ut perpetuum tempus duraturum sit, ex eo ostenditur damnatorum poenam omnibus suppliciis cumulandam esse: . . ."), xii. 1 ff, esp. 9, 12 ("nam quo plura membra habebunt, tanto acerbiori dolorum cruciatu conficientur:

agony throughout all eternity invited the mediaeval mind to indulge its powers of imagination in the most extraordinary way. A popular preacher of the thirteenth century taught that "the sinner suffers as many deaths as the motes that dance in the sun. If thy whole body were of red-hot iron, and the whole world, from earth to heaven, one vast fire, and thou in the midst, that is how a man is in hell, but that he is an hundredfold worse. And when, at the Last Day, soul and body are united again, and the two together must go back to hell, then will the damned feel it as much worse as the plunge from cool dew into a mountain of fire. . . ."[1] The conception of hell as portrayed in numerous mediaeval descriptions has been summarized as follows. "The saint was often permitted in visions to behold the agonies of the lost, and to recount the spectacle he had witnessed. He loved to tell how by the lurid glare of the eternal flames he had seen millions writhing in every form of ghastly suffering, their eyeballs rolling with unspeakable anguish, their limbs gashed and mutilated and quivering with pain, tortured by pangs that seemed ever keener by their recurrence, and shrieking in vain for mercy to an unpitying heaven. Hideous beings of dreadful aspect and of fantastic forms hovered around, mocking them amid their torments, casting them into cauldrons of boiling brimstone, or inventing new tortures more subtle and more refined. . . . There was no respite, no alleviation, no hope. The tortures were ever varied in their character, and they never palled for a moment upon the senses. Sometimes . . . the flames while retaining their intensity withheld their light. A shroud of darkness covered the scene, but a ceaseless shriek of anguish attested the agonies that were below."[2]

One thing only was lacking to fill the cup of cruelty to the brim, and that was—to represent the sufferings of the damned as an enjoyable spectacle for the saved. The Church not only discouraged as futile the offering-up of prayer by the living on behalf of those doomed to hell,[3] but taught distinctly that one of the joys of the blessed in heaven would be the sight of the damned writhing in the infernal flames. The historical origin of this revolting notion is simply the vindictiveness

quare illa membrorum restitutio, non ad eorum felicitatem, sed calamitatem ac miseriam est redundatura: . . . nam . . . illis . . . qui eamdem" [sc. poenitentiam] "contempserint, ad supplicium restituentur"), 15 (". . . damnatis, quorum corpora, licet incorruptibilia sint, aestuare tamen possunt atque algere, variisque cruciatibus affici").

[1] Bernhardt's summary of the teaching of Berthold of Regensburg, quoted by Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 450. Cf. the almost equally lurid description by an eminent monk of the twelfth century, quoted *ibid.* 452, 457.

[2] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 317 f; cf. 311, 314 f, 319, 321, *Morals*, ii. 219–225.

[3] Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 28, 173, 442 n., 450; Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 209a, 209 f. I take it that the charitable prayer, commended in *Catech. Rom.* IV. v. 2 (7), on behalf of those "qui peccare dicuntur ad mortem," refers only to *living* sinners. Scripture—1 Jn. v. 16 (cf. Jn. xvii. 9).

felt against hateful enemies as expressed in the Old-Testament phrase 'to see (one's desire) upon' so-and-so (Ps. cxii. 8, cxviii. 7: cf. xxii. 17, Micah vii. 10; Obad. 12f; Ezek. xxviii. 17; Isa. lxvi. 24). The visibility of the torments of hell appears in Jewish apocalyptic (Enoch lxii. 12; 4 Ezra vii. 61, 93). In the Apocalypse of John (xiv. 10) the wicked are tortured "in the presence of the holy angels and in the presence of the Lamb." Sporadic allusion to the belief occurs in the early Fathers (e.g. 2 Clem. xvii. 5). The rhetorical Tertullianus, in a lurid and oft-quoted passage ('Spect.' 30), consoles his fellow-Christians for the present deprivation of circus-shows by holding out to them the delightful prospect of seeing their heathen enemies writhing in flames in the next world. In the Middle Ages, the idea that part of the reward of the saved would consist of beholding the sufferings of the lost became a generally accepted article of belief. Even the saintly Francis of Assisi is found thanking God that the accursed ones will be sent to eternal fire:[1] but the doctrine in its full form was quite explicitly stated by such influential and representative teachers as Peter Lombard (about 1100–1160), Bonaventura (1221–1274), and Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274).[2]

Our minds to-day stagger at the task of endeavouring to realize and appraise the quality and the effects of this formidable doctrine, as elaborated, fixed, and taught by the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages. It is impossible not to observe the rigour and detail with which it was set forth, and the awful vividness with which it impressed itself on the minds of men generally. What gloom, what terror, what maddening despair it must have imparted to innumerable persons whose sufferings have left no distinct mark on the page of history! What unspeakable agony it must have brought to multitudes of poor ignorant women, whose newly born treasures were bereft of life ere baptism could be administered![3] Before we attempt to express ourselves further upon it, let us guard ourselves in advance against a reproach which it is easy and in a way natural to level against its critics.[4] Let us recognize

[1] Sabatier, *Life*, 256.

[2] See Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 319 n., 323; Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 66; and Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 28, 45, 441 f.

[3] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 313, 317–319, 363 f, 366 f n.; Heiler, *Kathol.* 216. It is the fashion of modern Catholics to decry as absurd the notion that the doctrine of hell was a cause of depression and misery in the Middle Ages (e.g. Maycock, *Inquis.* 14–16). Doubtless accurate generalization is difficult, and exaggeration easy; the mediaeval mind had its own ways of protecting itself against madness and despair: but it is inconceivable that such a hell could have been accepted as an actuality without occasioning much anguish.

[4] Cf. Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 158: "To deny this" (the possibility of eternal self-identification with evil—as if even that carried the Catholic hell with it) "is to show defective realization of the seriousness of moral issues, a blindness to the gravity of wilful sin, which tends to result in a falsely optimistic and immoral pantheism."

explicitly that the love and Fatherhood of God do not mean mere indulgent amiability, the whole purpose of which is exhausted in making things pleasant for us. Let us admit that God's love includes a severe and stringent discipline, that He does not regard or treat sin as other than fundamentally grave, that he does prescribe for us, though in a mysterious way indeed and under puzzling conditions, disappointment and pain as part of that loving discipline which sin necessitates. Having thus cleared the ground, it remains to characterize the mediaeval Catholic doctrine of hell in the way it deserves. The story of its origin and development robs it of all claim to be believed as true; and its atrocious and extreme cruelty renders it a standing outrage against man's intelligence, his sense of justice, and his feelings of charity, and a standing denial of the goodness and love of God. If the inward grounds on which this judgment rests, namely, intelligence, justice, and charity —"the likest God within the soul"—are insecure, then we are landed in the contradictory position of having enough inward enlightenment to appreciate the authority of Scripture and of the Fathers, but not enough to pronounce these mistaken when they impart to us teachings that violate the clearest and most sacred convictions of the soul.[1]

The protest of the liberal conscience against the traditional doctrine of hell has been so clear and emphatic that Catholics have felt themselves driven to minimize its horrors in every possible way.[2] Some of these minimizations are real, others are largely illusory. Among the latter is the suggestion that the doctrine of Purgatory gives the Catholic teaching about hell an advantage over the Protestant teaching.[3] This indeed may be granted in so far as the doctrine of Purgatory asserts that disciplinary and remedial pains may have to be endured in the future life; but when it is remembered that those whom Protestantism used to consign to hell, went to hell according to Catholic teaching also, whereas most of those whom Protestantism sent to heaven went, according to Catholicism, to the dreadful torments of Purgatory, it becomes clear that, of the two, Catholicism has no advantage whatever as regards mercy. Further, there is the important point that, while modern

[1] Farrar was perfectly right in contending (*Eternal Hope*, vii, xxxii, xxxiv, xli n., lvii, lxiii f, 53, 71, 73–75, 93, 96, 98, 110 f, 113–115, etc. etc.) that the evidence of the Christian conscience is of decisive importance on this point: but his other assumption that whatever was clearly taught in Scripture must be believed as true had an evil effect upon his exegesis.

[2] On the general modern tendency to 'water down' the doctrine, cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 311, 335 ("a few vague sentences on the subject of 'perdition' "), 365; Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, lvi; Stanton, *Authority*, 50.

[3] E.g. Shane Leslie in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 478 ("Oddly enough, it is the Protestant Churches who to-day teach a Hell undiluted by Purgatory"); G. K. Chesterton, *Superstitions of the Sceptic*, 34 ("Purgatory was conceived as the place of expiation for venial sins, with a background of hope. They cut it out"); Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 81 f, 93 f.

Protestants are free to believe in Purgatory, modern Catholics are not free to abandon belief in hell.

Again, it is frequently pleaded in reply to criticism on concrete points, that the Church has not definitely laid down any particular doctrines in regard to them.[1] This is, of course, simply the old plea that Catholicism is not to be blamed for such and such a belief, because that belief does not happen to have been laid down infallibly ex cathedra. Whatever the distinction may be worth in matters of history, it has little or no relevance to the present question, which is one—not of historical fact—but of moral judgment. We are considering, not what is the legal and official minimum which a Catholic is bound to believe about hell, but rather, what is the moral quality of those beliefs that have been and are normally taught and accepted in the Catholic Church. Similarly unsatisfying is the appeal sometimes made to-day, both by Romanists and Anglo-Catholics, to our great ignorance in regard to the precise conditions obtaining in the next life.[2] The appeal is unsatisfying because it involves an *unacknowledged* abandonment of a great deal of teaching quite unmistakably insisted on by the Church in former days, and also because it is not carried far enough. Despite our ignorance, we are yet supposed to know that God certainly does inflict eternal torment.

While the resources of language have been strained to the utmost in the endeavour to describe the intensity of the pains of hell, it has always been believed that not all are tormented with equally severe pains. Augustinus, for instance, accorded to unbaptized infants a "mitissima poena," and admitted that there were different grades and degrees of suffering. In the thirteenth century we find Berthold of Regensburg saying that noble pagans are in less torment than the positively wicked. The same principle of gradation according to demerit appears in Dante's 'Inferno,' in the conciliar pronouncements of 1274 and 1439, and in the most up-to-date Catholic teaching.[3] The suggestion has also been advanced from time to time that some intermission or mitigation of agony may sometimes be mercifully granted by God to the damned. Augustinus conceded this in rebutting the argument

[1] The argument is used by Anglo-Catholics as well as Romanists: cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 308; also Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 207b (as to position of hell), 209ab (as to possibility of proving eternal punishment by reason), 210a,b (power of damned to do a good deed), etc. (see below).

[2] Cf. Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 207 f (situation of hell); P. R. Pies summarized in *Theol. Litzg.* 1926. 10. 285 ("Was Gott mit den Heiden tut, wissen wir nicht; . . ."); Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 23, 280 f (". . . It is wisest, surely, to leave all blindly in His Hands, . . ."); Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 308; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 98 (quoting Pusey and R. W. Church).

[3] See above, p. 31. Cf. Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 211a; C. C. Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 324; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 442, 450, 473.

that punishment was not eternal.[1] His contemporary, the poet Prudentius, also took this view. The mediaeval suggestions were varied and fanciful. Those who have even one good action to their credit are granted at times a portion of manna from heaven to sustain them in their agony. The unfaithful angels repose each Easter-day on a beautiful island. Even Judas enjoys respite on a barren rock. St. Michael and St. Paul, after seeing the horrible torments of the damned, implored God to grant them relief every Sunday. Other suggestions were that condemned souls would become clinkered by perpetual roasting, and so grow insensible to pain—or that God would finally give them a comfortable refuge even under Satan's nose.[2] Present-day Catholic opinion on the point does not seem to be quite uniform. On the one hand, we are assured that there may be accidental changes in the pains of hell, and that 'the Church' has never expressly condemned the opinion that mitigation of suffering is granted.[3] "How far the love of God may and does attenuate certain of the accidental consequences of a state so intolerable, is His secret. We surely may trust that to His love"[4] (!). On the other hand, Thomas Aquinas condemned this view, and modern Catholic theologians are said to be "justly unanimous in rejecting it."[5] The Catholic biologist Mivart in 1892 argued that the pains of the damned decrease until they are even able to enjoy a certain natural happiness, and are better off than if they had never been born. This is very much the view that has recently been defended by a prominent Anglo-Catholic scholar.[6] Mivart's views, however, were condemned by the Holy Office, and he was later excommunicated.[7]

A much more considerable relief seems to be afforded by the plea that 'the Church' has never formally censured or repudiated the view that the fiery torments of the damned are of a mental and spiritual, and not of a corporeal, nature, that therefore it is perfectly open to any loyal Catholic to take that view of them, and that as a matter of fact several of the early Fathers (particularly in the East) and some Catholic theologians of recent centuries have done so.[8] The same, of course,

[1] Cf. Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 240–242.

[2] See H. V. Routh on 'This world's ideas of the next' in *Essays and Studies by members of the English Association*, xi (1925) 128–132; Coulton in *Hibb. Journ.* April 1916, 599 f, also *Five Centuries*, i. 68 (with n.3), 72. The instances quoted date from cents. viii–xiii.

[3] Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 211b.

[4] Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 157.

[5] Hontheim in *l.c.*

[6] C. Harris in *H.E.R.E.* xi (1920) 837b.

[7] Hontheim in *l.c.*; Aveling in *Cath. Encyc.* x (1911) 408a: cf. Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 52.

[8] Cf. Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, xxxv; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 18–21, 23 (12), 229; Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 210 f; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 97; Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 83, 120 f. Dr. Orchard strains every nerve to minimize the Catholic doctrine down to the point of acceptability, e.g. ". . . There is no need to increase the suffer-

holds good with regard to the character of purgatorial pains. Let the prospective convert to Catholicism take what comfort he may in the privilege here offered to him: only let him remember that, if he avails himself of it, he will be parting company with the vast majority of Catholics past and present, will be rejecting the doctrine repeatedly and explicitly taught in the official and authoritative 'Roman Catechism,'[1] and will not be able to pronounce the literal interpretation mistaken without rendering himself liable to the charge of 'temerariousness,' if not to more serious consequences.[2] And beyond all that, he must still believe that the damnation of the damned is eternal and irreversible.[3]

Another means of lessening the burden imposed on Christian hearts is the removal of various classes of people either from the torments of hell or from hell altogether. Thus the righteous who lived before Christ are believed by Catholics to have been kept prior to His Ascension in a 'limbus patrum,' from which His death freed them for transfer to heaven, and which is now consequently empty. The idea apparently grew up on the basis of 1 Peter iii. 19f, and proved a fruitful topic of speculative fancy in the Middle Ages. Modern Catholic teaching inclines to the view that the 'limbus patrum' is not a part of hell itself. This differs from the mediaeval idea as seen in the fourteenth-century miracle-play, 'The Harrowing of Hell,' according to which Christ rescues Adam, Eve, Abraham, David, John the Baptist, and Moses from hell, "this dredful hous," where they have been suffering pain.[4]

Analogous to the 'limbus patrum,' and, according to some, immediately beneath it, is the 'limbus infantium,' 'parvulorum,' or 'puerorum,' where infants who die unbaptized, but with no other than original sin upon them, remain eternally, without indeed the vision of God, but free from positive pain or torment. The notion that such children—whether in hell or not—are at least not tormented, forced itself upon the Catholic mind in the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The credit of leading the revolt against the detestably cruel tradition inherited from Augustinus belongs to the heterodox Abailard (1079–1142). His pupil, the influential Peter Lombard (about 1100–1160), gave his support to the humaner review; and in process of time the notion of a special region of hell set apart for unbaptized innocents crystallized

ings of Hell by making one of its conditions the tedium of unending time; . . . There is no more time in Hell than in Heaven; both are in eternity . . ." (124; cf. 121, 125 f).

[1] See above, p. 531 f n. 4. [2] See below, pp. 541 f.

[3] Cf. Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 209b (the idea that God might occasionally liberate a soul from hell is said not to infringe any express Catholic dogma, but to be undoubtedly mistaken).

[4] See Pollard's *English Miracle Plays*, 166–172; and cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 207; Routh (see above, p. 536 n. 2) 120 f, 137, 143; Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 207a, 209b; Toner in *op. cit.* ix (1910) 256ab.

into a more or less regular doctrine. As such, it was taught by Thomas Aquinas (1226–1274) and the later Schoolmen, with the added suggestion that the tenants of the place enjoy a natural happiness.[1] By the time of the Reformation, belief in the 'limbo of infants' was fairly general, though neither the decrees of Trent nor the 'Roman Catechism' mention it,[2] and there were still eminent Catholics who thought that the Schoolmen had been too lenient.[3] In 1794 the Pope declared that the repudiation of limbo as a Pelagian fable was "false, temerarious, (and) injurious to the Catholic schools."[4] Modern Catholics still seem uncertain as to whether this 'limbo' is a part of hell, or is outside it: the inclination is towards the latter view; and, in conformity with the modern spirit, stress is now laid on the great though limited natural happiness which children in limbo are able to enjoy.[5] The contradiction between this position and the "eternal misery and death" of the 'Roman Catechism'—and still more the "ignis aeterni sempiterno supplicio" of the sainted Fulgentius—is too glaring either to escape notice or to need fuller elaboration.[6]

A further exemption is allowed in the interests of pagans and heretics of good character. The original position had been that all such went into the eternal fire; and this was officially and emphatically laid down by the Pope in 1441. The removal of the Emperor Trajanus, not from hell, but from its torments, through the prayers of Pope Gregorius (590–604 A.D.) was explained as a special case, which was not to be treated as a precedent.[7] Yet the manifest injustice of this view came to be deeply felt, and mitigations began to be introduced. A thirteenth century preacher taught that worthy pagans suffered lighter torment than the wicked.[8] The Schoolmen introduced various theoretical devices for justifying the belief that they were free from punishment, if not capable of true salvation. According to Dante, Vergilius and

[1] Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 442; Rashdall, *Atonement*, 378, 389. Cf. also Dante, *Purg.* vii. 31 ("parvoli innocenti").

[2] Wilhelm's statement (*Cath. Encyc.* xiii [1912] 121a) that *Catech. Rom.* dealt with the subject of Limbo seems to be mistaken. For the doctrine taught on the subject by *Catech. Rom.*, see above, pp. 407 f, 531.

[3] Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 443.

[4] Bull *Auctorem fidei*, 28 Aug. 1794, prop. 26.

[5] Cf. Fanning in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 267; Toner in *op. cit.* ix (1910) 256b–259a; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 338 n. (". . . natural happiness, surpassing, as we may well believe, all that earth offers of delight . . . Let not, then, the Catholic faith be accused of cruelty towards such . . ."); Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 443; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 235 f.

[6] See above, pp. 530 f, and cf. Coulton, *l.c.* Father Knox, however, is ready (*l.c.*) with his explanation: "*in statu miseriae*, a phrase which is perfectly well understood as merely contrasting the natural with the supernatural life"—a very obvious afterthought.

[7] See above, p. 530.

[8] Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 450.

other blameless pagans were in hell, but in a region of it where they suffered no other pain than the privation of the beatific vision for which they longed.[1] A little later, in the fourteenth century, Langland considered it to be our duty to pray for the souls of Aristoteles and Socrates; Rulman Merswin, a Strassburg banker, contended that an honest Jew or pagan was on his deathbed supplied by God with an equivalent for baptism, namely the baptism of desire, and consequently attained everlasting life; and a similar view was taken by the preacher Sacchetti.[2] Nowadays, it is declared either that Scripture and the Church do not tell us what God does with the heathen, or that good pagans belong to 'the Soul of the Church' and thus attain some form of real salvation,[3] or else that, although "technically they are 'in hell,'" they are free from suffering, and enjoy a natural happiness.[4] As for the position of well-meaning heretics and schismatics, who ex hypothesi would submit to Rome if they were convinced that she were the true Church, and, even if unbaptized, may be said to have received the 'baptism of desire,' they too belong to 'the Soul of the Church' and attain to salvation, though the bliss enjoyed in heaven will vary according to the degree of virtue reached on earth.[5] It is quite clear that this relatively recent doctrine of 'the Soul of the Church' is, despite all verbal juggling, a real abandonment of the ex-cathedra dogma: "Extra ecclesiam nulla salus."[6] In this, as in other questions, the more Rome endeavours to come to terms with modern criticism, the more hopeless are the inconsistencies into which she falls.

The brilliant idea has even occurred to some that no one will be finally damned. Who knows? The Church has never formally condemned universalism, and has always refrained on principle from declaring that any particular individual has gone to hell. He would indeed be a bold Catholic who should declare that none were lost: it is normally taken for granted that the damnation of the devil, the fallen angels, Judas, and a few other individuals at least, is certain. But apart from them, there is room for the brightest hopes. Cardinal Manning once spoke of hell as a place of eternal punishment eternally untenanted.

[1] Dante, *Inferno*, iv. 24 ff, *Purg.* vii. 25–36.

[2] Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 450 f.

[3] See above, pp. 59–61: and cf. Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 8, 10, 23; C. Lylburn, *Our Faith*, ii (1908) 77–88; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 338 n.

[4] Martindale, *loc. cit.* A special treatise on the whole subject has been written by Paul R. Pies, *Die Heilsfrage der Heiden*; but it is known to me only through Fendt's review in *Theol. Litzg.* 1926. 10. 283–285.

[5] C. Lylburn, *Our Faith*, ii. 80 f; Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 536 (quoting Pius IX's allocution of 1854); Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 125–127, 138 (but it is an exaggeration to say that the salvability of the heathen has been "tenaciously held by the Catholic Church").

[6] See above, pp. 44–61.

The innumerable facilities for escaping from hell have been taken as proving that in the Middle Ages the belief in its existence did not possess that terror which we commonly ascribe to it. Of course, if there are to be no living souls writhing in the flames, there is no cruelty in raising their temperature to the *n*th degree, though the difficulty of understanding how a loving God could even threaten sinners with it still remains. However, let the Roman Church choose which she prefers, to stand her trial on a charge of cruelty, or else to admit the patent alternative, namely, that her doctrines have at times to be abandoned and her ex-cathedra dogmas reinterpreted in a radically new sense.[1]

But despite all these qualifications and suggestions, the doctrine in its broad features remains as a fixed tenet of the Roman Church to-day, and certain parts of it are strongly retained by Anglo-Catholics also. Modern Romanists are prepared to reaffirm with emphasis their Church's belief in eternal punishment in general,[2] and in particular, the beliefs that the fate of the damned is irrevocably fixed at death,[3] and that their punishment commences immediately after death,[4] and continues throughout all eternity.[5] The general contention of Anglicans of all schools is that the final and irreversible alienation of the soul from

[1] Cf. Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, xxxv; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 6–17, 23; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 325, 340; T. A. Lacey in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 473 f; Shane Leslie *ibid.* 478; Routh (see above, p. 536 n. 2) 127, 137: also C. Harris in H.*E.R.E.* xi (1920) 836 f (few or none will be damned); Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 124–127 (error to suppose most will be damned). But see below, n. 5 fin.

[2] Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 208a (quoting Athanasian Creed: ". . . everlasting fire"), 209a; Wilhelm in *op. cit.* 261a (fate of formal heretics—"flames of eternal fire"); Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 320 ("Those who die in original sin, or with grave personal sin unrepented, go forthwith to hell, . . ."); Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 237 f (real apostates certainly damned).

[3] Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 209a (view confirmed by great significance of the moment of death and general belief of mankind), 209b (otherwise God would have made it clear: repentance, etc. impossible in the next life), 210ab (lengthy exposition of the morally irremediable condition of the damned); Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 326 (". . . complete, irreversible soul-suicide, the act of dying with the will rebellious against God's"): so also Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 57–61, 74, 83, 93 f, 116, 126 (full defence). Individual Catholics, like Schell, have dissented; but their views are disapproved (Hontheim in *op. cit.* 208b). Some Anglo-Catholics have accepted the usual Roman view (e.g. Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 6 n., 17 f); others have preferred to take the Last Judgment as the 'terminus ultra quem non' (N. P. Williams in *Congress-Report 1923*, 172 f).

[4] Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 208a; J. A. McHugh in *op. cit.* viii (1910) 550b–552a; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 320.

[5] Gilavert, *Influence of Cath.* 11, 101; Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 208a, 209ab, 210b ("Their consciousness that God . . . is their enemy for ever"); Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 320, 326; Watkin, *ibid.* 156 (possibility of a fixed and irrevocable reprobation); Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 116. For a general Catholic re-affirmation of all these doctrines, coupled with a repudiation of the idea of an empty hell as a "facile joke" and "an evasion of God's revelation," see Dr. J. P. Arendzen in *Daily News*, 15 June 1928, 8, and 22 June, 1928, 8.

God must be accepted as at least an open possibility.[1] Catholics of all types seem to be unanimous in denying the possibility that children who die unbaptized can ever attain to salvation. When Herman Schell (in 1893) argued that such children might enter heaven, his statements called forth a storm of protest, and his book was placed on the Index.[2]

Modern Catholicism is as solid as it can be (in the absence of an unmistakably infallible dogmatic definition) in insisting that hell-fire is not to be understood metaphorically, but literally, and that future punishment includes 'pains of sense.' That view is, as we have seen, repeatedly taught in the 'Roman Catechism,' to which we are still referred to-day as an authoritative statement of Catholic doctrine. As late as the middle of the last century, popular Catholic manuals were exploiting the imaginary horrors of hell in the most unrestrained way.[3] In 1892 the Holy Inquisition, presided over by Leo XIII, issued a

[1] Even Farrar took this view (*Eternal Hope*, xiii f, xxix, 71 n., 86 n., 104, 227). Cf. Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 27; Pinchard in *Congress-Report 1920*, 147; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 306, 327 f; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 97–99: cf. Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 117–120, 128.

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 222 (". . . dieses ebenso unchristliche wie hässliche Theologumenon . . ."). Cf. Martindale in *op. cit.* 338 n.; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 11; Fanning in *Cath. Encyc.* ii (1907) 266 f; and (most recently) Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 110, iv. 126.

[3] Lecky (*Morals*, ii. 223 f) quotes the following sentences from *The Sight of Hell*, by Rev. John Furniss, C.S.S.R., published about 1860 'permissu superiorum.' "See! on the middle of that red-hot floor stands a girl; she looks about sixteen years old. Her feet are bare. . . . Listen! she speaks. She says, I have been standing on this red-hot floor for years. Day and night my only standing-place has been this red-hot floor. . . . Look at my burnt and bleeding feet. Let me go off this burning floor for one moment, only for one single short moment. . . . The fourth dungeon is the boiling kettle . . . in the middle of it there is a boy . . . His eyes are burning like two burning coals. Two long flames come out of his ears. . . . Sometimes he opens his mouth, and blazing fire rolls out. But listen! there is a sound like a kettle boiling. . . . The blood is boiling in the scalded veins of that boy. The brain is boiling and bubbling in his head. The marrow is boiling in his bones. . . . The fifth dungeon is the red-hot oven. . . . The little child is in this red-hot oven. Hear how it screams to come out. See how it turns and twists itself about in the fire. It beats its head against the roof of the oven. It stamps its little feet on the floor. . . . God was very good to this child. Very likely God saw it would get worse and worse, and would never repent, and so it would have to be punished much more in hell. So God in His mercy called it out of the world in its early childhood." In 1715 there was published a small volume entitled *Hell Opened to Christians; to Caution them from entring into it: or, Considerations of the Infernal Pains, Propos'd to our Meditation to avoid them: and Distributed for every Day of the Week*, translated from the Italian by F. Pinamonti, S.J. It contained the most realistic and revolting descriptions of the torments of the damned, accompanied by a number of engravings illustrating the processes used. Successive editions of it appeared, e.g. a sixth in 1815, another in 1819, and yet another, revised and inscribed "with lawful authority" in 1844. A number of the illustrations were reproduced in G. J. Holyoake's *Catholicism, the Religion of Fear* (1851), in which Pinamonti's book was quoted and criticized. Cf. Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, lxii. On lurid descriptions of hell in general, see above, pp. 531 f, and cf. Lecky, *Morals*, ii. 220–228, Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 57 n.

decree approving the action of an Italian priest, who had denied absolution and communion to a layman, because he had declared his disbelief in the material fire of hell, and ordaining deprivation of the Sacraments as the punishment for such disbelief in the future.[1] The most up-to-date Catholic statements reaffirm quite unmistakably the material character of the pains of hell.[2] I have not, myself, met any modern Romanist apologia for the mediaeval idea of the saved rejoicing at the sight of the damned in hell-fire. It seems to have been left to one who is not himself a Romanist to startle the modern world with a defence of this totally indefensible belief.[3] I am not however aware that in Catholic circles it has been in any way abandoned or disowned.

The doctrine of eternal punishment is defended against the criticisms of modern liberal Protestants on a number of grounds. It is said, for instance, to be required by the justice of God,[4] and is thought to be

[1] 'The Author of "The Policy of the Pope" ' in *Contemp. Rev.* Sept. 1894, 353; Coulton, *The R.C. Ch. and the Bible*, 52, *Five Centuries*, i. 71 n.; Heiler, *Kathol.* 241.

[2] Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 207b, 210b ("The damned can never divert their attention from their frightful torments, . . ."), 210 f (full and emphatic statement in support of material fire; God makes it possible for the soul to feel physical pain as it does on earth; hell-fire needs no fuel; the demons roaming by Divine permission away from hell are continually tormented by portions of the fire to which they are inseparably fettered; and so on), 211 a,b (after the resurrection and Last Judgment, the sufferings of the damned will be increased, firstly, by the reunion of soul and body, and secondly, by the permanent presence of the demons who will thenceforward be confined within the limits of hell); C. Dawson in *God and the Supernatural*, 117 (Church insists on *corporal* resurrection); Martindale in *op. cit.* 320 ("penalty of sense"), 322 with note 1 (clear assertion that the tormenting agent is physical, with some obscure qualifications about pictorial metaphors); Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 195 (". . . a punishment which does not stop short with mere regret, mere moral torments"). Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 227, 367 (Catholic speculations as to the physical way in which hell-fire is produced). On belief in material punishment by the Tractarians, cf. Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, viii; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 257; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 96 f.

[3] I cannot but regard Dr. Orchard's argument in *Foundations*, iv. 121–124 as a complete failure. ". . . It must therefore be possible," he says, "to regard the souls in Hell with no more concern than one looks upon coals burning in a fire; it is their will to be there, they have not a moment's wish to be anywhere else, they have no pains of conscience, no grief for being deprived of God. Their condition may perhaps be conceived as morally analogous to that of the incurably insane"; etc., etc. But what Dr. Orchard here defends against the charge of cruelty is not the traditional Catholic doctrine at all, but a fancy of his own. To excuse rejoicing over the damned on the ground that the damned are so insensitive that they have no wish to be anywhere else but in hell, is to depart pointedly from Catholic teaching, according to which the endurance of excruciating pain on the part of the damned is a quite essential feature of the whole situation. Moreover, even admitting as correct Dr. Orchard's description of the damned, what moral right have the saved to *rejoice* at the sight of them? It is perfectly certain that a man with Dr. Orchard's love for his fellows could *never* do so. That some of the criticisms which his argument has evoked are couched in intemperate terms is hardly matter for surprise.

[4] *Catech. Rom.* I. viii. 11, xii. 14; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 176, 181, 186, 191 (quoting Fathers); Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 209b.

proof against the charge of cruelty because the absolute justice of God can be taken for granted: none will be in hell except those of whose amendment God knows that there is no hope, and who—by their wilful rebelliousness—richly deserve to be there.[1] Now the Divine justice doubtless necessitates severity in God's discipline of His erring children: but severity does not mean eternal punishment. Moreover, the appeal to justice is discredited when those who make it show that they have but the crudest and most sub-Christian idea of what justice means. People who speak of God hating sinners[2] or who can picture God as known by the tormented to be "infinitely happy,"[3] need to read the fifteenth of Luke again before they argue about the justice of God. Similarly indecisive are the arguments based on the holiness of God,[4] or on His infinity (any offence against an infinite Being requiring, it is said, infinite punishment),[5] or on the analogy of the eternity of His rewards, or on the necessarily quasi-automatic method in which God's laws must operate.[6] All such arguments are vitiated by the use of mechanical, commercial, or forensic categories as the final determinants, when the domestic, the educational, and the medical are much more helpful, and only the personal and moral are really adequate. A more solid plea is based on the fact of man's freedom. If man remains really free, must not the possibility that some will choose to be *finally* rebellious and impenitent be admitted?[7] This argument, however, is unanswerable only so long as we are taking no account of the *infinity* of God's resources of patience and love. Grant the real infinity of these,

[1] Stanton, *Authority*, 50; Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 156 f; Martindale in *op. cit.* 325–327; Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 209b. Cf. Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 308 mid; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 98.

[2] *Catech. Rom.* III. ix. 29 (3) (4) (". . . qui in insigni odio sit apud Deum . . ."); Moehler, *Symbolism*, 145 f "the Catholic Church teaches that he only, who loves God, is beloved of God. . . ."; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 61 ("Venial sin . . . diminishes God's love towards us"). Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 182; Pinchard in *Congress-Report 1920*, 151 (purgatorial sufferings *vindictive*).

[3] Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 210b.

[4] Hontheim in *op. cit.* 209b; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 99. Cf. H. Koch's review of Braun's *Handlexikon der kath. Dogmatik* in *Theol. Litzg.* 1927. 11. 262 ("Leugnung der ewigen Höllenstrafe verrät eine 'allzu anthropomorphe Denkweise über Gott' ").

[5] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 335 (quoting Leibnitz); Farrar, *Eternal Punishment*, 168; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 62; Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 209a (God must terminate man's probation at some point; otherwise He would be dependent on man's caprice), 209b (". . . there is in sin an approximation to infinite malice which deserves an eternal punishment").

[6] Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 180 (quoting Irenaeus); Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 156. Cf. Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 209b (hell *one* punishment, not a series).

[7] Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, xxiv; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 22 f, 28, 31 f, 179; Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 157 f; Martindale in *op. cit.* 326, 328, 335–337, 340; C. Harris in H.*E.R.E.* xi (1920) 836b; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 330; Stone. *Eng. Cath.* 98; Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 98 f, 118 f.

and the ultimate salvation of all, without prejudice to anyone's freedom, becomes intellectually tenable and defensible.

But the real ground for the long survival of belief in eternal punishment has undoubtedly been the conviction that it is clearly taught in Scripture, particularly in the Gospels, and that, since these authorities are infallible, what they teach must be accepted, whether we like it or not. "Never, assuredly," writes Father Martindale, "will Catholics consent to discard the words Christ used, nor to dilute the terrible reality of His revelation, for the sake of modern nerves."[1] Dean Farrar endeavoured to vindicate his 'Eternal Hope' by an appeal to the plain general sense of Scripture as against obscure and isolated texts.[2] Dr. Orchard's recent defence of the traditional doctrines regarding the future rests throughout on the assumption that statements found in Scripture, and even those supported by what he somewhat vaguely calls "Catholic theology" or still less persuasively "the Scholastic Theology," constitute a body of revealed doctrine, the truth of which must be accepted as resting on a Divine guarantee.[3] Abundant reasons have, however, been given in other parts of this book for refusing to regard the fact that a thing is taught in Scripture as a *necessary* reason why we should believe it. The actual teaching of Jesus on the matter is obscure, and in any case has to be received and interpreted in the light of His clear and distinctive Gospel of the forthgoing love of God, as portrayed, for instance, in the parable of the Shepherd (Lk. xv. 3–7 = Mt. xviii. 12–14).[4] While, therefore, the utterances of Scriptural authors on this question are valuable as illustrating man's progress towards a fuller knowledge of God's ways, they provide us with little or no certain knowledge in regard to the detailed conditions of life beyond the grave.

The question of credibility closely affects another argument used in defence of the doctrine, namely, that it moves men to be religious and moral by means of the appalling penalties with which it threatens

[1] In *God and the Supernatural*, 323; cf. 320: cf. also Watkin in *op. cit.* 156; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 23 f, 94, 100, 136, 178, 240–243 (Augustinus repudiated on Scriptural grounds the argument from God's mercy); Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 208ab, 209a, 211b; C. Harris in H.*E.R.E.* xi (1920) 837a; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 307 f; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 99.

[2] Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 75 f, 205, etc.

[3] Orchard, *Foundations*, iv passim, esp. 84 f, 88, 95, 105 ("... the Scholastic Theology is prepared to make some concessions to human frailty and to allow us to believe. . . ."), 116. It should, however, be added (1) that Dr. Orchard makes a serious attempt to justify rationally and morally what he regards as given by revelation, and (2) that on particular questions he seems prepared to abandon, not only Catholic theology (with its belief in *material* hell-fire—83, 120 f), but even Scripture (with its teaching about a millenium—166)!

[4] For the authority of the Bible in general, see above, pp. 179–204, of Jesus in general, pp. 205–226; for their authority on this particular question, pp. 522–527.

irreligion and immorality. The appeal to fear has from the earliest times been a favourite method of Christian apologists and preachers.[1] Of course, as long as one possesses means of making people believe in the reality of hell, it is natural enough that many will be moved to religion by the dread of going thither. It will often happen that such folk possess truly charitable and spiritual dispositions—Fra Angelico and Mary Slessor may be mentioned as shining examples. But the moral effect of the doctrine may well be—and often has been—quite other; for there is no doubt whatever that belief in it facilitated and encouraged, if it may not be said to have actually suggested, the atrocious cruelties of mediaeval persecution.[2] But in any case it ought to be admitted that the fear of future torment is a poor motive for the great appeal of the Christian Gospel[3]; and it is by no means impossible that much of the indifference to religion in recent times is due to the large use formerly made of this particular method of persuasion.[4] For the doctrine in its undisguised form is so shocking to the loftiest sentiments in man's nature, so contrary to all that makes the Christian revelation of God welcome to humanity as a real evangel, so repugnant to justice and charity alike, that multitudes of people, unable to prove against tradition that it was no true part of the Christian message, have felt driven to cast Christianity aside altogether, as the only means of escaping intolerable confusion, bewilderment, terror, and even madness.[5] We read of a certain Radbod, King of the Frisians, who, when about to be baptized, asked where his ancestors were, and on being told by the Christian missionary that they were in hell, immediately withdrew his foot from the baptismal font.[6] It is impossible to refuse him our sympathy and

[1] For patristic views, see my *Early Church and the World*, 87, 156 f, 225 f, 307 f, 478, 617; also Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 173 f, 185, 193 f, 215, 223, 235, 247–255, 271, 277, and (in regard to the martyrs) 24, 46, 153. Cf. also, Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 71 f, 457 (±1150 A.D.); Heiler, *Kathol*, 118 (Thomas Aquinas), 244, 246 (modern Catholicism generally); *Conc. Trid.* sess. vi, can. 8 (Mirbt 301 [25]: ". . . gehennae metum, per quem ad misericordiam Dei de peccatis dolendo confugimus vel a peccando abstinemus, . . ."); bull *Auctorem Fidei*, 28 Aug. 1794, prop. 25; Newman, *Developm.* 423; Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 96; Pusey, *Eternal Punishment*, 1 f, 4, 19, 257; Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 209a,b; Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 107 f.

[2] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 323 f, 328, 333–335; Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 751a.

[3] Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 96, 120, 124, 130 f, 140, 151; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 196 f. We hear of an old woman who was met in the streets of Acre, some time in the middle of the thirteenth century, carrying a pan of charcoal and a flask of water, and saying that she meant to burn up paradise and to quench hell-fire, in order that henceforth people might do right only for the pure love of God (Coulton in *Hibb. Journ.* April 1916, 600 f).

[4] See A. T. Cadoux in *Hibb. Journ.* Apl. 1920, 581 ff.

[5] In view of the facts set out above, it is quite hopeless to try to secure acceptance for the doctrine by disentangling "its Scriptural sense and Catholic definition" from "the false conceptions which have gathered about it, the exaggeration of its tortures," etc., etc. (Orchard, *Foundations*, iv. 113 f).

[6] Gibbon, *Decline* (ed. Bury) iv. 81; Menzel, *Hist. of Germany* (Eng. trans.) i. 222.

even our admiration. He is typical of thousands who in later times have been scared away from Christianity and even scared out of their belief in God, because they were told about hell-fire and were powerless to disprove it.[1] Modern liberal criticism, by laying bare the historical and psychological basis of the doctrine, has now made it possible to believe in the holy love and just severity of God, without confusing and stultifying that belief by attributing to Him a cruelty beside which the brutal inflictions even of a mediaeval torturer might seem to err in the direction of leniency.

It is, of course, a matter of common knowledge, that Catholics have not been by any means alone in their acceptance of a crude and horrible doctrine of future punishment. The Reformers at first introduced no improvement in this respect, nay, in some ways they made the doctrine even sharper. Among all sections of Protestant Christians, belief in eternal punishment has been professed, sometimes in an extremely revolting form, and is still professed by many (mostly the less educated). They took it over from that powerful mediaeval tradition which Catholicism had built up and to which Catholicism still clings. But there is this difference between the positions of Catholicism and Protestantism in the matter. Protestants are free to allow themselves to be taught by those reforming voices which from time to time have appealed for a humaner and a juster doctrine. Moving along the line marked out by Origenes and his school, by Scotus Erigena in the ninth century, and in our own day by Dean Farrar, they are more and more ridding their religion of that nightmare which has for so long disgraced the Christian record. Catholics, on the other hand, are tied to the past. The utmost use they can make of these reforming voices is to borrow from them a few qualifications, in order to make their own doctrine look a little less outrageous. But the borrowing process occasions not a little confusion, inconsistency, and evasiveness. And for the most part the reforming voices have to be pronounced by Catholics mistaken.[2] It was laid down dogmatically at the Council of Trent that the fear of Gehenna does not make sinners worse,[3] and Catholics are obliged to believe this dogma in spite of the manifest evidence to the contrary which modern conditions furnish. Doubtless it may be said that the Catholic doctrine of hell is worthy of some respect as a forcible expression of the heinous-

[1] Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, lvii (case of the elder Mill: "Compared with this, every other objection to Christianity sinks into insignificance"), lviii, lx f, lxv, 64 f, 94, 119 f, 204.

[2] Cf. Hontheim in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 208b: "The few men who, despite the morally universal conviction of the human race, deny the existence of hell, are mostly atheists and Epicureans. But if the view of such men in the fundamental question of our being could be the true one, apostasy would be the way to light, truth, and wisdom."

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vi, can. 8 (Mirbt 301 [25]).

ness of wrong doing.[1] Doubtless also the reaction against belief in hell has sometimes been associated with an easy-going, and therefore fatally mistaken, estimate of the gravity of sin. But what Catholics seem never to realize in these matters is that cruelty is itself a deadly sin, and therefore that he who consents to a wrongdoer being sentenced to interminable suffering—so far from rebuking sin—becomes himself guilty of it, and finally that he who believes and declares that God so sentences the wrongdoer is charging Him with injustice, nay with cruelty. We may not censure those who sincerely hold even mistaken beliefs. Particularly we may not do this when the conditions under which such people have lived virtually precluded any abandonment of those beliefs. But in the onward progress of man's intellectual, moral, and spiritual powers, there comes a time when we may say to our brethren, Are you content to ignore and even condemn that new revelation which God is ever giving of Himself in the best that man sees and feels? We have our Saviour's own warrant for believing that human goodness is a reliable index to Divine goodness (Mt. vii. 11=Lk. xi. 13, and elsewhere). Man's sense of justice is everywhere declaring to-day that the traditional doctrine of hell is not only intellectually incredible, but morally outrageous. The Roman Church prefers to trust her traditions rather than to trust human justice. It is a significant and fatal preference.[2]

[1] Routh (see above, p. 536 n. 2) 122, 138: cf. Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 63 f.

[2] "L'Eglise Romaine s'est porté le dernier coup: elle a consommé son suicide le jour où elle a fait Dieu implacable et la damnation éternelle" (Georges Sand, *Spiridion*, 302, quoted by Farrar, *Eternal Hope*, 204).

CHAPTER XXIV

PERSECUTION—PERTINENT FACTS

It is a fact of immense importance, but one to which very scant justice has as yet been done by Christian theologians, that Jesus Christ, while deliberately fulfilling a Messianic, i.e. a Jewish and national, rôle, and calling upon His fellow-countrymen to accept His guidance, yet refrained from all use of violent methods in compassing His ends. In the endeavour to appraise the universal and Divine significance of His mission and death, Christian thinkers have unhappily been misled into overlooking the historical, moral, and personal conditions under which His life was lived and sacrificed. It is literally true to say that there would have been no Cross in human history, had not our Lord so understood brotherly love as to preclude the adoption of what would otherwise have seemed an unmistakable part of the Messiah's work, namely, the establishment of the Kingdom of God by force of arms.[1] However problematic may be the duty of the modern Christian in regard to injurious coercion, the ethical teaching and example of Jesus are sufficiently plain: He avoided it on principle. We may hazard the suggestion that it is a half-conscious realization of this fact which causes so many modern Christians to take it for granted that religious persecution is contrary to our Master's spirit and teaching. However that may be, such at least was the inference drawn in the early days of the Church. For the first three hundred years of its life, the Christian Church extended itself by moral and spiritual means only, and condemned as futile and wrong the use of coercion in religious matters. Apart from a very few difficult incidents—like the fatal collapse of Ananias and Sapphira, and the blindness of Elymas—no injury is recorded to have been inflicted on wrongdoers within or without the Church. At the worst, offending Christians are expelled from the community.[2] The

[1] Dr. C. Anderson Scott, in a review of my recent book, *The Early Church and the World*, in *Journ. of Theol. Stud.* Apl. 1926, 311, observes: "The assertion that 'Jesus preferred to die rather than declare a Messianic war' . . . infers a pitifully narrow interpretation of His consciousness, . . ." Narrow indeed it would be, did it purport (as in my book it does not) to state fully the *significance* of Jesus' death; but is it, or is it not, historically true? Dr. Anderson Scott does not pronounce it untrue, but objects to it (and to the inferences based on it) on the ground that our Lord's allusions are too scanty to justify it. In view, however, of what we know about the *Jewish political situation and the Messianic beliefs of His time*, His words must be held to justify the assertion complained of.

[2] The strong words of 1 Cor. v. 5 and 1 Tim. i. 20 simply mean expulsion, upon which, however, it was understood that calamitous visitations from Satan might ensue.

early Christian Apologists refer repeatedly to the Christians' practice—based on the Lord's teaching and example—of not resisting or punishing their enemies; and Origenes (248 A.D.) contrasts the Church with the ancient Jewish community in this respect. Nor did they omit to urge that, in the nature of the case, compulsion in the matter of religion is absurd. Tertullianus, early in the third century, and Lactantius, early in the fourth, voiced the convictions of the Church in regard to religious toleration. But the force of the plea was derived as much from the natural wishes of persecuted believers as from their comprehension of the real ethic of Jesus: "the martyrs," it has been said, "died for conscience rather than for liberty of conscience."[1] Hence it came about that, when altered circumstances made it possible for the Church to persecute, she succumbed after a time to the temptation.[2]

The first to yield to it, however, were not the ecclesiastical leaders, but the imperial patrons of the Church. By means of various laws, Constantinus discouraged pagan worship, though he took no really effective steps to suppress it. In the Arian controversy, he endeavoured to extinguish Arianism by political methods; but in this—as later in banishing Athanasius—he was probably acting mainly out of concern for the public peace. His Arianizing son and successor, Constantius, undertook repressive measures, both against paganism and against non-Arian Christianity. In 370 A.D. the Arian Emperor Valens, it is said, compassed the death of eighty orthodox bishops. In 372 A.D. the orthodox Emperor, Valentinianus I, who was tolerant toward heretics generally, decreed the total suppression of Manichaeism. The Donatist schismatics

[1] Fawkes in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 751b.

[2] The sequel does not profess to be a history of persecution, but a summary statement of those facts in its history on which we base our denial of the peculiar 'holiness' of the Roman Church. A consideration of the extenuating circumstances is postponed to the next chapter. In a summary covering so long a period, absolute exactitude in every detail is not easy to guarantee. I have done my best to avoid all over-statement, and have made use of Catholic, as well as of Protestant, writings. My chief authorities have been Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 11–39; S. F. Smith, S.J. on 'The Spanish Inquisition' in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 375–398; J. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 256–262 (Art. 'Heresy'); J. Blötzer, S.J. in *op. cit.* viii (1910) 26–38 (Art. 'Inquisition'); P. D. Aphandéry (of the Sorbonne) in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 587–596 (Art. 'Inquisition'); J. Williams in *Encyc. Brit.* xxvii. 72–79 (Art. 'Torture'); E. Vacandard in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 330–336 (Art. 'Inquisition'); A. Fawkes and W. T. Whitley in H.*E.R.E* ix (1917) 749–762 (Arts. 'Persecution'); G. G. Coulton, *Death-Penalty* (1924); C. Poyntz Stewart, *The Roman Church and Heresy* (1925); A. L. Maycock, *The Inquisition* (1926). (Curiously enough, *The Catholic Encyclopedia* contains no article on torture). The reader is asked to accept this list as a substitute for detailed references in support of the various specific statements in regard to events prior to 1850. While apologizing in advance for possible slips, which may reveal themselves to the specialist's eye as having crept into my summary, I would observe that the argument of the chapter is cumulative, and would therefore probably be unaffected by any such disclosure.

were fierce persecutors of their orthodox brethren: but the Church-fathers of the period—Athanasius, Hilarius, Basilius, Gregorius of Nazianzus, and Ambrosius—were all in favour of toleration. The one exception to this noble record was Optatus, Bishop of Milevis in Numidia, who flourished about 365–385 A.D., and who openly advocated, on the basis of Old-Testament precedents, the State-infliction of the death-penalty on Donatists. In 380 A.D. the Emperor Theodosius I and his colleagues promulgated a persecuting law—one of a long series enacted by Christian Emperors, and embodied in the Theodosian Code in the next century. Under these laws, both paganism and heresy became punishable crimes. For some forms of error (such as Manichaeism) the penalty was to be death; for others scourging with lead and banishment. It is likely enough that these enactments were not directly due to ecclesiastical influence, though it is not easy to believe that they could not have been prevented, had the Church-leaders seriously opposed them. In 385 A.D. Priscillianus, the Spanish heretic who advocated celibacy, and six of his followers were executed at Trier. Sentence was passed on them by the Western Emperor Maximus; but it had been instigated by ecclesiastics. The deed gravely shocked the conscience of the Church: Ambrosius of Milan and Martinus of Tours both voiced their strong disapproval of it, the latter long refusing to communicate with the prosecuting bishops.[1] Hieronymus seems to have defended, at least in theory, the execution of heretics; but Chrysostomus declared it to be an inexpiable sin, though he approved of the forcible suppression of their meetings. When Augustinus, as Bishop of Hippo, came into conflict with the violent and unmanageable Donatists, he favoured at first the adoption of purely spiritual and moral measures in regard to them; but later his opinions changed, and he felt reluctantly driven to sanction, to defend, and even to invoke the use of State-coercion and State-penalties, though he still deprecated the infliction of death. In the fifth century, an occasional word in favour of religious freedom was uttered: but, although the Church still refrained from inflicting any but spiritual penalties herself, her leaders (such as Pope Leo the Great and the Council of Chalcedon) are found approving of the harsher discipline exercised by the State. The enactments of Theodosius II (408–450 A.D.), Valentinianus III (425–455 A.D.), and Justinianus (527–565 A.D.) perpetuated and elaborated the severe penalization of heretics and non-Christians of all classes. The death-penalty was definitely prescribed for Manichæans; and a number of them were stoned to death at Ravenna in 556 A.D.

[1] Mr. Maycock exaggerates when he says (*Inquis.* 3): "the bishops *to a man* rose up and denounced the atrocious and un-Christian savagery of the action" (italics mine), and omits to mention that the execution was brought about by the efforts of two bishops—Ithacius and Idatius.

Thenceforward persecution may be said to have slumbered for several centuries. The further story of persecution in the East is neither continuous, nor strictly relevant to our present subject. A few instances only are noteworthy. About 580 A.D., a man named Anatolius, who was accused of heathen practices at Constantinople, was brutally scourged, torn by wild beasts in the amphitheatre, and finally crucified or burnt. In the middle of the ninth century, the Empress Theodora put to death 100,000 rebellious Paulician heretics (also known as Bogomils). The Emperor Alexius I (1081–1118 A.D.) also persecuted them, and burned a Bogomilian leader named Basilius. But on the whole, the history of the Eastern Church has not been marked by persecution, just as it has not been marked by great proselytizing zeal.[1]

In the West, no persecution for heresy is on record for a long time after the episcopate of Gregorius the Great (590–604 A.D.), though the right to compel submission to the Church was clearly maintained as a matter of theory. The Fourth Council of Toledo (633 A.D.), presided over by St. Isidorus of Seville, forbade the forcible conversion of Jews, yet laid it down that all who had embraced the Christian faith, whether voluntarily or otherwise, ought to be constrained to adhere to it, and treated as heretics if they relapsed. Isidorus regarded it as the duty of the civil ruler to repress error in religion. Under the laws of Charles the Great and his successors, the bishops were supposed to keep watch against infringements of orthodoxy. Extreme measures, however, were not always resorted to. Elipandus of Toledo and Felix of Urgel, the Adoptionist heretics who flourished towards the close of the eighth century, were officially censured for their views, but not otherwise seriously molested. On the other hand, the unfortunate monk Gottschalk, who entertained erroneous views on predestination, was whipped, imprisoned, refused the Sacraments, and buried in unconsecrated ground (848–867 A.D.). Pope Nicolaus I (858–867 A.D.) emphatically condemned the use of torture as a means of extracting judicial evidence.

Towards the end of the tenth century, however, a fiercer spirit began to manifest itself in the treatment of heresy. The disciples of the heretical Vilgard in Italy and Sardinia were destroyed with fire and sword. But for some considerable time, the parties mainly responsible for outbursts of violence were the secular rulers and the populace, not the ecclesiastics. Thus in 1022, Robert the Pious, the saintly King of France, with the consent of the people, caused thirteen Catharist heretics to be burnt alive at Orléans. At Asti in 1034 the Bishop joined with the other lords in attacking the Cathari; but apparently it was not he that had the chief voice in deciding on their execution. At Milan in 1039, the civil magistrates burnt a number of heretics, contrary to the wish of the arch-

[1] Stanley, *Eastern Church*, 32–34 (lect. 1, § 5).

bishop. About 1045, Wazo, Bishop of Liège, being consulted by the Bishop of Châlons in regard to the spread of Catharism in the latter's diocese, explicitly deprecated the use of the sword, on the ground that it would effectually prevent the tares from being converted into wheat. In 1049 the Synod of Reims decreed excommunication alone against heretics and those who encouraged them. In 1051 and 1052, a number of heretics were hanged at Goslar by order of the Emperor Henry III. The clergy were not responsible for this; and on the whole they disapproved of the suppression of heresy by means of civil penalties. The one exception at the time to this generalization was Theodwin, who had succeeded Wazo as Bishop of Liège and who appealed to the civil power for the punishment of heretics, without, however, asking for the death-penalty against them (about 1050 A.D.). Another exception, if only a partial one, appears a little later, when in 1076 a Catharist, regarding whom the Bishop of Cambrai and his assembly could reach no decision, was seized by the people and some of the minor clergy, and burnt. Gregorius VII, however, ordered the excommunication of the Catholics who had taken part in this violence.

The twelfth century was to witness a considerable advance in the views and methods of the Church; but in its earlier part we can still observe her reluctance to kill. At Soissons in 1114 the mob, fearing (we are told) the softness of the clergy, took advantage of their bishop's absence to storm the prison, take out the accused heretics, and burn them. In 1119 the Council of Toulouse laid it down that heretics, besides being excommunicated, should be dealt with "per potestates exteras"; but it made no mention of capital punishment. In 1137 Peter of Bruys, who advocated a number of anti-ecclesiastical doctrines, was burnt by a mob, infuriated at seeing him destroy and burn crosses. In 1139 a Council at the Lateran in Rome repeated the recommendations made at Toulouse twenty years earlier. In 1144 Adalbero, Bishop of Liège, actually rescued a number of Catharists from the mob which was eager to burn them, and which actually succeeded in burning others. Bernard of Clairvaux protested publicly against the massacres which took place on the occasion of the Second Crusade (1146): he gave no encouragement to outbreaks of popular violence against heretics, but urged that they should be reclaimed by pacific means, and, if necessary, excommunicated and imprisoned. In 1148 a Council at Reims forbade secular princes to support or harbour heretics; but again there was no demand for capital punishment. In 1155 Arnold of Brescia, who had vehemently criticized the wealth and corruption of the clergy, was hanged at Rome. He had been denounced and attacked in various ways by St. Bernard and others on the ground of heterodoxy; but his death —brought about by Pope and Emperor—was due chiefly to political

considerations. In 1163 a number of Catharists were burnt at Cologne: the efforts of the clergy to lead them to repentance were frustrated by the violence of the populace, who seized and burnt them. Further burnings took place in Cologne later on in the century: one story, referring apparently to about 1200, tells how a young girl, though compassionately taken out of the flames by some bystanders, plunged back into them herself to die with her martyred leader. In 1163 a Council was held at Tours, at which Pope Alexander III was present, and which called upon secular princes to imprison heretics and confiscate their property. In 1166 about thirty heretics were condemned by Henry II of England to be scourged, branded on the face, and banished: and as his laws forbade anyone to help or shelter them, they all died of destitution.

It is evident that heresy, chiefly of the Catharist variety, spread with enormous rapidity during the twelfth century (owing—at least in part—to the corruption and worldliness of the Church), and that in opposition to it there grew up in western Europe the legal custom of punishing it with the flames. The policy of the Church wavered; but on the whole it consisted rather of deferring the penalty (in hope of converting the accused) than of definitely disapproving of it. The twelfth-century developments in Canon-Law reveal the mind of the Church in a state of transition, the canonists expressing now a milder, now a harsher, view. But with the growth of the danger, it was the latter that more and more prevailed in practice. In 1167 some heretics were burnt at Vézelay, after judgment had been pronounced on them by the abbot and several bishops. It was in Southern France that the heretics—here called the Albigenses—were most numerous. In 1178 Pope Alexander III sent thither a cardinal with full powers to repress the evil, and with authority to command the assistance of the local clergy. Next year he held another Council at the Lateran, at which the coercive measures of the earlier Councils were renewed, secular sovereigns were required to protect Catholics against the violence of the Catharists, and to silence the latter by means of imprisonment and confiscation; indulgences were promised to those who cooperated in this work, and the penalties due to heretics were extended to their defenders. In 1183 Duke Philip of Flanders, aided by the Archbishop of Reims, burnt alive many of his subjects of both sexes, confiscated their property, and divided it with his ecclesiastical ally. Hugo, Bishop of Auxerre (1183–1206), robbed, exiled, and burnt a number of the so-called Manichæans in his diocese. In 1184 Pope Lucius III and the Emperor Frederic Barbarossa concerted definite measures for the extinction of heresy: bishops were to search out and examine all who were suspect, and, if they were convicted, excommunicate them, and hand them over to

the secular authorities, who would then inflict upon them "the due punishment": this included exile, loss of property and of civil rights, etc. but not explicitly the death-penalty (though it was later understood to imply this): rulers and nobles were to cooperate, on pain of being excommunicated and forfeiting their offices. The papal decree, 'Ad Abolendam,' embodying these decisions, was later incorporated in the Canon-Law of the Church. Emphatic objection to the death-penalty was expressed towards the close of the century by the respected Peter 'the Cantor,' who approved only of imprisonment; but it seems to have been threatened in a law enacted by Count Raymond V of Toulouse (about 1194). The first sovereign who is known for certain to have decreed death by burning against heretics is Peter II of Aragon: in 1198 he ordered the Waldenses to evacuate his territories within a given time, failing which their property would be confiscated and themselves burnt.

It is, however, the great Pope Innocentius III (1198–1216) who enjoys the unenviable distinction of virtually committing the Church to sanguinary measures. Within a few months of his accession, he ordered the Archbishop of Auch to expel the heretics from his province and to require princes and peoples, if necessary, to coerce them "with the power of the material sword." The same year he sent legates to Toulouse, ordering that the people should take arms against the heretics, whenever these legates should give the word. In March 1199, he wrote to the magistrates of Viterbo, declaring heresy to be analogous to, but much worse than, civil treason, and therefore justly punishable with excommunication and loss of goods: his letter was inserted in the Canon-Law. In 1200 he sent a young nobleman to suppress heresy at Orvieto; but this deputy fell a victim to a conspiracy provoked by his unsparing severity. Meanwhile, during the opening years of the thirteenth century, Philippe-Auguste, King of France, burnt a number of Catharists (of both sexes) at Paris and other towns in his kingdom. The existence of heresy in northern and central France might, however, be considered sporadic in comparison with its strength and prevalence in the south—in and around the towns of Toulouse, Carcassonne, Albi, Castres, Narbonne, and Béziers. After patiently endeavouring for several years to re-convert these Albigensians to orthodoxy by peaceful means, the Pope at length in 1204 called for a crusade to suppress them by force of arms. While not formally decreeing additional legal penalties against them individually, he filled his instructions with scriptural allusions to the sword, and promised indulgences to those who would help in the work of destruction. Owing partly, however, to the dilatoriness of the King of France, nothing could be done in this way for some time, and peaceful efforts were continued, by Dominic and others, though without much success.

At last, in 1209, the persistent efforts of Innocentius were rewarded. The crusade began in earnest: Arnold-Amaury, Abbot of Cîteaux and papal legate, was its spiritual leader, Simon de Montfort its military commander. In July, Béziers was taken. Arnold's report of the proceedings to the Pope ran as follows: "our men, sparing neither rank, sex, nor age, slew about 20,000 men with the edge of the sword; and when a huge slaughter of men had been made, the whole city was pillaged and burnt, the Divine vengeance wondrously raging against it." It was also said that Arnold, being asked by some Catholic soldiers how they should distinguish orthodox from heretic, replied: "Kill them, for the Lord knows who are his." Carcassonne was next attacked: the inhabitants surrendered on condition that they should be allowed to leave the city empty-handed and should not be molested during the first day's march. Many other castles and towns submitted. In the closing months of the year, the Pope wrote to the Archbishops of Arles and other places, praising God for the success of the campaign and urging them to stir up the people to help the cause. He also wrote to De Montfort in similar terms of jubilation, promising to help him in finally extirpating the heresy: no disapproval of his bloodthirstiness and cruelty was expressed. He also wrote to the Emperor Otto, to the Kings of Aragon and Castile, and to others, appealing to them to help De Montfort. In his letters he repeatedly referred to the whole effort against the heretics by the ominously ambiguous word 'extermination.' Otto, who in October was crowned as Emperor in Rome, had to promise that he would cooperate in a crusade.

The campaign in southern France continued. At Castres De Montfort allowed a heretic to be burnt in spite of his recantation. At Brom, in order to avenge the mutilation of some of the crusaders, his men tore out the eyes and cut off the noses of a hundred of the defenders. At Minerve, in June 1210, about 140 heretics who refused to abjure their faith were cast into a large fire. At Lavour, the commander of the castle was hanged, his sister and her daughter were cast into a well and buried with stones, and eighty captured knights massacred. Here and at other places the crusaders are said to have burned alive numbers of the heretics "with immense joy." They boasted of the work, and declared their intention of continuing it. Under Arnold's inspiration, Jews also were massacred. The Archbishop of Toulouse was said to have destroyed half a million lives. As the war continued, however, political antagonisms gradually obscured the religious issues, and Innocentius accordingly made efforts to check it. In January 1213, he pronounced the crusade at an end: but the following year he allowed it to be resumed. In 1212 eighty heretics, mostly Waldenses, were burnt alive by the populace at Strassburg.

In 1215 Innocentius III held an Œcumenical Council in the Lateran at Rome. The third canon of that Council condemned all heretics, ordaining that those convicted should be left to the civil power to be punished "animadversione debita" and should forfeit their goods; that suspects, unless they could prove their innocence, should be excommunicated, and, if they were not restored within a year, punished as heretics; that the secular powers should be required to swear that they would "exterminate" heretics out of their lands; that rulers who neglected to do this should be excommunicated and, if persistent, deprived by the Pope of their subjects' fealty; that the lands of such rulers should be open to the occupation of true Catholics, "the heretics having been exterminated"; that "Catholics, who, having taken the sign of the cross, have girded themselves for the extermination of heretics, should enjoy the same indulgence and be protected by that same holy privilege as is granted to those who go to the holy land"; that those who receive or defend heretics should be penalized; and finally that the superior clergy were to take regular steps to discover if heresy were lurking anywhere in their dioceses.[1] The word 'exterminate' means literally 'to expel from the land'; and as it is obviously possible in the abstract to do this without killing, and as Innocentius formally introduced no fresh legal penalty, Catholic writers defend him against the charge of punishing heresy with death. When, however, we consider (1) that actual expulsion from all Christian lands in those days could hardly be effected without inflicting death, (2) that Innocentius knew perfectly well the carnage and the atrocities that had attended the 'extermination' of the Albigenses, and (3) that this canon of the Lateran Council was understood by Catholic scholars from Aquinas down to recent times to imply the infliction of death, it is impossible to acquit this Pope of the responsibility of committing the Church to the policy of stamping out heresy in blood.

In 1217 Dominic, the friend of Simon de Montfort, after nearly twelve years spent in trying to convert the people of Languedoc, left the country, threatening it with war, devastation, massacre, and slavery. After De Montfort's death at Toulouse in 1218, Louis, the son of the King of France, led an army against the Albigenses. At Marmande, 5000 men, women, and children were put to death by order of the Bishop of Saintes—on the sole ground of their assumed heretical beliefs —and the city was burnt.

In 1220, the Emperor Frederic II issued a rescript against heretics in the terms and spirit of Innocentius III; and the new Pope, Honorius III, commissioned his legates in Italy to enforce the imperial decree of 1220 and the papal decree of 1215. In 1222 a student at Oxford, who

[1] Mirbt 179–181.

had apostatized to Judaism, was condemned to be burnt. In 1224 the Emperor further ordained for Lombardy that relapsed heretics should be burnt, or, as a lesser penalty, have their tongues torn out: and Honorius ordered the Bishops of Brescia, Modena, and Rimini, to expel the heretics from their dioceses. Louis, now King of France (1223–1226), granted subsidies for the support of those engaged in the investigation of heresy. In 1226 James I of Aragon forbade the Catharists to enter his kingdom. The same year the Franciscan, Antonius of Padua, was urging the resumption of hostilities against the Albigenses: and next year the Metropolitan of Sens and the Bishop of Chartres were offering contributions for this purpose. In 1228 James I of Aragon outlawed the Catharists and their friends; and at Milan the papal legate handed over the unconverted and lapsed heretics to the secular authority.

In 1229 the Albigensian war (which had become largely a dynastic struggle) terminated in the military triumph of the papal forces, without, however, having effected the suppression of the heresy. A Council was held by the papal legate at Toulouse; and steps were taken to put the Inquisition in that region on a regular footing. The Council seems to have assumed that death at the stake was the usual secular punishment for heretics in France. In 1230 the Dominican Guala, Bishop of Brescia, proceeded to enforce the imperial law in all its rigour on his episcopal town. Another Dominican was appointed the same year inquisitor in Florence. In 1231 Pope Gregorius IX embodied the imperial laws of 1220 and 1224, by which condemned heretics were to be burnt alive, in the law of the Church. Some Patarin heretics actually were burnt at Rome in February 1231. It remained the regular practice for inquisitional and other ecclesiastical courts to refrain from actually passing sentence of death (on the excellent principle that 'the Church shrinks from bloodshed'), and to hand the excommunicated person over to the secular arm, with the request that he should be mercifully dealt with, and that bloodshed and death should be avoided. There had perhaps been a time when this request was sincerely meant; but from the period of Gregorius IX onwards it was a pure formality. So far from being expected to take it literally, the secular magistrates were required to burn the condemned man; and it was not long before the Church threatened them with excommunication, if they did not execute this sentence within a given time.

In October 1231, Gregorius entrusted the Dominican, Conrad of Marburg, with extended powers to establish the Inquisition in Germany[1];

[1] A Catholic author, Professor Pohle, speaks of "the frightful scenes which Germany witnessed under the grim grand inquisitor, Conrad of Marburg," as exemplifying the "serious and lamentable defects" of the Inquisition (*Cath. Encyc.* xiv [1912] 766b).

and the immediately ensuing years saw the extension of it throughout a great many new regions in that country, as well as in Flanders, France, Spain, and Lombardy. In 1233 the burning of heretics began at Milan, at the instigation of the newly arrived Dominican, St. Peter Martyr. The same year Friar John, a Dominican who had been sent to reclaim north-eastern Italy, succeeded in reconciling large numbers to the Church, with much effusion of tender emotion, and crowned his triumph by burning sixty Catharists in the public square at Verona.[1] In 1234 the recently appointed Inquisitors at Toulouse, who had begun executions there in 1233, sentenced to death a sick woman, who had to be carried on her bed to the place where she was burnt alive, the bishop and the friars thereafter thanking God and St. Dominic for their achievement. One is not surprised to learn that the Inquisition in Languedoc was but feebly supported by the civil authorities, and at times violently opposed by the populace. Meanwhile, in other parts of Europe, violence was the order of the day. Bosnia was laid waste with fire and sword by a crusade which Gregorius IX had summoned for the suppression of Catharism. The same year (1234) the Stedingers, a peasant-folk who lived near the mouth of the Weser and had been adjudged heretics in 1230, and against whom two abortive papal crusades had already been launched (in the second of which all men captured had been burnt), were defeated by overwhelming forces, their land devastated, and their population of both sexes massacred: the survivors were solemnly 'reconciled' to the Church. Organized resistance of this kind was rare: but as in Languedoc, so elsewhere, the severity of the Inquisitors not infrequently provoked outbursts of violence, as well as political opposition and restriction.

In 1235 Gregorius IX appointed Robert le Bougre, an ex-Catharist Dominican, Inquisitor-General over the whole of France. This official journeyed year after year through Nivernais, Burgundy, Flanders, and Champagne, condemning people everywhere to the stake in the most perfunctory manner, and supported in his work by the ecclesiastical, as well as the civil, authorities. On 29 May 1239, he burnt at Mortwimer 180 persons, all of whose cases he had investigated during the previous week. His excesses and irregularities led to a papal enquiry; and he was eventually deposed and imprisoned for life. William of Auvergne, the eminent Bishop of Paris (1228–1249), argued in the most confident and emphatic manner that heretics ought to be slain, on the analogy of traitors, murderers, and dangerous wild-beasts. Ferdinand III, King of Castile (1217-1252), was a zealous persecutor of the heretics, and with his own hands carried wood to the scaffold: for this and other excellences he was canonized in 1671 and praised

[1] Sismondi, *Hist. de la liberté en Italie* (1832) i. 108–110.

in the Roman Breviary. In 1241 the Inquisitors vigorously resumed operations in and around Toulouse after a period of enforced quiescence: but the next year one of them was assassinated with several of his companions at Avignonnet. In 1244 these assassinations were avenged by the burning of 200 Albigensian 'perfecti' at Montségur without trial.

Innocentius IV had become Pope in 1243. In 1245 he ordered the bishops of Bohemia to prosecute the Waldenses in their midst with the aid of the secular arm. In 1249 Raymond VII of Toulouse caused eighty heretics to be burnt in his presence at Berlaiges, without permitting them to recant. Heresy being still rampant, the Pope proceeded in 1252 to severer measures. He promulgated a bull, 'Ad Extirpanda,' in which he laid it down that the responsible Inquisitor "is to be obliged (teneatur) to compel" (i.e. by torture, but) "without loss of limb or danger to life, all the heretics whom he has in custody, like genuine robbers and murderers of souls and thieves of the Sacraments of God and of the Christian faith, openly to confess their own errors and to accuse other heretics," and that, when they were condemned, the secular authority should be obliged—under pain of excommunication —to carry out the imperial law (i.e. burning) within five days. Torture had previously been customary in civil courts, but it now became the practice of ecclesiastical courts also.[1] It had become customary also to confiscate the goods of the condemned, thus reducing his dependents to penury; and the Church now managed to gain a share of the spoils. In 1253 the Pope canonized Peter Martyr, who as Inquisitor in northern Italy had been conspicuous for his severity and had been assassinated at Milan the previous year.

Under Alexander IV (1254–1261) the Inquisition was extended and intensified. It was now active over the greater part of western and central Europe. In 1259 the bull of Innocentius IV ordaining torture (1252) was renewed and confirmed. In 1260 Alexander IV authorized Inquisitors to absolve one another whenever for the sake of convenience they had committed the irregularity of being personally present while torture was being administered. Next year he removed another legal check, by pronouncing evidence given by heretics against one another to be valid in law, whereas previously Inquisitors had hesitated as to its legal admissibility. The following year (1262), the next Pope, Urbanus IV, gave permission again for Inquisitors to be present at the torture; and it soon became customary in consequence for their examination to be continued in the torture-chamber itself. In 1265 the decree of 1252

[1] It is not enough to say of the use of torture that Innocentius IV "*sanctioned* its introduction into inquisitional practice" (so Maycock, *Inquis.* 158, italics mine): he definitely *commanded* it.

was again renewed, this time by Clemens IV. In 1266 this Pope urged James I, King of Aragon, to expel the Moors from his dominions; and in 1278 Pope Nicolaus III blamed Peter III of Aragon for having made a truce with them. About 1275, Waldenses were still being captured and burnt in Burgundy.

The leading Churchmen of the time were, needless to say, ready to defend these violent proceedings by argument. Cardinal Henry of Susa (also called Hostiensis), who died in 1271, insisted that "the due penalty" referred to in the papal decree of 1184 meant being burnt alive: and the same view was taken by the eminent jurist of the next century, Johannes Andreae. Still more significant are the detailed arguments of the revered 'angelic doctor,' Thomas Aquinas, whose death occurred in 1274. He too believed the decree of 1184, as well as that of 1215, to prescribe the death-penalty. With many appeals to Scripture, much logical argumentation, and numerous answers to objections, Thomas Aquinas urged that, while pagans and Jews were not to be compelled to become Christians, yet Christian heretics and schismatics ought to be compelled, even by bodily compulsion, to fulfil their baptismal pledges; that, just as false-coiners and malefactors are speedily condemned to death by the secular authority, so heretics, if they remain obdurate after two admonitions (see Titus iii. 10–11), might with even more reason be "exterminated from the world by death" (though Thomas does not specify the method of execution to be adopted); that the words of Matt. xiii. 30 imply that, if the tares *can* be rooted up without detriment to the wheat, they should be; and that, although ordinary heretics, if penitent, should be spared, relapsed heretics, even if penitent, should be absolved, but not spared, lest they should unduly endanger others.[1]

The Popes, of course, endeavoured, by means of various regulations, to safeguard the use of torture in the quest for evidence from all wrongful excess: but, as a modern Catholic writer has candidly said, "as their restrictions to its use were not always heeded, its severity, though often exaggerated, was in many cases extreme. The consuls of Carcassonne in 1286 complained to the pope, the King of France, and the vicars of the local bishop, against the inquisitor Jean Galand, whom they charged with inflicting torture in an absolutely inhuman manner, and this charge was no isolated one."[2] The consuls, in fact, addressed a similar complaint in 1290 to the French King, Philip IV. Nevertheless the next Pope, Nicolaus IV (1288–1292), once more renewed the

[1] See the passages collected and quoted in Mirbt 201–203, and Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 242–264; and cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 190 f note; Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 35b; Vacandard in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 335a; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 2, 3 n., 17 f, 19 f, 22, 30, 36, 56 f, 63.

[2] Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 33a.

torturing edict of 1252: and his example was followed by Bonifatius VIII (1294–1303), who—like Innocentius IV—threatened with excommunication princes who refused to burn those whom the Inquisition handed over to them, though in some minor respects he lightened the severity of inquisitional procedure. He endeavoured, though without success, to introduce the Inquisition into the Balkan Peninsula. "In practice," writes another authority, "all the ingenuity of cruelty was exercised to find new modes of torment. These cruelties led at times to remonstrance from the civil power." In 1302, for instance, Philip IV, King of France, issued an ordonnance commanding the Inquisition to confine itself within the limits of the law.[1] A little later (1306) both King and Pope intervened to mitigate the cruelties of the reign of terror that had been devastating Languedoc ever since the great Albigensian crusade. The atrocious prison-conditions at Carcassonne and Albi were dealt with: but relief from persecution proved to be temporary. In 1307 Bernard Guy became Inquisitor at Toulouse, and held the office till 1323. He took a lofty view of his responsibilities, and is looked up to by some as the ideal Inquisitor. Yet we learn that he protested against a papal enquiry into the prison-régime in Languedoc as likely to diminish the prestige of the Inquisitors, that he held that heresy could be exterminated only as heretics were burnt, that he presided at eighteen autos-da-fé, and pronounced nearly 930 sentences against persons convicted of heresy, of whom forty-two were handed over to the secular arm for burning and apparently eighty-nine were dead already (the sentence therefore merely confiscated their property and so disinherited their heirs). In a word, he virtually completed the destruction of Catharism in this region.

Pope Clemens V (1305–1314)—as has been already hinted—attempted in a number of ways to check the abuses of the terrible engine of destruction his predecessors had built up: yet it was in his pontificate that the cruel and iniquitous suppression of the Knights-Templars took place. Philip IV was in urgent need of money, and was envious of the wealth and influence of the Order. In 1307, therefore, without the authorization of the Pope, but with the support of the Inquisition in France, he had the members of the Order arrested, and numbers of them examined in regard to certain allegations made against them. The most appalling tortures were used in the investigation. At Paris, thirty-six of the knights, and at Sens, twenty-five died under torment. Efforts were made—but with very partial success—to extend the attack on them to other countries. The Pope endeavoured to control and moderate the movement by taking part in it; but he was led on and on by circumstances. In 1310 fifty-four Templars were

[1] J. Williams in *Encyc. Brit.* xxvii. 75a.

burnt at Paris, four at Senlis, and a little later nine more. Others were burnt as late as 1314; the Order was suppressed by a papal decree; and a goodly proportion of its wealth found its way into the French king's coffers. Yet modern scholars—both Catholic and Protestant—seem unanimous in the view that the Templars were innocent of the charges laid against them, the confessions extorted by unbearable torture being altogether insufficient as evidence.

In 1317 Pope John XXII set the Inquisition of Languedoc in motion against the 'Spirituales' (irregular followers of Francis). Four of them were publicly burnt alive at Marseilles under sentence passed by a bench of ecclesiastical judges. About 1320 there were many burnings of Franciscan sectaries at Narbonne, Béziers, Carcassonne, etc. At Pamiers, between 1318 and 1324, sixty-four persons were sentenced, and five of them burnt. In 1323 the same Pope tried again to introduce the Inquisition into the Balkans—though with only partial success. Sporadic burnings took place during this period in Spain and Germany. In 1335 Pope Benedictus XII tried to introduce the Inquisition into Ireland. In 1336 fourteen heretics were burnt at Angermunde, and in 1348 twelve at Embrun. Under Clemens VI (1342–1352) the Dominicans protested, though fruitlessly, against the permission given earlier by the King of France to a dignitary of a certain order to visit regularly and to console some of his brethren who had been sentenced to solitary confinement for life. In 1354 two men were burnt at Carcassonne. In 1366 the Waldenses in the hills of south-eastern France were invaded by an army; and a number of burnings followed. From 1375 to 1393 François Borelli carried on a fierce inquisitorial persecution against these Waldenses, large numbers of whom were consigned to the flames. A heretic was burnt at Erfurt in 1368, and seven at Nordhausen in 1369.

In the latter half of the fourteenth century flourished Nicolas Eymeric, the eminent Grand-Inquisitor of Aragon. Heresy was not strong in Spain, and Eymeric's victims were not so numerous as those that had to be dealt with elsewhere: but he took a very serious view of his office, and his biographer later observed that his chief merit was "that he regarded all heretics with sharp hatred." On the basis of long years of experience, he wrote, about 1368, an important manual of procedure, entitled 'Directorium Inquisitorum.' In it he gave a detailed account of the whole inquisitional procedure, including full particulars in regard to the varieties of torture that might be used. The papal regulations had laid it down that torture was to be inflicted once only, and was not to be repeated unless new evidence was brought forward: Eymeric, however, explained that, though not to be 'repeated,' there was nothing to hinder the torture from being 'continued' over three days. Part of

the formula of condemnation ran: "Thou, being given up to reprobate feeling, alike led and led astray by a malignant spirit, hast chosen to be tormented with terrible and perpetual tortures in hell, and here to be bodily consumed by material fires, rather than, by clinging to more wholesome counsel, to recoil from damnable and pestilent errors." We gather from his description that those handed over to the secular arm were not infrequently burnt alive by a slow fire, the advantage of this method being that the victim had more time for repentance. Eymeric's book was one of the earliest manuals of rules for the infliction of torture, and its conclusions were widely adopted by secular jurists: for Inquisitors, the book became a classic, and as such, ran through several authoritative editions.

The fifteenth century opened with the English statute 'De Haeretico Comburendo' (1401), entitling bishops to hand convicted heretics over to the sheriffs to be burnt alive. The first victim of the new act was William Sawtrey, who was burnt the same year at St. Paul's Cross. A Wyclifite named John Resley was burnt in Scotland in 1407. In 1410 John Badly was burnt in London for denying transubstantiation; another man about the same time, and yet another in 1413. The famous Sir John Oldcastle perished at the stake in 1417. The Council of Constance (1414–1418) reaffirmed the doctrine that heretics "should be punished even unto fire," and gave effect to it in the condemnation and burning of John Hus (1415) and Jerome of Prague (1416)—who maintained the rights of conscience against the authority of the Pope. Persecution of the Hussites of Bohemia followed, and developed into armed conflict. During the century, the operations of the Inquisition —though far from having ceased—seem to have been somewhat more sporadic, local, and occasional, than formerly. In 1419 Pope Martinus V authorized the Inquisition to proceed against usurers, thus giving it a hold over the Jews, who were not in the ordinary way liable to punishment for heresy. Special interest attaches to the condemnation of Joan of Arc by the Inquisition at Rouen in 1431, and her death at the stake, especially in view of her subsequent canonization by the Roman Church.[1] In 1469, on the occasion of a papal crusade against the Hussites, a medal was struck by Pope Paul II, depicting a boar-hunt and bearing the inscription: "The pious shepherd wages war only against wild beasts." Occasional burnings for Lollardy continued to take place in England (1431, 1438, 1440, 1466, 1485).

In 1478, at the request of the Spanish sovereigns, Ferdinand and Isabella, Sixtus IV authorized the establishment of a special Inquisition

[1] Mr. G. B. Shaw's skilful presentation of the story in his play *Saint Joan* has been subjected to trenchant criticism on historical and moral grounds by Mr. A. Lunn (*Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1926, 77–88).

for Spain. The primary purpose of this was to deal with the Jewish peril. The Jews were very numerous and wealthy in Spain; and for a couple of centuries efforts had been made either to convert or destroy them. Much blood had been shed, and many thousands compulsorily converted and baptized. The loyalty of these converts to the Church could not but be doubtful; and suspicion and terror were further roused by the relapse of many of them into Judaism. A little later, precisely analogous difficulties arose in connexion with the converted Moors. The Spanish Inquisition was unquestionably an ecclesiastical or papal institution; but it was also national in a sense that could not be predicated of the Inquisition elsewhere. The Spanish monarchy had a large share in the control of it, and was enriched by its exactions. Hence it became increasingly independent of the Pope. It was popularly regarded in Spain as an indispensable agent of public protection. Its procedure was approximately the same as that of the Roman Inquisition, with certain modifications due to its national and royal character. The first step in any given place was to call for voluntary confession and abjuration of heresy; and such as responded were pardoned under certain conditions. In the examination of suspects, torture in its most diabolical varieties was freely used. The trial concluded with an 'auto-da-fé' (act of faith)—a public religious ceremony at which penitents confessed, sentences were announced, and the condemned were handed over to the secular arm. The execution of these latter was not, strictly speaking, an official part of the auto-da-fé; but it took place in public, under the eyes of royal persons and representatives of the Church. Those who had relapsed into heresy and repented were strangled before being burnt; others were burnt alive. The property of the persons condemned was confiscated—the State and the Church sharing the spoils; but children who betrayed their parents were allowed to keep their patrimony. Even the dead were sometimes sentenced, either their effigies or their disinterred corpses publicly burnt, and the property of their heirs confiscated.

A beginning on these lines was made in September 1480, by the royal appointment of two Inquisitors at Seville, who entered upon their labours in the January of the following year. Before its close, 298 persons had been burnt at Seville, and 5960 sentenced to various penalties short of death.[1] Complaints of cruelty and injustice reached Rome; and in January 1482 Sixtus IV issued a brief censuring the Inquisitors. He even threatened them with deposition; but from this they were saved by the intercession of the sovereigns. Eighty-eight persons were

[1] The figures given by Llorente, ex-secretary and historian (1815–1817) of the Spanish Inquisition, are generally regarded as exaggerated: those given above represent the more moderate estimates of later investigators.

burnt during 1482, and 625 penanced. In 1483 the Pope urged Ferdinand and Isabella to press forward the Christ-like work,[1] and appointed the Dominican Torquemada Inquisitor-General of Castile and Aragon. The number of victims for the year were 142 burnt, and 2840 penanced. The Inquisition was revised, reinvigorated, and extended: new courts were set up in various places. During the fifteen years of Torquemada's tenure of the supreme office, 2000 persons were burnt, and 40,000 penanced. In 1484 he issued detailed instructions as to procedure, including of course particulars regarding torture. Such cruelty naturally provoked a certain amount of resentment; and in 1485 Don Pedro Arbues, Inquisitor of Aragon, was murdered while at prayer before the altar. Five autos-da-fé were held at Toledo in 1486; 3300 persons were sentenced, and of these twenty-seven were burnt. Although the Popes were often at issue with the Spanish monarchy and the Spanish Inquisition over appeals, confiscations, and even acts of excessive cruelty, they yet supported the main enterprise wholeheartedly. Innocentius VIII, for instance, besides approving of the acts of his predecessor, in 1486–7 conferred additional powers and dignities on Torquemada. In 1492, under Torquemada's influence, the unconverted Jews—in enormous numbers, with infinite suffering, and to the great detriment of commerce —were driven out of the Spanish Peninsula.[2] Torquemada died in 1498; but his work went on. Between 1498 and 1809, the Spanish Inquisition is said to have burnt over 23,000, and to have otherwise penalized over 200,000, persons. The figures have been challenged as exaggerated—perhaps rightly: but even so they testify to an appalling measure of cruelty.

But Spain was not the only country in which this brutality was being practised. In 1491 a priest was burnt in Paris for denying the Real Presence. In 1494 an old woman of over eighty was burnt in England as a follower of Wyclif; and burnings by the Dominicans took place in Germany. In 1496 five Lollards were burnt in London, one at Canterbury in 1497, and one (an old man) in London in 1499. In 1498 Savonarola fell a victim to the hatred of the Borgian Pope Alexander VI; the Florentine government excused itself for the delay in dealing with him, by pleading his extraordinary physical powers, which had necessitated repeated applications of torture. In 1503 the 'Directorium Inquisitorum' of Eymeric[3] was printed at Barcelona. From 1506

[1] See Prescott, *Ferd. and Isab.* (ed. 1886) 172 f (". . . encouraging both sovereigns to proceed in the great work of purification by an audacious reference to the example of Jesus Christ, who, says he, consolidated His kingdom on earth by the destruction of idolatry; . . .").

[2] For particulars regarding this heart-rending episode, see Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 277–281, and Jacobs in *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, xi. 500 f.

[3] See above, pp. 562 f.

onwards, further burnings took place in England. In 1507 the eminent Cardinal Ximenes became Inquisitor-General of Spain: he organized inquisitorial tribunals at Seville, Cordova, Jaen, Toledo, Murcia, Valladolid, and Calahorra, and was responsible for introducing them into Spanish America.

The coming of the Reformation naturally inflamed still further the ardour of persecuting Catholics. In 1520 Leo X condemned, among other doctrines of Luther, the statement that "it is contrary to the will of the Spirit that heretics should be burnt."[1] In 1522 the Emperor Charles V set up the Inquisition in the Netherlands; and the number of persons there put to death for their religion during his reign (i.e. till 1556) was estimated by the Catholic Paul Sarpi at 50,000. Anabaptist men were slowly burnt to death, Anabaptist women drowned. The conscientious Pope, Adrianus VI (1522–1523), had served as Inquisitor in Aragon before his election to the pontificate; and he regarded the Inquisition as one of the instruments for reforming the evils of his time. In 1524 an inscription was put up at Seville in a public place, stating that since 1492 nearly 1000 persons had been burnt and 20,000 otherwise penanced after abjuring heresy. The same year the Spanish Inquisition began to afflict the converted Moors—though with diminished severity; while at Paris the first French Protestant was strangled and burnt—to be followed by another in 1529.

In January 1535, Francis I, King of France, issued an edict ordering the extermination of all the French heretics; and the same day, in the presence of the King, his court, a large crowd, and a number of high ecclesiastics, with saints' relics and the Host, six of these heretics —their tongues having been cut out to prevent them speaking—were alternately lowered into and raised out of the flames till they were consumed. In the course of the year, as a sequel to the fall of the Anabaptist republic at Münster, an imperial edict was issued at Brussels, condemning unrepentant Anabaptists to be burnt, repentant men to be slain with the sword, and repentant women to be buried alive. In 1542 Pope Paul III established the 'Holy Congregation of the Roman and Universal Inquisition,' for the purpose of checking the now rapidly growing Protestant heresy. It was a tribunal consisting of six cardinals (afterwards more) who were to deal with all suspected heretics. In Italy they succeeded in extinguishing Protestantism altogether for a time. In 1545 and 1550 Charles V issued instructions about torture and other matters for the guidance of Inquisitors. Unparalleled atrocities were committed in his dominions. The Council of Trent (1545–1563) said nothing explicit about burning heretics: but in 1547 it anathematized those who said that one baptized as a child, but unwilling as an

[1] Mirbt 258 (29: no. 33).

adult to carry out the baptismal pledges, should be compelled to the Christian life by no further punishment than exclusion from the Sacraments pending his change of mind.[1] The same year special Inquisitors were appointed for France. In 1551 Philip II took over the governmen of Spain: he increased the power of the Inquisition in Spanish America, and established it permanently in three new places—Lima, Mexico, and Cartagena. In 1553 five young students were burnt at Lyons. In 1554 Father Picart, a French preacher, urged that the King should feign himself a Lutheran, so as to make it more possible to lay violent hands on the Protestants, and purge the kingdom of them. It must have been about 1556 that Joseph Scaliger, then in his middle teens, saw in Guienne a man who had been condemned by the Church burnt so gradually that he was half consumed before he died. The use of a slow fire in the burning of heretics was apparently habitual in certain districts: and zealous theologians sometimes bitterly complained when they saw a heretic strangled instead of being slowly burnt.

Under Queen Mary of England, between 1555 and 1558, the country having formally returned to its allegiance to Rome, the heresy-laws were again enforced—accompanied by the illegal use of torture: 277 persons were burnt, sixteen perished in prison; and others were otherwise punished. In Calabria, from 1555 to 1561, the Waldenses were persecuted by the papal Inquisition: they were slaughtered, hurled from cliff-tops, imprisoned, burnt at the stake, sent to the mines and the galleys: one hundred elderly women were first tortured and then killed: other women, and children, were sold into slavery. In 1556 Philip II became ruler of the Netherlands. It is said to have been his boast that, if his own son were a heretic, he would himself bring a faggot. He immediately confirmed and extended the powers of the Inquisition; and it has been estimated that under his rule in the Low Countries about 25,000 persons perished for their religion. In 1558 the Spanish Inquisition decreed the penalty of death for those possessed of forbidden books. The same year was published the 'Sacro Arsenale' (by Father Masini), the text-book of procedure for the Italian Inquisition: it contained detailed instructions for the use of torture, and ran through numerous editions during the next couple of centuries. In 1559 two autos-da-fé were held in Philip II's presence at Valladolid: seventy-one persons were condemned, twenty-six of whom were handed over to the secular authorities for execution, but of these only two were actually burnt alive. The same year Henry II, King of France, confidentially broached to William of Orange a scheme, formed by Philip II and himself, to massacre simultaneously every heretic in France and the Netherlands. At Rome, on the death of the stern Pope Paul IV, an

[1] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vii, bapt. can. 14 (Mirbt 304 f).

insurrection against the rigour of the Inquisition took place; and in 1560 the Inquisitor-General at Venice (afterwards Pope Sixtus V) was obliged to flee owing to the opposition his severity had aroused. In April 1561, the Bishop of Mans reported that his "good people" had been able to carry out a small massacre at the sacking of a Huguenot's house; and in December the same year a crowd, led and mainly composed of ecclesiastical persons, slaughtered some Huguenots assembled for a prayer-meeting at St. Médard. In 1562 the Duke of Guise slew a number of Huguenot worshippers at Vassy; and this act inaugurated the civil wars of religion which convulsed France for many years. Besides the operations between the opposing armies, a number of massacres (sometimes accompanied by appalling cruelty) were perpetrated on unarmed Huguenot civilians at Toulouse, Orange,[1] and other places. Simon Vigor, a priest in Paris, declared that isolated executions were not enough for him, and that those who were unwilling to destroy the Huguenots had no religion. The lust for blood became so violent that a holocaust on a tremendous scale was feared by dispassionate observers; and in 1563 King Charles IX forbade the clergy to preach sermons exciting the people to commotion.

We are, in fact, approaching what is perhaps the most sanguinary period in the Church's history. In 1564, the year after the Council of Trent broke up, Pius IV promulgated his so-called 'Creed,' which was to be binding on all persons holding positions of responsibility in the Church, and has since been frequently used as the normal pledge to be taken by converts to Rome. It requires firm acceptance of all the traditions, usages, and constitutions of the Church, an oath of obedience to the Pope, unhesitating acceptance and profession of conciliar traditions, definitions, and declarations, and an anathematization, damnation, and rejection of all heresies.[2] How much such promises were in that age understood to cover appears from contemporary events. In 1566 Pius V became Pope. He was a man of exemplary piety and religious fervour: he was also a most indefatigable persecutor, and made the violent destruction of heresy one of the chief aims of his policy. At Rome, during his pontificate, the prisons were full, and hangings, beheadings, and burnings took place almost daily. In his first year, the authoritative 'Roman Catechism' was officially published. In this, heretics and schismatics were described as traitors and deserters of

[1] The most horrible barbarities were committed on the civilian population, as well as the soldiers, at the sack of Orange by the papal general Serbelloni in 1562 (C. P. Stewart, *Rom. Ch. and Heresy*, 15 f note): but these are represented as a just reprisal for outrages previously committed by the Huguenot army of Orange in sacking Barjol and massacring the inhabitants (so Pontbriant, *Histoire de la Principauté d'Orange*, [Paris, 1891] 54–62).

[2] Mirbt 339 f.

the Church, and therefore outside it: "yet," the 'Catechism' continued, "it is not to be denied that they are in the Church's power, as people who may be by her called to judgment, punished, and damned with anathema."[1] The Pope wrote letters to all and sundry, urging cooperation in the task of exterminating heresy and heretics. He wrote, for instance, in 1567 to the Doge of Venice, the King of Spain, and the Duke of Savoy, calling on them to assist King Charles IX of France against the Huguenots. Late in 1568 he was writing letters of hearty congratulation, thanks, and encouragement to the Duke of Alva. This man had been in the previous year appointed by Philip II commander-in-chief in the Netherlands. He immediately erected a special tribunal, which soon became known among the people as 'the court of blood.' Civil and religious liberty was crushed, heretics and malcontents executed in hundreds. In February 1568, a sentence of the Holy Office condemned all the inhabitants of the Netherlands (about three million people) to death as heretics, and a royal proclamation confirmed this decree, and ordered it to be immediately carried out. Alva reported having ordered 1500 arrested persons to be executed on a single occasion; and when he left the country in 1573 he boasted that, besides the multitudes destroyed in battle and massacred after victory, he had consigned 18,000 persons to the executioner. Meanwhile, in spite of the peace of Longjumeau (March 1568), further terrible massacres of Huguenots took place in France. Pius V caused to be promulgated at Toulouse a bull calling for a holy war against the Protestants, recalling the earlier slaughter of the Albigenses, and promising absolution to those who should slay heretics, and heaven to those who should die in the endeavour to slay them. The same year (1568) he was assured (through Cardinal Santa Croce) that Charles IX and his mother, the Queen-Regent, Catharine de' Medici, wished one day to gather all the Huguenots together, and make a butchery of them. During 1569 he wrote a number of letters to Catharine, Charles, and other leaders —ecclesiastical and secular—in the war against the Huguenots, urging them in the most emphatic terms to the work of extirpating heresy by slaughter. He sent troops to the King's help, and celebrated the Catholic victories with rejoicing. He sent a priest to England, to stir up revolt against Elizabeth. In 1570 the Pope's letters to France first discouraged and then condemned the conclusion of peace with the Huguenots: but the King promised him in dark mysterious hints that he would soon give effective and striking proof of his loyalty to the Church. Pius meanwhile pushed forward his schemes against Elizabeth, not only by secret means (which included a project for her assassination), but by formally

[1] *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 12: the doctrine is enforced in the *Praxis* prefixed to the Catechism.

excommunicating and deposing her, and forbidding her subjects to continue their allegiance.

In 1571, at the request of Philip II, the Pope extended the province of the Spanish Inquisition to the galleys, fleets, and armies of Spain. In May 1572 Gregorius XIII succeeded Pius V as Pope. He was disposed to encourage the violent suppression of heresy, and to give financial help for the purpose. Within the first months of his pontificate occurred the crowning crime of the century. On 24 August (St Bartholomew's Day), at the instigation of Catharine de' Medici and with the consent of King Charles IX and the approval and assistance of a number of French cardinals, a series of massacres began, which lasted in Paris till late in September, and in the French provinces till the beginning of October, and in which about 70,000 Huguenots were slain.[1] For this deed Catharine de' Medici received the congratulations of all the Catholic powers; the princes and preachers of the Church were filled with jubilation; and, in particular, Gregorius XIII, when the event was reported to him, celebrated a special high Mass of thanksgiving, proclaimed a jubilee for all Christendom, had bonfires lighted and guns fired and a medal struck bearing the exultant inscription: "Ugonottorum Strages, 1572." The eminent painter Vasari was summoned from Florence to Rome, and commissioned by the Pope to depict the massacre in a series of frescoes. Cardinal Orsini was sent to Paris as papal legate towards the close of the year, and stayed there till the following March (1573). He gave absolution to a number of the murderers who asked for it, and under the Pope's instructions urged the king to continue his policy of extermination. Charles, however, was already uneasy about the horrible deed, and the Holy Father's advice was not followed. The papal and ecclesiastical jubilation was nevertheless not to be damped: in 1573 Gregorius sent Charles a sword and a cap which had been solemnly consecrated, accompanied by praise, benediction, and an indulgence; and at Avignon, St. Bartholomew's Day was celebrated by an ecclesiastical procession. In 1574, shortly after Charles IX's death, his confessor (who was afterwards Bishop of Nevers) published his life, praising him warmly for the vigour and skill of his measures against the heretics. Another life of the king, written by a Jesuit (Masson) in 1575, complained that the massacre was not complete enough.

The same year (1575) there was published at Rome a work by Simancas, Bishop of Badajoz, entitled 'De Catholicis institutionibus

[1] Lest I be suspected of numerical exaggeration at this point, I would explain that the number rests on the authority of Charles IX's own admission to the papal legate, Cardinal Orsini, as reported by Salviati, the papal nuncio at Paris (C. P. Stewart, *Rom. Ch. and Heresy*, 50).

liber, ad praecavendas et extirpandas haereses admodum necessarius.' In it the author vigorously defended the inquisitional practice of torture against its critics, and gave a vivid account of the various methods employed. In 1578 and 1585 the 'Directorium' of Eymeric was republished at Rome with special papal approval.[1] Even the devout St. Theresa, who died in 1582, saw nothing wrong in the burning of heretics: and the great Catholic scholar of this period, Bellarmine, argued strongly for the Church's right to put them to death. In the years 1580–1583 plans were afoot for the assassination of Queen Elizabeth, and the approval of the Pope was conveyed to the conspirators through the Cardinal of Como.[2] Treatises were written by Jesuits of the period, defending the rightfulness of assassinating tyrants or usurpers. In 1583 Suarez de Paz published his 'Praxis ecclesiastica et secularis,' in which he defended the legality of torturing anyone over fourteen years of age suspected of heresy, and of scourging those under fourteen, on the analogy of the usage adopted in trials for treason. The man who nearly succeeded in murdering William the Silent in 1582, had not only attempted by prayers and vows to secure the favour of Jesus, the Virgin Mary, Gabriel, etc., but had received Holy Communion and absolution from his Dominican confessor the day before. The successful assassin of 1584 was encouraged in his project by the regent of the Jesuit college of Trier and a celebrated Franciscan at Tournay. In 1587 an auto-da-fé was held in the Canary Islands: Gaspar, an Englishman of twenty-four, was burnt for refusing to abjure Lutheranism (he had stabbed himself in prison the previous night, but was still alive) —and fourteen English sailors, who had been tortured into submission, were reconciled as penitents to the Church, flogged, and sentenced to the galleys. Pope Sixtus V (1585–1590) reorganized the Holy Office of the Inquisition; and in 1588 Henry III was urged to re-establish the Inquisition in all the principal towns of his kingdom. The Pope gave his hearty support to Philip II's attempt to subdue England by means of the Invincible Armada, which carried among its thousands officers of the Inquisition. In 1589 Henry III of France, who had, by means of murder, freed himself from the control of the Guises, was assassinated: a Jesuit prior had promised the assassin a higher place in Paradise than the Apostles; leading Churchmen applauded the deed; the Pope, in doing so, compared it, not only to Judith's act, but to the Incarnation and Resurrection of our Lord. A later Pope, Clemens VIII, uttered indignant threats over the Edict of Nantes (1598), by which a liberal measure of toleration was granted to the French Protestants by Henry

[1] See above, pp. 562 f, 565 bott.

[2] Mirbt 351–353; Coulton in *Anglic Ess.* 93–95; C. P. Stewart, *Rom Ch. and Heresy*, 28.

IV. The same year the Spanish Inquisitor Paramo published a work treating the Inquisition as the central fact in human history, calling God the first Inquisitor, showing the close parallel between inquisitional procedure and God's treatment of the defaulters in Eden, claiming our Lord as head of the present Inquisition, and comparing it to the Good Samaritan, who used not only the oil of mercy, but the wine of a wholesome severity, and so on. In 1600 the eminent philosopher Giordano Bruno was burnt alive at Rome.

In February 1610, Cardinal Barberini reproached De Thou, the Catholic historian, with having blamed what his father, the elder De Thou, had approved, namely, the massacre of St. Bartholomew. Later the same year, the tolerant Henry IV was assassinated: in an important Jesuit college at Paris, he was represented as being dragged by demons to hell, while his murderer Ravaillac was borne up to heaven by angels. In 1611 a Jesuit named Kellerus issued a book defending the rightness of tyrannicide against Calvinistic attack; and two years later another apologia for the practice was published by another Jesuit, Francisco Suarez, maintaining that the Pope was entitled to depose a heretical prince and depute persons to kill him. In 1614 a Dutch captain, condemned two years before by the Inquisitors in the Canaries for refusing to abjure heresy, was burnt alive.

In 1618 occurred the death of Prospero Farinacci, procurator-general to the Pope Paul V and, according to the Catholic estimate of those (as of later) times, a most famous and gifted lawyer. This man's great work was entitled: 'Praxis et Theorica Criminalis,' first published towards the end of the author's life, several times re-edited, and duly endorsed with authoritative approval. In this work the discussion of torture occupies over 250 closely-printed folio pages: an immense variety of tortures is mentioned, and the list clearly tended to grow with the inventiveness of judges. In regard to the children of heretics, Farinacci says that they "are legally made so incapable of succeeding their father(s) that they cannot inherit a single penny; nay rather they ought always—like the children of those guilty of human treason—so to sink (sordescere) in misery and need, that nothing else is to be left to them except life only, which is granted out of pity; and they ought in this world to be such that life is a punishment to them, and death a comfort."[1]

The year that saw the death of Farinacci saw also the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War. Two years after its commencement, Spain seized the Valteline valley, uprooting heresy there by massacring six hundred Protestants. Pope Paul V (1605–1621) repeatedly lamented his inability to oppose such aggression on the part of Spain, without extending protection to heretics. The collapse of the revolt of Bohemia

[1] Farinacci, *Praxis*, etc. bk. I, tit. iii, qu. 24 (ed. 1723, 344).

in 1627 led to the merciless repression of the Protestants in that country. The Catholic philosopher Campanella, who died in 1639, taught that the task of the Spanish Empire was to place treasures from overseas at the Church's disposal for her contest with heretics. The margin of the 1633 edition of the Rheims New Testament summarizes Hebrews x. 29 as follows: "Heresie and Apostasie from the Catholike faith, punishable by death." Escobar, the notorious Jesuit casuist, who flourished at this time, took the view that an inquisitor may follow a 'probable' opinion in ordering torture, neglecting a more 'probable.' In 1648, when the disastrous Thirty Years' War was brought to an end, and peace was made between Catholics and Protestants, Pope Innocentius X protested against it, on the ground that it involved toleration of heresy. Earlier this year, at an auto-da-fé held at Seville, fifty-two persons were sentenced, of whom one was handed over to the secular power: as he repented, he was graciously strangled before being burnt. Out of 1205 cases investigated by the Inquisition at Toledo between 1648 and 1694, only six were completely acquitted. In 1662 the centenary of the massacre of unarmed Huguenots was celebrated at Toulouse by papal instructions. In 1671 the vehement persecutor, Ferdinand of Castile (1217–1252), was canonized.[1] In 1680 a Jewish girl of seventeen was burnt alive at Madrid after a pathetic but fruitless appeal to the Queen on her way to the stake. Persecution raged in Spain against the followers of Molinos, as it had against the Illuminati. In 1685, under the influence of the Catholic clergy, Louis XIV of France revoked the Edict of Nantes; and the cruel persecution of the Huguenots, which had already recommenced, received its full legal sanction. Even the enlightened Gallican Bossuet (1627–1704) defended the severe intolerance of the Church.

In Spain, during the reign of Philip V (1700–1746), over a thousand heretics are said to have been burnt. In 1712 Pope Pius V, who had been so active in urging the extermination of Protestants,[2] was canonized. In 1713 Clemens XI condemned Quesnel's lamentation over the condemnation and persecution, in the name of religious zeal, of the upright disciples of truth. In 1730 the Jesuit Tournemin appealed to the death-penalty ordained for apostasy by the Mosaic Law, and declared that only false religions could authorize tolerance. In 1754 appeared the Franciscan Father Tempesti's 'Life of Sixtus V,' dedicated to Cardinal Albani and duly authorized: in it the massacre of St. Bartholomew was represented as a very creditable achievement, which was unhappily shorn of its completeness by the cunning of Catharine de' Medici! In 1758 the Abbé de Caveyrac published an 'Apology . . . for the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes,' in which he argued that

[1] See above, pp. 558 f.

[2] See above, pp. 568 f.

intolerance was not contrary to reason, humanity, and religion. In 1762 the centenary of the 1562-massacre was again celebrated at Toulouse; and Jean Calas, a Protestant merchant, was on a charge of murder put to death with horrible tortures. Peter Dens (1690–1775), in his 'Theologia moralis et dogmatica,' which has been much used as a text-book for Catholic students, defended the view of Aquinas that heretics were rightly punished with death, defined heresy as "pertinacious error," and pertinacity as resistance to the truth of the Faith when sufficiently put forth; and he named the majority of the Dutch people as instances. Alphonso dei Liguori (1696–1779) discussed in his 'Theologia moralis' the casuistry of the infliction of torture. Torture was not formally abolished in the Empire till 1776; but step by step it disappeared from the theory and practice of European law. In 1780 the French clergy solemnly protested against the partial tolerance that had come to be extended to Protestants in France, and petitioned the King that it might go no further. In 1789 the Catholic clergy in Belgium exerted themselves to put an end to the religious liberty established there by Joseph II's edict of 1780. In 1794 Pius VI condemned those propositions of the Council of Pistoia which limited the Church's exercise of authority to counsel and persuasion, and which denied her right to enforce obedience to herself by means of "external judgment and salutary penalties."

In 1808 the Spanish Inquisition was abolished by Napoleon and his brother Joseph at Madrid; and in 1813 the Cortes of Spain, in spite of the protests of Rome, declared it to be incompatible with the constitution. Ferdinand VII, however, who regained the throne in 1814 on the expulsion of the French armies from Spain, reintroduced the Inquisition, and it continued for some years, though in an impoverished form. After Napoleon's abdication (1814), a constitutional government was given to France by a charter, which secured—among other things—freedom of religion, and against which Pius VII (who was now able to restore the Inquisition in the Papal States) accordingly protested. In spite of legal protection, however, the French Protestants suffered acutely under the restored ascendancy of the Catholic Church: murders, massacres, and other outrages took place, particularly in and around Nîmes, between 1815 and 1819. The Roman authorities seem to have done nothing to check the persecution. In 1815, on the re-establishment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Belgian prelates did their level best to induce the King not to grant religious liberty to his Protestant subjects.[1] Catholic Bible-commentaries published at this period in Ireland justified the killing of heretics,[2] though O'Connell was eager

[1] *Annual Register for . . . 1815*, [97–[99.

[2] See also below, p. 593 n. 4, and p. 594 n. 1.

to disavow this view. In 1818 the Bavarian constitution guaranteed liberty to the Protestants, and was on that ground denounced by the Pope. In 1820 the Inquisition was once more abolished in Spain, but was temporarily restored in 1823: in 1826 a Jew was burnt, and a Quaker hanged, for relapsing into heresy. In 1832 Pope Gregorius XVI stated in an encyclical: "Out of this most foul fountain of Indifferentism flows that absurd and erroneous opinion, or rather raving, that liberty of conscience is to be asserted and vindicated for everybody."[1] The same year a committee advised the omission from the Jesuit 'Regulation for Studies' of the clause permitting students to attend the public execution of heretics, since in some regions the words would cause offence: they were, however, still present in the edition published thirty-seven years later. In 1834 the Spanish Inquisition was finally abolished through Liberal influence: but Protestant worship and unauthorized distribution of Scripture were still liable to be punished with imprisonment, until the united protests of England and Prussia secured a more liberal measure of toleration. In 1845 Newman remarked that classical paganism "was the fit subject of persecution, for its first breath made it crumble and disappear."[2] In 1848 Charles Albert, King of Piedmont, gave permission for the Waldenses to enter Italy. In Tuscany, however, people were still being imprisoned for reading and distributing the Bible (1852): for the Grand-Duke, under papal pressure, had abolished the toleration previously in force. In June 1849 the following opinions were expressed in the pages of 'The Rambler': "The Catholic has some reason on his side when he calls for the temporal punishment of heretics, for he claims the true title of Christian for himself exclusively . . . we are prepared to maintain, that it is no more morally *wrong* to put a man to death for heresy than for murder; that in many cases persecution for religious opinions is not only permissible, but highly advisable and necessary. . . ." The difference between silencing and burning a person for his opinions was declared to be only one of degree. Again, in September 1851: "You ask, if he" (the Roman Catholic) "were lord in the land, and you were in a minority, if not in numbers, yet in power, what would he do to you? That, we say, would entirely depend upon circumstances. If it would benefit the cause of Catholicism he would tolerate you; if expedient, he would imprison you, banish you, fine you; possibly, he might even hang you. But be assured of one thing, he would never tolerate you for the sake of 'the glorious principles of civil and religious liberty'. . . Shall I lend my countenance to this unhappy persuasion of my brother, that he is not flying in the face of Almighty God every day that he remains a Protestant? Shall I hold out hopes to him that I will not meddle with his creed, if

[1] Mirbt 439 (30): often quoted.

[2] Newman, *Developm.* 92.

he will not meddle with mine? Shall I lead him to think that religion is a matter for private opinion, and tempt him to forget that he has no more right to his religious views than he has to my purse, or my house, or my life-blood? No! Catholicism is the most intolerant of creeds. It is intolerance itself, for it is truth itself. We might as rationally maintain that a sane man has a right to believe that two and two do not make four, as this theory of religious liberty. Its impiety is only equalled by its absurdity. . . . A Catholic temporal government would be guided in its treatment of Protestants and other recusants solely by the rules of expediency, adopting precisely that line of conduct which would tend best to conversion, and to prevent the dissemination of their errors."[1]

In March 1851, Pius IX concluded a concordat with Isabella II of Spain, according to which "the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion, which—to the exclusion of every other cult—is to be (esse pergit) the sole religion of the Spanish nation, shall be always preserved throughout the whole realm (ditione) of Her Catholic Majesty," etc. and all education, public and private, was to be conformable to Catholic doctrine.[2] Later in the same year, the Pope formally condemned, in the bull 'Ad Apostolicas,' the proposition of Nuytz, a Turin professor, to the effect that the Church did not possess the power to employ force against persons. Next year he had occasion strongly to condemn the freedom of public worship granted to non-Catholic immigrants in New Granada.[3] Again in 1852 the new penal code in Portugal prohibited the acceptance by natives of any religion but Catholicism.[4] In March 1853, the official Jesuit organ in Rome, the 'Civilta Cattolica' deplored the lapse of punitive laws against heresy and the depreciation by many Catholics of the Church's Inquisition, and acclaimed the spirit of the inquisitional tribunals as "a sublime spectacle of social perfection."[5] In 1856 the Pope complained of the free exercise of all worship and free expression of religious opinion allowed by the Mexican government.[6] In 1862 he concluded a concordat with the republic of Ecuador, according to which Catholicism was to be its religion; "wherefore no other religion (cultus) or society that has been condemned by the Church will ever be able to be permitted" in Ecuador: moreover all education was to be Catholic, and the circulation of books subject to ecclesiastical censorship.[7] The same year the third centenary of the massacre at Toulouse would, on the Archbishop's proclamation, have been duly celebrated, had not the government forbidden it.[8]

[1] *Rambler*, June 1849, 119a, 126b, 128b, Sept. 1851, 174, 178.
[2] Mirbt 446 (25).
[3] Pusey, *Eiren.* 296 f.
[4] Bain, *New Reformation*, 190.
[5] Quoted by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 34, 70 f.
[6] Pusey, *Eiren.* 295 n. 3.
[7] Mirbt 449 f.
[8] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 82.

On 8 December 1864, Pius IX issued an encyclical, 'Quanta Cura,' in which he deplored as false the current opinion "that that condition of society is best in which the government is not entrusted with the duty of coercing by appointed penalties the violators of the Catholic religion, except in so far as the public peace demands it," and approvingly recalled Gregorius XVI's condemnation (1832) of the demand for liberty of conscience and worship as a "deliramentum." He explained at length that such liberty was a "liberty of perdition," and strongly condemned the secularism of those who contended that "the Church does not possess the right of coercing the violators of her laws with temporal penalties." Appended to the encyclical was a 'Syllabus' of eighty erroneous opinions, which were thereby formally and authoritatively condemned. Here is a selection of the errors condemned. "15. Every man is free to embrace and profess the religion which, led by the light of reason, he thinks to be true. . . . 24. The Church does not possess the power of employing force, nor (does she possess) any temporal power direct or indirect. . . . 37. National churches can be set up, withdrawn, and entirely divided from the authority of the Roman pontiff. . . . 55. The Church ought to be separated from the State, and the State from the Church. . . . 77. In this age of ours it is no longer expedient that the Catholic religion should be held as the sole religion of the State, to the exclusion of all other cults. 78. Hence legal precautions have been praiseworthily taken in certain regions of the Catholic name for men immigrating into it to be allowed to enjoy (habere) the public exercise each of his own particular cult. 79. It is certainly false that civil liberty for every cult and full power for all to display openly and publicly what opinions and ideas they like conduces to the easy corruption of the characters and minds of the peoples and to the propagation of the plague of indifferentism."[1]

In 1867 Pius IX threw a halo round the Spanish Inquisition by canonizing Pedro Arbues, who had in 1485 been slain in consequence of his cruelty. This in some measure counterbalanced the final establishment of religious liberty in Spain, consequent upon the fall of Isabella II in 1868.[2] Towards the close of his pontificate, a book suggesting certain Church-reforms was sent to him by its author, Fra Andrea d'Altagene, for approval: d'Altagene was in consequence sentenced to twelve years'

[1] Mirbt 450–454 (but he does not print the encyclical itself). Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 295 f. Pohle (in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv [1912] 769b) explains that props. 77–79, "from which enemies of the Church" (unaccountably enough!) "are so fond of deducing her opposition to the granting of equal political rights to non-Catholics," do not now, in view of changed conditions, apply even to predominantly Catholic countries. On no. 24, cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 445 f (quotation of a Jesuit commentator, who specifies among the Church's temporal punishments fines, imprisonment, scourging, and banishment).

[2] Cf. Bain, *New Reformation,* 2, 171 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 322.

imprisonment, but after serving three years was released through the efforts of the French government.[1] Cardinal Camillo Tarquini, Professor of Canon Law at Rome, defended, in the fourth edition of his 'Institutiones' (published in 1875), the doctrine that heretics may be punished by the Church.[2] W. G. Ward advocated toleration on the specific ground of expediency.[3] In Belgium, during the period 1870–1878, when the clerical party was in power, great efforts were made to bring the country under the control of the papacy, and to apply the principles of the Syllabus of 1864 to its affairs.[4] In 1876 a measure of religious liberty was legally granted in Spain, but publicity of Protestant worship was prohibited; and the same year a Protestant church was burnt, and the worshippers lynched, at Atzala in Latin America.[5] In January 1877, there was published in 'The Dublin Review' a hearty and unrepentant defence of Catholic intolerance in the Middle Ages, in the interests of Catholic unity and truth, and a plea that it was still necessary and right in predominantly Catholic countries like Spain.[6] About 1879 a Jesuit Father told a group of Protestants, with whom he was breakfasting in Balliol College, Oxford, that he wished he could, by means of the civil government, stamp out Jews and Protestants, and that the English police-force was his only deterrent; when challenged to say whether he would begin with thumbscrews, he replied: "Oh dear no, I should go for your necks at once."[7] In 1882 Rev. T. F. Knox, in a book compiled at Cardinal Manning's request, quoted the persecuting decree of the Lateran Council of 1215 as being still a part of the law of the Church.[8] The pontificate of Leo XIII (1878–1903) was marked by a great number of persecutions and prosecutions inflicted upon Catholic savants, to the great detriment of the intellectual reputation of the Church:[9] Döllinger, for instance, was told in 1887 that he was subject to all the penalties decreed in the Canon Law against the excommunicated, was denounced from the Catholic pulpits in Munich, and was offered protection by the Chief Constable against orthodox violence.[10] In 1885, in the encyclical 'Immortale Dei,' Leo XIII blamed all states that granted "equal rights to every creed, so that public order may not be disturbed by any particular form of religious belief."[11] In 1887 the

[1] Bain, *New Reformation*, 217 f.
[2] Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 58 f.
[3] Horton, *England's Danger*, 98.
[4] Bain, *New Reformation*, 165 f.
[5] *Ibid.*, 172 f; Whitley in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 761b.
[6] Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 257.
[7] F. C. Conybeare, *Roman Catholicism as a factor in European politics*, 58 f.
[8] Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 255.
[9] F. X. Kraus in *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 720a,b.
[10] Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 33 n.
[11] A complete English translation of this interesting encyclical, in which the claim is explicitly made that the State ought to support only the Catholic Church, freedom of religious opinion is denied, and religious toleration is frankly condemned, is to be seen in *Pope and People*, 71–100: see esp. 75–77, 85–93. The words quoted above occur on 86.

'Defensa Catolica' declared that "true charity consists in opposing one's neighbour, in injuring him in his material interests, in insulting him and in taking his life, always supposing that it is done for the love of God."[1] In 1888 Leo XIII issued another encyclical, 'Libertas Praestantissimum,' in which he laid it down that the State ought not to tolerate all religions alike, but ought to profess only that which is true, viz: Catholicism, that liberty of worship for individuals is the degradation of liberty and the submission of the soul to sin, that "the more a State is driven to tolerate evil, the further is it from perfection." The Church, he said, "does not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice, for the sake of avoiding some greater evil": nevertheless, "although in the extraordinary condition of these times, the Church usually acquiesces in certain modern liberties, not because she prefers them in themselves, but because she judges it expedient to permit them, she would in happier times exercise her own liberty. . . ."[2] In the same document Leo condemned the view of those, who, as regards the Church, "maintain that it does not belong to her to legislate, to judge, or to punish, but only to exhort, to advise, and to rule her subjects in accordance with their own consent and will. By such opinon they pervert the nature of this divine Society, and attenuate and narrow its authority, its office of teacher, and its whole efficiency," etc. etc.[3]

The same year (1888) appeared the fifth volume of Herder's 'Kirchenlexikon,' containing an article on 'Häresie,' by the great Jesuit professor, Granderath. In it he argued at great length that, since all men are commanded to believe (Mark xvi. 15–16), not to believe Catholic truth is a punishable offence, that the Church is competent to punish it, and acts meritoriously in doing so.[4] In 1892 Leo XIII declared the separation of Church and State to be an absurdity;[5] Rev. E. J. O'Reilly, S.J., declared that the principle of liberty of conscience "is one which is not, and never has been, and never will be, approved by the Church of Christ"; and another former professor of Maynooth College, Rev. T. Gilmartin, maintained that the Church could require the assistance of the State in suppressing heresy, if such a step were necessary for

[1] Whitley in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 761b.

[2] *Leonis Papae XIII Allocutiones*, etc. iii. 96–120 (esp. 116); *Pope and People*, 115–120, 124–126; Poynter, *Rome from Within*, 18, 38f. Cf also the frank condemnation of tolerance, and advocacy of persecution, by Rev. Walter Croke Robinson in his pamphlet, *Liberty of Conscience* ('Cath. Truth Soc.'), quoted by Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 258: and see below, p. 613.

[3] *Pope and People*, 127 f.

[4] Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 320–341, also 97, 157, 181, 199; and Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 31.

[5] Whitley in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 762a.

the good of society.[1] In September 1894, a Catholic with liberal sympathies wrote anonymously: "our English co-religionists are encouraged, when comparing notes with their Protestant fellow-countrymen, to treat the Holy Inquisition as the dry bones of an extinct institution into which no pontifical Ezechiel would ever dream of breathing new life; while our best accredited theologians on the Continent are frankly teaching that this beneficent agency is not dead, but sleepeth, and that he who holds that the burning of heretics is displeasing to the Holy Spirit is himself a heretic, and richly deserves to be burned at the stake in this world previous to being consumed in hell-fire in the next."[2] In January 1895, there appeared in the 'Analecta Ecclesiastica,' a clerical journal published at Rome, an article by a Capuchin friar, protesting against the modern disapproval of the 'intolerance' of the Inquisition of earlier days, and boldly justifying its methods. "So may we never," the author says, "befogged by the blindness of liberalism, which masks itself under the pretext of prudence, seek out unwarlike little reasons for defending the Holy Inquisition against heretical pravity! Let not the condition of the times, the hardness of human nature, intemperate zeal, or any other quibble whatever, be pleaded, just as if Holy Mother Church, in Spain or elsewhere, ought—in regard to the proceedings of the Holy Inquisition—to be excused, if not for the whole, at least for so much. To the auspicious watchfulness of the Holy Inquisition is certainly to be ascribed the religious peace and also that steadfastness in the faith whereby the Spanish race is distinguished. O blessed flames of the pyres whereby—through the removal of a very few poor creatures (homuncionibus) and those the most crafty—hundreds and hundreds of squadrons of souls were snatched from the jaws of error and perhaps of eternal damnation, and whereby civil society itself, admirably fortified century after century against the ruin and slaughter of domestic dissensions and wars, lasted on happy and safe! O illustrious and venerable memory of Thomas Torquemada, who, conspicuous by his most prudent zeal and invincible virtue, while he decreed that Jews and infidels should not be coerced into baptism, yet at the same time splendidly provided for the baptized to be held aloof by wholesome fear from the apostasy of the Judaizers, the law of either power cooperating, and thus won for his fatherland a prosperity greater and nobler than the acquisition of the Indian kingdoms."[3]

In 1898 Father Marianus De Luca, S.J., Professor of Canon Law

[1] Quotations in Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 257 f. Cf. the milder defence, by Rev. S. F. Smith, S.J. (in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 377, 398), of the Church's intolerance on abstract doctrinal grounds.

[2] 'The Author of "the Policy of the Pope" ' in *Contemp. Rev.* Sept. 1894, 352.

[3] Closely translated from the Latin printed by Mirbt 491. Cf. Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 71 f.

at the Gregorian University of Rome, presented to Leo XIII a large work entitled 'Praelectiones Juris Canonici,' in the course of which, following his predecessor Tarquini,[1] he briefly justified the death-penalty for heretics. In reply he received from the Pope a letter expressing the warmest congratulation and appreciation.[2] At Irapuato in Mexico, in this year, a Protestant girl was dragged to the public square, and threatened with burning.[3] A Jesuit priest in Ireland told Mr. Joseph Hocking (about 1897) that he held that, inasmuch as everything that the Church has done is right, the proceedings of the Spanish Inquisition were right, and that the massacres in the Netherlands were according to the mind and spirit of Christ. The same English author asked a Catholic bishop in Rome in 1900 what the Church would do if it possessed its ancient power, and he (Hocking) were to preach Protestantism. "We would quickly put a stop to your heresy, young man," was the reply.[4]

During the present century, Catholic persecution has been limited to two forms—both of them serious and significant, though less terrible than the full severity of the Inquisition. On the one hand we have theoretical pronouncements, both official and otherwise: these we shall consider in our next chapter.[5] On the other hand, there has been the oppression casually exercised by boycott or mob-violence on the part of Catholics. Ugly incidents of both kinds took place in Austria in 1899, 1900, and 1901. In 1901 an attempt to enforce the penal code against non-Romanists in Portugal was frustrated only by a Protestant deputation to the King. In 1905 a widely-noticed and (as it proved) successful protest was made against the persecution to which Spanish Protestants had been recently subjected, despite the fact that their liberties were legally guaranteed to them.[6] In 1909 a colporteur was mobbed at Dores do Turvo in Brazil, the priest calling on the people to burn him.[7] In 1910 Pius X remonstrated with the Spanish government for allowing non-Catholic churches that greater publicity of worship which the law had previously denied them.[8] In France, up to within a comparatively recent date, serious hardship was often inflicted on Protestants, especially pastors, at the instigation of the priests. The annual reports of the British and Foreign Bible Society still refer occasionally to acts of opposition and petty persecution suffered by its agents when engaged in distributing the unannotated Scriptures in

[1] See above, p. 578 top.

[2] Coulton, in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, p. 46 bott., and §§ 265–273; also *Death-Penalty*, 58–60. See also below, pp. 586 f.

[3] Whitley in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 761b.

[4] Hocking in *Shall Rome*, etc. 96, 79.

[5] See below, pp. 586–589.

[6] Bain, *New Reformation*, 61–64, 66, 79, 188 f, 195.

[7] Whitley, *loc. cit.*

[8] Hocking in *Shall Rome*, etc. 108; Phillips in *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 721a.

Catholic countries. Even as late as 1926 there were reports of disabilities being imposed by Mussolini on Protestant recreational and educational activities in Italy, Romanism being "the only religion recognised by the State, the others being tolerated and nothing more."[1] And in 1927 came the report of the exclusion of a Spanish Professor of Canon Law at Madrid from the Catholic Church, for opposing the clericalism and bureaucracy of the Church in Spain, and for demanding toleration for the Protestants:[2] while in 1928 we hear of a Spanish Protestant, a poor widow with children, sentenced to two years' imprisonment at Segovia for saying to her Catholic neighbours that the Virgin Mary gave birth to other children after Jesus.[3]

It is a sad story—and a bloody one. For the purpose of gathering the horrid details to a point and fitly characterizing the age-long enormity which they exemplify, I venture to borrow a few paragraphs from one whose familiarity with mediaeval literature gives authority to his words. After speaking of the influence of Christianity in promoting mercy, Mr. Lecky proceeds: "it is a no less incontestable truth that for many centuries the Christian priesthood pursued a policy, at least towards those who differed from their opinions, implying a callousness and absence of the emotional part of humanity which has seldom been paralleled, and perhaps never surpassed. . . . The monks, the Inquisitors, and in general the mediaeval clergy, present a type that is singularly well defined, and is in many respects exceedingly noble, but which is continually marked by a total absence of mere natural affection. In zeal, in courage, in perseverance, in self-sacrifice, they towered far above the average of mankind; but they were always as ready to inflict as to endure suffering. These were the men who chanted their Te Deums over the massacre of the Albigenses or of St. Bartholomew, who fanned and stimulated the Crusades and the religious wars, who exulted over the carnage, and strained every nerve to prolong the struggle, and, when the zeal of the warrior had begun to flag, mourned over the languor of faith, and contemplated the sufferings they had caused with a satisfaction that was as pitiless as it was unselfish. These were the men who were at once the instigators and the agents of that horrible detailed persecution that stained almost every province of Europe with the blood of Jews and heretics, and which exhibits an amount of cold, passionless, studied, and deliberate barbarity unrivalled in the history of mankind."[4]

"In mediaeval Christendom it" (torture) "was made use of to an

[1] *Christian World*, 16 Sept. 1926, 9, quoting the New York *Watchman-Examiner*.
[2] *Christian World*, 24 Feb. 1927, 17, quoting *Die Christliche Welt*.
[3] *Christian World*, 8 Mar. 1928, 9.
[4] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 326 f.

extent that was probably unexampled in any earlier period, and in cases that fell under the cognisance of the clergy it was applied to every class of the community. And what strikes us most in considering the mediæval tortures, is not so much their diabolical barbarity, which it is indeed impossible to exaggerate, as the extraordinary variety, and what may be termed the artistic skill, they displayed. They represent a condition of thought in which men had pondered long and carefully on all the forms of suffering, had compared and combined the different kinds of torture, till they had become the most consummate masters of their art, had expended on the subject all the resources of the utmost ingenuity, and had pursued it with the ardour of a passion. The system was matured under the mediæval habit of thought, it was adopted by the Inquisitors, and it received its finishing touches from their ingenuity. In every prison the crucifix and the rack stood side by side, and in almost every country the abolition of torture was at last effected by a movement which the Church opposed, and by men whom she had cursed."[1]

"Almost all Europe, for many centuries, was inundated with blood, which was shed at the direct instigation or with the full approval of the ecclesiastical authorities, and under the pressure of a public opinion that was directed by the Catholic clergy, and was the exact measure of their influence.

"That the Church of Rome has shed more innocent blood than any other institution that has ever existed among mankind, will be questioned by no Protestant who has a competent knowledge of history. The memorials, indeed, of many of her persecutions are now so scanty, that it is impossible to form a complete conception of the multitude of her victims, and it is quite certain that no powers of imagination can adequately realise their sufferings. . . . And . . . when we recollect that after the mission of Dominic the area of the persecution comprised nearly the whole of Christendom, and that its triumph was in some districts so complete as to destroy every memorial of the contest, the most callous nature must recoil with horror from the spectacle. For these atrocities were not perpetrated in the brief paroxysms of a reign of terror, or by the hands of obscure sectaries, but were inflicted by a triumphant Church, with every circumstance of solemnity and deliberation. Nor did the victims perish by a rapid and painless death, but by one which was carefully selected as among the most poignant that man can suffer. They were usually burnt alive. They were burnt alive not unfrequently by a slow fire. They were burnt alive after their constancy had been tried by the most excruciating agonies that minds fertile in torture could devise. This was the physical torment inflicted on those

[1] *Op. cit.* i. 328–330.

who dared to exercise their reason in the pursuit of truth; but what language can describe, and what imagination can conceive, the mental suffering that accompanied it? For in those days the family was divided against itself. The ray of conviction often fell upon a single member, leaving all others untouched. The victims who died for heresy were not, like those who died for witchcraft, solitary and doting women, but were usually men in the midst of active life, and often in the first flush of youthful enthusiasm, and those who loved them best were firmly convinced that their agonies on earth were but the prelude of eternal agonies hereafter. This was especially the case with weak women, who feel most acutely the sufferings of others, and around whose minds the clergy had most successfully wound their toils. It is horrible, it is appalling to reflect what the mother, the wife, the sister, the daughter of the heretic must have suffered from this teaching. She saw the body of him who was dearer to her than life, dislocated and writhing and quivering with pain; she watched the slow fire creeping from limb to limb till it had swathed him in a sheet of agony, and when at last the scream of anguish had died away, and the tortured body was at rest, she was told that all this was acceptable to the God she served, and was but a faint image of the sufferings He would inflict throughout eternity upon the dead. Nothing was wanting to give emphasis to the doctrine. It rang from every pulpit. It was painted over every altar. The Spanish heretic was led to the flames in a dress covered with representations of devils and of frightful tortures to remind the spectators to the very last of the doom that awaited him.

"All this is very horrible, but it is only a small part of the misery which the persecuting spirit of Rome has produced. For, judging by the ordinary measure of human courage, for every man who dared to avow his principles at the stake, there must have been many who believed that by such an avowal alone they could save their souls, but who were nevertheless scared either by the prospect of their own sufferings, or of the destitution of their children, who passed their lives in one long series of hypocritical observances, and studied falsehoods, and at last, with minds degraded by habitual deception, sank hopeless and terror-stricken into the grave. And besides all these things, we have to remember that the spirit which was manifested in acts of detailed persecution had often swept over a far wider sphere, and produced sufferings not perhaps so excruciating, but far more extensive. We have to recollect those frightful massacres, perhaps the most fearful the world has ever seen: the massacre of the Albigenses which a pope had instigated, or the massacre of St. Bartholomew for which a pope returned solemn thanks to Heaven. We have to recollect those religious wars which reproduced themselves century after century with scarcely diminished fury, . . .

which inundated with blood the fairest lands of Europe, . . . and which planted animosities in Europe that two hundred years have been unable altogether to destroy. . . . When we add together all these various forms of suffering, and estimate all their aggravations, when we think that the victims of these persecutions were usually men who were not only entirely guiltless, but who proved themselves by their very deaths to be endowed with transcendent and heroic virtues, and when we still further consider that all this was but part of one vast conspiracy to check the development of the human mind, and to destroy that spirit of impartial and unrestricted enquiry which is the very first condition of progress as of truth; when we consider all these things, it can surely be no exaggeration to say that the Church of Rome has inflicted a greater amount of unmerited suffering than any other religion that has ever existed among mankind. To complete the picture, it is only necessary to add that these things were done in the name of the Teacher who said: 'By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, that ye love one another.' " [1]

[1] *Op. cit.* ii. 32–39.

CHAPTER XXV

PERSECUTION—MODERN APOLOGIES.

THE facts adduced and summarized in the preceding chapter threaten the reputation of Rome with such serious discredit before the face of the modern world that the most urgent need has arisen for some apologia to be presented in regard to them. Modern Catholic literature shows how intensely eager the Roman Church is to commend herself to men of this—as of every—generation; and the indignant reproaches levelled at her on account of her terrible cruelties have drawn forth quite a number of explanations. An attempt will be made in this chapter to give some account of the various, often quite inconsistent, and sometimes anti-traditional lines which the Church's apologia has taken since the commencement of the present century.

The simplest and, in a way, most intelligible answer to the charge of inhuman cruelty is the bold effort to brazen the matter out. On the whole, this is the only defence consistent with that unchangeableness in faith and morals which is the characteristic boast of the Roman Church. But though consistent with the past, it constitutes for the present age a complete refutation of the Church's claim to holiness, and, in proportion as it is widely understood, will go far towards permanently alienating from the Church the best elements in the world of to-day.

Its spokesmen have been numerous and representative. They maintain with the greatest unanimity and clarity, usually on the analogy of the right of the State to punish criminals, that the Church, as a perfect society, has an indefeasible right to coerce and punish—by physical as well as spiritual means—her disobedient children or disloyal subjects.[1] Thus, in 1901, the already mentioned Father Marianus De Luca, S.J.,[2] published two volumes of 'Institutiones Juris Ecclesiastici Publici.' They contained, besides the official sanction and numerous testimonials from orthodox journals, a warmly commendatory letter sent to the author by Leo XIII on the receipt of his earlier work on the same subject. In dealing with heretics, De Luca does indeed reproduce that charitable concession made by Augustinus which had developed later into the distinction between formal and material heretics. The

[1] See the ominous parallel quoted by Maycock (*Inquis.* 111) from Nickerson between the Inquisition and *martial law.*

[2] See above, pp. 580 f.

latter are baptized persons who have been brought up outside the Church, and who err in good faith, and do not defend with pertinacity the errors which they have sucked in with their mother's milk. Against them the Church threatens no penalties: but in the case of formal heretics, i.e. baptized persons who *do* adhere to and defend their views with pertinacity, or who, having once accepted the Church's faith, afterwards abandon it, the Church possesses the fullest right to coerce and punish them at her discretion, and even to inflict on them the penalty of death. Seven distinct reasons are given in support of this claim.[1] The precise meaning and implications of De Luca's statements have been hotly debated:[2] but the general severity of them is unmistakable. A born heretic is not indeed punishable unless he is pertinacious; but who is to be the judge of whether he is pertinacious or not? Of course, the officers of the Church. It is exactly the kind of concession which exempted no one so long as the Church was strong enough to punish, but which can be conceded to almost anyone now that the Church, being weaker, wants a legal excuse for not punishing and for not threatening to punish so ruthlessly in the future.

In July 1902, the Jesuit organ 'Civilta Cattolica' maintained that the coercive power of the Church was 'de fide.' The same year there was published a pocket-handbook of apologetics, drawn up alphabetically by Father X. Brors, S.J., stating, under 'Inquisition,' that an obstinate heretic "has according to Scripture, earned" (or "deserved"—"verdient") "eternal punishment in hell. Therefore a heretic has also deserved earthly death." Later editions of the book, however, omitted these words.[3] A whole series of contributors to 'The Catholic Encyclopedia' insist on the Church's right to coerce and penalize. Thus, for instance: "The present-day legislation against heresy has lost nothing of its ancient severity; . . . To restrain and bring back her rebellious sons the Church uses both her own spiritual power and the secular power at her command."[4] Again, the hierarchy of jurisdiction is endowed with "the right to enforce obedience, and to punish disobedience to its laws, i.e. coercive power."[5] Again: "It may be that in modern times men as a rule judge more leniently the views of others, but does this forthwith make their opinions objectively more correct than those of their predecessors? . . . The Church established by Christ, as a

[1] See the passages quoted by Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 193–195, and *Death-Penalty*, 29–31, 58–60; also in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 265–319, and in McCabe, *Popes*, 159–162.

[2] Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 21, 45–48, 89–91, 100 f, 111, 159, 161 f, 195, 214 f (i.e. pp. 46–49).

[3] Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 37 n., 72.

[4] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 260b, 261a.

[5] A. van Hove in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 323a.

perfect society, is empowered to make laws and inflict penalties for their violation. Heresy not only violates her law but strikes at her very life, unity of belief; and from the beginning the heretic had incurred all the penalties of the ecclesiastical courts."[1] Again: "Every corporation lawfully constituted has the right to coerce its subjects within due limits. And though the Church exercises that right for the most part by spiritual sanctions, she has never relinquished the right to use other means . . . the Church does claim the right to coerce her own subjects." The persecution of Albigenses, Wyclifites, etc. is adduced as exemplifying this principle.[2] Similarly elsewhere: "From the conception of the Church as a complete, permanent, and ordered society, . . . the consequence is deduced that . . . the rulers of the Church, and primarily the Pope, are vested with a coercive jurisdiction. . . . As for the coercive jurisdiction, this seems to be attested by many passages of the New Testament (*e.g.* Mt $18^{17f.}$, 2 Th 3^{14}, 1 Co $5^{3ff.}$, 2 Co $10^{5f.}$, Ac $4^{18ff.}$ etc.), and by the practice of the first centuries."[3] Father Alexius Lépicier, Professor in the Papal College of the Propaganda at Rome, issued in 1910 the second edition of a book, 'De Stabilitate et Progressu Dogmatis,' in which he defended at length the Church's right to put heretics to death.[4] The book was prefaced by a letter from the Vatican conveying to the author an expression of enthusiastic appreciation from Pius X. In his own introduction and appendix, Lépicier insisted that his doctrine about the Church's relation to heretics was not his own, but was guaranteed by St. Thomas Aquinas and many other eminent theologians and canonists as the true Catholic doctrine.[5]

In line with this defence of the Church's right to coerce are the repeated denunciations of tolerance which emanate again and again from Catholic authorities of all grades. The preceding chapter has provided several exemplifications of this attitude prior to 1900, notably the great 'Syllabus' of 1864,[6] which ought undoubtedly to be held as

[1] Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 36a; cf. 26a. Cf. also Maycock, *Inquis.* 263 (heresy more serious than crime; Jesus bitter against the Pharisees: therefore alleged contradiction between Inquisition and Gospel must be 'qualified').

[2] Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703a,b. Cf. Joyce in *op. cit.* iii (1908) 755a; id. in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 266ab (right of Church to invoke civil power to execute her sentences certain).

[3] Father Thurston in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 628 f.

[4] Cf. Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 32 f, 62–68.

[5] *Op. cit.* 68–70. Maycock (*Inquis.* 63 f, 101, 105, 146, 263 top) seems to hold that the mediaeval persecutions were justified under the circumstances then prevailing, but would not be justified under the circumstances of to-day: we refrain from persecuting, not because we are more logical or better than they of old time, but because their premises are no longer applicable. "Granted the savage criminal law of the time, granted the theocratical structure of European polity, granted the peculiarly repulsive teachings of the Albigensian heretics, and the sequel is clear and inevitable" (105).

[6] See above, p. 577.

coming within the statements for which infallibility is claimed. But while more recent writers speak in less defiant terms, they still defend—as an essential implicate of the Church's Divine authorization—her implacable opposition to all other faiths. The doctrine 'Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus' is admitted to be stern, but "only in the sense in which sternness is inseparable from love." John viii. 24 is quoted in justification of this view. The Church must not flinch from the assertion of her claims.[1] "The Church's legislation on heresy and heretics is often reproached with cruelty and intolerance. Intolerant it is; in fact its *raison d'être* is intolerance of doctrines subversive of the Faith. But such intolerance is essential to all that is, or moves, or lives, for tolerance of destructive elements within the organism amounts to suicide."[2] "Inasmuch as the Church and she alone, with her authority to teach and the power of the keys, may legislate even for conscience, she and she alone is justified in making a particular faith obligatory in conscience; consequently she may bring to bear upon interior conviction an *ethical* compulsion, to which corresponds the obligation to believe on the part of the subject. . . . She regards dogmatic intolerance not alone as her incontestable right, but also as a sacred duty. If Christian truth like every other truth is incapable of double dealing, it must be as intolerant as the multiplication table or geometry. . . . If she were to leave everyone at liberty to accept or reject her dogmas, . . . she would . . . end her own life in voluntary suicide. . . . And it is just in this exclusiveness that lies her unique strength, the stirring power of her propaganda, the unfailing vigour of her progress."[3]

It is of course true that some of the Catholic apologists who write in this strain, while defending—or at least excusing—mediaeval persecution on these and other lines, do not mean to advocate physical coercion of heretics as a right practice for to-day. One way of justifying this apparent inconsistency is to distinguish between intolerance as the political prohibition and temporal punishment of heresy on the one hand, and intolerance as a refusal to agree, or rest content, with our neighbour's error on the other. As a defence of the Church, the distinction between the two is valueless: for it is of the former brand of intolerance that the Church has been guilty; and no insistence on the patently true but abstract proposition, that truth and error are incompatible, and that error has no moral right to exist,[4] avails to remove her guilt. The

[1] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 753a.

[2] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 261 f. Cf. Bridge in *op. cit.* xi (1911) 703a ("The Church would therefore seem to be strangely inconsistent, for while she claims toleration and liberty for herself she has been and still remains intolerant of all other religions").

[3] Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 765a, 766a.

[4] E.g. Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 763 f, 765b.

distinction, however, is a real one, and introduces a real ambiguity into the meaning of the term 'intolerance.' Advantage is taken of this ambiguity, and also of the obvious fact that unconcern over religious truth would naturally discountenance *all* intolerance,[1] in order to make out that any vehement criticism of the Church's persecutions must necessarily be connected with religious scepticism, or at least indifference.[2] Thus, M. de Falloux remarks in his 'Histoire de St. Pie V' (of which the third edition was published in 1858): "Toleration was a thing unknown in the ages of faith, and the idea which that new word represents could only have found a place among the virtues in a century of doubt. When the notions of truth and falsehood have become confused, and the most opposite opinions find almost equal upholders in a nation, then assuredly toleration becomes a part of Christian prudence; it becomes right and praiseworthy to use no other means of proselytism than that afforded by the excellence of the doctrine which we would uphold."[3] More recently: "Opponents say: . . . the rigours of the Inquisition violated all humane feelings. We answer: they offend the feelings of later ages in which there is less regard for the purity of faith; but they did not antagonize the feelings of their own time, when heresy was looked on as more malignant than treason. . . . Toleration came in only when faith went out."[4] In 'God and the Supernatural' attention is drawn to the fact that men to-day have "an increased sensibility to suffering, a decreased sensibility to sin. . . . The increased sensibility to suffering is clear gain. . . . But the decreased sensibility to sin has produced . . . a lack of vision for the purgative and expiatory values of suffering."[5] The argument is not applied to persecution, but its bearing on the matter before us is obvious. Finally, Father Ronald Knox observes that justification of the rack by Church-interests "sounds nonsense, of course, to those Protestants (and they are numerous) who think in the back of their minds that the religious truths they hold are not really certain, only probable opinions. But the faith which is strong enough to make martyrs is strong enough to make persecutors."[6] It is, of course, perfectly true that many of the most vehement antagonists of persecution, and particularly of torture, in the seventeenth and

[1] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 65.

[2] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 97.

[3] Quoted by C. P. Stewart, *Rom. Ch. and Heresy*, 5 f.

[4] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 262a. Cf. Lépicier translated and quoted by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 65 ("Perhaps this doctrine" [death for heresy] "will seem too severe to our age, which neglects the spiritual order and is prone to tangible goods," etc.). We have a close analogy in the position taken up by the Zoroastrian priests, who called Yazdgard I the 'sinner' because of his tolerance in quarrels about religion (Söderblom in *H.E.R.E.* i [1908] 206b).

[5] Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 138.

[6] In Maycock, *Inquis.* xiv f. Similarly, W. D. Gainsford in *Spectator*, 30 Aug. 1902, 291ab.

eighteenth centuries, were rationalists or religious sceptics:[1] but to infer that a plea for toleration implies indifference to religious truth is a complete fallacy; for it overlooks the fact that a due sense of the exceeding sinfulness of cruelty and the exceeding foolishness of trying to force men to believe this or that, may well be quite as potent a ground for toleration as lukewarmness in regard to religious truth could be.

From the view-point of this thorough-going Romanist apologetic, it is a sufficient defence of mediaeval persecution to observe that its victims were guilty as rebels against the Divine authority of the Church. "It is true that in many cases heretics were rebels against the State also; but the Church's claim to exercise coercion is not confined to such cases of social disorder . . . her purpose was not only to protect the faith of the orthodox, but also to punish the apostates. Formal apostasy was then looked upon as treason against God—a much more heinous crime than treason against a civil ruler."[2] In the Middle Ages there was no excuse for heresy. "The Church of God was then indeed as a city set upon a hill. No one could be ignorant of her claims, and if certain people repudiated her authority it was an act of rebellion inevitably carrying with it a menace to the sovereignty which the rest of the world accepted."[3] How essentially heresy was a matter of insubordination appears from the condemnation and burning of four Franciscans in 1318 for refusing to obey the ruling of their superiors (duly authorized, as these were, by the Pope) in the matter of the garb they were to wear.[4]

Disobedience, then, was the head and front of the heretic's offending. For this alone he fully deserved to suffer death. But the sin of rebellion was aggravated by other evils. The heretic was religiously dangerous. The Manichaeans, Catharists, and Albigensians, who figure so frequently in mediaeval history, were dualists, i.e. they regarded matter as evil and anti-Divine: furthermore, many of them disbelieved in Jesus' Virgin-Birth, the efficacy of baptism, the Real Presence in the Eucharist, the authority of the Old Testament, the Divine commission of the Pope and the hierarchy, and so on.[5] Thus the issues may fairly be described as very largely, though certainly not as exclusively, religious. What doubtless accounts in great measure for the readiness of the State to assist the Church in its persecuting work was the fear that heresy would prove politically dangerous. To represent the victims of persecution as

[1] Pre-eminently, of course, Voltaire (Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 66 f; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 68).

[2] Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703b.

[3] Thurston in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 761b. The Cathari, Waldenses, Albigenses, Lollards, Hussites, early Protestants, and Huguenots are mentioned as examples of this principle.

[4] Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 50 f.

[5] J. B. Mullinger in *H.E.R.E.* i (1908) 278 f, 281 f.

political rebels was, and still is, a favourite argument in defence of the treatment they received. There were, of course, cases in which political issues were entangled with religious; but in crucial instances (e.g. St. Bartholomew), political considerations were for the Church entirely secondary.[1] Still more stress is laid by modern Catholics on the ethical and social aberrations of the heretics. These are painted in very black colours. The Albigenses, for instance, eschewed marriage and all sexual intercourse, meat-eating, military service, oaths, and lying, and occasionally practised suicide. Such enormities, it is maintained, struck at the very roots of the social order.[2] Doubtless in some respects these people were gravely wrong, especially in their practice of suicide: but in certain other respects they were ahead of their time. It is to their honour, for instance, that they believed in the final salvation of all men[3]: and we are at this time of day totally unimpressed when their vegetarianism, their disapproval of capital punishment, their conscientious objection to killing in war, and their refusal to take oaths, are adduced as proving them to have been the enemies of social welfare![4] Moreover, men willing to face torture and death for their convictions could not have been destitute of moral nobility. On the whole, they were known as simple, blameless people. They were not less moral, sexually, than the orthodox. Time and experience would have corrected their errors, the seriousness and danger of which are enormously exaggerated by modern Catholic apologists, just as they were by the Popes and sovereigns of their own day.[5] That ethical goodness did not lie exclusively on one

[1] One of the grounds on which Quesnel's propositions were condemned in 1713 was that they were "in potestates saeculi contumeliosas, seditiosas, impias," etc. (Bull *Unigenitus*). For St. Bartholomew, cf. C. P. Stewart, *Rom. Ch. and Heresy*, 2, 4 f, 13 n., and see below, p. 600.

[2] Vacandard in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 335a; Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 29b, 31a ("history does not justify the hypothesis that the medieval heretics were prodigies of virtue, deserving our sympathy in advance"); Thurston in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 762 f; Pohle, *ibid.* 768b. Cf. Mullinger in H.*E.R.E.* i (1908) 278 f, 281a. The argument is repeatedly insisted on by Father Knox and Mr. Maycock: in the Middle Ages, the Church and the papacy stood for social stability and public morals, and to oppose the Church was therefore to undermine society (*Inquis.* xiii, 12, 18, 23, 46, 64, 98, 102, 137, 163 f, 195, 256 f). Furthermore, the Albigensian heresy was inherently anti-social and immoral (xiv, 25, 46 f, 49 f, 63 f, 70, 90, 92, 97–99, 104, 110–113, 124 f, 162, 257 f, 265–270), and so on.

[3] Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 68 n. 3.

[4] Maycock, *Inquis.* 34, 41, 46, 143, 268.

[5] E.g. S. F. Smith, S.J. in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 379 ("the abominable Albigensian heresies"): see also note 2 on this page. Mr. Maycock denounces the Catharist teaching in very emphatic terms: "It was essentially diseased, unwholesome, anti-social. It could only continue by encouraging hypocrisy" (51); he calls it "the heresy which, soaking like a poison into the veins of this brilliant but slightly anaemic civilization, corrupted its whole system and made of it" (Languedoc) "a very plague-spot within the heart of Europe" (60: the simile of poison reappears—99, 225, 262, 270); it was "a system which . . . aimed explicitly at the destruction of the race and the undermining of all morality" (70); "a definitely anti-social philosophy, aiming at the literal

side or the other appears from the defence of a suspect at Toulouse: "I am not a heretic," he exclaimed, "for I have a wife and I lie with her, and have children, and I eat flesh, and lie, and swear, and am a faithful Christian."[1]

Seeing, however, that heretics were guilty of rebelling against the lawful authority of the Church, were a danger to the spiritual safety of others, and were a general menace to the social order, it follows that the proceedings taken against them did not constitute persecution[2]—for persecution is unlawful and unjust, and "the Catholic Church forbids the least injustice to anyone."[3] Nor are the victims rightly regarded as martyrs; for they suffered, not on behalf of Christian truth, but on behalf of their own mistaken opinions.[4] Nor was the treatment they received cruel: it was, indeed, painful, but so is all chastisement.[5] Even burning alive is not necessarily a cruel punishment; for it gives the sufferer ample opportunity of penitence before death.[6]

If now the Church as a perfect society has a right to coerce heretics and apostates by means of temporal penalties, if toleration on principle is indefensible because it presupposes religious

destruction of society" (97); the Albigensian heretics "were deservedly detested by everybody" (100); "the peculiarly repulsive teachings of the Albigensian heretics" (105); "so revolting and blasphemous a philosophy" (125). Yet the edge of this impassioned onslaught is not a little blunted by Mr. Maycock's candid admissions that "the Inquisition never set itself up as a judge of ordinary moral offences and obliquities of conduct" (143), that our knowledge of what the Albigenses taught and did is derived almost exclusively from the statements of men who were bitterly hostile to them (144, 265), that it would be absurd to believe all the scandalous tales told about their conduct (266), that some at least of them did not condemn marriage (268), and lastly "that there was much in their teaching that was fine and inspiring" (270). He also points out the high moral standard maintained by the Waldenses (34–36).

[1] Lea, *Inquisition*, i. 98 n. The words are quoted by Maycock (*Inquis.* 139, 267); but, following De Cauzons, he omits all after "children."

[2] So Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703a, 703 f: cf. Thurston, in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 761b (admits, however, that persecution begins when the force used is disproportionate to the importance and power of what it seeks to control).

[3] Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 137 (the context deals with the Church's holiness, and is eloquently silent about her persecutions).

[4] So Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 704a (". . . and therefore unhappily no more than pseudo-martyrs"). Cf. Maycock, *Inquis.* 125; also the note to Rev. xvii. 6 in the Catholic Bible published in 1813 in Ireland: the verse, it says, does not refer to Rome's punishment of heretics, for "their blood is not called the blood of saints, no more than the blood of thieves, man-killers, and other malefactors, . . ." (Salmon, *Infall.* 189 n.). One of the condemned propositions of Quesnel (no. 98) claimed that the endurance of persecution is a meritorious test, making a man more like Jesus Christ: many of his statements, the Pope complained, "under an imaginary pretence that persecution is raging to-day, nourish disobedience and obstinacy, and describe them by the false name of Christian patience" (Bull *Unigentuis*, 1713; cf. Mirbt 399 [16]).

[5] So Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 262a (". . . Cruelty only comes in where the punishment exceeds the requirements of the case"). Cf. Marianus de Luca ap. Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 25 n.2.

[6] Petrasancta (biographer of Bellarmine) quoted by Salmon, *Infall.* 191 n.

indifference, if the treatment which the Church formerly meted out to heretics was neither cruelty nor persecution, but the just chastisement of real guilt, it surely follows that—opportunity given—the Church will coerce heretics in the same way again. The accuracy of this very simple inference is strongly confirmed by the repeated declaration of modern Catholic authors that the reason why the Church to-day has given up persecution is the regrettable fact that circumstances—in particular, political circumstances—have changed, that States and governments no longer profess the Catholic faith, and that no State to-day is willing, as in the Middle Ages, to lend its power to the execution of ecclesiastical penalties.[1] There are obvious reasons why the intention of the Church to persecute again, if ever strong enough to do so, should not be too loudly noised abroad: but there have not been wanting responsible Catholics who have had the frankness to state explicitly the inevitable conclusion. We have already quoted the significant words of Pope Leo XIII in 1888 and of a private Catholic in 1894 to this effect.[2] Coming to more recent times—in 1901, Father Harney said, in reply to a question put to him about

[1] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 188 f n. (quotation of notes from Catholic Bible published in Ireland soon after 1813: persecution justified when it is possible without public disturbance); M. de Falloux, quoted by C. P. Stewart, *Rom. Ch. and Heresy*, 6 (toleration prudent to-day, because intolerance would be fruitless of benefits to society: formerly it was otherwise); *Dublin Review*, Jan. 1877 quoted by Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 257 (mediaeval intolerance still applicable to Catholic countries like Spain); Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 303–313, 318 (De Luca's contention [1901] that "Circumstances may sometimes be such that in view of them, we must conclude that the Church does not wish heretics to be bound by her laws or by some particular law"); Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 679b ("the use of censures as a means of coercion has grown constantly rarer, *the more so as it is hardly ever possible for the Church to obtain from the civil power the execution of such penalties*"); Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 67 (Lépicier's contention [1910] that heretics may sometimes be tolerated lest worse evils come, e.g. "in order that we may avoid the scandal or the discussions which might come from excessive severity, . . ."); Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 266b ("the question is of theoretical, rather than of practical importance, *since civil Governments have long ceased to own the obligation of enforcing the decisions of any ecclesiastical authority*"); Thurston in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 761b (milder interpretation of Canon Law on the part of those "who were themselves perhaps living under political conditions which forced them to appreciate the advantages of toleration, . . ."); Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 769a ("*Since the secularized State renounced its union with the Church*, and excluded heresy from the category of penal offences, the Church has returned to her original standpoint, and contents herself again with excommunication and other spiritual penalties," etc.), 769b ("The final conversion of the old religious State into the modern constitutional State, *the lamentable defection of the majority of states from the Catholic Faith*, the irrevocable secularization of the idea of the state, and the coexistence of the most varied religious beliefs in every land *have imposed the principle of state tolerance and freedom of belief upon rulers and parliaments as a dire necessity* and as the startingpoint of political wisdom and justice . . ."), 772a (tolerance right, according to mediaeval theologians, whenever intolerance would do more harm than good). Italics throughout mine.

[2] See above, pp. 579 f.

Protestants during a mission in New Jersey: "I do not doubt, if they were strong enough, that the Catholic people would hinder, even by death if necessary, the spread of such errors through the people. And I say, rightly so."[1] In 1902 a Catholic writing in the 'The Spectator' stated: "the common-sense of the matter is that we are justified in constraining others for their own good (1) when we are reasonably certain that we are right, and (2) when we are physically able to do it. The real reason why religious persecution is unpopular to-day is that nobody is strong enough to persecute."[2] Professor Lépicier insisted, not only that the Church "truly has the right of putting such men" (heretics) "to death, as guilty of high treason to God and as enemies of society," but also that we must either condemn her as having formerly erred in the domain of morals, or allow her in the future to kill, whenever her Infallibility may judge fit to do so.[3] A writer in 'The Catholic Encyclopedia' stated in 1911—in the article on 'Persecution'—that, "though the Church exercises that right" (of coercion) "for the most part by spiritual sanctions, she has never relinquished the right to use other means."[4] Father Janvier, preaching in Notre Dame in 1912, said with reference to heretics: "The Church has, therefore, the right to subdue their diabolical depravity, not only by anathema, but by the sword, that is to say, by obtaining from Catholic States the suppression of heretics by penalties which may extend to death."[5] In 1921–2 was published the fourth edition of the Jesuit Cardinal L. Billot's 'Tractatus de Ecclesia Christi,' in which the author maintains that the Church is not only permitted by God to use force, but that he definitely prescribes this to her, that there are no thoroughly efficacious remedies against heresies but the mediaeval laws. "Therefore we must say that material force is rightly employed to protect religion, to coerce those who disturb it, and, generally speaking, to remove those things which impede our spiritual aim: nay, that force can have no more noble use than this."[6] Father Ronald Knox maintains that "in the abstract a culpable apostasy which threatens to propagate apostasy is a sin worse than murder," that heretics are "technically, if baptized, subject to the Church's authority," and that in the future a Catholic country might possibly and reasonably banish or deport opponents of the faith, and provide legal deterrents against morally culpable disbelief.[7]

[1] *New York Herald*, 7 May 1901, 5, col. 2.

[2] W. D. Gainsford in *Spectator*, 30 Aug. 1902, 291. Cf. Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 192 f.

[3] See Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 32 f, 65 f. For Lépicier, see above, p. 588.

[4] See above, p. 588 n. 2. Cf. Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 769b (right of the Church to cling to her privileged position in Catholic countries).

[5] Quoted from *Le Christianisme au Vingtième Siècle* for 17 May 1912, in 'The Protestant Press Bureau' pamphlet no. 19, § 5. [6] Quoted by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 88.

[7] In Maycock, *Inquis.* xv–xvii: similarly, Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 241 f. For expressions

Such a line of defence—boldly justifying both the theory and practice of persecution—has the merit of preserving consistency with the Church's past: but it does this only at the cost of convincing the world that the Church is grievously fallible in the realm of morals and does not possess any special 'holiness' of life such as she claims. Most Catholics, therefore, who express themselves on the subject to-day, advance one or more concessions or excuses of varying force and relevancy.

It is indeed only natural that the Catholic conscience should not have been content to see justice and pity totally smothered by the remorseless logic of the Church and her insatiable 'will-to-power.'[1] Hence, over against her terrible record of bloodshed, there stand recurrent manifestations of a more Christian temper. Mediaeval Popes intervened from time to time to check attacks upon the Jews, who were in theory exempt from the Church's discipline, but who nevertheless often suffered under the orthodox zeal of princes, lay-folk, and ecclesiastics. They protested also against the excessive severity of the Spanish Inquisition, and—after the suppression of the Templars—against excessively severe torture. Even the stern old Emperor Charles V, making clocks in the retirement of his old age, reflected on the folly of having tried to force his subjects into uniformity of belief, when he could not make any two of his clocks keep the same time.[2] It is possible to name a whole succession of eminent sons of the Church who—in various ways and various degrees—disapproved of the use of rigorous coercive discipline of a temporal kind on the part of the Church:—Bernard of Clairvaux (1090–1153), Marsiglio of Padua (1270–1342),[3] Erasmus (1467–1536), Cardinal Sadoleto (1477–1547), Sir Thomas More (1480–1535), Luis Vives, the Spanish philosopher (1492–1540), Cardinal Pole (1500–1558), L'Hôpital, the French statesman (1505–1573), the Bishop of Lisieux who prevented the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day from extending into his diocese (1572), Lord Baltimore, founder of the colony of Maryland in North America (1649), Pope Innocentius XI (1611–1689), Fleury, the Church-historian (1640–1723), Pope Benedictus XIV (1675–1758), Pope Clemens XIV (1705–1774), who dissolved the Jesuit Order and suspended the public reading of the

of Protestant opinion, see Hase, *Handbook*, i. 104f; Horton, *England's Danger*, 98; Fawkes in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 754b; and esp. Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 118f and *Death-Penalty*, 32, 34, 36.

[1] One might with some fitness say of the unrepentant Catholic persecutors what Lactantius said of the mighty in his day, namely, "even if we bring the sun itself in our hands, they will not believe that doctrine that bids them despise all power and honour and live so humbly that they can even receive an injury and not wish to return it" (Lact. *Div. Inst.* VII. i. 15).

[2] W. Robertson, *Hist. of Charles V*, 391a. [3] Cf. Creighton, *Persecution*, 93–98.

bull 'In Coena Domini,' in which Protestants and heretics had been annually cursed, Beccaria, the influential Italian publicist and philosopher (1735–1794), Thadeus de Trautsmandorff, Canon of Olmütz and later Bishop of Königsgrätz, who published a book in favour of tolerance in 1783, a small proportion of the French clergy who favoured toleration in 1789, Padron, a Spanish priest who in North America as well as in his own country denounced the Inquisition (about 1790–1813),[1] many Irish Catholics in the first half of the nineteenth century (including Daniel O'Connell, Bishop Doyle, and a number of other bishops), and later still the eminent French historian Montalembert. In 1853 the 'Civilta Cattolica' was complaining that there were sincere Catholics who irreverently deplored the Inquisition.[2] Cultured English Catholics —like Newman and Lord Acton—were naturally disposed to look askance at persecution.[3] Modern defenders of the Roman Church are aware that many Catholics nowadays deny the Church's right to inflict the death-penalty, and recall the horrors of mediaeval persecution only with disgust and regret. In 1904 a priest who caused a Protestant worker in Portugal to be assaulted and robbed was punished with five weeks' imprisonment. In 1905 an agitation for greater tolerance in Spain was warmly supported by several public organs in that ultra-Catholic country. "What," asked Professor Pohle in 1912, "has the Church of to-day to do with the fact that long-vanished generations inflicted, in the name of religion, cruelties with which the modern man is disgusted? The children's children cannot be held accountable for the misdeeds of their forefathers."[4] After observing that State-persecution was one of the disadvantageous results of the alliance of Church and State in the Middle Ages, this author proceeds: "Viewed from the historical standpoint we may justly doubt whether the bloody persecu-

[1] Whitley in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 756b. [2] See Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 70.

[3] Newman, *Apol.* 66 (iv) (". . . neither at this, nor any other time of my life, not even when I was fiercest, could I have even cut off a Puritan's ears, and I think the sight of a Spanish *auto-da-fé* would have been the death of me"), 227, 230 (vii), *Gramm.* 372 f ("if Paine's aphorism has a *primâ facie* force against Christianity, it owes this advantage to the miserable deeds of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries"). Lord Acton wrote: "The principle of the Inquisition is murderous, and a man's opinion of the papacy is regulated and determined by his opinion about religious assassination. . . . If he accepts the Primacy with confidence, admiration, unconditional obedience, he must have made terms with murder. . . . The controversy, primarily, is not about problems of theology: it is about the spiritual state of a man's soul, who is the defender, the promoter, the accomplice of murder" (*Letters to Mary Gladstone* [1904] 185 f [cf. 145 f]—frequently quoted). Again: "the papacy contrived murder and massacre on the largest and also on the most cruel and inhuman scale. They were not only wholesale assassins, but they made the principle of assassination a law of the Christian Church and a condition of salvation" (*Selections from the Correspondence of the First Lord Acton* [1917] 55). Cf. also Purcell, *Manning*, i. 642.

[4] *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 767b; cf. 769a (plea for precaution against recrudescence of cruel punishments in the future).

tions resulted in greater blessings and advantages or in greater want, hate, and suffering for Christendom."[1] Father Vermeersch, a Belgian Jesuit, Professor of Moral Theology in the Gregorian University, published a treatise which appeared in an English translation in 1913 under the title 'Tolerance,' and which endeavoured to free the Church from the charge of complicity in bloodshed.[2] Dr. Vacandard, the Catholic historian of the Inquisition, condemned the use of torture and other inquisitorial excesses in unsparing terms.[3] "It is all a horrible memory," is Mr. Shane Leslie's comment.[4] Mr. A. L. Maycock, the latest Catholic writer on the Inquisition, categorically condemns the use of torture,[5] and admits the harshness and unfairness of the Inquisitors' procedure,[6] but with many pleas that allowance must be made for the extreme gravity of the issue at stake, and for the fact that they knew their task better than we do.[7]

It is, however, one thing to express disapproval of what happened in the Middle Ages; it is another thing to show how such disapproval is consistent with one's other commitments as a Catholic.

Something can be done towards this end by pointing out that popular ideas as to the amount of suffering and the degree of the Church's responsibility for it are greatly exaggerated.[8] Thus, it is frequently urged that the Church's penal legislation was limited exclusively to her own subjects, i.e. baptized Christians, and was, on principle, deliberately not applied to pagans and Jews.[9] Again, it is urged that the custom of dealing violently with heretics was initiated, not by the Church, but by the populace and the secular rulers, and that the Church often intervened to secure milder measures.[10] This is true of the early mediaeval persecutions;[11] but it leaves untouched the Church's guilt in having succumbed later to this bad precedent and in

[1] *Op. cit.* 771b.

[2] Walker in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 157, 166; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 80–85.

[3] In H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 334a,b. Cf. the criticisms of Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 766ab, 768a,b.

[4] *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 479.

[5] Maycock, *Inquis.* 157–164 (". . . the employment of torture by the Inquisition was a crime which merits the perpetual obloquy of posterity . . ."), 258.

[6] *Op. cit.* 121 f, 146, 150, 154 f, 157, 186 f, 191, 258, 261 f, 264.

[7] *Op. cit.* 146, 150, 163 f, 264.

[8] Maycock, *Inquis.* 2, 16 f, 82, 100 f; Knox in *op. cit.* xi.

[9] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xiv, poen. cap. 2 (Mirbt 311 [26]. Cf. Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 243, and Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 19, 67 (for Aquinas); also Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 26b; Bridge in *op. cit.* xi (1911) 703a; and Thurston in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 762ab.

[10] Cf. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 262a; Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 768b, 769a, 771b; Vacandard in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 334b; Fawkes in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917 754a; Maycock, *Inquis.* 103 f, 173, 175 f.

[11] See above, pp. 551 f.

having soon become its most enthusiastic advocate. Occasionally, shelter is still sought behind the fact that the actual infliction of temporal penalties was always entrusted to the civil power; the Church shrank from blood, and never shed it herself—nay, in handing over the excommunicated person to the authorities, she begged them to use mercy.[1] But most Catholics admit to-day that there is no apologia to be found along this line[2]: the petition for mercy soon became the merest legal fiction, and magistrates who did not inflict the supreme penalty within five or six days were themselves threatened with excommunication.

Somewhat more reasonable is the plea that the Spanish Inquisition, against which there lies a specially heavy charge of cruelty, was worse in this respect than the Roman Inquisition which operated in other lands, that it was worse because of its close connexion with the Spanish monarchy, and that the Popes often intervened to protest against its severities, and were often appealed to by its victims.[3] But these facts do not alter the equally true facts that the Spanish Inquisition was set up and continued long in being by papal authority and sanction, that agents of it like the pitiless Torquemada received signal marks of papal approval, and that the cruelties practised by the Roman Inquisition elsewhere than in Spain were beyond description horrible. This last, too, is the answer to the plea that care was taken to procure as Inquisitors men of (otherwise) blameless character, that they regularly aimed, not at penalizing the accused, but at reconciling him to the Church, that individual Inquisitors who went to excess (like Robert le Bougre) were rebuked and punished, and that false witnesses were sternly dealt with.[4] We are warned that Llorente's estimates of the numbers of those who suffered under the Spanish Inquisition are gravely exaggerated.[5] Granted: but what shall we say of the hundreds—nay, thousands—who on any showing were most brutally tortured and burnt? And so on, with all that is said about the mildness of many of the sentences pronounced by the Inquisitors, and all the other limitations set to severity:[6]

[1] See above, pp. 557, 559. Cf. S. F. Smith, S.J. in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 388; Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 262a; Blötzer in *op. cit.* viii (1910) 34ab; Thurston in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 762b; Fawkes in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 753a; Whitley, *ibid.* 756b; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 63–65, 82–84.

[2] Schaff, in H.*E.R.E.* iv (1911) 718a; Vacandard in *op. cit.* vii (1914) 335b; Maycock, *Inquis.* 104, 173, 180 f.

[3] S. F. Smith, S.J. in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 379, 382, 390, 395–398; Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 32a, 33a; von Pastor in *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 707a; Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703b; Thurston in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 762ab.

[4] Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 30 f, 33b, 35a; Vacandard in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 334a; Maycock, *Inquis.* 116, 129, 148, 262.

[5] S. F. Smith, S.J. in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 382–386.

[6] E.g. S. F. Smith, S.J. in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 391–395; Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 29ab, 30b, 31b–34a, 37a; Vacandard in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 333 f. (In

it all leaves untouched a vast and horrible mass of the most inhuman inflictions of which history has any record. That there were limits in point of numbers, regulations, and dates, beyond which these inflictions did not go, simply makes the charge more precise, but constitutes no answer to it.

Nor is it of any avail to minimize the facts—almost to the point of contradicting history.[1] The suggestion, for instance, that the Popes had no responsibility for the atrocious massacre of St. Bartholomew[2] is quite untenable in view of the facts. However political may have been the motives of Catharine de' Medici, the truth remains that for several years before the massacre Pope Pius V had been writing round to various rulers (including those of France), urging them to exterminate the heretics,[3] that hints of what was coming were given to Rome in advance,[4] that—months after the event, when the real facts must have been fully known—the legate of Pope Gregorius XIII visited Paris, absolved many of the murderers, and urged the French King to continue and complete the suppression of the Huguenots,[5] while the Pope himself commissioned the artist Vasari to portray the massacre in a series of frescoes.[6] All this shows the utter hollowness of the plea that, when he celebrated his rejoicings on the first arrival of the news, he thought that all that had happened was that a Huguenot plot against Charles IX's life had been frustrated by the slaughter of a small number of the conspirators.[7] When all is said, and all conceivable deductions in the interests of exact truth are made, the great body of facts recorded in

1816 Pius VII formally abolished torture in all tribunals of the Inquisition). Mr. Maycock (*Inquis.* 19 f, 177) pleads in extenuation:—

that the penalty of burning alive was not the most severe that could be imposed;

that it was not confined to heretics;

that it was not selected with a view to inflicting pain, since (*a*) people and judges were often indifferent as to whether the criminal were burnt alive or dead, and (*b*) corpses were often disinterred and burnt;

that it was chosen for its symbolic significance;

that it eventually took on a partially ceremonial character, almost wholly unaccompanied by hatred of the accused.

[1] What, for instance, are we to make of Blötzer's statement (*Cath. Encyc.* viii [1910] 34a), that "in this way" (i.e. because burning heretics was required by the law of the Empire) "Gregory IX may be regarded as having had no share, either directly *or indirectly*, in the death of condemned heretics"? (italics mine). Yet this was the Pope who in 1231 embodied this imperial law in the law of the Church, as Blötzer himself records (30a)! For instances of the suppression of facts by Catholic writers, see C. P. Stewart, *Rom. Ch. and Heresy*, 8, 56 f, 59, 72.

[2] Cf. von Pastor in *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 711a; Goyau in *Cath. Encyc.* xiii (1912) 333b, 336ab, 337ab, 338a; Thurston in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 763a; C. P. Stewart, *Rom. Ch. and Heresy*, 2, 45 f, 48, 55, 61, 74, 78.

[3] C. P. Stewart, *op. cit.* 12–21, 37 f, 69 n., 77 (he gives chapter and verse for everything: the thorough documentation of the book is acknowledged even in the critical notice in *Times Lit. Suppt.* 15 Oct. 1925, 678).

[4] *Op. cit.* 21–24, 40–43, 71, 74, 77 f.

[5] *Op. cit.* 49–51, 61.

[6] *Op. cit.* 2, 56–60.

[7] See above, n. 2.

the last chapter remains in all its appalling magnitude and horror. The only solace left to a Christian heart, harrowed by the perusal of such grim records, is the reflection that in all probability there is a maximum in the amount of pain the human body can feel, and that actual suffering declines after that maximum is passed[1]: but for this relief we have to thank, not the Catholic Church, but the merciful care of a Providence who thus set limits to the amount of harm she could do.

A much more plausible and certainly a very frequent Catholic reply to the reproach of cruelty is the argument that Protestant persecutions were just as bad as—some maintain even worse than—those inflicted by the Roman Church.[2] They were, it is said, morally more blameable, because, on their own principles (trust in private judgment, and disbelief in objective truth) and on their own admission, Protestants have no right to persecute.[3] Moreover, Protestant persecutions ceased only very recently, and only when political force was not available for their continuance.[4]

It is, of course, true that toleration was not one of the tenets of the great Reformers, and did not become a characteristic doctrine of Protestantism until nearly two centuries after the break with Rome. The idea of freedom of opinion in matters of religion was unknown to

[1] Cf. Sir Walter Scott, Note G to *The Betrothed*; Williams in *Encyc. Brit.* xxvii. 72b (quoting Ulpianus as to endurability of torture); Neilson in *H.E.R.E.* xii (1921) 392b (insensibility produced by muttering charms); L. T. Hobhouse, *Rational Good*, 39 n.; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 542.

[2] Cf. Newman, *Apol.* 231 (vii) (". . . what is there in this want of prudence or moderation more than can be urged, with far greater justice, against Protestant communities and institutions?"); S. F. Smith, S.J. in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 377 f, 387 f, 390 f, 393 f, 398; Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703a, 703b (". . . The Reformers were not less, but, if anything, more, intolerant. . . . If the intolerance of the Church is blamable, then that of the Reformers is doubly so . . . the outspoken intolerance of the Protestant leaders . . . gave additional right to the Church to appeal to force"); Thurston in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 763a ("the ferocity of the leading Reformers more than equalled that of the most fiercely denounced inquisitors"); Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 767b (". . . It is, however, unjust to hold modern Protestantism, in the one instance, and Catholicism in the other responsible for these atrocities"); Walker in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 156; Maycock, *Inquis.* 101; Knox, *ibid.* xiv.

[3] Cf. Newman, *Developm.* 128 f ("Germany and Geneva began with persecution, and have ended in scepticism . . ."); Granderath (1888) quoted in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 328; S. F. Smith, S.J. in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 377 ("If Protestants are, theoretically, advocates of universal toleration, this is because they do not believe in any objective certainty of religious truth. Creed, for them, is matter of opinion, not of certain knowledge"), 398; Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703a, 703b (". . . they could hardly use force to compel the unwilling to conform to their own principle of private judgment"); Blötzer in *op. cit.* viii (1910) 36b; also Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 51 f, 55. The opinion that *Protestants* have no right to persecute is one of the few matters in this contentious field on which they and the Catholics are at one!

[4] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 262a; Bridge, as above, 703a; Blötzer, as above, 35b.

the mediaeval world, and the Protestant Reformation was slow in bringing it to light.[1] Henry VIII was as despotic and severe in maintaining orthodoxy as in defending his own prerogatives. Luther contended that it was the duty of the secular ruler to put down heresy; and he warmly encouraged the bloody suppression of the Peasants' Revolt. Calvin took the same view of the functions of the State, and was instrumental in having Servetus burnt for heresy. It is said that in Geneva, during sixty years of Calvinistic rule, 150 heretics were burnt. Melanchthon congratulated Calvin on the execution of Servetus (as did other leading Reformers), and defended the Lutheran principle of State-coercion. At Zurich, under the Zwinglians, Anabaptists were drowned. In France, the Duke of Guise was assassinated, and the Huguenots took arms and committed some atrocities. In Scotland, Cardinal Beaton was murdered; John Knox advocated the most sanguinary measures against Catholicism; and under the Stuarts the cruellest persecution was carried on against the Presbyterians. In England under Elizabeth, it became high treason to deny that the Queen was Head of the Church, to convert others or be converted oneself to Catholicism, and even to celebrate Mass. These severe laws were not rigidly carried out; but under them between 180 and 190 Catholics, mostly priests, suffered death in the course of Elizabeth's reign for constructive treason.[2] Torture, moreover, was not infrequently used in the course of investigating their guilt. Even the Puritans did not dispute the principle of the State-coercion of heretics: they challenged only the right of Elizabeth's application of it to them. "Heretics," wrote the Presbyterian Thomas Cartwright (1535–1603), "ought to be put to death now. If this be bloody and extreme, I am content to be so counted with the Holy Ghost." In 1593 the Diet of Upsala declared, in the interests of Swedish Lutheranism, that no heresy, whether popish or Calvinistic, would be tolerated in the country. In 1619 the Synod of Dort expelled a number of Arminians from the Netherlands. In England, during the reign of James I, nearly thirty Catholics were executed as 'traitors.' During the first fifteen years of the reign of Charles I, the Church of England lent itself to the persecution of Puritans, on whom some cruel sentences of mutilation were passed. After 1640 the tables were turned, and the hand of Puritanism pressed heavily on the Anglican clergy. The 'Westminster Confession' of 1649 maintained that it was the duty of the civil magistrate "to take order . . . that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed," etc. Cromwell belonged to a party which had consistently pleaded for religious free-

[1] Cf. Rawlinson, *Authority*, 59 f.

[2] St. Cyres in *Encyc. Brit.* xxiii. 496 f ("only about 180 persons"); Whitley in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 757b (Catholics claim 189).

dom: but his endeavours to give effect as head of the State to this principle were sadly limited by various disabilities which on political grounds he thought it necessary to impose both on Catholicism and on Anglican 'prelacy.' In 1660 the Anglican Church regained its power, and various oppressive measures were enacted against non-Anglicans. Six Baptists were condemned to death in 1664; and John Bunyan spent twelve years in prison. John Milton, late in life, deprecated the toleration of Catholicism on the ground that it was idolatrous. The abortive attempts of Charles II in 1673 and of James II in 1688 to introduce general toleration were frustrated, partly by religious bigotry, and partly by disgust at the sovereign's unconstitutional procedure. A number of Catholics suffered death unjustly in the excitement over the 'Popish Plot' in 1678–1680. Persecution may be said to have ceased in England after 1688, though non-Anglicans were subject to various legal disabilities for many years. In 1829, in the Catholic Emancipation Act, it was made illegal for any Jesuit to enter Great Britain; but this stipulation has been hitherto virtually a dead letter. During the seventeenth century, the Puritan settlers in America persecuted the Quakers and proscribed Catholics. In 1687 Jurieu, the eminent Protestant pastor of Rotterdam, condemned the doctrine of universal toleration as Socinian and productive of religious indifference. A Protestant synod held at Amsterdam in 1690 repudiated as false and pernicious the growing doctrine that the magistrate has no right to crush heresy and idolatry by means of the civil power. In 1696 a student of eighteen was hanged at Edinburgh for heresy.

Nothing is to be gained by attempting to minimize the responsibility or guilt of the Protestants concerned in the persecuting measures here briefly summarized. There are, however, one or two things to be said in regard to this phase of Protestant history, in view of the Catholic attempt to find in it an answer to the charge of cruelty brought against the Roman Church.

1. In the first place, objection must be taken to the exaggerated language in which some modern Catholics draw their comparisons. Here, for instance, are three typical statements. "The history of heresy . . . shows . . . that the greater number of the victims of the sword is on the side of the faithful adherents of the one Church founded by Christ."[1] "In Spain the Inquisition at a small cost of human life preserved the old faith; in England the infinitely more cruel penal laws stamped out all opposition to the innovations imported from Germany."[2] "Hundreds of faithful Catholics, who fell victims to the Reformation in England, are venerated to-day as the English martyrs.

[1] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 262a.
[2] Id. in *Cath Encyc.* xii (1911) 502a.

The greater number of executions occurred, not under Mary the Catholic, but under Queen Elizabeth."[1] Now these statements are palpably at variance with the facts. Between 1483 and 1498 2000 persons were burnt in Spain. Between 1492 and 1524 1000 persons were burnt in Seville alone. During the last three years of Mary's short reign (1553–1558), 277 persons were burnt in England. But during Elizabeth's reign, which lasted forty-five years, not "hundreds," but about 190 Catholics were executed for high treason. The Catholic estimate for the whole number of Catholics martyred in England between 1535 and 1681 (i.e. nearly 150 years) amounts to 253[2]—fewer, that is, than the number of heretics burnt by Mary in three years or about the number burnt by Torquemada in two. Father Thurston speaks of "the ferocity of the leading Reformers"[3]; and this is not an unfair term in which to characterize Luther's attitude to the rebellious peasants or Knox's to the Catholics. But if so, we must find a still stronger word to describe the temper of the protagonists of Rome; for in comparison with that, whether as regards vogue or duration, the ferocity of the Reformers shrinks into very small compass. In the light of the recorded facts, the suggestion that the Protestant persecutions were as severe as the Catholic, in any of the respects in which we can compare them, is ludicrous.

2. Not unconnected with this last point is the question of what brought persecution to an end. Now Catholic writers often say quite frankly that the Church does not inflict temporal penalties to-day because no State to-day is willing to enforce them.[4] This comes very near to admitting that the rank and file of men (for most modern governments are in some measure representative) have prevented the Catholic hierarchy against its will from coercing heretics. In any case, such is probably the fact: and Catholics often urge that Protestant persecution was ended in precisely the same way.[5] The comparison, however, is erroneous. There has been no clash of opinion between Protestant hierarchies and secular governments on the desirability of persecuting; nor are the Protestant Churches now lamenting—as the Roman Church laments—the fact that nowadays they can get no government to carry out their persecuting decrees. The Protestant governments which formerly persecuted have ceased to do so,[6] not because political power has been wrested from Protestant leaders against their will, but because the Protestants, who themselves largely make up the states and govern-

[1] Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 767b.
[2] Whitley in H.*E.R.E.* ix (1917) 757b.
[3] See above, p. 601 n. 2.
[4] See above, p. 594 n. 1.
[5] See above, p. 601 n. 4.
[6] The last burning for heresy in England took place in the reign of James I. Since that date, the death-penalty has been seldom inflicted (Whitley in H.*E.R.E.* ix [1917] 758a).

ments in question, have come to see and to abandon the error of their fathers' ways. We cannot indeed go so far as to say, with the youthful Gladstone, that "it is the mere cant of controversy, or dogmatism of ignorance, to say that Protestants and Romanists persecuted alike, as each gained the ascendancy"[1]; but we can say that, whereas the Roman hierarchy, in abandoning persecution, yielded mainly to pressure from without, Protestants abandoned it under no such constraint, but rather in consequence of a genuine alteration in their views.[2]

3. The determining cause of Protestant persecution was the universality of the belief in religious coercion at the time of the Reformation. For that universality the Roman Church was clearly responsible. There had been a time, early in the Middle Ages, when Rome was ahead of the populace and the Empire on this question of the ethics of persecution: but she had soon abandoned that lead, and had identified herself wholeheartedly with the most stringent customary notions in regard to heresy. Instead of standing out for the higher and truly Christian way, she sanctified and universalized the lower. We do not on this account excuse the Protestants for their error: but in appraising the extent of their responsibility, we must bear in mind that no human reformers can be expected to see the whole truth at once—especially in regard to usages sanctioned for centuries past,[3] and furthermore that the use of Rome's traditional measures in her dealings with the Protestants gave to the subsequent cruelties of the latter the character of natural and almost inevitable reprisals.

4. While some measure of political expediency probably entered into most of the persecuting acts of the Roman Church, it may fairly be pleaded that political grounds are far more readily adducible in explanation of Protestant persecution than is the case with Catholic persecution. The peasants, for instance, against whom Luther breathed such sanguinary exhortations, had actually broken out in armed rebellion against the powers that be. The severities practised by Protestant rulers against the Anabaptists were in large measure the consequence of the wild excesses committed by the Anabaptist commonwealth of Münster. Queen Elizabeth, the bête noire of Catholic writers on persecution, was extremely anxious—at least until the closing years of her reign—to avoid the appearance of attacking liberty of conscience; and although legal measures were enacted against Romanism soon after her accession, no Catholic is known to have suffered death before 1570, in which year Pius V issued a bull excommunicating and deposing her, and forbidding

[1] Gladstone, *The State in its Relations with the Church*, ii. 199.

[2] Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 81, 97 f; Creighton, *Persecution*, 113–115.

[3] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 54 f; Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 196 (". . . Rome led the way . . .").

her subjects to obey her. Many of those who were executed later were men who, knowing the law and intending to defy it, came to England with the deliberate purpose of undermining the loyalty of the Queen's subjects.[1] Somewhat similarly the oppression of Catholics under James I has to be viewed in the light of the match which Guido Fawkes was just too late to strike. It may safely be said that the political excuse, though not always absent from Catholic calculations, was of much less significance and force in Rome's suppression of heresy than in the persecuting measures of Protestant rulers. We may note, as an unconscious admission of this fact, that Catholic apologists, in order to prove Protestant cruelty equal to that of Rome, appeal, not simply to the harshness exhibited by Protestants as religious persecutors, but also to the severity they employed in the punishment of civil offences.[2]

5. But the main answer to the 'Tu quoque' apologia of Romanists is that the abandonment of persecution by modern Protestants is—unlike the abandonment of it by Rome—*unequivocal*. Both groups have ceased to persecute, and that for reasons which, though often made the subject of subtle discussion, are tolerably clear to all. Protestantism has gone further, and has unanimously and unambiguously condemned persecution on principle. The condemnation took a long time coming, but it came. Even before the Reformation, Hus had likened ecclesiastics who caused incorrigible heretics to be punished by the secular judge, to the Scribes and Pharisees who condemned our Lord. Even Luther in his early days advocated toleration, and maintained that it was against the will of the Holy Spirit that heretics should be burnt. Zwingli was sincerely averse to persecution. But for a long time the cause of toleration was championed only by isolated individuals or minor sects whose orthodoxy was doubtful. Sebastian Castellio (1515–1563) created a sensation by denouncing the execution of Servetus. The most considerable groups who advocated toleration were the Socinians, the Anabaptists, and—among the English Puritans—the Brownists (or, as they were known later, the Independents) and the Baptists (who branched off from the Brownists about 1611). From the two latter bodies there emanated, during the first half of the seventeenth century, a number of written pleas for liberty of conscience in matters of religion. In Sir Henry Vane the Younger, the cause found a distinguished political champion. The sect of Quakers, which sprang up about the middle of the century, was wholly antagonistic to coercion. During the latter half of the century, the appreciation of liberty began to spread

[1] For Catholic misrepresentations in this connexion, see Poynter, *Rome from Within*, 42–44.

[2] Cf. S. F. Smith, S.J., in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 387 f; Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 769a; Maycock, *Inquis.* 19, 44, 259.

among the leaders of the Church of England. In the course of the eighteenth century, the cause went forward both in England and in the American colonies. Of the growth of toleration Lecky observes: "what is especially worthy of remark is, that the most illustrious of the advocates of toleration were men who were earnestly attached to positive religion, and that the writings in which they embodied their arguments are even now among the classics of the Church."[1] For the nineteenth century we have a long series of distinguished men, who represent every variety of Protestant opinion, and who with one voice condemn persecution without reserve—Isaac Taylor (1787–1865), Richard Harris Barham ('Thomas Ingoldsby,' 1788–1845), Macaulay (1800–1859), E. B. Pusey (1800–1882), Newman, as an Anglican (1801–1890),[2] Horace Bushnell (1802–1876),[3] Gladstone (1809–1898), Oliver Wendell Holmes (1809–1894),[4] Robert Browning (1812–1889),[5] James Anthony Froude (1818–1894), Mandell Creighton (1843–1901).[6] The list could be indefinitely extended, and there are no dissentient voices.

We Protestants are not organized into a compact and uniform company, with an official figure-head and mouth-piece; but our unanimity in repudiating and deploring the policy of persecution is complete and obvious. We have no defence to offer of the persecutions carried on by Protestants of earlier days other than the charity always needed in our judgment of those in error. The teachings of our forefathers do not constitute for us an authoritative corpus which we are required at one and the same time to abandon and to defend; nor do we hear in our midst from time to time learned traditionalists reviving and advancing the theories of the past, and deploring the low esteem into which the intolerance of early Protestantism has now fallen. Contrast with this the round-about and non-committal apologetic of modern Romanists—with their half-dozen or so mutually inconsistent lines of defence, on the one hand professing to treat it as obvious that no Catholic to-day would feel it to be right to treat heretics as the Inquisitors treated them, yet carefully refraining on the other hand from any really frank abandonment or even wholeheartedly adverse criticism, of the principles which were held in the Middle Ages to justify persecution and which, if true, would justify it equally well to-day.

When Professor Coulton argued in 1924 that the Pope could at any moment reverse the formal abolition in 1917 of the death-penalty for heresy, a reviewer observed: "It is equally true, and equally to the point,

[1] Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 81 f. [2] Cf. *Developm.* vii, *Apol.* 127 f (v), 150 (vi). *Nature and the Supernatural*, 327.

[4] *Professor*, 66. [5] *Holy-Cross Day.*

[6] *Persecution*, passim, esp. 31–33, 45 f, 87 (attributes persecution to moral, not intellectual, deficiency).

that the British Legislature could at any time revive the Statute *De haeretico comburendo*"—an observation shortly afterwards quoted with apparent approval by Canon T. A. Lacey.[1] The remark was, however, more witty than wise. There is absolutely nothing in Protestantism to make a revival of religious persecution in the least degree likely: in Catholicism, however, there is a great and still venerated body of traditional teaching which justifies persecution; there are teachers and spokesmen who from time to time frankly justify it; and there is a whole host of conciliatory apologists who, despite their apologies, nearly always carefully refrain from really condemning it. There is therefore some ground for regarding the tacit abandonment of the death-penalty in the new 'Codex Juris Canonici' of 1917 as a very inadequate substitute for that frank official disclaimer which alone will satisfy the modern world. Rome has, however, the greatest difficulty in uttering such a disclaimer: for even if she could bring herself to mean it, it would look too much like climbing down, and that is a thing her pride forbids her to do.[2]

It is this last-mentioned fact which unhappily discounts what would otherwise be a very reasonable explanation of Catholic persecutions. It is perfectly fitting to point out what a very recent development in Christian ethics the virtue of toleration is, how very natural is the inclination to persecute religious innovators,[3] how rigidly intolerant in theory even Plato was, and how almost inevitable persecution must have been under the general conditions prevailing in the Middle Ages.[4] The persecuting ecclesiastics with whom we are concerned were, it is pleaded, men of their time, who were honestly doing their best according to the imperfect standards then available. Their motives and characters were good; and to visit them with the censures and reproaches which torture and burning would richly deserve to-day is to commit an anachronism.[5] Now all this is very reasonable. It is, in fact,

[1] Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 37; *Times Lit. Suppt.* 31 July 1924, 479; Lacey in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 475.

[2] Cf. Pusey, *Eiren.* 99 ("Probably . . . there is an hereditary dread of the renewal of the fires of Smithfield, the sinfulness of which has never been disowned"); Bishop of London in *Congress-Report 1923*, 11 ("We shall never persecute—it is not in our blood; . . ."); Gore, *Holy Spirit*, 196 (Protestant persecution "was shortlived, because it was incompatible with the whole spirit of the movement in which it occurred . . ."); E. Milner-White in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 334; and esp. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 187 f.

[3] Cf. Newman, *Private Judgment*, 337 f; J. A. Froude, *Earl of Beaconsfield*, 171 f; Mair in *H.E.R.E.* ii (1909) 463a; A. Lunn in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1926, 79 f.

[4] Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 35a, 36a.

[5] Cf. M. de Falloux, *Histoire de St. Pie V*, quoted by C. P. Stewart, *Rom. Ch. and Heresy*, 5; S. F. Smith, S.J. in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 375–378, 386–388, 394 (". . . The Inquisition was naturally governed in this respect" [prisons] "by contemporary methods"), 397 ("The Inquisition belonged to an age which was far

precisely in this way that we must view the persecutions carried on by Protestants also—due allowance of course being made for possible blameworthiness in the case of particular individuals.[1] But all this is useless as an apologia for Catholic persecutions, simply because, if maintained, it is quite fatal to the Church's claims to be the moral teacher of mankind.[2] It is, therefore, not surprising that, as recently as 1910, the already mentioned Professor Lépicier, in the second edition of a book that had called forth an expression of warm appreciation from Pope Pius X, clearly repudiated the view of some Catholics, "who timidly grant that the Church, yielding to the spirit of the times, went somewhat astray in this matter." "Who dares to say," he asked, "that the Church has erred in a matter so grave as this?"[3] Now it can hardly be denied that the coercive jurisdiction of the Church, as viewed by mediaeval and indeed also by modern theologians, is part of her organic constitution.[4] But in his decree, 'Lamentabili,' of 1907 Pius X formally condemned the statement that "the organic constitution of the Church is not immutable; but the Christian society is just as liable to continual evolution as human society."[5] According to this, Lépicier's repudiation of the plea that the Church was complying with the backward spirit of the times was perfectly justified.

If persecution is once candidly admitted to have been an error, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the doctrinal infallibility of the Church

harsher in its dealings with crime than our own, and the clergy are always, necessarily, imbued with the ideas and feelings that are in the air they breathe, . . ."), 398; Purcell, *Manning*, i. 642 (urges the point as a mitigation, not as an apology); Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 35b ("The representatives of the Church were also children of their own time," etc. etc.), 36a; Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703b (". . . Churchmen had naturally the ideas of their time as to why and how penalties should be inflicted"); Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 768ab, 769a, 771b; J. P. R. Lyell, *Cardinal Ximenes*, 63–68; B. L. Conway, quoted by Poynter, *Rome from Within*, 18; Maycock, *Inquis.* 17 f, 104 f, 134, 150, 163 ("It seems to us that the most that can be said is that, in adopting the use of torture, the Holy Office was consciously following, with certain theoretical restrictions, the precedent of the secular courts and the Roman law; . . ."), 181, 258 f (". . . we do well to remember that the humanitarian feeling of the present day is a thing of very recent growth . . ."), 260, 263 f; Knox, *ibid.* xv; Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 240.

[1] See above, p. 607 n. 6.

[2] "When modern apologists of the ancient Church refer to the general spirit of the age and ask that the Church's action should be judged only in the light of the general ethical level civilization had then reached, they only provoke the retort that the Church is supposed to lead mankind, to be far in advance of the ordinary conscience of the secularist and the worldling, and to possess in its own documents clear teaching on which it ought to have acted" (Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 61). One has only to look at the way of life portrayed in the New Testament or in the story of the primitive Church, to see the glaring wickedness of the inquisitorial procedure.

[3] Lépicier quoted by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 66.

[4] Cf. e.g. Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 755a, and see above, pp. 586–588.

[5] Mirbt 507 (33: prop. 53).

is called in question. The normal way of meeting this challenge is to emphasize the distinction between the Church's canons of faith and her canons of discipline, and to urge that only the former are infallible and really binding. "It is also essential to note," writes a Jesuit scholar, "that the Inquisition, in its establishment and procedure, pertained not to the sphere of belief, but to that of discipline. The dogmatic teaching of the Church is in no way affected by the question as to whether the Inquisition was justified in its scope, or wise in its methods, or extreme in its practice."[1] It is impossible to regard this kind of apologia as more than a legal quibble. It is one of those numerous subtle devices adopted by many modern Catholics in order to avoid being driven by Protestantism into patent self-contradiction. Persecution may be a matter of discipline, but it is also a matter of morals; and the Church claims to be as infallible in morals as in faith. So far as obligatory compliance is concerned, there is nothing to choose between the two types of canons. Melchior Cano (about 1550) was apparently the first to distinguish between them; and he regarded the persecuting decree of 1184, 'Ad Abolendam,' as an example of a canon of *faith*. In July 1902, the Jesuit organ 'Civilta Cattolica' maintained that the coercive power of the Church is 'de fide.' The 'Creed of Pius IV' (used frequently in the reception of converts) requires not only the unhesitating acceptance and profession of "all other things delivered, defined, and declared by the sacred Canons and General Councils," but also a promise and oath of true obedience to the Roman Pontiff. Now the decree of 1215, calling for the extermination of heretics, was issued by a General Council. Is it seriously contended that the individual Catholic, if he disapprove of the disciplinary instructions of the hierarchy, has permission to disregard them, on the ground that they are not canons of faith? To what purpose is it to split hairs over the difference between 'declaring' or 'defining' on the one hand, and 'decreeing' on the other —between 'receiving' on the one hand and 'professing' on the other, and so on? To what purpose is it to appeal from the original Latin of the 'Creed of Pius IV' to the abbreviated English version often used for the reception of converts in this country? The latter, it is pointed out, omits the pledge of obedience to the Pope; but what is its official authority? And does it not in any case bind the convert to belief in the Pope's primacy of jurisdiction? Does it really for a single moment leave the individual free to disobey any disciplinary papal injunctions of which he may happen to disapprove? All the clever arguments advanced in order to show that modern Catholics will never be obliged to persecute, and that technical infallibility does not belong to edicts of persecution, cannot alter the fact that, on a grave point of doctrine

[1] Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 36a.

affecting Christian morals, the Roman Church for several centuries went grievously astray.[1]

The Roman Church has ceased to be in practice a persecuting Church. The new edition of the 'Codex Juris Canonici,' issued under papal authority in 1917, laid it down: "In regard to penalties of which no mention is made in the Codex, be they spiritual or temporal, medicinal or—as they are called—punitive, . . . let them be regarded as repealed."[2] Also, "let no one be compelled against his will to embrace the Catholic faith."[3] The death-penalty for heresy is thus at last officially discarded. Even before this climax had been reached, Catholic writers had got used to saying that the Church had abandoned the employment of all penalties of a temporal kind.[4]

It would seem indeed at first sight as if this happy consummation ought to be enough to satisfy the most suspicious of Protestant critics. So indeed it would, if it meant a frank, consistent, and sincere repentance of the cruelties of the past, and a deliberate break with the whole principle of intolerance and persecution. Unhappily, the way in which the change of policy is explained to us makes it impossible to regard it in this light. Frequently Catholic apologists make it quite clear that the change involves no abandonment of principle, but that it is simply an expedient necessitated by altered circumstances. Thus: "the power of rejecting heresy adapts itself in practice to circumstances of time and place, and, especially, of social and political conditions."[5] The Church "adapts her discipline to the times and circumstances in order that it may fulfil its salutary purpose."[6] The dependence of the Church's policy of toleration upon the altered political conditions of the modern world is in fact candidly admitted by Catholics.[7] It is only

[1] Cf. Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 112–114, *Death-Penalty*, 37 n., 46–49, 72; Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 14 f, 17, 24, 40, 63, 79–83, 112, 114, 146–150, 195, 214 (p. 48 bott.), 215 (p. 45 bott.), 225–231. Father Walker's statement (§ 40, cf. 149) that in the *Creed of Pius IV* "nothing is said of disciplinary enactments" is not strictly accurate. Are disciplinary enactments not affected by the promise of obedience and the belief in papal jurisdiction?

[2] Can. 6 (sect. 5) in Mirbt 534 (44). [3] Can. 1351 in Mirbt 555 (41).

[4] Granderath quoted in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 340 f, and by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 31 (cf. 33); Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 260b ("the penalties on heretics are now only of the spiritual order; . . ."); Bridge in *op. cit.* xi (1911) 703b ("Her own children are not punished by fines, imprisonment, or other temporal punishments, but by spiritual pains and penalties, and heretics are treated as she treated pagans: 'Fides suadenda est, non imponenda' "); Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 767b. Cf. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 64 f.

[5] Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 260a.

[6] Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703b. Cf. Newman, *Gramm.* 456 (". . . in heathen countries and in countries which have thrown off her yoke, she suspends her diocesan administration and her Canon Law, and puts her children under the extraordinary, extra-legal jurisdiction of Propaganda").

[7] See above, p. 594 n. 1.

putting the same fact in other words to say, as Protestants have frequently said, that the one real reason why Rome does not persecute to-day is because she cannot.[1] If that be so, the moral difficulty has not been met. Achan has gone, but the accursed thing remains.[2] What wonder is it that the Protestant world is not satisfied with the assurances occasionally given by modern Catholic writers, that their Church has no desire or intention of reviving persecution, even if she should some day possess the ability to do so?[3] What wonder if a couple of brief sentences in the new 'Codex Juris Canonici' be deemed an insecure guarantee of Rome's good conduct in the unlikely event of her regaining her temporal power?[4]

Occasionally indeed, modern Catholic writers are found using very emphatic language on the duty of religious toleration, the necessity of it in the modern world, and the advantages that flow from it.[5] This, of course, is excellent Protestant doctrine; but nobody can fail to see the stark contradiction between these amiable modern sentiments and the official policy of the Catholic Church as reflected in her actions during

[1] E.g. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 81, 95, 104; Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 32, 35, 37, 40, 47 f.

[2] There is something truly nauseating in Lépicier's words (quoted by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 69 f): "the Church . . . possesses the right of punishing the enemies of the Faith with suitable penalties, although, *as a most benign mother*, she not only shrinks from shedding blood but is even accustomed to deal with delinquents more mildly than the letter of the law would warrant. It is true that, *imitating Christ*, . . . the Church suffers violence and inflicts none, but most lovingly invites all men to her bosom, tempering the rigour of discipline *in accordance with the needs* of places, times, and persons"! (italics mine).

[3] E.g. S. F. Smith, S.J., in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 375, 378, 393, 397 f; Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703b; Wilhelm in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 500b; Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 767b, 768b, 769a. Father Knox (in Maycock, *Inquis.* xii, xv f) observes that most Catholics would admit nowadays the wrongness of physical torture, that probably not even the death-penalty could ever be revived, and that Catholics are not generally agreed that a long-standing heretical minority ought to be coerced, even if it were possible, by a Catholic power.

[4] Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 104–106, 110 f, 165, 214 (p. 46 mid.), 215 (p. 49 [7]); Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 37, 40 f, 74. See also above, pp. 607 f.

[5] Pius IX (1854) in Mirbt 447 (26: see above, p. 61 n. 1); Leo XIII in encyc. *Libertas*, 20 June 1888, in *Pope and People*, 102 f, 110 f, 130 (the Church as the champion of human freedom); Cardinal Gibbons quoted by Whitley in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 762a ("The Catholic Church has always been the zealous promoter of civil and religious liberty"); S. F. Smith, S.J., in *The Month*, Mar. 1892, 377; Father Harney, quoted in *New York Herald*, 7 May 1901, 5 ("The history of the Church has been the history of toleration"); Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 536; Blötzer in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 36a; Joyce in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 266b; Wilhelm in *op. cit.* xii (1911) 500a,b, 501b; and esp. Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 764ab, 765a (". . . into the secret sanctuary of the mind only the Deity can enter, and He alone can compel the heart . . ."), 767b ("The sublime example of Christ affords a striking indication of the manner in which we should regulate our conduct towards those who differ from us in faith. . . . To penetrate into the inner shrine of another's conscience with feelings of doubt and distrust is forbidden to all . ."), 769a–772b.

the Middle Ages and even in the notorious 'Syllabus' of 1864. Catholics, however, blandly ignore the moral significance of the discrepancy. How far the Church is from really condemning her past sins, and how blind she is to the contradictions into which the modern world is forcing her, is exhibited in a remarkable encyclical, 'Immortale Dei,' issued by Pope Leo XIII on 1 Nov. 1885. In it he said: "Although indeed the Church judges that it is not lawful for various kinds of religious worship to enjoy the same right(s) as the true religion does, yet she does not thereby condemn those rulers who, for the sake either of securing some great good or of preventing evil, patiently endure as a matter of custom their having each one their own place in the State." He goes on to say that no one should be compelled against his will to embrace Catholicism, and then proceeds to distinguish the true liberty (which the Church approves and supports) from the false: this latter is that "which breeds contempt for God's most holy laws and puts away the obedience rightly owing to power"; it also "allows man to become a slave to errors and desires," etc.[1] In another encyclical, 'Libertas Praestantissimum,' issued three years later (June, 1888), Leo repeated this view: "while not conceding any right to anything save what is true and honest, she does not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice, for the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some greater good."[2] In somewhat similar terms to Leo's, Cardinal Gibbons defines a man's religious liberty as the "right of worshipping God according to the dictates of a right conscience, and of practising a form of religion most in accordance with his duties to God."[3] That is to say, liberty—as viewed by Rome—is simply liberty to do the things of which Rome approves. We are still without any unequivocal and authoritative repudiation of the principle of religious persecution.[4] All we get consists either of brief legal clauses of uncertified permanence, or else elaborate vindications of State-tolerance that include no condemnation of the iniquities of the past, or else emphatic assertions of the Church's love of religious liberty, defining it however in such a way as to make it virtually identifiable with the acceptance of Catholicism!

Finally, the Catholic apologist of to-day pleads that modern Protestants are viewed by Rome as falling within the category, not of heretics, but of infidels, and that as such they need have no fear that they will ever be liable to the coercive jurisdiction of the Church.[5] An alternative

[1] *Leonis Papae XIII Allocutiones*, etc. ii. 162 f; *Pope and People*, 92 f.
[2] *Leonis Papae XIII Allocutiones*, etc. iii. 115; *Pope and People*, 124 f; cf. 128 f.
[3] Quoted by Whitley in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 762a.
[4] Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 114 f.
[5] See Vermeersch, quoted by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 81, and in Coulton and

device for ensuring the same satisfactory conclusion is to give Protestants generally the credit for 'good faith,' to ascribe their Protestantism to 'invincible ignorance,' and therefore to class them as 'material,' i.e. blameless (not 'formal,' i.e. guilty) heretics.[1] The ground sometimes given for this distinction is the fact that only recently has it become possible for excusable heretics to exist: formerly, when all knew Catholicism better, the rejection of it was inexcusable and therefore punishable.[2] Another and humbler explanation is that only recently have Catholics (and, it is added, Protestants) discovered the fact that a mistaken man may yet be sincere.[3]

It is indeed gratifying to learn that the spokesmen of the Roman Church have been seeking colourable reasons for exempting Protestants from the Church's penal laws: but it has to be observed:—

(1) that the guilt of those who feel conscientiously compelled openly to leave the Catholic Church is absolutely untouched by this, as by most of the other concessions of modern Romanists, and their liability to the utmost rigour of ecclesiastical discipline is by implication still maintained;[4]

(2) that the exemption of heretics-born from the penal jurisdiction of the Church is a flagrant departure from the theory and practice of the mediaeval Church, which is thereby declared to have been in error: for (a) many a mediaeval heretic felt just as much difficulty in accepting Catholicism as modern Protestants feel, and therefore just as much right to be considered only 'material' heretics; nevertheless they suffered punishment as if guilty: and (b) if it is true that mistaken men may be sincere, a holy and infallible Church ought not to have taken five centuries to discover the fact;[5]

Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 158 f, also 338 f (quotation of Granderath). Cf. Bridge in *Cath. Encyc.* xi (1911) 703b. For the exclusion of pagans and Jews from the Church's penal legislation, see above, p. 598.

[1] Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 681 f; Pohle in *op. cit.* xiv (1912) 764b, 768a; Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 161, 215 (p. 49).

[2] Thurston in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 761b and in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 629a. See above, p. 591.

[3] Walker in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 156.

[4] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 756a; Bridge in *op. cit.* xi (1911) 703b; Walker in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 215 (p. 49); Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 65 (". . . faith is never lost without the gravest sin" [Lépicier]), 67. Perrone (1794–1876) argued that those who secede from the Church cannot plead invincible ignorance, and that their damnation is one of the certainties of faith (Coulton, *Christ, St. Francis*, etc. 195 f).

[5] On the whole it may quite safely be said that Catholic theory made virtually no exception in favour of the heretic-born until modern times; and certainly no exception was made in practice during the Middle Ages. The point is discussed at great length, particularly with reference to the precise position of Aquinas, by Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 18–21 (= *Anglic. Ess.* 114 f), §§ 41–48, 84–95, 101 f, 151–156, 160, 169, 194, 211, 214 (p. 48), 215 (p. 47), and Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 20 f, 24, 26 f, 31, 54–56. It is simply not true to history to say, of the salvability of blameless

(3) that to class modern Protestants with infidels and to exempt them from penal jurisdiction flatly contradicts the official theory that all baptized persons are members of the Catholic Church and therefore subject to her government.[1] Somewhat similarly, the excommunication of heretics en masse[2] is inconsistent with the recognition that many of them truly belong to 'the Soul of the Church;'[3]

(4) that, since the heresy of the heretic-born is 'material' (and not 'formal') only so long as it is not defended by him with 'pertinacity,' convinced Protestants under a dominant Romanism could avail themselves of the proffered exemption only so long as the hierarchy were willing for their sakes to interpret this word 'pertinacity' in a far more offensive sense than either etymology or current usage could properly justify.[4] Such a guarantee would obviously be somewhat precarious.

The question might quite properly be asked, To what purpose is all this insistence on the unpleasant episodes of the past? Can we not let bygones be bygones? Is it not ungenerous to disinter and re-expose to the light of day wrongs committed centuries ago?[5] Our answer is that we disinter them, not in order to wound the feelings of others, nor even to utter reproaches against the guilty, but because these historical facts have a very close bearing upon the question with which Rome herself never ceases to face us, namely, her own claims to holiness and infallibility. It has, indeed, been argued that the persecutors ought to be condemned, because their policy was disapproved even by the enlightened judgment of their own time.[6] The justice of censuring them

non-Catholics, who belong to 'the Soul of the Church': "Hic fuit enim constans Ecclesiae sensus," or that it was "Patribus et theologis constanter inculcatum" (Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 536 f: he quotes Catholic authors who deny this salvability, and whom he therefore regards as mistaken). Nor is it true to say that: "*In every age* the Church has drawn a fundamental distinction . . . between formal and merely material heretics, and her penal legislation was directed *solely* against the former category"; and more to the same effect (Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv [1912] 767 f: italics mine). In the same way, it is not true to say that "the Catholic Church has ever taught that nothing else is needed to obtain justification than an act of perfect charity and of contrition," etc. (Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii [1908] 752b), unless by 'perfect charity and contrition' we understand submission to the Roman Church.

[1] See above, p. 407.

[2] For which, see Boudinhon in *Cath. Encyc.* v (1909) 681b, 686a.

[3] See above, pp. 60 f.

[4] Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, §§ 21, 42, 45–48, 161, 214 (p. 48); Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 58.

[5] Cf. Pohle in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 767b: "The enemies of the Church search eagerly the musty documents which tell of inquisitional courts, *autos-da-fé*, chambers of horror, instruments of torture, and blazing pyres. . . . When the inglorious origin of his forbears is constantly cast in the teeth of an honest nobleman, with the spiteful idea of wounding his feelings, no upright person will regard such conduc as tactful or just."

[6] See above, pp. 596 f, and cf. Creighton, *Persecution*, 83, 87–98; Fawkes in H.*E.R.E.* x (1917) 624b.

on this basis is doubtful; and we make no claim here to do so. It is not for us to try to measure up the extent of their personal blameworthiness, if blameworthy they were. Let it be granted that, at least in the main, such men were honestly acting according to their lights. One might even construct a theory of the *relative* justification of persecution, based on the good faith of the persecutors and on the reality of the dangers with which they had to deal, and on this ground commending the policy as having been allowed and even used by God, despite its crudity and shortsightedness.[1] But all this would not foreclose a very definite judgment on our part as to the wrongfulness and error of this policy. It is surely quite possible to brand an action as criminal and damnable, without prejudice to Christian charity towards the doer. And we brand the mediaeval persecutions (by whomsoever committed) as hideously wrong and unchristian—not simply because they were tactically unwise, or because they engendered hypocrisy in those who were intimidated by them,[2] or because they produced disunion in the Church[3]—but principally on the ground of their sinful cruelty. In this connexion there is in present-day thought a little confusion that needs to be cleared up. One of the excuses that used to be offered for persecution was that the physical suffering of the heretic was a minor evil compared with the eternal torment or final damnation of himself and his dupes. The element of truth in this plea has led some to deprecate emphasis on the physical suffering, when we are condemning persecution.[4] But a distinction needs to be drawn between the moral quality of enduring pain and the moral quality of inflicting it. The brave endurance of persecution is doubtless noble and fraught with high moral value: the infliction of it is none the less a grave moral wrong.

Of that wrong the Catholic Church stands guilty to a perfectly appalling extent. Consequently, her claim to be as a Church conspicuously 'holy' and to be infallible as a moral guide is completely and finally disproved.[5] And this judgment holds good irrespective of the

[1] Cf. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 188. Mr. Maycock's general attitude throughout his book (*Inquis.*) leans in the direction of such a view (see above, p. 588 n. 5, p. 592 nn. 2 and 5, and p. 598 n. 7), but he does not work the theory out.

[2] Orchard, *op. cit.* 182.

[3] Martineau, *Seat*, 163 f; Creighton, *Persecution*, 138 f; Grubb, *Authority*, 111 f; Orchard, *op. cit.* 187.

[4] E.g. Orchard, *op. cit.* 182. Maycock, for instance, pleads that modern condemnations of the Inquisition arise from the present age's "intense preoccupation with the things of the body and its corresponding lack of serious interest in those that concern the soul . . ." (*Inquis.* 17; cf. 181) and lays stress on the deep "consciousness of sin" (20 f) and general moral grandeur (260 f) of the Middle Ages.

[5] The modern judgment on this point was anticipated by George Fox (*Journal* [ed. Penney, 1924] 254: "If they (the Papists) were in the true faith, they would never use racks, prisons and fines to persecute and force others. . . . This was not the practice of the apostles and primitive Christians, who witnessed and enjoyed the

particular way in which from time to time Rome may reply to Protestant criticism. When the challenge is boldly accepted and the Church's innocence maintained,[1] the justice of our conclusion is patently vindicated. But it is equally valid in face of that chaotic mixture of mutually discrepant concessions of one kind and another with which the modern Catholic views of persecution abound. Those views include, as we have seen, no candid and authoritative repentance on the part of the Church for the blood she has spilt. They include indeed everything but that; and it is fairly obvious that such a frank disavowal can hardly be expected, since it would be tantamount to a confession of fallibility. So that, even supposing it were forthcoming, while Christendom as a whole would rejoice at the final disappearance of the sanguinary spectre of persecution, the justice of the charge we are here pressing home would be finally established by the actual confession of the guilty party.

true faith of Christ; but it was the practice of the faithless Jews and Heathens so to do"). Cf. Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 754b (". . . there can be no more conclusive disproof of the divine origin of the papacy than the good faith of the popes in their age-long work of blood").

[1] As, for example, by Lépicier (summarized by Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 32: "we must either condemn her as having formerly erred in the domain of morals, or allow her in the future to kill again whenever her Infallibility may judge fit to do so"). See also above, pp. 586–596.

CHAPTER XXVI

CATHOLICISM AND MORALS GENERALLY

In the Third Part of this work we brought the light of historical evidence to bear upon a large number of Catholic teachings. Not only were many of these found to be untenable, but the whole Catholic attitude to the method of historical criticism seemed to betray a defective sense of truth in connexion with the events of the past.[1] When we examine the record of the Roman Church in regard to that whole province of ethics to which historical truthfulness belongs—the ethics of honesty and sincerity in general—we find nothing that compensates for the defect already noticed, and much that shows that the Catholic Church is no more exempt than any other body of Christians from the natural human liability to lapse from ideal Christian standards. It was not only their precepts on the actual question of justifiable falsehood, but the general spirit of their system of subtle casuistry, that earned for the Jesuits their unenviable reputation for disingenuousness.[2] Those who are familiar with the methods of Catholic propaganda and controversy are well aware of the uncanny resourcefulness and double-facedness, with which the harsher elements in Catholicism, which passed unchallenged in former times and are still maintained in backward Catholic countries, are disguised and softened when the case has to be argued out on the liberal soil of Protestantism. Nor can we help suspecting that the statements made in or about certain Catholic publications are sometimes better adapted to create a favourable impression of Catholic strength than to convey the precise truth. Particular Catholic usages—for example, the granting of indulgences (sometimes for what is virtually a monetary consideration)—inevitably open the door to a certain amount of intrigue and insincerity.[3]

[1] See especially, pp. 499–512.

[2] See above, pp. 501 f: also Heiler, *Kathol.* 250–253, 652.

[3] It must be recognized that an Indulgence is never intentionally a permission to sin, and does not dispense with true repentance, but only remits penance or abbreviates Purgatory (Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 182–184, 216 f). At the same time, the dangers and evils attending the system are unmistakable. See Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 206 f (". . . Quite lately we heard of two ladies who, in great contrition for their sins, resolved to make their servants fast for them . . ."), 213–234, 356–358; Horton, *England's Danger*, 141 f (raffles organized by Catholic priest in Mexico for the release of souls from Purgatory); Heiler, *Kathol.* 178 f, 270–275, 699 (notes to S. 231, 275); McCabe, *Popes*, 139–142 (on actual *sale* of indulgences in Spain); Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 138–140. Father Thurston's breezy pamphlet, *Indulgences for Sale! Enquire within* ('Cath. Truth Soc.') does not avail to clear the system of its discredit.

The Catholic Church has shown no sympathy to the sectional efforts made from time to time to secure obedience to our Lord's prohibition of oaths. In very categorical terms Jesus forbade, not rash or idle swearing only, but all swearing (Mt. v. 33–37); and His teaching on this point is re-echoed in the Epistle of Jacob (v. 12). The fact that Paul does not seem to have been aware of any such prohibition, and the further fact that the observance of it does not square with our modern notions of civic convenience, are altogether insufficient grounds for questioning whether our Lord's words quite mean what they say. It has, however, been left to sects counted heretical, like the Waldenses, Albigenses, Hussites, Anabaptists, and Quakers, to insist upon an attempt to realize in human affairs our Lord's ideal in this respect. To their aspirations the Church has always offered steady opposition. Innocentius III severely condemned scruples as to the legality of oaths. Martinus V (1418) condemned Wyclif's doctrine that civil and commercial oaths were illicit. In 1713 Clemens XI condemned Quesnel's protest against the taking of common oaths in church; and in 1794 Pius VI condemned the Pistoian doctrine declaring that in the beginning oaths had been regarded in the Church as forbidden, and deploring that they had become customary in its administration. Not only has the Roman Church thus frowned on all efforts to secure obedience to her Lord's teaching on this point, but, by frequently absolving various persons from their oaths on political or semi-political grounds, the Popes have given the impression of taking an easy view as to the responsibilities of a binding promise.

In the three preceding chapters, we have studied the Church's teaching on the subject of eternal punishment and of persecution, and her actual conduct with regard to the latter. In the light of the facts adduced, it is not too much to say that over large areas of human duty Rome seems to have long been quite unaware of the fact that extreme and atrocious cruelty is morally sinful. Hence her paradoxical suggestion that the protests of outsiders against what she has said and done spring from a diminished sensitiveness to sin. In other ethical questions connected with the chastisement of those who are deemed to be in error, Rome has shown very little sympathy with progressive Christian idealism.

Thus, apart altogether from the infliction of physical penalties on those whom she had power to punish in that way, her constant attitude even to the honest truth-seeker who, whether within or without her borders, dared to maintain or advocate any position incompatible, not only with her own 'de fide' dogmas, but even with any part of her traditional teaching, has normally been one of harsh unloving censure.

She makes no allowance for honest doubt, displays no sympathy with the independent search for truth, and attributes all divergence of view to unworthy motives, such as pride, desire for novelty, or sheer love of one's own opinions. What she cannot condemn as definitely heretical, she condemns as 'temerarious.' She has thus visited some of her most loving and loyal sons with sharp rebuke, with despotic demand for unconditional submission, and even with excommunication and disgrace. No doubt, considerations of discipline can be, and are, pleaded in justification of this severity: but a Christian discipline which unjustly attributes low motives to candid investigation and frank avowal, and brands honest conviction as blameworthy and punishable, sins against love, and therefore stands self-condemned, as representing rather the irreligious 'will-to-power' than the meekness and gentleness of Christ.[1]

The story of the Catholic persecution of witches makes almost more horrible reading than the record of the Church's proceedings against heretics, when we recall the vast numbers, the sex, age, and helpless condition of most of the victims, the appalling and indescribable tortures used in examining and executing them, and the imaginary nature of most of the crimes for which they were punished.[2] It is quite true that Protestantism also was guilty of cruelly persecuting both men and women for sorcery; but as regards the bearing of this fact on the Roman claims, one can say only (1) that Rome set the pace, and (2) that, witch-burning being by general consent indefensible, Romanists were quite clearly not superior to Protestants either in the moral insight or in the moral temper that might have prevented the practice.[3]

[1] Heiler, *Kathol.* 325 (". . . Doch die grosse, weite, reine Liebe hat in Rom keine Stätte. Wie furchtbar ist zu allen Zeiten die Lieblosigkeit der Päpste gegen jene gewesen, die—von tiefstem religiösem Geiste ergriffen—auf anderen Wegen zum Göttlichen wanderten als auf der römischen Heerstrasse! . . ."), 326 f, 329 f, 343 (". . . Fehlt die Liebe, so ist alles Kirchenrecht Heidentum, alle Hierarchie Apostasie, alle Autorität Häresie . . ."), 591 (". . . Die Kirche hat immer wieder Jesum verleugnet und Jesum gekreuzigt, ihn, der die Liebe verkündet hat—wie kann sie seine Braut sein?"), 633–635, 650–652, 657.

[2] The nineteenth-century assumption that the crimes of those punished for witchcraft were *wholly* imaginary, and that their punishment therefore was *wholly* undeserved, has been challenged in recent years on the ground that witchcraft was a pagan practice deliberately calculated to injure Christianity, and was therefore a proper object of judicial repression (Margaret A. Murray, *The Witch-cult in Western Europe*, 1921, and Montague Summers, *The History of Witchcraft and Demonology* and *The Geography of Witchcraft*, 1927). Father Thurston (in *Cath. Encyc.* xv [1912] 674b, 677ab), while maintaining on biblical and ecclesiastical grounds the possibility of real intercourse with the devil, etc., yet believes "that in 99 cases out of 100 the allegations rest upon nothing better than pure delusion."

[3] Lecky has put together the gruesome details of the story of the witch-trials among Catholics *Rationalism*, i. 2–7, 35, 37, 46 f, 53, 55, 59, 63 f, 79–81, 84 f, 89 f, 91, 98, 104, 137 f, ii. 38: cf. Alphandéry in *Encyc. Brit.* xiv. 591ab) and Protestants (*Rationalism*, i. 8, 61 f, 104–108, 120–136 [the Puritans of the Commonwealth-period —particularly those in Scotland—seem to have been the worst offenders]). Cf. also Thurston in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 675–677.

In 1484 Pope Innocentius VIII issued a formal bull, insisting upon the inquisitorial suppression of the witchcraft prevalent in certain parts of Germany.[1] One would have thought that an official papal decree, requiring obedience on the part of all the faithful whom it might concern, would come within the definition of an infallible utterance, especially in the sanction it gave to the universally accepted belief of the time. In 1678 Thiers protested naturally enough that incredulity as regards witchcraft was blameworthy, "puisque l'Église, qui est conduite par le Saint-Esprit, et qui par conséquent ne peut errer, reconnoît qu'il se fait par l'opération du démon."[2] The modern Catholic, however, has an easy way out of the difficulty: "This bull contains no sort of dogmatic decision on the nature of sorcery. The very form of the bull, which merely sums up the various items of information that had reached the pope, is enough to prove that the decree was not intended to bind anyone to belief in such things." And so on.[3]

The record of the Church in the matter of war is somewhat similar to her record in the matter of taking oaths. Here too we have something which Jesus distinctly disallowed,[4] but which makes so exacting a demand on human nature that His followers as a whole have so far been unable to observe His prohibition. The idea that it is wrong for a Christian man to slay his fellow-man in war was very widely and firmly, though not unanimously, held among the Christians of the first three centuries.[5] But after the Church's unofficial compact with Constantinus, this thorough-going view was rapidly abandoned; and all that remained of it was the ruling—emphasized in a whole series of Councils—that the *clergy* should not bear arms. The tradition speedily established itself that it was unquestionably lawful for the Christian man to serve his political ruler in a just war. The Franciscan 'Tertiaries,' indeed, were at first forbidden to bear arms; but in 1289 their rule was altered by

[1] Mirbt 244 f. [2] Quoted in Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 80 n.

[3] Von Pastor in *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 707a. Similarly Thurston in *Cath. Encyc.* xv (1912) 676ab (who however admits that the Pope in this bull "must be considered to affirm the reality of the alleged phenomena").

[4] The usual idea that Jesus ignored this question is made possible only by ignoring the historical conditions of His ministry. A Jewish Messiah, working for the establishment of God's Kingdom on earth (Mt. vi. 10), could not possibly—however universalistic and spiritual His mission might be—have left the Judaeo-Roman feud out of account. In the light of these historical conditions, the attitude of Jesus at His temptation, His teaching in the Sermon on the Mount and elsewhere (e.g. Lk. xix. 41–44), and especially His example in submitting to death, constitute a prohibition of participation even in a 'just' war, as clear for those who will use their eyes as any explicit words could make it. This conclusion, of course, by no means forecloses the question as to the ultimate significance of His death for Christian theology (see above, pp. 370 f, 548).

[5] The evidence is fully given in my *Early Christian Attitude to War* and in the relevant chapters of my *Early Church and the World*.

the Pope so as to permit them to take part in wars of defence. In general practice, however, the prince himself was regarded as the best judge of the justice of any particular war: and no real liberty was accorded to the individual of forming his own judgment and of refusing service, if conscribed for a war of which he personally disapproved. The Catholic Church formulated no 'de fide' dogma on the subject; but in the 'Roman Catechism' she acquitted of the guilt of sin those who take life either in self-defence or in a just war;[1] and this became in practice a virtual permission to participate in *any* war led by a de facto political ruler, so long as it was not against the Pope.

The wide opportunities thus opened to Christian military activity were frequently used by individual ecclesiastics and by the supreme rulers of the Church in order to compass ends of which they approved. The Crusades for the recovery and defence of the Holy Land (about 1095–1291) are the most conspicuous examples of the activity of the Catholic Church in kindling war. Even a saint like Bernard of Clairvaux gave the Crusades his blessing, undeterred by the appalling slaughter and cruelty which they entailed. The English clergy clearly made no effort to dissuade Henry V from plunging into his fatuous war for the French crown, even if they did not, as some later writers of dubious trustworthiness have asserted, actually egg him on to begin it. His uncle, Cardinal Beaufort, had leanings to a military life, and took part in a Continental crusade. Cardinal Ximenes organized and personally led a campaign against the African Moors, in which thousands of Moorish civilians—men, women, and children—were massacred. The wars of religion occasioned by the spread of Reformation-doctrines were in many cases encouraged, if not actually suggested, by Popes and bishops. Since the status and influence of the papacy as a political force dropped into the background, the temptation actually to foment wars has not been strong: but Rome to this day has steadily maintained the legitimacy of soldiering.[2] She has not even succeeded in keeping her clergy free from the taint of slaughter. During the Middle Ages, ecclesiastics frequently led troops to battle, and took part in the fighting themselves.[3]

[1] *Catech. Rom.* III. iv. 6 (2), 7.

[2] See the casual allusions in *Pope and People*, 129, 150, 152, 199, 201. Mr. Maycock specifies refusal of military service, as one of the anti-social malpractices of the Albigenses (*Inquis.* 41, 143). Cf. Walter Scott, *Monastery*, ch. 34 (" 'True, my Lord Abbott,' said the Sub-Prior, 'we cannot fight with carnal weapons, it is alike contrary to our habit and vow; but we can die for our Convent and our Order. Besides, we can arm those who will and can fight . . .' "). It was said that Louis XIV was promised by the nun Marguérite Marie Alacoque constant victory, if he would blazon the heart of Jesus on his banners (see above, p. 494).

[3] Historical justification cannot apparently be found for the idea that fighting ecclesiastics used maces instead of swords and spears, so as not to break the canonical law forbidding priests to shed blood (*Encyc. Brit.* xvii. 214b note; W. E. Wilson,

During the recent war, thousands of priests served, by special permission, in the French army. Newman took the permissibility of war for granted, and advocated the public acknowledgement of untruths in war as not being lies; "and then there could be no danger in them to the individual Catholic, for he would be acting under a rule." [1]

At the same time, it has to be noted that the Roman Church has frequently exerted herself to check in various ways the evils that attend armed conflicts. In the Middle Ages, she set her face resolutely against ordeal by battle, private warfare (by means of the 'Truce of God'), and duelling. In particular instances, the Popes made strenuous efforts to maintain peace between the Christian princes of Europe. During the present century, and particularly since the war of 1914–1918, Catholics of every rank from the Pope downwards have made the most praiseworthy efforts in the cause of international peace. The utterances and arguments of individual Catholics have sometimes gone far in the direction of pacifism. It must, however, be observed that, as a religious body, the Church of Rome is by no means alone in this post-war work for peace, that international peace is naturally linked very closely in the Catholic mind with the world-wide supremacy the Church should enjoy, and that exponents of Catholic peace-views are usually careful to explain that these are not inconsistent with national patriotism and do not cancel the individual's duty to fight for his country in case of need.[2]

On the whole, then, Rome's contribution to the cause of world-peace has been very ordinary. Here, as elsewhere, she is not in the van of progress. She has left it to minor Protestant sects, like the Waldenses, Anabaptists, Mennonites, and Quakers, to keep before the world the Christian ideal of overcoming the world's evil with good and good only. True, the great Reformers like Luther and Calvin did not approve of radical pacifism,[3] any more than did the great Protestant bodies during

Christ and War, 79; cf. Freeman, *Norman Conquest*, iii. 464; Lytton, *Harold*, bk. xii, ch. 8 [regarding Odo of Bayeux]). The military Churchmen of the Middle Ages were neither so scrupulous nor so hypocritical as has been supposed!

[1] Newman, *Apol.* 311 (appx. 8).

[2] Cf. Père M. J. Lagrange in *Construct. Quart.* Mar. 1918, 13 f ("But if the Pope speaks in the name of God, he can but remind them of their duty as Catholics to defend their country even at the cost of their lives. If he used different language, he would not be listened to, but he cannot use it, for neither the Church nor its Head can deny their traditional doctrines. Then there is nothing to fear from the Church with regard to the maintenance of nationalities"); E. Beaupin in *Construct. Quart.* Mar. 1921, 129 ("It should be noted that loyalty to one's country is in no way endangered, for Catholics are unanimous in desiring to uphold this, and all join in maintaining its beneficence and its necessity . . ."). See also the interesting statements on the matter made by a thorough-going Catholic pacifist in *Reconciliation*, Sept. 1925, 163–165, Oct. 199.

[3] E.g. Calvin, *Instit.* IV. xx. 10–12; also *Article* xxxvii of the Church of England.

the recent war: but it is at least open to these latter some day to confess that they have been mistaken, which Rome, claiming to be the moral guide of mankind, can never do; moreover it is within the bosom of Protestantism, not of Catholicism, that the bolder handling of the ethical problems of war has commenced and advanced. Now that the mists of war-time frenzy have well-nigh cleared, an increasing number of serious people are coming to feel that, valuable as all existing peace-agencies may be, the evil of war (like other great entrenched evils) can be radically cured only by an increasing amount of convinced personal abstention on Christian grounds, coupled of course with an extended use of the positive power of the Christian spirit for good. If, as seems increasingly probable, the way of advance lies—in part at least—along this line, it is not likely that the Church of Rome will lead the world along it, however well-fitted to do so she may in some respects seem to be.[1]

In the course of our Fourth Chapter, we paid a willing tribute to the ethical intensity of the genuine Catholic spirit and, in particular, to the Church's loyalty to the teaching of Jesus in the matter of divorce.[2] It falls to us in this place to express appreciation again of her unflagging efforts to maintain among her members a high standard of sexual morality. So serious is the alarm now being felt at the apparently growing laxity in society at large, that some are disposed to see in the unbending standards of Catholicism a sign of its moral superiority to Protestant Christendom.[3] Further, the absence among Protestants of any authoritative and generally accepted ruling on the subject of conception-control contrasts unfavourably, it is thought, with the final and unhesitating condemnation of the practice by the Catholic Church. We are only too willing to accord to her a generous measure of praise for her insistence on a lofty ethical standard in this connexion. It would, however, be a mistake to infer either that her principles are beyond criticism, or that the results she actually achieves are necessarily better than those of Protestantism. Thus, her repudiation of divorce, while it happens to agree with the teaching of Jesus as investigated by higher-critical methods, does not agree with it as Rome herself, rejecting criticism, accepts it; for according to Roman teaching Jesus actually spoke the words ascribed to him in Mt. v. 32 and xix. 9, and these words tacitly allow, in the case of adultery, divorce (and therefore re-marriage) to the innocent party. Thus the Church's view of the indissolubility of

[1] Cf. the discussion of this point in Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 168–176.

[2] See above, pp. 79–81. Cf. Leo XIII's encyclical *Arcanum Divinae* on the subject of Christian marriage, 10 Feb. 1880 (*Pope and People*, 41–66, esp. 50).

[3] Cf. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 55.

the marriage-tie is rather an inference from her theory as to its sacramental nature than an exhibition of loyalty to the teaching of her Divine Master.

Again, the wholesale condemnation of conception-control clearly rests on much more than a very proper dislike of any interference by mechanical means with nature's operations. The Church has long thrown her whole weight on the side of unlimited fertility and the highest possible birth-rate. We do not need to look very far for her reasons for doing so; since it is clear that her counsel, if followed by those whose ear she naturally possesses most, secures her a numerical advantage over her rivals. Were it not for this motive, she would surely recognize more adequately the great moral difference between conception-control by means of mechanical devices and conception-control by self-restraint or by the limitation of marital intercourse to the so-called 'sterile period.'

Further, not only has history some very discreditable facts to report in regard to sexual laxity on the part of mediaeval Popes and ecclesiastics,[1] but even in modern times Catholic populations—so far as statistics can tell us—do not show any general superiority to Protestant peoples, in regard to purity of life. It is usual to refer in this connexion to the low percentage of illegitimate births registered for Ireland, in comparison with the figures for England and Scotland; but the proportions are largely affected by the custom of transporting Irish girls who have 'got into trouble' to Liverpool, Glasgow, and other places overseas, before their offspring are due to appear. Also, while the percentage is low in Ireland, it is exceedingly high in Continental countries like Bavaria, Austria, and Portugal. Taken over a wide area and for a period of years, the figures show a slightly smaller proportion of illegitimate births among Protestants than among Catholics.[2]

Lastly, Catholic asceticism resulted in the superiority of celibacy to the married state being made one of the fixed dogmas of the Church,[3] and was responsible during the Middle Ages for a very general and almost traditional vilification of the female sex. This vilification was often couched in the most extreme and shocking expressions, and—at least in certain Catholic circles—is not altogether a thing of the past.[4]

One of the plainest cases of the Church having in good faith, but sheer error, long misdirected the moral conduct of Christian men is

[1] See, for example, McCabe, *Popes*, 68–82, and A. Lunn in *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1926, 81 f.

[2] See Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 132, 137 f: also the Catholic and other testimonia collected in Tract No. 3 of 'The Protestant Press Bureau.'

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. xxiv, can. 10 (Mirbt 331 [4]): cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 174–195.

[4] Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 77–79, *Morals*, ii. 117–121, 127–131, 337 f; Heiler, *Katho.* 130; Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 174–180, 398, 443–445, 447, 537 f.

the case of her teaching in regard to usury. The generally accepted view of ancient moralists was that the exaction of money over and above the actual sum lent was ethically indefensible. Such was, for instance, the teaching of the Old Testament, at least so far as dealings with a compatriot were concerned. The Catholic Church took over this doctrine, without perceiving its fallaciousness, and for centuries maintained it with her official authority. The Fathers were unanimous in condemning the exaction of interest. A whole series of Church-Councils—from that of Illiberis about 300 A.D. to that of Vienne in 1311—sanctioned and reinforced the patristic view. In the Western Church, Christian conviction on the subject was virtually unbroken down to the time of the Reformation. Pope after Pope issued bulls declaring the taking of interest to be sinful. It has been calculated that usury (which was not distinguished from interest until it became necessary to sanction the latter) was condemned by twenty-eight Church-Councils (six of which were œcumenical) and seventeen Popes. Of the Reformers Luther, Melancthon, and others, maintained the traditional view: Calvin was the first to lay it down that the exaction of a moderate rate of interest was blameless. The 'Roman Catechism' issued in 1566 reaffirmed the old position.[1] The growing justification of interest was long treated by Catholic writers as one of the Protestant heresies: the great Bossuet (1627-1704), for instance, maintained that the traditional Catholic view was 'of faith.' As late as 1745 that view was solemnly reaffirmed by Benedictus XIV, and an attempt was made to enforce it in Quebec even in 1793. Meantime, the error, impracticability, and harmfulness of this teaching had been slowly forcing itself on human minds. The payment of interest had always been a practical necessity, and although the demand for it had been left mainly to the Jews (who had no scruples on the matter in their dealings with Gentiles), Popes, prelates, and Catholic sovereigns had found it necessary to pay it in order to be able to borrow, and had for the most part refrained from taking drastic steps to suppress all usurers. In 1830, however, the Holy Office, with the approval of Pope Pius VIII, decided that those who regarded the civil legality of a certain rate of interest as a sufficient reason for taking it were "not to be disturbed." Although the Holy See has apparently given no decision in recent times, all modern Catholic writers agree that to charge a moderate interest on money lent is a perfectly permissible act for Christian men. Nothing could thus be clearer than the fact that the Church now sanctions what formerly she condemned with constancy and emphasis through all the official channels of her teaching-ministry. The attempt is sometimes made to defend her against the charge of inconsistency and

[1] *Catech. Rom.* III. viii. 19 f, 25.

error by adducing the great change that has taken place in the economic conditions of society, and by urging that the former prohibition of interest had reference, not to the modern type of loan (where business-capital is advanced with good prospect of easy repayment), but to the earlier custom of lending money to poor persons who were in extreme need and had no chance of improving their financial position.[1] Doubtless the exaction of interest from a distressed debtor is uncharitable, and the Church did right in condemning it: but this does not alter the fact that, long after government- and business-loans (in which the payment of interest is often no occasion of distress) had become familiar, the Church adhered to her disapprobation of the practice of taking interest.

One would have thought that the repeated and formal declarations of so many Popes and Councils would have constituted the verdict against usury an 'ex-cathedra' decision, if ever there was one: yet it was admittedly an erroneous verdict. And even if we accept the specious plea that not one of the formal utterances in question comes within the technical definition of what is 'ex cathedra,'[2] the fallibility of the Church as a moral guide remains none the less patent and conspicuous.[3]

In slavery we have a case of a special institution which, though inconsistent with the whole spirit of Christianity and as such unanimously condemned by all modern Christians, was yet not explicitly forbidden either by our Lord (so far as we know) or any of His followers in New-Testament times, and was not in fact generally repudiated by the Church until many centuries had passed. Into the reasons why our Lord did not express Himself on the topic we do not need here to enter. It is, however, necessary to put forward a caveat against the explanation very commonly given as to why the early Christian teachers generally, and the Apostle Paul in particular, refrained from requiring the slave-owning members of the Church to emancipate their slaves.[4] The usual explanation is that these leaders knew well enough that the possession of slaves was unchristian, but that they did not try to stop it because they did not wish to precipitate a social upheaval: so they contented themselves with cultivating that spirit of Christian brotherhood which would undermine and ultimately overthrow the whole system. But, in

[1] What Mr. Maycock (*Inquis.* 13) calls "the taking of interest on an unproductive loan." Cf. Vermeersch in *Cath. Encyc.* viii (1910) 77a, xv (1912) 235b, 236 f, 237ab.

[2] Vermeersch argues (*Cath. Encyc.* xv [1912] 236a) that, although Benedictus XIV's encyclical of 1745, forbidding usury, was in 1836 declared by the Holy Office to apply to the whole Church, that does not make it an infallible document.

[3] Cf. Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 254–271; Martineau, *Seat*, 158 f; Fosdick, *Modern Use*, 238 f.

[4] It is not quite certain that Paul did consistently so refrain: Philemon 21b looks like a broad hint to Philemon that he should free Onesimus.

the first place, to suppose, as Loring Brace and others do,[1] that a slave-war would have been started by the Apostles requiring Christian converts to free their slaves, is ridiculous: there were not nearly enough wealthy Christians in Paul's day, nor did they multiply nearly fast enough, to make it probable that a general Christian emancipation, through suddenness or wide extent, would launch a slave-war or even a social revolution. And secondly, it is doing a grave wrong to the early Christians to suppose that, if once convinced that a certain course of action was contrary to their Master's will, they would have refrained from denouncing it and continued to practise it, on the strength of some far-sighted, quasi-Victorian notion of the sacro-sanctity of social conventions. That was not the course they took in the case of idolatry or fornication or gladiatorial games, though their stiff attitude with regard to at least the first of these convulsed society to the very foundations. If the early Church did not set herself to abolish slavery, this was because her thoughts and feelings on the subject were immature (development being somewhat checked by the expected nearness of the Lord's Return), and her mind consequently was for long not made up.[2]

The comparative blindness of the pre-Constantinian Church in regard to the moral iniquity of slavery descended as a bequest to the Church of the Middle Ages. The slavery of paganism lived on in the Christian empires, and was gradually replaced by the scarcely less unchristian system of serfdom. Occasionally, indeed, voices were raised against it, as for instance by Pope Alexander III in the twelfth century, by Wyclif in the fourteenth, by Pius II in the fifteenth, and so on. But the Church herself—and in particular the monasteries—had come to own large numbers of serfs; and economic reasons acted as a brake on the Church's advocacy of freedom, and at times occasioned the issue of special rules prohibiting emancipation. Thomas Aquinas, who figures even to the present day as an accredited and reliable teacher of the Church, explicitly justified slavery as economically sound and morally defensible. No general movement for the liberation of serfs was initiated by the Church or the monasteries. When, in the nineteenth century, the abolition of slavery was eventually achieved, it owed comparatively little—as Cardinal Manning afterwards complained[3]—to the reforming energy of Catholicism.

It is, indeed, true that, from the very beginning, the Church exerted

[1] Brace, *Gesta Christi*, 45: the same opinion is expressed by Allard in *Cath. Encyc.* xiv (1912) 37b.

[2] Cf. my *Early Church and the World*, 132 f. Particulars in regard to the pre-Constantinian Christian views and doings in the matter of slavery are given in the relevant sections of that book.

[3] Purcell, *Manning*, ii. 781.

herself to ameliorate the treatment which slaves received, and encouraged individuals who could afford it to emancipate their slaves as a voluntary act of charity. Her influence in this direction, though limited in the ways already described and often exaggerated by modern Catholic writers,[1] was no doubt great, and deserves to be duly acknowledged. Nor is it for us to censure our predecessors for the time they took in awakening to the moral evil of slavery,[2] however obvious that evil may appear to us to-day and however deplorable the effects of the long delay may be. The reproach of it—if such there be—rests equally upon many sections of the Church. Our point, however, is that the Roman Church, despite all the charity she has displayed in dealing with the matter, has given no evidence of possessing any marked superiority over other bodies of Christians in point of moral insight, let alone any infallibility for the settlement of the moral problem involved.

Man's treatment of the animals is a sadly neglected province in the field of Christian ethics; and the detailed record of Christendom in regard to it would richly repay a much fuller investigation than has yet been given to it or can possibly be given to it here. The gross brutality to which the habits of sport and even of flesh-eating have inured most Christian consciences obviously yields but slowly before the insistent reproaches of those nobler and tenderer feelings which the Spirit of God has implanted within us and which the Christian discipline serves to enhance and develop. It is pleasing in this connexion to be able to refer to the general helpfulness of the Church's influence. The type of sainthood characteristic of Catholicism—with its leanings to asceticism and the passive virtues—is peculiarly favourable to a humane and even friendly treatment of the brute creation. Hence the number of beautiful stories about animals to be found in the biographies of Catholic saints.[3] It must also be placed to the credit of the papacy, and of the Society of Jesus (in its earlier days), that strenuous efforts were made by both to put an end to Spanish bull-fighting. In 1567 Pius V forbade it under pain of excommunication.[4] Although later this general

[1] See the claims made in *Pope and People*, 17, 110, and the array of very damaging facts published by Coulton in *Rev. of the Churches*, July 1927, 366–372.

[2] Lecky says (*Rationalism*, ii. 333 n.) that the first man who unequivocally condemned the slave-trade was the Spanish Dominican Soto (1494–1560). "The first practical adversaries of the slave trade were the Quakers, with 'Antony Benezet (1713–1784) . . . the son of a French Huguenot . . .' " (Coulton in *Rev. of the Churches*, July 1927, 371).

[3] See a collection of these in *The Church and Kindness to Animals* (Burns and Oates, 1906) 19–135. Cf. also Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 491–494. Unhappily the saints were not always thus. St. Dominic, for instance, to whom Mr. Maycock refers enthusiastically as "that amazing man" (*Inquis.* 75), "saw the devil in a sparrow that hindered his reading; therefore he plucked it alive" (Coulton, *Five Centuries*, i. 179).

[4] There is an Eng. trans. of his bull in *The Church and Kindness to Animals*, 3–5.

prohibition had to be withdrawn, its application to monks and ecclesiastics was retained in force. In 1885 the Bishop of Nîmes in the south of France addressed to the flock of his diocese a passionate appeal (based on considerations both of cruelty and of danger) not to allow bull-fighting to be re-introduced into this region.[1] Eminent Catholics, like Cardinal Manning and Archbishop Bagshawe, have taken a prominent part in the agitation against the cruelties of vivisection.[2]

Yet one cannot but feel that all this, truly estimable as it is, falls very far short of what a supreme ethical teacher would have achieved. The papal decree of 1567 refers several times to the danger to human life occasioned by bull-fighting; but a single passing reference to Christian charity is all the notice taken of the cruelty with which the bull is treated. Moreover, if bull-fighting really ought to have been forbidden, how can we justify the subsequent relaxations in its favour granted by the Popes in 1575, 1586, and 1596? Are the requirements of God's Law to be trimmed down in deference to a barbarous national craze for the blood of innocent beasts? In actual practice, the Church in Spain offers little or no opposition to the custom. Bull-fights are usually held on feast-days, and form part of most great religious festivals, especially those in honour of the Virgin.[3] Madrid has ere now been placarded with announcements of a bull-fight on Whit-Sunday evening in honour of the Holy Ghost.[4] Every large Spanish bull-ring has its chapel, its altar, and its priest; and the sacrament of the body and blood of the Saviour of men is solemnly administered to the fighters before they go forth to their insane and brutal work.[5] Up to a certain point, no doubt, the teachers of the Church endeavour to inculcate kindness to animals;[6] but in regard to any of the more progressive or idealistic efforts in this direction, such as antagonism to blood-sports and flesh-eating, virtually no help can be expected from a Church so willing to meet half-way the tastes of the average man and so deferential to the precedents to be found in the Old Testament.

When we come to the wider area of social and political life, the task of appraising the Church's contribution to human welfare becomes much more complicated and therefore more difficult. In the first place, it has to be recognized that during the early Middle Ages the main responsibility for shaping and controlling the general organiza-

[1] *Op. cit.* 6–17. [2] *Op. cit.* 139 ff.

[3] See Lecky, *Rationalism*, i. 302 f n. for several of the foregoing details.

[4] G. F. Edwards in *Papacy and Bible*, 25.

A good picture of the bull-fight in actual practice is given in Ibañez's novel, *The Matador*. For a defence of the Church's attitude, see Amado in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 52b.

[6] See *The Universe*, 6 May 1921, 1, col. 3 ('Popes and Cruelty to Animals').

tion of society fell to the Church; and despite the limited extent of her experience, the intractability of the material, and the general confusion of the times, she attained a very large and creditable measure of success. Besides releasing and energizing a thousand agencies for the charitable relief of human distress, she played no small part in laying the foundations of a stable civilization. She held up before the eyes of crude and often brutalized multitudes the ideal of a supra-national and on the whole humane religious sovereignty.[1] She even managed to secure the adoption, in economic relationships, of certain principles of justice (e.g. those relating to price), which were felt to arise directly from her theological and ethical doctrines. Doubtless, too, mediaeval life was not altogether so gloomy as some of its beliefs and usages would lead us to suppose: we may readily grant that, alongside of much callousness and much acute suffering, there was also much tenderheartedness and sympathy, much joy and merriment. Nor must we overlook the interest taken and the zeal displayed in social service, not only by Anglo-Catholics, but by Romanist leaders such as Cardinal Manning and Pope Leo XIII and by large numbers of Catholic priests and lay-folk of the present day, both in Europe[2] and in America.

On the other hand, there is a very considerable body of facts which would seem to warrant the belief that, as a civilizing and socially redemptive agency, Catholicism has been at least equalled—and in some respects surpassed—by Protestantism. The Papal States in Italy, for instance, where for centuries the Church had an entirely free hand, are known to have been among the worst governed provinces in Europe. When the temporal sovereignty of the Pope was brought to an end in 1870, only an infinitesimal fraction of his subjects voted, in the plebiscite, against being transferred from his dominion to that of the King of Italy.[3] Again, countries in which Catholicism is dominant, like Mexico, South America, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, contrast as a whole very unfavourably with countries that are mainly Protestant, as regards cleanliness, health, morality, culture, and business-efficiency.[4] Certainly there are many social evils still unsuppressed in Protestant countries; yet the broad contrast remains. It is true that these things have to do mainly with the material side of life; yet after all, the social

[1] *Pope and People*, 17–21, 38, 71, 84; Lecky, *Rationalism*, ii. 29, 51; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 106, 191 f; Fawkes in *H.E.R.E.* ix (1917) 622a.

[2] Cf. e.g. Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 23–26, 76.

[3] Hase, *Handbook*, i. 392–396; Salmon, *Infall.* 470–473 (quoting Catholic evidence); Rockwell in *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 712b. Mr. Shane Leslie wittily treats the fact as irrelevant (in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 477), but does not deny its truth.

[4] Cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 196–198; Horton, *England's Danger*, viii, x, xiii, 7–16, 88 f. Tanquerey maintains (*Synops. Theol.* 530 f), though with some hesitation, that the reverse is the case. Leo XIII represented the Church as the champion of civil liberty (*Pope and People*, 102 f, 110 f, 130).

decencies and services of modern civilization are a part of what is required by the Christian ethic—else why feed the hungry and tend the sick? It is true that the comparative backwardness of the countries mentioned may conceivably be due to other causes than their religion;[1] yet the coincidence of their Catholicism and their backwardness is certainly striking. It is impossible to deny or ignore the fact that, even allowing for the far-reaching demoralization resulting from the Great War, the general level of public and private morality to-day is higher than it was in the Middle Ages, despite the enormous drop in the influence of the Roman Church. In the days of her power, the Church was partly unable and partly unwilling to solve the economic problems and remove the economic abuses of society, just as to-day she has not only achieved far less than Protestantism in the amelioration of social wrongs,[2] but—contenting herself with condemning socialism, reasserting the rights of property, and stating a number of other general propositions—she shows herself no more successful than the rest of humanity in discovering the solution of the pressing question of industrial peace and justice.[3]

Some Protestant controversialists have probably over-reached themselves in the way they have tried to rouse prejudice against Rome for claiming that the duty owed by Christians to the Church is more binding than that which they owe to the State. Objection to this claim is sometimes stated in such a way as to imply that the citizen's duty to obey the civil government under which he lives is an *absolute* duty, that is to say, that no other moral tie can take precedence of it. Such a view is no doubt what the secularist politician would like men generally to take: and the appeal for it, being virtually an appeal to patriotism (sometimes to chauvinism), can always be sure of a good deal of popular support. Yet it is clearly not a view which Free-Churchmen can defend. For them—as for Catholics—there are responsibilities more sacred than obedience to the laws of the State; and in this sense and to this extent the Catholic claim that Church takes precedence of State ought (the question of defining the Church apart) to command the concurrence and approval of all Christians, especially Free-Churchmen. At the same time, the protest launched against the doctrine in question has a certain justification. For the ulterior power which this doctrine

[1] Newman has a lecture urging this view ('The social state of Catholic countries no prejudice to the sanctity of the Church,' no. viii in the series *Certain Difficulties felt by Anglicans*, etc.). It is also advanced by Tanquerey (*Synops. Theol.* 530–532) and is re-echoed by Orchard (*Foundations*, iii. 54).

[2] Cardinal Manning, as is well known, complained bitterly of the general backwardness of Catholics in philanthropic movements (Purcell, *Manning*, ii. 781). Cf. Bain, *New Reformation*, 28 (quoting the Catholic Ehrhard), 248–250 (quoting an American Catholic).

[3] Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 147, 150 f.

enthrones above the State is, in effect, not the sacred voice of personal conviction, but virtually the dictation of another State—and that an alien one. When it was claimed that the Pope had the right to depose secular rulers and to release their subjects from their oaths of allegiance (as was done in the case of Queen Elizabeth), or to support tyrants against the well-merited resistance of their victims (as was done in the case of King John), then the assertion of ecclesiastical supremacy was naturally felt to be rather a political usurpation, than a safeguard of the rights of conscience. Moreover, the events of the not very distant past in certain countries seem to many not to justify any final certainty as to the political loyalty of zealous Catholics. In view of the fact that the Roman Church happens to-day to be powerless to interfere in any effective way between rulers and subjects, the modern Catholic explanations as to the practical harmlessness of the doctrine in question are naturally regarded as unsatisfying.

Finally, though the present-day Catholic can write confidently about 'the Catholic theory of the State,' no theory deserving such a name really exists. The Church's utterances down the ages have been, on the whole, neither uniform nor concrete: individual Catholics have given their support, some to autocratic despotism, some to democratic liberty. Not constancy of principle, but the call of circumstances, has governed the choice: and while the conditions of the modern world have shown the expediency of a certain general and stable attitude on the part of the Church towards the State, both mediaeval and modern history make it perfectly clear that Catholics are generally willing to make full use of whatever political means lie ready to their hand, for the purpose of strengthening and advancing the influence of their Church.

What then are we to conclude in regard to the 'holiness' of the Catholic Church, and in regard to her claim to be able to give infallible guidance in the sphere of morals? Let us recognize at the outset that the 'holiness' claimed for her certainly does not mean that all her members are free from sin. Catholic apologists have long been familiar with the necessity of distinguishing the perfect ideal of the Church from the more or less imperfect empirical reality.[1] There is need for constant endeavour to make the latter approximate as much as possible to the former[2]: but the existence of the gap between them is never denied. The presence of evil men in the Church is frankly admitted,[3] and the partial defection

[1] Moehler, *Symbolism*, 274–276; Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 265; Heiler, *Kathol.* 11, 140 (Dante), 332 f, 630–632 (quoting Moehler and Von Hügel), 636 f.

[2] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* XVI (quoting Father Andres), 636.

[3] *Conc. Trid.* sess. vi, can. 23 (Mirbt 302 [13]); *Catech. Rom.* I. x. 10 ("In Ecclesia Militante sunt et boni et mali"), 11 ("Neque bonos tantum, sed malos etiam complectitur, . . ."), 12, IV. xi. 23 (2).

of the Church from holiness declared to be a possibility.[1] Catholics are unable to deny—and do not attempt to deny—that at sundry times in the past, particularly in the period immediately preceding the Reformation, the Church was, as a matter of fact, in a grievously corrupt condition.[2] Nor are they concerned to deny that even in later times there is a large admixture of moral evil in the life of the Church.[3]

On the other hand, the claims of the Church to holiness and to infallibility in morals are sometimes, perhaps in deference to Protestant criticism, worded so modestly that they cease to affirm anything really remarkable or distinctive in the Catholic Church as contrasted with other bodies of Christians. Thus the moral indefectibility of the Church is expressed as follows: "in every age the lives of many of her children will be based on that sublime model" (Christ). ". . . Again and again she produces saints, . . ."; and Francis, Dominic, Philip Neri, Ignatius Loyola, and Alphonso dei Liguori are mentioned as typical examples. "When the Church points to sanctity as one of her notes, it is manifest that what is meant is a sanctity of such a kind as excludes the supposition of any natural origin. . . . It is not without reason that the Church of Rome claims to be holy in this sense . . . . at all times of the Church's history there have been many who have risen to sublime heights of self-sacrifice, of love to man, and of love to God."[4] Again: "the Roman conception of the note of *Sanctity* naturally lays stress upon the claim that the Catholic Church has at all periods, even those of the greatest corruption of morals, been the fruitful mother of children who, by their heroic virtue, by their devoted zeal in preaching the gospel to the heathen, and by miracles attested after judicial investigation by competent tribunals, have proved their acceptance with God and have been raised to the honours of canonization."[5] Putting aside the miracles (which we have discussed elsewhere, and which we decline to accept as certificates of moral worth) and the canonizations (which are domestic acts of the Roman communion), we find nothing here with which we should quarrel. Rome has indeed been the mother of saints: and we

[1] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 756ab.

[2] Cf. Salmon, *Infall.* 102 f (quoting Baronius); von Pastor in *Encyc. Brit.* xx. 707a, 709ab; Purcell, *Manning*, i. 642 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* XXVI (St. Bernard), 139 f (Dante); R. H. Murray in *Anglic. Ess.* 96 (quoting Lord Acton).

[3] E.g. Newman, *Apol.* 217 (vii) (". . . not of course denying the enormous mass of sin and ignorance which exists of necessity in the world-wide multiform communion").

[4] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 756b, 759ab (the context refers also to the good moral *doctrine* of the Church—a point which is dealt with separately below).

[5] Thurston in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 628b: also Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 521–527. Cf. the similar interpretation of the Roman claim by Oman in H.*E.R.E.* iii (1910) 622b. For the miracles, cf. Knox, *Belief of Caths.* 162 (". . . the one Church which has never ceased to believe in the permanent possibility of miracles—the note of Holiness").

recognize too that their sanctity has often been of a beautiful and peculiar type not easily paralleled outside her borders.[1] But the type of sanctity which she is peculiarly fitted to nourish is not the only type, nor necessarily the most perfect type. "One star differeth from another star in glory"; and there are varieties of Christian excellence which flourish far better outside the Catholic frontier than within it.[2] But to come back to the main point, if the production of Christian sainthood entitles the Roman Church to call herself 'holy,' there is scarcely a Christian sect anywhere that might not, by the same token, lay claim to the same august epithet: for there is no question that a level of Christian virtue quite as lofty as that of the Roman saints has again and again been reached by Protestant Christians of very varied types.

Again, what is the use of affirming that the Church is an infallible guide in morals, if we go on to say—when we find the Church committing terrible moral blunders—that "it is for the laying down of moral principles, not for the use of them, that infallibility is claimed"?[3] Who wants an infallible moral guide to lay down abstract moral principles for him? Men can do that perfectly well for themselves with the aid of conscience, experience, history, Scripture, and the good examples of others. For all agree that justice, and truth, and purity, and courage, and love have true moral value. On the other hand, when it comes to the application of these principles to the varied situations of practical life, problems and dilemmas arise thick and fast; and men with the best intentions are often so perplexed that they would be glad of the help of some reliable teacher to give them an authoritative solution of each ethical puzzle as it faces them. If it be admitted that the Church possesses no infallibility here, it is virtually admitted that she possesses no advantage over any other Christian body in the matter of ethical insight. Her infallibility in regard to the abstract principles of ethics may be ornamental, but—in a field where the average conscientious Christian can quite easily fend for himself—it is neither distinctive nor indispensable.

Unless therefore these claims advanced on behalf of the Church are to be written off as nugatory, they must clearly mean a good deal more than the apologists whom we have just quoted take them to mean. And, as a matter of fact, we find other Catholic apologists expressing the Church's claims in much more ambitious terms.

Thus, if the epithet 'holy' as applied to the Church is to mean anything distinctive, it must surely mean that the moral virtues of

[1] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 759b; Martineau, *Seat*, 152 f, 156; Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 396; Heiler, *Kathol.* 133 f; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 55–60.

[2] Martineau, *Seat*, 160 f; Coulton, in *Anglic. Ess.* 133 (see below, p. 637 n).

[3] So Father Leslie Walker, S.J., in Coulton and Walker, *Rom. Cath. Truth*, § 168.

Catholics, while admittedly not perfect, are *on the whole* markedly superior, not only to those of pagans, but to those of non-Catholic Christians also. The Lord's promise that the Gates of Hades should not prevail against His Church (Mt. xvi. 18) is declared to mean, not that every Catholic is a saint, "but *merely* that the Church, as a whole, will be *conspicuous* among other things for the holiness of life of her members."[1]

And again, if the claim to infallibility in morals is to be more than a mere pious phrase, it must surely mean that the Church possesses the power—not, of course, of securing every individual against a moral misjudgment—but at least of issuing right guidance to Christians on the main ethical problems of practical Christian conduct. That, needless to say, is how many Catholics regard it. "Though on a few broad principles," we are told, "there may be some consensus of opinion as to what is right and what is wrong, yet, in the application of these principles to concrete facts, it is impossible to obtain agreement." A number of obvious examples (property, marriage, and liberty) are adduced. "Amid all this questioning the unerring voice of the Church gives confidence to her children that they are following the right course, and have not been led astray by some specious fallacy."[2]

This, then, being the real meaning of the Church's claims, the history we have surveyed in these pages proves them both beyond question to be totally without foundation. When every reasonable allowance has been made for the complexity of the evidence and for possible unwitting over-statement of it, it yet remains as clear as any generalization in regard to history can be, that Catholics are not on the whole at all superior to Protestants in moral attainment.[3] The

[1] Toner in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 792b (italics mine). Cf. Oman in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 622b ("a sphere marked off for all from heathen and sinners"); Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 528–532; Heiler, *Kathol.* 636 f ("Gewiss, wenn der Katholizismus die allein wahre, heilige, übernatürliche Religion wäre, als die ihn seine Orthodoxie ausgibt, dann müsste er diese übernatürliche Wahrheit und Heiligkeit in der Wirklichkeit so erweisen, dass kein gutwilliger und vernünftiger Mensch daran zweifeln könnte. . . . Wenn wirklich allein in seinem eucharistischen Sakrament Christus gegenwärtig wäre, dann müssten die, welche täglich dieses Sakrament empfangen, überströmen vom Liebesgeist Christi").

[2] Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii (1908) 755a; cf. 756a ("It can never become corrupt in faith or in morals. . . . God . . . established it that it might be to all men the school of holiness. This it would cease to be if ever it could set up a false and corrupt moral standard"); Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 522; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 61.

[3] Cf. Trollope, *Barchester Towers*, ch. 21 ("Grant that there are, and have been, no bickerings within the pale of the Pope's Church. Such an assumption would be utterly untrue; but let us grant it, and then let us say which church has incurred the heavier scandals"); Martineau, *Seat*, 153 (". . . who can say that the Church has less to deplore within her pale that is offensive to her saints than in society around?"), 155, 159–161; Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, i. 237–239 ("There is nothing in the political history of Catholicism which suggests in the slightest degree that the spirit of Christ

suggestion sometimes advanced that Protestantism releases men from a number of the higher Christian duties which Catholicism calls upon them to fulfil, and so owes its popularity to its habit of making religion easier, is perfectly ludicrous. The reverse is really the case. Catholicism, with its doctrine of authority, its detailed organization, and its well-marked distinction between the easy moral minimum obligatory for the layman and the meritorious extra open to the 'religious,' reduces the difficulties of Christianity for the average man to a minimum, while, at the other pole, the Free Churches owe not a little of their numerical inferiority to the fact that their principles demand so much from their members in the way of intellectual and moral vigour.[1] The readiness with which the Catholic official spirit can give way before practical obstacles and abandon the plainest inferences drawn from Catholic principles, provided only those principles be accepted without qualification in the abstract, appears to Protestant minds to savour too much of moral compromise in the evil sense of that word.[2] Moreover, the Catholic Church as an institution normally shows, in the face of adverse criticism

has been the guiding principle in its councils. Its methods have, on the contrary, been more cruel, more fraudulent, more unscrupulous, than those of most secular powers. . . . It is increasingly difficult to find, in the lives of those who belong to any one denomination, proofs of marked superiority over other Christians . . . the evidence does not support the theory that we cannot be Christians unless we are Catholics . . ."); Heiler, *Kathol.* 637 (". . . die meisten frommen Katholiken sind nicht reinere, bessere und freiere Menschen als die Frommen anderer Religionen. Der Katholizismus kann seinen Absolutheitsanspruch in der Wirklichkeit des Lebens ebensowenig beweisen wie irgendeine andere Religion . . ."); Coulton in *Anglic. Ess.* 133 ("Judged by their fruits, they do not even rise a little above rival denominations; there are virtues shown by modern Anglicanism and Nonconformity and Agnosticism which rule out those exclusive St. Petrine claims as emphatically as history does"); id., *Rom Cath. Hist.* 14; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 54 (". . . the world's hatred is not always due to hostility to the holiness of the Church, but to indignation with its unholiness, on which it makes a pretence which is hypocritical, and claims a right to condemn which is intolerable"). Such statistics and other information in regard to crime—both in this country and America—as I have seen are very unfavourable to the claim of the Catholic Church to comparative holiness.

[1] Cf. Wilhelm in *Cath. Encyc.* xii (1911) 499ab; Hase, *Handbook*, i. xv f. On the two standards of ethics, cf. Hase, *Handbook*, ii. 40–48, 52; Martindale in *God and the Supernatural*, 38 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 435–450; C. J. Cadoux in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1923, 327–336.

[2] Cf. Fogazarro, *The Saint* (Eng. tr.) 291 (ch. vii) (papal apologia for not giving offence to average Catholics); L. Strachey, *Eminent Victorians*, 95 ("To this question" [of Gladstone's as to reliability of Catholics' civil allegiance after 1870] "the words of Cardinal Antonelli to the Austrian ambassador might have seemed a sufficient reply. 'There is a great difference,' said his Eminence, 'between theory and practice. No one will ever prevent the Church from proclaiming the great principles on which its Divine fabric is based; but, as regards the *application* of those sacred laws, the Church, imitating the example of its Divine Founder, is inclined to take into consideration the natural weaknesses of mankind'." Cf. Hase, *Handbook*, i. 297); L. Phillips in *Priests' Convention*, 62 f.

however courteously expressed, a pride and touchiness which accords but ill with the important Christian duty of humility.[1]

As for the pretence that the Catholic Church is a trustworthy guide for the solution of perplexing ethical problems, a Divinely appointed teacher able to pronounce infallibly on questions affecting Christian morals, one has only to recall how the Church counselled Christians to act in regard to heresy, witchcraft, and usury, to see that the claim to moral infallibility—if it means anything more than a knowledge of general principles such as all Christians share—is simply a hollow farce.

Various apologetic pleas have, of course, been advanced as to the significance of the Church's moral deficiencies. Newman dealt with them on the principle 'Corruptio optimi pessima': the horror of Catholic sin was enhanced, because it was always sin against the light.[2] More recently it has been argued that Churches with a long history are more liable to corruption than those of recent origin, that Rome included all baptized persons in her constituency, whereas the Free Churches admit only those who explicitly profess discipleship, and further that the Catholic Church had to supervise the application of Christian truth to the whole vast expanse of human relationships, and therefore was at a partial disadvantage as compared with small sects that have specialized in some few neglected points of Christian ethics.[3]

Now if it were our concern here to apportion the amount of blame due to the Catholic Church for her sins, excuses and defences of this kind would have to be taken into consideration: but for the particular point we are now discussing they are irrelevant. We have dwelt at some length and with some emphasis on the sins of Rome, not for the sake of finding fault or administering censure, but because the patent existence of these sins touches closely on our refusal to admit her claim to our obedience. It is all very well for Catholics to ascribe the evils we have mentioned to the sin and failure of individual human beings, and then to ask us to believe that, in spite of them, 'the Church' remains unsullied, holy, and infallible.[4] The content of this ideal concept, 'the Church,' is no doubt difficult to fix in precise terms: but if we cannot say, in regard to such unanimous and long-lived teachings as those concerned with the torture and burning of heretics and witches and the prohibition

[1] Heiler, *Kathol.* XXVI f: cf. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 63.

[2] Newman, *Apol.* 290 f (appx. 6).

[3] Cf. Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 54 f, 62.

[4] Cf. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 524; Faà di Bruno, *Cath. Belief*, 138 ("The Church cannot be held responsible for the conduct of bad Catholics, for they are bad inasmuch as they depart from the Catholic teaching and rule . . ."); Heiler, *Kathol.* 630–632 (quoting Cyprianus, Augustinus, Moehler, and Von Hügel).

of interest, that 'the Church' made herself responsible for them, then it is difficult to see anything whatever that could be truly predicated of her. If words mean anything, the guilt and error of these iniquities lie as much at the door of 'the Catholic Church' as they do at the door of any individual Pope or Inquisitor: and that being so, the doctrine that the Roman Church is, by comparison with other Christian bodies, morally holy and morally infallible is a pretence and a mockery. It is not at all a question of blaming or forgiving our Catholic brethren for the black things in their Church's past. There are black things in our own past also; and we have no more right to censure Catholics for the evil things in their Church's record than we should admit the right of Catholics to censure, say, modern Presbyterians for the bloody doctrines of John Knox. The evil deeds of the past, both among Catholics and Protestants, arose from the ignorance and sin of imperfect men. They were sometimes moved by unworthy motives; they were sometimes simply misguided; they were sometimes guiltily responsible for their own ignorance.

> Faults in the life breed errors in the brain,
> And these reciprocally those again.

It is not our business to attempt that which only the omniscience and perfect justice of God can compass, namely, to delimit the frontier between their sinfulness and their innocent ignorance. But it is our business to take warning from them, lest we too go astray as they did; and it is also our business to observe that the existence of these transgressions and shortcomings is absolutely fatal to Rome's persistent claim to a holiness of life which other Christian bodies do not share, and to an ethical infallibility inaccessible to all but herself.

PART V

THE FUTURE OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

CHAPTER XXVII

THE MOVEMENT FOR CORPORATE REUNION

In his chapter on 'Church-Clothes' in 'Sartor Resartus,' Carlyle says of them: "They are first spun and woven, I may say, by that wonder of wonders, Society; for it is still only when 'two or three are gathered together,' that Religion, spiritually existent, and indeed indestructible however latent, in each, first outwardly manifests itself (as with 'cloven tongues of fire'), and seeks to be embodied in a visible Communion and Church Militant. Mystical, more than magical, is that Communing of Soul with Soul, both looking heavenward: here properly Soul first speaks with Soul; for only in looking heavenward, take it in what sense you may, not in looking earthward, does what we call Union, mutual Love, Society begin to be possible. . . . Gaze thou in the face of thy Brother, in those eyes where plays the lambent fire of Kindness, . . . feel how thy own so quiet Soul is straightway involuntarily kindled with the like, and yet blaze and reverberate on each other, till it is all one limitless confluent flame, . . . and then say what miraculous virtue goes out of man into man. But if so, through all the thick-plied hulls of our Earthly Life; how much more when it is of the Divine Life we speak, and inmost me is, as it were, brought into contact with inmost Me."[1]

So it is that fellowship, in some shape or form, is an almost inseparable accompaniment of every effort to lead the Christian life. Even those who have felt moved to flee from the contaminations of the world into solitude, have tended to draw closer to one another in monastic groups and communities. There are, indeed, to-day many who are eager to follow Jesus, but who are so discouraged by the shortcomings of professed Christians that they have ceased in their impatience to take any personal interest in the corporate life of the churches: they regard these as so chronicly timid and conservative and even worldly-minded, that they have no hope of them as instruments whereby the Kingdom of God can be realized on earth.[2] Whatever sympathy may be owing to the practical and progressive energy of such people (and the present writer confesses to feeling not a little), one cannot but observe (1) that dissatisfaction with other professed Christians is not a sufficiently humble, and therefore not an adequate, ground for voluntary secession, and (2) that such voluntary secession is no way out of the difficulty,

[1] Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*, bk. iii, ch. 2.

[2] Such Church-less Christianity can appeal to the authority, among others, of John Locke (A. C. Fraser, *Locke*, 261).

for (a) it discourages the progressive Christians who remain in the Church, and (b) it isolates and therefore weakens the seceder.[1] In a word, if Christians, then members of a Christian Society.

It is a true instinct that tells us, not only that Christian discipleship involves association with a society of disciples, that is, with a Church, but also that, in the nature of the case, there can—in the deepest and truest sense of the word—be only One such society, only One Christian Church. The present state of things may seem to flout any such notion; yet the notion persists. Inasmuch as there is but one God, and one Lord Jesus Christ, one human race and one moral law, so quite obviously, however appearances may contradict it, there can be only one Church. The proposition is so simple and incontrovertible that there is no need to labour it further.

Seeing, however, that bodies of Christians are, as a matter of fact, dissociated from one another, there is every reason why much discontent should be felt and expressed at the discrepancy between this state of things and the ideal unity that should embrace all the followers of Jesus, as well as at the inefficiency and disrepute which the Church's divided condition entails. In other words, the discontent is a Divine discontent; and the movement prompted thereby towards corporate reunion ought therefore to be regarded not simply as useful, but—so far as its purpose and spirit are concerned—as due to the influence of the Holy Spirit of God.[2] Nothing is more unworthy and deplorable than to treat difficulties and disagreements over particular proposals as a ground for deprecating the whole movement as uncalled for, and even ascribing its origin to a cunningly concealed desire to dominate.

Not only has the Reunion-movement a real claim upon our sympathy as the fruit of the Spirit's workings; but it presents a real challenge to our courage in face of the overwhelming difficulties which beset its path. We ought not to shut our eyes to difficulties, but neither ought we to allow them to defeat us. Christianity contemplates and provides for the removal of mountainous obstacles: and the Christian must not set limits to what is possible to the grace of God when it finds a sufficiently large response in the surrendered hearts of men. The ideal of the Kingdom of God as the reign of social righteousness seems immeasurably far away, when we look at the actual condition of the world: yet

[1] Cf. Coleridge, *Church and State*, 194: ". . . even grievous evils and errors may exist that do not concern the nature or being of a Church, and . . . they may even prevail in the particular Church, to which we belong, without justifying a separation from the same, and without invalidating its claims on our affection as a true and living part of the Church Universal."

[2] So the Free-Church Council *Reply* of 22 Sept. 1925 to the *Lambeth Appeal*, § V: "Believing that the Spirit of God is, in these days, manifestly drawing more closely together all who name the Name of Christ as Lord and Saviour," etc. etc. Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 653 f.

it is the inspiration of countless lives, the mainspring of a vast amount of noble and fruitful service. The obstacles in the way of Christian unity, great and formidable as they are, can hardly be described as greater than those that hinder the realization of our social ideal: why should it be any less worth while to think and pray and work for it than to labour for the social rights of man? God has spoken to our hearts, and bidden us bestir ourselves over our weakened and disunited state. Our part must be—not to foreclose discussion and experiment by saying that union will never be possible—but to take up and carry forward the search, not feverishly, yet not slackly, neither betraying the truth we know, nor shutting our eyes to the truth others know, without blindness to the facts, but also without despair. Only so can our prayer be granted, that God's Will may be done on earth.

It is not always a sign of cowardice to urge that 'the better part of valour is discretion': and probably all would agree that they who help most to clarify their own thoughts and those of others, serve the cause of true Reunion best. It becomes necessary, therefore, to approach the subject not only with a loving heart, but also with an analytic mind. And the first thing that this means is the question, In what sense precisely is the Church of Jesus Christ one, or rather in what way is she not now one, but ought to and might be so? There are many ways in which the oneness of the Church might be conceived; and it is important to determine which of these is the true way.

Now the most obvious form of unity for a society of human beings is that they should be officially grouped together and uniformly governed in a single business-organization.[1] This might be secured—at least in large measure—by the federation of existing Christian groups under a central unifying bureau with real and wide, if carefully defined, powers of control. There have been eminent Christians who have pleaded that the way to unity lies along this line.[2] To many others, however, it has appeared that a merely federal unity, seeing that it would still leave visible a good many marks of division, would reflect the Church's ideal unity very insufficiently, and that this last demands nothing less than a mutual amalgamation or absorption, a combination or corporate reunion, such as would leave visible only a single body, whatever variety its different activities and manifestations might still exhibit.[3] The confidence with which this quite plausible view is held derives strong reinforcement, in the minds of most of those who hold it, from the fact that the Church in New-Testament times was a cor-

[1] Cf. Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 7, 35.

[2] Cf. Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 41 ff, 48 ff, 96–120.

[3] E.g. Stanton, *Authority*, 199; Clayton in *Congress-Report 1920*, 102; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 90, 111.

porate unity—at least in the sense of being free from those sectarian divisions that are so much of a problem to-day. Loyalty to New-Testament ideals being the major premise, corporate reunion as the objective for to-day might well seem to follow as an unquestionable conclusion.

If this notion of unity be accepted as a valid starting-point, it immediately becomes necessary to consider whether the Church of Rome—as the largest of all existing Christian bodies, and as standing formally in the direct line of succession from the Church of Apostolic times—may not be the only possible basis for reunion to-day. There is indeed much that points in the direction of this primâ facie view. Needless to say, Romanists themselves take it for granted.[1] But there are a great many non-Romanists also who are so impressed with the strong and great things in the Roman system that they regard this system as the only possible rallying-centre for the scattered sects of Christendom.[2] It is, indeed, fairly obvious to all that any scheme of corporate reunion which should finally exclude Rome would by that very fact proclaim itself to be a failure.[3] Furthermore Protestantism, looked at as a whole, appears unable to offer the slightest guarantee of furnishing a stable and practical basis for the reunion of all Christians. However precious the values which it seeks to guard, the attempt to build with them seems almost indistinguishable from a standstill.[4] Protestantism, we are told, possesses no instrument of authority comparable to that of Rome, whereby even its own doctrines can be known:[5] it is hopelessly disunited;[6] it "has worked itself out, . . . For indeed the Catholic ideal is the true one"[7]; "there is no future before Protestantism as such."[8] Rome, on the other hand, is recognized, as being at least a *part* of the true Catholic Church, by all Christians, except perhaps (theoretically) by the backward Eastern Church[9] (which is already honeycombed with

[1] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 13, 657: see also below, p. 648.

[2] This may almost be said to be a standing feature of the Anglo-Catholic position (Walsh, *Oxf. Movement*, 106, 165, 196, 205, 217, 228; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 172 top; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 20 f). But cf. also Heiler, *Kathol.* 656–658, and especially Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 46–48 (". . . The Roman Church can be admitted to be formally *the* Catholic Church, . . . We can therefore hold that Rome is the true Church, . . .").

[3] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 657 f.

[4] Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 260–264 (". . . Wood, hay and stubble are abundant. By using them progress, visible for the blindest eyes, can be made when otherwise it would be hidden from the keenest . . .").

[5] Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 186.

[6] *Op. cit.* 71 f, 76 f: cf. Tanquerey, *Synops. Theol.* 510 f, 513, 528.

[7] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 166. Cf. *Times Lit. Suppt.* 8 May 1924, 276 (". . . the reconstruction of Christianity effected by the Reformers in the sixteenth century has ceased to be tenable . . .").

[8] H. M. Relton in *Rev. of the Churches*, July 1926, 388; cf. 389. Cf. also F. J. Hall in *Congress-Report 1923*, 153 ("we cannot . . . regard their" [Nonconformists'] "enjoyment of God's blessing as evidence that nonconformity as such fulfils the purpose of Christ").

[9] Cf. Woodlock, *Modernism*, 29 n., 76, 79.

Roman influence) and a quite inconsiderable percentage of Protestants.[1] It is also very widely felt that Christendom as a whole stands in need of certain forms and ideals of Church-life which Catholicism is better able to supply than Protestantism, so that the ideally reunited Church would need to be built by Catholic as well as Protestant hands.[2] The Anglican Church, and in particular the Anglo-Catholic section of it, while refusing to come to the point of admitting the Pope's sweeping demands, has sufficient ground in common with papalism, and sufficient esteem for it, to cast many a wistful look Romewards and engage in many a 'conversation' with Roman statesmen.[3]

It is not, of course, for any man lightly to dogmatize as to what is, and what is not, possible in the future. We have a proverb which tells us that it is always the unexpected that happens. Especially cautious should we be of making definite judgments concerning factors so incalculable as human minds reacting to the stimulus of the Spirit of God. At the same time, there are certain well-understood limits of meaning, within which positive pronouncements may legitimately be offered and, whether they meet with agreement or disagreement, will be neither misunderstood with regard to their range, nor resented for being formally 'ultra vires.' Speaking κατὰ ἄνθρωπον in this sense, we may say with confidence that the Roman Church, as a suggested basis or centre for Christian reunion, is—so far as Protestants are concerned—definitely and finally impossible.[4] If the quintessence of Christianity is to be seen only where Romanists claim to be able to show it, that is to say, in the Roman Church, then

> The pillar'd firmament is rottenness,
> And earth's base built on stubble!

And so far as anything in human affairs can be declared to be final and certain, we do declare definitely and finally that we will never abandon the freedom with which Christ has made us free, or put our necks again beneath the crushing yoke of Rome.

This we would declare with solemn emphasis and even with intense

[1] Dr. Forsyth was not representing the normal Protestant view when he wrote: "it costs us as much to admit Catholic orders as it costs them to admit ours" (*Ch. and Sacraments*, 100).

[2] Heiler, *Kathol.* 61, 643 f, 704 (note to S. 644).

[3] For the 'conversations,' see—among other literature—Coulton, *Death-Penalty*, 39–45; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 89; *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1926, 610–612; Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 98; E. Hirsch in *Theol. Litzg.* 1928. 4. 86–89; Sir H. Lunn in *Rev. of the Churches*, Apl. 1928, 163–168; R. E. G. George in *op. cit.* 210–214.

[4] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 13, 655 n. (quoting Söderblom); Rawlinson, *Authority*, 37, 175 f; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 63, 83 f (on the sense in which, and the extent to which, it is still necessary to brand Rome as Antichrist).

passion; but we do not "fill the mouth of deep defiance up" in the spirit of those who think to add impressiveness to their speech by speaking with closed eyes. Before committing this declaration to writing, we have filled many hundred pages with reasons for it. Reduced to a single sentence, those reasons are—that the theory of authority on which the Roman system is built is, philosophically considered, demonstrably unsound and untenable, that the views of history to which Rome and her children are committed are demonstrably untruthful, and that not her bloody persecutions alone, but her evasive modern apologies for them, and in addition her doctrine of eternal punishment, flout the sentiments of human justice and thereby do despite to the righteousness and love of God, while her ethical attainments generally prove her claim to special holiness and to infallibility in morals to be a hollow sham. And, as if all that were not more than enough to justify our refusal to submit to her demands, she treats all Christians outside her own pale as outside the true Church, refuses them all real recognition and fellowship, forbids her members to pray and worship with them, and declines to have anything whatever to do with their common efforts after Christian unity, other than giving them to understand that the only proper way for them to reach that unity is by submitting to herself.[1] There are, of course, many catholic-minded people—principally, of course, Anglo-Catholics—who speak and write as if they were entertaining the hope that Rome will some day, if not in the near future, change her attitude, and admit them to her Sacraments and her priesthood on other and easier terms than those of unconditional surrender. They speak of Rome having 'not yet' conceded this or that point.[2] That Rome should concede some of these necessary points is, indeed, a consummation devoutly to be wished. Having regard to the endless resources of Divine Grace, we ought not to declare that it is hopeless or impossible. Nor shall we cease to labour and to plead that the Divine Grace may have freer course in the counsels of Rome and be glorified. But in laying our plans for the welfare of the Church, we cannot overlook the fact that Rome glories in her rigidity and unchangeableness, and has done her best to make any real reform of herself an impossibility. The expectation, therefore, that Rome is going to 'come round' is not practical politics.[3] Her dogmas make our union with her impossible, and she has declared that she will never change them. Some suggest

[1] On the narrow exclusiveness of post-Tridentine Rome as justifying the existence of Protestantism, see Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 60 f.

[2] Cf. E. M. Milner-White in *Congress-Report 1920*, 86–89; *Anglic Ess.* vii f.

[3] Cf. Rev. P. H. Malden, *Anglo-Caths.* passim; Heiler, *Kathol.* 345 ("Die Geschichte von Papstum und Kurie in den letzten sechs Jahrhunderten spricht fast einhellig gegen die Hoffnung auf eine umfassende Erneuerung der äusseren Kircheninstitution des Katholizismus"); Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 61 f, 127.

that her dogmas should be, not abandoned (for to abandon them would be 'infra dignitatem'), but reinterpreted or explained in such a way as to remove the barriers between ourselves and her.[1] But this—even were Rome willing to do it—would involve such a deal of hair-splitting and artificiality that the whole proceeding would be robbed of all moral dignity. Visions, therefore, of a reunited Christendom, in which Protestantism and Roman Catholicism are both harmoniously synthetized in a single organization—however real the value of such visions as abstract ideals may be[2]—resemble not so much the distant heights of a slope we have already begun to climb, but rather a far point in space whither neither feet nor wings can carry us.

While therefore it is clear that the ideal unity of the Christian Church ought to be better expressed than is done at present, it is, if anything, even more clear that corporate reunion with the Church of Rome, that is to say, submission to her, is, as things stand, quite out of the question. It might seem at first blush as if the conflict between these two convictions was so direct that one or other of them must be mistaken. That would be the case, however, only if our conception of the Church's unity were tied down to the notion of one single outwardly unified business-organization, governed by a uniform constitution and from a single centre. That is, indeed, as was said above, the most obvious form for our idea about unity to take: but it is by no means the only possible form; it is not *necessarily* the right and best form; and the intransigeance of Rome shows that, placed as we are, it is not in actual fact right and best. The absolute necessity of preserving our constitutional independence of Rome compels us to look for, and to work out, some form of Church-unity under which that independence will not be imperilled.[3]

Before we proceed to discuss further the possibility of some such alternative ideal, it will be well to test our tentative theory as to the need of it, by considering the claims so energetically advanced in these days on behalf of the Church of England. There is a great deal that can be said in support of the plea that she provides the one possible rallying-centre for the broken squadrons of the Christian army; and this constitutes

[1] Cf. 'Romanus' in *Contemp Rev.* Dec. 1897, 859 f; F. J. Hall in *Congress-Report 1923*, 156 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* 658 n.; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 47 f: also Bartlet's criticism of Orchard in *Christian World*, 27 May 1926, 10.

[2] See E. M. Milner-White in *Congress-Report 1920*, 86–96; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 57, 61 f, 109; Heiler, *Kathol.* 337–340 (a striking and beautiful imaginative description of what a genuine 'papa angelico' might do towards the reunion of Christendom—summarized by Rawlinson, *Authority*, 48–53). Cf. also J. K. Mozley in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 517 (quoting O. C. Quick's *Cath. and Prot. Elements in Christianity*); K. D. Mackenzie, *The Confusion of the Churches*, 227.

[3] On the error of assuming that the Church's unity *must* involve the submission of all to a uniform discipline, cf. Patrick, *Apology of Origen*, 323 f.

at least a strong primâ facie case for taking the Anglican position as the best practical basis for Christian Reunion.[1]

Foremost among the titles of the Church of England in this regard is the comprehensiveness of her character. Her way is the 'Via Media,' not in the sense that she abandons Catholicism on the one hand and Protestantism on the other, but that—by deriving her continuous life from that type of Christianity which preceded the divergence of these two—she is able to transcend the discrepancy between them, and so, while excluding their extreme modern developments, to comprehend the essence of them both. Hence she offers herself to-day, as the body uniquely qualified to act as mediator between the episcopal and the non-episcopal sections of the Church, between Rome at the one extreme and the Society of Friends at the other.[2] Though unwilling to submit to the rigid and exacting demands of Rome as Rome now is, and consequently unrecognized by that great Christian body, she has insisted all along on her status as a living and true 'Branch' of the one Holy Catholic Church. Even at the risk of further alienating the Free Churches for a time, or at least of making closer relations with them more difficult, she refuses to abandon her hope that Rome may some day be reunited with the rest of Christendom, and that she herself may be privileged to play the part of mediator in the great reconciliation. Her Catholicism, it is claimed, rests on quite a different theory of authority from the despotic dogmatism of Rome: it has no quarrel with the principle of intellectual liberty, and is prepared to abide the judgment of the untrammelled Christian reason. So far from resting on a basis of conservative obscurantism, it has been and is being expounded to us by some of the best scholars in the English Church.[3] On the other hand, this Church has room for large numbers of men of very pronounced evangelical views, who regard Romanism with horror, but whom even enthusiastic Anglo-Catholics profess to have no desire to turn out of the Church.[4] Further than that, the 'Lambeth Appeal' of 1920 and Dr. A. C. Headlam's 'Bampton Lectures' of the same year[5] inaugurated

[1] Cf. Stanton, *Authority*, 204 (". . . the duty of Nonconformists to become reunited to the Catholic Church, and of striving with us to make it a little less unlike Christ's design"), 205 ("we maintain the principle that the Christians of the same place, the same race, the same nation ought not to be divided against themselves, and this is the Church of the English nation").

[2] Cf. Freeman, *Authority*, 69, 77, 92 f; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 105 f; *Anglic. Ess.* v (". . . It is not too much to say that never before in the history of Anglicanism was the value of its mediating position so evident"); *Times Lit. Suppt.* 22 Feb. 1923, 117; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 181, 183; Lacey, *Anglo-Cath. Faith*, 9 f.

[3] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 174 f, 182.

[4] F. Underhill in *Congress-Report 1920*, 80. Cf. also Rawlinson, *Authority*, 182 (on the impossibility of purging the Church of England of Anglo-Catholicism).

[5] *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion.*

a new epoch, by recognizing all baptized believers in Jesus Christ as having a place alongside of Anglicans in the one true Church,[1] and their accredited ministers, even if not episcopally ordained, as possessing a true and valid Christian ministry. There were many qualifications and refinements as to the significance of this recognition and as to its theoretical and practical implications[2]; but there can be no question as to the scholarly and statesmanlike thoroughness of Dr. Headlam's pleading and as to the fine Christian idealism of the Lambeth debates and decisions. Nor ought Protestants to be over-hasty in condemning the Anglican hope of ultimate reunion with Rome, and in taking alarm at the 'conversations' held between Anglican and Roman officials. Individual Anglo-Catholics may from time to time go over to Rome, just as individual Christians of other denominations do; and others of them may talk as if Rome were some day going to climb down. But Rome does not accord to the Church of England even as much recognition as she does to the schismatic Churches of the East, whose ministerial orders at least she recognizes as valid; while representative Anglicans on their part have repeatedly declared that there can be no possibility of union with Rome until Rome is other than she is, that is to say, they are waiting for a forward step which Rome shows not the slightest sign of ever taking. Meantime, the validity of Anglican orders is recognized both by the Eastern Orthodox Church,[3] which has played an active part in recent conferences on Reunion, and by virtually all bodies of Free-Churchmen. Anglican clergymen do not, in point of fact, preach the Word and administer the Sacraments in non-episcopal churches; but this is due almost entirely to their unwillingness (of course, for official reasons) to do so, very partially to the narrow sympathies of some Free-Church people, and not at all to any Free-Church theory as to the invalidity or irregularity of Anglican orders. The profession of the Bishops at Lambeth, therefore, that they and their clergy would accept from the authorities of non-episcopal communions "a form of commission or recognition which would commend our ministry to their congregations,"[4] though intelligible as part of the general scheme of Reunion which they contemplated, seems to have been based on a misunderstanding, so far as the Free-Church theory of the ministry is concerned. Were Anglican ministers really willing to do so, they might enter scores, if not hundreds, of nonconformist pulpits by the simple invitation of nonconformist ministers and congregations. No "form of

[1] Freeman had previously (1913) suggested this recognition from the Anglican standpoint (*Authority*, 68 f).

[2] See below, pp. 670–674.

[3] Sir H. Lunn in *Rev. of the Churches*, Apl. 1926, 201. cf. *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 29 f, 47, 92, 101 f.

[4] *Lambeth Appeal*, viii.

commission or recognition" would be necessary: the needful recognition of ministerial validity is already there.[1]

Nevertheless, it has to be said that, in spite of occupying this advantageous position, the Church of England cannot, as things are, furnish the basis for a corporately reunited Church. Not only is Rome quite unlikely to go back on the papal decree of 1896, 'Apostolicae Curae,' which declared Anglican orders invalid and which therefore put the Church of England outside Roman Catholicism almost as completely and hopelessly as other Protestants are outside it; but the Free Churches also are altogether unable to comply with the Anglican conditions of a close official union. The reasons for this latter inability do not lie in the nonconformist distaste for the richness of Anglican ritual, as many superficial observers might suppose. People are coming to see that differences over what are merely forms of worship are not fundamental. The degree of richness employed in the ritual of worship is largely a matter of differing tastes and consequently differing needs; and many staunch nonconformists have in recent years introduced not a little of the dignity and formality of High Anglican usage into their services. Nor is the connexion of the Church of England with the State the real barrier: for, though it contradicts Free-Church theory directly, yet it is removable by legislation and its removal is eagerly desired and sought by many within the Church itself.

The real causes of separation lie deeper—in the exclusiveness of Anglican theories touching the constitution and government of the Church. This exclusiveness is manifested

(1) in the insistence on a credal test as a condition of membership in the Church. It must be borne in mind that the question here is not whether the Church should teach a creed, or even what creed she should teach, but whether she should require, as a condition of membership, the acceptance of a creed (understood as a group of written doctrines, professing to explicate, and therefore distinguishable from, that simple profession of faith in Jesus Christ, without which the very question of a Church of Jesus Christ could not arise). The Society of Friends since its inception, and the Congregational and Baptist bodies almost since theirs, have refused to adopt such a procedure, however plausible its claims, as the right basis on which to build up the Christian Church.[2] Their reasons for this refusal have not always been clearly under-

[1] *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 50, 69 f (". . . we did not suppose that our ministerial order would be seriously questioned by the non-episcopal communions . . ."), 114 top; Baptist *Reply to Lambeth Appeal*, in *Rev. of the Churches*, July 1926, 456b ("We gladly acknowledge the reality of the ministry of our Anglican brethren, whose representative Bishops have similarly acknowledged the reality of our ministry. This mutual recognition is significant and full of hope").

[2] Dale, *Congregational Principles*, 183–190; cf. 48, 166 f, 204.

stood and worked out and expressed: but we have shown above that they rest on a perfectly sound instinct and are capable of being cogently defended. The credal test is not only disadvantageous in practice, but, being incompatible with the truth of things in regard to authority in religion, is mistaken in principle.[1] Here then is the great barrier to any official rapprochement between the Church of England and some at least of the great Free-Church bodies. A credal test as a condition of membership appears in Anglican eyes so unquestionable a necessity for the Christian Church that it is taken for granted in all Anglican statements in regard to Reunion; and one rarely, if ever, sees an Anglican (or Catholic) defence of it which shows any understanding of the inwardness of the Congregational refusal of it, or goes much beyond the declaration that such a test is obviously necessary.[2] Yet the abandonment of it has not prevented Congregationalist and Baptist Christians from maintaining for over three centuries so strong and clear a grasp of the evangelical faith that in 1920 a conference of Anglican Bishops at Lambeth was ready to recognize these bodies as parts of the true Church and their ministers as true Christian ministers. Nor has the retention of the credal test availed to preserve the Anglican Church from the inroads of modern criticism, insomuch that many of her clergy and laity are now in the unhappy position of having solemnly and repeatedly to declare their belief in sundry statements which they do not believe, and then of having to justify their position by dubious, or at least unfortunate, casuistical arguments. The credal test has rent Christendom without safeguarding orthodoxy.

(2) A similar, if apparently minor, obstacle is the Anglican view of Baptism as a sine-quâ-non of Church-membership.[3] Here again, it is important to grasp the precise point. The question is not whether it is a fact that our Lord enjoined baptism or that the Holy Spirit guided the Church in her adoption of it: the question is, what is to be done with good Christians (like Quakers and Salvationists) who either do not think so or are on some other ground convinced that they are under no obligation to baptize or be baptized. Anglican theory definitely and finally excludes them. Some of the broader Anglicans would like to borrow the Catholic theory of the 'Baptism of Desire' or the 'Baptism of the Spirit' as a means of enabling them to include Quakers among the baptized:[4] but the theory is far too tenuous, too scantily held, and

[1] See above, pp. 227–251.

[2] E.g. Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 238 f; E. M. Milner-White in *Congress-Report 1920*, 88; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 67 f, 111 f; F. T. Woods in *Construct. Quart.* Sept. 1921, 386; H. L. Clark in *Anglic. Ess.* 286 f.

[3] *Lambeth Appeal*, intro.; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 68.

[4] Cf. C. J. Cadoux in *Construct. Quart.* Mar. 1922, 9.

too much like a legal fiction to bridge the gulf. If it be held to bridge the gulf, then the Anglican Church ought quite frankly to abandon her insistence on the *necessity* of baptism as a condition of membership. If it does not bridge the gulf, then we are landed in the anomalous position of having to refuse a place within the reunited Church to numbers of good Christians who are fully worthy to be within it.[1] The present writer was once privileged to converse with one of the Bishops who had enthusiastically voted for the famous 'Lambeth Appeal.' When asked what was to be done with the Quakers, his Lordship could but reply with a sigh and a shrug. Ought not the impasse to which Anglican logic has led to suggest to its defenders that there may be something wrong with their premises?[2]

(3) A third hindrance of a less definite, but no less serious kind, is the superior attitude which High-Church principles almost compel Anglicans to take up towards nonconformists,[3] and, as a kind of logical extension of this attitude, the positive antipathy professed by Anglo-Catholics against Protestantism. There is here more than mere heartfelt regret that at the Reformation the Church was divided: there is a definite dislike of the Reformation as such and a failure to appreciate the characteristic values for which it stood and which, however imperfectly, it helped to preserve.[4] The 'Lambeth Appeal' of 1920, even including all its qualifications and limitations, is very far from representing the unanimous feeling of the Church of England, and in any case was of a purely advisory and non-legislative character. The question is being gravely asked whether the Church of England can be regarded any longer as Protestant in any real sense.[5] It was stated at the Anglo-Catholic Congress of 1920 that both the Church of England and the Church of Rome "grasp the meaning and the glory of the word *Church* in such a way as to make Protestantism seem almost another religion."[6] In October 1925, 'The Church Times,' while recognizing that the grace of God operated in many members of "separated bodies," added: "But such grace in associated individuals does not make the body resulting from their voluntary association a Church in the Catholic sense."[7] In 1913–1914, a serious hubbub was created in the Church

[1] For an Anglican appreciation of Quakerism, see K. D. Mackenzie, *Confusion of the Churches*, 115–119.

[2] Bartlet, *Validity*, 15 f. [3] Cf. H. L. Stewart in *Hibb. Journ.* July 1920, 683.

[4] Hurrell Froude wrote privately: "Really I hate the Reformation and the Reformers more and more" (Ollard, *Anglo-Cath. Revival*, 38). Per contra, A. Hamilton Thompson in *Ess. Cath. and Crit.* 346.

[5] Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 3; Congregational *Reply to Lambeth Appeal*, § 5 (asks whether the reunited Church "would continue to be loyal to the sound principles of the Reformation . . ."). Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 642.

[6] E. M. Milner-White in *Congress-Report 1920*, 88.

[7] *Church Times*, 2 Oct. 1925, 365 f.

of England by the action of some Anglican Bishops in Africa admitting a number of non-episcopalian missionaries and their unconfirmed converts to Holy Communion in the Presbyterian Church at Kikuyu. To give the Communion to unconfirmed 'schismatics' was mentioned at the Congress of 1920 as a typical violation of discipline.[1] A proposal to recognize nonconformist orders as in some sense valid, though irregular, is said to have been put forward at the Lambeth Conference of 1888, but not to have been allowed either to get a hearing or to appear in the official report; and the incident is alluded to apparently as a ground for satisfaction by Dr. Gore in the 1900 edition of his 'Roman Catholic Claims.'[2] In 1920, just when the Lambeth Conference of that year was about to issue its broad appeal, the Anglo-Catholic Congress was told that 'the Sacrament of Holy Order' did not belong to the nonconformist ministry—"a ministry which we treat with such respect as it deserves, but which is of another kind from the Ministry of the Catholic Church."[3] It is, of course, true that these exclusive tendencies —in particular the desire for closer relations with Rome—are warmly opposed by both the Evangelical[4] and the Modernist sections of the Church of England, the former at least including a very large proportion of the rank and file of the laity. But it must be admitted that the Anglo-Catholics (whatever may be the case with their ritualistic excesses) have, in their exclusive views touching the Church and the Ministry, the letter of the law on their side. And if this be the attitude of the Church of England towards Protestantism and nonconformity, its attitude to modernism is not likely to be more hospitable and appreciative. There is, of course, quite a considerable section of the Church of England which frankly calls itself Modernist,[5] just as there is in most of the Free-Church bodies. Despite the fact that the word 'modernism' does not lend itself to exact definition, and that it is still less possible to specify any fixed or limited set of doctrines as characteristically modernist, it may safely be said that much of the untrammelled quest for truth along the lines of historical, literary and philosophical research must undoubtedly fall within the generally accepted denotation of the term 'modernism.' That being so, the presence of a strong group of Modernists in the Church of England cannot but be a matter of rejoicing for all who realize the need of the untrammelled search in question. At the same time, the apparent inconsistency between advocating modernist views and holding office (or even membership) in a Church

[1] L. Pullan in *Congress-Report 1920*, 76 f. [2] Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 18 f.
[3] Bishop of Zululand in *Congress-Report 1920*, 47; cf. 46.
[4] Cf. Rigg in *Expos. Times*, Apl. 1927, 309 f.
[5] Two volumes have recently been published expounding the views of this group —Dr. P. Gardner's *Modernism in the English Church* (in 'The Faiths,' pubd. by Methuen), and Dr. H. D. A. Major's *English Modernism: its Origin, Methods, Aims* (Milford)—both 1927.

which professedly and palpably bases itself on the acceptance of certain written creeds (some at least of the clauses of which are now by many modernists discarded) has never been quite satisfactorily cleared up.[1] Meantime, though the Anglican Modernists are too strong to be turned out of the Church,[2] their views are anathema to the powerful Anglo-Catholic party[3] and to a considerable extent to the Evangelical Anglicans also.

Seeing, therefore, that the strongest and best-organized group in the Church of England repudiates modernism, nonconformity, and even Protestantism, utterly refuses in any way to broaden its basis,[4] and is straining at the leash in the direction of Rome, the acknowledgment (on both sides) of a great gulf fixed and of the virtual impossibility of corporate union, would seem to rest on an accurate diagnosis of the facts.[5] "Events are slowly but surely moving," writes a Congregational leader, "towards the discovery of new lines of cleavage in the Christian Church. All minor distinctions are being merged in the cardinal issue between the Catholic and Protestant positions. Our Churches at least are irrevocably committed to Protestantism. . . ."[6]

(4) It is against the background sketched in the immediately preceding pages—more particularly in the immediately preceding paragraphs—that the Reunion-discussions in recent years in regard to episcopacy have to be viewed. Otherwise, i.e. if the steady refusal of the Free Churches to accept episcopacy as a step towards Reunion is regarded

[1] See above, pp. 238–240.

[2] Cf. J. K. Mozley in *Rev. of the Churches*, Apl. 1927, 180: "I do not suppose that even radical Modernism is likely to be excluded by official action from the Church of England. That does not mean that it can claim as a right a place within the Church. Bishop Welldon stoutly and reasonably denies that right. But it is one thing to sanction heresy and another to tolerate the presence within the Church of those who, even in what seem to be denials rather than re-interpretations of the historic faith, claim that what they are attempting to do is to commend the substance though not the form of that faith to their generation."

[3] Cf. Stockley in *Priests' Convention*, 107 f; Moxon, *Modernism*, passim.

[4] Cf. Rev. G. N. Whittingham in *Priests' Convention*, 198: "What he would chiefly urge, however, was that one outcome of their gathering should be not that they should 'broaden their basis' (Heaven forbid!) but that they should be ready to recognize," etc., etc.

[5] Cf. G. H. Clayton in *Congress-Report 1920*, 103 ("For while some of our fellow-Christians do reject the whole conception of Catholic order, there are others who do not. . . . It is with them that we are concerned. As to the others, we are bound to observe the most scrupulous courtesy and charity; but there can be no question of corporate reunion with them. It is the business of our scholars to show them that they are wrong. It is the business of us all to win them by the fruits of our work and the holiness of our lives"); *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 110 ("Of the barriers between us and our Anglo-Saxon kith and kin of the Free Churches, it is difficult to speak with wisdom *and patience* . . .": italics mine). Note also the tone in which Dr. Arnold's project for union with the Dissenters is referred to by Canon Ollard (*Anglo-Cath. Revival*, 19, 25).

[6] Selbie, *Freedom*, 39.

in isolation from its context, it not unnaturally wears in the eyes of some the appearance of a dogged and unreasoning insistence on petty sectional independence, a blindness to the clear need and reasonable demand of the Christian community as a whole, an obstinate refusal to give way on what is after all only a matter of organization and procedure.[1]

It is, indeed, true that, in the course of the discussions referred to, the claims of episcopacy have often been advanced in extremely tolerant and reasonable terms and in a form calculated to attract the consent of all peace-loving Christians. Thus, in the 'Lambeth Appeal' these claims were based, not on any explicit theory of sacramental validity, but on "considerations alike of history and of present experience," and on the view that episcopacy "is now and will prove to be in the future the best instrument for maintaining the unity and continuity of the Church."[2] It was furthermore clearly stated in the 'Appeal' that, in accepting the scheme for mutual recognition which would involve episcopal reordination for Free-Church ministers, "no one of us could possibly be taken to repudiate his past ministry. God forbid that any man should repudiate a past experience rich in spiritual blessings for himself and others. . . . We shall be publicly and formally seeking additional recognition of a new call to wider service in a reunited Church," and so on.[3] In 'Lambeth and Reunion 1920,' three Bishops recalled how the Bishop of London had negotiated on Reunion with certain Wesleyan leaders, and how practical arrangements had been discussed, "care being taken to cast no reflection on a ministry previously exercised."[4] The view that episcopacy is essential, not to the 'esse,' but to the 'bene esse' of the Church, was expressly held by many great Anglican divines of former days; and in some form or other it has been not infrequently advanced in the course of the discussions on Reunion. The suggestion has, for instance, been made, and by many welcomed, that in the reunited Church episcopacy should be accepted by all in the interests of peace and regularity, but that it should be clearly understood that the acceptance of it does not of necessity involve any particular theory as to its nature and basis. Thus the Bishop of Ripon, writing in 'The Daily Express' in 1926, in reference to the demand that Free-Church ministers should be episcopally ordained, said as follows: "But we on the Anglican side must first do everything in our power to take the sting from this requirement, by making plain, 'beyond a peradventure,' that all this is simply in the interests of order, not to secure for those whose commissions are thus (so to speak) revised and

[1] Cf. for example, Dr. Welldon, *The English Church*, 132 f (". . . They are not prepared, it seems, to say or to do anything except what they have said and done ever since 1662 . . .").

[2] *Lambeth Appeal*, vii.

[3] *Ibid.* viii.

[4] *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 33.

extended any 'grace of orders' which they could not otherwise have, or to make 'valid' the sacraments which they dispense."[1]

To refuse to agree with the strongly-expressed wish of the majority of our associates in a matter simply affecting the kind of organization best suited for a common effort, and thus to render united action of a certain kind impossible, would seem to be so shortsighted and atomistic a proceeding, that even the knowledge and possession of a superior plan would hardly suffice to justify it. Looked at in isolation from the other issues connected with it, the Free-Church insistence on maintaining a ministry *not* ordained by bishops seems sheer perversity. It is only when we consider fairly the principles inseparably involved in the proposal before us, that we see the refusal of it to spring, not from atomistic perversity, but from a clear grasp of great issues. Thus, the suggestion that episcopacy should be accepted without any necessary theory as to its basis and nature, however sincerely advanced, would be in practice impossible to carry out. The distinction between 'necessary to the "esse"' and 'necessary to the "bene esse"' of the Church means more than those who appeal to it seem to realize. If a thing is of the 'esse' of the Church, then indeed it is necessary and obligatory upon all: if, however, it does but conduce to the 'bene esse' of the Church, then 'necessary' is in this context the wrong term to use for it.[2] The Church, in the full and true sense, can at least exist without it; and allowance must be made for those who take different views of what is advisable. Whatever penalty is to be meted out to such wrong-headed folk, at least it ought not to be exclusion from the Church. The inflexible insistence of Anglican writers en masse on the absolute necessity of episcopacy points to something beyond a mere utility, however lofty and however obvious, something more than a highly valuable instrument of Church-government, something more than a policy eminently conducive to the widest possible reunion of the Christian body. The contention that bishops are indispensable means that their office is of the 'esse' of the Church, not simply of its 'bene esse.' This does in fact involve a definite theory as to the nature and basis of episcopacy, whatever sincere and broadminded Anglicans may suggest about leaving the theory an open question. The theory involved is simply this: that through Divine appointment episcopal ordination is the only means whereby the Christian minister can receive that 'grace of Holy Order,' which authorizes him to preach, and enables him to administer valid Sacraments, in the Christian Church.[3]

[1] Quoted in *Public Opinion*, 5 Feb. 1926, 148. Cf. also the powerful and broadminded appeal of Canon O. C. Quick in *Construct. Quart.* Mar. 1921, 48–55.

[2] Contrast the view expressed by the Bishop of St. Albans in *Congress-Report 1920*, 201.

[3] Cf. D. Stone in *H.E.R.E.* iii (1910) 627a ("The episcopal ministry, which is the

Here we have at last the real rock of offence and stone of stumbling; and not even the constitutionalizing of the episcopate (of which much has been said on both sides[1]) would avail to remove it. It is merely in order to bring out the real import of the position, and not in any hypercritical spirit, that we draw attention here to the fact that, in the 'Lambeth Appeal,' the term used to describe what Anglican ministers would (it was hoped) receive from nonconformists was "a form of commission or recognition," whereas the nonconformist ministers were invited to accept "a commission through episcopal *ordination*." Whether this onesidedness was deliberate or unconscious, it is clearly there; and one cannot be surprised that Free-Church leaders should have fastened upon it.[2] The question upon which our Anglican brethren have asked us to pronounce is not simply: Is episcopacy valuable as a means to Reunion? but rather: Is episcopacy absolutely essential to the existence of a regular and valid ministry and to the administration of regular and valid Sacraments? To agree to the Lambeth proposals would inevitably be regarded as answering this question in the affirmative. As it is, the only answer open to us is: Non possumus. We cannot but reject the theory in question on the threefold ground (a) that it has no sanction in our Lord's teaching as expounded by the Church in the New Testament,[3] (b) that it involves a quasi-mechanical theory of Divine grace

mark down the ages of the historic Church, and at the present time the common possession of Easterns, Roman Catholics, and Anglicans, is much more than a part of outward organization. It is the link whereby the society which possesses it is connected with the past history and present life of the Church; and *it affords the possibility of that complete sacramental system which is the covenanted means of the union of Christians with the Lord and head of the Church*": italics mine); Bishop of Zululand in *Congress-Report 1920*, 45 (". . . the main division is, after all, a plain one—it is between those who believe that the Sacraments are an essential part of the faith and the way of salvation, and those who do not so believe . . ." He alludes further on to the latter as "those now separated from her" [the Church's] "communion," and to their teaching as "the varied opinions of contending societies"); *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 91 (". . . This connection with the Holy Communion brings out the real ground for the insistence of" [? on] "episcopacy. It is not asserted as the best form of government. It may or may not be this; but if it were no more than this, 'overseers' could easily be appointed." But the immediately ensuing words indicate how easily the implication can be ignored: "The bishops do not insist on any theory of episcopacy in regard to the transmission of sacramental grace"!). Rev. N. P. Williams, operating with *two* meanings of the word 'Church,' holds that episcopacy "is of the *bene esse* of 'the Church' in the broader, and of the *esse* of 'the Church' in the narrower, sense of the term" (in *Expos. Times*, Nov. 1927, 58ab).

[1] Cf. *Lambeth Appeal*, vii; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 50 f, 81 f; Bishop of St. Albans in *Congress-Report 1920*, 201–203; Free Church Council *Reply*, § IV. ii.

[2] *The Free Churches and the Lambeth Appeal*, 18 f; Free Church Council *Reply*, § IV. iv: cf. *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 112–114. In *Congress-Report 1920*, 105, Rev. G. H. Clayton expresses his willingness to "submit to conditional re-ordination" at the hands of nonconformists for the sake of Church-unity.

[3] See above, pp. 411 f, 439–446, and cf. Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 417 f; Bartlet, *Validity*, 3–11. The Anglican case used to rest, as the Romanist still does, on the

which is out of keeping with the spirit of the Gospel,[1] and (c) that it is falsified by experience.[2]

Thus a careful examination of the peculiar claims of the Church of England does but confirm the conclusion to which we seemed to be forced by our examination of the claims of Rome, namely, that the way of official and external union seems to be definitely barred, and that the question must therefore be asked whether our initial assumption that Christian unity necessarily means a single ecclesiastical organization, governed by a single constitution, was justified. If we examine the grounds on which that assumption is usually based, we shall find that it rests on the natural inclination to follow as closely as possible the New-Testament model. Thus, the former Bishop of Peterborough, in enumerating the objections to federation, says: "Not the least of them is that the New Testament knows nothing of any such scheme, nor would it have been conceivable to the mind of a man like St. Paul."[3] Similarly, the Archbishop of York declared that, if a purely spiritual unity "had been the conception of the Church in the early centuries there would probably have been no such thing as definite Christianity, humanly speaking, in the world to-day."[4] In particular, the Christian mind is naturally disposed to attach profound significance to the great analogies used in the New-Testament descriptions of the Church, and to draw very concrete inferences from them in regard to present-day problems. Thus, Dr. C. B. Wilmer has written: "If we are to follow St.

contention that monarchical episcopacy and episcopal ordination were primitive and apostolic arrangements. That view is, however, being abandoned in Anglican circles: we are now warned against "a self-conscious and artificial archaism which ignores the work of the Spirit of God in the facts of history subsequent to Apostolic times . . ." (Rawlinson in *Foundations*, 408f: cf. Hatch, *Organization*, 213; C. H. Turner, *Studies in Early Church History*, 35), and we are referred to the unassailable fact that "the ultimate judgment of the universal Church settled down to regard the main stream of episcopal succession . . . as the plan of the Divine appointment concerning the means for the security of the Divine gifts . . ." (D. Stone in *H.E.R.E.* iii [1910] 626a). Cf. *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 75 top. It seems impossible to determine any precise date at which episcopal ordination became universally regarded as essential to a valid ministry; see the essays by Frere and Brightman in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 263–408, esp. 275, 401–403: also Dunin-Borkowski in *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 342 f.

[1] Sir H. Lunn in *Rev. of the Churches*, Apl. 1926, 201.

[2] See below, p. 674. Pusey (*Eiren.* 278) believed that in India, "when the Gospel was preached, even by pious men, without the Episcopate, it languished after a time; when the Church was planted according to its Divine form, it flourished." No one would defend episcopacy by such an argument to-day. Further, the deep divisions between various groups of episcopalians (Eastern, Roman, Anglican) stultifies the claim that the absolute necessity of episcopacy "is sufficiently proved by the divisions which have occurred among those by whom it has been discarded" (Moxon, *Modernism*, 105). No; if the appeal is to be made to 'fruits,' the indispensability of bishops is plainly disproved (J. D. Jones, *Validity*, 28–30).

[3] *Construct. Quart.* Sept. 1921, 389.

[4] *Yorkshire Observer*, 11 Dec. 1920, 6, col. 6.

Paul, the very nature of the Church necessitates organic union. The Church . . . is the *Body* of Christ. . . . How many bodies do we expect Christ to have? . . . the Church is the *Bride* of Christ; how many brides do we expect Christ to have? If anyone thinks this is quite consistent with splitting up under different leaders, hear St. Paul: 'I beseech you, brethren, . . .' "[1] Our investigation of the Catholic doctrine of the Church will have shown how large a part is played in it by the designation of the Church as the Body of Christ. Here is a typical instance of the use to which the analogy is put: "If the invisible soul-Church must be expressed by an external society, it is surely plain that this must be one body, not many. For the mutual exclusion and opposition of many diverse corporations could not express that unity-in-multiplicity which we have seen to be the law of the invisible society. One soul does not inform more than one body, nor can one soul inspire a plurality of diverse and conflicting consciousnesses. The rare phenomenon of multiple personality is obviously pathological. Believers in one invisible Church expressed by a multitude of conflicting visible institutions with opposing beliefs and aims, must thus find the physical analogy of Christ's body in a condition of extreme psycho-physical disease and disintegration. Therefore, the one Lord and the one Spirit and the one mystical body demand one visible Church-body with one creed and one system of government and sacraments."[2]

It is rather interesting to observe here in passing how apt Christian thinkers seem to be to shift their ground under stress of controversy. When it is a question of deciding how the local church ought to be governed, the Congregationalist has no difficulty (if conditions of fair research are allowed) in showing that, in New-Testament times, the method of government was predominantly of the congregational type: Anglicans, confessedly unable now to establish the Apostolicity of the monarchical episcopate, thereupon complain of the 'artificial archaism,' which ignores the Divine guidance given to the Church in subsequent centuries.[3] When, however, it becomes a question of the general form Church-unity should take, it is the Anglican who insists on the New-Testament precedent, while the Congregationalist refuses to regard that precedent as finally settling the matter. In reality, however, the inconsistency is on neither side so blatant as it seems. Ignoring for the moment the distinction between Congregationalism and Independency, we may say that Congregationalists adhere to congregational government, not for the sake of copying the primitive Church in a mere piece of external machinery or organization, and certainly not with the intention of ignor-

[1] *Construct. Quart.* Sept. 1921, 450 (quoting 1 Cor. i. 10, 12 f, Eph. iv. 3).
[2] Watkin in *God and the Supernatural*, 261.
[3] See above, p. 660 n.

ing later Church-history or of unchurching—or severing themselves from—other Christians:[1] their history for the last hundred years has shown how easily local independence can be harmonized with combined action in larger bodies—the various Congregational Unions. They adhere to Congregationalism, because only so can they safeguard the essential principles of the immediate contact between the local group and the Divine Head of the Church, and of its immediate responsibility to Him. If, in the last resort, some external authority has the right to dictate or to veto the decisions of the local church, this immediacy of contact and responsibility is at once infringed. Similarly Anglicans, in adhering to episcopacy, do not intend to set at naught the congregational precedent of the primitive Church; but they conceive it to be superseded by that method of government which alone in their view safeguards the cardinal principle of visible unity.

However that may be, it is fair to appeal to the Anglican abandonment of the primitive congregational organization, as illustrating the important truth that, in regard to externals, the precedents of New-Testament times are not the final norms. Congregationalism is defensible to-day, not because it copies the external model of New-Testament times, but because it alone seems capable of preserving a certain vital principle of the Christian life: for where the Spirit of the Lord is, there must needs be liberty. Doubtless the unity of the Church is also a vital principle of the Christian life; but it does not follow that the external form which that unity was able to take in the first century will be the form it can take fifteen or nineteen centuries later. Paul, it is true, was a stranger to the idea of Christians being out of visible communion with one another: but then he was also a stranger to monarchical episcopacy and to the Nicene Creed, not to mention the historical conditions and crises which have brought our modern schisms into being. His ideas as to the form of the Church's unity do not therefore solve our problem to-day.[2] Still less is it allowable to use the analogies of the Body of Christ and the Bride of Christ as settling the question. For analogies they are, however fitting: and analogy is not proof, nor can any analogy be made to run on all fours. There are respects in which the Church is not in the least like a bride or a body;[3] and these analogies cannot therefore be used as necessarily determining the sole kind of unity at which all Christians to-day must aim, be the cost what it may.

[1] Dr. Orchard is gravely wrong in saying that in congregationally governed bodies "schism has there been erected into a system" (*Foundations*, iii. 70).

[2] Cf. the claim made by a Jesuit to Pascal (*Lettres écrites*, etc. vi): "Nous voyons mieux que les anciens les nécessités présentes de l'Église."

[3] Cf. Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 75 f (". . . His earthly body could not love and trust Him as His Church does. Even if we speak of Him as having a celestial body now it does not do that . . .").

It would, however, be futile to ignore the fact that, if, in the sight of God, we Free-Churchmen are (as we believe) justified in maintaining our freedom, it follows that those who force the struggle for freedom upon us must be responsible for the hopelessness of all efforts at external or official reunion. That, indeed, is largely the position as we see it. Were we prepared to lay aside our objections and, under pressure of the great ideal of unity and under a realization of the great evils of schism, to accept submissively the minimum terms of communion demanded either by the Church of England or by the Church of Rome, we should be sacrificing values that are to us as clear and majestic as anything in the Christian life can be. That being so, to sacrifice them would be an act of inconsistency and treachery which would vitiate and stultify every subsequent act of Christian worship or service.[1] We did not set up those tests that keep us out: the only thing is that, for the sake of God and His truth and the future of His Kingdom on earth, we dare not submit to them. We are prepared to give reasons for our refusal, hoping that they will be understood and acted on. We do not ourselves impose any similar tests on other Christians as a condition of admitting them to our fellowship; but we are prepared to welcome them on the strength of a sincere profession of faith in our Lord. We wish indeed that our episcopalian brethren could find a way of remaining loyal to their own convictions without excluding us from their company as Churchmen: and we do plead that, if they cannot, then the cause of the disunion that follows lies in their exclusive attitude to us, not in our inclusive attitude to them, and the responsibility for that continued disunion therefore rests with them, and not with ourselves.

The spirit of toleration, however, demands that we should regard their refusal as springing, not from any censurable amour-propre[2], but from an entirely honourable conviction as to the nature of the Church and as to our Lord's will concerning membership in it. While we cannot but believe that conviction to be mistaken, and feel therefore driven to plead against it, yet we respect it as conscientious and sincere, and accept the necessity of allowing for it in our schemes for the Reunion of the Church. Similarly, we would suggest, Anglicans and Romanists, who strongly disapprove of our beliefs, but respect them as sincerely held and recognize us as fellow-Christians in spite of them, must allow for their persistence, when laying plans for Church-unity. This condition of things lifts the whole problem above the level of assessing responsibility for the divisions of Christendom, and brings us face to face again with the question as to the precise nature of the true unity

[1] Cf. Glover, *Reunion*, 51–53.

[2] ". . . Jacobi's word that the only true tolerance was the bearing of the intolerance of others" (Mackennal, *Evolution of Congregationalism*, 243).

of the Church, having regard—as indeed we are bound to do—to the conditions under which it has to be sought.

May it not be that this unity is something that altogether transcends the differences and divisions of external organization? Was the true unity of the Church imperilled when our Saviour forbade his eager disciple to interfere with one who cast out demons in His name, but did not follow in company with the other disciples (Mk. ix. 38–40= Lk. ix. 49f)? Was the true unity of the Church imperilled when Peter defied all established precedents and baptized Cornelius, or when Paul vindicated the rights of the Gentile converts in the teeth of the Mother-Church at Jerusalem?[1] Was the true unity of the Church imperilled when in the first century the Jewish and Gentile groups, strong in their common loyalty to the one Lord, went none the less their own very diverse ways? Is it not at least conceivable that the true unity of the Church of Christ to-day may be something which we have not the means of visualizing in a concrete way, something which indeed ought to keep us ever on the search, and may and does call for drastic changes from time to time in the official procedure of Christian groups, but something which itself lies altogether beyond questions of ecclesiastical machinery?

It is very widely admitted among Christians of all types that, whatever form the unity of the Church ought to take, it must leave room for a very considerable element of variety. The dissimilarity of the gifts of the Holy Spirit furnishes the theme for one of the finest chapters in Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians (xii); and he elaborates the idea of variety by means of the comparison of the Church to a human body. The Roman Church-system provides admirably for the unity of the organism; but, apart from its sharp distinction between the lay and the 'religious' life, it gives no special place to that element of diversity, which modern Romanists yet admit to be an essential law of the Church's life.[2] By most non-Romanists, the desire to make room for variety is expressed by saying that in the Church there must be unity, but not uniformity,[3] and that this true unity is therefore not external but spiritual, and depends rather upon the Church being indwelt by the

[1] "But historically the Judaising Christians were right, for the authority of tradition and scriptural proof was on their side. The one thing necessary, however, was the evidence of existing spiritual life, and that was on the side of Cornelius and St. Peter. So it is also to-day" (K. Lake, *Stewardship of Faith*, 56 f).

[2] See above, p. 661 (". . . that unity-in-multiplicity . . ."). The strife within the Church of England over the revision of the Prayer-Book illustrates the failure of episcopacy and the credal test to secure real harmony between dissentient parties.

[3] Cf. Martineau, *Essays*, iv. 380; Oman, *Vision*, 139 f; *Free Churches and the Lambeth Appeal*, 10; G. B. Smith in *Journ. of Relig.* Sept. 1922, 556; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 124; Congregational *Reply to Lambeth Appeal*, § 1.

one Lord and the one Spirit than upon its outward organization and government being single and uniform.[1] This deeper unity of the Spirit has been acclaimed as the true Catholicism, in contrast to that less noble and worthy form embodied in and defended by the Roman Church.[2] The hall-mark of the truly Catholic unity is its comprehensiveness. It provides on principle for the inclusion within the Church of a great variety of developments and expansions of the Christian spirit; and, for protection against the triumph of falsehood, it relies on verification in experience and on the Divine unifying centre, rather than on any humanly-constructed ring-fence. However lamentable the disunion of the Church may seem—and indeed may be—the opportunity which it has given for the rich and free outgrowth of Christian life, the wide distribution of diverse gifts, and the fulfilment of diverse tasks, constitute a compensation by no means to be despised.[3]

[1] Cf. Heiler, *Kathol.* 661 (quoting Luther); Hase, *Handbook*, i. 7 f (quoting Luther's contemporary, Sebastian Franck), 27; Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 26–30 (". . . She is one because she alone of all societies of men possesses a supernatural indwelling presence and relation to God in Christ. This is a unity which underlies all external separations of place or time, all external divisions and hostilities which result from the marring of the sacred gift by human sin . . . she no more ceases to be 'one' by outward divisions, than she ceases to be 'holy' by tolerating sin, . . ."); Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 60–64, 97 f; Grubb, *Authority*, 112 f; J. K. Mozley in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1924, 519 ("We need a religious far more than an ecclesiastical unification, . . ."); Lacey, *The One Body*, 202 f ("The other" [i.e. the preferable] "way is to regard all sections as belonging presumably to the Body, still linked together, however imperfectly, in the Unity of the Spirit . . ."); Wright, *Rom. Cath.* 34; Baptist *Reply to the Lambeth Appeal*, fin.; Selbie, *Freedom*, 13 f.

[2] Martineau, *Essays*, ii. 85; Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 131; Oman, *Vision*, 157, 162; Heiler, *Kathol.* XXIX.

[3] Cf. *Life . . . of H. Bushnell*, 173 ("Most of what we call division in the Church of God is only distribution. The distribution of the Church, like that of human society, is one of the great problems of divine wisdom; and the more we study it, observing how the personal tastes, wants, and capacities of men in all ages and climes are provided for, and how the parts are made to act as stimulants to each other, the less disposed shall we be to think that the work of distribution is done badly"), 280 ("I rested in the conviction that the comprehensive method is in general a possible and, so far, the only Christian method of adjusting theologic differences"); A. J. Carlyle quoted in *Oxford Chronicle*, 9 Nov. 1917 ("The divisions of English Christianity were no doubt lamentable, but it must also be recognised that they had had their good as well as their evil results; they had been the means of making room for the development of the religious temper in many different forms, for the expression of many different aspects of the religious genius. Their religious life had lost much in coherence and in the strength which comes from unity of form and direction, but it had gained much in the richness and variety of the character, in its adaptation to the connection" [? "convictions"] "and experiences of different men, and human experience in matters of religion was as varied and manysided as life itself. . . ."); K. Lake, *Stewardship of Faith*, 173 ("the schism which led to the creation of the various Protestant churches is the birth of new organisms, and . . . the task of the future is not reunion, but recognition and co-operation"); Heiler, *Kathol.*, 655 n. (quoting Söderblom); Rawlinson, *Authority*, 176 f, 183 ff; Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 297.

Along this line there is a great deal to be said for the view (often impatiently swept aside by eager reunionists) that 'our unhappy divisions' are not after all only 'unhappy.'[1] Doubtless it would be in many ways a great gain if divisions which exclude Christians from each other's fellowship did not exist: but we are disposed to argue that it is better that they should exist as they do, being conscientiously defended and, in part at least, corrected by unofficial brotherliness, than that, owing to their non-existence, the whole of Christendom, uniformly organized, should be afflicted by those evils which have so often befallen nations religiously undivided.[2] We may therefore rest assured that, in loyally serving our own respective denominations, in helping them to function at their best, in contributing to their efficiency, and endeavouring to infuse the Christian spirit ever more and more thoroughly into them, we are truly and directly serving the interests of the One Universal Church of Jesus Christ.[3]

There is nothing wrong in sketching imaginatively the form which a finally reunited Church might take, and in indicating the practical steps by which that consummation might be reached. Nay, rather, it is good that we should do so; for it is only by keeping a wide and keen look-out into the future before us, with all its myriad and endless vistas, that our eyes can be made ready for the growing vision of God's glorious Will. Again and again has the Christian thinker striven to depict the ideal he yearns to see realized.[4]

> Surely at last, far off, sometime, somewhere,
> The veil would lift for his deep-searching eyes,
> The road would open for his painful feet,
> That should be won for which he lost the world.

Yet alongside of such uplifting and inspiring visions of the future, we hear evermore from the diverse groups statesmanlike warnings not to be in a hurry to force our denominations to conform to the pictured ideal of unity. The warning may sometimes owe something to the unadventurous mediocrity of officialism; but it has its more solid justification in the fact that, whatever our hopes and imaginings may

[1] Stanton, *Authority*, 199; Fulford in H.*E.R.E.* xi (1920) 234 f; Orchard, *Foundations*, iii. 71 f; Congregational *Reply to Lambeth Appeal*, § 1.

[2] Cf. Trollope, as above, p. 636 n. 3; A. J. Carlyle, in sequel to passage quoted in n. 3 on previous page. Cf. further on the advantageous variety made possible by disunion, Horton, *England's Danger*, 119; Oman, *Vision*, 139–141, 154 f; Curtis in H.*E.R.E.* vii (1914) 262a; Glover, *Reunion*, 17; Hermelink, *Kath. und Prot.* 68, 129; Selbie, *Freedom*, 14 f, 35.

[3] Cf. Oman, *Vision*, 288; Heiler, *Kathol.* 13 f.

[4] Cf. e.g. Hase, *Handbook*, i. xxxi f, 27; Heiler, *Kathol.* 656 n. (quoting Söderblom's suggestion of an œcumenical council initiated by the Patriarch of Constantinople and the Archbishop of Canterbury), 659 f; Rawlinson, *Authority*, 183–187.

tell us, we really do not yet see and know what the reunited Church will be like, how it is to be brought into being, and how, when established, it will harmonize the now disunited forces of Christendom. We can indeed be sure that some at least of the reunited bodies will be utterly unlike what they now are.[1] More than that we can hardly say, at least so far as the practical achievement of Reunion is concerned.

But if the full vision of the Church in her consummated perfection is denied to us, enough vision is granted to enable us to throw our full energy into the tasks of the present, confident that God, who wisely overrules even the errors of men for their ultimate good,[2] will not fail to overrule for good the upward seeking of His children's hearts despite the dimness of their sight, and the loyal service of His children's hands despite the shortness of their reach. "What God may have in store for us half a century hence is not our most immediate duty. Even by sketching ideals of what we might wish to be fifty years from now we might be standing in the way of God's plans. What He does then is His affair. What does He want us to do now?"[3] Let us do our best to see to that; for if that be well done, what lies beyond it will not suffer.

[1] Cf. K. D. Mackenzie, *Confusion of the Churches*, 227.
[2] Martineau, *Seat*, 298 f: cf. W. Irving, *Christopher Columbus*, 33.
[3] Glover, *Reunion*, 55; cf. 56.

CHAPTER XXVIII

LINES OF ADVANCE

LOOKED at superficially, or from one angle only, the apologetic of this book might seem to have landed the reader in nothing better than a vast array of negations. Protestantism itself is not infrequently declared by those unsympathetic to it to make on them the same dismal impression. It must indeed be admitted that our arguments have often in the course of our study had to be of the kind that leads to negative conclusions. Nay more, let us grant that, as every society that has to contend for its own rights suffers somewhat in the conflict and bears the marks of it, so Protestantism—having to contend against the vast dogmatic system of Rome—is not unnaturally in danger of falling into an excessively negative attitude. While, however, we are ready to acknowledge this danger, and to recognize that there have been Protestant individuals and groups that have fallen victims to it,[1] we do not for a moment admit that there is no escape from the danger other than into the Roman Church, or that it is a more deadly danger than the credulous acceptance of Rome's innumerable fabrications, or that it prevents the genuine Christian religion from flourishing in Protestantism better than it does in Romanism. As for the negations in this book, they are purely incidental to the form which the subject in hand has necessitated; they will be seen on examination to constitute but a small part of what the book tries to say; and they all suggest, and are accompanied by, positive pleadings of a very fundamental kind.[2] The purpose of this, our closing chapter, is to supply the positive counterpart to the negative element present in the last, and to point as it were to the further steps which the several divisions of Christendom may now take, in the spirit of the Reunion-movement, if not in any of the concrete ways suggested in the course of it. And in doing this, we shall have occasion to appeal to the many positive findings arrived at in the course of the foregoing discussions, and in particular to bring out in clear relief those special affirmations which are indeed the concern of the whole Church, but

[1] Cf. Bain, *New Reformation*, 110; Heiler, *Kathol.* 641 n.

[2] "The modern spirit is not the spirit 'which always denies,' delighting only in destruction; still less is it that which builds castles in the air rather than not construct; it is that spirit which works and will work 'without haste and without rest,' gathering harvest after harvest of truth into its barns, and devouring error with unquenchable fire" (Huxley, quoted by O. Lodge, *Life and Matter* [1906] 70).

for which Free-Churchmen have perhaps a special discernment and therefore a special responsibility.

If we take first the great Roman communion, it certainly appears at the outset as if the rigidity of her dogmatic position left those of us who are outside her doors absolutely nothing to hope for. Nevertheless, the gloom is not entirely unrelieved. Within the last few centuries, not only has Rome's treatment of those whom she adjudges heretics and schismatics become comparatively humane, but her words about them and her theories concerning them have also marvellously softened. We do not refer here to the mild approval with which Catholics naturally regard both the Rome-ward leanings of Anglo-Catholics[1] and the sundry manifestations of a larger tolerance towards Catholics on the part of Protestants generally. We are thinking rather of Rome's view of the status of heretics and schismatics. It is, of course, part of her regular teaching that, if baptized, they are still 'Christians,' despite their heresy and schism.[2] Those familiar with the apologetic of modern Catholicism are well aware of the generous distinction Rome now emphasizes between formal and material heresy, of the acquittal she pronounces on the latter of these, and of the definition that allows any serious Protestant to hope for immunity under it. Even unbaptized Christians can claim to have received that 'Baptism of the Spirit' or 'Baptism of Desire,' which can remove the bar to a man's salvation almost as effectively as water-baptism does. If a heretic or schismatic be only sincere (and clearly the average Protestant can claim to be that), then—even though, in his 'invincible ignorance,' he refuse to submit to Rome and to enter the visible body of the Church—Rome yet regards him as truly endowed with the grace of God, as capable of salvation, and as belonging to 'the Soul of the Church.'[3] It might not be easy to find adequate official sanction for every phase of this new doctrine:[4] but in so far as it is sincerely meant and can be taken as accurately reflecting the real mind of the Roman Church, its significance is very far-reaching. For quite clearly it calls for a very different attitude to non-Romanist Christians generally from that haughty and censorious exclusiveness which still continues to mark the general policy of the Roman Church. If Catholics mean what they say when they say that we Protestants belong to 'the Soul of the Church,' then they ought not to

[1] E.g. Woodlock, *Modernism*, 11, 16, 85 f.

[2] See above, p. 48 n. 3, p. 177 n. 2, pp. 235 f n. 4, pp. 242, 248.

[3] See above, pp. 58–61, 613 f.

[4] Dr. Gore (*Rom. Cath. Claims*, 131 n.) adduces an interesting, though indirect, piece of evidence: "the language of the Roman liturgy still involves the idea that the Church is divided and requires corporate reunion: she prays to our Lord 'to bring her into peace and unity (pacificare et *coadunare*) according to His will.'"

refuse to pray with us, to worship God with us, or to negotiate with us about Reunion[1]: nor ought they to brand us with the stigma of heresy, or to be unwilling to learn something from us as to the needs of the Church and the truths of Christianity. The answer, of course, will be that there are many other things in the teaching of Rome more important than the modern doctrine of 'the Soul of the Church'; and it is unhappily far from clear in what precise ways the Roman Church could bring her official attitude into proper harmony with that larger and more tolerant spirit upon which her apologists in this country have been in recent times laying so much stress. The future will show whether those who shape the Church's policy will retreat to the harsher and more exclusive positions of earlier days, or will just let the Church drag on without any attempt to deal with the inconsistency, or will lead her further forward along the path of reconciliation with the Christians outside her ranks—dogmas and traditions notwithstanding. And there, for the present, the matter must be left.

With the Church of England, the prospect of 'some better thing' is brighter. We Free-Churchmen have doubtless much of importance to learn from the older communions; and with that we shall attempt to deal presently. For the moment, however, our purpose is to appeal to our Anglican brethren to take fuller knowledge of the grave rift made in their doctrine of exclusive and Catholic validity by their growing readiness to extend recognition to the non-episcopal ministries and sacraments of Free-Churchmen: for we are confident that, while complete formal and logical consistency is generally regarded as undesirable, or at least as unattainable,[2] no body of thinking men can continue indefinitely to maintain two *palpably* inconsistent positions.

Of the full strict Anglican position we have already spoken at length. In theory, it is an absolutely exclusive position. Only those are true ministers of the Church of Jesus Christ who have received ordination at the hands of bishops, who themselves stand in direct succession from the Apostles. They alone are entitled to preach in the Church: they alone can administer a valid Eucharist. Nonconformist bodies are neither churches, nor parts of the One Church: their ministers are not

[1] The following sentence, for instance, seems totally to ignore the Soul of the Church: "In recent years, much has been said by *those outside the Church*, about unity of spirit being compatible with differences of creed. Such words are *meaningless* in reference to a Divine revelation" (Joyce in *Cath. Encyc.* iii [1908] 759a: italics mine). Cf. *op. cit.* 753 f (repudiation of the distinction between the visible and the invisible Church). Heiler (*Kathol.* 278) refers to the doctrine of the invisible Church as "Diese eminent katholische Auffassung (die freilich im römischen Katholizismus stark in Vergessenheit geraten ist)".

[2] Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 2 f note (à propos of the 'Via Media').

in the true sense ministers of the Church: their Communion-services are not valid Sacraments. From this it naturally follows that Anglicans may not participate in a Communion-service conducted by a nonconformist, and that nonconformists may not only not preside at the Lord's Table in an Anglican Church, but (as unconfirmed) may not even take the Communion there from an Anglican clergyman. That, and nothing less than that, is the full Anglican theory.[1] But it is very far from being theory only; it still in the main regulates Anglican practice. In 1920 Dr. Headlam (in his 'Bampton Lectures'), the First Anglo-Catholic Congress, and (in the main) the Lambeth Conference, all declared themselves opposed to intercommunion and interchange of pulpits between Anglicans and Nonconformists, prior to the adoption of some scheme of reunion.[2] Since 1920 this exclusive position as regards the pulpit and the Lord's Table has been reaffirmed, not only by Anglo-Catholics,[3] but also from the standpoint of broadminded Anglican Reunionism.[4]

In stark opposition to this exclusiveness of theory or practice or both, stands the claim of the Free Churches to be recognized, on the strength of their Christian profession and their fruits, as belonging in the fullest sense to the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church of Jesus Christ, as enjoying God's grace and blessing in rich measure, as possessing a fully valid ministry, and as administering fully valid Sacraments,[5] and, on the basis of this claim, the plea for free intercommunion and interchange of pulpits as between Christians already cordially recognizing one another as fellow-Churchmen.[6]

Now let us observe how extremely reluctant Anglicans are to defend even the most obvious implications of their exclusive theory. To begin with, they are faced, like the Romanists, with the difficulty of having to

[1] See above, pp. 652–660.

[2] Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 287–290; Clayton in *Congress-Report 1920*, 105 f; *Report of Lamb. Conf.* Resol. 12(*B*); *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 6, 90–93.

[3] F. J. Hall in *Congress-Report 1923*, 153. In Jan. 1927, a meeting held at Westminster by the English Church Union passed a resolution protesting against the admission of nonconformists to Anglican pulpits as an 'evil' (*Christian World*, 20 Jan. 1927, 12).

[4] See the remarks of the Bishop of Ripon quoted from *Daily Express* by *Public Opinion*, 5 Feb. 1926, 148 (". . . A solemn, central, representative act of intercommunion would not carry with it any right to general intercommunion among the rank and file till organic unity was achieved. It might even not be repeated before that great day . . .").

[5] Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 193 (". . . I claim to be, as much as any Catholic, heir to all that is Christian in Catholicism; and the claim is not in any way affected by either absolute negation or qualified assent from the Catholic's side . . ."); Bartlet and Jones, *Validity*, 16–19, 28–32; Glover, *Reunion*, 41 f; Scott Lidgett and Berry quoted in *Public Opinion*, 5 Feb. 1926, 146, 148; Selbie, *Freedom*, 32.

[6] Cf. Glover, *Reunion*, 54–56; *Free Churches and the Lambeth Appeal*, 24; Congregational *Reply to Lambeth*, § 6 fin.

admit the existence of hosts of genuine and professing Christians who, despite their strong desire to belong to the Church of Christ, nevertheless (according to the natural meaning of Anglican theory) do not belong to it. More than that, even the most exclusive Anglo-Catholics have again and again rightly and generously recognized that among these Christians, who (ex hypothesi) are not in the Church and do not therefore receive the services of a valid Christian ministry or enjoy the grace conferred through valid Sacraments, the fruits of the Holy Spirit's activity are richly manifest in the ardour of their devotion, the genuineness of their fellowship in Christ, and the practical goodness of their lives.[1] To concede as much as this is to concede to the Free Churches at least a *quasi*-validity; and efforts have been made from time to time to give proper expression to the inference. Thus, in 1891, the late Dr. V. H. Stanton of Cambridge denied that the Church of England unchurched the nonconformists.[2] In 1913 Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson wrote in 'Foundations': "The ministries of the various Protestant denominations may quite legitimately point to the witness of the souls they shepherd, and with St. Paul exclaim, 'The seal of our apostleship are ye in the Lord'; and it were well if the further bandying of epithets like 'valid' and 'invalid' could be abandoned by consent, as the *damnosa hereditas* of an age of legal metaphors and embittered controversy."[3] Again, at a conference on Reunion held at Oxford in June 1920, while the tentative Anglican statement put forward unofficially, as a basis for discussion, did not state that baptism by the Holy Spirit was an optional and permissible alternative to water-baptism, yet it did affirm that "it has been held in the Church that, while in all normal cases Baptism by water is the method of admission, in abnormal cases Baptism by blood, or Baptism by the internal operation of the Holy Spirit, may take the place of Baptism by water": and it was verbally explained that this last qualification (for which the authority of Thomas Aquinas had been quoted) had been added with special reference to the Quakers, who had done so much during and since the War in the spirit of Christ. Some little hesitancy was observable in the language of the 'Lambeth Appeal' touching the Churchmanship of nonconformists and the

[1] Bartlet, *Validity*, 15 f (quoting Gore); C. S. Gillett in *Congress-Report 1920*, 118; *Lambeth Appeal*, ii. vii; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 43, 69; Stone, *Eng. Cath.* 75 (". . . The existence of a visible Church, within which there is covenanted grace and the guarantee of valid sacraments, does not necessitate the denial that sanctifying gifts may be bestowed on those outside it by the Author of all good"); J. K. Mozley in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1926, 585 (quoting Selwyn).

[2] Stanton, *Authority*, 205 (". . . no definition of the Church is given which would expressly exclude from it all bodies that have not the historic episcopate. . . . It is as though she said to bodies of more doubtful position, 'We will not take upon ourselves to unchurch you, . . .' ").

[3] *Foundations*, 386: cf. Bartlet, *Validity*, 18.

validity of their ministry: yet it contained no statement declaring their Sacraments invalid, it confessed "the spiritual reality" of their ministries as having "been manifestly blessed and owned by the Holy Spirit as effective means of grace," and it acknowledged "all those who believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, and have been baptized into the name of the Holy Trinity, as sharing with us membership in the universal Church of Christ, which is His Body."[1] Not unnaturally, the 'Appeal' has been widely understood as recognizing definitely the validity both of the churchmanship and of the ministerial orders of nonconformists[2] and this recognition had, as a matter of fact, been explicitly conceded earlier the same year, firstly, by the Anglicans present at the Mansfield College Conference,[3] and secondly, by Dr. A. C. Headlam in his 'Bampton Lectures.'[4]

In conformity with this recognition of quasi-validity, some very partial relaxations have been made in the rules which exclude nonconformists from Anglican pulpits, and both Anglicans and nonconformists from one another's Communion-services. What was virtually full mutual recognition on equal terms was agreed upon at the Mansfield College Conference in January 1920: but only a few of the Anglican signatories were High-Churchmen, and the resolution possessed no official authority.[5] At Lambeth, later the same year, the bishops resolved that they would "not question the action of any Bishop who, in the few years between the initiation and the completion of a definite scheme of union, shall countenance the irregularity of admitting to Communion the baptized but unconfirmed Communicants of the non-episcopal congregations concerned in the scheme"; also that, "in cases in which it is impossible for the Bishop's judgment to be obtained beforehand the priest should remember that he has no canonical authority to refuse Communion to any baptized person kneeling before the Lord's Table (unless he be excommunicate by name, or, in the canonical sense of the term, a cause of scandal to the faithful)."[6]

[1] *Lambeth Appeal*, pref. and vii.

[2] Free Church Council *Reply to Lambeth Appeal*, IV. iii; *Rev. of the Churches*, Jan. 1927, 7. But it is clear that there was a little ambiguity as to precisely what was meant; cf. *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 72 ("It is true that in the Lambeth Conference . . . there were some who favoured a federation, with complete recognition of certain types of non-episcopal ministries. It is the glory of these men that they were able to subordinate their personal predilections to a scheme that carries with it the Anglican episcopate as a whole, . . ."), 97 ("The minister not episcopally ordained is recognised as such . . ."); Glover, *Reunion*, 48 f.

[3] *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 35–37.

[4] *Doctr. of the Church*, 264 f. Cf. also N. P. Williams in *Expos. Times*, Nov. 1927, 56b, 58.

[5] *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 36 f.

[6] *Report of Lamb. Conf.* Resol. 12(*A*) ii, (*C*) ii; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 6 f, 72, 93 f, 97 f.

With regard to the interchange of pulpits, the Lambeth resolution ran: "A Bishop is justified in giving occasional authorization to ministers, not episcopally ordained, who in his judgment are working towards an ideal of union such as is described in our Appeal, to preach in churches within his Diocese, and to clergy of the Diocese to preach in the churches of such ministers."[1]

It should now be apparent what is meant by the grave doctrinal rift to which allusion was made a few pages back. We would press upon the thinkers of the English Church these questions: Can there be a Christian ministry which is blessed by the grace of God, but is at the same time not valid? Can there be any other test of having received the Divine grace than the production of the fruits of the Spirit? How long halt ye between two opinions? Are our churchmanship and our ministries valid, or are they not? If they are not, how is it that we produce the fruits of the Spirit, and so give evidence of having received God's grace,[2] and how say so many among you that our churchmanship and our ministries *are* valid? On the other hand, if they are valid, how can you justify your exclusive doctrine of orders and sacramental grace, and your refusal to have fellowship with us in the preaching of God's Word and at the Table of our common Lord? We recognize the difficulties you genuinely feel in the way of immediate and general intercommunion and interchange of pulpits[3]: but we beg you to think again whether they are really so grave as to justify your continued excommunication of your acknowledged fellow-Churchmen.[4]

[1] *Report of Lamb. Conf.* Resol. 12(*A*) i; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 5 f, 95, 98. Cf. *Rev. of the Churches*, Apl. 1927, 136 f (action of the Bishop of Birmingham under this clause).

[2] On the irrationality of recognizing a ministry as effective and valid, but at the same time ostracizing it as unauthorized and irregular, cf. Norman Felix in *Christian World*, 1 Jan. 1920, 4, and cf. F. C. Spurr in *Rev. of the Churches*, Oct. 1926, 609; also Bartlet, *Validity*, 15–18.

[3] The difficulties appear to be mainly a disapproval of 'short cuts' as obscuring the real issues and therefore as ineffective and irritating, a horror of apparent insincerity, a proper reverence for orderly and legal procedure and for traditional principles, an unwillingness to pretend to be united when we are disunited, a discontent with what looks like mere federation, like "healing the hurt of our people lightly," and so on (Headlam, *Doctr. of the Church*, 288–290; Clayton in *Congress-Report 1920*, 106; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 90–92).

[4] Dr. Headlam writes (*Doctr. of the Church*, 154): "Ever since the beginning of Christianity there have always been those who, sometimes perhaps in a censorious spirit, sometimes from a real desire for purity, have made their ideal a pure Church, and have tried to attain it by refusing to communicate with *those who do not come up to their particular standard*. They have always failed. To use the well-known language, the wheat and the tares have to grow together until the harvest. We cannot distinguish them from one another. To attempt to substitute the judgement of man on earth for the judgement of God will always end in disaster" (italics mine). Now who is there that does not see that these words, written by an eminent Anglican authority, express precisely the Congregational view of the matter, and are a final condemnation

What now are the ways in which we Free-Churchmen specially need —for the sake of the whole Church—to go beyond that to which we have already attained?

We need in the first place a clearer and more reverent vision of the essential and sacred Oneness of the Church. We observed above that every struggling group bears the marks of its own struggle, and issues from the contest in some way warped as a result of what it has been through. The Free Churches arose out of a tremendous struggle for independence against the massive uniformity of Catholicism. It is quite possible to justify to the full the struggle for freedom, while at the same time admitting that those who waged it were partially deprived by it of a full appreciation of the values of Catholicism.[1] In the same way, it is quite possible to approve of the replies which the various bodies have given to the concrete proposals of the 'Lambeth Appeal,' while at the same time admitting and deploring the fact that the Reunion-movement generally has not found among the rank and file—or even among the leaders—of the Free Churches quite that measure of sympathy, understanding, and appreciation, of which so great a cause is worthy.[2] A deep and passionate concern for the One great Church is, on the other hand, a characteristic of Romanism, Anglo-Catholicism,[3] and Anglicanism.[4] One may quite fairly point out that, the less one's group has had to suffer excommunication and persecution for vindicating its freedom, the easier one will naturally find it to maintain a clear vision of the ideal unity of the Church. Nevertheless, we ought not to shrink from taking a leaf out of the book of our Catholic-minded brethren, and giving a larger place in our thoughts and counsels to the Oneness and majesty of that great and living body to which we belong.[5]

of the Anglican refusal to communicate with Free-Churchmen, because the latter "do not come up to their particular standard" in the matter of the credal test and the episcopally ordained ministry?

[1] Cf. Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 52 ("But this inner light is individualist, and it is alien to a Church as more than a club of mystics without objective base or authority"); Heiler, *Kathol.* 61 (". . . während umgekehrt bei den Reformatoren des 16. Jahrhunderts der Eifer für das reine Evangelium die weite Katholizität beengte").

[2] Rawlinson (*Authority*, 77 f) complains that so many Protestants cannot think of Church-unity except as a federation. I refer with regret to two letters sent by prominent Congregational ministers to *The Christian World* (27 Jan. 1927, 11, and 3 Feb. 7), deprecating the reunion-movement in unsympathetic and disrespectful terms—though it is fair to add that they were smarting under an insult recently uttered against nonconformists by an Anglo-Catholic spokesman and then withdrawn.

[3] Cf. Ollard, *Anglo-Cath. Revival*, 16.

[4] *Lambeth Appeal*, iv; *Report of Lambeth Conf.* Resol. 15; *Lambeth and Reunion 1920*, 2, 7, 83, 104.

[5] Cf. Bartlet, *Validity*, 18 f; Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 36 f (". . . The sects arose as gifts of God to the Church. . . . They were parts and servants of the Church, and should from the first have been so regarded. . . . And that sense of the Church should grow in them. They need to cultivate the œcumenical note . . .").

We should be the less backward in doing this, inasmuch as a high doctrine of the Church—considered intensively, if not extensively—is a feature of Puritan, and especially of Congregational, theology.

One of the first results of such a wider vision would be the final disappearance of that atomism of sympathy which causes some nonconformists to act and plan and speak as if their own denomination (sometimes even their own little local conventicle) were coextensive with the whole Church of Christ. Both Romanists and Eastern Orthodox Christians[1] regard their own communions as each identical with the true Church: but the logic of the identification is stultified—in the case of the Easterns, by their recent recognition of Anglican Orders as valid—and in the case of the Romanists, by their recognition of Eastern Orders as valid, and by their further doctrine of good heretics and schismatics belonging to 'the Soul of the Church.' The stultification is, it will be seen, very similar to that discernible in the Anglican theory, according to which the true Church consists, not of Anglicans alone,[2] but of the Eastern, Roman, and Anglican branches (communion being denied to all outside these), while non-episcopal bodies are more and more being recognized as somehow within the universal Church. A very few of these latter bodies make the same mistake as the Romanists, and recognize no true Church of Christ as existing outside their ranks. Such, however, is the position taken only by the least educated and least significant of the sects. None of the larger nonconformist bodies takes up this absurdly exclusive attitude. Several of them have a very lofty doctrine of the Church considered qualitatively or intensively; denominational interest—which within certain limits is, as we have shown, entirely justified—seems to have hindered the proper development of the doctrine on its extensive side, and to have limited the range of nonconformist vision and interest too much to non-episcopal territory. In this sense it must be allowed that there is some justification for the charge brought against us, that we are not sensitive enough to the evils of schism. While this may frankly be conceded, it may yet be pleaded in mitigation that those who are less[3] marked by this defect have not had to go through the struggle and the agony which left us constitutionally subject to it. But however that may be, the time has certainly come for the display of a deeper corporate loyalty and a broader sympathy towards the whole Christian brotherhood.[4]

It is clear that along this line considerable progress has already been

[1] See above, p. 646 bott.

[2] Gore, *Rom. Cath. Claims*, 129, 179.

[3] 'Less,' not 'un-': the *exclusiveness* of the Catholic bodies means, of course, that they themselves *in some measure* lack a proper sense of the unity of the Church.

[4] Oman, *Vision*, 286, 288; Bartlet, *Validity*, 18 f; J. A. Robinson in Swete, *Ch. and Ministry*, 91 f; Heiler, *Kathol.* XXXII. See also above, pp. 71 f.

made, and that there is nothing to prevent still further progress being made in the future. It needs to be emphasized that there is a real sense, however partial and special, in which the divided Church of Christ is already one, and has in fact never been other than one. There is a spiritual unity of Christendom that has never been broken. Dissatisfied as we may well be with the practical expression (or rather lack of it) which this unity finds, it is obviously a bad mistake to think and argue as if it did not exist. The common acceptance of Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour, the common Scriptures, the common beliefs and ethical ideals, the common Christian name mutually conceded to one another and recognized by the world as truly distinctive, and above all our common submission to the objective discipline of the One Divine Father and Lord of the Universe—these make up a body of characteristics that lend very real unity to all who share them.[1] Moreover, in the field of practical life, the Roman Catholic who cannot kneel in prayer alongside the Protestant is yet ready to associate with him in redemptive Christian social work.[2] Between Anglicans and Free-Churchmen, cooperation, not only in social work, but even to a considerable extent in religious and evangelical work, has been taking place; and there is no reason why in the future it should not be very considerably extended.[3] The "practical tolerance and practical brotherliness" which Hort was urging in 1886[4] has become a fait accompli, thanks very largely to the 'Lambeth Appeal' and to the excellent spirit of friendliness in which the ensuing discussions have been conducted. Those who feel disappointment over the negative result of the negotiations would do well to find encouragement in the desire for closer fellowship and cooperation which has been engendered in the course of them[5] and the manifest possibility of realizing such a desire in practice.

The needed enlargement of the nonconformist conception of the Church will involve the exploration, not only of further opportunities for practical fellowship, but of further possibilities in regard to Church-organization. As it is in matters of organization that steps towards Reunion seem to be most difficult, so it is precisely in these same

[1] Cf. Paterson, *Rule of Faith*, 202; G. B. Smith in *Journ. of Relig.* Sept. 1922, 556; Ed. Grubb in *Congreg. Quart.* Apl. 1928, 156–163.

[2] Father Woodlock, S.J., writes (*Modernism*, 88): "The only union that is practicable is a genuine sympathetic co-operation of all Christian bodies in the work of social reconstruction. A sincere conviction of the *bona fides* of those who reject our personal beliefs and cling to those we reject ought to enable us to work like brothers for the healing of the wounds of the world. . . . It is narrow-minded doubt as to the *bona fides* of those who differ from us that has so often killed the mutual charity which should be the ever-present bond of union, even in a disunited Christendom."

[3] Free Church Council *Reply to Lambeth Appeal*, IV. i.

[4] See Fairbairn, *Cathol.* 417 f.

[5] Congregational *Reply to Lambeth Appeal*, 6.

matters that Christian thinking seems to be most sadly in arrears. Mutually independent organizations have sprung into existence in response to some urgent need or other, have been of value in making room for various manifestations of the Christian spirit, and have become almost a necessary part of the religious life of their respective members. Yet they are no more adapted to the office of unifying the activities of Christendom generally than are the ancient communions of Rome and England. Many of them are not free from exclusive rules in the matter of creed, and so on; and they thus inevitably act to some extent as barriers keeping Christians out of fellowship with one another. The Society of Friends has rendered incalculable service in recalling Christians to the personal and spiritual foundation and essence of all true religion; but their effort to free religious life altogether from organization has been a failure. They have had to organize themselves like other bodies: they have their regular periodical gatherings, their own officials, their headquarters-office, their 'Book of Discipline,' their 'Meeting for Sufferings,' their stated times and methods of worship, and so on. There are, of course, distinctive features in their customs; and it is quite possible to regard these as improvements on the customs of others: the point is, however, that the 'Religion of the Spirit' has with them proved itself to need a corporate organization.[1] The Independents again have vindicated the vital principles of personal Christian self-commitment (as distinct from being simply born and baptized in a Christian country) as the basis of Church-membership, and of the direct responsibility of the individual Church-member and of the local church to Christ Himself. Yet in practice it has been found inexpedient to stop short at this point. While the 'democratic' basis has been jealously maintained, Congregational churches have seen the wisdom of a wider corporate life, and—with very few exceptions—have linked themselves up in great country-wide 'Unions,' to which certain of the powers of the constituent members are, not surrendered, but delegated. Affiliation to one or other of these Unions is entirely voluntary; but it inevitably entails some sacrifice of freedom on the part of individuals and churches for the sake of the Congregational fellowship as a whole. The further step of installing regional 'Moderators' was at first suspected and opposed by some Congregationalists as infringing too much the principle of local liberty: but experience has shown that it is not beyond our power to reap the advantages of the moderatorial system in the way of organization, without sacrificing the ultimate freedom of the local church. Other Free-Church bodies have adopted

[1] "The history of religion shows that the antithesis which writers on Quakerism are too ready to make between spiritual ideals and the life of a corporate Christian organization is a wholly mistaken one" (*Times Lit. Suppt.* 19 Apl. 1923, 257).

analogous machinery, which in some cases limits much more severely the independence of their constituent groups. But just as it is impossible to visualize the whole universal Church as an organization on Roman Catholic lines, so it is impossible to visualize it as a mere extension of the Congregational Union of England and Wales, or of any other of the large Free-Church organizations, not excluding even the National Free Church Council. The figure of the ideal Church may be in part familiar to us from the impassioned language of Christian devotional literature, from 'Ephesians' onwards: but it is hard to make it fit in with the discernible future of the modern world.

> I cannot see the features right
> When on the gloom I strive to paint
> The face I know; the hues are faint
> And mix with hollow masks of night.

It does not follow from this that the freedom of the Free Churches must be wrong; the necessity of this freedom is no less certain than is the ideal unity of the Church. Moreover, the Roman and Anglican bodies, with their exclusive tests, are quite as sectarian as most of the sects (a fact which only their greater size and power make it possible for them to forget) and are also quite as incapable of providing the organization for a universal Church. Nor does it follow that the matter of organization is unimportant. What does follow is that the whole question of the relation between the Christian spirit and the visible machinery through which it is to work needs to be reinvestigated; and the possibility of evolving some theory in regard to it, which would lend itself to progressive embodiment in practice, needs to be patiently and watchfully explored.

Lastly, we may mention among the tasks for which Free-Churchmen —especially those of the rank and file—are called upon to revise and develop their position, the need for a deeper and steadier concern for the doctrinal elaboration of Christian truth. Those Free-Church bodies have, we contend, done right which have refused on principle to erect any written creed into a test which candidates for admission to the Church must pass on pain of being denied the right-hand of fellowship. But every right course has its own attendant dangers; and the abandonment of the credal test has been wrongly allowed to engender in certain circles a comparative neglect of doctrine as such. Doctrinal freedom was rightly fought for, and won: but when won, it was wrongly left to a large extent unused. The corrective of this short-coming does not lie in a retreat to the arbitrary dogmatic position of selecting one or more of the ancient creeds as on the whole the best, and then trying to unchurch all who cannot subscribe to it or them, but in a more earnest

and thoughtful interest in the theological implications of our faith, as themes for constant and prayerful consideration and discussion, and, within the limits of our enlightenment and conviction, for utterance and teaching also. We do not necessarily need more of the Romanist's conclusions regarding Christian truth; but we certainly need more of his zealous concern to believe, as well as to live, rightly. The knowledge that no man or body of men has the right to expel us from the Church or to deny us entry to it because of imperfections—real or supposed—in our grasp of truth, and the further knowledge that ultimate certainty in regard to many problems of theology is beyond our reach in this life, ought not to lull us into neglecting our theology or into suffering it to be more imperfect than we need.[1]

Such then are some of the ways in which Free-Churchmen may extend the horizon of their vision, enlarge the range of their concern and sympathy, and develop their attitude and principles, in the interests of that true catholicity proper to the Church of Christ. Alongside of these suggestions we would now put a number of issues which are of vital concern for the Church at large, and in which Free-Churchmen are already specially qualified to serve the true interests of their brethren.

In the first place, it falls preeminently to them to safeguard the fundamental values achieved by means of the Protestant Reformation. No doubt it is true that modern Protestantism differs in many important ways from the Protestantism of the sixteenth century.[2] The difficulty of characterizing with precision the more and the less essential qualities and manifestations of so complex an entity as that designated by the word 'Protestantism' opens the door for wide differences of judgment as to the identity or otherwise of the ancient and the modern variety. No doubt, further, the measure of success with which the Protestant bodies have met has not been so complete but that Anglicans —not to mention Romanists—overlooking for the moment, perhaps, the elements of weakness in their own position, have felt justified in proclaiming the bankruptcy of Protestantism, and in particular, of nonconformity.[3] Nevertheless, without entangling ourselves in unprofitable arguings over the purely verbal side of the question, we must maintain that, in insisting on the absolute centrality and cruciality of the Gospel of God's love and grace in Jesus Christ, and on all those great truths and privileges which may fairly be covered by the single term 'Christian liberty' (including freedom from the control of the State), modern Protestants are standing in the direct line of succession

[1] Cf. F. D. Maurice, *Theological Essays*, 174; Forsyth, *Authority*, 257 f.
[2] Cf. Troeltsch, *Protestantism and Progress* (Eng. trans.) 44–57.
[3] See above, p. 646.

from the great Reformers and vindicating the cardinal principle involved, however imperfectly it was recognized at the time, in the Protestant Reformation.[1] These truths and privileges, we cannot but believe, are an absolute necessity to the full life of the One Church. Rome flatly repudiates them. In Anglicanism they have been widely recognized, thanks very largely to the persistent witness of nonconformity: but the Anglo-Catholic is so dominated by reverence for tradition that, while acknowledging the value of liberty, he does not seem to realize that, with Hannibal at the gates, the minimum price of liberty is eternal vigilance. He is so appreciative of the good, the strong, and the attractive things in Romanism, that he is not alive to the danger that would instantly overwhelm Christian liberty and all the values it stands for, if once the stout defiance which Protestantism maintains against the despotic claims of Rome were to collapse. Nor must we forget that Rome herself, despite her frowns and her anathemas, owes not a little of her great vigour and virtue to the challenge with which Protestant criticism and apologetic has for four centuries been continually facing her. Not therefore for the sake of keeping Christendom disunited, but for the sake of preserving it from bondage and consequent putrefaction, we declare that the conflict between Romanism and Protestantism has in our day to be re-fought, and will again and again in the future need to be re-fought: and in view of the doubtfulness which ever and anon overclouds the Protestant character of the Church of England, the brunt of this particular contest is bound to fall on the ranks of the Free Churches.[2]

In the second place, Free-Church Christianity—of which Congregationalism may in this matter be taken as the type—offers with all modesty to the Church at large a view of Church-membership which, being based on a really defensible theory of religious authority,[3] avoids the palpable anomalies inherent in the exclusive systems of the Church of Rome and the Church of England,[4] without sacrificing that high and exacting standard of righteousness in life and truthfulness in creed which is incumbent on the Christian as such. By depending, for the maintenance of this standard, not on the rules of admission, but on the teaching-office of the Church and on the spirit and influence of the Church-group, and by taking the personal profession of faith in Christ and a desire to enter His Church as the one *applicable* test of fitness for recognition as Christians and therefore as fellow-Churchmen, Congregationalism makes it possible to do what neither Romanism nor Anglicanism can do, viz: to include within the Church as organized all who

[1] Cf. Troeltsch, *op. cit.* 54 f, 75.
[2] Selbie, *Positive Protestantism*, 3.
[3] Selbie, *Freedom*, 11.
[4] See above, pp. 669–674.

have a just claim to be so included. To the objection that thereby many are admitted who in reality ought not to be, we reply:—

(1) that this—as is well-known and acknowledged—is also the case in Romanism and Anglicanism;

(2) that it does not overthrow the cogent logic (on the subject of authority) behind the Congregational position;

(3) that its true corrective is the Holy Spirit of God animating the Church, not the Church's rules for exclusion or expulsion;

(4) that for practical purposes it is kept within the needful limits by the positive power of Christian truth and influence, whereby the really unworthy are induced to exclude themselves.

The logical basis for this whole position has been very fully argued earlier in this book:[1] all that is necessary in this place, therefore, is to bring out the bearing of it on the general question of the true unity and good estate of the Church. We contend that the Congregational basis, because of its inclusiveness, is in essence the one truly Catholic basis for the constitution of the Church. There is nothing in it, theoretically or practically, that is incompatible with a very exalted idea of the sanctity of the Church. Canon Rawlinson has written: "It is in a sense no small paradox that the point of view which in one way most nearly approaches that of Catholicism, though in another it diverges from it most widely, is that of Congregational Independency. Both are at one in conceiving the Church as primarily a mystical and religious entity, eternal in the heavens, a spiritual communion of the elect people of God which is of a higher order than space and time; and both agree in conceiving the assemblage of Christian people for worship as a manifestation visibly upon earth of this invisible or ideal Church—*ubi tres, ibi ecclesia.*"[2] Congregationalists, then, are in the true sense High-Churchmen: they share the Catholic's transcendental view of the Church, and (unlike the Catholic) they adopt a policy which does justice to their catholicity. Congregationalism, though for practical purposes it may be legitimately called a denomination, is not in any sense a sect. For a sect is an exclusive religious body with its set of rules and regulations which (however elastic) ensure its severance from all other Christians who disagree with any part of its basis: Congregationalism, on the contrary, is a polity so framed as to bring its members *into* fellowship with all who say: "Jesus is Lord," and who will give Congregationalists the same Christian recognition and liberty which these give unasked to them. "The original attraction of Congregationalism to me," writes Dr. Orchard, "was that it did not create between the local congregation and the Universal Church a denominational *tertium quid*, thereby being free from an obviously illegitimate ecclesi-

[1] See above, pp. 231–251.

[2] In *Foundations*, 393 f.

astical intrusion."[1] It is a curious fact that the Free-Church body which is usually regarded as the very apotheosis of the spirit of schism should have grown up on the basis of *a more catholic conception of the Church* than is held by any other group in Christendom.[2] The assumption of the natural man, as of the Catholic apologist, is that an exclusive basis is indispensable for corporate life. Speaking of the intolerance of the Roman Church, Professor J. Wilhelm writes: "Such intolerance is essential to all that is, or moves, or lives, for tolerance of destructive elements within the organism amounts to suicide. Heretical sects are subject to the same law: they live or die in the measure they apply or neglect it."[3] Congregationalism is the standing disproof of this and of all similar contentions. Built up on tolerance as one of its constitutive principles, it manifests after more than three hundred years an undiminished standard of Christian attainment in thought and life, an undiminished capacity for Christian fellowship.[4] So far from this being a matter for surprise, for those who believe in the Holy Spirit's guidance it ought, of course, to appear the most natural thing in the world.

However long it may take some Christians to see it, the fact remains that the Congregational basis is the only one on which can be built a reunited Church which shall be at one and the same time both Christian and comprehensive. Canon Rawlinson, in sketching his "vision of the Church of Christ on earth as it might be hereafter," describes a system "free, elastic, evangelical, and genuinely Catholic," in which room will be found for the positive contributions of all, and "there will be no constraint save that of love. Strong in the power and in the confidence of truth, the Church will be able to afford to abstain from excommunicating men for heresy, and to prefer the rational authority of consensus to the dragooned uniformity secured by discipline at the price of schism."[5] Now these truly beautiful words are an exact description of what would result from the universal acceptance of the Congregational principle and basis, and not otherwise. And precisely the same may be said of the reasonable plea of reunionists generally, that in the future it ought to be possible for Christian societies with special 'concerns' to remain within the Church instead of separating from it.

It is, of course, perfectly true that not all Congregationalists have

[1] *Christian World*, 17 Dec. 1925, 8. In an earlier letter (*op. cit.* 26 Nov. 1925, 8) he rightly observes: "surely Congregationalism does not deny our membership in the One Holy Catholic Church, or exclude us from the communion of saints."

[2] The Society of Friends shares it in a rather more attenuated outward form.

[3] *Cath. Encyc.* vii (1910) 261 f.

[4] Cf. Carlyle, *Heroes*, lect. iv: "And now I venture to assert, that the exercise of private judgment, faithfully gone about, does by no means necessarily end in selfish independence, isolation; but rather ends necessarily in the opposite of that."

[5] Rawlinson, *Authority*, 183–187.

clear ideas regarding the principles of their denomination. The development of certain average types of theological outlook, method of worship, and so forth, within the Congregational churches, misleads many into supposing that these doubtless valuable developments are of the essence of Congregationalism. When therefore there arises in their midst an individual minister who—in the course of adventurous search after a fuller unity with the Church Universal—adopts modes of worship and expresses theological views widely different from those that have long been customary among them, many are alarmed, and cry out that Congregationalism has no room for such a man. When these people are faced with the Congregational principle of liberty, they begin asking whether liberty ought to develop into licence, whether it has no limits, whether Congregationalism stands for nothing but liberty, and so on. They show thereby that they regard Congregationalism simply as an exclusive sect, ensuring their *dis*association from all who differ from them, and its principle of liberty as nothing other than a liberal, but limited, margin on either side of an average praxis. They overlook the fact that, however unusual (from the Congregationalists' point of view) and however un-Protestant this particular minister's views and liturgy may appear, yet so long as he sincerely preaches the Gospel, preserves fellowship with his brethren, and is willing to join them at their Communion-Tables, to admit to his own all who come to it in the Lord's name, and to give the right-hand of fellowship to all who profess faith in Christ, his right to a place within the Congregational community is absolutely unimpeachable. To say this is, of course, to express no opinion as to the wisdom or otherwise of the ceremonial in question, or as to the truth or error of the doctrines that accompany it. These may be fit subjects for brotherly discussion, possibly even remonstrance: but to complain of them as a breach of Congregational principle points to a confusion between the essence and the customary forms of Congregationalism. The confusion is the more to be regretted, seeing that the essence thus obscured is the priceless treasure of a genuine Christian catholicity.[1]

In regard to the precise status of the Christian ministry, there cannot be said to be any one universally accepted Free-Church or even Congregationalist view. Opinions range from that of the Quakers, who, though appointing particular men to particular pieces of work, and even to particular offices, reject the idea of a regular ministerial class altogether, to that of the Wesleyan Methodists, whose view approximates closely to that of the Church of England. What is usually regarded as the traditional Congregationalist view is that the minister is simply a member

[1] See the correspondence on the subject of Dr. Orchard's position, in *Christian World*, 29 Oct.–17 Dec. 1925, and 26 May–23 June 1927.

of the Church who has been specially called of God to serve the local church as its leader, has responded to that call, and has accordingly been recognized, ordained, and set apart by the church, which delegates to him the functions of its own ministerial office. While therefore it is acknowledged that the highest honour is due to the sanctity of the minister's calling, yet it is maintained that the primary office-bearer is the church itself, and that therefore it is perfectly permissible for the church to entrust the fulfilment of any ministerial function (such as the administration of the Sacraments), if occasion requires, to one of its own lay-members (of either sex).[1] This theory of the ministry has the advantage of securing due recognition for the specially sacred nature of the minister's calling without involving any corresponding violation of the principle—fundamental to the essential Free-Church position—of the priesthood of all believers.[2] It is only a half-truth, if not a travesty, to say that, according to this theory, there is no difference between a minister and a layman.[3] At the same time, Free-Churchmen need to be constantly on their guard lest, in the effort to correct that travesty,[4] they forget the cardinal truth that all Christian believers are priests, and are therefore called to lead consecrated lives of service and of leadership.

Another task in which the Free Churches will be able to render special assistance is the reconstruction of Christian doctrine. Their steady insistence on freedom for individual thought and utterance, and the refusal of their most representative constituent bodies to adopt a credal test of membership, are indeed dangerous positions to take up, for not only do they expose such groups to the mistaken charge of having no use at all for doctrine as such,[5] but they do actually help to generate (if not carefully watched and supplemented) a certain unconcern in the rank and file of the Church as regards the doctrinal implications of our faith. As has already been remarked, the Free Churches have not been unaffected by the natural man's disinclination for specifically theological matters.[6] Nevertheless, the fundamental Protestant principle of freedom, i.e. freedom from the binding obligation to accept our neighbour's opinion touching the infallibility of certain objective and external standards, does give the Free-Church scholar a somewhat specially favourable vantage-ground for the elaboration

[1] Cf. Dale, *Manual of Cong. Principles*, 91–119; Selbie, *Freedom*, 20–26, 31.

[2] See above, p. 412. Cf. Glover, *Reunion*, 39–46, 56.

[3] It would thus be rather by way of supplement than of direct denial, that one would reply to Canon Rawlinson's incisive words: "Protestants (with the exception of the 'High Church' party among the Scotch Presbyterians) regard the whole conception of validity of orders as unmeaning" (*Foundations*, 395 n. 2).

[4] See, for emphatic protests against it, Forsyth, *Ch. and Sacraments*, 123 f; J. D. Jones, *Validity*, 24 f.

[5] See above, pp. 245–247.

[6] See above, pp. 679 f.

of doctrinal truth. The claim may seem a stark absurdity in the eyes of Catholics, for whom the endless variety of Protestant theological opinion patently discredits the freedom from which it has sprung, and who regard it as axiomatic that all theology must begin its building on the foundation of the œcumenical creeds and that it would be sheer sacrilege to go behind them.[1] But however desirable theological uniformity may seem to be in the interests of truth, yet it is doubtful in the first place whether the doctrinal variations complained of are as evil in their effects as they are often judged to be. Like the disunion of the Church's organization, they have the great incidental advantage of making room for the free expansion of individual and sectional effort, which would be lost if all were compelled to march in step.[2] And in the second place, of what use is it to escape doctrinal variations by arbitrarily and unphilosophically choosing a particular external authority, and acclaiming it as infallible? So far as one can persuade men to agree in this course, one secures uniformity, but only at the cost of blocking up the way to truth. No one would dream of erecting an infallible authority in history or science: men look to the objective data, not to an infallible expert, as the proper corrective for error. So in theology, freedom from the infallibilities does not leave us defenceless against a riot of blundering, for we are still living under those Divine laws and in that Divinely governed universe which can and will safeguard earnest seekers for truth against lapse into final or fatal error.

Some of the newer exponents of Anglo-Catholicism undertake, at all events in their apologetic, to abandon frankly the characteristically Catholic doctrine of the infallibility of the Creeds, and to build up their system ab ovo by a process of reasoning. This marks a very great advance in Anglican teaching; but it does not yet quite do away with that timidity which is bound to attend doctrinal investigation, when a body of conclusions already lies before the investigator—conclusions with which he may disagree only at the peril of his consistency or of his reputation for orthodoxy. Such is the position, not of Anglo-Catholics and Anglicans alone, but of all who have persuaded themselves that this or that formulated doctrine is an 'articulum stantis vel cadentis Ecclesiæ.' With how many, for instance, has scientific enquiry into the life and ministry of our Lord been hampered, and the results of the most careful reasoning with regard to it rejected, because of the fear lest this or that conclusion should savour of unitarianism! The dread of unitarianism is allowed to hold up the search for truth and even to blot out the desire for it. A similar terror lest religious values be lost as a result of modern enquiry lies behind the declaration that modernism

[1] See above, pp. 62 f.

[2] See above, pp. 665 f.

"is a religion of the study which has little value in the outside world," and that "it is constructively impotent."[1] But now, if this or that doctrinal conclusion which we dread be really false, a candid, open-eyed, and untrammelled search for truth will show it to be false. The refusal to consider it an open question pending investigation is a mark of weakness, not of strength, in our faith. If on the other hand the conclusion we dread be true, what right have we to dread it?

Free-Churchmen are ready to acknowledge unreservedly that the impulse to frame creeds, i.e. to theorize as to the realities that lie behind our religious experiences, is not only a proper, but a God-given impulse.[2] But they would insist that the distinction between the religious experience itself and the intellectual account of it in theological terms must be carefully and faithfully maintained, in order that the quest for theological truth be not hampered by ascribing to traditional theologies that essentiality and sanctity which belong properly only to God's direct dealings with the soul.[3] And they would further insist that, where theological formulation takes us on to scientific, philosophical, or historical ground, the scientific, philosophical, and historical questions must be first investigated on their own merits, fearlessly and without prejudice, before being taken up as materials into a theological system.[4] To such an enterprise of doctrinal construction, every thoughtful Christian may hope to have something to contribute. The conclusions which are arrived at will be declaratory and authoritative, but not necessarily binding or permanent. Not necessarily binding—for the same reason that the agreed conclusions of science are not binding on the individual scientist: being scientifically arrived at and verifiable by comparison with the objective universe, the truth that is in them receives all the recognition it is entitled to, without any need for the assumption of infallibility. Not necessarily permanent—because truth is a greater thing than any human statement of it, and "the Lord hath yet more light and truth to break forth out of His holy Word." Finally, as regards our hope of success in this effort, that rests—not upon our being able to agree with the conciliar decisions of the Church—but upon our trust in that God who is able to overrule even the errors of men for good

[1] Moxon, *Modernism*, 9.

[2] See a beautiful passage to this effect in Origenes, *Princ.* II. xi. 4 (". . . Quod desiderium, quem amorem sine dubio a Deo nobis insitum credimus; et sicut oculus naturaliter lucem requirit et visum, et corpus nostrum escas et potum desiderat per naturam; ita mens nostra sciendae veritatis Dei et rerum causas noscendi proprium ac naturale desiderium gerit," etc., etc.). Cf. Bigg, *Christian Platonists* (ed. 1913) 189f; Harnack, *Hist. of Dogma* (Eng. trans.) i. 21–23.

[3] Cf. J. F. Bethune-Baker, *Christian Doctrine*, x; W. A. Curtis in *Hibb. Journ.* Jan. 1914, 321 f; K. Lake, *Stewardship of Faith*, 132; W. F. Halliday, *Reconciliation and Reality*, 25 n.

[4] See above, pp. 188, 194.

and in that Holy Spirit who makes it His task to lead us into all the truth.[1]

One further specific piece of service on the part of the Church remains to be noticed; and that is the formation of an adequate system of Christian ethics and its application to the problems of modern life. The time has long gone by when ethical questions received little notice in Christian pulpits, and when progressive attempts at social service found little sympathy with the leaders of the churches.[2] There has indeed been a widespread awakening of the Christian conscience, particularly in regard to the demands which Christ makes upon us in the spheres of our economic and political life. There yet remains, however, much to be done, first of all in making the new sense of responsibility as far-reaching and as weighty as possible. But over and above that, there is need for devising new and true answers to a whole mass of pressing questions concerning daily conduct. In order that this need may be met, the ethical teaching of Christian thinkers in the immediate future must be systematic and concrete in its form, social and international in its range, and rooted in our Lord's teaching and example as regards its content. They must not shrink from the age-long reproach, which has fallen indeed on casuistry as such, but ought to have fallen only on *bad* casuistry; they must persistently attempt to work out the Christian solutions of such problems as those affecting sex, war, the treatment of crime, health and disease, money-making and -spending, employing and being employed, voting and governing. Their casuistry will not be of the kind to help the individual to dodge his conscience or to shirk the labour of thinking out his own problems; nor will it ignore the tangled variableness of practical life, prolific in dilemmas and manifold perplexities. But it will aim at clarifying the moral issues involved in certain familiar problems characteristic of certain departments of life, so that Christian men involved in them may be helped towards a true analysis of the concrete difficulties with which they severally find themselves faced. It goes without saying that the Christian casuistry of the future will not be confined to man's private responsibilities in his home-life, and so on, but will embrace the whole of his moral life, as worker, trader, professional man, citizen: it will cover his relations with all his fellow-creatures, without distinction of race,

[1] Cf. Milman, *Latin Christianity*, i. 12 ("Human thought is almost compelled to assert, and cannot help asserting, its original freedom. And as that progress is manifestly a law of human nature, proceeding from the divine Author of our being, this self-adaptation of the one true religion to that progress must have the divine sanction, and may be supposed, without presumption, to have been contemplated in the counsels of Infinite Wisdom").

[2] For instances, cf. G. M. Trevelyan, *British History*, 53 n., 162, 227, 246, 281.

class, sex, as well as with the animals. And while it will not construct a code out of the sayings of Jesus, it will have to be founded in a very real and intimate way on the substance of His teaching. Those who are fond of saying that this teaching is not a law for Christians to obey, may well be asked to produce the grounds for their doubtless strongly-held views as to the content and binding character of the Christian sex-ethic. It is a fatal error not to give full weight to those grave words, with which our Lord completed His Sermon on the Mount, comparing the man who heard His teaching and did not practise it to a foolish man who built his house on the sand, only to have it collapse about his ears in the day of storm. At the same time, all must recognize that some of the specific questions that torment us to-day were not before Jesus in His earthly life: and the Christian teacher's work consists therefore in distilling from the story of that life the fundamental ethical principles that actuated it, and discovering how they apply to the conditions of to-day.

These remarks are not, of course, intended for a moment to suggest that Free-Churchmen are the only, or even the best, people to undertake such a task. Other Christian bodies are alive to the need.[1] It is the kind of task in which fitness for achievement will vary from man to man, and group to group, and problem to problem. All that is here claimed is that the Free Churches will be responsible for taking their share in the whole work; and it will be an important share. They have no monopoly or even priority of fitness for it: in certain respects they have a special advantage, though doubtless taking a second place in others. Their general freedom from the binding weight of tradition and from the trammels of dependence on the State, enables them to attack certain problems somewhat more boldly than their episcopalian allies. In the problem of war, for instance, radical opposition on Christian grounds has a better chance among Free-Churchmen than among members of a State-Church of being considered on its merits and, if approved, acted on. But the whole enterprise is one in which every section of the Church has some part to take which cannot be taken so well by any other.

It is only when we step back from the details of our discussing and contending, that we can see the whole question in its right context—the context which alone makes the details worth worrying about. The times give much cause for anxiety. Men hardly know whether to expect a religious revival or a general flood of scepticism. The so-called 'transition-stage' seems never to be over. Many of the old landmarks

[1] Cf. e.g. *Lux Mundi*, appx. I; L. Phillips in *Priests' Convention*, 57 f, 63; F. G. Belton, *ibid.* 167 f; Leach, *ibid.* 197.

are gone, and the new seem to be few in number and often difficult to discern.

> But now the old is out of date,
> The new is not yet born.

This long exposition of an individual Christian's views might seem strangely irrelevant to the seething unsettlement of the days we live in. Things will surely go on just as before. Yet fresh outlooks do sometimes grow out of individual efforts. The situation to-day has to be looked at in its full historical context; and of that, God Himself is controller. To wrestle with difficulties, to wring solutions from them, to test and sift what one has wrung—all this will give results, not final indeed, but (if God has inspired and aided the struggle) as definite and as true as we need and as we can yet use. If truth has been reached, others will see it and accept it: if it has been missed, the missing of it here may perchance subserve the finding of it by another. Of two things at least there can be no doubt. God must and will bless a sincere love and search for Truth; and secondly, inasmuch as God inspires and answers prayer, it is by exploring further the life of prayer in all our doing and thinking that we shall best fulfil His Will. So may the Church of Jesus Christ, despised for her faults and ignored despite her virtues by a world which knows not how much it owes to her, go on from strength to strength to establish her Master's Kingdom, served and upheld in the struggle by the prayers and strivings of all His disciples.

> I love Thy kingdom, Lord,
> The house of Thine abode,
> The Church our blest Redeemer saved
> With His own precious blood.
>
> I love Thy Church, O God;
> Her walls before Thee stand,
> Dear as the apple of Thine eye,
> And graven on Thy hand.
>
> For her my tears shall fall,
> For her my prayers ascend,
> To her my cares and toils be given,
> Till toils and cares shall end.

INDICES

GENERAL INDEX

THIS Index is not exhaustive, but is intended to serve merely as a supplement to the Detailed Table of Contents, the List of Abbreviations, and the Index of Biblical Passages. Names of places and of modern writers are for the most part not included. In regard to notation, a plain figure indicates a page of this book; a raised figure a footnote on the page whose number immediately precedes; f between a page-number and a footnote-number indicates a footnote that extends on to the following page; n. following a page-number, refers to a footnote that is carried over from the previous page. The page or note given does not always contain the actual word against which it is entered, but always refers to the thing or person which the word indicates.

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